United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
2d 858
Gorko, an enlisted man in the United States Air Force, was charged with
murder in violation of Art. 118, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).1
The offense occurred on May 27, 1960, and the charge was filed on June 2,
1960. Trial before a general court-martial began on October 11, 1960, and on
October 14, 1960, a finding of guilty of unpremeditated murder was returned.
Gorko was sentenced to dishonorable discharge, total forfeiture, and
Gorko contends that as his term of enlistment has expired the military
authorities had no jurisdiction to subject him to a second court-martial. We
disagree. At the time of the offense Gorko was an enlisted member of the Air
Force and subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.7 Jurisdiction was
then present and it was not lost by the subsequent change in the accused's
status.8
The government urges that the question of right to speedy trial is not before us
because that question must be first raised in and determined by the military
tribunals. Cases may arise in which resort to habeas corpus may be proper
because of the denial of speedy trial, but this is not one of them. The right to a
speedy trial is relative and must be determined in the light of all the
circumstances of each case.9 From the inception of the prosecution the
proceedings were carried out in conformity with the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and without any purposeful or oppressive delay.10 The time reasonably
consumed in the use of the procedures which are designed to protect the rights
of the accused and to which no objection is raised forms no basis for a claim of
undue delay.
Turning to the claim of double jeopardy, we are concerned with the facts as
they were when the trial court acted.11 At that time the second court-martial had
not been convened. Exhaustion of all available military remedies is required
before reliance may be had on habeas corpus.12 The Uniform Code of Military
Justice provides that no person, without his consent, may be tried a second time
for the same offense.13 The adequacy and availability of the military remedy is
not questioned. Consideration of the question by the courts is, accordingly,
premature.
Affirmed.
10 U.S.C. 918
10 U.S.C. 860-864
10 U.S.C. 866(b)
10 U.S.C. 867(b)(2)
Bennett v. Davis, 10 Cir., 267 F.2d 15, 17. See also Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S.
137, 140-142, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508; Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103,
110-111, 70 S.Ct. 495, 94 L.Ed. 691
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 383, 22 S.Ct. 181, 46 L.Ed. 236. Cf. Lee
v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228, 231, 79 S.Ct. 276, 3 L.Ed.2d 260
Day v. Davis, 10 Cir., 235 F.2d 379, 385, certiorari denied, 352 U.S. 881, 77
S.Ct. 104, 1 L.Ed.2d 81
10
See Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393
11
Dean v. United States, 8 Cir., 30 F.2d 523. Cf. Tilghman v. Hunter, 10 Cir., 168
F.2d 946
12
Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131, 71 S.Ct. 149, 95 L.Ed. 146
13