U.S. of America v. Glenn Alin Martinoff, 972 F.2d 343, 4th Cir. (1992)
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Scribd Government DocsU.S. of America v. Glenn Alin Martinoff, 972 F.2d 343, 4th Cir. (1992)
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Scribd Government Docs972 F.
2d 343
NOTICE: Fourth Circuit I.O.P. 36.6 states that citation of
unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing
res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires
service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth
Circuit.
U.S. of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Glenn Alin MARTINOFF, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 92-5093.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: June 11, 1992
Decided: August 3, 1992
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
North Carolina, at Wilmington. W. Earl Britt, District Judge. (CR-91-407)
Michael Murchison, Murchison, Taylor, Kendrick, Gibson & Davenport,
Wilmington, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Margaret P. Currin, United States Attorney, John Bowler, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina; Thomas E. Booth,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
E.D.N.C.
Affirmed.
Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Glen Alin Martinoff appeals from his jury conviction of bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). Because we find that
the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict and because we find that
the trial court's order in regard to peremptory challenges was harmless error, if
error at all, we affirm.
The parties stipulated before trial that Appellant entered a savings and loan
insured by the FDIC and removed $4734 from teller drawers in the presence of
three bank employees and a customer. The only disputed issue at trial was
whether Appellant's conduct was sufficient to establish intimidation under
2113(a).
All three bank employees testified that Appellant leaped over a gate which
separated the teller area from the rest of the bank. Two of the tellers stated that
they stepped away from their stations as he entered, and although all three
noticed that one of Appellant's hands was covered with a white paper towel,
only one stated that she thought it might have been a weapon. The bank
employees described their reactions in various ways: "frightened,"
"intimidated," and "stunned."
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the
relevant question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government, any rational trier of facts could have found the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018,
1021 (4th Cir. 1982). A verdict must be sustained if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
To establish a taking by intimidation in violation of 2113(a), evidence must
show that a defendant's conduct was "reasonably calculated to produce fear"
and that "an ordinary person in the teller's position reasonably could infer a
threat of bodily harm from the defendant's acts." United States v. Wagstaff, 865
F.2d 626, 627-28 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 907 (1989) (citations
omitted). A robber's leap over a teller counter is sufficient intimidation. See
United States v. Lucas, 619 F.2d 870, 871 (10th Cir. 1980). Since a jury could
reasonably find that Appellant's actions, including his leap over the gate into
the teller area with bank employees nearby, his statement that, "This is a
robbery," and the concealment of one of his hands in a towel, constituted
intimidation calculated to produce fear, the evidence was sufficient to support
Martinoff's conviction.
Appellant next alleges that the trial court committed reversible error when it
Appellant next alleges that the trial court committed reversible error when it
required the parties to state their reasons for exercising peremptory challenges
of prospective jurors.* Though the court excused all of the jurors Appellant
challenged, Appellant alleges that the court's order had "a chilling effect on free
exercise of his peremptory challenges." Appellant states that the court"allowed
each side to exercise the peremptory challenges it desired," and does not
specifically allege how he was hampered by any "chilling effect" resulting from
the court's order. Since we are unpersuaded that the "error" of which Appellant
complains contributed to the jury's verdict, we need not decide whether this
procedure is permissible. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Therefore, we affirm Martinoff's conviction. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
The record does not show why the court insisted on this procedure, but the
government contends that the court was motivated by a desire to prevent
improper discrimination by both parties in the exercise of their peremptory
challenges
