United States v. Augustine Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 2d Cir. (1983)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Augustine Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 2d Cir. (1983)
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Scribd Government Docs704 F.
2d 675
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,
v.
Augustine GUIDO, Appellant.
No. 823, Docket 82-1356.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued Feb. 1, 1983.
Decided March 31, 1983.
Anne Feigus, New York City (Ronald P. Fischetti, New York City, of
counsel), for appellant.
Ephraim Savitt, Asst. U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Raymond J.
Dearie, U.S. Atty., E.D.N.Y., Jane Simkin Smith, Asst. U.S. Atty.,
Brooklyn, N.Y., of counsel), for appellee.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, KEARSE, Circuit Judge and RE, Chief
Judge, United States Court of International Trade.*
FEINBERG, Chief Judge:
Augustine Guido appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York, I. Leo Glasser, J., following a jury trial.
Guido was convicted of distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec.
841, and conspiracy to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. He
was sentenced to eight years in prison, to be followed by ten years' special
parole.
In April 1982, appellant was arrested in a friend's apartment by five DEA
agents. The agents informed Guido that he was under arrest for having violated
the federal narcotics laws, and read him his Miranda rights. Guido indicated
that he understood his rights, and requested that he be allowed to call his
attorney before leaving the apartment. The agents refused, but permitted him to
ask a friend who was present to make the call for him. Guido was then taken to
the Eastern District courthouse for processing. Guido asked during the ride
what the arrest was about, and was again told that it was a narcotics arrest. He
was also told that he should consider cooperating with the authorities in their
investigation, and that he should discuss the possibility of cooperation with his
attorney.
3
After reaching the courthouse, Guido was taken to an interview room for
processing, which includes the taking of photographs, fingerprints, and a
personal history. At this point, a DEA agent told Guido the arrest involved the
sale of heroin. Guido asked the time and location of the sale and was told it
occurred the previous summer in the area of Court Street in Brooklyn. Guido
then asked if the sale took place at a candy store, and when the agent answered
that it did, Guido exclaimed: "Oh Christ. Okay. I knew that one was trouble."
According to Guido, this statement was obtained in violation of his Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights, and should have been suppressed prior to trial. The
introduction of the statement into evidence forms the basis for Guido's appeal.
As an initial matter, we note that the incident at issue took place shortly after
appellant's arrest and prior to his arraignment and indictment. Since the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only after the filing of formal charges,
appellant's incriminating statement, if protected at all, is protected by the Fifth
Amendment rather than the Sixth. See United States v. Duvall, 537 F.2d 15,
20-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 3173, 49 L.Ed.2d 1188
(1976).
Guido's Fifth Amendment claim turns on whether his incriminating statement
was volunteered or the product of interrogation. It is undisputed that when
Guido was taken into custody, he requested the assistance of counsel before he
made the statement at issue. Judge Glasser found at the suppression hearing
that the defendant requested an attorney at least twice, and possibly as many as
five times. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the arresting agents were
not entitled to question Guido about the case. As the Supreme Court stated in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1627, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966), "[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present." But it is also clear that voluntary
statements made by a suspect who understands his rights are not prohibited:
6 fundamental import of the privilege while an individual is in custody is not
The
whether he is allowed to talk to the police without the benefit of warnings and
counsel, but whether he can be interrogated.... Volunteered statements of any kind
are not barred by the Fifth Amendment ....
Id. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630; see also United States v. Carpenter, 611 F.2d 113,
7
117 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922, 100 S.Ct. 3013, 65 L.Ed.2d 1114
(1980) (spontaneous, unprovoked incriminating statement is admissible).
The standard for determining whether a statement is the product of
interrogation is outlined in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100
S.Ct. 1682, 1689-1690, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980) (footnotes omitted):
We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in
custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.
This is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
10
In Innis, a suspect volunteered to show police the location of a shotgun after
hearing several officers discuss the possibility that children attending a nearby
school for the handicapped might find the gun and accidentally injure
themselves. The Court held that there was no "express questioning" and that the
officers could not have known that the conversation was likely to trigger an
incriminating response, since there was no suggestion that the officers were
aware that Innis was "peculiarly susceptible" to such an appeal. Innis, supra,
446 U.S. at 302, 100 S.Ct. at 1690. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
officers' conversation did not constitute interrogation.
11
Appellant does not contend that he was subject to express questioning, but
rather that he was subject to its "functional equivalent." He argues that the
discussion of cooperation initiated by the agents while transporting him to the
Eastern District was intended to elicit incriminating information and was
inherently a form of interrogation. Appellant claims that his subsequent
statements in the courthouse must be viewed in this context. At the very least,
Guido argues, his incriminating statement was a foreseeable result of the
agents' conduct, and therefore inadmissible under Innis.
12
We are not persuaded by these arguments. We do not accept the proposition
that a discussion of cooperation is inherently a form of questioning for purposes
of Miranda. Cf. United States v. Thierman, 678 F.2d 1331, 1336-37 (9th
Cir.1982) (officers' discussion of possible consequences of suspect's failure to
cooperate held not to constitute interrogation even though one officer "guessed"
he was attempting to get suspect to respond); United States v. Hart, 619 F.2d
325 (4th Cir.1980) (per curiam). Nor is there sufficient reason on this record to
reverse the conclusion of the trial judge that Guido's statement was not the
product of interrogation. While the agents did suggest that Guido cooperate in
the investigation, they apparently also told him he should discuss this
possibility with his attorney, and they indicated that Guido would not be
questioned about the case at that time. There is no indication that the agents'
conduct was "designed to elicit an incriminating response," Innis, supra, 446
U.S. at 302 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 7, or that Guido was "peculiarly
susceptible" to an appeal to cooperate, id. at 302, 100 S.Ct. at 1690.
13
During the discussion at the courthouse, the agents merely supplied Guido with
general information regarding the crime he was suspected of committing, in
response to Guido's own questions. The Fourth Circuit has held that Miranda
does not bar police from answering a suspect's questions about a crime alleged,
even after he has requested counsel, and that if the suspect then makes a formal
waiver and confession it is admissible. See United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d
942, 947-48 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 908, 97 S.Ct. 2955, 53 L.Ed.2d
1081 (1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Whitehead v. United States,
435 U.S. 912, 98 S.Ct. 1463, 55 L.Ed.2d 502 (1978). Moreover, other courts, in
finding that a suspect validly waived his Fifth Amendment rights, have held
that furnishing a suspect with details of the evidence against him after he has
requested counsel does not constitute interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 366-68 (9th
Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099, 97 S.Ct. 1118, 51 L.Ed.2d 546 (1977);
United States v. Hodge, 487 F.2d 945, 946-47 (5th Cir.1973) (per curiam); cf.
United States v. Boston, 508 F.2d 1171, 1175 (2d Cir.1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 1001, 95 S.Ct. 2401, 44 L.Ed.2d 669 (1975). A fortiori, the officers'
responses to Guido's questions, even when viewed in light of the earlier
suggestion that he cooperate, do not amount to interrogation. Since we agree
with the trial judge that Guido's incriminating statement was volunteered, and
not the product of interrogation, we need not consider the government's
powerful argument that the statement was merely cumulative in light of the
overwhelming evidence of Guido's guilt.
14
Appellant urges us to adopt the "New York rule," which prohibits an
uncounseled waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege "once a suspect in
custody requests the assistance of counsel" or once "formal adversary
proceedings" have begun. People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 424
N.Y.S.2d 421, 400 N.E.2d 360 (1980); cf. People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154,
412 N.Y.S.2d 874, 385 N.E.2d 612 (1978). But the New York rule is based on
the state, not the federal, constitution. See Cunningham, supra, 49 N.Y.2d at
207, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 400 N.E.2d 360. Further, as noted earlier, this court has
held that the right to counsel does not attach on the filing of a complaint and the
issuance of an arrest warrant. Duvall, supra, 537 F.2d at 22. In any event, the
New York rule does not proscribe a " 'spontaneous', blurted-out admission" of
the sort at issue here. See Cunningham, supra, 49 N.Y.2d at 210 n. 2, 424
N.Y.S.2d 421, 400 N.E.2d 360. Accordingly, we do not find the New York
rule, or its policy basis, applicable to this case.
15
Although we find that Guido's statement was not rendered inadmissible by the
Fifth Amendment privilege, we note that the DEA agents in this case appear to
have been unduly slow in granting Guido's repeated requests to call his attorney.
Legitimate security concerns may have prompted the arresting agents to deny
Guido's initial request to call his attorney while still at the apartment where he
was arrested. But we see no valid reasons apart from administrative
convenience to prevent a suspect from calling his attorney once he is brought to
a courthouse for processing. In our view, the accused's interest in obtaining the
prompt assistance of counsel outweighs any such administrative concerns. In
this case, we see no substantial evidence in the record to suggest that the
officers delayed Guido's access to an attorney in the hope that he might
incriminate himself. Moreover, Guido was allowed to call his attorney within
approximately one to one-and-a-half hours of his arrest. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say that the delay was egregious. Nonetheless, we
think the better procedure would have been to permit Guido to call his attorney
on Guido's arrival at the Eastern District courthouse, and we expect that such
requests will be so honored in the future.
16
We have considered all of appellant's arguments, and they do not persuade us to
reverse. Judgment affirmed.
Honorable Edward D. Re, Chief Judge, United States Court of International
Trade, sitting by designation
