International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation v. Local 400, Professional, Technical and Salaried Division, International Union of Electrical, Radio and MacHine Workers, Afl-Cio, 290 F.2d 581, 3rd Cir. (1961)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government DocsInternational Telephone and Telegraph Corporation v. Local 400, Professional, Technical and Salaried Division, International Union of Electrical, Radio and MacHine Workers, Afl-Cio, 290 F.2d 581, 3rd Cir. (1961)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government Docs290 F.
2d 581
INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
CORPORATION
v.
LOCAL 400, PROFESSIONAL, TECHNICAL AND
SALARIED DIVISION, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS, AFLCIO, Appellant.
No. 13434.
United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.
Argued May 1, 1961.
Decided May 19, 1961.
Sidney Reitman, Newark, N. J. (Kapelsohn, Lerner, Leuchter & Reitman,
Newark, N. J., on the brief), for defendant-appellant.
Walter P. Loomis, Jr., Chicago, Ill. (James E. Fagan, Yauch & Fagan,
Newark, N. J., Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., on
the brief), for plaintiff-appellee.
Before GOODRICH, STALEY and FORMAN, Circuit Judges.
STALEY, Circuit Judge.
This appeal involves the question of the arbitrability, under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement, of a dispute that has arisen between the ITT
Laboratories ("company"), a division of the International Telephone and
Telegraph Corporation, appellee, and Local 400, Professional, Technical and
Salaried Division, International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine
Workers, AFL-CIO, the appellant ("union").
In the latter part of 1959, the company requested four of its employees, who are
also members of the union, to apply for voluntary retirement under pension
plans then in effect. Upon their refusal to do so, the company terminated their
employment and began making pension payments.
The union took the position that such terminations of employment constituted
violations of the collective bargaining agreement. Thereafter, it unsuccessfully
filed a grievance and then requested arbitration. The company, maintaining that
the matter was not arbitrable, instituted an action for declaratory judgment in
the district court, where arbitration was refused. D.C.D.N.J.1960, 184 F.Supp.
866.
Three decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in 1960,1 followed soon
thereafter by two opinions authored by Judge Goodrich for this court,2 formed
the basis for our holding in International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v.
Local 400, 3 Cir., 1960, 286 F.2d 329, 330-331, where, in summing up the role
of the federal judiciary in disputes arising under labor contracts containing
arbitration clauses, we said:
"* * * These decisions make it abundantly clear that the judicial function is
narrowly circumscribed in cases such as this where the parties have agreed to
submit to arbitration disputes arising under their collective bargaining
agreement. That function is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking
arbitration is making a claim which on its face is one governed by the
agreement. A court cannot pass on the merits of the claim. That is the
arbitrator's function."
The union contends that the so-called retirement of the four employees
constituted in effect a discharge which Article XIV3 of the agreement prohibits
except in those cases where an employee's conduct or performance prove to be
unsatisfactory. The company's answer to that is that Article XIV can only be
invoked where an employee is discharged allegedly because of "unsatisfactory
performance or conduct," and not where he is retired under a pension plan, and
that in any event, it has an absolute and unconditional right to discharge
employees under Article XVIII4 of the agreement, absent a specific provision in
that agreement to the contrary.
In recent but unrelated litigation between the company and the union, this court
in International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v. Local 400, 3 Cir., 286 F.2d
329, 331, in referring to an arbitration and no-strike clause identical to that
before us, said:
"Here, the agreement contains a no-strike clause, together with a broad
arbitration clause whereby `The Union, desiring to submit a matter to
arbitration shall notify the Company in writing within the * * * thirty day
period.' Under this provision, any dispute between the company and the union
requiring the interpretation and application of the agreement is a `matter,' as
that term is used in the arbitration clause, subject to arbitration. We are fortified
in arriving at this conclusion by the fact that the agreement itself specifically
exempts from the reach of the clause disputes in certain areas not even remotely
related to that which is asserted here. Thus, we have here clear and
unambiguous exceptions to an otherwise sweeping arbitration clause."
9
It is indubitably clear that the dispute between the parties is subject to
arbitration. Even a passing examination of their contentions establishes the
existence of a dispute which on its face is governed by and necessitates an
interpretation and application of the agreement. Whether the company has the
right to unilaterally retire an employee once he reaches the age of 65 will
require an interpretation and application of the various provisions in the
agreement relied on by the union and the company. Is the company correct
when it asserts that it has an unqualified right to terminate employment under
the "management rights" clause except where the agreement provides to the
contrary? These and other questions may be pressed before the arbitrator, but
certainly they are beyond our jurisdiction.
10
We have examined the other contentions pressed and find them without merit.
11
The judgment of the district court will be reversed and the cause remanded for
further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Notes:
1
United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 1960, 363
U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1363, 4 L.Ed.2d 1432; United Steelworkers of America v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 1960, 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d
1409; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 1960,
363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424
International Molders and Foundry Workers Union, etc. v. Susquehanna
Casting Co., 3 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 80; Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 3 Cir., 1960, 283 F.2d 93
Article XIV reads as follows:
"Section 1. Discharge of employees for unsatisfactory conduct or performance
shall be effected in accordance with the warning procedure set forth below:
"(a) A written notice concerning his deficiency shall be given to the employee
concerned.
"(b) If there is no improvement within a reasonable time, the employee shall be
given a second written warning notice and will be allowed a sufficient
opportunity to improve.
"(c) A copy of each warning notice shall be given to the Union.
"(d) No employee may be discharged based upon two successive written
warnings when the interim between the warnings exceeds three months.
"Section 2. The Company shall discuss with the Union the contemplated
discharge of an employee before the discharge takes place.
"Section 3. No warning need be given to an employee in the case of discharge
for good and sufficient cause requiring summary action. The Union shall be
notified immediately of any such discharge."
4
Article XVIII, the so-called "management rights" clause, reads as follows:
"Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the management of the Company
and the direction of the working force, including the right to hire, promote,
transfer, suspend or discharge employees, and the right to lay off employees
because of lack of work or other legitimate reason, is vested exclusively in the
Company; but such rights shall not be employed for purposes of discrimination
against the employee because of bona fide activities on behalf of the Union or
because of race, creed, color, sex, national origin or political belief."
