United States v. Tabares, Francia AKA "Titora," "Chickie" Francia Tabares, 86 F.3d 326, 3rd Cir. (1996)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Tabares, Francia AKA "Titora," "Chickie" Francia Tabares, 86 F.3d 326, 3rd Cir. (1996)
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Scribd Government Docs86 F.
3d 326
UNITED STATES of America
v.
TABARES, Francia aka "Titora," "Chickie" Francia Tabares,
Appellant.
No. 95-5509.
United States Court of Appeals,
Third Circuit.
Argued May 23, 1996.
Decided June 19, 1996.
Michael N. Pedicini (argued), Morristown, NJ, for Appellant.
Faith S. Hochberg, United States Attorney, Henry Klingeman (argued),
Assistant United States Attorney, Kevin McNulty, Office of United States
Attorney, Newark, NJ, for Appellee.
Before SLOVITER, Chief Judge, SAROKIN and OAKES* , Circuit
Judges.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Chief Judge.
I.
1
Francia Tabares was one of the defendants charged in a three-count
Superseding Indictment on August 23, 1994, for their participation in a drug
distribution ring. Tabares was charged in Count One with conspiracy to
distribute and possession with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846, and in Count Two
with conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute marijuana
in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. She was not named in Count
Three, which charged a conspiracy to import cocaine.
Tabares pleaded guilty to Count One of the Superseding Indictment on March
Tabares pleaded guilty to Count One of the Superseding Indictment on March
28, 1995, and thereafter the court dismissed Count Two on motion of the
government. In the plea agreement, the government and Tabares stipulated that
if Tabares continued to recognize and affirmatively accept personal
responsibility for her criminal conduct, she would be entitled to a two-point
reduction in the overall offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a); that
pursuant to 3E1.1(b)(1), she would be entitled to an additional decrease of one
level for timely notifying the authorities of her intention to enter a plea of
guilty; and that "the applicable guideline range for [her was] 50 to 150
kilograms of cocaine," resulting in an offense level of 36, pursuant to U.S.S.G.
2D1.1(c)(5). PSR p 44.
The Probation Office used 2D1.1(c)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines to
calculate Tabares' base offense level at 36, from which she received a threelevel downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. This yielded a total
offense level of 33. Her criminal history category was I; thus, Tabares'
guideline range was 135 to 168 months' imprisonment. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A.
The district court imposed a sentence of 168 months' imprisonment, to be
followed by a term of 5 years of supervised release.
II.
4
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated:
Ms. Tabares, I've reviewed your record, and, frankly, it is not a record that one
would say confers good standing on someone before this Court.
You know, for someone who allegedly is remorseful and respects the law, you
said that the last time. You had an opportunity once before: You were
convicted of a drug offense, you were sentenced to prison. You had an
opportunity to learn what it means to be restricted of your freedom and to be
away from your children, your family.
And you didn't learn from that experience.
And in reading the presentence report, it indicates that you were less than
candid with the Probation Officer who prepared the report. Some places, you
indicated you had a lapse of memory, but the overall view that a reader comes
away with is that you're less than a candid individual.
And there is really not much mercy that this Court feels in your situation.
10
Supp.App. at 13 (emphasis added). The court also spoke about the harm
wreaked on purchasers of drugs by such criminal activity.
11
The court explained its decision to impose the maximum sentence as follows:
12
I imposed a sentence on the higher end of the guideline because you are not a
first offender before this Court, and because of your prior drug offense, and
because of your lack of candor with the Probation Department.
13
I do not think that you are remorseful. And this is not the sentence that calls for
the imposition of mercy.
14
Supp.App. at 15.
15
Neither Tabares' counsel nor the prosecutor corrected the court's statement that
Tabares had previously been convicted and served time behind bars.
Apparently, this first came to light in this case in the supplemental brief filed by
counsel for Tabares in this court when he sought leave to withdraw the brief he
had filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18
L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). At that time, defense counsel called to our attention the
significant fact that Tabares had two prior arrests, but no prior convictions. The
government does not disagree with these facts. Thus, we must decide what
action is appropriate under these circumstances.
16
Tabares requests this court to remand for resentencing on the ground that the
district court's statement demonstrates that the court sentenced Tabares in
reliance on false or unreliable information, in violation of her due process
rights. The government responds that although the district court's statement at
sentencing regarding a prior conviction was technically incorrect, Tabares was
not prejudiced by the error and therefore we should not remand for
resentencing. Because Tabares did not raise this issue in the district court, we
review the district court's sentence for plain error. See United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 731-37, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).
17
To meet the plain error standard, Tabares must demonstrate an "error" that is
not only "plain" but also "affect[s] substantial rights." Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). An
error will usually be considered to have affected substantial rights when it is
prejudicial and affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. United
States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 897 (3d Cir.1994) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 734,
113 S.Ct. at 1777-78), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1716, 131 L.Ed.2d
575 (1995). The Supreme Court has instructed that "Rule 52(b) leaves the
decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of
appeals." Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. at 1776. In Turcks, we said we
would exercise our discretion "where the defendant is actually innocent, or
where, regardless of the defendant's innocence or guilt, the error 'seriously
affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' "
Turcks, 41 F.3d at 897 (emphasis added) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113
S.Ct. at 1776-77).
18
In Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 1255, 92 L.Ed. 1690
(1948), the Supreme Court stated that sentencing a defendant on the basis of
assumptions concerning his criminal record which are materially untrue,
"whether caused by carelessness or design, is inconsistent with due process of
law, and such a conviction cannot stand." In other cases, the courts have
remanded for resentencing when the district court relied upon erroneous or
unreliable facts or inferences at sentencing. See United States v. Tucker, 404
U.S. 443, 447-49, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591-93, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) (remand for
resentencing because sentencing court had relied on two convictions later found
unconstitutional as a result of defendant's lack of representation); United States
v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.1982) ("[A]s a matter of due process,
factual matters may be considered as a basis for sentence only if they have
some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation."); see also Moore
v. United States, 571 F.2d 179, 183 (3d Cir.1978) ("[A] defendant should not
be sentenced on the basis of information about him that is materially
incorrect....").
19
Tabares contends that her sentence violated due process because the district
court relied upon the erroneous assumption that she had been convicted of a
drug crime, whereas the record shows only that she has been arrested twice
before but shows no prior convictions. Thus, she argues that she is entitled to
resentencing. The government does not allege that it would suffer any prejudice
should this case be remanded for resentencing. Instead it argues that the district
court expressed "more than sufficient reasons" to impose the sentence it did,
apart from its misstatement. Brief of Appellee at 26. It notes that the written
judgment entered by the district court sets forth the following reasons: "Prior
drug arrests--not first offender, lack of candor with the probation office; not
remorseful." App. at 38.
20
Although Tabares argues she should be viewed as "a first offender," the
presentence report, which Tabares did not challenge, referred to two prior
arrests for drug offenses. The report refers to but gives little detail about an
arrest in California in 1986 on a charge of Transport/Sale of Narcotics. It states
that Tabares' husband was convicted and imprisoned for his involvement but
that disposition as to her was unknown. The report also records a second arrest
in 1991 in Arizona on similar grounds when she was charged in a two-count
indictment relating to narcotics. The Arizona charge was brought after she was
found driving a truck that carried almost 20 kilograms of cocaine. After
Tabares was released on bond, she fled to avoid prosecution. PSR p 71. At the
time she pled guilty in this case, she was still a fugitive from Arizona
authorities. Id.
21
Although the government expresses confidence that the district court, looking
at Tabares' prior record including her flight from Arizona and her lack of
remorse, would "unquestionably ... reimpose precisely the same sentence," we
do not have any basis to cut short the defendant's right to be sentenced on the
basis of accurate facts, particularly because the district court stressed that
Tabares had failed to learn from her prior time served. See Supp.App. at 13. As
the Supreme Court stated:
22 are not at liberty to assume that items given such emphasis by the sentencing
We
court, did not influence the sentence which the prisoner is now serving.
23
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. at 740-41, 68 S.Ct. at 1255.
24
We need not decide today whether every situation in which a district court
relied on a mistaken belief about a prior conviction would require resentencing.
We merely hold that under the circumstances presented here, Tabares is entitled
to be resentenced based on accurate information as to her prior record.
25
In remanding for resentencing, we believe it is important to note that the district
court did not get the help from counsel to which it was entitled. Defense
counsel has conceded that he failed to pick up the misstatement as to Tabares'
prior conviction. The Assistant United States Attorney explained at oral
argument before us that fourteen defendants were being sentenced within three
days, which may explain the scenario under which these events occurred. We
note, however, that the government counsel, as well as defense counsel, has a
responsibility to assure that the district court is relying on accurate facts. See
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314
(1935).
26
In any event, we are satisfied that a remand is not only in the interest of justice
for Tabares but helps to promote the public's confidence in the judicial system's
willingness to do justice. Of course, we do not make any observations or
suggestions about the resentencing itself, leaving that to the district court.
III.
27
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentence of the district court and
remand for resentencing.
Hon. James L. Oakes, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, sitting by designation
