317 F.

2d 429

Minerva BRADLEY, I. A. Jackson, Jr., Rosa Lee Quarles, John

Edward Johnson, Elihu C. Myers and Elizabeth S.
Myers, Appellants,
v.
The SCHOOL BOARD of the CITY OF RICHMOND,
VIRGINIA, H. I.
Willet, Division Superintendent of Schools of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, and E. J. Oglesby, Alfred L. Wingo and
E. T. Justis, individually and constituting the Pupil
Placement Board of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Appellees.
No. 8757.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 9, 1963.
Decided May 10, 1963.

Henry L. Marsh, III, Richmond, Va. (S. W. Tucker, Richmond, Va., on

brief) for appellants.
Henry T. Wickham, Sp. Counsel, City of Richmond (J. Elliott Drinard,
City Atty., Richmond, Va., and Tucker, Mays, Moore & Reed, Richmond,
Va., on brief) for appellees, The School Board of the City of Richmond,
Virginia, and H. I. Willet, Division Superintendent of Schools.
Before BOREMAN, BRYAN and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges.
BOREMAN, Circuit Judge.

This is a school case involving alleged racially discriminatory practices and the
maintenance of public schools on a racially segregated basis in the City of
Richmond, Virginia. In September 1961 eleven Negro pupils, their parents and
guardians instituted this action to required the defendants to transfer the pupils
from Negro public schools to white public schools.1 The plaintiffs also pray, on
behalf of all persons similarly situated, that the defendants be enjoined from
operating racially segregated schools and be required to submit to the District

Court a plan of desegregation. The District Court ordered that the individual
infant plaintiffs be transferred to the schools for which they had applied. This
appeal is based upon the refusal of the court to grant further injunctive relief.
2

Defendant, Virginia Pupil Placement Board, answered the complaint, admitting

that plaintiffs had complied with its regulations pertaining to applications for
transfer but denying discrimination and other allegations of the complaint. The
defendants, School Board of the City of Richmond and the Richmond
Superintendent of Schools, answered and moved to dismiss on the ground that
sole responsibility for the placement of pupils rested with the Virginia Pupil
Placement Board pursuant to the Pupio Placement Act of Virginia, Sections 22232.1 through 232.17, Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended.2

The defendants interpreted the bill of complaint as attacking the

constitutionality of the Pupil Placement Act and the motions to dismiss were
grounded also on the theory that constitutionality should first be determined by
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia or the case should be heard by a
District Court of three judges. The Court below correctly denied the motions to
dismiss after determining that the constitutionality of the Act had not been
challenged by plaintiffs.

The record discloses that the City of Richmond is divided into a number of
geographically defined attendance areas for both white and Negro schools.
These areas were established by the School Board prior to 1954 and have not
been materially changed since that time. It is admitted that several attendance
areas for white and Negro schools overlap. The State Pupil Placement Board
enrolls and transfers all pupils and neither the Richmond School Board nor the
city Superintendent of Schools makes recommendations to the Pupil Placement
Board.

During the 1961-62 school term, 37 Negro pupils were assigned to 'white'
schools. For the 1962-63 school term, 90 additional Negro pupils had been so
assigned. At the start of the 1962-63 school term, all of the 'white' high schools
had Negro pupils in attendance. Negro pupils also attend several of the 'white
junior high schools and elementary schools.

Certain additional facts are clearly established by the record. The City School
Board maintains five high schools, three for whites and two for Negroes; five
junior high schools for whites and four for Negroes; eighteen elementary
schools for whites and twenty-two for Negroes. As of April 30, 1962, there
were 40,263 pupils in Richmond public schools, 23,177 Negroes, 17,002 whites

and 84 non-whites of a race other than Negro but considered white for the
purpose of assignment in the Richmond public school system. Only 37 Negroes
were then attending schools which white children attended, 30 of those being in
the 'white' Chandler Junior High School. Three of the remaining seven were in
attendance at the 'white' John Marshall High School, one attended the 'white'
Westhampton Junior High School and three handicapped children attended the
Richmond Cerebral Palsy Center. With the possible exception of the three last
mentioned, these children had sought transfers from Negro schools and all but
one were able to satisfy the residential and academic criteria which the Pupil
Placement Board applies in case of transfers but not in case of initial
enrollment. The remaining child had been admitted by court order in eariler
litigation.3
7

The 1961-62 Directory of the Richmond, Virginia, Public Schools shows

'White Schools' in one division and 'Negro Schools' in the other. The 'White
Schools' are staffed entirely with faculties and officials of the Caucasian race.
The schools listed as 'Negro Schools' are staffed entirely with faculties and
officials of the Negro race.

Thus it is clear, as found by the District Court, that Richmond has dual school
attendance areas; that the City is divided into areas for white schools and is
again divided into areas for Negro schools; that in many instances the area for
the white school and for the Negro school is the same and the areas overlap.
Initial pupil enrollments are made pursuant to the dual attendance lines. Once
enrolled, the pupils are routinely reassigned to the same school until
granduation from that school. Upon granduation, the pupils are assigned in the
manner found by the District Court to be as follows:

'* * * Assignments of students based on promotion from an elementary school

to a junior high school and from a junior high school to high school are
routinely made by the Pupil Placement Board. These assignments generally
follow a pattern, aptly described as a system of 'feeder schools', that existed
prior to 1954. Thus, a student from a white elementary school is routinely
promoted to a white junior high school and in due course to a white high
school. A Negro student is routinely promoted from a Negro elementary school
to a Negro junior high school and finally a Negro high school. In order to
change the normal course of assignment based on promotion all students must
apply to the Pupil Placement Board. The majority of the plaintiffs in the present
case are such applications.'

10

As of April 30, 1962, a rather serious problem of overcrowding existed in the

Richmond Negro public schools. Of the 28 Negro schools 22 were

overcrowded beyond normal capacity by 1775 pupils and the combined

enrollments of 23 of the 26 white schools were 2445 less than the normal
capacity of those schools. For the current 1962-63 school term, the applications
for transfers from Negro to white schools of only 147 Negro pupils had been
granted.
11

Four of the infant plaintiffs, who had completed elementary schools, sought
admission to the white Chandler Junior High School. After comparing test
scores of these pupils with test scores of other pupils, the Pupil Placement
Board denied the applications on the ground of lack of academic qualifications.
These plaintiffs contended that pupils from white elementary schools in the
same attendance area are routinely placed in Chandler Junior High and their
scholastic attainments or qualifications are not scrutinized by the Pupil
Placement Board. The District Court concluded that academic criteria were
applied to Negro pupils seeking transfer based on promotion, which criteria
were not applied to the white pupils promoted from elementary schools to
junior high schools. This, said the court, is discriminatory and is a vaid
criticism of the procedure inherent in the system of 'feeder schools'. The court
further stated:

12

'Proper scholastic tests may be used to determine the placement of students. But
when the tests are applied only to Negroes seeking admission to particular
schools and not to white students routinely assigned to the same schools, the
use of the tests can not be sustained. Jones v. School Board of the City of
Alexandria, 278 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1960).'

13

Another of the Negro plaintiffs, who was promoted from a Negro junior high
school, sought admission to the 'white' John Marshall High School. His
application had been denied because he lived thirteen blocks from the John
Marshall High School and only five blocks from a Negro high school.
However, it was pointed out in the court below that this plaintiff lives in the
attendance area of the John Marshall High School and, had he been a white
student, he would have been routinely assigned there without considering the
didtance of his residence from that school or from another high school. The
District Court said: '* * * Residence may be a proper basis for assignment of
pupils, but it is an invalid criteria when linked to a system of 'feeder schools'.
Dodson v. School Board of the City of Charlottesvill, 289 F.2d 439 (4th Cir.
1961).'

14

The remaining five plaintiffs sought transfers from the Graves Junior High
School (Negro) to the 'white' Chandler Junior High School. They were denied
transfer by the Pupil Placement Board because of lack of academic

qualifications. The evidence showed that the same standards for determining
transfers, upon application, from one junior high school to another junior high
school were applied by the Board indiscriminately to both white and Negro
pupils. The District Court stated:
15

'* * * Were this the only factor in this phase of the case, the issue would
involve only judicial review of the decision of an administrative board.
However, the situation of these plaintiffs must be considered in the context of
the system of 'feeder schools', which routinely placed them in the Graves Junior
High School while white students routinely were placed in Chandler Junior
High School. The application of scholarship qualifications under these
circumstances is discriminatory. Green v. School Board of the City of Roanoke
(304) F.2d (118) (4th Cir., May 22, 1962).'4

16

With respect to a determination of the rights of all of the infant Negro plaintiffs,
the District Court held:

17

'The foregoing facts and conclusions of law require the admission of the
plaintiffs to the schools for which they made application.'An appropriate order
was entered injoining and restraining the defendants from denying the infant
plaintiffs, therein named, admission to the schools for which they ahd made
application. The defendants have not appealed from this order.

18

It follows that each infant plaintiff has been granted the relief which he or she
individually sought. But the District Court, although expressing its disapproval
of the 'feeder school system' as now operating in the City of Richmond, denied
further injunctive relief. The case was ordered retained on the docket for such
further relief 'as may be appropriate'.5

19

The conclusion of the District Court that a 'reasonable start toward a nondiscriminatory school system' had been made appears to have been based
primarily upon consideration of four factors discussed in its opinion as follows:

20

'Rigid adherence to placement of students by attendance areas has been

modified in four respects. First, the Chairman of the Pupil Placement Board
testified that any Negro child applying for enrollment in the first grade of a
white public school in his attendance area is assigned to that school. Second,
the Superintendent of Schools testified that George Wythe High School and
John Marshall High School had been constructed to accommodate all high
school students in their respective attendance areas. Counsel stated in argument
that six Negro students had applied for admission to George Wythe High

School for 1962 and all had been accepted. Third, a Negro student presently
attending a white school, upon promotion to a higher school, is routinely
assigned to a white school. Fourth, some Negro students have been assigned to
schools in white attendance areas.'
21

In the context of this case the principal questions to be determined may be

stated as follows: (1) Are these four basic factors cited by the District Court
sufficient to evidence a reasonable start toward maintaining a nondiscriminatory school system and consistent with the true concept of equal
constitutional protection of the races; and (2) should the court have granted
further injunctive relief? We think question (1) must be answered in the
negative and question (2) in the affirmative in view of the discriminatory
attitude displayed by the Pupil Placement Board toward the transfers sought by
the infant plaintiffs in the instant case and which transfers, denied as the result
of discriminatory application of residential and academic criteria, were effected
only through this protracted litigation.

22

It is notable that there is no assertion here, as in some of the other school cases,
of a defense based upon a claim that a reasonable start has been made toward
the elimination of racially discriminatory practices coupled with a suggestion
that additional time, consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest
practicable date, is necessary in the public interest. Instead, the answer of the
City school authorities denied that anything done or omitted by them had given
rise to the present litigation. The answer of the Pupil Placement Board admitted
that the plaintiffs had complied with its administrative procedures but denied
and demanded strict proof of facial discrimination.

23

One of the interrogatories served by the plaintiffs was: 'What obstacles, if any,
are there which will prevent the racially non-discriminatory assignment of
students to public schools in the City of Richmond at the commencement of the
1962-1963 school session?' The local school authorities side-stepped the
question by claiming to be unable to answer because all power to assign
students to schools had been vested by law in the Pupil Placement Board. That
Board replied to the interrogatory as follows: '* * * That to the extent that such
question implies discrimination, such implication is denied and that such
question lacks sufficient specificity to evoke an intelligent snswer which does
not involve broad conclusions or have argumentative dedeuctions. Aside from
that, and under Brown v. Board of Education, these defendants know of no
reason why students should not be assigned to public schools without
discrimination on the ground of race, color, or creed.'

24

The Superintendent of Schools testified that the City School Board had not

attempted to meet the problem of overcrowded schools by requesting that

Negro pupils in overcrowded schools in a given area be assigned to schools
with white pupils. He stated that some new schools and additions to existing
schools had been provided. The record discloses that the earlier litigation,
Warden v. The School Board of the City of Richmond, referred to in our
footnote 3, was instituted on September 2, 1958. At a special meeting held on
September 15, 1958 (approximately two weeks after the beginning of the
school term), the School Board voted to request the Pupil Placement Board to
transfer the pupils then attending the Nathaniel Bacon School (white) to the
East End Junior High School (white), and that a sufficient number of pupils be
tranferred from the George Mason (Negro) and Chimborazo (Negro) schools to
the Nathaniel Bacon building to utilize its capacity, thus converting Nathaniel
Bacon to a Negro school.
25

The attitude of the City school authorities, as disclosed by the Superintendent

of Schools in his testimony, is and has been 'that the state law took out of the
hands of the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools any decision
relating to the integration of schools (and that) * * * it has been a feeling of both
the School Board and the Administration.' that any conflict that might exist
between the state and federal law should be decided by the Courts, not by the
School Board and the Administration.'

26

The following is taken from the testimony of the Chairman of the Pupil
Placement Board:

27

'Q. Well, what do you do where you have overlapping school zones and school
areas?

28

'A. You have got that, of course, in Richmond.

29

'Q. Yes.

30

'A. Normally, I would say fully 99 per cent of the Negro parents who are
entering a child in First Grade prefer to have that child in the Negro school.
Judging by the small number of applications we get, that must be true. Now,
we do not think that this Board was appointed for the purpose or that the law
required the attempt on our part to try integrate every child possible. What we
thought we were to do was to be completely fair in considering the requests of
Negroes, we will say, to go into White schools, but certainly not trying to put
those in that didn't want to go in.

31

'Now, when a Negro parent asks for admission of his child in the First Grade of
a White school, very clearly he is asking for desegregation or for integration, or
whatever you want to call it, and he gets it. And it is true that in general there
will be two schools that that child could attend in his area, on White and one
Negro, and we assume that the Negro wants to go to the Negro school unless he
says otherwise, but if he says otherwise, he gets the other school.'

32

It is true that the authority for the enrollment and placement of pupils in the
State of Virginia has been lodged in the Pupil Placement Board6 unless a
particular locality elects to assume sole responsibility for the assignment of its
pupils.7 The School Board of the City of Richmond has assumed no
responsibility whatever in this connection. It does not even make
recommendations to the Pupil Placement Board as to enrollments, assignments
or transfers of pupils. It here defends charges against it of racial discrimination
in the operation of the City's schools on the ground that the sole responsibility
is that of the State Board. At the same time the system of dual attendance areas
which has operated over the years to maintain public schools on a racially
segregated basis has been permitted to continue. Though many of the Negro
schools are overcrowded and white schools are not filled to normal capacity,
the only effort to alleviate this condition has been to provide new buildings or
additions to existing buildings, a move obviously designed to perpetuate what
has always been a segregated school system.

33

It is clear that the pupil assignments are routinely made by the Pupil Placement
Board. The Chairman of that Board says that now initial enrollments are on a
voluntary basis and a Negro child may be enrolled in a white school upon
request. But in the absence of a request, the long established procedure of
enrollment of Negro children in Negro schools and white children in white
schools persists. Then the 'feeder' system begins to operate and the only means
of escape is by following the prescribed administrative procedure of filing
requests or applications for transfer. The difficulties to be encountered in
pursuing this course are graphically demonstrated by the experiences of the
infant plaintiffs in this litigation. They were able to escape from the 'feeder'
system only after the District Court made possible their release by ordering
transfers.

34

A Negro child, having once been caught in the 'feeder' system and desiring a
desegregated education, must esxtricate himself, if he can, by meeting the
transfer criteria. As this court said in Green v. School Board of City of
Roanoke, Virginia, 304 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1962):

35

'* * * These are are hurdles to which a white child, living in the same area as

35

'* * * These are are hurdles to which a white child, living in the same area as
the Negro and having the same scholastic aptitude, would not be subjected, for
he would have been initially assigned to the school to which the Negro seeks
admission.'

36

It was pointed out in Jones v. School Board of City of Alexandria, Virgainia,

Board of City of Alexandria, Virginia, reason of the existing segregation
pattern, it will be Negro children, primarily, who seek transfers. The truth of
this statement is evidenced by the fact that in Richmond only 127 Negro
children out of a total of more than 23,000 are now attending previously allwhite schools. This court further said in Jones, supra: 'Obviously the
maintenance of a dual system of attendance areas based on race offends the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and others similarly situated * * *.' 278
F.2d 72, 76.

37

In recent months we have had occasion to consider the legality of other 'feeder'
systems found in operation in the public schools of Roanoke County, Virginia,
and in the City of Roanoke, Virginia. See Marsh v. County School Board of
Roanoke County, Va., 305 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962), and Green v. School Board
of City of Roanoke, Virginia, 304 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1962). In those case, in
opinions prepared by Chief Judge Sobeloff, the unconstitutional aspects of the
systems there in operation were discussed in the light of the decision of the
Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98
L.Ed. 873 (1954), and 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955), and in
the light of numerous prior decisions of this and other courts. We find it
unnecessary to again cite or review the pertinent decisions applicable to the
maintenance of racially segregated school systems. In the Marsh and Green
case we reached the conclusion that injunctive relief, not only for the individual
plaintiffs but for those who might find themselves confronted with the same
problems, was justified.

38

A start has, indeed, been made to end total segregation of the races in the
Richmond schools. The first step has been taken, one which, no doubt, was
distasteful to those who are traditionally and unalterably opposed to an
integrated school system. But, upon this record and from the statements of the
school officials, we find nothing to indicate a desire or intention to use the
enrollment or assignment system as a vehicle to desegregate the schools or to
effect a material departure from present practices, the discriminatory character
of which required the District Court to order relief to the infant plaintiffs before
it. In the present status in which the case was left by the District Court, the
school authorities are yet free to ignore the rights of other applicants and thus to
require the parents of new applicants to protest discriminatory denials of

transfers, to require an infant applicant with his or her parents to attend a

hearing on the protest which is not likely to be held earlier than August of
1963, and then to require the applicants to intervene in the pending litigation
(possibly to be met with defensive tactics calculated to result in delay), the
applicants fervently hoping to obtain relief from the court not long after the
beginning of the 1963-64 school session if such relief is to be meaningful.
39

The School Board of the City of Richmond has abdicated in favor of the Pupil
Placement Board leaving the latter with a school system which, in normal
operation, has demonstrated its potential as an effective instrumentality for
creating and maintaining racial segregation. Nearly nine years have elapsed
since the decisions in the Brown v. Board of Education cases and since the
Supreme Court held racial discrimination in the schools to be unconstitutional.
The Richmond school authorities could not possibly have been unaware of the
results of litigation involving the school systems of other cities in Virginia,
notably Norfolk, Alexandria, Charlottesville and Roanoke. Despite the
knowledge which these authorities must have had as to what was happening in
other nearby communities, the dual attendance areas and 'feeder' system have
undergone no material change.

40

Assignments on a racial basis are neither authorized nor contemplated by

Virginia's Pupil Placement Act. We are told that initial assignments are now
made on a purely voluntary basis but the Placement Board assumes that a
Negro child prefers to attend a school with children of his own race and he is so
assigned unless otherwise requested. Richmond's administration of her schools
has been obviously compulsive and it is evident that there has been little, if any,
freedom of choice.

41

'Though a voluntary separation of the races in schools is uncondemned by any

provision of the Constitution, its legality is dependent upon the volition of each
of the pupils. If a reasonable attempt to exercise a pupil's individual volition is
thwarted by official coercion or compulsion, the orgainzation of the schools, to
that extent, comes into plain conflict with the constitutional requirement. A
voluntary system is no longer voluntary when it becomes compulsive.' See
Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 1962).

42

Notwithstanding the fact that the Pupil Placement Board assigns pupils to the
various Richmond schools without recommendation of the local officials, we
do not believe that the City School Board can disavow all responsibility for the
maintenance of the discriminatory system which has apparently undergone no
basic change since its adoption. Assuredly it has the power to eliminate the dual
attendance areas and the 'feeder' system which the District Court found to be

primarily responsible for the discriminatory practices disclosed by the

evidence. It would be foolish in the extreme to say that neither the City School
Board nor the Pupil Placement Board has the duty to recognize and protect the
constitutional rights of pupils in the Richmond schools. That there must be a
responsibility devolving upon some agency for proper administration is
unquestioned. We are of the opinion that it is primarily the duty of the School
Board to eliminate the offending system.8
43

In these circumstances, not only are the individual infant plaintiffs entitled to
relief which has been ordered but the plaintiffs are entitled, on behalf of others
of the class they represent and who are similarly situated, to an injunction
against the continuation of the discriminatory system and paactices which have
been found to exist. As we clearly stated in Jeffers v. Whitley, 309 F.2d 621,
629 (4th Cir. 1962), the appellants are not entitled to an order requiring the
defendants to effect a general intermixture of the races in the schools but they
are entitled to an order enjoining the defendants from refusing admission to any
school of any pupil because of the pupil's race. The order should prohibit the
defendant's conditioning the grant of a requested transfer upon the applicant's
submission to futile, burdensome or discriminatory administrative procedures.
If there is to be an absolute abandonment of the dual attendance area and
'feeder' system, if initial assignments are to be on a nondiscriminatory and
voluntary basis, and if there is to be a right of free choice at reasonable intervals
thereafter, consistent with proper administrative procedures as may be
determined by the defendants with the approval of District Court, the pupils,
their parents and the public generally should be so informed.

44

If, upon remand, the defendants desire to submit to the District Court a more
definite plan, providing for immediate steps looking to the termination of the
discriminatory system and practices 'with all deliberate speed,' they should not
only be permitted but encouraged to do so.

45

The District Court should retain jurisdiction of this case for further proceedings
and the entry of such further orders as are not inconsistent with this opinion.

46

Reversed in part and remanded.

47

ALBERT V. BRYAN, Circuit Judge (dissenting in part).

48

I see no need for the prospective injunction. With fairness and clarity the
opinion of the Court comprehensively discusses and approves the course the
District Court prescribed for the defendants to follow in the future. With no

reason to believe his directions will not be respected, the District Judge refused
the injunction. In this he exercised the discretion generally accorded the trial
judge in such situations, especially when the necessity for an injunction must
be measured by local conditions. Of these we have no knowledge more intimate
than his. I would not add the injunction.

Of eleven original pupil plaintiffs, one was assigned by the Pupil Placement
Board to an integrated Junior High School to which he had made application
before the hearing in the District Court. His case became moot

Raised below (but not involved in this appeal) was the issue as to the joinder of
the Richmond School Board and Superintendent of Schools as parties
defendant. Correctly, we think, the District Court held:
'* * * The State Pupil Placement Board has authority over the placement of
pupils, and the local officials refrain from making recommendations to the
Board, but approximately 98 per cent of the placements are made routinely as a
result of the regulations of the School Board pertaining to attendance areas. The
evidence shows that the State Pupil Placement Board has no inclination to vary
these attendance areas, although undoubtedly it has authority to do so. In view
of this situation, the School Board and the Superintendent of Schools are proper
parties.'

On September 2, 1958, a suit styled Lorna Renee Warden et al. v. The School
Board of the City of Richmond, Virginia, et al. was instituted in the District
Court, praying, inter alia, that a permanent injunction be entered restraining the
Richmond School Board and its division Superintendent of Schools from any
and all actions that regulate or affect, on the basis of race or color, the
admission, enrollment or education of the infant plaintiffs, or any other Negro
child similarly situated, to and in any public school operated by the defendants
That suit was decided on July 5, 1961. The District Court ordered that the then
one remaining Negro plaintiff be transferred from the Negro school located five
miles from her home and admitted to the white school in her neighborhood.
However, the court denied class relief, stating: 'There is no question as to the
right of the infant plaintiff to be admitted to the schools of the City of
Richmond without discrimination on the ground of race. She is admitted,
however, as an individual, not as a class or group; and it is as an individual that
her rights under the Constitution are asserted.'
The court refused to grant a permanent injunction and dismissed the case from
the docket.

The case to which the District Court referred is styled Green v. School Board of
City of Roanoke, Virginia, and is now reported in 304 F.2d 118

In its written opinion the District Court stated as follows:

'The plaintiffs prayed that the defendants be enjoined from continuing
discrimination in the city schools and that the School Board be required to
submit a desegregation plan. The Court has weighed all of the factors presented
by the evidence in this case and finds that the defendants have taken measures
to eliminate racially discriminatory enrollments in the first grade. Apparently
they are eliminating discriminatory enrollments in George Wythe High School
(white) and they are routinely assigning Negro students in white junior high
schools to white high schools.
'While the School Board has not presented a formal plan of desegregation, the
Court finds that the defendants have made a reasonable start toward a
nondiscriminatory school system resulting in the attendance of 127 Negro
students in white schools for the 1962-1963 school term. In view of the steps
that have been taken in this direction, the Court concludes that the defendants
should be allowed discretion to fashion within a reasonable time the changes
necessary to eliminate the remaining objectionable features of the system of
'feeder schools'.
'In Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed.
1083) (1955), the Supreme Court stated 'Traditionally, equity has been
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a faility
for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.' The Court is of the
opinion that the relief decreed in this case is sufficient at this time in view of
the evidence presented. The refusal of broad injunctive relief now is not to be
construed as approval to continue the 'feeder school system' as it is now
operated. See Hill v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, Virginia, 282 F.2d
473 (4th Cir. 1960); Dodson v. School Board of the City of Charlottesville, 289
F.2d 439 (4th Cir. 1961).
'This case will be retained on the docket for such further relief as may be
appropriate.'

Va.Code Ann. 22-- 232.1-232.17 (Supp. 1960)

Va.Code Ann. 22-- 232.18-232.31 (Supp. 1960)

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954);
Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083
(1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958)