PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KENNY CAMERON,
Defendant-Appellant.

No. 08-4277

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Joseph R. Goodwin, Chief District Judge.
(2:07-cr-00142-1)
Argued: May 15, 2009
Decided: July 21, 2009
Before Sandra Day OCONNOR, Associate Justice
(Retired), Supreme Court of the United States,
sitting by designation, and NIEMEYER and GREGORY,
Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published

opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Associate
Justice OConnor and Judge Niemeyer joined.

COUNSEL
ARGUED: Jonathan D. Byrne, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appel-

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

lant. Steven Loew, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: Mary Lou Newberger, Federal Public Defender,
Edward H. Weis, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE
OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States
Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION
GREGORY, Circuit Judge:
The Appellant, Kenny Cameron, was convicted of three
counts of uttering counterfeited obligations of the United
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 472 (2006); and one count
of falsely making and counterfeiting obligations of the United
States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 471 (2006). At sentencing,
the district court applied a four-level enhancement because it
found that Cameron was a leader or organizer of a counterfeiting operation that involved five or more participants. Cameron challenges both his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 471 as
well as the district courts application of the enhancement. For
the reasons set forth below, we affirm Camerons conviction
but vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.
I.
On October 3, 2003, Cameron made a purchase from the
Tobacco Plus store in Dunbar, West Virginia, using a counterfeit twenty-dollar bill. The store owner suspected that the bill
was counterfeit and called the police. Two Dunbar police officers, Scott Dempsey and Charles Young, responded to the
call. When the officers arrived on the scene, Officer Young
asked Cameron to give him the change from the transaction.
Although Cameron complied with the request, the officers
noticed that Cameron kept his left hand clenched. From this,

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

the officers surmised that Cameron was attempting to conceal

an object in his hand. Officer Dempsey grabbed Camerons
left wrist, causing him to unclench his hand and reveal a second counterfeit twenty-dollar bill. Cameron was then arrested
and taken to the police station, where he admitted that he
passed a counterfeit bill at the Tobacco Plus store and that he
planned to pass the second counterfeit bill.
After Camerons arrest, police officers and United States
Secret Service personnel executed a search warrant on the
home of Camerons grandmother, where Cameron was residing at the time of his arrest. In an upstairs bedroom, officers
found cut and uncut counterfeit bills, an X-Acto cutting board,1
currency envelopes, and a counterfeit detection pen. While
officers were searching the home, Cameron arrived in a vehicle being driven by Brett Reynolds. Reynolds consented to a
search of the vehicle, and officers found sixteen counterfeit
$100 bills in a paper box located in the passenger-side floorboard.
The following day, police officers and Secret Service personnel executed a search warrant on the home of Camerons
sister. During this search, officers recovered a computer,
paper cuttings, printer ink cartridges, ink refills, and a printer
manual.
At trial, the Government presented testimony from Secret
Service agents who analyzed several of the items recovered
from the homes. Vici Inlow, a fingerprint expert with the
Secret Service, testified that Camerons fingerprints were discovered on eight of the sixty-one counterfeit bills found in his
grandmothers home. Special Agent Mark Grantz, a computer
forensic examiner, testified that a deleted file was recovered
from the computer found in the home of Camerons sister.
1

Special Agent Thomas Sheppard of the United States Secret Service

testified that X-Acto cutting boards can be used to cut bills so that the bills
have straight edges. (J.A. 100.)

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

According to Special Agent Grantz, the file contained an

image of a twenty-dollar bill that matched the serial number
of one of the bills that was seized from the home of Camerons grandmother.
At the close of the Governments case, Cameron moved for
a judgment of acquittal on the count of falsely making and
counterfeiting obligations of the United States, claiming that
the Government had not produced sufficient evidence that he
actually manufactured the counterfeit bills.2 The district court
denied Camerons motion, and the jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
At sentencing, Cameron objected to a recommended fourlevel enhancement for being the leader or organizer of the
counterfeiting operation. In support of the enhancement, the
Government presented the testimony of Ashley Campbell, a
participant in the counterfeiting operation. Campbell testified
that her role in the operation was to make small purchases
with the counterfeit bills and return the change to Jessie
Smith, another participant in the operation. Reynolds
recruited people into the operation and supervised the participants, and the earnings from the scheme were ultimately split
between three participantsReynolds, Smith, and Jason
DArco.
By contrast, Campbells testimony provided little insight
into the nature of Camerons involvement in the operation
beyond his manufacturing of counterfeit bills. According to
Campbell, she first met Cameron when she, DArco, Smith,
and Reynolds picked him up from his place of work and
2

Cameron also objected to the district courts failure to provide his proposed "reasonable doubt" instruction to the jury. While Cameron presents
this issue on appeal, he acknowledges that this argument is contrary to our
established precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 486
(4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir.
1998).

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

drove him home. At that time, Smith and Reynolds gave

Cameron cocaine and a genuine $100 bill. Reynolds then
entered Camerons home and returned a few minutes later
with the same bill.
Two days later, Campbell, DArco, Smith, and Reynolds
again drove to Camerons home. This time, Reynolds went
into the home and returned ten minutes later with counterfeit
bills. Although Campbell could not say how many bills Reynolds received from Cameron, she testified that Reynolds gave
her eight counterfeit $100 bills and that Reynolds used the
rest of the bills to purchase approximately $2000 worth of
marijuana. Campbell had no knowledge of the nature of the
relationship between Reynolds and Cameron, but she knew
that Cameron supplied the counterfeit bills for the operation.
In addition to the testimony of Campbell, the district court
had before it the presentence investigative report ("PSR") and
the representations made by the Government during sentencing. According to the PSR, Secret Service agents had traced
counterfeit bills manufactured by Cameron to at least twelve
states, and the loss attributed to the operation was determined
to be $10,520. The Government further proffered that the
counterfeit bills had been passed in over 250 businesses.
Based on this evidence, the district court overruled Camerons objection to the enhancement, stating that it was "very
comfortable that this manufacturing operation was extensive
and that the person who did the manufacturing of the bills and
the distribution of them, or a leader of that enterprise[,] was
this defendant." (J.A. 304.) The court continued: "This was a
rather major counterfeit operation and thisyou know, its
like saying Henry Ford wasnt a leader of Ford, he just made
the cars. This defendant made money. He decided who to turn
it over to. He passed it himself. He received drugs." (J.A. 30405.) After applying the recommended enhancements, including a two-level enhancement for manufacturing the counterfeit bills, Camerons total offense level was nineteen and his

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

criminal history category was III, which yielded a Guidelines

range of thirty-seven to forty-six months imprisonment. The
district court ultimately sentenced Cameron to a term of fortysix months imprisonment, followed by a three-year term of
supervised release.
II.
A.
Cameron first challenges his conviction on the count of
falsely making and counterfeiting obligations of the United
States, 18 U.S.C. 471. In a criminal case tried by a jury, we
must sustain a guilty verdict "if there is substantial evidence,
taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support
it." United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc) (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80
(1942)). In this context, "substantial evidence is evidence that
a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendants guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. To that end, this Court "must consider
circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts
proven to those sought to be established." United States v.
Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982); accord United
States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2008).
B.
Cameron advances several arguments in support of his contention that the Government did not present substantial evidence to support his conviction for manufacturing counterfeit
bills: (1) there was no evidence during trial regarding the
inside details of the counterfeiting operation; (2) the link
between the computer seized from his sisters home and the
counterfeiting operation was weak, since the computer contained only one image of a counterfeit bill; (3) there was no
evidence that Cameron himself used the computer to create

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

counterfeit bills; (4) officers did not recover a printer when

they searched his sisters home; and (5) Camerons fingerprints were identified on only eight of the sixty-one documents recovered from his residence.
Camerons arguments, however, discount the significance
of the circumstantial evidence introduced by the Government
at trial and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. In Camerons room at his grandmothers home, officers
found the trappings of a counterfeiting operationcut and
uncut counterfeit bills, cutting equipment, a counterfeit detection pen, and currency bills. The fact that Camerons fingerprints were identified on several of the counterfeit bills further
connects him to the operation.
Even if the evidence recovered from Camerons residence
would not have been sufficient on its own to sustain his conviction, that was not the only evidence presented at trial. The
computer and evidence of printing found in his sisters home,
in combination with the evidence recovered from Camerons
residence, was more than sufficient to sustain his conviction.
Using file recovery software, Special Agent Grantz discovered a deleted computer file that contained an image of a
twenty-dollar bill. He testified that the serial number from that
bill matched one of the counterfeit bills found in Camerons
residence. Taken together, the evidence from Camerons residence and his sisters home creates a more than reasonable
inference that Cameron manufactured the counterfeit bills
found in his place of residence.
While Cameron points out that Special Agent Grantz discovered only one image on the computer and the officers did
not actually find a printer in his sisters home, these facts
must be weighed against the considerable evidence of manufacturing recovered from both homes. Given the "circumscribed scope of our review," Burgos, 94 F.3d at 862, the
evidence connecting Cameron to the manufacturing of coun-

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

terfeit bills was sufficient to sustain his conviction for that

offense.
III.
A.
Cameron next challenges the district courts application of
the four-level enhancement at sentencing for being a leader or
organizer of the counterfeiting operation. We review all sentences for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Osborne, 514 F.3d 377, 387 (4th Cir.
2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 590
(2007)). "In assessing whether a sentencing court properly
applied the Guidelines, we review the courts factual findings
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo." Id. (quoting United States v. Allen, 466 F.3d 522, 527 (4th Cir. 2006)).
B.
Section 3B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (2007) provides for a four-level increase (the so-called
"leadership enhancement") in a defendants offense level "[i]f
the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity
that involved five or more participants or was otherwise
extensive." The Sentencing Commission has clarified in an
Application Note to 3B1.1 that in order to qualify for an
enhancement, the defendant must have been the organizer or
leader "of one or more other participants" as opposed to
merely "exercis[ing] management responsibility over the
property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization." See
U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 cmt. n.2. In determining a defendants
"leadership and organizational role," courts must consider
seven factors:
[1] the exercise of decision making authority, [2] the
nature of participation in the commission of the
offense, [3] the recruitment of accomplices, [4] the

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the

crime, [5] the degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, [6] the nature and scope of
the illegal activity, and [7] the degree of control and
authority exercised over others.
U.S.S.G. B1.1, cmt. n.4; see also United States v. Sayles,
296 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the seven-factor
test).
In Sayles, this Court provided insight regarding the type of
evidence needed for a district court to assess a 3B1.1
enhancement. The defendants in that case, Robert Jared Smith
and Leonard Sayles, were participants in a drug distribution
conspiracy. The Government presented evidence from coconspirators that both defendants purchased and sold crack to
other participants in the conspiracy. Furthermore, one of the
co-conspirators testified that Sayles was involved in the conversion of cocaine powder to crack. Based on this evidence,
the district court assessed the leadership enhancement to
Smith and a lesser two-level enhancement to Sayles.3 Id. at
220-22.
In reversing the district courts application of the 3B1.1
enhancements, this Court held that "being a buyer and seller
of illegal drugs, even in league with more than five or more
other persons, does not establish that a defendant has functioned as an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of
criminal activity." Id. at 225. That is because an adjustment
under 3B1.1 is proper "only . . . if it [was] demonstrated that
[the defendant] was an organizer, leader, manager or supervi3

Sayles received a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c)

for being an "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal
activity other than that discussed in [ 3B1.1] (a) or (b)." 296 F.3d at 224.
While the leadership enhancement at issue in this case is different from the
two-level enhancement in some respects, the application of both enhancements depends on the same seven-factor test. See U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 cmt.
n.4.

10

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

sor of people." Id. at 226. Although the Government contended that it had presented evidence that both defendants had
recruited other participants and that Smith had retained a
larger share of the proceeds from the conspiracy, no such evidence was found in the record. Without evidence of the defendants aggravating role in the conspiracy beyond the buying
and selling of "significant" quantities of drugs, this Court
found that the district court clearly erred in applying the
enhancement to the defendants. Id. at 226-27.
As in Sayles, the Government failed to present evidence at
Camerons trial or during his sentencing demonstrating that
his role in the conspiracy was that of an organizer or leader
of people, as opposed to that of a manager over the literal and
figurative "currency" of the counterfeiting operation. There
was no evidence that Cameron planned or organized the operation, exercised any control or authority over other participants, recruited accomplices into the operation, or claimed
any sharemuch less a larger shareof the fruits of the
criminal activity. If anything, the testimony elicited from
Campbell suggested that the other participants, and Reynolds
in particular, organized and led the counterfeiting operation.
Although it is true that more than one person may qualify as
an organizer or leader of a criminal operation, U.S.S.G.
3B1.1, cmt. n.4, Campbells testimony highlights the paucity of evidence supporting the application of the leadership
enhancement in this case.
The Government nevertheless contends that this Court
should defer to the district courts judgment because Cameron
manufactured bills for the counterfeiting operation. According
to the Government, Camerons integral role as the manufacturer of the bills effectively gave him the authority to control
the flow of the bills to the other participants. However, this
argument misses the mark because it conflates the potential to
exercise control over an operation with the actual exercise of
control. In the cases in which this Court has affirmed the
application of the leadership enhancement, there was evidence

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

11

that the defendants actually exercised authority over the other

participants in the operation or actively directed its activities.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 356 F.3d 529, 538 (4th Cir.
2004), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 952 (2004) (defendant recruited
dealers, controlled the allocation of drugs to dealers, determined how the profits were divided, and handled the logistics
and arrangements for the transactions); United States v. Perkins, 108 F.3d 512, 518 (4th Cir. 1997) (defendant "directed
the activities of other members of the drug ring and facilitated
the criminal enterprise by renting apartments, acquiring pagers, hiring a lawyer for a codefendant, and paying for the
bond of another codefendant").
If we were to adopt the position urged by the Government,
any defendant who supplies a good or service to a criminal
operation would automatically qualify for the leadership
enhancement because he or she could potentially leverage that
role to control the other participants in the operation. Such an
outcome is contrary to the letter and spirit of the Sentencing
Guidelines. The Sentencing Commission amended its Application Notes to clarify that the enhancement applies only to
defendants who organize or lead "one or more other participants" and not to those who just "exercise[ ] management
responsibility over the property, assets, or activities of a criminal organization." U.S.S.G. 3B1.1, cmt. n.2. The Governments position ignores this distinction.
Furthermore, Camerons sentence already reflects his role
in the counterfeiting operation through application of
2B5.1(b)(2)(A) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which provides a two-level increase where a defendant manufactured or
produced counterfeit obligations of the United States. The
existence of this separate enhancement suggests that, at least
in the context of counterfeiting operations, a defendant must
exercise a leadership role beyond the manufacturing of counterfeit bills in order to be subject to the leadership enhancement.

12

UNITED STATES v. CAMERON

The Government is thus left with evidence that Cameron

supplied counterfeit bills to one other participant in an extensive counterfeiting operation and that Cameron himself
passed bills on one occasion. As this Court already decided in
Sayles, the supplying of contraband to other participants in a
conspiracy and involvement in illegal transactions, without
more, cannot sustain the application of the leadership
enhancement. See 296 F.3d at 227. And although the extensiveness of a criminal activity is a relevant consideration in
determining whether the leadership enhancement should
apply, U.S.S.G. 3B1.1 cmt. n.4, the Government urges this
Court to give this factor more weight than it deserves. If the
extensiveness of a criminal activity were enough to justify the
assessment of the leadership enhancement, then all participants in an extensive operation would be subject to the leadership enhancement regardless of whether there was any
evidence that the particular participants were leaders or organizers of the operation. Such an interpretation is clearly contrary to 3B1.1, which provides enhancements "[b]ased on
the defendants role in the offense."
IV.
We affirm Camerons conviction for falsely making and
counterfeiting obligations of the United States. However,
because the district court clearly erred in applying the leadership enhancement in calculating Camerons offense level, we
vacate his sentence and remand the case to the district court
for resentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED