Fredrik Petersson

Willi Mnzenberg, the League against Imperialism,

and the Comintern, 1925 1933

lonialism in Brussels marked the establishment of the anti-imperialist organisation,

the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI, 1927-37). The
complex preparations for the congress were though initiated already in 1925 by Willi
Mnzenberg, a German communist and General Secretary of the communist mass
organisation, Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (IAH, 1921-35), together with the Communist International (Comintern, 1919-43). Berlin was the centre for the LAI and its
International Secretariat (1927-33), a city serving the intentions of the communists
to nd colonial migr activists in the Weimar capital, acting as representatives for
the anti-colonial movement in Europe after the Great War. With the ascendancy to
power of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) on 30 January 1933, the LAI reached an abrupt, but
nonetheless, expected end in Berlin. This doctoral thesis examines the role, purpose
and functions of a sympathising communist organization (LAI): to act as an intermediary for the Comintern to the colonies. The analysis evaluates the structure and
activities of the LAI, and by doing so, establish a complex understanding on one of
the most inuential communist organisations during the interwar period, which, despite its short existence, assumed a nostalgic reference and historical bond for anticolonial movements during the transition from colonialism to post-colonialism after
the Second World War, e.g. the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955.

We Are Neither Visionaries Nor Utopian Dreamers.

On 10 February 1927, the First International Congress against Imperialism and Co-

Fredrik Petersson

Willi Mnzenberg, the League against Imperialism, and the Comintern, 1925 1933

We Are Neither Visionaries

Nor Utopian Dreamers.

Fredrik Peterssons study, based on archives in Moscow, Berlin, Amsterdam, London,

and Stockholm, uncovers why the Comintern established and supported the LAI
and its anti-imperialist agenda, disclosing a complicated undertaking, characterised
by conict and the internal struggle for power, involving structural constraints and
individual ambitions dened by communist ideology and strategy.

2013

bo Akademis frlag

Fredrik Petersson

We Are Neither Visionaries

Nor Utopian Dreamers.
Willi Mnzenberg, the League against Imperialism,
and the Comintern, 1925 1933
Doctoral Thesis, General History
Division for Arts, Education and Theology, History Department

Doctoral Thesis (2013)

Fredrik Petersson
*
Division for Arts, Education and Theology, History Department,
bo Akademi University

We Are Neither Visionaries

Nor Utopian Dreamers.
Willi Mnzenberg, the League
against Imperialism, and the
Comintern, 1925 1933

TO EMMA, LINNA, AND WILHELM

CONTENTS
Commendatory Foreword by Professor Robert JC Young
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations

i
iii
vii

Introduction
Previous Research: Historiography in Passim
Archives, Documents and Method
Linking the Ties that Bind Together

1
15
25
39

PART I
Chapter 1
Conceiving the Anti-Colonial Project
Lenin, the Comintern and the Colonial Question
Internationale Arbeiterhilfe, Philanthropy and the Colonial Question
Hands off China and Against the Cruelties in Syria
Selling the Anti-Colonial Project

53
54
60
65
83

Chapter 2
Birth
LACO, the Comintern and Berlin
En route to Brussels: Assembling the Anti-Imperialist Network
The Aggravated Network

92
96
103
122

PART II
Chapter 3
Demonstration
Euphoria (not Utopia)
Gather All Visionaries and Utopian Dreamers
The LAI Organism Investigated and Experienced

135
149
161
187

Chapter 4
Brussels Revisited
The End of Euphoria

201
215

Chapter 5
Utopia Redefined, Part I
Adapting to Ideology, and Chattos Network
The Reversed Trojan Horse
The Arnot Connection: Evaluation of the Colonial Work and the Colonial
Conference
Chapter 6
Utopia Redefined, Part II
Consolidation Models
Bound for Utopia
Utopia Disrupted, Frankfurt am Main, 20-27/7-1929

231
237
245
253

275
296
310
319

PART III
Chapter 7
Anni confusionis
Aftermath: The Onset of the Anni confusionis
The Crisis
A Languishing Movement, Part I
The Trial

339
343
363
373
379

Chapter 8
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
The Return to a United Front
Hub of the Anti-Imperialist Movement
Revival (or Decline?)

395
399
410
426

Chapter 9
Nadir
A Languishing Movement, Part II
Prologue to the End

451
457
470

Chapter 10
Collapse and Ruin
Organisation No More

477
487

Chapter 11
Postscript: The LAI in Exile Paris 1933 and London 1933-37 A New
Beginning and the End

497

Conclusion

503

Appendix I: Chronology 1925 1933

Appendix II: Dramatis Personae
Bibliography: Archives, Sources and Literature
Index

517
519
533
563

List of Tables
Table 1.1:
Table 1.2:

Categorisation of the Empirical Material

The International Secretariat and the Comintern, 1927-1933

Table 2.1:
Table 2.2:
Table 2.3:
Table 2.4:

The Network of the Hands Off China Campaign, June-August 1925

The Colonial Question and Outline of Actors, 1925
The Actors in the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, December 1925
Interactionist Structure of the Anti-Colonial Project, December, 1925
February, 1926

Table 3.1:
Table 3.2:
Table 3.3:

Composition of the LACO Executive, July 1926

Links of Communication in the Anti-Imperialist Network, February July, 1926
The Anti-Colonial Project, 1925 1927

Table 4.1:
Table 4.2:
Table 4.3:

Geographical Representation at the Brussels Congress, February 10-13 1927

The Merging of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: a Theoretical Outline
The Dutch-Indies Delegation, 1927 1930

Table 6.1:
Table 6.2 :
Table 6.3:

Chattos Egocentric Network, 1928-29

Robin Page Arnots European Journey, 20/12-1928 10-11/2-1929
Structure and Actors in the Colonial Conference, March-June 1929

Table 7.1:
Table 7.2:
Table 7.3:
Table 7.4:
Table 7.5:

The Second LAI Congress Institutional Actors in Moscow, 30/3-27/6-1929

The Nerve Centre: The Commission on the LAI and the Sub-Committee
Geographical Division and Colonial Representation Invited to the Second
International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism 1929
Making the Connection: The LAI Congress and the Colonial Conference
Political and Colonial Representation, Frankfurt am Main, 21 27/7-1929

Table 8.1:

Composition of the LAI Executive Committee, January 1930

Table 9.1:

The LAI Executive Committee, June 1931

*

Commendatory Foreword

Robert JC Young
Silver Professor; Professor of English, Comparative Literature

While conducting research on the anti-colonial movements between the two world wars, I
repeatedly encountered mentions in passing of the League against Imperialism (henceforth LAI)
and the eminent activists from Willi Mnzenberg to Jawaharlal Nehru to Albert Einstein who were
involved in its organisation or the remarkable Congress against Imperialism that took place in
Brussels in February, 1927. Substantive information about the LAI and associated organisations,
however, was remarkably scarce. A whole chapter of radical history was effectively off the
historical radar. While this was not altogether unusual with respect to the often shadowy and
deliberately poorly documented organisations that straddled Europe and the colonial world in this
period, the lacuna surrounding the LAI, the first international anti-colonial organisation, was
perhaps the most serious gap for anyone carrying out research in this period. It was therefore with
considerable interest and excitement that I first encountered the work of Fredrik Petersson and the
discovery that he had been carrying out extensive research to fill this much-needed lacuna. His
description of his archival sources in Moscow made clear the reasons why there had been such a
scarcity of knowledge up to this point: it was only when the archives were fully opened after the
fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 that the history of transnational revolutionary communist
organisations in Europe in the twentieth century could be uncovered and recovered.

What is most remarkable about Peterssons research in fact is the amount of detail that he has been
able to document and to reveal: where there had been scarcity there is now abundance. This book
represents the product of a very substantial amount of original research which transforms our
understanding of the history of the League against Imperialism. Until Petersson availed himself of
the opportunities afforded by the opening of the Russian archives comparatively little was known
about the LAI, its organisation, its relations with the Comintern, or the role of its principal players,
particularly that of Willi Mnzenberg. Petersson has transformed that situation, and tracked the
complex history of the development of the LAI as a result of his extensive research in the archives
of RGASPI (Moscow), SAPMO-BA ZPA (Berlin), IISG (Amsterdam), together with a number of
other minor sources. What is most remarkable, however, is Peterssons ability to put together a
historical narrative about a somewhat shadowy and secretive organisation from such a complex

range of sources concerned with activities which were deliberately designed to make their
operation opaque to any outsider.

The book presents its material chronologically, beginning with the relations to the Comintern, and
the evolution of a series of anti-colonial organisations, including the Internationale Arbeiterhilfe
and League against Colonial Oppression, that eventually were transformed into the better known
League against Imperialism. We are shown how a number of specific international movements,
such as Hands Off China and Against the Cruelties in Syria campaigns of 1925, also provided
the constituency from which the LAI was established. The narrative that is presented could be
described as the progress upwards towards the Brussels Congress of February1927 (Part I), the
high point of the congress itself and the confusion of its aftermath (Part II), followed by the
decline of the movement, encapsulated in its enforced relocation to Paris and London in 1933 (Part
III). Petersson shows how the course of the LAI as an organisation was determined by a series of
difficulties: the tense relations that often obtained between the Comintern and the LAI, the
attempts towards control and autonomy among the parties involved, the changing situation in the
Soviet Union particularly after Lenins death in January 1924 and the rise of Stalin and the
consequential changes in Comintern policy, and the rise of fascism in Germany which made it
impossible for the LAI to continue in Berlin after 1933. The broad frame of this narrative is
charted in extraordinary and fascinating detail, with the author managing to keep us in touch with
the overall trajectory of the story whilst painstakingly picking out the often complex and
convoluted relations between the main actors involved, ending in Mnzenbergs own tragic and
ignominious death in June 1940.

While the history of the anti-colonial movements has been told in terms of individual movements,
and from a broader perspective in terms of the global resistance to imperialism that developed into
the decolonization movements after the Second World War, this is the first time that we have been
given a history of the operation of anti-colonial movements within Europe itself. In providing this,
Petersson has provided a new way of understanding the history of colonialism and its opponents in
the twentieth century.

New York University

ii

Acknowledgements
Wir sind keine Phantasten und utopischen Trumer, wir kennen sehr wohl die Grenzen
unserer Krfte und Leistungsmglichkeiten.
The First Congress against Imperialism
and
Colonial
Oppression,
Willi
Mnzenberg, Brussels, 13/2-19271
This study began with an inquiry and has taken me around the world both literally and in the mind.
On my first visit to the Comintern Archive (RGASPI) in Moscow 2004, formerly known as the
Institute for Marxism-Leninism and the Central Party Archive during the Soviet Union, I found
myself astonished by the impression of the house and some of its interiors. Under the stairs,
leading to the first floor, I saw busts of prominent characters and theoreticians which symbolize
the ideological construction of socialism and communism. However, the busts of Marx, Engels,
and Lenin were not placed there for public display, but rather, they were hidden. A couple of years
later during one of my frequent visits to the archive, they were covered by grey cloths, and in
2012, no longer there. The gradual disappearance of the busts in the archive also resembles one of
the primary aims of this dissertation: the recovery, or to be more precise, the re-discovery and
understanding of lost history.
Opportunities to present my research to scrutiny and for discussions have been invaluable for
the development and intellectual refinement of ideas, structuring of the narrative, and to reach an
understanding on the visionaries and utopian dreamers. I thank the organisers, panellists, and
audiences of numerous forums: the research seminar at bo Akademi University; the Swedish
Historical Association for organising Historikerdagarna at Uppsala University in 2005; the
International History Department at Columbia University, New York, for putting together the
Solidarities Through History conference in 2007; the Tvrminne doctoral seminars in 2005 and
2007; the members of the InterSol panel (Holger Weiss, Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Kasper Braskn,
Gleb J. Albert, and Aldo Agosti) at the European Social Science History Conference in Glasgow
2012; and the pioneering effort of the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung (Berlin) to organise the
Europische Willi-Mnzenberg-Arbeitstagung in Berlin, October 2012, together with the
Zentrum fr Zeithistorische Forschung, Potsdam, bo Akademi University, and Instituts fr
Soziale Bewegungen der Ruhr-Universitt Bochum.
The research presented in the following study would not have been possible without the
exceptional assistance provided by research assistant and Ph.D. Tatiana Androsova, Institute of

Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii (RGASPI) 542/1/69, 37-49, Transcript of Willi
Mnzenbergs speech at the Brussels Congress, 13/2-1927.

iii

Universal History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, during my periods visiting and
working in the Comintern Archive. The same goes to the archival staff in the reading rooms on the
4th and 5th floor at RGASPI for allowing me to work in the archive even though it was officially
closed. Additional archives that deserve credit (and of equal importance for my research) are the
Bundesarchiv in Lichterfelde, Berlin; the helpful service from the staff at the Internationaal
Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) in Amsterdam; Arbetarrrelsens arkiv och bibliotek
(Labour Movement Archives and Library) in Stockholm for allowing me to borrow almost every
book on international communism, colonialism, and imperialism; Riksarkivet in Stockholm; the
fortune of stumbling across a vast collection of documents in the Stockholm City Archive; and
finally, thanks to the service from the librarians at Kungliga biblioteket, Stockholm, and bo
Akademi University.
Since this has been a project in the making over the years, which, in comparison to a
continuous process, it has been an undertaking secured by research grants and funding from
different sources. I wish to extend the greatest of gratitude for the scholarships provided from the
bo Akademi University Research Foundation for the one-year scholarship and travel funding; the
Research and Education Board at bo Akademi University; Finlands Akademi for its funding of
the research project Comintern and African Nationalism, 1921 1935; the Centre for
International Mobility (CIMO), Helsinki; Kommerserdet Otto A. Malms donationsfond, Helsinki,
and finally, the Scholarship for Higher Education from Stiftelsen Markussens studiefond in 2012
was a very valuable source to get me across the finishing line. My doctoral studies have also been
one of work in other academic fields and scholarly sites. I wish to thank CHESS and its staff at
Stockholm University; Pia Molander, Jerker Widn and Lars Ericson Wolke at Frsvarshgskolan,
Stockholm; the students and members of the teaching staff at bo Akademi University during my
year as a university teacher in General History; and Tamara, Marina, and the students at Svenska
centret at the Russian State University for the Humanities (RGGU) in Moscow for giving me the
opportunity to expand my ideas on history. To the doctoral students at bo Akademi University
and at other scholarly institutions that either have passed through the eye of the needle, or struggle
to achieve the above, I thank for the comments, advice, and collegial context: Kasper Braskn for
being a colleague and friend, Gleb J. Alberts enthusiasm and expertise, Stefan Norrgrd for
explaining the benefit of using graphs, Anna Sundelin, Hanna Lindberg, Johanna Wassholm,
Matias Kaihovirta, Anders Gustafson, Carl-Johan Svensson, and everyone else not mentioned (you
know who you are).
A number of people deserve credit for having listened to, or given me advice on how to
proceed. Lisa berg introduced the idea of contacting Nils Villstrand, Professor of Nordic History
iv

at bo Akademi University, and the rest is history. Professor Emeritus David Gaunt for pushing
me in the direction, at an early stage, to visit and use archives, as well as giving me the inspiration
to pursue an academic career. This also goes out to Lars Bjrlin, Helen Carlbck, Madeleine Hurd,
Yvonne Hirdman, Jacob Zumoff, Aleksander Kans constructive remarks at an early stage during
my doctoral studies, and to Kim Salomon, Klas-Gran Karlsson and Kristian Gerner at Lund
University. The creative discussion with doctoral student Stephen Fein of the London School of
Economics on the Anti-Imperialist Exhibition in Paris 1931 has stimulated a future collaboration.
Risto Marjomaas participation in the research group Comintern and African Nationalism, 1921
1935, initiated at bo Akademi University in 2004, was a pivotal source of support and
inspiration during our first journeys to Moscow. Music has been (and still is) a source of
inspiration during the piecing together and writing the book, thanks to Greg Dulli and Trent
Reznor for providing it. Docent Bernhard Bayerlein for giving me the chance at an early stage in
my research to publish a synopsis and theoretical idea in The International Newsletter of
Communist Studies in 2005, and later, for including me in its Board of Correspondents. Thanks
goes to Kimmo Rentola, Professor of History at the University of Turku, for reading, commenting,
and writing the examiners report on the first and complete version of the manuscript. To my
second examiner, Robert JC Young, Professor of English, Comparative Literature, at New York
University, I thank for the constructive comments on the text, and for suggesting me to write an
article on the League against Imperialism for publication in the journal Interventions:
International Journal of Post-Colonial Studies, and lastly, for the Commendatory Foreword to this
book. Thanks to the Edwin Mellen Press, and its editors, Patricia Schulz, Irene Harvey, and Iona
Williams, for contacting me and wanting to publish this book.
To the linguistic expertise of Sarah Hale, I have nothing but admiration and respect, especially
for her momentous work in correcting my linguistic turns, editing the text, and to critically
question some of my arguments. Finally, the profoundest of gratitude I give to my supervisor,
Professor of General History, Holger Weiss, at bo Akademi University, whose vision to explore
the activities and networks of African nationalists in the context of international communism
during the interwar years, introduced me to the wonders and enigma of a global history generally
neglected and forgotten. On a more personal note to Weiss, I treasure our discussions on ideas and
the deciphering of particular documents, for providing me with accommodation, and for
journeying beyond the borders of our common interest in history (on the rooftop in Berlin, and the
Moscow experiences). Thanks also to the Weiss family for sharing and caring.
I am entirely responsible for the analytical results, views and conclusions presented in this
book. The freedom I had, while approaching, analysing and understanding the history of the
v

League against Imperialism is that there existed no given framework, thus, I had to create one.
This work would not have been, however, completed without the warm and tolerant support from
my family. First, to my parents, Saga and Hans, and my mother-in-law, Ingela Johnsson, for
helping out in co-ordinating the routines of everyday life, and second, to my two wonderful
children, Linna and Wilhelm, and Emma for putting up with my journey into the past during my
frequent travels away from home, and the occasional mental absences at home.

vi

List of Abbreviations
The readability of a history of an organisation often suffers from the frequent use of acronyms in
sentences and phrases, e.g. the indifferent attitude of the communist parties, especially the PCF,
the CPGB, and the KPD or as members of the CEQCCB. Granted a term of ten working days to
complete a report, the ECCI Secretariat expected the commission to examine the available
documents on the LACO at Comintern headquarters and to present a report. The Resolution of the
CEQCCB was given in person by Roy to the ECCI Secretariat, are almost like a cipher for the
reader. I have made an effort not to use acronyms for organisations mentioned here and there in the
text. However, there has been no getting around the fact that this is a history of an organisation
(the League against Imperialism; LAI), intimately linked to another organisation (the Communist
International; Comintern) which itself had affiliations and links to other organisations,
associations and committees, the majority of which occur so frequently that it has been impossible
to completely avoid the use of abbreviations. However, this does not represent a major problem in
the following study, or as Geerth van Goethem observed, it takes only a small effort to memorise
the most frequently used acronyms.2
AAAIL
Agitprop
A-I-Z
AITUC
ANC
ANLC
ARAB
AUCCSLU
CEQCCB
CGWCC
CIB
CNA
CO
Comintern
CPCh
CPCz
CPGB
CPH
CPSU (B)
CPUSA
ECCI
FESAIL

All American Anti-Imperialist League

Agitation and Propaganda
Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung
All India Trade Union Committee
African National Congress
American Negro Labour Congress
Arbetarrrelsens arkiv och bibliotek (Labour Movement Archives and
Library)
All Union Central Council of Soviet Labour Unions (Allunionistischen
Zentralrats der Sowjetgewerkschaften)
Commission for the Examination of the Question of a Colonial
Congress in Brussels
Commission to Guide the Work of the Colonial Congress
Colonial Information Bureau
Chinese National Agency
Colonial Office
Communist International; Third International
Communist Party of China
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
Communist Party of Great Britain
Communist Party of Holland
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)
Communist Party of the USA
Executive Committee of the Communist International
Far Eastern Secretariat of the Anti-Imperialist League

Geert van Goethem, The Amsterdam International. The world of the International Federation of Trade Union
(IFTU), 1913-1945, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006, pp.8-9.

vii

FWA
HO
IAH
ICC
ICB
ICBu
IFTU
IISG
ILP
ILS
INC
Inprecorr
IRH
ITUC
ITUCNW
KIM
KMT
KOSTUFRA
Krestintern
KUTV
LACO
LAI
LAICNI
LDRN
LHR
LRD
LSI
KPD
MdI
MFGB
NA
NAACP
NAFTA
NAFTU
NEP
NSDAP
OMS
PCF
PI
PKI
Profintern

Furniture Workers Association

Head Office
Internationale
Arbeiterhilfe
(Workers
International
Relief;
Mezhdunarodnaia rabochiia pomoshch, MPR)
International Control Commission
International Colonial Bureau
International Colonial Bureau of the Comintern (1924)
International Federation of Trade Unions; Amsterdam International
Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (International
Institute of Social History)
Independent Labour Party
International Lenin School
Indian National Congress
International Press Correspondence
Internationale Rote Hilfe (Mezhdunarodnaia organizatsiia pomoschchi
revoliutsioneram; International Red Aid; MOPR)
Indian Trade Union Council
International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers of the RILU
Kommunisticheskii Internatsional Molodezhi (Communist Youth
International; CYI)
Kuomintang
Kommunistische Studenten Fraktion (Communist Student Fraction)
Peasants' International (Krestianskii Internatsional)
Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka (Communist
University for Eastern Workers)
League against Colonial Oppression (Liga gegen Koloniale
Unterdrckung)
League against Imperialism and for National Independence (Liga gegen
Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit)
League against Imperialism and Colonial Rule and for National
Independence
Ligue de Dfense de la Race Ngre (League for the Defence of the
Negro Race)
League for Human Rights (Liga fr Menschenrechte)
Labour and Research Department
Labour and Socialist International; the Second International
Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (Communist Party of Germany)
Ministerium des Innern (Prussian Ministry of the Interior)
Miners Federation of Great Britain
National Archive, Stockholm (Riksarkivet)
National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People
National Amalgamated Furniture Trades Association
Native Federation of Trade Unions
New Economic Policy
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (the Nazi Party)
Department for International Liaison (Otdel mezhdunarodnoi sviazi)
Partei Communiste Francais (Communist Party of France)
Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association)
Communist Party of Indonesia
Red
Trade
Union
International
(Krasnyi
internatsional
professionalnykh soiuzov; RILU)
viii

RGASPI
RK
RKO
RMdI
SA
SAPMOBA ZPA
SATUC
SCA
SPD
TNA
TUC
UNIA
WAFU
WASU
WEB
WES
WPA
WZSPS
ZK KPD

Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Arkhiv Socialno-Politicheskoj Istorii

Russian State Archive for Social and Political History), Moscow
Reichskommissar (Reich Commissar)
Reichskommissar fr berwachung der ffentlichen Ordnung (Reich
Commissar for the Supervision of Public Order)
Reichministerium des Innern (Reich Ministry of the Interior)
Sturmabteilung (Storm Troopers of the Nazi Party)
Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im
Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv, Lichterfelde, Berlin
South African Trade Union Congress
Stockholm City Archive (Stockholms stadsarkiv)
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland (Social Democratic Party of
Germany)
The National Archives, Kew, London
Trade Union Council
Universal Negro Improvement Association
West African Farmers Union
West African Students Union
West European Bureau
West European Secretariat
Workers Party of America
see AUCCSLU
Zentralkomitee des Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Germany)
*

ix

We Are Neither Visionaries Nor Utopian Dreamers.

Willi Mnzenberg, the League against Imperialism, and the Comintern,
1925 1933

The chronological sorting of memories is an interesting business.

Donna Tartt, The Secret History (1992)

Introduction
[T]o act as a neutral intermediary between the Communist International and nationalist
movements in the colonies.
Manabendra Nath Roy, Moscow,
Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/5-1926

to

The organisation for a special purpose (Zweckverband) is a peculiarly discreet sociological

formation; its members are in psychological respects anonymous; and, in order to form the
combination, they need to know of each other only that they form it.
Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Secrecy
and of Secret Societies, in American
Journal of Sociology, Nr.11, University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1906, p.449
Achmed Sukarno, the President of Indonesia, stated in his opening speech at the Afro Asian
Conference in Bandung, Indonesia, 17 24 April 1955: I recognise that we are gathered here
today as a result of sacrifices. Sacrifices made by our forefathers and by the people of our own and
younger generations. [] It is a new departure in the history of the world that leaders of Asian and
African peoples can meet together in their own countries to discuss and deliberate upon matters of
common concern. Only a few decades ago it was frequently necessary to travel to other countries
and even other continents before the spokesmen of our peoples could confer. I recall in this
connection the Conference of the League Against Imperialism and Colonialism which was held
in Brussels almost thirty years ago. At that Conference, many distinguished delegates who are
present here today met each other and found new strength in their fight for independence. But that
was a meeting place thousands of miles away, amidst foreign people, in a foreign country, in a
foreign continent. It was not assembled there by choice, but by necessity.1 This was a historical
bond highly treasured by Sukarno, but what did this bond represent? Whilst the Bandung
Conference was the scene of conviction and determination amongst the leaders from twenty-nine

George McTurnan Kahin (ed.), The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955, Cornell University
Press, Ithaca, New York, 1956, p.40. Parts of the quote above are found in Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations. A
Peoples History of the Third World, The New Press, New York, p.30. For an introduction on the Afro Asian
Conference in Bandung, see Christopher J. Lee, Introduction, in Making a World after Empire. The Bandung
Moment and its Political Afterlives, Christopher J. Lee (ed.), Ohio University Press, Athens, 2010, pp.1-32. In
commemoration of the thirtieth anniversary of the Bandung conference, the Indonesian Ambassador in Tunis, S. A. M.
Alaydroes, wrote that the conference was the beginning of a movement in world politics, which had created a
flame, a spirit of solidarity and of determination that kindled the hearts of men and women on a transcontinental level
Africa Asia Latin America, see S. A. M. Alaydroes (Ambassador of Indonesia, Tunis), Thirty Years Asian African
Conference, Ambassade de la Republique DIndonesie, Tunis, 1985, p.1.

African and Asian countries, who had gathered to solve the potential future direction of the postcolonial world, the First Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism in Brussels on
10-14 February 1927 was the scene of euphoria. Representing the place and occasion to celebrate
the inauguration of the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI), the
congress was guided by the spiritual motto National Freedom Social Equality. On 13 February,
Willi Mnzenberg (1889 1940), the German communist and General Secretary of the communist
mass organisation Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (Workers International Relief; IAH; 1921 1935)
which had been set up by the Communist International (the Third International; Comintern; 1919
1943), addressed delegates of anti-colonial movements, leaders of the European left-wing
movement and European intellectuals on the establishment of a permanent worldwide
organisation linking up all forces against imperialism and colonial oppression. Mnzenberg
concluded his speech by stating this time the optimists, believers, have been proven right [].
From this day, the story of the League against Imperialism begins.2 A story referred to, after the
Second World War, in nostalgic terms and which assumed mythological proportions, having the
LAI symbolise the spiritual bond between the colonial liberation movements of the inter-war era
with the ones emerging during the post-war period. Thus, the idea and understanding of the LAI
reached its crescendo at the 1955 Bandung Conference with Sukarnos reference that [I]t was not
assembled there by choice, but by necessity. The Brussels Congress and, later, the establishment
of the LAI, had in fact been the results of meticulous planning and construction rather than by
necessity, in a cleverly-disguised interplay between Mnzenberg, the IAH and the Comintern, an
important focus of the following study.
Mnzenbergs role in the history of the LAI is pivotal. Tied to the Comintern and to the
German communist movement, he experienced a fairly independent organisational and political
position within the Kommunistische Partei Deutschland (KPD). Described by his contemporaries,
as well as in biographies and scholarly works, as the entrepreneurial genius of communist
propaganda and organisational manoeuvres in Europe during the inter-war era, the mythology of
his persona in the historiography of national and international communism is not only obscured, it
is characterised by misconceived narratives. Mnzenberg, one of Lenin's friends, experienced a
thriving and turbulent career within the European communist movement. After having been forced
into exile in Paris once the Nazi Party (Nationalsozialistiche Partei; NSDAP) seized power in

Louis Gibarti (ed.), Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont, Neuer Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1927; IISG LAI
Collection 3392.1/5, Agenda of the Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, Brussels, 10/2-1927;
RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Manuscript of Willi Mnzenbergs speech, Brussels, 13/2-1927. The LAI was alternatively
referred to by its contemporaries and in scholarly works as the Anti-Imperialist League, League against Imperialism
and Colonial Oppression, League against Imperialism and Colonialism. However, throughout this study, the
abbreviation LAI shall be retained as the point of reference.

Germany 1933, his relations to the KPD and the Comintern were cut short in 1938 after, first,
being expelled, and then recognised and described as a persona non grata. Along with other
German communist migrs, Mnzenberg was incarcerated in the Chambaran internment camp on
the direct orders of French authorities after the German invasion of France on 10 May, 1940. In
June the same year, the decision was taken to evacuate the camp, thus, every prisoner was left to
his own devices. What followed is still, to this day, a mystery. On 17 October 1940, two hunters
found Mnzenberg's decomposed body with a noose around his neck, in the forest outside the
French town Montaigne. Saint Marcellin authorities categorised the cause of death as suicide,
although the circumstances leading to Mnzenbergs demise have, in retrospect, produced a series
of interpretations, which suggests that he was murdered either by the German SS or by Soviet
NKVD agents, rather than having committed suicide. The crux of the matter is that the murder
claim is not supported by any empirical evidence. Hence, the conspiratorial perspective has filled
the gap to interpret and explain the reasons behind Mnzenbergs death, although it had also
foreshadowed his life and career within the socialist, pacifist and communist movements.3
Acting as the leader and General Secretary of the IAH, formed on Lenins instructions in
August 1921, Mnzenberg was the architect behind the invisible web of loosely-knit committees,
propaganda campaigns and relief activities outside Soviet Russia. Mnzenbergs fundamental aim,
initially, was to use the committees and campaigns as instruments in procuring material and moral
support for the war-stricken Soviet Russian society, which had suffered famine and destruction
after the Great War and the Russian Civil War in 1918-1921. By adopting the theme of proletarian
solidarity, Mnzenberg hoped to illuminate and unite the political struggle of the working class. It
was an operation and objective which grew and manifested itself over time as a self-perpetuating
propaganda machine but which, first and foremost, abided by the rules and rationale of the
Comintern and the international communist movement during the 1920s.4 The LAI was a part of
3

Research and writings on Mnzenbergs life, career and persona are scattered and elusive and still require a
definitive assessment, in particular his involvement in the Comintern while being active in the service to spread
communism. Babette Grosss political biography, Willi Mnzenberg. Eine politische Biographie, Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, Stuttgart (1967), is a canonical work, which offers an insight into the life and career of Mnzenberg. In
contrast to Gross' book is the biased and ill-conceived interpretation in Sean McMeekins The Red Millionaire. A
Political Biography of Willi Mnzenberg, Moscows Secret Propaganda Tsar in the West (Yale University Press, New
Haven, 2003), a work complemented by Stephen Kochs attempt to understand Mnzenbergs activities as disclosed in
Double Lives: Stalin, Willi Mnzenberg and the Seduction of the Intellectuals (Harper Collins, London, 1995). A more
thorough account of the last years of Mnzenberg's life is given in Harald Wessel, Mnzenbergs Ende. Ein deutscher
Kommunist im Widerstand gegen Hitler und Stalin. Die Jahre 1933 bis 1940, Dietz Verlag Berlin, 1991, and, the short
biography provided in Hermann Weber and Andreas Herbst (Hrsg.), Deutsche Kommunisten Biographisches
Handbuch 1918 bis 1945, Karl Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp.521-524.
4
Interpretations of the IAH and Mnzenberg are found in the works mentioned above. See further in the dated, but
valid accounts in Helmut Gruber, Willi Munzenbergs German Communist Propaganda Empire 1921-1933, in The
Journal of Modern History, Vol. 38, No. 3, University of Chicago (Sep., 1966), pp.278-297, and, Robert Nigel Carew
Hunt, Willi Muenzenberg, in International Communism, St Antonys Papers Number 9, David Footman (ed.), Chatto
& Windus, London, 1960, pp.72-87. PhD student Kasper Braskns forthcoming thesis on the conceptual framing and

this process. However, the organisation was also the result of the IAHs ambition to assist the
Comintern in spreading communism around the world. In Brussels, in February 1927, Mnzenberg
wanted everyone to observe that the congress was tremendous and historically significant due to
the fact that it had managed to link together liberal thinkers with workers representatives, as
well as political and trade union organisations in Europe and the USA. Bringing the congress to a
euphoric finale, Mnzenberg provided the crowd with a feeling of relief and collective joy which
aimed to embrace, wrap up, and shed light on the spiritual message that a movement against
colonialism and imperialism had finally been created: [W]e have come together, we have got to
know and feel that we belong together and must stay together. [] We know very well that a
conference only offers a limited opportunity, the effect and the work must be carried out outside on
the real battlefields.5
This study is based on primary archival sources; documents which throw new light on the
mythological proportions the LAI and the Brussels Congress have, over time, acquired. Whilst
post-colonial or subaltern studies work within their own contextual settings, chronological
divisions and separations of time, I shall be interpreting the LAI as a source of concerted
inspiration for the liberation movements in the colonial and semi-colonial countries after the
Second World War, which set ablaze the process of decolonisation.6 However, is the history of the
LAI a precursor to the history of decolonisation and post-colonialism? The issue is far more
complex and intricate than this. For example, it is connected to different sets of chronologies, e.g.
the decolonisation process and post-colonialism. However, the LAI is also unquestionably linked
to the political developments of the inter-war years (1918 1939) and, above all, to the
chronology and study of international communism and the Comintern.
*

practical usage of solidarity as a political delineator in the context of the IAH and Mnzenberg shall contribute with an
in-depth understanding of the ramifications of the IAH as a part of the German communist movement in the inter-war
years.
5
RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Manuscript of Willi Mnzenbergs speech, Brussels, 13/2-1927. Euphoria as a concept and
its implications is discussed in Richard Stites intriguing study of utopia and experimentalism in the Soviet Union; see
Richard Stites, Revolutionary Dreams. Utopian Vision and Experimental Life in the Russian Revolution, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1989, p.39.
6
See Prashad (2007); Lee (2010); Robert J. C. Young, Postcolonialism. An Historical Introduction, Blackwell
Publishing, Oxford, 2001; Dohra Ahmad, Landscapes of Hope. Anti-Colonial Utopianism in America, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2009; Jrgen Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien zu
Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gttingen, 2001; David B. Abernethy,
The Dynamics of Global Dominance. European Overseas Empires, 1415-1980, Yale University Press, New Haven,
2000; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 2000; Dipesh Chakrabarty, The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of
Culture, in Lee (ed.) 2010, pp.45-68; Marc Ferro, Colonization. A Global History, World Heritage Press, Quebec,
1997.

The Mosaic of the Research

The European continent was shattered after the ending of the Great War in November 1918.
Characterised by the loss of millions of lives, an indescribable devastation on all societal levels, a
number of former, major European empires had either collapsed or were confronted by revolution:
tsarist rule in Russia and the Romanovs, the Austro-Hungarian Empire under the Habsburgs, the
Ottoman Empire and the rule of the Hohenzollerns in Germany. It was the dawning of a new era
for mankind, as the end of the war set in motion new ideas and movements which, during the
inter-war years (1918 1939) challenged former systems of international relations and called into
question the existing structures of global order, sending vibrations throughout Europe and beyond.
It was within the context of the aftermath of a great ordeal which, according to historian Zara
Steiners study on the reconstruction of Europe after the war, the 1920s has to be understood as a
post-war and not a pre-war decade to the 1930s. Hence, the global society witnessed the coexistence of old and new structures, which in turn determined the character of international
relations after the war. The principles required to secure world peace and restore global order were
outlined in the renowned Fourteen Points, formulated and presented by the President of the USA,
Woodrow Wilson, in spirit and flesh at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, which celebrated the
establishment of the guarantor of world peace, the League of Nations. These peace negotiations
were epochal in the history of international relations, providing the emotional and ideological
impetus to increase the demand for national self-determination for all peoples. This was a message
which set ablaze the hopes of nationalists from the colonial and semi-colonial world who had
arrived in Paris to pursue the struggle for national independence and liberation for their countries.
The representatives of anti-colonial movements hoped to be a part of and to influence the
Wilsonian moment. Thus, for a brief moment, Wilson assumed the icon-like status of the
guarantor of a righteous and better world. This was, however, a vision which faded rather quickly
as, according to Erez Manela, it left in its trail bitter dissolution. Instead, the peace conference
provided an arena for the victorious Entente: USA, Great Britain, France and, to a lesser degree,
Italy. The conference celebrated in ritualistic terms a new global divide. For Germany, the peace
negotiations were particularly humiliating, as the Entente held on to their colonial possessions,
whilst the victorious nations distributed former German colonies amongst themselves, redesignated as mandates. The political and social classes in Germany experienced the Versailles
Peace Treaty as degrading, particularly the vast war reparation demands. This defined the picture
of the newly-born republic the Weimar Republic as having been born in defeat. Confronted
not only by the hostility of foreign nations, German society faced a revolutionary attempt by the
communists during the November Revolution in 1918, which culminated in the transformation
5

of the Spartacist Group, under Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknechts leadership, into the KPD in
December the same year.7 For the anti-colonial representatives present in Paris at the peace
conference, it was a question of positioning themselves within the new world order, which was
either characterised by nationalism and the principle of self-determination, or the Bolshevik
conception of internationalism. With the removal of the tsarist regime after the February revolution
in Russian in 1917, and the ensuing Bolshevik coup in Petrograd in October the same year, the
international political scene included a radical and new actor which attracted attention from the
anti-colonial movement. The anti-colonial movements criticised the civilising mission of European
empires in the colonial and semi-colonial countries; a practice put into effect during the height of
colonialism in the nineteenth century. Thus, representatives for these movements focused solemnly
on one particular object of interest, that of achieving national liberation based on the principles of
self-determination. This was a process and a frame of mind which, according to Vijay Prashads
observation, inspired the anti-colonial nationalist movement to produce a series of gatherings
and a language of anti-colonialism which elicited an emotional loyalty among its circle and
beyond.8
The Wilsonian moment had evaporated by the end of 1919, whereupon the agenda and
language of the anti-colonial movements turned towards the internationalism and solidarity
embraced by the socialist movement. In some cases, the radicalism of communism and the display
of popular utopia that the Bolsheviks in Soviet Russia espoused justice, community and rebellion
enabled the anti-colonial movement to be perceived as the answer to creating a foundation for
the struggle against colonialism and imperialism.9 This became evident with the establishment of
the Comintern in Petrograd on 3-7 March 1919, which aimed to function as a political response to
the so-called failure of the international labour movement, particularly the Second International
(the Labour and Socialist International; LSI), to protest against the imperialist war. However, the
Comintern aspired to creating not just a Communist world, but also a world of communism.10 In

Zara Steiner, The Lights That Failed. European International History 1919-1933, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
2005, pp.1-5, 602-603; Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment. Self-Determination and the International Origins of
Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.3-7; Eric D. Weitz, Creating German
Communism, 1890-1990. From Popular Protests to Socialist State, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1997, pp.8395; Kevin McDermott & Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern. A History of International Communism From Lenin to Stalin,
Macmillan Press, Houndmills, 1996, p.11; Andrs Sikls, Revolution in Hungary and the Dissolution of the
Multinational State 1918, Budapest, 1988. The Spartacist Uprising was thwarted in January 1919 by the
paramilitary Freikorps, culminating in the brutal murder of Luxemburg and Liebknecht in Berlin.
8
Prashad 2007, p.13. For a discussion on civilizing mission, see further in Michael Adas, Contested Hegemony.
The Great War and the Afro-Asian Assault on the Civilizing Mission, in Lee (ed.) 2010, pp.69-106.
9
Manela 2007, p.7; Carsten Holbraad, Internationalism and Nationalism in European Political Thought, Palgrave
Macmillan, New York, 2003, p.69; Joachim Schrder, Internationalismus nach dem Krieg. Die Beziehungen zwischen
deutschen und franzsischen Kommunisten 1918-1923, Klartext Verlag, Essen, 2008; Stites 1989, p.14.
10
Alexander Vatlin, Die Komintern. Grndung, Programmatik, Akteure, Karl Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp.34-39;

this world of communism, anti-colonialism and the colonial question proved, however, to be a
daunting challenge for the Comintern. In principle, the question focused on justifying arguments to
provide an ideological and organisational base for the anti-colonial movement in the heart of world
revolution, i.e. Bolshevism, the Comintern and international communism, although communism,
as defined as the societal phenomenon in Russian history which existed as an ideology and a state
system for 73 years (1917 1991), is a topic usually interpreted and understood in terms of its
rigid monolithic structure, repression and terror. However, from an ideological perspective,
communism is a movement and political tradition which belongs to the radical social labour
movement where, as noted by Hermann Weber, communism builds upon the utopian vision to
create a better world.11

Berlin was the capital of the Weimar Republic, a mosaic and hefty brew of political, cultural and
social expressions as well as home to about four million residents during the inter-war years. To
walk around the city, as suggested in Eric D. Weitz study of Weimar Germany, was to experience
voyeuristically the components of German society during the inter-war years. Most importantly,
Berlin provided a political space, determined by the heritage of the Great War and the humiliating
Versailles Peace Treaty, characterised by hope and despair, political struggles in public and
informal spheres but also by intensity and expectations, cultural relations unified in connections
linked together in networks.12 The history of the LAI is firmly rooted in Berlin as much as Berlin
was firmly rooted in the LAI. The heart of the LAI was the International Secretariat, the pivotal
link in establishing and sustaining communist as well as anti-colonial networks. Located at 24
Friedrichstrae, in the hub of the government and entertainment districts, the International
Secretariat was within walking distance of the IAH headquarters at 48 Wilhelmstrae. However, in
order to bring to mind the topography of where the International Secretariat was once located (its
actual position having been physically obliterated at the end of the Second World War), one must
stand at the Checkpoint Charlie intersection, the symbol of the Cold War. During the 1920s,
Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe, Introduction, in International communism and the Communist International 1919-43,
Tim Rees and Andrew Thorpe (eds.), Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1998, p.10. Vatlin suggests that the
Germanocentrist paradigm explains why the KPD holds a dominant role in the historiography of the international
communist movement and the Comintern. However, other elements need to be included in the equation, Vatlin argues,
e.g. Lenins position and the ensuing effects of his death in 1924; the political development(s) in the Soviet Union;
and, the isolation of the European communist movement in Europe, see Aleksandr Vatlin, The Theory and Practice of
World Revolution in the Perception of Inter-war Europe. An Attempt at a Historical Generalisation, in Politics and
Society under the Bolsheviks, McDermott & Morison (eds.), Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1999, pp.245-249.
11
For the distinction on rigid systems and the historical tradition of communism as a radical labour movement, see
Hermann Weber, The Stalinization of the KPD, in Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern. Perspectives on
Stalinization, 1917-53, LaPorte, Morgan, & Worley (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2008, pp.27-28; Ahmad
2009, p.8.
12
Eric D. Weitz, Weimar Germany. Promise and Tragedy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007, pp.41-79.
According to Weitz, Weimar was Berlin, Berlin Weimar.

however, the neon-lit pavement and goings-on on Friedrichstrae symbolised modern Berlin, a city
shaped by liberalism and radicalism, which offered pleasurable entertainments of all sorts.13
Berlin was the administrative hub for the international communist movement in Europe.
Described as the Comintern's global village, the city provided the communists with a scene for
its activities and, most importantly, an impetus rooted in the peoples deep resentment towards the
Versailles Peace Treaty, which kept feeding the radicalism on the extreme Left and Right.
According to Karl Schlgels topographic analysis of the Weimar capital, Red Berlin represented
a place that reproduced and physically distributed the social and political image of Bolshevism and
the Soviet Union. As the Org-Welt of the Comintern, the communist movement used Berlin to
administrate and co-ordinate its activities across the world. Hence, the city, covered by networks
linking together the activities of the Comintern, was a haven for the KPD and the communist
planetary system of mass and sympathising organisations as well as for foreign residents. For the
KPD, Berlin resembled a hotbed in which to organise and continue the struggle to represent itself
as the safeguard for the German proletariat against social democracy and fascism, an undertaking
which reached a bitter end after the NSDAP seized power on 30 January, 1933.14
The radicalism and explicit political milieu of Berlin corresponded to the desires and
expectations among individuals who belonged to the colonial migr community. Either living in
the capital as students, journalists or as sojourners in a continent which had instigated the modern
system of colonialism during the nineteenth century, the anti-colonial movement found a haven in
Berlin. According to the demands of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had to renounce its colonial
possessions to the victorious powers, which produced a confused relationship to and understanding
of colonialism and imperialism in Germany during the 1920s. In turn, this gave impetus to the
activities of the anti-colonial movement in the country.15 Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime
Minister of India in 1947, attended the Brussels Congress and, as an elected member of the LAI
Executive Committee Berlin, visited Berlin in 1927 after the congress. In the city, Nehru realised
that a majority of the activities carried out by the 5,000 colonial residents in the colonial
metropolis, had links to either radical or communist movements. The political discussions

13

Karl Schlgel, Berlin Ostbahnhof Europas. Russen und Deutsche in ihrem Jahrhundert, Siedler Verlag, Berlin,
1998, pp.163-165; Brendon 2002, pp.125-126. The LAI International Secretariat was located at the headquarters of
IAH at 48 Wilhelmstrae in 1927. From 1928 to 1931, the International Secretariat had a bureau at 24 Friedrichstrae
and, in 1932-33, 13 Hedemannstrae functioned as a refuge for its activities.
14
Schlgels informative account of Red Berlin, the global village of the Comintern, includes the notation that
Mnzenberg was one of the most important Comintern representatives in Berlin. Yet there is no mention of any of the
functions and activities of the LAI or the anti-colonial movement, see Schlgel 1998, pp.136-158; Weitz 1997, p.280.
15
Gross 1967, p.197; Mary E. Townsend, The Contemporary Colonial Movement in Germany, in Political Science
Quarterly, Vol.43, No.1 (Mar., 1928), The Academy of Science, pp.64-75; Jared Poley, Decolonization in Germany.
Weimar Narratives of Colonial Loss and Foreign Occupation, Peter Lang, Oxford (2005).

amongst Indian nationalists focused on expressing anti-colonial ideas, which aimed to create some
kind of action or movement in support of the oppressed nations.16
The following study refers to place as a decisive prerequisite determining the LAIs
opportunities in both carrying out political activism and its results. Eric D. Weitz writes that
German communists did not operate in an environment of their own choosing, an observation
which can also be applied to the colonial people who were living in Berlin during the inter-war
years. The political space in which the LAI and the International Secretariat existed, defined itself
by both the potential and limitations of place. For example, the organisation and carrying out of
public rallies, demonstrations, the scheduling and preparation of curricular activity, the openness
and restrictiveness of city plazas and markets; and how national and local security services
administrated its surveillance, solely in order to monitor the activities and relations between the
German communist movement and colonial individuals. All of the above represent arenas which
housed realms of political engagement and conflict.17 Place represents a particular symbolic role
in this study; but why? The political backdrop in Berlin contributed to the shaping of the political
identity amongst the individuals engaged in the LAI. As a common meeting ground, the physical
location of the International Secretariat functioned as an intersection of particular bundles of
activity spaces, of connections and inter-relations, of influences and movements, which in turn
the LAI and the Comintern supported feverishly.18 The International Secretariat wanted to pose as
the location and hub for the anti-imperialist movement in Europe and beyond; however, its
relations with its ideological and material supporter, the Comintern headquarters in Moscow, was
the determining factor behind this.
A majority of the ideas introduced by the LAI never came to fruition, however. The history of
the Comintern is a significant part of the LAI narrative. This world party was dissolved on the
direct orders of Stalin in 1943, during the turbulence of Second World War, and was interpreted as
having been a failed political actor of grandiose proportions. However, by interpreting the world of
communism(s) as a failure is a rash mistake. Such a postulation reproduces and strengthens the
misconception of the history of communism, while at the same time neglecting the activities and
16

Jawaharlal Nehru, An Autobiography with musings on recent events in India (first edition: 1936), The Bodley Head,
London, 1953, p.161. The term colonial metropolis is further discussed in Jennifer Anne Boittin, Colonial
Metropolis. The Urban Grounds of Anti-Imperialism and Feminism in Interwar Paris (University of Nebraska, 2010);
Brent Hayes Edwards, The Shadow of Shadows, in Positions II:I, Duke University Press, 2003, pp.11-49.
17
Weitz 1997, p.6.
18
The discussion on place is taken from human geography research, see, for example, Doreen Massey, The
conceptualization of place, in A Place in the World?, Doreen Massey and Pat Jess (eds.), Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1995, pp.58-59. Historian Josephine Fowlers study on Japanese and Chinese immigrant activists during the
inter-war years includes a theoretical discussion on place as a conceptual framework and uniting concept to create as
well as sustain influence in political movements. Further, Fowler bases her discussion on Masseys definition of
place, see Josephine Fowler, Japanese and Chinese Immigrant Activists. Organizing in American and International
Communist Movements, 1919-1933, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 2007, p.5.

undertakings of the communist parties and its mass and sympathising organisations. Above all,
such a perspective reduces the value and history of the individuals, the majority of which devoted
their entire lives as visionaries and believers to creating a world of communism. The following
study aims, therefore, to fill in the gaps, silences and histories which remain in the shadows;
hence, it is a recovery of lost history.19 This is a perspective that concerns a historiographical
distinction of good and bad histories,20 which depends on placing the history of the LAI within
its proper context. What is the aim of this approach? This narrative strives to look behind the onedimensional contention that communism, as an ideology, was the only motive endorsing the LAI
and its activities. The fundamental quest is, firstly, to achieve an understanding as to the structure
and ideology which united the LAI, Comintern and the anti-imperialist movement. This requires
an examination of the inner dynamics and structures linking the network together, e.g. ideology,
institutions and individuals. Secondly, this analysis aims to discern how loyalties and obligations
evolved over time, space and place by evaluating and discussing the history of the LAI in order to
reach an understanding of the organisation's achievements and its historical legacy. Intertwined
with all of the historical twists and turns outlined above, this analysis strives to place itself within
the LAI by looking outwards from the inside. Its purpose and aim is to investigate the networks
and structural dynamics of the system which emerged and gained momentum once the IAH and
the Comintern had decided to establish and support the LAI. The following study is an in-depth
study of how and why the euphoria of the Brussels Congress evaporated, only to be replaced by
despair.
The comprehensive aim of this thesis is to analyse and interpret the inner structure and
functions of the LAI. My first point of departure will be the causal dynamics after the Comintern
endorsed the decision to establish and support the LAI as a cover for Comintern activities in the
19

The argumentation on gaps, silences and lost history is found in Fowler (2007, pp.12-14). Franz Borkenau, a
former communist and engaged in the KPD and the Comintern, was one of the first critics to describe the Comintern
as a failure in his examination of the world party in 1938 (while it still existed). Borkenau argued that the history of
the Comintern can be summed up as a series of hopes and disappointments, Franz Borkenau, The Communist
International, Faber and Faber Limited, London, 1938, p.413. This one-dimensional opinion contrasts the approach
introduced by historian Jane Degras in 1965. According to Degras, any research on the Comintern has to look beyond
failure as the end of the Comintern, in fact, is an understanding refuted as an irrelevant question. On the contrary,
any examination of the Comintern should focus on discerning its accomplishments. Failure, as a paradigm, rests on the
postulation that the Comintern was a structure and idea established in a milieu characterised by a misreading of sociopolitical conditions, whilst its sudden liquidation in 1943 was an embarrassing moment for the promoters of world
revolution. In conclusion, Degras states that the history of the Comintern deserves a broader context, which includes
the epochal event the Russian revolution and the emergence of the Bolsheviks as the trumpeters of state power.
Hence, the Comintern is inseparable from Soviet history, see Jane Degras, The Communist International 1919-1943,
Documents Volume III, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965, p.ix. Historian Apollon Davidson et al. (2003)
introduced a similar argumentation, stating that the Comintern was without doubt one of the most important global
organisations ever to have existed, see Apollon Davidson; Irina Filatova; Valentin Gorodnov & Sheridan Johns (eds.),
South Africa and the Communist International: a Documentary History. Volume I, Socialist Pilgrims to Bolshevik
Footsoldiers, 1919-1930, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p.1.
20
Chakrabarty 2000, pp.97-99.

10

shape of a sympathising organisation (for more, see below). Secondly, to analyse whether there
existed any patterns of independence of the International Secretariat and, on the basis of the above,
how the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow implemented its practices in
subjugating the LAI. While the LAI represented itself in public as a non-party organisation,
claiming to have no affiliations with any political party or ideological conviction, the LAI was a
political actor nonetheless. Intertwined with the Comintern and its network of subsidiary sections
the national communist parties, the mass and sympathising organisations this thesis aims to
introduce a historie totale of an organisation which is largely a marginalised feature within the
historiography of international communism. One must not forget, however, that the LAI was the
symbol of a political message which the engaged individuals treasured highly and which was
worth defending. After the Second World War, some of these individuals became influential
agenda-makers in the post-war societies, particularly in the decolonisation process. At the same
time, one finds individuals who ended up as casualties to an ideology, communism, which they
had regarded as being the answer and solution with which to retaliate against the system of
colonialism and imperialism. The general expectation of this thesis is to present and establish a
more nuanced understanding of a particular aspect of communist inter-war history. This study of
the LAI brings to light what went on behind the faade and the often made-up plot.
The study of the LAI is a topic one can approach from different perspectives. The retrospective
and nostalgic approach, for example, places the LAI within the context of decolonisation, a story
which culminates in the 1955 Bandung conference. Yet, this perspective only confirms the
mythology of the LAI and strengthens its ambiguous history. Thus, the initial and determinant
perspective offers a more constructive approach. The initial perspective focuses on the initial
purpose, intentions and goals of the LAI: e.g. how the LAI and the Comintern interacted to reach
an understanding on how and why they collaborated to achieve the outspoken hopes attributed to
the LAI. This perspective also helps to determine the origin of the LAI, and to explain how and
why the LAI carried out its various strategies and directives, sanctioned by the Comintern, or
whether the organisation acted independently.21 The determinant perspective focuses on two
aspects, the distinction between external and internal factors, in order to evaluate the result and
consequences of particular events and episodes. The external framework, or as Hermann Weber
refers to it, the exogenous explanations, determines the structural position of the LAI within a
general political and social context. For example, the emergence of the political struggle in the
Soviet Union and Weimar Germany; the ideological twists and turns inside the Comintern; the
trans-continental relations; and finally, the NSDAPs ascendancy to power in Germany, which
21

For a discussion on reasons and causality, see C. Behan McCullagh, The Truth of History, Routledge, London, 1998,
pp.236-238.

11

marked the literal end of the Weimar Republic after the Reichstag Fire in Berlin on 27 February
1933. The internal factors focus on the structural constraints and obligations imposed on the LAI,
particularly its relations with Comintern headquarters in Moscow. This is, essentially, a question
which addresses how the actors interacted to assess the course of the LAI, e.g. by establishing a
number of working commissions in Moscow. Furthermore, this analysis aims to expose how the
process to work out and formulate directives in the departments at Comintern headquarters
developed, and to reveal the system set up by the communists to monitor and register how the
European-based anti-imperialist movement was progressing over time.22 At this stage, therefore, it
is logical to introduce the following two assumptions. Firstly, if perceived as a pawn in a larger
scheme, whether the LAI acted exclusively as a promoter and defender of Soviet foreign policy.
Secondly, whether the LAI was a unique entity, considered by the Comintern to be one of the most
valuable organisations outside the Soviet Union, the main purpose of which was to find and
establish contact with anti-colonial activists in Berlin and beyond. Yet, in the end, did the LAI
willingly carry out its obligation to act as a distributor of Bolshevik propaganda in Europe, the
USA, Latin America as well as in the colonial and semi-colonial countries on a global scale?
The fundamental field of enquiry of this study focuses on the question of motive, purpose and
intention: i.e. why the LAI was established. The analysis has a chronological framework; however,
thematic questions narrow down the postulation that the LAI was an ideological and organisational
instrument of particular value for the Comintern in order to expand the colonial work of the
international communist movement. Thus, the question addresses the need to discern patterns of
relations by following a number of research questions: what was the character and nature of the
process leading to the establishment of the LAI in February 1927? Was it one of mutual
understanding between the actors in Berlin, the IAH and Mnzenberg and Comintern headquarters
in Moscow? How did the International Secretariat and the Comintern experience and respond to
the effects of the LAI in 1927? Was the LAI self-sustaining, based on its own organisational
strength, or was the International Secretariat dependent on receiving regular support from the
Comintern? Of equal relevance is to address the question on whose behalf the LAI aimed its
activities and its political agenda. Was the LAI merely a cover organisation for and serving the
interests of the Comintern, or did the LAI promote an independent anti-imperialist agenda which
22

Hermann Weber discuss exogenous and endogenous factors in his reassessment of the KPD in connection with new
empirical findings and scholarly conclusions after the opening of the Russian archives, see Weber (LaPorte, Morgan &
Worley [eds.]) 2008, pp.22-44. The political scientist Philip Selznick emphasizes in his the study of Bolshevik
strategy and tactics (1952) the need to discern externally and inherent tensions. Externally relates to when an
organisation faces a harsh environment, leading to inner stress and adaptive change of both the organisation and its
environment, whilst the inherent tension is generated by the very act of delegation, which creates new centres of
interest and power [] an indispensable phase of organizational experience, see Philip Selznick, The Organizational
Weapon A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics (Second Edition), The Free Press of Glencoe, Illinois, 1960, pp.xxi.

12

attracted the anti-colonial movement? This last question concerns how the LAI made its antiimperialist agenda known to the public, e.g. propaganda campaigns, public meetings, conferences
or congresses. Thus, these public displays of propaganda form a crucial part of this study; in
particular, to evaluate the process of how the Comintern and the International Secretariat prepared
their campaigns and congresses. The last thematic thread addresses the nature of the LAI and its
actual historical legacy from a short and long perspective. How did the involved actors perceive
and experience the LAI? In addition, is it possible to verify hierarchical relations between the
actors, both on an individual and an institutional level?
The reason why there is an emphasis on chronology in this analysis is due to the structure of
the empirical material and the relative scarcity of previous research. Furthermore, this is a history
of the life and decline of an organisation. According to historian Geert van Goethem, the history
of an organisation is likewise the story of a life. Thus, such a perspective promotes chronology
with all its restrictions and narrative pitfalls, which in turn imply thorough and separate
evaluations. A thematic approach would, however, face similar pitfalls. For example, anticolonialism and the Comintern; the European anti-imperialist movement and its peripheries; the
colonial question and the left-wing movement in Europe; or the structure and impact of
colonialism and imperialism in a socio-political context during the inter-war years, thematic
departures which would have to (largely) ignore the organisational dynamics and scope of the LAI.
Therefore, to assess the political and organisational life of the LAI, this analysis merges
chronology with thematic approaches.23 The LAI, particularly the deliberations and activities
developed at the nerve centre the International Secretariat in Berlin is the focus of our
evaluation and analysis. On the one hand, its relations to the Comintern and, on the other hand, the
individuals involved in dispersing anti-imperialism as an idea and as an activity. Several episodes
or cases have posed a challenge to understand, e.g. why the decision-making process at Comintern
headquarters assumed the direction it did and how this affected the International Secretariat. Much
of the above, however, concerns the policy shifts that the Comintern promoted during the
chronological limitation of the study, 1925-1933. This was a period, commonly understood in
terms of Bolshevization and Stalinization, in which the Comintern subjected the sections to swift
policy changes. Whilst the LAI had been founded during the height of the united front strategy, by
1928 however, the Comintern had changed course and introduced the radical doctrine of the third
period, also known as the new line, or the infamous class against class policy,24 which left in

23

Goethem 2006, p.8.

Jrgen Rojahn, A Matter of Perspective: Some Remarks on the Periodization of the History of the Communist
International, in Centre and Periphery. The History of the Comintern in the Light of New Documents, Mikhail
Narinsky and Jrgen Rojahn (eds.), IISG, Amsterdam, 1996, pp.35-45.
24

13

its wake much confusion and had immense consequences for the international communist
movement. Another qualitative perspective, which is vital for the general context, is to make the
distinction between the LAI as a representative for the anti-imperialist movement; and the
intertwined relations of the LAI with the Comintern and the international communist movement,
an organisational prerequisite that existed from beginning to end. However, after the NSDAP came
to power in Germany in 1933, the International Secretariat escaped to Paris and, in August the
same year, the apparatus of the LAI was transferred to London, and finally dissolved
undramatically in 1937.25 The study and ambition of this thesis do not, however, strive to analyse
the endeavours of the International Secretariat in Paris or London. The focal point is to discern
how and why the actors at the International Secretariat in Berlin realised that the LAI had come to
the end-of-the-road in Berlin, due to reasons beyond their control.
This thesis is not a study of how the German communist movement created proletarian
solidarity as an expression to orchestrate political and social campaigns to amass support from a
moral or a financial perspective. Neither is it a study of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU [B]; Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks); RCP [B]), nor of the KPD. However, one
cannot disregard the influence and omnipotent role of the CPSU (B) and the KPD within the
communist movement during the inter-war years. Nevertheless, the history of the LAI is not out of
necessity written in the context of these two communist parties. Other contexts are equally
relevant, e.g. the policing and monitoring carried out by national security services and the politics
of empire; colonial liberations movements, the spread of radicalism and communism on a global
scale, and the incursion of ideologies within Weimar Germany and their expressions on a sociopolitical level.
This thesis is a critical investigation of the LAI, based on how the contemporary actors
experienced, described and referred to the organisation. Represented by its protagonists: the
international communist movement, anti-colonial activists and the Comintern, as well as by its
antagonists: the various national security services across the world, the European socialist
movement and particularly the LSI,26 the LAI was one of few political actors, which seriously
questioned and criticised the system of colonialism and imperialism during the inter-war years.
Further, the covert activities, sponsored and carried out by the LAI, offer a complex account of the
25

John Saville, The League Against Imperialism, 1927-1937, in Dictionary of Labour Biography, Volume VII,
Macmillan Press, London, 1984, p.46.
26
The LSI made efforts to oppose the political agenda and origin of the LAI. Founded in 1889, the LSI acted as the
official representative for every European socialist party, functioning as an umbrella organisation influenced by the
Marxist maxim, which aimed to protect and support the democratic process, the peaceful development of political
power, and to regulate the labour market. The LSI's main ambition was the establishment of a broad political agenda in
order to act as a political power on a national and international level, see Donald Sassoon, One Hundred Years of
Socialism. The West European Left in the Twentieth Century, Harper Collins, London, 1996, pp.xx-xxi.

14

difficulties experienced gaining momentum in an organisation which introduced itself as a

sympathising organisation, but which was also a cover organisation for the Comintern. Introducing
itself in public as a radical non-party organisation, and yet its links to the Comintern largely
determined the course of its history. Established in a milieu of consent and hope, both the LAI and
the International Secretariat witnessed how the balance of power shifted in favour of the decisionmaking process at the Comintern headquarters in Moscow. This did not, however, imply the end of
the LAI; it merely resulted in the LAI ending up serving other purposes than the one originally
intended: to act as the Comintern's intermediary in colonial and semi-colonial countries.
*
Previous Research: Historiography in Passim
The scholarly interest and historiographical trends in international communism and the Comintern,
as both a social and a political phenomenon, introduce a vast academic vista. In the aftermath of
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, formerly closed archives were finally allowed the light of
day in Moscow, a prerequisite that finally provided the scholarly community with the possibility of
studying the Comintern and the impact of international communism as a political, cultural, social
and economic actor. Thus, in the early 1990s, this gave rise to an increase in rich empirical studies
of the Comintern and of the global impact of communism.27 However, some aspects of
international communism faced a reverse trend. Research on international actors that had intimate
and structural relations to the Comintern the mass and sympathising organisations are often
characterised by misconceptions and ambiguity. In reference to the LAI, two conclusions shed
some light on the existing dilemma. According to the correct observation made by historian Peter
Martin in the article Die Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung in Ulrich van der Heyden, and
Joachim Zellers anthology on German colonialism, the interest in this organisation has, for a
long time, been at a low ebb, while Vijay Prashad concludes that the legacy of the LAI is
ambiguous despite its connection to the Bandung Conference in 1955.28 The basic challenge here
is two-fold. Firstly, to draw a distinction between historiographical trends and scholarly fields and,
secondly, to discuss the academic and narrative contexts which have examined, interpreted and
presented the LAI as a historical topic. Is the question of the LAI and its history exclusively a part
of the historiography of the Comintern, or is it likewise a part of the history of decolonisation and
27

Weitz 1997, p.12. Weitz resembled the results from the scholarly community as a great outpouring of rich empirical
studies which, however, offered few new questions or approaches to the history of communism.
28
Peter Martin, Die Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, in Macht und Anteil an der Weltherrschaft. Berlin
und der deutsche Kolonialismus, Ulrich van der Heyden, Joachim Zeller (Hrsg.), Unrast Verlag, Berlin, 2005, pp.261269. Martin's focus is to introduce the process that led to the establishment of the LAI in Brussels, February 1927,
above all on the forerunner to the LAI, the League against Colonial Oppression (established in Berlin on 10 February,
1926); Prashad 2007, p.29, 32.

15

the post-colonial critique? From a broader perspective, the topic of the LAI has been marginalised,
treated and described in a peripheral sense when it comes to historical works of a general character
on the inter-war period, above all in critical studies on international communism, anti-colonial
movements, anti-imperialism as both a theory and practice, and the international labour movement.
All of which can be wholly explained by the fact that previous research has limited itself either to
pondering limitations, possibilities and cursory generalisations or through a biased framework.
Firstly, John D. Hargreaves states in African Affairs (1993) that the collapse of the Soviet Union
and the subsequent opening up of the Russian archives greatly enhanced possibilities for
research on anti-colonial movements and the LAI. This was, however, an observation which had
already been made by John Saville in his momentous survey of the British labour movement
(1984), concluding that any attempt to write a comprehensive evaluation of the LAI and its anticolonial history would fail because of the current inaccessibility to the empirical material locked
away in Moscow. In 2008, historian Jonathan Derrick continued developing arguments on the
challenge of conducting a closer study of episodes, themes or individuals linked to anti-colonial
activity and organisations such as the LAI in his study of militant anti-colonialism in Africa and
the West during the inter-war years.29 Secondly, the empirical and ground-breaking study of the
LAI by historian Mustafa Haikal, as introduced in the anthology Aufstieg und Zerfall der
Komintern (1992), based exclusively (for the first time) on documents filed in the Comintern
Archive in Moscow (RGASPI), offered a first glimpse into the possibilities of compiling a
comprehensive evaluation. Yet, in this article, Haikal was content with determining the LAIs
chronological patterns from its inception in 1927 till 1929, with a focus on defining patterns of
disintegration. In 1995, Haikal re-assessed his opinion of the LAI in his anthology Willi
Mnzenberg:

ein

deutscher

Kommunist

im

Spannungsfeld

zwischen

Stalinismus

und

Antifaschismus (1995), emphasising the pivotal role Mnzenberg had had in establishing the
LAI.30 Finally, the last perspective is the biased research results on the LAI, produced by curricular
departments in the Soviet Union (the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow) and in the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) at the Karl-Marx Universitt in Leipzig, studies based on the
principle of supporting communism as an ideology. Grigorii Zakharovich Sorkins study,
Antiimperialisticheskaia liga, 1927-1935, published in Moscow 1965, is a pioneering account of
29

Jonathan Derrick, Africas Agitators. Militant Anti-Colonialism in Africa and the West, 1918-1939, Hurst &
Company, London, 2008, p.5, 180-185.
30
Mustafa Haikal, Die Kommunistische Internationale und die Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale
Unabhngigkeit, in Aufstieg und Zerfall der Komintern. Studien zur Geschichte ihrer Transformation (1919-1943),
Theodor Bergmann/Mario Keler (Hg.), Podium Progressiv, Mnchen, 1992, pp.239-252. This anthology is one of the
first critical assessments of the Comintern after the archives had been opened in Moscow; Mustafa Haikal, Willi
Mnzenberg und die Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, in Willi Mnzenberg: ein
deutscher Kommunist im Spannungsfeld zwischen Stalinismus und Antifaschismus, Schlie/Roche (Hrsg.), Peter Lang,
Frankfurt am Main, 1995, pp.141-153.

16

the LAI from the perspective that it introduced the LAI as one of the first organisations to support
the struggle against imperialism. The glorification of the LAI was a view further developed in the
official historiography of the Comintern in the book Outline History of the Communist
International, endorsed and issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) in 1971, which described the organisation as the first broad-based anti-imperialist
united front of the international working class. In 1987, a biased conception of the LAI
culminated in the release of the anthology, Die Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale
Unabhngigkeit, issued under the tutelage of the History Department at Karl-Marx-Universitt in
Leipzig, a book aiming to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the LAI at a conference in Leipzig
on the symbolic date of 9-10 February, 1987. According to its foreword, the anthology addressed
the history and actuality of a little-known anti-colonial world organisation by assessing the
international ramifications of the LAI and its contacts with nationalist organisations and
individuals (without any reference to archival sources). Hans Piazza, the acting editor of the
anthology, stated that the LAI had been an organisation motivated by the desire to end barbaric
colonial rule and act in solidarity against imperialism, conceding nevertheless that its outcome
had had varying consequences.31 After the end of communism in the Soviet Union and in the
GDR, Piazza and Haikal (the latter also attended the Leipzig conference in 1987), continued their
work of analysing the LAI throughout the 1990s, with the slight but significant difference that the
research based itself on documents located in the Comintern Archive in Moscow. For Piazza, the
findings in the archive provided him with a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the LAI,
which he described in the article The Anti-Imperialist League and the Chinese Revolution
(2002): the documents shed new light on the history of the AIL [LAI], which has enabled me
to revise my previous view of the subject.32

31

Grigorii Zakharovich Sorkin, Antiimperialisticheskaia liga, 1927-1935. Istoricheskii ocherk, Glav Nauka, Moscow,
1965; A. I. Sobolev (Head of group), Outline History of the Communist International, Institute of MarxismLeninism, Central Committee of the CPSU, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1971, pp.260-262; Hans Piazza (Hrsg.), Die
Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit 1927-1937. Zur Geschichte und Aktualitt einer wenig
bekannten antikolonialen Weltorganisation, Karl-Marx-Universitt, Leipzig, 1987, p.5. Other examples of biased
research is found in the theoretical organ of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), Beitrge zur
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (Institut fr Marxismus-Leninismus beim Zentralkomitee der SED,
Hrsg.). During the 1960s, the Beitrge functioned as a channel to revise, and re-introduce a history of the party, an
undertaking that also had an effect on the anti-colonial discourse. See Emil Langer, Konferenz ber die
antikolonialistischen Traditionen des Kampfes der deutschen Arbeiterklasse, in Beitrge zur Geschichte, 4/1963,
Leipzig, pp.716-721, and, Adolf Rger, Die Erste Internationale Konferenz der Neger-Arbeiter (Hamburg 1930), in
Beitrge zur Geschichte 5/1967, Leipzig, pp.782-797. The LAI is mentioned in a peripheral sense, mentioned merely
as one of many actors in the German communist movement. Historian Catherine Epstein has examined the
background and causal effects of the SED and the revision of party history, see The Last Revolutionaries. German
Communists and Their Century, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (2003).
32
Hans Piazza, The Anti-Imperialist League and the Chinese Revolution, in Leutner et al. (eds.), The Chinese
Revolution in the 1920s. Between Triumph and Disaster, Routledge, London, 2002, pp.166-176.

17

The above overview introduces three particular aspects. Firstly, one should not conclude that
the LAI belongs to the historiography of the Comintern and international communism, a research
field which divides itself into different scholarly interpretations and theories, e.g. the study of
dynamics and structural relationships taking place at the centre (Moscow) and the periphery (the
national sections/communist parties), deduced and interpreted through theoretical perspectives
such as the totalitarian, revisionist or the comparative approach.33 However, Frank Borkenaus
somewhat dated and biased study of the Comintern, The Communist International (1938),
introduced an essential thematic idea when it comes to the evaluation of the history of international
communism and the Comintern, stating that it was a puzzling phenomenon built on the firm
hopes of the communists. Historian Apollon Davidson et al re-addressed the question in their
documentary narrative on the South African communist movement in 1919-30 (2003), concluding
that communism is an ideology that represents one of the most important phenomena of the
twentieth century, in which the Comintern symbolised the ambitions of the Bolshevik regime to
spread communism on a global scale.
The second aspect relates to the challenges that the scholarly community has been forced to
confront due to the archival discoveries after the collapse of the Soviet Union which, according to
historian Kevin McDermott, has either confirmed existing interpretations or opened up new
vistas.34 Thus, in the context of these new vistas, a pivotal task is to carry out critical
evaluations of the complex structure, functionality and instrumental use of the sympathising
organisations which represented a crucial part of the international communist movement during
the inter-war years. In conclusion then, prior to the demise of communism in Russia, critical
assessments of the structure and involved actors in the Comintern were topics approached mainly
from a political perspective which, additionally, in some cases, was lacking in its methodological
and theoretical coherency. By now, however, as accurately observed by historian Alexander Vatlin,
the study of the complex apparatus and ideological connotations of the Comintern is a scholarly
field where legends and myths co-exist in document editions, academic assessments and
dissertations, as well as on the Internet.35
Thirdly, the quest is to discover why the narrative character of the previous research on the
LAI is a field aptly defined here as historiography in passim. The major reason is that a majority of
33

Examples of the revisionist school are found in Milorad M. Drachkovitch & Branko Lazitch (eds.), The Comintern:
Historical Highlights Essays, Recollections, Documents, Praeger, New York, 1966; Helmut Gruber, Soviet Russia
Masters the Comintern: International Communism in the Era of Stalins Ascendancy, Anchor Books, New York, 1974;
Fernando Claudin, The Communist Movement: From Comintern to Cominform, Monthly Review Press, New York,
1975. For the comparative approach, see Matthew Worley (ed.), In Search of Revolution International Communist
Parties in the Third Period, I. B. Tauris, London, 2004.
34
Borkenau 1938, p.413; Davidson et al. 2003, p.1; Kevin McDermott, The history of the Comintern in light of new
documents, in Rees & Thorpe (eds.) 1998, p.38.
35
Vatlin 2009, p.9.

18

the research results on the LAI are either inaccurate or incoherent assumptions. However, the
intention here is not to chronologically locate and describe the interpretations of the LAI in
different categories, e.g. in a pre-Soviet or post-Soviet category. My focus is on assessing former
interpretations of the LAI and their narrative contexts. The challenge is where to begin. A logical
point of departure is from biographical works and memoirs that include, or focus, on
Mnzenbergs persona. The reason for this is that Mnzenberg was the key individual in the
history of the LAI, from its inception until its end. Additionally, the biographical approach in the
study of communism and the Comintern has contributed to a greater understanding of its history
via the methodology and theoretical approach addressed as prosopography.36 Hence, biographical
works on Mnzenberg have contributed to establishing an understanding of his role in the
Comintern, especially the range of organisational enterprises and manoeuvres masterminded by
him. The biographies authored by Mnzenbergs life-long companion, Babette Gross, Willi
Mnzenberg. Eine politische Biographie (1967), and Gross sister, Margarete Buber-Neumann, in
Von Potsdam Nach Moskau (1957), as well as her second book, Kriegsschaupltze der
Weltrevolution (1967), have determined the contextual scope and understanding of Mnzenbergs
life and career within the international communist movement, interpretations which have been
adopted either in their entirety or partially in consecutive research. Those of Gross and BuberNeumann are characteristic with their anti-communist bias, a consequence of their suffering from
Stalinist repression and the societal turmoil caused by the Second World War, narratives which
depict a period in their lives they shared together with other committed and well-known
communists in Germany. While Gross book is a political biography of Mnzenberg, BuberNeumanns two memoirs focused on her experiences of the KPD and the Comintern. Gross
summarised the contextual panorama of the LAI as Der Schrei der unterdrckten Vlker, which
describes how Mnzenberg approached the colonial question in 1925, to fulfil the two-fold
36

Prosopography, as a theoretical and methodological approach, is outlined in Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen & Andrew
Flinn (eds.), Agents of the Revolution. New Biographical Approaches to the History of International Communism in
the Age of Lenin and Stalin, Peter Lang, Oxford (2005), and, John McIlroy, Kevin Morgan, Alan Campbell (eds.),
Party People, Communist Lives. Explorations in Biography, Lawrence & Wishart, London (2001). Historian Lewis
Namier focused in his study of eighteenth century English politics on examining a large number of individuals in order
to establish an understanding of the larger context. According to Arthur Marwick, this developed a perspective that
moves from an individual level and upwards, a methodology later addressed as prosopography, see Arthur Marwick,
The Nature of History (third edition), Macmillan, London, 1989, p.91, 402. The abundance of biographical works on
national and international communism and the Comintern is located in Weber & Herbst (Hrsg.) (2004); Lazar Jeifets,
Vctor Jeifets & Peter Huber (eds.), La Internacional Comunista Y Amrica Latina, 1919-1943. Diccionario
Biogrfico, Instituto de Latinoamrica de la Academia de las Ciencias, Moscow (2004); Michael Buckmiller & Klaus
Meschkat (Hrsg.), Biographisches Handbuch zur Geschichte der Kommunistischen Internationale. Ein deutschrussisches Forschungsprojekt, Akademie Verlag, Berlin (2007); Theodor Bergmann/Mario Keler (Hrsg.), Ketzer im
Kommunismus. 23 biographische Essays, VSA-Verlag, Hamburg, (2000); Branko Lazitch & Milorad M.
Drachkovitch, Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern. New, Revised and Expanded Edition, Hoover Institution,
Stanford, 1986; William J. Chase, Enemies Within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939,
Yale University Press, New Haven (2002).

19

purpose of developing the IAH's international activities and, most importantly, assisting the
Comintern's ambition to gain access to the colonies. According to Gross, the establishment of the
LAI in 1927 was, in a sense, the culmination of Mnzenbergs colonial work, the organisation of
which by 1929 found itself completely subjected to the dictates of Comintern headquarters in
Moscow. Buber-Neumann describes the functionality of the LAI in both of her books, included in
a discussion on Moscow and the coloured world, and Lenins attitude towards the colonial and
semi-colonial countries. However, in contrast to Gross, Buber-Neumann had a closer relationship
to the LAI and its International Secretariat in Berlin after having worked there as a steno-typist in
1927.37 Despite the insightful information provided by both Gross and Buber-Neumann, the books
are littered with inconsistencies and misconceptions. For example, individuals are either misplaced
or confused with other actors, yet this does not deny the fact that they represent standard works on
the history of Mnzenberg and the LAI. Published prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
GDR, they were a useful source for the studies produced outside of the communist sphere during
the Cold War, introducing insightful interpretations on Mnzenberg, but leaving the LAI
categorised as one of his many entrepreneurial adventures. For example, the wistful articles by
Robert Nigel Carew Hunt (1960) and Helmut Gruber (1966) on Mnzenberg are still valid and
vivid interpretations of his central role in establishing the LAI.38 G. L. Ulmens biographical
appraisal of Karl August Wittfogel, the well-known Sinologist from Germany and engaged
communist, in The Science of Society (1978) provides an insight into the teething problems the
communists had in creating an the anti-imperialist agenda for the LAI.39 Furthermore, in PanAfricanism or Communism (1971), George Padmore describes in riveting detail the intentions and
manoeuvres of the German communist movement (with a focus on Mnzenbergs leadership) to
turn the LAI into a stronghold able to capitalise on the colonial question to the fullest. Burdened
37

Gross 1967, pp.196-210; Margarete Buber-Neumann, Von Potsdam Nach Moskau. Stationen eines Irrweges,
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1957, pp.97-110; Margarete Buber-Neumann, Kriegsschaupltze der
Weltrevolution. Ein Bericht aus der Praxis der Komintern 1919-1943, Seevald Verlag, Stuttgart, 1967, pp.299-307.
Buber-Neumann worked together with other leading actors in the LAI, for example the Indian nationalist
revolutionary Virendranath Chattophadyaya and the Hungarian communist Laszlo Dobos (see further below). Gross
was engaged to Mnzenberg, whilst Buber-Neumann was married to the well-known German communist Heinz
Neumann (1902 1937), who was executed during the Great Terror and purging of the Comintern apparatus in
Moscow in 1937, see Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.531-533.
38
Carew Hunt (1960) based his article on interviewing Gross and Buber-Neumann, in which the LAI is described in a
cursory fashion; Helmut Gruber, Willi Munzenbergs German Communist Propaganda Empire 1921-1933, in The
Journal of Modern History, Vol.38, No.3 (Sep., 1966), University of Chicago Press, pp.278-297. See also Jrgen
Schleimann, The Organisation Man. The Life and Work of Willi Mnzenberg, in Survey: a Journal of Soviet and
East European Studies, No.55, April 1965, London, pp.64-91, which was based on the narratives found in Gross' and
Buber-Neumann. Other accounts that fall within the same framework as the ones above are Til Schulz (Hrsg.) Willi
Mnzenberg. Propaganda als Waffe. Ausgwhlte Schriften 1919-1940, Mrz Verlag, Frankfurt am Main (1972); and,
Rolf Surmann, Die Mnzenberg-Legende. Zur Publizistik der revolutionren deutschen Arbeiterbewegung 1921-1933,
Prometh Verlag, Kln (1983).
39
Gary L. Ulmen, The Science of Society. Toward an Understanding of the Life and Work of Karl August Wittfogel,
Mouton Publishers, The Hague, 1978, pp.80-85, 103-105. The sections on the LAI in Ulmen are based on his
interviews with Wittfogel, Gross and Buber-Neumann, see p.ix.

20

by its lack of accurateness, however, Padmores narrative of the 1927 Brussels Congress relies on
secondary sources.40 A majority of the misconceptions about the LAI after 1991 are, however,
attributable to the vast number of biographical works on Mnzenberg. Two representative
examples of this are Stephen Kochs sensationalist biography of Mnzenberg, Double Lives
(1994), and Sean McMeekins attempt to present Mnzenberg's life within an academic
framework, The Red Millionaire (2003). Kochs presentation of the LAI contains a number of
critical source inaccuracies, e.g. brusquely concluding that the organisation was an instrument for
propaganda, sabotage and espionage without any further assessment.41 McMeekins biography
was a remake of Gross political biography, which aimed to respond to Kochs careless
polemic and dramatic claims. Yet, where Koch magnified the extent of Mnzenbergs
influence, McMeekin perceived Mnzenberg as a topic of prejudice, portraying him as a person
who acted as an unabashed, calculated and stern believer, who promoted communism only in order
to fulfil his own needs, above all, to make money. McMeekins short passage on the LAI gives the
wrong impression (based on a misreading of Gross) that the organisation disappeared in 1929, at
the same time as the dissolution of the LAI's theoretical organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review.
Considering the fact that Koch and McMeekin had access to the Comintern Archive (RGASPI) in
Moscow,42 the misconceptions of the LAI in these two books leave us with more questions than
answers. Nevertheless, in juxtaposition to both Koch and McMeekin, Nirode K. Barooahs
biography on Virendranath Chattophadyaya, an Indian nationalist revolutionary and the
International Secretary of the LAI, Chatto. The Life and Times of an Indian Anti-Imperialist in
Europe (2004), is in many respects a detailed study of the LAI, its inner dynamics and its ambition
40

George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism, Doubleday & Company, Garden City, 1971, pp.300-307.
Padmore described Mnzenberg as a likeable German in which the colonial peoples had a sympathetic friend
(p.305). Padmores own experience of the Comintern, Profintern, and its network(s) left him puzzled as to whether the
Pan-African movement or communism would solve Africas dilemma in the heyday of decolonization. Padmore opted
for the former alternative in the end.
41
Koch 1995, p.64. For example, a typical example of an erroneous statement from Koch is a meeting between
Mnzenberg and Jawaharlal Nehru in Berlin, after the establishment of the LAI in 1932 (!) see p.39.
42
McMeekin 2003, p. 208, 310 (footnote 3), 348 (footnote 15). McMeekin borrowed the title for his book from a
subtitle in Gross' biography on Mnzenberg (Der Rote Millionr), see Gross 1967 pp.211-215. The International
Secretariat re-launched The Anti-Imperialist Review in 1931; see The Anti-Imperialist Review, Vol.1, No.1, SeptemberOctober, Berlin, LAI International Secretariat, 1931. One of the most astonishing remarks made by McMeekin is how
he compares Mnzenberg and the Comintern with the worlds most formidable terrorist organizations of today, i.e.
Islamic terrorists (p.307). This comparison is not only bold; it pays lip service to speculations. One of the harshest
critiques against Koch's and McMeekins narratives was published by literary critic Michael Scammel in New York
Review of Books (2005, pp.32-35), which concluded that the basic problem with Koch's and McMeekins narratives is
the flagrant categorization of Mnzenbergs life as a cautionary tale. Historian Tania Schlie had already in Die Zeit
(1994, Nr.8) criticized Kochs thesis for its lack of evidence. See Michael Scammel, The Mystery of Willi
Mnzenberg, in New York Review of Books, New York, 3/11-2005, and Tania Schlie, Griffige These ohne Beweise,
in Die Zeit, Nr.08, 18/2-1994. Rightfully then, in-depth assessments and interpretations of Mnzenberg are preferably
found in Wessel (1991); Tania Schlie/Simone Roche (Hrsg.), Willi Mnzenberg: ein deutscher Kommunist im
Spannungsfeld zwischen Stalinismus und Antifaschismus, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1995; Theo Pinkus (Hrsg.),
Willi Mnzenberg. Eine Dokumentation zur Muezenberg-Tagung im September 1989 in Zuerich, Zusammengestellt
von Peter Vonderhagen und Brigitte Walz-Richter, Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, Zrich (1990).

21

to organise international anti-imperialist activity and propaganda. Nevertheless, Barooah focuses

on Chattos ties to the Indian nationalist movement in Europe and India and his personal relations,
e.g. his intimate relationship with Jawaharlal Nehru as well as on Chattos engagement to the wellknown Agnes Smedley. After having conducted research over a period of thirty years, Barooah
presents a balanced and thorough study of Chatto, although crucial aspects in the histories of both
the LAI and Chatto are inaccurate.43
The LAI was an international organisation which aspired to make an impact on the
international political scene, thus, this has resulted in different historical interpretations: the
historiography of transcontinental racial and nationalist movements, subaltern studies on colonial
oppression as well as in regional and national studies of the growth of communism in both an
imperialist as well as a colonial and semi-colonial context. All of the above fields concur in
recognising the LAI as a distributor of anti-imperialist propaganda and, above all, as a source of
inspiration. Research on Pan-Africanism, the Black Belt movement, and African nationalism
during the inter-war years has largely discussed the LAI and its role in the framework of the Negro
question and communism. Immanuel Geiss ground-breaking study, Panafrikanismus (1968),
claimed that communism and the LAI contributed to the strengthening of the struggle against
colonialism in Africa, as communism was also an ideological alternative to the socialist and
eclectic agenda of the Pan-African movement, inspired by the writings of William E. Burghardt du
Bois and Marcus Garvey. J. Ayodele Langley elaborated further on Geiss contentions in PanAfricanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945 (1973), basing his narrative on the LAI on
the writings of Padmore, Carew Hunt, A. Fenner Brockways memoir Inside the Left (1942) and by
interviewing the British socialist and one-time Secretary of the British LAI Section, Reginald
Bridgeman. The opening up of the archives in Russia significantly changed the scientific and
critical evaluation of the Pan-African movement and African nationalism and its links to
international communism. Research results presented by historians such as Hakim Adi, Robbie
Aitken and Mark Salomon as well as Holger Weiss research project, Comintern and African
Nationalism, 1921-1935 initiated at bo Akademi University, link together the African and
transatlantic Black radical movements with the anti-imperialist movement in Europe during the
inter-war years.44

43

The errors included in Barooah are further discussed in this analysis. Nirode K. Barooah, Chatto. The Life and Times
of an Indian Anti-Imperialist in Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp.246-282. Other biographies and
memoirs that mention the LAI are John Callaghan, Rajani Palme Dutt. A Study in British Stalinism, Lawrence and
Wishart, London, 1993; Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography Volume One 1889-1947, Jonathan Cape,
London, 1975; Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru, Routledge, Oxon, 2004. Nehrus own account of the LAI in 1927 is worth
reading, see Nehru (1953).
44
The Comintern addressed Africa and the Afro-American population in the USA as the Negro question, see further

22

Research on the emergence and characteristics of the Indian independence movement during
the inter-war years and the history of Indian communism is vast and encompasses a wide variety
of interpretations. Sobhanalal Datta Guptas study, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in
India 1919-1943 (2006), is a pertinent example of the peripheral understanding of the LAI and its
involvement in Indian politics. So too is the discerning analysis by Milton Israel in
Communications and Power (1994), which unravels the links of communication and networks
within the Indian nationalist struggle and links them with the anti-imperialist movement in Europe,
in which the LAI and its International Secretariat played a key role, as Israel states.45
Josephine Fowlers analysis of the organisational contribution of Japanese and Chinese
immigrants in international communist movements (2007) illustrates the global spread of the antiimperialist movement, and is shrewd from the perspective that it puts the LAI in a migratory,
multilingual, and transnational context, defining the organisation as a subject of inspiration.46 The
LAIs activity has also featured in national studies of the inter-war political history. Susanne
Heyns article, Der kolonialkritische Diskurs der Weimarer Friedensbewegung zwischen
Antikolonialismus und Kulturmission (2005), analyses the colonial discussion in Germany after
the Great War. Heyn categorises the LAI and its forerunner, the League against Colonial

in James A. Miller, Susan D. Pennybacker, and Eve Rosenhaft, Mother Ada Wright and the International Campaign to
Free the Scottsboro Boys, 1931-1934, in The American Historical Review, The American Historical Association,
Washington, Vol.106, Issue 2, 2001; Imanuel Geiss, Panafrikanismus. Zur Geschichte der Dekolonisation,
Europische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main, 1968, pp.251-264; J. Ayodele Langley, Pan-Africanism and
Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945. A Study in Ideology and Social Classes, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973,
pp.308-310; P. Olisanwuche Esedebe, Pan-Africanism. The Idea and Movement, 1776-1991, Howard University Press,
Washington, 1994. For Marcus Garvey, see the editorial work of Robert A. Hill (ed.), The Marcus Garvey and
Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, University of California Press, Berkeley (1986). For W. E. B. du
Bois, see Bill V. Mullen, Du Bois, Dark Princess, and the Afro-Asian International, in Positions, 11:1, Duke
University Press, Durham Spring, 2003. For research on the African question, carried out from the 1990s and onward,
see Hakim Adi, The African Diaspora, Pan-Africanism and Anticolonial Ideologies, in The Dark Webs. Perspectives
on Colonialism in Africa, Toyin Falola (ed.), Carolina Academic Press, Durham, 2005, pp.75-96; Hakim Adi, PanAfricanism and communism: the Comintern, the Negro Question and the First International Conference of Negro
Workers, Hamburg, 1930, in African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal, 1:2, Routledge, London, 2008,
pp.237-254; Robbie Aitken, From Cameroon to Germany and Back via Moscow and Paris: The Political Career of
Joseph Bil (1892-1959), Performer, Negerarbeiter, and Comintern Activist, in Journal of Contemporary History,
Vol.43, No.4, Sage Publications, London, 2008, pp.597-616; Mark Salomon, Cry was Unity. Communists and African
Americans, 1917-1936, University Press of Mississippi, Jackson, (1998); Holger Weiss, The Making of a Radical
African Atlantic, 1922-1937: African American Agency, African Nationalists and the Comintern Connection
(unpublished manuscript), bo Akademi University (2011).
45
Sobhanlal Datta Gupta, Comintern and the Destiny of Communism in India 1919-1943. Dialectics of Real and a
Possible History, Seribaan, Kolkata, 2006; Milton Israel, Communications and power. Propaganda and the press in
the Indian nationalist struggle, 1920-1947, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1994. See John Callaghan, Storm
Over Asia: Comintern Colonial Policy in the Third Period, in In Search of Revolution. International Communist
Parties in the Third Period, Matthew Worley (ed.), I. B. Tauris, London, 2004, pp.18-37. The dated yet still useful
studies which provide biographical information on individuals tied to the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement, are
Gene D. Overstreet & Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959, and
Cecil Kaye, Communism in India. With Unpublished Documents from National Archives of India (1919-1924),
compiled and edited by Subodh Roy, Editions Indian, Calcutta, 1971; see also John Patrick Haithcox, Communism and
Nationalism in India. M. N. Roy and Comintern Policy 1920-1039, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971.
46
Fowler (2007).

23

Oppression (LACO), within the context of the pacifist movement, as one of the most scathing
critics against the pro-colonial movement in Germany in the 1920s.47 In-depth accounts of the
British and Irish LAI sections are to be found in Jean Jones' (1996) and Kate OMalleys (2003)
articles, studies which shed light on how the LAI gained attention among anti-colonial circles in
Great Britain.48 Ricardo Melgar Baos examination of the Latin American anti-imperialist
movement is illustrative of how the LAI has been a misunderstood topic and, despite recognising
its central role within the international anti-imperialist movement, Bao only re-enacts the existing
misreading of the organisation by referring to secondary sources.49 Thomas Kampens article,
Solidaritt und Propaganda: Willi Mnzenberg, die Internationale Arbeiterhilfe und China, is an
intriguing study which analyses how the IAH and Mnzenberg strove to consolidate the theme of
proletarian solidarity in order to strengthen their material and moral campaigns in support of the
Chinese struggle in 1925 and onwards throughout the 1920s. Kampen concludes that the LAI was
a relevant actor which developed and strengthened the anti-imperialist movement and functioned
as a centre of experience for the individuals involved in the organisation.50
This critical survey of previous research into the LAI has shown, in its essence, that there
exists a fundamental scarcity of information on how and why the LAI came into existence.
However, from this historiography in passim, it is clear that the LAI is a topic which has been
primarily interpreted as a political history from below, with a focus on the involved individuals
(Mnzenberg, Chatto), the Comintern connection or the socio-political milieu of which the LAI
was a part during the inter-war years. This is an approach found particularly in the works of
Haikal, Piazza and Martin, whilst biographical works and memoirs are frequently littered with
inconsistencies or erroneous accounts. With the inclusion of the LAI within the history of
decolonisation, and as a central actor within the postcolonial critique, the organisation has been
raised to a different level, assuming a symbolic value driven by a ceremonial impetus. For
example, the nostalgia of the LAI and its spiritual bond to the Bandung moment in 1955 is a

47

Susanne Heyn, Der kolonialkritische Diskurs der Weimarer Friedensbewegung zwischen Antikolonialismus und
Kulturmission, in Stichproben. Wiener Zeitschrift fr Kritische Afrikastudien, Nr.9/2005, 5. Jg, pp.37-65.
48
Jean Jones, The League against Imperialism, Preston, 1996; Kate OMalley, The League Against Imperialism:
British, Irish and Indian connections, in Communist History Network Newsletter, Kevin Morgan & Richard Cross
(eds.), No.14, Spring 2003, University of Manchester, Manchester. Matthew Worleys description of the LAI in Class
against Class. The Communist Party in Britain Between the Wars, I. B. Tauris, London, 2002, p.228, is based on
Jones. See also Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence. Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914,
University of California Press, Berkeley, 2008, p.100-101, 205, and for a brief introduction to the LAI in France, see
Martin Thomas, Albert Sarraut, French Colonial Development, and the Communist Threat, 1919-1930, in The
Journal of Modern History, 77 (December 2005), University of Chicago, pp.917-955.
49
Ricardo Melgar Bao, The Anti-Imperialist League of the Americas between the East and Latin America, in Latin
American Perspectives, Issue 159, Vol.35 No.2, March 2008, pp.9-24.
50
Thomas Kampen, Solidaritt und Propaganda: Willi Mnzenberg, die Internationale Arbeiterhilfe und China, in
Zeitschrift fr Weltgeschichte. Interdisziplinre Perspektiven, Hans-Heinrich Nolte (Hrsg.), Jahrgang 5, Heft 2, Peter
Lang, Berlin, (Herbst 2004), pp.99-105.

24

process described as a historical sequence which connected world events with intellectuals and
activists, according to Christopher J. Lee (2010). However, Robert J. C. Young observed in
Postcolonialism (2001) that one must recognise the relevance of the Comintern and the LAI as
actors which laid the basis for the orientation of the post-war anti-colonial movements.51 Thus, it
is fair to conclude that the historiographical leniency on the LAI has a stronger linkage to the
history of the Comintern and, consequently, the present challenge is to discern the complex
processes that focus on the formulation of ideas, objectives and instructions emanating from the
connections between the LAI and the Comintern. Pivotal to this backdrop is the unravelling of the
relations and ties which constituted the networks linking the LAI, the Comintern and the antiimperialist movement.
*
Archives, Documents and Method
This analysis of the LAI relies extensively on unpublished source material located in Russian and
European archives.52 Printed documentary collections of official communist press material, or
those taken from archival holdings in Germany, Russia, Great Britain and the USA, have assisted
in providing both evidence and contextual explanations.53 Another essential source is the official
protocol of the 1927 Brussels Congress, Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont, published in
June 1927, a publication preceded by the abridged version, Der Brsseler Kongre gegen
Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, released in March 1927, two accounts which
explain how the LAI was introduced to public. The aim here is to: firstly, discuss the vast number
of documents extracted from the archives and secondly, to argue for the analytical methodology.

51

Lee 2010, pp.9-10; Prashad 2007, p.32. See also Youngs discussion on why the LAI and the Comintern laid the
basis for the orientation for the development of post-war anti-colonial movements (2001, p.176).
52
For this study, the consulted archives have been the Comintern Archive (RGASPI) in Moscow; Stiftung Archiv der
Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv Zentrales Parteiarchiv (SAPMO-BA, ZPA) in
Lichterfelde, Berlin, the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) in Amsterdam; the National
Archives (TNA) in Kew Gardens, London (research and extracted documents on the LAI in the TNA have been
provided to me by my supervisor professor Holger Weiss); Stockholm City Archive (SCA); Riksarkivet (RA) in
Stockholm; and Arbetarrrelsens arkiv & bibliotek (Labour Movement Archive & Library; ARAB) in Stockholm.
53
The following documentary works have been consulted: Jane Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943:
Documents Volume 1-3 (Oxford University Press, London, 1956-1965), Robert V. Daniels, A Documentary History of
Communism and the World. From Revolution to Collapse (third edition, University of Vermont, Hanover, 1994);
Edward Acton and Tom Stableford, The Soviet Union. A Documentary History Volume 1 1917-1940 (University of
Exeter Press, Exeter, 2005); Elfriede Lewerenz & Helga Geisler (Hrsg.), Komintern und revolutionre Partei. Die
Kommunistische Internationale ber die revolutionre Partei und die marxistische-leninistische Weltanschauung der
Arbeiterklasse. Auswahl von Dokumenten und Materialien 1919-1943 (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1986); John Riddells
editorial corpus, The Communist International in Lenins Time. Lenins Struggle for a Revolutionary International.
Documents: 1907-1916. The Preparatory Years (Monad Press, New York, 1984), The Communist International in
Lenins Time. Founding the Communist International. Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919
(Pathfinder, New York, 1987) and To See the Dawn. Baku, 1920 First Congress of the Peoples of the East
(Pathfinder, New York, 1993); Davidson et al. (2003).

25

The most valuable archive is the Comintern Archive, a section of the Rossiiskii
gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsialno-politicheskoi istorii (Russian State Archive for Social and
Political History; RGASPI) in Moscow. Prior to the collapse of communism in Russia in 1991, the
Comintern Archive was a mythological institution in the study of international communism, kept
under lock and key and located in the Central Party Archive of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.
In October 1991, the archive re-designated itself as the Russian Centre for Preservation and Study
of Modern History Records (RTsKhIDNI) and, with the Rosarkhiv reform in March 1999, the
archive assumed its present name (RGASPI). Known for being the major source for the historical
study of international communism and the Comintern during the existence of the Soviet Union, the
Comintern Archive was, as noted by historian Branko Lazitch, subjected to the Kremlins
silence. However, after 1991, it was no longer possible to remain silent. According to the former
Director of the RGASPI, Kirill Anderson, in connection with the declaration of the openness of
archival information in Russia in October 1991, the scholarly community could critically test the
myths of communism by either visiting the archive in person, or consulting the Comintern Archive
on the Internet (INCOMKA).54
The Comintern Archive is an eclectic documentary resource. Despite its large quota of personal
files (lichnye delo) on Comintern cadres,55 the archive is not primarily a biographical source. On
the contrary, the archive is a political archive which delineates the dynamics of communism as an
ideology as well as the practical and theoretical efforts to promote communism and world
revolution on a global scale. This involves, above all, an organisational framework and belief
system represented by high-ranking decision makers and departments that reached all the way
down to the grass roots of the movement. From its inception a multi-linguistic organisation, the
Comintern engaged people from all the corners of the world who were not skilful in the Russian
54

The bulk of literature in Russian archives illustrates the inquisitiveness amongst the scholarly community to discuss
openness versus political sensitiveness, the character and content of the archives, collections and research possibilities.
See further in the writings of historian and researcher on Russia, Patricia Kennedy Grimstead, and her research papers
on Russian archives, for example, Archives of Russia Five Years After: Purveyors of Sensations or Shadows Cast to
the Past?, Research Papers, IISG, Amsterdam, 1997, and Russias Trophy ArchivesStill Prisoners of World War
II? (March 25 2002; taken from the Internet: < http://www.osa.ceu.hu >). Stephen Kotkins conclusion on the archival
situation is also worth noting in this context, Stephen Kotkin, 1991 and the Russian Revolution: Sources, Conceptual
Categories, Analytical Frameworks, in The Journal of Modern History, Vol.70, No.2 (Jun., 1998), The University of
Chicago Press, pp.384-425; Lazitch 1986, p.viii; and Kirill Anderson, A New Life for the Comintern Archives, in
Comma, International Council on Archives, Paris, 2002.3-4, pp.157-158. INCOMKA (International Committee on the
Project of Computerization of the Comintern Archive) was a joint project initiated on the initiative of the Federal
Archival Service of Russia (Rosarchiv), and the International Council on Archives (ICA) in 1996. The original idea
was to digitize a minor part of the holdings in the Comintern Archive (not the fonds of communist parties) to make the
archive visible. The Comintern Archive consists of approximately 220,000 collections/fonds (between 20 and 25
million documents). The INCOMKA project has digitised approximately 1 million documents. For quantitative data,
see Internet: < http://www.osa.ceu.hu/db/fa/381.htm >.
55
John Earl Haynes, 170,000 Names for the INCOMKA Database of the Comintern Archives. The Results of
International Cooperation, in Jahrbuch fr Historische Kommunismusforschung / The International Newsletter of
Communist Studies, Mannheim, 2003, pp.360-375.

26

language, but who either chose to live in Moscow, travelled abroad on assignments or acted as
plenipotentiaries of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI).56 This
meant that the Comintern had to issue directives and administrative instruction in a language
comprehensible to everyone, thus, and considering the dominant influx of German communists as
KPD representatives in Moscow, the German language was the lingua franca within the
Comintern apparatus, lasting well into the 1930s.57
The documents on the LAI are, at first glance, filed in a separate collection in the Comintern
Archive or, according to the Russian archival system, fond 542 Antiimperialististitsheskaja liga,
which holds 103 dossiers.58 The documents in the LAI fond consist of a mixed assortment of
correspondence, protocols of meetings and conferences, monthly reports from the International
Secretariat in Berlin to Comintern headquarters in Moscow. In addition, there are personal letters,
reports on individuals involved in the LAI, lists of members and attending participants at the two
LAI congresses in Brussels (1927) and Frankfurt am Main (1929), budget proposals and financial
negotiations, analytical reports of global events and political assessments in the shape of
resolutions or intelligence.59
The Comintern Archive is an organic archive. Despite the existence of a separate LAI fond,
one must not overlook the observation that other documents on the organisation are located in a
number of other fonds in the archive. From this standpoint, having attained this understanding of
the archive, which tacitly unravels the structural functions of the Comintern, this analysis provides
an in-depth study of the organisational dynamics at work, which existed in both horizontal and
vertical structures. Thus, the understanding of the archive has, in turn, assisted the process of
linking together the LAI with an array of institutional bodies, all active at the headquarters of the
Comintern in Moscow: the ECCI Secretariat (495/18), the ECCI Bureau (495/20), the ECCI
Bureau Secretariat (495/103), the Political Secretariat (495/3), the Political Commission (495/4),
56

For conspiratorial work and behavioral norms imposed on the ECCI representatives and within the Comintern
apparatus, see Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, The Special World. Stalins power apparatus and the Soviet systems secret
structures of communication 2, Museum Tusculanum Press, Copenhagen, 2009, pp.169-184.
57
Weitz 1997, p.242. The documents examined and referred to in this study are in the following languages: German,
English, French, Spanish and Russian.
58
Fond designates collections that contain personal papers and/or collections as well as groups of institutional
records. The reference system in this study follows the logic of fond/collection, opis/inventory, delo/dossier, and
list/page: RGASPI fond/opis/delo, and list/page (fol.). See Grimstead (2002).
59
Intelligence is perceived as a systematic strategy the LAI adhered to in order to supply Comintern headquarters
with information on how both the organisation and the anti-colonial movement(s), were progressing. Its primary
purpose was to facilitate the process of establishing strategies, or improve and enhance the policy choices made in
Moscow. Thus, intelligence constituted a crucial part in the decision-making process. Martin Thomas' discussion in
Empires of Intelligence on human intelligence (Humint) as an essential feature of the modern nation-state to
integrate incoming information is well-worth bearing in mind in this context, see Thomas 2008, pp.21-22. However,
the collection of intelligence and the system of administration connecting Berlin with Moscow is not referred to as a
process of Humint throughout this study. A similar definition of intelligence is given in Edward Waltz, Knowledge
Management in the Intelligence Enterprise, Boston, 2003, p.1.

27

the Small Commission (495/6), the Standing Commission (495/7), the Eastern Secretariat
(495/154), the West European Bureau (499/1), fond of secretary Iosif (Osip) Piatnitsky (495/19),
the ECCI Organisational Bureau (495/25), the ECCI Agitprop Department (495/30) and the fond
for temporary commissions of the ECCI (495/60). In addition, the LAI had extensive or brief
collaborations with other international mass or sympathising organisations of the Comintern, e.g.
Internationale

Arbeiterhilfe

(538),

Internationale

Rote

Hilfe

(539),

Peasants

International/Krestintern (535), Profintern/Red International of Labour Unions (534) as well as

playing a crucial part in the emerging anti-Fascist movement (543/1). Documents on the LAI in
the above-mentioned fonds are of a different character in comparison to the ones located in the
LAI fond, e.g. protocols and decisions that focus on political, organisational and individual
questions. This also concerns documents of different commissions, e.g. the Commission for the
Examination of the Question of a Colonial Congress in Brussels (CEQCCB) in Moscow in 192627, as well as sources that disclose investigations and evaluations carried out by the Comintern on
the anti-imperialist movement and the colonial work amongst the European communist parties, as
well as accounts of the consistent interactionism the LAI had with the communist movement.60
The large number of personal files (lichnye dela) in the Comintern Archive is, nevertheless, a
valuable source, especially the ones linked directly to the LAI. Due to ethical restrictions on the
release of the whole file, this is a challenge and a conundrum which, as noted by Alexander Vatlin,
has to change in order to aid the process of reaching a full understanding of the nature of the
Comintern. However, despite this conundrum, I have been fortunate enough to have been able to
consult a fair share of the documents (not entire dossiers) in personal files. Material that has shed
additional light on how the individuals experienced and, in some cases, described their
commitment to the international communist movement. These personal files are, in a sense,
testimonies which expose the obscure and tragic fates that a majority of these actors ultimately
faced.61
The Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BA ZPA) in Lichterfelde, Berlin, is quite similar to the RGASPI:
a political archive containing the dossiers of the Zentralkomitee der KPD (ZK KPD), the
documents of the Berlin and Prussian police authorities (the Schutzpolizei and the
Reichskommissar fr berwachung der ffentlichen Ordnung/Reich Commissar for the
60

53 fonds have been analysed in the Comintern Archive during this research, see further in Bibliography: Archives,
Sources and Literature.
61
The archival staff at the Comintern Archive informed me prior to being able to examine the personal files, e.g.
Mnzenbergs file (RGASPI 495/205/7000), that personal affidavits from the next of kin are needed in order to consult
personal files. See further discussion on ethical questions in Vatlin 2009, p.169. A constructive and well-structured
analysis, based on an extensive examination of personal files in the Comintern Archive, is Peter Hubers study of the
Swiss communist community in Moscow during the Stalinist repression; see Peter Huber, Stalins Schatten in die
Schweiz. Schweizer Kommunisten in Moskau: Verteidiger und Gefangene der Komintern, Chronos Verlag, Zrich,
(1995).

28

Supervision of Public Order, RKO) as well as of governmental agencies such as the Auswrtige
Amt (the German Foreign Department) and the Prussian Ministry of the Interior (Ministerium des
Innern; MdI).62 The content of these documents provides an account, for example, of the
correspondence from the ZK KPD to the German ECCI delegation in Moscow, the activities of the
LAI and the anti-imperialist movement in Germany,63 whilst articles (collected by the national
security services) from the German communist press, e.g. the Comintern weekly paper, the
International Press Correspondence (Inprecorr), Die Rote Fahne, Welt am Abend, ArbeiterIllustrierte-Zeitung (A-I-Z), illustrate the public presentation of the LAI, sources which the
German security services used to analyse the German communist movement. Additionally,
RKO reports and assessments on the colonial community in Berlin and across Germany, reveal
the ties linking active foreign residents with the LAI and the International Secretariat. In 1926,
Auswrtige Amt decided to keep a special dossier on the anti-colonial movement, a file which
reveals the emergence of the anti-colonial movement in Berlin and, later, within the LAI. The
personal files at SAPMO-BA are quite different from the ones at RGASPI. The content in these
files exposes the retrospective experiences and agony of numerous individuals during the Second
World War, actors who later assumed leading positions in connection with the establishment of the
GDR. Hence, this is a source of information that makes it possible to assess the efforts of the
Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschland (the KPDs successor; SED) in order to revise the
history of German communism during the inter-war years. This historiographical process, aptly
described as politics of biography, emerged in the GDR during the 1950s and 1960s, often
resulting in former communists (e.g. Mnzenberg) being subjected to degradation, erroneous
descriptions or simply being erased from the annals of history.64
The dossiers and documents on the LAI at the National Archives (TNA), Kew Gardens,
London, are characteristic of the type of intelligence linked exclusively to national security
services (MI5, Scotland Yard), but also of the work of colonial administrative agencies such as the
Colonial Office (CO) and the Home Office (HO).65 A majority of the documents are assessments,
62

Groundbreaking empirical research in this context is Hermann Weber, Der deutsche Kommunismus: Dokumente,
Kln (1963), and Karl Dietrich (Hrsg.), Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien.
Bd 6, Die Generalinie: Rundschreiben des Zentralkomitees der KPD an die Bezirke 1929-1933, Dsseldorf, Droste
(1981).
63
Microfilmed documents from the Comintern Archive were passed on from the Central Party Archive of the Institute
of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow during the 1970s to the Institut fr Marxismus-Leninismus in Berlin.
64
Epstein 2003, p.10. Illustrative of the above is the SED-sanctioned biographical work, Geschichte der deutschen
Arbeiterbewegung Biograpisches Lexikon (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1970), which reduce Mnzenbergs role and
involvement in the German communist movement during the inter-war years, see K. Haferkorn, Mnzenberg,
Wilhelm, in Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung Biograpisches Lexikon, Institut fr Marxismus-Leninismus
beim ZK der SED (Hrsg.), Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1970, pp.340-342. With the opening of the archives in Moscow and
Berlin, it has been possible to produce a more balanced biographical presentation, see Weber & Herbst (2004).
65
For an in-depth analysis of the activities and strategies of British security services in the colonies during the interwar years, see Thomas (2008).

29

compiled by the British security services, of the spread of anti-colonial/imperialist activism across
the Empire and in Great Britain, embodied either by the LAI or by Comintern personages and
colonial activists on British soil. This surveillance was an extensive system which relied on the
interception of correspondence, a thorough scrutinizing of the British communist press and an
exchange of intelligence with other foreign security services, e.g. the German and the Dutch. The
principal strength of the TNA documents serves a two-fold purpose. Firstly, these accounts
illustrate how British authorities pressured and demanded of its German counterpart to increase its
surveillance of the communist movement in Germany. Secondly, a number of personal files on
leading and less known communists, e.g. Mnzenberg, the Hungarian Laszlo Dobos/Louis Gibarti
and the Ukrainian Comintern emissary, David Alexandrovich Petrovsky, have contributed to
establishing a deeper understanding of these actors activities.
The IISG in Amsterdam has, aside from the LAI fond in the Comintern Archive and the LAI
dossier at Stockholm City Archive (SCA, see below), a specified LAI collection. Located and
divided chronologically into three dossiers, this collection contains (for the most part) published
material on the LAI: invitations to and resolutions from the two international LAI congresses, and
the General Council in Brussels, 9-11 December, 1927; transcripts of speeches; articles on the
congresses of the LAI in contemporary journals; and newspapers. These sources have aided the
analytical work of piecing together an understanding of the official presentation of the LAI. Oscar
H. Swede (1900 1942), a pacifist from Great Britain, collected and passed on these documents to
the IISG, a service also performed by the Dutch socialist and journalist Gijsbert Jasper van
Munster.66 Other collections at the IISG, e.g. the Labour and Socialist Archives contain
documents that provide an account of how the LSI perceived the LAI and how it established a
political discourse towards the LAI, a process directed by both the social democratic leader of
Switzerland and secretary of the LSI, Friedrich Adler, and the International Secretary of the British
Labour Party, William Gillies. Additionally, the papers of Swiss socialist and Mnzenbergs
personal friend, Fritz Brupbacher, a refreshing detour from the political narrative, provide an
insight into the life of Mnzenberg and Babette Gross in both Berlin and Paris.67
Official publications, released by the LAI during 1928-1932, have been located in an LAI
dossier in the personal collection of Carl Lindhagen at the SCA in Stockholm. Lindhagen was the
Mayor of Stockholm, but was most renowned for his commitment to the pacifist and socialist

66

Biographical information on Oscar H. Swede is taken from the IISG website, see Internet: <
http://www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/s/10770731full.php >. Prashads account of the LAI is based (to a large extent) on
the LAI Collection (3392.1) at IISG.
67
Other examined collections at the IISG are the two dossiers on the World Congress against the Imperialist War
(3390.2); the personal papers of socialist Leo Levy; the catalogue of the P. C. Joshis Archives (volume 7) deposited at
the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Archives on Contemporary History in New Delhi.

30

movements. Two reasons explain why Lindhagen collected material on the LAI. Firstly, his
personal relationship to Chatto (established during Chattos exile in Stockholm in 1917-21), and
secondly, Lindhagen fervently supported issues focusing on pacifism, colonialism and
international relations.68 The publications gathered by Lindhagen are Pressedienst, and
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, material released by the International
Secretariat during 1928-32. Additionally, the dossier contains official material (resolutions and
transcripts of speeches) from the second LAI Congress in Frankfurt am Main, in 1929, and letters
from Mnzenberg and Chatto. Other archives, consulted in Stockholm, are a crucial source for
research on the labour movement, Arbetarrrelsens arkiv & bibliotek (Labour Movement Archive
& Library; ARAB),69 which consist of a vast collection of literature on international communism
and the labour movement during the inter-war years, as well as the collections of the Swedish
Foreign Department and the national security service at Riksarkivet (National Archives; RA).

The ambiguous history of the LAI confirms itself from this brief review of the available
documents. It is therefore essential to establish methodological patterns in order to categorise,
evaluate and analyse the empirical material. This observation comes from the realisation that the
documents introduce a multitude of thematic threads which, due to their sheer quantitative size,
require that the sources are placed in their proper context before attempting to establish causal
explanations. Therefore, my analytical process has gone through three phases. Firstly, the history
of the LAI is primarily a political history, with a focus on the obligations and restrictions the
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow imposed on the individuals at the
International Secretariat in Berlin. Yet, of equal relevance is a discussion of the observation that
the history of the LAI does not only comes across as a topic, explained within a political
framework, but rather, this is a history that belongs to the global history of international
communism. For this reason, and in order to avoid an overtly deterministic political narrative, the
beginning and end of which are well known, other interpretative schemas have to be included.
Biographical accounts (personal files, or biographies and memoirs, have made it possible to place
68

The documents on the LAI at the Stockholm City Archive are referred to as the SCA CL Collection in this study.
Carl Lindhagen's involvement with the LAI has been discussed by me in two articles, see Fredrik Petersson,
Proletariatets proviantkolonn: Internationella arbetarhjlpen i Sverige, in Historisk tidskrift fr Finland, 2:2009,
Historiska freningen, Helsingfors, pp.220-247, and CoWoPa (Comintern Working Papers) 5, Varfr en liga mot
imperialism? Grundandet av League against Imperialism 1927, Holger Weiss (red.), bo Akademi University, 2005,
see Internet: < https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa5petersson.pdf >. Barooah (2003) has also consulted the
LAI dossier in the CL Collection at SCA, Carl Lindhagens samling 820, volume 131: Ligue contre lImperialisme,
1927 1932.
69
In 1965, Witold S. Sworakowski stated that the literature collection at ARAB was a very useful source for scholars
and researchers on the labour and communist movement, see Witold S. Sworakowski, The Communist International
and its Front Organisations a Research Guide and Checklist of Holdings In American and European Libraries
(Stanford, 1965). An opinion highlighted by Weber & Herbst (Berlin, 2004).

31

the individuals in a central role, especially by revealing their engagement and the pressure(s)
imposed upon them. This approach also entails a social context, e.g. living conditions, social ties
and personal conflicts, factors that give the analysis a deeper dimension. In order to do this, this
analysis must establish a fundamental understanding of the LAI within the context of the
international situation in the 1920s and 1930s. A perspective that focuses particularly on the
emergence or continuance of conflicts in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the political and
social struggles in Germany and the Soviet Union and the global effects of the economic recession
and its ensuing depression after 1929, contexts which provided the LAI with the impetus to shape
an anti-imperialist agenda. Linked to the general research objective of this study, these contexts
help to explain how and why the LAI and the Comintern conceived its strategies or put into
practice political and organisational directives.70 Secondly, this thesis relies primarily on
documents in the Comintern Archive; however, this empirical dictum makes it necessary to reflect
upon Kevin McDermotts remark that the Comintern Archive is an indispensable source where
historians tend to find what they want to find. Consequently, to reach a deeper understanding
of the actual political and geographical ramifications of the LAI, sources located in other archives
have corroborated the central workings of the Comintern apparatus in Moscow and enabled an
understanding not only from above, but also, from below.71 The third phase concerns the logic of
categorisation. By dividing the empirical material into three categories political, organisational,
and individual this has helped to elucidate and evaluate the content of the documents as well as
strengthened the analytical process. Furthermore, by categorising the sources, this has either
clarified or validated critical source questions, e.g. authenticity, provenance, the date of production
and type of documents (letters, protocols, directives, consultative material, intelligence and
resolutions), purpose and aim as well as author and receiver. This categorisation has also either
questioned the credibility of some sources or determined the position of various actors within the
network. Finally, the categories have distinct thematic threads which separate the political
organisational individual levels from each other, especially the relations between the
International Secretariat and Comintern headquarters.

70

Weitz is critical of a deterministic reading of communist history, above all the political history, a perspective of
essential value for the methodology of this thesis, see Weitz 1997, pp.12-13; C. Behan McCullagh, The Logic of
History. Putting postmodernism in perspective, Routledge, London, 2004, p.185.
71
McDermott 1998, pp.37-38. An example of McDermotts proposition is the empirical study of the German October
1923, which introduces and analyses documents from the party records of the Central Committee of the CPSU (B)
located in the Comintern Archive and the Presidential Archive in Moscow, see Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Leonid G.
Babicenko, Fridrich I. Firsov & Aleksandr Ju. Vatlin (Hrsg), Deutsche Oktober 1923. Ein Revolutionsplan und sein
Scheitern, Aufbau-Verlag, Berlin (2003).

32

Table 1.1: Categorisation of the Empirical Material

Theme
Level
Political/Ideology High/From Above/ Institutional/Hierarchical
Organisational
Middle/The Methodological Link between the Political and
Individual Level/Bureaucracy
Individual
Low/From Below/Hierarchical
This categorisation also helps to distinguish a system of hierarchies of relations (see further below)
which flow in both a vertical and a horizontal direction. Thus, the methodological approach has
eased the process of establishing generalisations on the political and individual level, with the
organisational level being the connection linking together the necessary incentives to realise an
idea, a strategy or directives. However, this was a process determined by the rigid and bureaucratic
structure at the headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow. Ultimately, historical investigations
which seek to explain organisational changes focus on mapping out the origin of changes, a
perspective which aims to discern patterns either from above or from below. The former focuses
on how rules were implemented, who came up with a plan for a change, who lobbied whom to
support the proposal (Comintern headquarters), while the latter focuses on the study of
departures from regulations from above, which became so regular as to constitute a new
practice in the behaviour within the sections of the Comintern (the International Secretariat).72
The sources show that the Comintern's authority followed its own rational logic and, therefore, this
study aims to interpret how the International Secretariat reacted to the system of administration
sponsored by the Comintern headquarters in Moscow.
Aside from categorising the sources in a proper context, especially since a majority of the
documents extracted from the archives (the Comintern Archive, SAPMO and TNA) were never
intended to undergo a critical investigation, this study seeks to accomplish (as far as possible) a
genuine history of the LAI.73 As separate accounts, each archive reveals an incomplete narrative;
the methodological principle in the study has therefore adopted the cut-and-paste approach,74 an
72

McCullagh 2004, p.187.

John Costello and Oleg Tsarevs sensationalist study Deadly Illusions (Century, London, 1993) on Soviet espionage
techniques concluded that Soviet intelligence officers of that time never thought that their files would become a
historical source, since it was never anticipated that even a formal institutional history would ever need to be written.
The contemporary records were only kept to satisfy immediate and practical needs, see Costello & Tsarev 1993,
p.xxi. Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsovs The Secret World of American Communism
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 1995, p.4) corroborate this opinion. A similar discussion is outlined in Davidson
et al (2003, p.2), whilst Kevin Morgan, Gidon Cohen & Andrew Flinn (eds.) (2005, p.14) focus on the present
opportunity to reach a genuine historicisation on the history of international communism.
74
The cut and paste methodology was introduced by the author in Fredrik Petersson, The League against
Imperialism: The Most Valuable Organizational Tool for Bolshevik Propaganda in the Imperialist and Colonial World
during the Interwar Era? Synopsis of a doctoral thesis, in The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online,
Bernhard H. Bayerlein (ed.), The European Workshop of Communist Studies, Mannheim, Vol. XIII (2007), No.20,
pp.105-110.
73

33

approach which has contributed to the unravelling of the inner dynamics of structural relations
and, in particular, the discussion concerning the reason why the Comintern endorsed the
establishment of the LAI and how the organisation received support from the Comintern. The cutand-paste methodology strives first to establish a number of observations in order to validate
causal explanations and, secondly, to map out the empirical labyrinth. This is comparable to
locating previously unknown doors to unknown rooms; hence, this methodology has helped to
solve a number of questions. As noted in the critical assessment of structural analysis by
sociologist Barry Wellman, this is a methodology inspired by tracing lateral and vertical flows of
information. According to Wellman, this belongs to the whole network approach, which strives
to identify sources and targets and detect structural constraints on flows of resources, a
methodology and perspective which help to explain the structural boundaries of this study: to
introduce and evaluate the relationships between the actors on an individual and institutional level,
with ideology representing the mobilising factor. The network approach in this study aims to link
together actors in a network of networks, actors belonging to separate or similar political groups
and social categories, but who were unified by their political and anti-colonial activism.75 Hence, a
pivotal task for this study is to distinguish these network(s), particularly the interactionism
between the International Secretariat in Berlin and Comintern headquarters in Moscow. The
challenge is, however, according to the proposition outlined in historian Niels Erik Rosenfeldts
analysis of the secret apparatus of the Comintern, to detect the highly fragmented system
which the Comintern constructed in order to obscure and blur communications and connections.76
As the LAI was a result of ideas introduced by the Comintern, the network analysis also strives to
differentiate between ties of exchange and dependency. The reason for doing so is to understand
the nature of the central functions within the LAI and the Comintern, e.g. to delineate the exchange
of communications, the implementation of authority, power and control, to identify senders and
75

Barry Wellman, Structural analysis: from method and metaphor to theory and substance, in Social Structures. A
Network Approach (first edition: 1988), Barry Wellman & S. D. Berkowitz (eds.), Contemporary Studies in Sociology,
Volume 15, JAI Press Inc, London, 1997, p.21, 26. A network can in many cases be interpreted and perceived in terms
of a web. J. R. McNeill and William McNeill define a web as a set of connections that link people to one another.
These connections may take many forms: chance encounters, kinship, friendship, common worship, rivalry, enmity,
economic exchange, ecological exchange, political cooperation, even military competition. In all such relationships,
people communicate information and use that information to guide their future behaviour. They also communicate, or
transfer, useful technologies, goods, crops, ideas and much else. [] The exchange and spread of such information,
[] and inconveniences, and human responses to them, is what shapes history, see J. R. McNeill & William McNeill,
The Human Web. A Birds-Eye View of World History, New York, 2003, pp.3-4.
76
Rosenfeldt (2) 2009, p.179. An example of the above and, above all, in reference to the administrative system of the
Comintern apparatus, see the table introduced in Kominternhovedkvarteret Verdensrevolutionens generalstab
1926-35, in Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Verdensrevolutionens generalstab. Komintern og det hemmelige apparat, Gads
Forlag, Kobenhavn, 2011, p.139. Edward Waltz' analysis of the flow of communications in organizations, implies that
the study of networks and the structure and flow of knowledge is somewhat as mapping explicitly representing
the network of nodes (competencies) and links (relationships, knowledge flow paths) within the organization, see
Waltz 2003, p.112.

34

receivers and to establish both the actors who were a part of the LAI network and those who
established networks of their own.77
Central actors in this study are both individuals and institutions. In two cities, Berlin (the
global village of the Comintern), and Moscow (Comintern headquarters), the individual actors
came from different social, cultural and political backgrounds, whilst the institutions, above all the
departments of the Comintern in Moscow, had a structural constraint on the LAI, either by
sanctioning or restricting its activity. Who were the leading individuals within the LAI network? Is
it possible to differentiate between the individual and institutional actors within both the LAI and
the Comintern? Firstly, the dramatis personae (see Appendix II) of each actor focuses on
disclosing their function and position within the LAI, a perspective that must include a
topographical factor (Berlin and Moscow), especially as the social and political setting of these
two cities were diametrically opposed to each other. Secondly, the secret apparatus and basic
rules of conspiracy of the Comintern is a thematic framework that becomes evident in the whole
network approach. However, where and when such aspects appear, first and foremost the highly
secretive Department for International Communications (Otdel mezhdunarodnoi svyazi; OMS), a
department which nevertheless must be perceived as a constituent and natural part of an
organisational system that facilitated the distribution of political and administrative directives from
Moscow to the national sections.78 Thirdly, in order to coherently illustrate the networks of the
LAI, the Comintern and of the anti-imperialist movement, especially its clusters (institutions,
committees or commissions), a number of tables in the study delineate relevant organisational and
egocentric networks.79
The International Secretariat was the host, political and organisational educational centre, and
meeting place for actors belonging to either the international communist movement or the anticolonial movement. Throughout the chronology of this study, Mnzenberg possesses a symbolic
role as the informal leader of the LAI who took care of the contacts with both Comintern
headquarters in Moscow and the ZK KPD in Berlin. However, other individuals were of equal
importance, especially the secretaries: the Indian nationalist revolutionary and journalist
Virendranath Chattophadyaya (1880 1937); the Hungarian communist and journalist Louis
Gibarti (real name: Laszlo Dobos, 1895 1967); CPGB member and journalist Clemens Dutt
(1893 1974); the Turkish communist and Comintern emissary Bekar Ferdi (real name: Mechnet

77

Wellman 1997, pp.29-32; Cilja Harders, Dimensionen des Netzwerkansatzes. Einfhrende theoretische
berlegungen, in Die islamische Welt als Netzwerk. Mglichkeiten und Grenzen des Netwerksansatzes im
islamischen Kontext, Roman Loimeier (ed.), Ergon Verlag, Wrzburg, 2000, p.41.
78
See Rosenfeldt (2009 [2], pp.169-292) and Hubers analysis on the secret apparatus of the Comintern and OMS
(1995, pp.28-36).
79
Wellman 1997, p.27, 43.

35

Schefik, 1890 ?); Bohuml Smeral from Czechoslovakia and emissary of the Comintern (1880
1941); and the Japanese-Danish communist Hans Thgersen (pseudonyms: York, Miller; 1902
?). Assisting the work of the secretaries, functionaries also played a crucial role: the Chinese
Kuomintang representative and communist Hansin Liau (? 1964); the Swiss communist and IAH
functionary Federico Bach (real name: Fritz Sulzbacher, 1897 1978); the radical Japanese
nationalist Teido Kunizaki who, during his German tenure, turned to communism (1894 - ?); the
German communist and Sinologist Karl August Wittfogel (1896 1988); CPGB member Emile
Burns (1889 1972); the German communist and IAH functionary Allo Bayer (??); the Swiss
communist and IAH functionary Otto Schudel (1902 1979); and the German communist and
steno-typist at the International Secretariat Ella Windmller (??). Frequent visits by Comintern
representatives to Berlin played a pivotal role in the administrative system of the International
Secretariat. The well-known Indian revolutionary and communist, Manabendra Nath Roy (1887
1954), played a symbolic role in the initial phases of developing both the anti-colonial project and
the LAI. The veteran communist from Japan, Sen Katayama (1859 1933), who appeared in
public at LAI congresses, had a secret function as the leader for the ECCI delegations from
Moscow. The British communist, Robin Page Arnot (1890 1986), examined the colonial work of
the European communist parties in 1929, a process which also influenced the course of events
linked to the LAI. Alexander Bittelman (Alex, 1890 1982), member of the Workers Party
America (the WPA was the precursor to the Communist Party of the USA, CPUSA), acted for a
short period as liaison for the International Secretariat in Moscow. Finally, the Ukrainian
communist and Comintern emissary David Alexandrovich Petrovsky (real name: David Lipetz,
1886 1937) carried out a crucial and highly secretive mission (using the pseudonym Isolde)
preparing the Brussels Congress in Berlin in January 1927. Petrovsky was an actor with numerous
aliases: all used in different contexts and for widely-differing purposes.80
The clandestine and secretive functions of the West European Bureau (the foreign bureau of
the ECCI; WEB), an institutional actor established in 1928 for the purpose of strengthening the
contacts between the ECCI and the national sections in Western Europe, were of great importance

80

MI5 compiled a dossier on Petrovskys function as an emissary of the Comintern and ECCI representative in the
CPGB, see TNA PRO KV2/1433. Davidson et al. (2003) introduced concise biographical sketches of individuals in
the Comintern and the anti-colonial movement which, if supplemented with the biographical richness in Jeifets, Jeifets
and Huber (eds.) (2004), disclose a majority of the pseudonyms used by Comintern agents and emissaries on
international missions. Vilm Kahan had also pondered over the initial purpose as to why pseudonyms were used by
the Comintern. For example, to maintain relations with the national sections and the mass organisations under the
guise of secrecy, but also the aliases illustrate and give an insight into the close personal relation between the
delegations of the different parties. The pseudonyms protected also the identity of the emissaries on a mission, as they
also increased the chance to manipulate the organs of the Comintern and its sections, see Vilm Kahan,
Bibliography of the Communist International (1919-1979) First Volume, Leiden, 1990, p.33.

36

to the LAI.81 As a relay station for the ECCI, the WEB monitored and controlled whether or not
the national sections were implementing the directives from Moscow. Acting as WEB leader in
Berlin from 1929 till 1933, the Bulgarian communist Georgi Dimitrov (Helmut; 1882 1949),
was a central actor not only for the LAI, but also for the European communist movement. The
German communist Richard Gyptner (Alarich, Magnus; 1901 1972) was the secretary of the
WEB and assisted Dimitrovs work. Other prominent European communists were conscripted to
do work for the WEB, e.g. the CPGB member Aitken Ferguson (Neptun), the German
communist and Profintern representative Fritz Heckert, and Jacques Doriot of the Partei
Communiste Francais (PCF).82 Dimitrov co-ordinated the WEB's contacts with the LAI through
Mnzenberg, Smeral, Ferdi and Clemens Dutt.
The leaders and members of the national LAI sections were also indispensable in the creation
and maintenance of the anti-imperialist network. The British socialist and pacifist Reginald
Bridgeman (1884 1968) was a leading actor in developing and fomenting LAI activities in Great
Britain.83 Other well-known socialist characters, e.g. the elderly George Lansbury (1859 1940)
of the British Labour Party; the leader of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) James Maxton
(1885 1946) and A. Fenner Brockways (1888 1988) brief but passionate connection with the
LAI in 1927, were all prominent characters within the LAI during its initial phases. Edo Fimmen
(1881 1941), the Dutch trade unionist and distinguished leader of the Amsterdam International,84
was also one of Mnzenbergs friends and contributed greatly to paving the way for the LAI both
81

The WEB is not to be confused with its forerunner, the West European Secretariat (WES), which was formed in
1919, located in Berlin. In 1925, the WES was a defunct and shallow actor, according to the internal discussion in the
Comintern. Empirical observations, especially the documents filed in the WEB fond in the Comintern Archive
(RGASPI 499/1), have verified a gap in time between the years 1925 and 1927. Any critical assessment on the
functions and activities of the WEB remains to be told, an actor that only appears in a peripheral sense in the history of
international communism. Imperative research on the WES has, though, been conducted, see for example Vatlin
Genosse Thomas und die Geheimttigkeit der Komintern in Deutschland 1919-1925, in Alexander Vatlin, Die
Komintern 1919-1929. Historische Studien, Decaton Verlag, Mainz, 1993, pp.21-44. This chapter was re-worked and
included in Vatlin 2009, pp.247-254. The somewhat dated but intriguing depiction of the WES in Branko Lazitch and
Milorad M. Drachkovitch, Lenin and the Comintern Volume I, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1972 pp.164-201,
recounts the tale of the complex attempts to spread communism during the initial phase of the Comintern in 1919.
82
See fol. RGASPI 499/1; Huber 1995, p.148. Some of the members of the WEB are included in the biased biography
on Georgi Dimitrov, Hans-Joachim Bernhard, Krysto Dontschew, Wolfgang Gruhn, Horst Hering & Ljubow
Pawlowna Petrenko (Hrsg.), Georgi Dimitroff, Urania-Verlag, Leipzig, 1982, pp.27-31. The primary functions of the
WEB was to nominate and send instructors to visit the communist parties in Western Europe; collect and disburse
administrative and political instructions to the parties, send intelligence to the ECCI in Moscow for further
consideration and to determine financial guidelines for the work of the parties.
83
For Reginald Bridgeman, see John Saville, Bridgeman, Reginald Francis Orlando, in Dictionary of Labour
Biography Volume VII, Joyce M. Bellamy & John Saville (eds.), The MacMillan Press, London, 1984, pp.26-40.
Bridgemans personal archive is located at Brynmor Jones Library, Hull University in England.
84
The Amsterdam International, also known as the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), was established
in Amsterdam (hence the name) in July of 1919, an organisation inspired by the Versailles peace treaty negotiations.
Primary aim was to act in response to the devastation of the Great War by proclaiming war on war under the slogan
to free the worker from capitalism. Whereas the LSI aimed its activities towards the socialist parties in Europe, the
Amsterdam International wanted to act as a representative for the European labour movement and the trade unions, see
Goethem (2006).

37

in the Netherlands and on an international basis. Charles Shipman from the USA, also known as
Manuel Gomez and a member of the WPA/CPUSA, was one of the few actors in the USA striving
to create a vigorous anti-imperialist movement who also had intimate ties to the International
Secretariat in Berlin.
At Comintern headquarters in Moscow were the actors (the decision and agenda-makers) who
decided the theory and practice of the LAI. In comparison to the relatively few contacts between
the International Secretariat and the IAH and the ZK KPD in Berlin, the apparatus of the
Comintern had a far more complex structure. In the capital of the Bolshevik state, its actors were
located in networks differing in character, size and authority. Otto Wille Kuusinen (1881 1964), a
Finnish migr communist and distinguished Comintern secretary, often played a leading role in
co-ordinating Mnzenbergs activities and vision of turning the LAI into an international mass
organisation. Furthermore, Kuusinen was a symbol of authority who provided the LAI and the
colonial question with direction and ideological impetus. From an organisational point of view,
Kuusinen was involved in a range of departments at Comintern headquarters, especially the
Eastern Department/Secretariat, which was the Comintern's communicative link with the LAI. One
of Kuusinen's co-workers, the Deputy Head of the Eastern Secretariat and Hungarian communist
Ludwig Ignatovich Magyar (real name: Lajos Milgorf; 1891 1937), had a pivotal role within the
network, whilst Pavel Aleksandrovich Mif (real name: Mikhail Aleksandrovich Fortus; 1901
1938) and Robin Page Arnot were also on occasion particularly influential. Mauno Heimo 1894
1937), a Finnish communist, carried out chancellery work at Comintern headquarters and was a
key actor who from time to time acted as Mnzenbergs personal liaison in relation to the LAI.
Two authoritative characters crucial for the development and continuation of the LAI were, firstly,
the Ukrainian communist Dmitri Manuilsky (1883 1959), the eyes and ears of the CPSU (B) in
the Comintern. Along with Kuusinen, Manuilsky was a theoretical authority who provided
Mnzenberg with guidelines on how to develop both the IAH's and the LAI's colonial work. The
second person was the Russian-Lithuanian communist Osip Piatnitsky (1882 1938), who was
responsible for financial, personnel and liaison matters within the Comintern.
The Comintern was an organisation characterised primarily by its hierarchy. Within this
hierarchical structure, the LAI was a topic discussed, assessed, evaluated and determined at
various levels, reaching all the way to the top of the structure. Both its authoritative department,
the Political Secretariat, and its consultative organ, the Political Commission (established in 1929),
frequently discussed the LAI. However, it was the ECCI Secretariat which began discussing the
IAH's anti-colonial project and the preparations for the Brussels Congress in 1925-26, whilst after
1927, the Eastern Secretariat was the connective point. Sensitive or secretive matters were first
38

assessed by Piatnitsky before being transferred to the Small Commission (Malaja komissija
Politsekretariata). Other departments which either frequently or intermittently discussed the LAI
were the Standing Commission (Postoiannaia komissiia), the ECCI Bureau, the ECCI
Organisational Bureau (Organizatsionnyi otdel; Orgotdel) and the ECCI Agitprop Department
(Otdel propagandy i agitatsii). Temporary commissions (Raznye komissii) were also devoted to
examining the LAI.85
*
Linking the Ties that Bind Together
The Bolsheviks in Moscow governed the Comintern from its inception until its end. As noted by
the historians Grant Adibekov, Eleonora Shakhnazarova and Kirill Shirinia in their anthology
Centre and Periphery (1996), the Comintern was inseparably linked to the CPSU (B) in respect
of ideology, policy, organisation and material support. In 1921, with the introduction of
democratic centralism in the Comintern, an organisational principle establishing hierarchical
relations from top to bottom, the one-way system of control exercised by the Comintern from the
centre of Moscow over the periphery was confirmed.86 Consequently, the dictates issued from the
centre/from above (Comintern headquarters in Moscow) and broadcast to the periphery/from
below (the national sections/communist parties) implied, according to McDermott and Agnew, a
structure built on dependency and total loyalty towards the centre.87 Is the history of the LAI a
part of this centre-periphery paradigm or are other paradigms visible? Bearing in mind the
relative scarcity of previous research done on the LAI and, more importantly, the richness of the
empirical material, other questions are brought into focus here than just the centre and periphery
paradigm. Thus, in order to outline and interpret, firstly, the complex relationships and behavioural
patterns linking the International Secretariat to the Comintern apparatus, and secondly, the
undertakings of the LAI and the Comintern to create a credible anti-imperialist agenda, it is
relevant to search beyond the rigid a priori understanding of the LAIs complete obedience

85

The latter part of this section is based firstly, on the observations and conclusions drawn during the research and,
secondly, on the following works: Rosenfeldt 2 (2009); Huber (1995); Lazitch (1986); Chase (2001); Vatlin (2009);
Kimmo Rentola, Finnish Communism, O. W. Kuusinen, and Their Two Native Countries, in Communism. National
& International, Tauno Saarela and Kimmo Rentola (eds.), Societas Historica Finlandiae, Helsinki, 1998, pp.159-181;
Grant Adibekov & Eleonora Shakhnazarova, Reconstructions of the Comintern Organisational Structure, in Centre
and Periphery. The History of the Comintern in the Light of New Documents, Narinsky & Rojahn (eds.), IISG,
Amsterdam, 1996, pp.65-73; Alexander Pantsov, The Bolsheviks and the Chinese Revolution 1919-1927, Curzon
Press, Richmond, 2000.
86
Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.72; Kirill Shirina, The Comintern: A World Party and Its National Sections,
in Centre and Periphery, Narinsky & Rojahn (eds.), IISG, Amsterdam, 1996, p.169. The policy of democratic
centralism, initially designed by Lenin, was introduced at the Third International Comintern Congress in Moscow (22
June 12 July 1921) on the initiative of the ECCI.
87
McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.xxi.

39

towards the Moscow elite. This requires a reconsideration of other perspectives. According to
Norman LaPorte et al in the anthology Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern (2008), once the
research goes beyond generalist claims and particularist modifiers this calls for a reassessment
of a more complex, sophisticated and pluri-disciplinary understanding of communism(s).
Typical of this is research and theoretical conceptions taken from the prosopographical approach,
the history of everyday life, or network theory. These academic advances have added rational
depth to the understanding of the dynamics of the systems, structures and networks of international
communism. Yet, at the same time, one must not ignore the reflection, as introduced in Hermann
Webers ground-breaking study of German communism, Die Wandlung des deutschen
Kommunismus (1969), that despite communism having introduced itself as either national or
international, any ensuing analysis and discussion has to include factors such as functionality,
instrumentality and practical connotations caused by the hierarchical structure of the communist
apparatus. It is therefore essential to highlight the impact of external (exogenous) and internal
(endogenous) factors in order to establish a clearer understanding of communism as a political and
social phenomenon.88

Movements
The theoretical framework of this study aims to clarify the interactionism between the
International Secretariat and the headquarters of the Comintern which developed over time. This
perspective also addresses how the LAI and its International Secretariat interacted with
representatives of the anti-colonial movement both in Berlin and around the world. Focusing on
the character and outcome of political and organisational processes, this analysis aims to uncover
intersections and mobilised networks, or networks which existed parallel to each other. The former
is a discussion on direct and indirect links between individuals and institutional actors, while the
latter relates to, according to the definition introduced by political scientist Sidney B. Tarrow, a
process which tied leaders to the organisation of collective action in order to set in place
movement co-ordination and allowing movements to persist over time.89 This definition
88

Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan and Matthew Worley (eds.), Introduction: Stalinization and Communist
Historiography, in Bolshevism, Stalinism and the Comintern. Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917-53, Palgrave
Macmillan, Houndmills, 2008, pp.1-3. For an adaptation of everyday life stories, see Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday
Stalinism. Ordinary Life in Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (1999);
Bert Hoppe, In Stalins Gefolgschaft. Moskau und die KPD 1928 1933, R. Oldenburg Verlag, Mnchen, 2007, pp.1119; Hermann Weber, Die Wandlung des deutschen Kommunismus. Die Stalinisierung der KPD in der Weimarer
Republik Band 1, Europische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt am Main, 1969, pp.7-20.
89
Sidney B Tarrow, Power in Movement. Social movements, collective action and politics, Cambridge University
Press, New York, 1994, p.136. Tarrow focused on the study of social movements in Italy and France during the
nineteenth century and strove to develop Charles Tillys political process theory; Steven M. Buechler, Understanding
Social Movements. Theories from the Classical Era to the Present, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder, 2011, p.125, 129,
136.

40

addresses the importance of finding out how and why relations between the International
Secretariat in Berlin and Comintern headquarters in Moscow developed and changed over time.
Most importantly, to examine how the Comintern put into practice its control over administrative
questions and ideology. Fundamental to the above is to make a distinction between the terms
interactionism and movements. Sociologist Georg Simmel observed, as noted in his analysis of
The Web of Group-Affiliations (Die Kreuzung sozialer Kreise), that as a higher concept binds
together the elements [] so do practical considerations bind together like individuals, who are
otherwise affiliated with quite alien and unrelated groups.90 For the LAI, therefore, it is logical to
concede that the higher concept and practical considerations were anti-colonialism and antiimperialism. Thus, for this study it is essential to elucidate how, why and where individuals chose
to bind together around a cause or modify interest groups, unifications, organisations. It is,
therefore, of particular interest to define interactionism as a political and organisational process, in
order to establish an understanding of how the actors responded to shared understandings and
common expectations as well as the organised efforts to obtain change and to establish a new
order of life. Tarrow suggests that this process of interactionism is defined by collective action,
feelings of solidarity91 and expressive behaviour and communication, factors which contribute
to the evaluation of the character and dynamics of social or political relationships. These
collaborations, which address the major challenge to interpreting the LAI as a political topic, as
expounded the political scientist Steven M. Buechler, focus on a macro-orientated view which has
little to say in relation to motivation, recruitment, conversion, or inter-personal dynamics within

90

Georg Simmel, Conflict and The Web of Group-Affiliations (translated by Kurt H. Wolff and Reinhard Bendix), The
Free Press, New York, 1955, p.128.
91
Solidarity is a historical term based on the Christian notion of fraternity which, taken from the Latin socius
(companion) has been associated with socialism and should be perceived as the adversary to nationalism, a political
framework that emerged during the nineteenth century. Solidarity, as a social concept, strives to make participants
recognise a common interest in the construction of an ideological identity. According to sociologist Emile Durkheim,
the process of social interaction builds on social relationships and ties that bind individuals to groups, organisations
and, in the end, to society. Hence, this marks the formation of a moral, devotional or an ideological contractual
relationship. The LAI used solidarity as an impetus for its activities; however, the idea of solidarity existed in a limited
socio-political context, which the communists used as a concept rather than in practice in order to maintain control
over the movement. Furthermore, as noted in Steinar Stjerns reflection on Max Webers conceptualisation of
solidarity, solidarity as such is not only integrative, it is also divisive, see Steinar Stjern, Solidarity in Europe. The
History of an Idea, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005, p.25, 35, 37; Michele Dillon, Introduction to
Sociological Theory. Theorists, Concepts and their Applicability to the Twenty-First Century, Wiley-Blackwell, West
Sussex, 2010, p.97; Norman Davies, Europe. A History, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, p.835. In
conclusion, the conceptual and practices of a limited solidarity was a topic addressed by the author at the conference
Solidarities Through History, arranged by the Centre for International History at Columbia University, New York, in
collaboration with The Harriman Institute, the Weatherhead Institute, the Middle East Institute, University of Leipzig
and the Graduate School Advisory Council, March 30 2007. For the conference paper, In Control of Solidarity? Willi
Mnzenberg, the Workers International Relief and League against Imperialism, 1921-1935, see Comintern Working
Paper (CoWoPa) 12, Internet: < https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa12petersson.pdf >.

41

movements.92 One of the fundamental aims of this study is to look beyond this so-called macroorientated interpretation.
The anti-colonial movement was the impetus for the LAI. The question is, nevertheless,
whether one can perceive the LAI as a part of the anti-colonial movement, or whether the LAI
strove to function as a political platform in order to unite the anti-colonial movement. It can be
argued that the LAI was a construction that never intended to pose as a spokesperson for the anticolonial movement. Instead, its primary ambition was to act as an international anti-imperialist
voice, declaring its support for the struggle of the oppressed peoples in the fight against
colonialism and imperialism. The conceptual relationship between colonialism and imperialism in
the context of the Comintern and international communism deserves further clarification.
Colonialism must be perceived as a practice, explicitly referring to the occupation of a foreign
land, whilst imperialism is a concept representing a system that combined ideology and economic
initiatives. Furthermore, administered from the centre to the periphery, imperialism is driven by
the motive of preserving its grandiose projects of power. The common theme for colonialism and
imperialism is power, a framework which seeks confirmation and validation through the
establishment of an administrative system characterised by institutions of governance, economic
patterns, ideas and values, which the colonisers imposed on the colonised.93 In order to document
and interpret the history of resistance against colonial oppression and imperialist exploitation,
according to Dipesh Chakrabartys postcolonial critique of modernity and history itself, the
study of colonialism is a subaltern history which aims to describe and make the world more
socially just. One must, therefore, question and discuss cultural dichotomies such as Europe/not
Europe, developed/undeveloped etc,94 where nationalism, as advocated by anti-colonial
activists during the inter-war years, considered the internationalism of the communist movement
as a haven.95 For the LAI, imperialism represented the pice de rsistance and structural
framework used to attract attention from the anti-colonial movement in Europe. The Bolsheviks
political interpretation of imperialism (Imperializm) ritualistically mirrored the social and
political realities of the Soviet Union and its perception of Western society, referred to as a hostile
political system in such terms as the camp of imperialism (lager imperializma') or
international imperialism (mezhdunarodny imperialism). Soviet propaganda also placed
imperialism within the context of the militarism of the West and capitalist society, and therefore

92

Simmel 1955, p.15; Social Movements, in The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth-Century Social Thought,
William Outhwaite & Tom Bottomore (eds.), Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1993, p.598; Buechler 2011, p.90.
93
Young 2001, p.17; Ferro 1997, p.1; Abernethy 2000, p.12.
94
Chakrabarty 2000, p.72; Osterhammel 2001, pp.14-16.
95
Thomas 2005, p.19.

42

imperialism was a colonial system the imperialist nations wanted to retain.96 From a theoretical
standpoint, to question a political system involving occupation and conquest, any critical study of
imperialism should include an assessment of factors such as empire and imperial ambitions.
Accordingly, the Marxist-Leninist conception of imperialism defines it as a broad structural system
characterised by economic domination, though not necessarily political domination. Yet,
imperialism as an idea and practice inherently distinguishes itself by its exercise and practice of
power through direct conquest, or political and economic influence, administered via
institutions and by ideological conviction. Construed and administered from the centre the
home country, e.g. Great Britain or France, the two leading empires in Europe during the inter-war
years the Empire used any measure at hand to extend its control over the furthest reaches of the
peripheries. After the Great War in 1919, the resentment against the state-sanctioned system of
the centre assumed theoretical and practical expressions amongst anti-colonial activists and
movements residing in the colonial metropolises of Europe (Berlin, Paris, and London). For the
Comintern, and then the LAI, these groups of anti-colonial activists would be their main target. In
the heyday of the Cominterns united front strategy, the LAI emerged as the actor and solution best
suited to establishing connections with the anti-colonial movement(s) in Europe, which would, in
turn, guarantee a political and organisational corridor to the colonial and semi-colonial countries.
The Comintern's primary motive in endorsing the establishment of the LAI in 1927 was to create
an organisation that would realise the political and organisational efforts required to spread
communism, thus enhancing the possibility of spreading communism to regions and countries
previously inaccessible to the international communist movement due to the international fear
caused by the practice of communism and the Bolshevik regime in Russia.97 Foreign governments
hostile towards the Bolshevik regime described the Comintern as a menace. Yet, for the mobilised
anti-colonial movements after the Great War, communism was a vibrant ideology, which
corresponded to their desire of achieving national independence; movements inspired by the
nineteenth-century developmentalist view of history, explicitly formulated by Marx and Darwin.
According to Elleke Boehmer, the anti-colonial movements strove to change the world order,
fuelled by a nationalist agenda in terms of political organisation which emphasised a cross- or

96

Imperialism (Imperializm), in Ilya Zemtsov, Encyclopedia of Soviet Life, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick,
1991, p.158.
97
Young 2001, pp.25-27; Abernethy 2000, pp.9-11; Chakrabarty 2000, p.41; Matthew G. Stanard, Interwar ProEmpire Propaganda and European Colonial Culture: Toward a Comparative Research Agenda, in Journal of
Contemporary History, 2009, Vol.44 (1), Sage Publications, London, pp.27-48; Elleke Boehmer, Empire, the National,
and the Postcolonial, 1890-1920, Resistance in Interaction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p.6. See Thomas
(2008, p.17) analysis of how the British and French security services practiced their extensions of control in the
colonial peripheries.

43

transnational in their range of reference and reception of influence.98 Protests by anti-colonial

movements against the oppression of colonialism were, however, not the IAHs primary focus in
1925. As the idea of the anti-colonial project took shape, the IAH used philanthropy as the
incentive to create reactions to anti-imperialism. In 1925, the IAHs philanthropy was a political
framework, broadcast to the public in various campaigns and committees in order to introduce a
social message focusing on the shaping of the future of society. Philanthropy was the concept
which defined the colonial question for the IAH, particularly its role as a donor and towards the
recipients.99 What was the nature of the IAHs philanthropy? It was to declare a social message
under the pretext of proletarian solidarity in order to gather material and moral support, an
undertaking driven by securing organisational support rather than altruistic motives. The question
is why. Accordingly, the IAHs anti-imperialist activism and propaganda, carried on by its
offspring the LAI, is essentially a question of political solidarity. This is a question further
addressed by the philosopher Sally J. Scholz, who writes that commitment to a political cause is a
pivotal factor in the organisation of collective action, as in this case, against colonialism and
imperialism. Thus, movements are, regardless of their political or social nature, a response to
collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction
with elites, opponents and authorities. Furthermore, as observed by Tarrow, this makes it
necessary to evaluate the structural source of collective political activity.100 The LAI justified its
98

Ahmad 2009, p.6; Manela 2008, p.13; Boehmer 2002, p.3. See the discussion on the Western conception of the
developmentalist idea from the eighteenth to the twentieth century in Hans-Jrgen Puhle, Das atlantische Syndrom.
Europa, Amerika und der Westen, in Wege der Gesellschaftsgeschichte, Jrgen Osterhammel, Dieter Langewiesche
und Paul Nolte (Hrsg.), Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gttingen, 2006, pp.179-200.
99
Thomas Adam, Introduction, in Philanthropy, Patronage, and Civil Society. Experiences from Germany, Great
Britain, and North America, Thomas Adam (ed.), Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004, pp.4-5; Hugh
Cunningham & Joanna Innes (eds.), Charity, Philanthropy and Reform. From the 1690s to 1850, Macmillan, London,
1998, p.2, 4. Cunningham and Innes focus on the use of charity, philanthropy and reform during the Age of
Enlightenment, with a chronological fixture from the French revolution to the European upheavals in 1848, and raise
the question of the relations between donor and recipient by disclosing the dilemma of power and reciprocity. See also
Robert H. Bremner, Giving. Charity and Philanthropy in History, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, 1994, p.xii.
Philanthropy is commonly defined as secular voluntary action which, in contrast to the religious term charity, aims to
inspire the voluntary promotion of human welfare as a way of solving poverty.
100
Sally J. Scholz, Political Solidarity, Pennsylvania State University Press, Pennsylvania, 2008, p.33, 59. Scholz
writes that starting a social movement is no easy task. The different commitments of the members of the solidarity
group account in part for the sustaining force of political solidarity [] some people will work diligently and
systematically to chip away at what they perceive to be a system of oppression or injustice. Others will suddenly find
themselves united by a passion for a cause or incensed by a current injustice. The unity that forms among actors might
be close-knit and coherent or quite amorphous and fluid. Regardless of the diversity of commitments linking
individual members and the power of the bond of the collective, political solidarity makes certain requirements on the
participants (p.70); Tarrow 1994, pp.4-5. Hence, the collective challenge for individuals, either in the form as densely
or loosely-knit associations, is in resisting the pressures from elites, authorities, other groups or cultural codes
which, according to Tarrow, often take on exaggerated expressions due to the lack of resources, for example, money,
organization or access to the state. One of the primal reasons for joining a movement is to go into opposition against
the claims and policies of its adversaries authorities or elites a process that contributes to shaping an identity
around a common cause. This represents collective action, in which the LAI wanted to attract the anti-colonial
movement by organising public demonstrations and meetings, and the establishment of propaganda campaigns (public
and letter writing campaigns; protest telegrams). However, failing to maintain collective action at a certain level, this

44

existence, either via the directives from the Comintern or through individual initiatives in Berlin,
by identifying collective challenges around particular political incidents and causes, driven by
the ambition to sustain collective action and solidarity in order to influence and control the anticolonial movement.

Hierarchy of Relations
The hierarchy of relations is a theoretical account of how the organisation of the Comintern,
according to the historian Inessa Iazhborovskaia, addressed questions concerning position, role as
well as the functionality of particular individuals and groups.101 What, therefore, are the basic
requirements to be included in the framework of the hierarchy of relations? Most importantly, this
theoretical framework aims to explain the complexity of the organisational and political
phenomena the Comintern has come to represent in retrospect. By identifying the nature and
dynamics of the administrative systems which existed both at the International Secretariat and at
Comintern headquarters, it is possible to distinguish the strategical incentives which aimed to
determine and locate the activity of individuals into certain channels. This depended primarily
on the existence of a hierarchy of relations, a structural phenomenon which placed the departments
of the Comintern in a hierarchy. Furthermore, it defined the hierarchical position of the
individuals, as well as their relations towards each other, hence, the system circulated around
questions of subordination and responsibility, of rights and obligations. The following
theoretical challenge for the study is to see whether Iazhborovskaias theory of organisation, which
focuses in its essence on evaluating the dynamics and mechanisms of the centre in Moscow and
its adherence to the political line,102 also existed outside the centre, and also whether it
adhered to its own rational logic.
The LAI was a network which, in turn, twirled around a complex set of other networks,
consisting of actors who shared a common belief both in the struggle against imperialism and,
most importantly, in communism. From an internal perspective, the hierarchy that emerged among
the individuals at the International Secretariat made a conscious separation between the people
who had responsibility and rights, while others were bound to subordination and commitment.
Hence, the distribution of rights and obligations at the International Secretariat, which constitutes
the focal point of the hierarchy of relations, witnessed a division into three sections: the core,
believers and followers. The core was a position reserved for trusted individuals who were granted
forces the movement to retreat into isolation. See also Wellmans discussion (1997, p.46) on network and collective
political activity.
101
Inessa Iazhborovskaia, The Logic of the Development of the Organisational Structure and Mechanism of
Administration in the Comintern, in Centre & Periphery, Narinsky & Rojahn (eds.), IISG, Amsterdam, 1996, p.57.
102
Iazhborovskaia 1996, p.57, 59.

45

responsibilities and rights on the basis of their long-standing devotional relationship to the
Comintern and communism: Mnzenberg, Smeral, Ferdi, Clemens Dutt and Gibarti. The believers
consisted primarily of anti-colonial activists who were living in Berlin and who had intimate
connections with the International Secretariat. However, these individuals were largely restricted
from gaining access to the core, even if they wanted to do so. The believers were a group
represented by Chatto, Hansin Liau, Kunizaki and Otto Schudel. The followers were left-wing
political, cultural or social groups, e.g. socialists, social democrats, pacifists, national
revolutionaries, trade unionists and intellectuals, elements the LAI wanted to get involved in the
anti-imperialist movement.

Table 1.2: The International Secretariat & the Comintern, 1927 1933
The International Secretariat

The Core

The Comintern
Piatnitsky
Secretariat

kom.Fraktion

Standing
Commission

Small
Commission
Believers

International
Secretariat

LAI Executive
Committee

Political
Secretariat

Political
Commission

Organizational
Department

National LAI
sections

ECCI
Secretariat

ECCI Secretariat
Bureau

LAI General
Council
Followers

Associations

Eastern
Secretariat

Members

Organisations

ECCI Negro
Bureau

Individuals

Agitprop
Department

Lndersekretariat

The focal point of this analysis is on the relations between the core and the believers, with the
followers acting in the background as a contextual backdrop. What is the motive for such a
demarcation? Whilst this study aims to portray the LAI as a global actor, in order to uncover the
system and nature of the hierarchy of its relations, the central question is to evaluate the
interactionism between the International Secretariat and Comintern headquarters. This also leads
us to see whether the authority of the decision-makers in Moscow vis--vis the dependency of the
LAI altered literally over time, or whether the organisation was a subservient slave to the dictates
of Moscow from the beginning, existing merely as a vessel to broadcast its loyalty towards the
46

Soviet Union. To illustrate how these hierarchical relations developed, it is crucial to distinguish
how and why the International Secretariat organised its activity as a sympathising communist
organisation through, for example, congresses and conferences, anti-imperialist propaganda
campaigns and curricular activity. This depended, almost without any exception, on carrying out
the directives issued by Comintern headquarters, and also on the ideological constitution of the
International Secretariat, the political composition of the LAI Executive Committee, the
organisation of international missions and on the conscription of reliable and suitable members.
This hierarchical administrative system depended, therefore, on its members swearing allegiance
to the cause, i.e. the establishment and the continuance of an international anti-imperialist
organisation.

A Sympathising Communist Organisation from the Inside

To comprehend the nature and structural foundation of the LAI, and the reasons why it was
established, it is essential to address the functionality and instrumental use of the sympathising
communist organisation. The erroneous term, front organisation, a term utilised by their
antagonists, does not portray the LAI from an impartial perspective and blurs what it initially set
out to be: a sympathising communist organisation and organisational cover initiated by the
Comintern to work in the service of the international communist movement. The aim of this study
is not to contribute to the narrative tradition which portrays the LAI as a front for the Comintern, a
framework established during the existence of the LAI and, especially, during the Cold War.103
Firstly, a sympathising communist organisation is not in any way connected to the general

103

The writings and total number of works that describe the LAI as a front organization is monumental. However,
the usage of the term is incorrectly linked to the united front strategy of the Comintern, a doctrine supported by the
communist movement during the 1920s, formally abolished in 1928 and replaced by the new line/class against class
policy. Characteristic examples of the above that have contributed to establishing the understanding of the
sympathizing communist organizations as fronts are the following works: the pamphlet The Communist Solar
System (The Labour Party, London, September, 1933), authored by William Gillies, the International Secretary of the
Second International. According to Gillies, the fronts and the sympathizing mass organizations concerned
themselves primarily with communism in disguise. Elizabeth Kirkpatrick Dillings The Red Network: A Whos
Who and Handbook of Radicalism for Patriots (Chicago, 1934) was a self-financed enterprise aiming to define the
anti-communist bias of the author vis--vis the American communist movement. Dilling defined the International
League against Imperialism as the parent organization that had branches in all parts of the world and is Moscows
agency for spreading revolutionary doctrines amongst colonial peoples (p.104). The report by the Joint Fact-Finding
Committee, supported by the Senate of the USA, Fourth Report on Un-American Activities in California: Communist
Front Organizations, more or less confirmed the perception of communist organizations as fronts. Released in 1948,
the authors of the report stated that front organizations are indispensable to supporting and establishing the
vanguard position of Communism and to pose as the only true friend of the struggling masses (p.25). In reference
to the LAI, the committee concluded that it had been an organization directly under the control of the Communist
International (p.107). The last example is Louis Nemzers article, The Soviet Friendship Societies, in The Public
Opinion Quarterly, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1949, pp.265-284. According to Nemzer, who focused
essentially on the association the Friends of the Soviet Union only to conclude that these so-called societies (or fronts)
were one aspect of the Kremlins power position in world politics in the extent and intensity of support given to its
policies in foreign countries (p.265).

47

perception of an organisation as a unified and permanent constellation.104 The term sympathising

was in fact a strategy implemented for the sole purpose of circumventing suspicion and probation
by governmental authorities and agencies (national security services). However, the principal goal
for a sympathising communist organisation was to extend communist influence. In October 1917,
after the Bolsheviks had seized power, Lenin was adamant about the necessity of establishing
organisations, associations and committees, organisational entities formed under the pretext of
acting as an interactionist link between the communist party and the masses. According to the
lingua franca of the Comintern, this form of organisation was a shape described as auxiliary
(podsobnyye), camouflage organisations (maskiruyuschiye organizatsii) or as a cover (maska,
skryvat). The fundamental purpose of the sympathising communist organisations was expounded
in Kuusinens Report of the Commission for Work among the Masses, introduced at the Sixth
ECCI Plenum in Moscow (17 February 15 March 1926). As noted in the Resolution of the Sixth
ECCI Plenum on the Development of Methods and Forms for Consolidating Communist Party
Influence on the Masses, based on Lenins dictum to use everything and everyone, Kuusinen
emphasised that the organisatory [sic] role of the proletariat is its main role. What did this
imply? For Kuusinen, the international communist movement could only be strengthened by
building up not only communist organisations, but other organisations as well. This primarily
concerned the channelling of communist influence over the masses through sympathising mass
organisations which, according to Kuusinen, needed an organisational structure that was as
flexible as possible. This depended nevertheless on the creation of a solar system of
organisations and smaller committees around the Communist Party under the influence of our
Party [Comintern] rather than under [a] mechanical leadership.105 According to Ludmila Sterns
study of the sympathy and moral support given by Western intellectuals towards the Soviet Union
104

The general understanding of an organisation is not that it is a random and chaotic entity, but rather, an organization
is perceived as a coherent entity that exists and functions around systems of rules and objectives, in co-existence with
administrative and hierarchical structures, which is required to meet and challenge changes in unanticipated ways. If
so, this calls for the adoption of new routines and functions, which depend on consultations from the stakeholders
which, in the context of the study, was the Comintern. The organisational theorist, Clive Archer, defines the primary
functions of an international organization as the following: functionality, the aims, activities and response from the
members that justify the existence of the organisation; instrumentality, how the organization is used by its members
for particular ends, and the set of common values every member shares; arena, the public places of the organisation,
i.e. meeting places for the members to come together to discuss, argue, co-operate or disagree; and finally, level of
independence, see Clive Archer, International Organizations, London, 1983, pp.1-2, pp.128-141. For further
discussions on organisation, see Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization. Executive Edition, Sage Publications,
London, (1998), and Michael Barnett & Marha Finnemore, Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global
Politics, Cornell University Press (2004).
105
Ludmila Stern, Western Intellectuals and the Soviet Union, 1920-40, Routledge, Oxon, 2007, pp.43-45; Bernhard S.
Morris, Communist International Front Organizations, in World Politics, Vol.9, No.1 (Oct.1956), Johns Hopkins
University Press, pp.76-87. For the Sixth ECCI Plenum and the discussion on the sympathizing mass organizations,
see Resolution on the Development of Methods and Forms of the Organisation of Masses under the Influence of the
Communist Parties, in Inprecorr, Vol. 6, No. 40, 13/5-1926, pp.649-650; (Otto W. Kuusinen) Report of the
Commission for Work among Masses, in Inprecorr, Vol.6, No.28, 15/4-1926, p.429.

48

during the inter-war years, and regardless of her erroneous use of the term front, the
sympathising (as referred to here) organisations intentionally concealed their links to the
Comintern, with the latter assuming the role of a silent partner/leader. Thus, the primary ambition
was to extend communist influence outside the communist movement, an objective attained by
distributing propaganda in cultural, social, or political left-wing spheres. For the Comintern, the
sympathising organisation was an organisational design, devoted to establishing connections with
the core of the left-wing movement, e.g. workers, pacifists, petit bourgeois and intellectuals. By
focusing on particular topics of interest (focus centred) educational and curricular activity,
thematic study groups, war veterans organisations, sport associations, theatre groups, the pacifist
and anti-colonial movements and questions of gender the sympathising communist organisation
assumed the shape of either an organisation, committee or an association. A fundamental
prerequisite was that the sympathising organisation introduced a non-communist leadership to the
public, and kept the public membership of communist party functionaries in the organisation
(known in a political context) to a minimum. The organisational and political work was a process
controlled by a communist faction (kom.Fraktion; kommunistische Fraktion), the primary aim
of which was to ensure the inclusion of the maxim in defence of the Soviet Union and the
process of socialist construction in the Soviet Union in its agenda.106 Cultural and political
organisations linked to the web of sympathising communist organisations of the Comintern (aside
from the LAI) were the Friends of the Soviet Union (established 1927), the Anti-Fascist League
(1923), the International Association of Revolutionary Writers (1930) and the Anti-War
Amsterdam/Pleyel Movement (1932). However, it is essential to make a distinction between the
sympathising organisations as distributors of propaganda and the functionality of mass
organisations, where the latter in a majority of cases identified and introduced themselves in public
as communist, and as members of the Comintern. Above all, the mass organisations targeted
memberships representative of society, in terms of place of residence, work, age, ideological
conviction and gender.107 The mass organisations of the Comintern were the IAH, the Red

106

Stern 2007, pp.44-45. The sympathising communist organisation is a topic frequently subjected to biased
interpretations. However, it must also be noted that the topic is a challenging one to research, examine, analyse and
interpret. According to Selznick, the communist front was one of the organisational weapons at hand for the
international communist movement to disguise the real political activities of the party, almost as the architectural idea
of a faade. In Hannah Arendts ground-breaking study of totalitarianism, published after World War II, she observed
that the first glimpse of a totalitarian movement [is] through its front organisations, whilst Witold S. Sworakowski
concluded that the global aims, the open and secret forms took on the bizarre methods of operation in the front
organisations of the Comintern, see Selznick (second edition) 1960, p.145; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of
Totalitarianism, Harcourt, San Diego, 1985 (first edition 1951), p.367; Sworakowski 1965, p.7. For a brief
presentation of the front organisations of the Comintern, see Edward Hallet Carr, The Twilight of Comintern, 19301935, MacMillan Press, London, 1982, p.398.
107
Gregory J. Kasza, The Conscription Society. Administered Mass Organizations, Yale University Press, New Haven,

49

International of Labour Unions (RILU; Profintern), Internationale Rote Hilfe (IRH; International
Red Aid), Krestintern (Peasants' International) and the Sportintern (the Red Sport International).
Was not the sympathising communist organisation required to carry out the decisions of the
Comintern, and was it a relation free from a mechanical leadership by the Comintern, based
rather on influence? For this study, these questions represent a vital theme. The proposal is that
the LAI was no exception to the subjugation imposed on the mass organisations by the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters. The obligations and commitment avowed by the LAI and its
International Secretariat need to be revealed and interpreted in order to establish an understanding
of the dynamics of a sympathising communist organisation.
The question of the intellectuals and their symbolic position within the sympathising
communist organisations deserves a brief introduction in this context. Previous research offers
well-informed and detailed studies of the intellectuals as fellow travellers to communism, who
functioned as political sojourners to the homeland of the revolution and embraced radicalism at a
distance. For example, Ludmila Sterns critical assessment of the spiritual declaration of support
western intellectuals gave to the Soviet Union, and David Cautes somewhat dated, yet still valid,
analysis of the theoretical character of fellow travelling as a lifestyle, represent constructive
research. In fact, as noted by the Marxist historian Eric J. Hobsbawm, the Comintern and the
Soviet Union only managed to attract intellectuals on the left in literature and the arts to openly
declare their support.108 Hobsbawms observation nevertheless corresponds to one of the
fundamental aims of the LAI to exist as a sympathising communist organisation: to use
intellectuals as an ideological varnish for the simple reason that they added credibility to the LAIs
anti-imperialist propaganda and agenda. Despite placing the intellectuals the followers at the
forefront, this group was nevertheless a peripheral factor when it came to the measures taken by
the LAI to gain access to the anti-colonial movement. They were used merely to ease the process.

1995, p.7. Kasza concluded that the general practice of treating and understanding administered mass organisations as
weak interest groups or abortive political parties, in fact obscures their true character (p.11), a point of view that has
much in common with the perception of the sympathising communist organisation.
108
Stern (2007); David Caute, The Fellow Travellers. Intellectual Friends of Communism (revised edition), Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1988; Eric J. Hobsbawm, How to Change the World. Marx and Marxism 1840-2011,
Little Brown, London, 2011, pp.264-265. For a biased study of Western intellectuals and their connection to
communism, see Paul Hollander, Political Pilgrims. Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China and
Cuba 1928-1978, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1981. A more balanced examination is presented in Michael
David-Fox, The Fellow Travelers Revisited: The Cultured West through Soviet Eyes, in The Journal of Modern
History, 75 (June 2003), The University of Chicago, pp.300-335. A majority of the research on the phenomenon of
fellow travellers, in the context of communism, takes its point of departure in the apologist work introduced by
Richard Crossman (ed.), The God that Failed (Bantham Books, New York, 1950), a book that discussed the idea of
the journey into Communism, and the return. This book includes the writings of well-known intellectuals such as
Arthur Koestler (who was a friend of Mnzenberg, and who later wrote the introduction to Gross' biography), Ignazio
Silone, Richard Wright, Andr Gide, Louis Fischer and Stephen Spender.

50

The LAI adopted these tactics in order to function as a cover for the Comintern by addressing
itself as a league. This term disguised the internal structure of the organisation and, above all,
defined the LAIs objective to pose as a campaigner against imperialism. The initial aim of a
league, a perspective often neglected in critical assessments of such an organisational form, is of
prime importance in this present study. A league strives to act as an ideological and organisational
centre, driven by its ambition to join together associations, organisations and individuals which, in
the present case of the LAI, meant the struggle against colonialism and imperialism. To emphasise
the difference between a league and the aims of an interest group, with the latter being an
organised association that strives to influence governmental decisions, a league feverishly
advocates radical change and, moreover, a league is not equivalent to an organisation.109
Therefore, it is logical to propose that, regardless of the fact that the LAI introduced itself in public
as an organisation, the LAI was from the beginning never designed to function as one. Rather, the
LAI was an agency, established solely for the purpose of functioning as a connective point and as
an educational centre for activists and organisations in league with the anti-colonial movement
across the world. The present challenge is both to examine and to reach an understanding as to
whether the LAI merely functioned as a cover for the political and organisational ambitions of the
Comintern, while at same time it also wanted to convince devoted individuals, associations or
organisations that it worked exclusively in the interest of the anti-colonial movement.

This analysis is divided into three thematic categories and chronological parts. Part I introduces the
background of how and why the IAH conceived the anti-colonial project in 1925, with a focus on
how Lenin and the Comintern approached and defined the colonial question during 1914 1924.
This part, comprising two chapters, establishes an understanding of the construction of the anticolonial project from 1925 to February 1927. The focus of Part II is on the impact, euphoria and
aftermath of the First Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism held in Brussels on 10-14
February, 1927. By introducing and evaluating the formal establishment of the LAI in 1927, Part II
ends with a critical assessment of how and why the idea of an anti-imperialist utopia vanished.
Moreover, in comparison to Part I, which is devoted to issues of construction and preparations,
Part II highlights the initiatives taken by the LAI International Secretariat in Berlin and at
Comintern headquarters in Moscow to exploit both the Brussels Congress and the LAI as the
international representatives of the anti-imperialist movement. By far the largest section in the
109

Kasza 1995, p.9. Political scientist Maurice Duverger's definition of a league is: [A]ssociations set up with
political aims, [] they are solely organisations for propaganda and agitation. [] by their very nature, leagues are
violently anti-parliamentary: [] The line development natural to the league is thus a transformation into an extremist
party, see Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Lethuen & Co.
London, 1954, xxxii-xxxiii.

51

thesis comprising four chapters which cover the two international LAI congresses this analysis
ends with a thorough assessment of the precarious interactionism in preparing the Second
Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism held in Frankfurt am Main on 21-27 July, 1929.
This part also investigates the Comintern's colonial strategy, and how the international communist
movement struggled to adapt itself to the policy change from the united front to the new line (the
third period/ class against class) in 1928, a turning point which forced the Comintern to reassess
its colonial work. In Part III, the focus is on the ideological and organisational crisis (the anni
confusionis; the year of confusion) in the LAI in connection with the aftermath of the second LAI
Congress in 1929, leading to the transformation of the initial purpose and aim of the LAI. This
involves a discussion on how and why the LAI and its network changed, becoming a malformed
structure characterised by disintegration, hesitancy and indifference. Four chapters cover how
particular internal and external episodes contributed to determining the bitter demise of the LAI
and the International Secretariat which, during the first months of 1933, ultimately led the
International Secretariat to realise that it did not have what was required to salvage the political
situation in Berlin.

52

PART I
Chapter 1. Conceiving the Anti-Colonial Project
The history of the LAI was created, formed and influenced by a series of episodes and incidents.
Characteristic and symptomatic of the political and social landscape of the inter-war years, the LAI
and its anti-imperialist agenda spurred a reaction amongst the representatives of the anti-colonial
movement in 1927. In 1925, however, the IAH and Mnzenberg did not proceed from the initial
idea to use anti-imperialism as the guiding principle for its political drive. In fact, the IAH
approached the colonial question under the pretext of stimulating relief activities outside Europe.
Addressed under the guise of philanthropy and proletarian solidarity, the IAH had begun to
manifest its presence in the Far East in 1923, culminating in the summer of 1925 in the
introduction of the Hands off China campaign in Germany. Thus, the anti-colonial project of the
IAH did not serve the purpose of paving the way for the establishment of an international antiimperialist organisation. On the contrary, the project was an interactionist process which unified
IAHs discourse of solidarity and philanthropy under the ideological supervision of the Comintern.
As the enterprise reached its peak in 1925, previous tentative attempts of the Comintern to solidify
the colonial work, e.g. the establishment of the International Colonial Bureau (ICBu) in 1924, had
ended embarrassingly. Thus, the colonial work of the IAH in Weimar Germany resulted in an
unexpected success for the IAH and Mnzenberg in 1925, which further convinced Mnzenberg to
develop the anti-colonial project, an idea that would lead to the establishment of the LAI in 1927.
The focus and aim of this chapter is to analyse the loose threads which, from the outset,
represented the structure of IAHs anti-colonial project. This concerns an examination of the ideas
and organisational measures the IAH took to initiate its colonial work, which came to life with the
introduction of the Hands off China campaign in June 1925, and the Against the Cruelties in Syria
Committee in December 1925. For Mnzenberg and the IAH, the anti-colonial project was a
pivotal source of inspiration and potency the Comintern could not fail to acknowledge. Hence, the
mobilisation of proletarian solidarity, under the guise of philanthropy, was the turning point for the
Comintern in developing the colonial question and strengthening the IAHs activities in 1925.
*

53

Lenin, the Comintern and the Colonial Question, 1914 1924

The internationalism of the Comintern responded to the frantic calls for independence against the
European domination of African and Asian peoples after the Great War. Delegates from the
colonial world, who attended the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles 1919, were seeking an
ideological platform which opposed and supported their struggle against colonialism and
imperialism. Once the bliss of the Wilsonian moment had begun to fade, some of the colonial
delegates began drifting towards Lenin and the Comintern as the answer to solving the colonial
question. Whilst the peace conference turned into a disappointment for the colonial delegates, the
material and human support wrested from the colonies to support the Great War left the European
continent dependent on maintaining the colonial system in order to rebuild their shattered empires.
Consequently, the colonised people and anti-colonial activists lost the confidence, as noted by
David B. Abernethy, they may have placed in their rulers ability or desire to improve their
lives.110 From this perspective, the euphoria of communism and the impact of the Comintern,
along with the vision to create a better world, became an ideological haven for the anti-colonial
movement in its struggle against colonialism and imperialism.
The inaugural congress of the Comintern in 1919, celebrated the unification of revolutionary
parties of the world proletariat. However, the congress left much unsaid about the colonial
question. Nevertheless, Lenin believed that the revolutionary upheavals emerging in Europe after
the Great War would affect the heart of imperialism in the metropolitan states in Europe, leading
to provocations and the final liberation of the colonies. A point of view which was supported by
Nikolai Bukharin who, in an article in Pravda on 6 March, 1919, argued that all the filth and dirt
[] in the colonies was the result of the most active agent generating it: capitalism. For the
Comintern, therefore, a fundamental task was to support the oppressed in their liberation
struggle.111
The Cominterns general understanding of the colonial question as well as colonialism and
imperialism as a societal phenomenon was a result of Lenins theories on national selfdetermination and imperialism. Theories which had been inspired by the earlier writings of Rudolf
Hilferding, John Atkison Hobson and Bukharin, which Lenin had referred to while living in exile
in Switzerland during the height of the Great War, writing his own theories and acting as the leader
110

Adas 2010, pp.79-80; Steiner (2005); Manela (2007); Abernethy 2000, p.104, 129; Vatlin 2009, pp.21-34.
John Riddell (ed.), The Communist International in Lenins Time. Founding the Communist International.
Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919, Pathfinder, New York, 1987, pp.307-308; Young
2001, p.127; Michael Weiner, Comintern in East Asia, in The Comintern, McDermott & Agnew (eds.), Macmillan
Press, Houndmills, 1996, p.159. In October, 1917, the Bolshevik regime reached out to the Caucasus region and
Central Asia to support the Petrograd coup. This was a strategy that aimed to consolidate the newly-born Bolshevik
state, and to undermine the influence amongst the imperialist powers on the Russian border, above all from the British
Empire. This also introduced the image of the October 1917 revolution as an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist
revolution, see further in Callaghan 2004, p.19.
111

54

of the Zimmerwald movement.112 According to his Theses on the Socialist Revolution and the
Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1916), Lenin distinguished three types of national states:
the capitalist countries in Western Europe and the United States; the developed bourgeoisdemocratic national movements and the heightened national struggle in Eastern European and
Tsarist Russia, whilst the last category, the colonial and semi-colonial countries, found themselves
in a stage beginning or far from finished of developing bourgeois-democratic movements. It
was the release of Lenins study, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917), which had a
strong historical impact on the communist perception of imperialism. Based on Hobsons
Imperialism: A Study (1902) which had highlighted the colonial system at the turn of the century,
Lenin stated that economic and political factors are essential to realising that imperialism was a
phenomenon which stood on the threshold to socialist revolution.113 A postulation further
developed by Stalin in 1918. According to an article by Stalin, published in Pravda on November
1918, Der Oktoberumsturz und die nationale Frage, the theory of imperialism had become a
political reality in tsarist Russia. Stalin stated in the context of the enslaved colonial and semicolonial countries (India, Persia and China) and the right to national self-determination, that the
international significance of the October Revolution had altered the political disavowal of the
colonised countries. Comparing the colonial struggle to the victorious feat of the Bolsheviks in
1917, Stalin concluded:
It has widened the scope of the national question and converted it from the particular
question of combating national oppression into the general question of emancipating the
oppressed nations, colonies and semi-colonies from imperialism; [] It has thereby erected
a bridge between the socialist West and the Enslaved East, having created a new line of
revolutions against world imperialism, extending from the proletarians of the West, through
the Russian revolution, to the oppressed nations of the East.114
112

For an analysis of Lenin and the Bolshevik migr group (the Zimmerwald movement) and the initial idea to
establish the Comintern/Third International, see Vatlin 2009, pp.11-38; Lazitch & Drachkovitch 1972, pp.3-49.
Lenins sojourn in Switzerland also served the purpose of establishing international ties, e.g. Lenin met Mnzenberg in
Zrich 1915. This relationship lasted for years. In August of 1921, when Mnzenberg visited Moscow to attend the
Third International Comintern Congress, Lenin instructed Mnzenberg in person to establish solidarity and material
relief campaigns in Germany. Addressed as the Foreign Committee for the Organization of Worker Relief for the
Hungry in Soviet Russia, this was a loosely-knit structure, built around various committees, the prototype of what later
became the IAH, Lazitch & Drachkovitch 1972, p.18; Gross 1967, pp.125-139.
113
Hugh Seton-Watson, Nationalism and Imperialism, in The Impact of the Russian Revolution 1917-1967, The
Royal Institute of International Affairs (ed.), Oxford University Press, London, 1967, p.144. Lenins study on
imperialism is a work reprinted on innumerable occasions; for example, a third edition saw its release in Sweden in
1972, V. I. Lenin, Imperialismen som kapitalismens hgsta stadium, Progress Moskva/Arbetarkultur Stockholm, 1972,
p.7, 74-85.
114
Joseph Stalin, Der Oktoberumsturz und die nationale Frage, in Pravda, Nr.241 & 250, 6 & 19/11-1918. Taken
from J. W. Stalin, Werke 4 November 1917 1920, Zentralkomitee der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion
(Bolschewiki) (Hrsg.), Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1951, pp.93-98; Young 2001, p.126. Stalins idea on the colonial question
was not a novelty for him. In 1913, Stalin had authored the article, Marxismus und nationale Frage, published in the

55

The Comintern introduced itself as both the arch-enemy of world imperialism and as the moral
supporter of the struggle of the oppressed, a political declaration given due attention at the Second
International Comintern Congress in 1920 (19 July 7 August). As anti-colonial disorder had
erupted in 1919, characterised by the protests in China against Japanese colonialism and European
imperialism, as well as in Korea, India and Egypt, these episodes determined the colonial
discussion at the congress. Yet, the debate between Manabendra Nath Roy and Lenin on the
latters colonial theses left a lasting imprint, a discussion which focused on how the Comintern
should sponsor the development of a communist movement in the colonies. In Lenins opinion, the
communists had to establish an alliance with national bourgeoisie elements, an argument Roy
refuted as being illogical, urging Lenin to understand that the movement should consist of classconscious workers in the colonies. The outcome of their discussion was a compromise as the
congress endorsed Lenins Theses on the National and Colonial Question, which advocated cooperation and independence.115 The introduction of the Twenty-One Conditions at the congress
nevertheless superseded the message of the colonial theses,116 principles that determined how the
members of the Comintern, or members seeking admission into the Comintern, should behave.
According to these conditions, which included the stipulated opinion of the Comintern on the
colonial question, the following was required of every member of the world party:
In the Colonial question and that of the oppressed nationalities, there is necessarily an
especially distinct and clear line of conduct of the parties of countries where the bourgeoisie
possesses such colonies or oppresses other nationalities. Every party desirous of belonging to
the Third International should be bound to denounce without any reserve all the methods of
its own imperialists in the colonies, supporting not only in words but practically a
movement of liberation in the colonies. []117
Russian revolutionary periodical, Prosweschtshenije (Die Aufklrung), which introduced the theoretical foundation for
Stalins opinion on the national question. This document was re-printed and published as a pamphlet in 1914,
Nationale Frage und Marxismus. Taken from J. W. Stalin, Werke 2 1907 1913, Zentralkomitee der
Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion (Bolschewiki) (Hrsg.), Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1952, pp.162-196, 215.
115
Manela 2007, pp.215-225; Callaghan 2004, p.20; Weiner 1996, pp.160-161; V. I. Lenin, Draft Theses on National
and Colonial Questions for the Second Congress of the Communist International, taken from V. I. Lenin, Collected
Works Volume 31 (Second English Edition), Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965, pp.144-151. Roy stated that there
existed no communist movement in India, where the leadership and influence of Mahatma Gandhis India National
Congress over the nationalist movement could not be trusted. Thus, the Comintern had to assist exclusively to form
a communist movement in India argued Roy, a process that had to focus on organising the broad masses, discuss the
class struggle rather than investing energy in building ties to bourgeois nationalist movements.
116
According to Sassoon, the Twenty-one Conditions demanded almost nothing in terms of ideology and strategy; it
was a genuine statement that focused on organizational questions. Furthermore, as observed by Vatlin, Lenins mistake
was to mould the Comintern on the revolutionary experiences of the Bolsheviks in Russia, see Sassoon 1996, pp.3233; Vatlin (2009). According to one of the contemporary participants in 1919, the socialist Angelica Balabanoff who,
for a short period acted as secretary of the new international, the International became a bureaucratic apparatus
before a real Communist movement was born, see Angelica Balabanoff, My Life as a Rebel, Hamish Hamilton,
London, 1938, p.247.
117
Conditions of Admission to the Communist International, approved by the Second Comintern Congress, August,

56

To manifest a political opinion on the colonial question, the Comintern focused on the Far East
(the people of Asia) and the Muslim population. In an attempt to highlight the question, the
Comintern organised the First Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku, Azerbaijan, on 17
September 1920, a location recognised as the heart of the oil industry in Russia. In total, 2,050
delegates attended the congress, representing a cross-section of political and anti-colonial activists,
which fitted the nascent oriental policy of the Comintern. The Baku Congress was not an extension
of the colonial discussions that had taken place at the second Comintern Congress; on the contrary,
the ambition of the event was to establish an understanding amongst the delegates in the fight
against imperialist domination and capitalist exploitation. Nonetheless, the far-reaching objective
was to form an alliance between the Comintern and the colonial liberation movement in Asia and,
above all, to win them fully to communism. Grigori Zinoviev (1883 1936), the Chairman of
the Comintern, and the Polish communist Karl Radek (real name: Karol Sobelson; 1885 1937),
promised at the congress that the Comintern intended to support the liberation movements in
Turkey, Persia and the Transcaucasian Republics. In retrospect, the Baku Congress was one of the
first forums where anti-colonial activists met, discussed ideas and exchanged opinions on the
future of the peoples of the East after the Great War. Amongst the delegates, the congress had a
mobilising effect, while for the Comintern, the event provided impetus to develop its colonial
work. However, this was not a congress of different political, social or cultural groups. In fact, it
was an event characterised as being a heterogeneous gathering of communists, anarchists and
radical nationalists.118 The Far Eastern liberation movement had assumed extraordinary
proportions in connection with the Chinese nationalist struggle, and with the practices of Japanese
imperialism. For the Comintern, this movement represented a vital source in order to establish
support for its colonial policy, especially after the revolutionary tide in Europe had petered out in
the beginning of the 1920s. The Comintern approached the anti-imperialist bourgeois-nationalist
Kuomintang (KMT), and its leader Sun Yat-sen, while at the same time supervising the foundation
of the Communist Party of China (CPCh). Hence, the strategy of the Comintern was to merge the
Bolshevik theory of imperialism with Lenins concept of the united front in China. For Lenin, the
Far Eastern revolutions were not destined to follow the logic of socialist progression, since the

1920, taken from Daniels (ed.) 1994, p.33. Paragraph eight continues: It should demand the expulsion of its own
Imperialists from such colonies, and cultivate among the workingmen of its own country a truly fraternal attitude
towards the working population of the colonies and oppressed nationalities, and carry on a systematic agitation in its
own army against every kind of oppression of the colonial population.
118
See Riddell (ed.) (1993); Mohammed Nuri El-Amin, The Role of International Communism in the Muslim World
and in Egypt and the Sudan, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.23, No.1 (May, 1996), Taylor &
Francis, pp.29-53; Solmaz Rustamova-Tohidi, The First Congress of the Peoples of the East: Aims, Tasks, Results,
in Narinsky and Rojahn (eds.), IISG, Amsterdam, 1996, pp.74-80; Weiner 1996, p.162.

57

liberation movements were in their essence nationalist, thus, requiring the communists to enter
into temporary alliances with the bourgeois liberation movements.119
The advances of the Bolshevik regime and the Comintern to extend communist influence in
colonial and semi-colonial countries attracted the attention of the national security services,
especially those of Britain and France. In Germany, however, the KPD had to confront a
humiliating defeat after its unsuccessful quest for power in March 1921 had been thwarted by the
paramilitary group, the Freikorps. 120 Hence, the colonial question turned into a far more
problematic question than expected for the Comintern, a conclusion introduced at the Fourth
International Comintern Congress in 1922 (5 November 5 December). According to the speech
delivered by Tan Malaka, the leader of the Communist Party of the Dutch East Indies [forerunner
to the Communist Party of Indonesia; PKI], revolutionary socialism should be moulded upon the
existing cultural conditions in the Far East in comparison to the tentative, political steps taken thus
far. Aside from Malakas observation, the only measure taken at the congress to strengthen the
colonial discourse of the Comintern, was to endorse theses on the Eastern and the Negro
question.121 Much to the displeasure of the international communist movement, the Bolshevik
regime and the sections of the Comintern had, by the beginning of the 1920s, realised that they
were defending an ideology that met with resistance around the world. In the aftermath of the
KPD's ill-conceived plot in 1921, which the Comintern had eagerly supported, the KPD
nonetheless made a second attempt to seize power in Germany in October 1923 (also known as the
German October). Due to a lack of communications between the KPD and the Comintern, this
attempt was (again) a failure, which forced the party briefly into illegality, leaving the German
communist movement debarred and humiliated. Because of the German October, the Comintern
advocated a change in its political and organisational work in order to become a political actor of
importance in international politics. The decision-makers in Moscow launched the principle of
Bolshevization to either mould or correct the sections, a policy introduced at the Fifth International
Comintern congress in 1924 (17 June 2 July). According to the Comintern, Bolshevization
implicitly recommended that every communist party adopt the historical experiences of the
Russian Communist Party.122 Expecting the policy to contribute to a structural fortification within
the parties, in the context of the national and colonial questions addressed at the congress,
Manuilsky urged (later included in the Resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Report
of the ECCI) the necessity of adopting the united front as a strategy to develop its colonial work:

119

Weiner 1996, pp.163-164; Pantsov 2000, pp.41-43.

Young 2001, p.143; Weitz 1997, pp.105-108; Thomas (2008).
121
Young 2001, p.146; Kahan 1990, p.20.
122
Bayerlein, Babicenko, Firsov & Vatlin (2003); Rojahn 1996, pp.39-41.
120

58

[] the Comintern has to win the revolutionary movements of liberation, amongst the
colonial peoples and all Eastern peoples, as allies of the revolutionary proletariat of the
capitalist countries.123
Yet, Manuilsky only uncovered the Comintern's internal and external difficulties in building
bridges to colonial and semi-colonial countries and the Comintern had, therefore, no other option
than to turn its attention towards the colonial metropolises in Europe in order to solve the
colonial question.
*
The International Colonial Bureau of the Comintern in Paris, 1924
In 1924, the ECCI authorised Manabendra Nath Roy, the recognised expert on the colonial
question in the Comintern, to lead the International Colonial Bureau (ICBu) in Paris. The initial
idea behind the ICBu was to establish contacts with French and British anti-colonial movements in
France and Great Britain, and to get the PCF and CPGB to carry out colonial work. Roy worked
together with the PCF leader Jacques Doriot, and with the ECCI representative of the PCF August
Guralski in Paris, to realise the objectives of the Eastern Department. However, the ICBu turned
into an agency affected by external episodes and internal pressure, all of which contributed to its
sudden demise in January 1925.
Roy arrived in Paris on July 1924, and began by observing the nature of the colonial work
within the communist movement, only to conclude that the Cominterns colonial question, as well
as the activities of the anti-colonial movement, existed parallel to each other on both an
organisational and political level. For the ICBu, therefore, the primary aim was to break this
established structure, and to make Paris the connective centre for anti-colonial activists, an
objective Clemens Dutt, the British communist, assisted Roy in achieving. Did the ICBu realise
any of the above? The ICBu confirmed contact with, for example, the leader of the Rif Liberation
Army and tribal chieftain Abd el-Krim al Khattabi,124 and organised a small conference against

123

Resolution of the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Report of the ECCI, in Jane Degras, The Communist
International 1919-1943 Documents. Volume II 1923-1928, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1960, p.106. Taken from
Inprecorr, iv, 91, p.1154, 17/7-1924. This congress adopted resolutions on the national and colonial question, and on
the Negro question, Kahan 1990, p.21. The congress was convened after Lenins demise in January 1924.
124
Abd el-Krim al Khattabi (Abdelkrim) did not initially intend to seek a conflict with the French Mandate powers in
the initial stage of a campaign that put forward the demand to liberate the Rif region in Morocco from the Spanish
protectorate. In May 1925, however, a military clash between French military and tribesmen from the Rif region
occurred, which resulted in a conflict that lasted for one year, dominated by the strength of French (armaments and
personnel). The disorder ended on 25 May 1926, with Abdelkrims arrest and subsequent deportation to the island La
Reunion. Abdelkrim spent twenty years in exile, but en route to France, he managed to escape in Port Said, and settled
down in Egypt. In Cairo, he co-ordinated the liaison service for the North African nationalist movement. Abdelkrim
died in 1963, see Marvine Howe, Morocco. The Islamists Awakening and Other Challenges, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 2005, p.66.

59

colonialism in Paris. In 1924, the French anti-colonial movement was starting to take hold, and the
activities of the ICBu contributed to increase anti-colonial propaganda. However, after the
dissolution of the ICBu, the anti-colonial work of the PCF culminated, in 1925-26, in a large
campaign against colonial war, which was supported by the Union Intercoloniale, an association
that was a sub-section of the PCF, formed under the pretext of supporting rebellion in the French
colonies and providing native propagandists with political education in France.125 There were two
reasons why the ICBu never gained momentum. Firstly, Roy was embroiled in a personal conflict
with Rajani Palme Dutt, Clemens Dutts brother and self-professed expert on the Indian question
in the CPGB. Secondly, the constant lack of money contributed to bringing the ICBu to its knees
and, once the French security service Sret decided to act, this bureau ceased to function. On 30
January, 1925, French police arrested Roy who, on the direct orders of the authorities, was
deported with immediate effect from France, and he left by crossing the Luxembourgian border.
His arrest marked the swift end of the ICBu, but it also left the colonial work of the PCF and
CPGB without any direction, and dislocated the contacts of the European communist movement
within the Indian communist movement.126
The ICBus setback affected the Comintern's vision of developing colonial work in one of the
leading colonial metropolises in Europe at the beginning of 1925. Concurrently, the anti-colonial
movement in Berlin was progressively assuming its role as the executor of the Cominterns hopes
and expectations of having a centre for its colonial work in Western Europe. For Mnzenberg
and the IAH, the colonial question was not a defined topic but, at the beginning of 1925, the
question represented a chance for organisational growth and political transformation. This
depended totally on finding a motive for the IAH to initiate some level of colonial work.
According to Mustafa Haikals analysis, the IAH founded the LAI,127 but what led to its
establishment and why did the IAH get involved in colonial work?
*

125

Derrick 2008, p.151; Edwards 2003, p.16.

Mustafa Haikal, Das Internationale Kolonialbro der Komintern in Paris, in Jahrbuch fr Historische
Kommunismusforschung, Bernhard Bayerlein (ed.), Mannheim, 1993, pp.126-130. The Ministry of Interior in France
arranged for the immediate deportation of Roy from France to Luxembourg. For Roy and Dutts diplomatic
relations, see Callaghan 1993, pp.86-94. Roy visited Berlin before travelling back to Moscow, see Overstreet and
Windmiller 1959, p.74.
127
Haikal 1995, p.141.
126

60

Internationale Arbeiterhilfe, Philanthropy and the Colonial Question

In 1926, the IAH celebrated its first five years of existence. Commemorating its role as a
progressive socio-political actor, and organiser of relief support and solidarity campaigns, the IAH
published Mnzenbergs book, Fnf Jahre Internationale Arbeiterhilfe. According to Mnzenberg,
this book was an overview setting out the original aim and growth of IAHs organisational
structure from 1921 to 1926, an organisation no longer comparable to its original shape due to the
changes in the political landscape since 1921. Mnzenberg stated that the IAH had succeeded in
transforming itself into an international proletarian relief organisation, existing not only for the
purpose of functioning as a social almsgiver, but rather as a social actor acting through the
proletariat for the proletariat. Mnzenberg emphasised that the IAHs work was being carried out
by the IAH sections in Europe (England, France, Belgium, Elass-Lothringen, Holland, Sweden,
Norway, Germany, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Austria and Russia), as well as in Africa, North
and South America, Argentina, Australia, Canada, China, Japan and Mexico.128
The growth of the IAH also explained the transformation of the organisational structure of the
organisation, as Mnzenberg stated, a process which included a shift in focus for its socio-political
work by including questions of philanthropy, e.g. the oppression of colonial and semi-colonial
countries. The question is what purpose did the IAHs philanthropy serve? Was it in the interest of
the donors rather than those of the recipients? For Mnzenberg, the IAHs strong, international
connections and relations were a convincing fact illustrating the IAHs capacity to organise strong
campaigns of agitation and propaganda which, in 1925, had made it possible for the organisation
to support the struggle for the liberation of the colonial peoples. An operation, co-ordinated by
the special colonial section at IAH headquarters in Berlin, and subordinated to the direct
supervision of the Central Committee IAH in Berlin, Mnzenberg claimed that the colonial work
had confirmed contacts with hundreds of social revolutionary colonial groups and
organisations.129 However, from an internal perspective the situation looked somewhat different,
and the so-called special colonial section was merely a reference to an institution which only
involved of a handful of individuals.
*
Enquiries into the Philanthropic Approach and the ZK KPD Circular
The IAHs proletarian solidarity relief operations were the guiding principle behind its colonial
work. For example, the gathering of material support for Japan after the earthquake there in 1923

128
129

Willi Mnzenberg, Fnf Jahre Internationale Arbeiterhilfe, Neuer Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1926, p.9, 28.
Mnzenberg 1926, p.28.

61

and, in 1924, after the catastrophic flood in China.130 The advance towards philanthropy as a new
activity for the IAH did not, however, occur unnoticed. In Berlin, Auswrtige Amt (the German
Foreign Department) questioned the transformed political character of the IAH, making enquiries
into the reasons for the change. Realising that the IAH had become a political actor across Europe,
Auswrtige Amt sent out information to the German consulates on the organisation, which also
included a brief account of the German communist movement. As noted in a Secret report, dated
30 March, 1925:
Since its foundation [the IAH has] gone through a transformation, there cannot be any doubt,
that the activity in the philanthropic area only functions as a means to prepare Bolshevist
ideas and preparation for world revolution.131
According to Auswrtige Amt, the IAHs philanthropy indicated a definite change in its political
direction, as well as a new focus for its activities. If so, German authorities had to expose the
supporters of the new agenda. In an analysis of the publications (Not und Brot, and
Mitteilungsblatt fr die Funktionre des Bundes der Freunde der IAH), released by the IAH,
Auswrtige Amt linked together a number of associations, Bund der Freunde der IAH,
Knstlerhilfe der IAH and the Anti-Fascist League, to the IAH.132
This Secret report included an elusive query. Allegedly, in December of 1924, Mnzenberg
had transferred through the IAH the sum of five million francs to the PCF in France. Auswrtige
Amt suspected this transaction to be the first of many too come, particularly as there was a
reference to the fact that the money would finance a colonial sub-section of the PCF in Paris: the
French Committee for Colonial Propaganda [Colonial Commission of the PCF]. For the
Auswrtige Amt, therefore, the IAHs philanthropy was a strategy and cover for distributing money
to France in order to finance Bolshevik propaganda using the colonial question as its pretext.
Despite the empirical shortcomings of the Secret Report, e.g. Auswrtige Amt had omitted any
reference to the original source; it is the reports conclusion that deserves attention, which implied
that the IAH had reserved the right to lead the colonial work in Europe.133 Yet, at this stage, it is
rather bold to suggest that this was the beginning of the IAHs anti-colonial project. Instead, this
report indicates that the IAH was but one link in a long chain of money distribution from Moscow
to Paris. Additionally, other documents verifying Mnzenbergs transaction of five million francs
130

RGASPI 538/2/27, 26-29, Bericht des Reichssekretariats, to, ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, [undated]; Mnzenberg
1926, p.20, 67.
131
TNA PRO GFM Berlin, Secret report to the German General Consulate in Antwerp from the German Foreign
Office, Berlin, 30/3-1925. British troops most likely seized the document during the Second World War.
132
TNA PRO GFM Berlin, Secret report to the German General Consulate in Antwerp from the German Foreign
Office, Berlin, 30/3-1925.
133
TNA PRO GFM Berlin, Secret report to the German General Consulate in Antwerp from the German Foreign
Office, Berlin, 30/3-1925.

62

have not surfaced. If the network of the IAH was functioning as one of many financial links of the
Comintern within Europe, this activity had to remain secret, with no trail being left in the
documents. In conclusion, as noted in a report from IAH headquarters in Berlin on 5 January to the
KPD Org-Bro (Organisational Bureau) in Berlin, which summarised the activities of the
organisation in 1924 and its scheduled plans for 1925, any reference to colonial work or contacts
with the Colonial Commission PCF was to be omitted.134
Yet, in January 1925, the ZK KPD announced the IAHs colonial work in a Rundschreiben
(circular letter) to the German communist movement. According to the ZK KPD, the IAH should
begin by establishing a proletarian solidarity campaign in support of the liberation struggle of the
oppressed peoples in China, Japan and in other colonial countries. The political discourse of this
campaign would focus on raising awareness in Europe of the economic backwardness of the
oppressed colonial peoples and nations caused by capitalist oppression, while the IAH also
intended to enlighten the colonial masses with education on the question of class. The ZK
KPD wanted the IAH to construct bridges of solidarity: firstly, between the labour movement in
Europe and the USA and, secondly, to link these bridges with the oppressed peoples in the
colonies. This would establish a natural alliance of class struggling workers around the world.
The ZK KPD expected the IAH to become an organisation which could unify the labour
movement in Europe and the USA in order to protest against the Imperialist system. If
successful, the second step for the IAH would, therefore, be to build a bridge of solidarity with
the oppressed peoples in the colonies, a natural alliance of class struggling workers across the
world.135
*
Null and Void
The colonial question had an impact on the IAH. Yet, in 1925, a serious question overshadowed
the transformed character of the IAH. Apparently, due to internal squabbles and controversial
decisions, the IAH was on the brink of collapse.136 The proposition that internal dissent
represented one of the reasons why the colonial question had surfaced as a new field of activity for
the IAH is, however, a vague one. Above all, the question, at this stage, was a tentative topic, in
134

RGASPI 538/2/27, 2-3, Report from the IAH, unsigned, Berlin, to Org-Bro/ZK KPD, Berlin, 5/1-1925.
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 3003/OR ARG/Sammlung Rote Hilfe/7, p.82, Rundschreiben [Berlin, im Januar 1925].
136
Gross and McMeekin provide a background to and interpretation of the direction of the IAH in 1924-25, a period
characterized by internal turbulence, an on-going power struggle between the IAH and the IRH, and by financial
shortcomings rooted in commercial failures. Francesco Misiano, IAH functionary in Moscow, stated in May 1926 that
the basic problem for the IAH in 1924-26 was too many ventures, no means, many debts, see McMeekin 2003,
pp.169-172, quote taken from fol. RGASPI 538/2/37, 77, Report from Misiano, Moscow to Kornblum, Moscow, 27/51926.
135

63

which the IAH had no strategy, or focused objective. The German context was also different from
the French one. In the spring of 1925, the PCF took the colonial anti-war campaign out onto the
streets. On 16 May, the PCF organised a public meeting at Luna Park in Paris, attended by
representatives of the KIM (Kommunisticheskii Internatsional Molodezhi; the Communist Youth
International), the communist trade union Confdration Gnrale du Travail-Unitaire (CGTU)
and the Association Rpublicaine des Anciens Combattants (ARAC).137 In Moscow, Nikolai
Bukharin pondered the colonial question. At the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum (21 March 6 April,
1925), Bukharin concluded that the colonial question was nothing but the question of the
relations between town and country on a world scale.138 Hence, none of the above explains the
starting point for the IAHs colonial work (aside from the aforementioned vague reference in the
January Rundschreiben from the ZK KPD). On 22 April, Karl Mller (? ?), Mnzenbergs
liaison at IAH headquarters in Moscow, defined the dilemma facing the IAH with respect to
developing any colonial activity in a letter to the Ukrainian communist and Secretary of the ECCI
Isaak Romanovich Kornblum:
If you can recall, you requested a proposal from us concerning the planned IAH campaigns
that would be forwarded in writing to the ECCI Secretariat. That is no longer possible,
because at this time no campaign is planned to take place in China, and after the catastrophic
flood last year [in China], no additional tasks have been given to our Chinese delegates []
I do not even know whether it is necessary to provide the Comintern with any specific
proposals. If you are of a different opinion, then we will look at what kind of proposal you
might have. We have, in this case, acted in full accordance with the 1 December, 1924
guidelines from the Comintern, concerning the activity of the IAH.139
Nevertheless, the IAH nourished the ambition to use China as a focal point for its anti-colonial
project. Chinese campaigns by the IAH and the Comintern (the IAH campaign in China after the
catastrophic flood and the Hands off China campaign, a joint effort by the ECCI and the Profintern

137

Derrick 2008, p.153.

Nikolai Bukharin, Extracts from the Theses of the Fifth ECCI Plenum on the Peasant Question, in Degras vol.II
1960, p.201. Taken from Inprekorr, v, 77 [80], 1026 [1078], 11/5-1925. The plenum agreed on the necessity to
reorganize the Eastern Department in order to get the colonial work operational. Thus, the overarching aim was to get
the Eastern Department to establish an own organization, supported by propaganda sub-departments, under the
leadership of 24 comrades from eight Eastern countries. The primary aim of this re-organization was to confirm
contact with non-communist revolutionary organizations and help them to work out their programme and tactics, see
Degras vol.II 1960, p.247.
139
RGASPI 538/2/27, 39-39b, Letter from Karl Mller, IAH Headquarters, Moscow, to Kornblum, ECCI Secretariat,
Moscow, 22/4-1925. The Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum in Moscow (21/3 6/4-1925) discussed the colonial question
and, according to the resolution introduced by the ECCI Colonial Commission, focused on India, Java, Egypt and
other dependent countries, see Degras vol.II 1960, p.187. For a biography on Kornblum (1880 1948; known
pseudonym: Wladimir Tulsky), see Jeifets, Jeifets, & Huber 2004, p.167.
138

64

in the summer of 1924), having quickly lost their momentum, 140 Mller questioned what kind of
focus the IAH should have within the Chinese context.
*
Hands off China and Against the Cruelties in Syria
Sun Yat-sen, the KMTs undisputed leader, died in Beijing on 12 March, 1925.141 Prior to his
demise, Sun Yat-sen had travelled to Shanghai in January, in order to strengthen the nationalist
struggle in China. However, a majority of the KMTs activities were conducted in the Cantonese
region, where members of the Communist Party of China (CPCh) were co-operating with the leftwing KMT to such an extent that foreigners visiting China, as well as members of the rightwing KMT, believed that the communists had hijacked the movement. Both Chinese and foreign
communists were prominent figures in Canton, the most prominent being Chou En-Lai, the
Russian emissary Michael Borodin and the Russian General Galen (V. K. Blykher/Blcher).142
Whilst this was all part of the political struggle in China, the episode which set the IAHs
activities in motion in 1925 took place in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. The British Concession
police in Shanghai, a part of the British Mandate military forces, killed thirteen individuals at a
demonstration, an incident which created a wave of international reaction. This action led to largescale strikes and student unrest in China itself, a movement focusing on the social unrest, poor
economic conditions and the slave-like working conditions in the Chinese textile industry. When
the Chinese labour movement demanded the organisation of trade unions, an argument introduced
by the communists, the Chinese workers went on strike. After this bloody episode in Shanghai and
the ensuing turbulence throughout China had ended, Inprecorr published a written statement from
the CPCh, accusing the British of having carried out an act of imperialist policy and, later,
Inprecorr started to run the news feature Hands off China on a regular basis.143 For the IAH, the
140

Degras vol.II 1960, p.169. Taken from Inprekorr, iv, 117, 1538, 9/9-1924. The establishment of the first Hands
off China campaign occurred after an armed uprising in Canton in 1924, between the Merchants Volunteers (an
association armed and financed by local merchants and the British Mandate authorities) and the KMT. By October,
the KMT had disarmed the association, and British military forces avoided confrontation.
141
Jack Gray, Rebellions and Revolutions. China from the 1800s to the 1980s, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990,
p.191. Sun Yat-sen suffered from cancer to the liver. After his death, he quickly earned a national and international
reputation.
142
Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, Longman, London, 1995, pp.124-125; Pantsov (2000).
143
The Shanghai episode and its ensuing strike doubled the total number of members in Chinese trade unions over a
couple of weeks which, after a while, the communists controlled. According to Jack Gray, the work of Borodin
reached its climax in connection with the Shanghai episode, see Degras vol.II, 1960, p.218; Gray 1990, p.217, 219;
Mnzenberg (1926). In February, 1926, Manuilsky stated in the Communist International that the events in
Shanghai had ushered in a new era in human history, see Gnther Nollau, International Communism and World
Revolution. History & Methods, London, Hollis & Carter, 1961, p.102. Manuilskys understanding of what was
happening in China was a product of the notations made by one of his assistants in Moscow in January 1926. See fol.
RGASPI 523/1/58, 1-13, Material on China, compiled by unknown author, Moscow, to Manuilsky, Moscow, January,
1926.

65

violence in Shanghai corresponded with its aim of establishing a proletarian solidarity campaign in
support of the Chinese national liberation struggle. According to Mnzenberg, the China campaign
was the IAHs fourth largest international action.144 Thus the political message of the Hands off
China campaign in its protest against colonialism began to overshadow the IAHs relief activities
and would become its guiding principle.
*
The Birth of a Campaign: Anti-Colonialism in Germany
In June 1925, Mnzenberg instructed the IAH apparatus in Berlin to distribute information on the
Hands off China within the German labour movement. Optimistic about the outcome of its
campaign, Mnzenberg informed Kornblum that much depended on getting the German
communist movement to express its support for the campaign before developing the issue further.
On 12 June, the Comintern contributed by releasing a joint manifesto from the ECCI, Profintern
and the KIM protesting against imperialist atrocities in China. Nonetheless, for Mnzenberg, the
first step in consolidating the campaign was to get prominent intellectuals to sign petitions, and to
initiate negotiations with representatives of the Amsterdam International in order to get their
support for the campaign. However, the fundamental dilemma that needed to be solved was the
financial question. According to Mnzenberg, the protest rallies provided a perfect arena for the
IAH to galvanise support, e.g. money collections and to sell Chinahilfmarken (Chinese
obligations) in Europe, the latter symbolising a proletarian bond, using the surplus of the sales to
sponsor the Chinese workers on strike. The ECCI had to approve this obligation idea; however,
Mnzenberg argued that it would be foolish to delay something that had already been set in
motion, especially as the IAH intended to celebrate the birth of the campaign at a China Evening
in Berlin on 22 June.145 In a report from D. O [?], a functionary at the ZK KPD secretariat in
Berlin, the evening was convened in a good atmosphere and was a unified political rally
which had every chance of making progress.146
The China Evening was a test for the IAH in order to evaluate whether the anti-colonial
rhetoric had had any impact. This rhetoric is illustrated in the transcript for a speech which was
given at an IAH demonstration in Berlin in July, which declared that the Chinese brothers faced
144

Mnzenberg 1926, p.104.

RGASPI 538/2/27, 75, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum, Moscow, 3/6-1925. The enclosed documents
were not filed in connection with the report. Mnzenberg promised Kornblum to send a detailed report on the China
evening, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/27, 78, Letter from Mnzenberg to Kornblum, 18/6-1925. See further in
Mnzenberg 1926, pp.104-120 for the China campaign, and for the 12 June manifesto, see Manifesto of the ECCI,
RILU, and YCI against Imperialist Atrocities in China, Inprecorr, v, 93, 1260, 12/6-1925, taken from Degras vol.II
1960, pp.218-220.
146
SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 20-22, Letter from D. O, Berlin to Heinz Neumann, Moscow, 23/6-1925.
145

66

the canons of unified English American French Japanese Imperialism, a struggle in which
European workers had to support the anticipated hopes of their Chinese labour brothers in order
to achieve revolution.147 Mnzenberg informed Kuusinen that the general objective of this
campaign was to follow the dictates of the united front strategy. Firstly, the campaign had to
establish itself as a progressive feature in Germany before introducing the campaign, via the
organisation of large demonstrations, in every country. Secondly, Mnzenberg requested that
Kuusinen instruct the European communist parties to support the campaign and the IAH, and
asked whether the CPSU (B) would consider the idea of organising money collections in the
Soviet Union. If the CPSU (B) supported the Chinese campaign, Mnzenberg promised to include
this in the propaganda, with a focus on how the Soviet proletariat had declared its solidarity with
the struggles of the Chinese worker.148
The IAH was not entirely on its own in drawing attention to the Chinese question. On 18 June,
the ECCI and the Profintern sent a telegram to the LSI Executive in Zrich, requesting a chance to
collaborate against the politics of the imperialist powers and to support the struggle of the
Chinese workers. The LSI Bureau replied and thanked them for their proposal, however, the LSI
criticised the Comintern for only acting at the last moment, when a political crisis has reached its
climax. In comparison to the Cominterns modus operandi, the LSI favoured a timely and
conscientious preparation for common action rooted in firm organisational groundwork, rather
than a method of improvisation. Confirming that they were poles apart on the political
barometer, the LSI questioned why the Comintern had proposed the creation of a common
platform.149 Nevertheless, the LSI had already established an antagonistic position towards the
Comintern, the international communist movement and the IAH. On 6 May, 1924, Friedrich Adler,
the secretary of the LSI, despatched a circular letter to every association and party affiliated with
the LSI, instructing everyone to avoid the IAH for the simple reason that it was a communist

147

SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/67115, 83-86, Manuscript of speech, 15/7-1925.

RGASPI 538/2/27, 77, Telegram from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow [undated, 1925]. Mnzenberg
organized (at least) three other campaigns and relief committees in 1925. In defence of Soviet Russia, a solidarity
campaign in support of the Hungarian communist Mtys Rkosi, who had been imprisoned and faced trial in
Budapest in the fall of 1925 and, finally, a protest campaign against Mussolini and the Italian Fascist regime, which
had prohibited the activities of the IAH. The modus operandi of the IAH campaigns was a process Mnzenberg
gradually refined, in which the focus on getting prominent individuals (intellectuals) involved became a focal point.
On October 7, 1925, Mnzenberg informed the ECCI Secretariat that several intellectuals had promised to support the
work of the Central Committee of the IAH in the Rkosi campaign, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/27, 138-141, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 7/10-1925. In the 1930s, the CPSU (B) was described as the AllUnion Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia Partiia (bolshevikov), VKP (b), see J. Arch
Getty & Oleg V. Naumov, The Road to Terror. Stalin and the Self-Destruction of the Bolsheviks, 1932-1939, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 2010, p.xiii.
149
IISG LSI Collection 3033/10, Telegramm der Kommunistischen Internationale und der Roten GewerkschaftsInternationale, [signed] Kuusinen & Nin, Moscow, to the LSI, 18/6-1925; IISG LSI Collection 3033/19-20, (Draft) To
the Executive of the Communist International, Zrich, 4/7-1925.
148

67

institution which, under the cloak of the so-called United Front, works politically for the
Communists.150
The ZK KPD kept the trickle of information flowing from Berlin to Comintern headquarters in
Moscow. Ernst Schneller (1890 1944), German communist and functionary at the ZK KPD
secretariat in Berlin, notified Heinz Neumann in Moscow in a letter dated 18 June, that the Hands
off China campaign had had an impact on the political scene both in Berlin and throughout
Germany, and had encouraged Chinese activists in the city to willingly participate.151 Leo Flieg
(1893 1939), the grey eminence at the KPD Polbro in Berlin, in charge of the KPDs covert
business and liaison services, and Mnzenbergs friend, informed Neumann on 26 June that the
Hands off China campaign had exceeded the KPD's expectations, concluding that the campaign
had every chance of becoming a political success (ein Schlager werden wird).152
The Hands off China campaign relied from the outset foremost on the nature of individual
relations. Introduced to the public and taken out onto the Berlin streets in the summer of 1925, the
communication links running between Berlin and Moscow (the IAH, KPD, the KPD representative
in Moscow and the ECCI), are possible to trace, re-construct and evaluate.

150

IISG LSI Collection 3050/3, To the Parties affiliated to the L. S. I., Friedrich Adler, Zrich, 6/4-1924. The
European labour movement continued to question the very nature of the IAH in 1925. According to Gross, the Belgian
Workers Party published several documents that mentioned the communist links of the IAH, a public stunt that
resulted in a joint resolution from the British Labour Party and the British Trade Union Council, demanding the IAH
to focus on relief campaigns rather than instigating political propaganda, see Gross 1967, p.159.
151
Schneller was a party theoretician in the KPD, acting both as editor of the journal Internationale and as the leader
of the study circle, Marxistisch-Leninistischen Zirkel, in Berlin. On 11 October, 1944, the SS executed Schneller in
the KZ Sachsenhausen along with 26 other prisoners; SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 18, Letter from Schneller, Berlin, to
H. Neumann in Moscow, 18/6-1925. Ernst Schneller, in Weber & Herbst (Hrsg.) 2004, pp.687-688. Arthur Koestler
wrote in The God that Failed that Schneller resembled a thin, bony man [] with a pinched, taut-skinned face and an
awkward smile, who only read the official Party organ, Rote Fahne, see Arthur Koestler, in Crossman (ed.), 1954,
p.25.
152
SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 23-25, Letter from Flieg, Berlin, to Neumann, Moscow, 26/6-1925. Fliegs comment
(in German) was Ich hoffe, dass ein Schlager werden wird.

68

Table 2.1: The Network behind the Hands off China Campaign, June-August 1925
Berlin

Moscow

Mnzenberg, IAH

Karl Mller;
IAH, Moscow

Flieg, ZK KPD

Zinoviev

Schneller,
ZK KPD

Kuusinen, ECCI
Secretariat

D. O. [?], KPD
Secretariat

Kornblum, ECCI
Secretariat
Neumann, ECCI
KPD representative

Mnzenbergs ties confirm that he was in contact with both the Comintern's high-ranking
secretaries Kuusinen and Kornblum, and with the Chairman of the Comintern, Zinoviev. Flieg and
Schneller had Neumann as their liaison in Moscow (KPD representative at the ECCI). More
importantly, the anti-colonial project and the China campaign depended on the nature of these
individual relations rather than on maintaining a system which relied on receiving directives per se
from the ECCI Secretariat, the Eastern Department or from the ZK KPD. For Mnzenberg, Kurt
Mller was the key actor in developing the anti-colonial project.
*
A Mission to Beijing and Ambitions of a Great Demonstration in Berlin
In May (not later than 12 May), Mller left Moscow on an IAH mission to Beijing, travelling
with the Swiss communist Siegfried Bamatter and a Russian Comrade. Mller sent a report to
the ECCI Secretariat members (Kornblum, Piatnitsky and the Russian Grigorii Naumovich
Voitinsky), outlining the IAHs area of operation and the Hands off China campaign in China.153
Francesco Misiano (1884 1936), the Italian communist, in charge of the IAH film production
company Mezhrabpom-Film at IAH headquarters in Moscow, visited Mnzenberg in Berlin to
work out the details of the Hands off China campaign in July. In a report from Mnzenberg and
Misiano to the ECCI, the IAH had begun to evaluate the results of the Hands off China campaign,
153

RGASPI 538/2/27, 45-50, Kommerz-Abteilung [bericht] IAH, to, ECCI Secretariat [?], Moscow [?], undated, year:
1925; RGASPI 538/2/27, 91-94, Letter from Karl Mller, Beijing, to Kornblum, Piatnitsky, Voitinsky, Moscow, 14/71925. For biography on Siegfried Bamatter (1892 1966), see Jeifets, Jeifets & Huber 2004, pp.42-43, and, for
Grigorii Naumovich Voitinsky, see Pantsov 2000, p.295.

69

e.g. well-known characters in China [unknown] had sent greetings of sympathy to the Central
Committee of the IAH. However, as the leadership in both the CPGB and the Workers Party of
America (WPA) showed no intention of supporting the IAH in its work, the ECCI was forced to
exert pressure on these parties, Mnzenberg argued.154 It seems, however, that Mnzenberg was
either unaware of, or had overlooked the steps taken by the WPA. Manuel Gomez, the leader of the
All American Anti-Imperialist League (AAAIL, established in Chicago in 1925, the colonial
section of the WPA), had published a communiqu on 2 July appealing to all trade unions, the
Socialist Party and every organisation in sympathy with the cause of the Chinese people to
support the Hands off China campaign. The signatories of this communiqu disclosed the overt
communist connotations of the appeal: the Executive Secretary of the WPA, C. E. Ruthenberg, the
Chairman of the WPA, William Z. Foster and the secretary of the Trade Union Educational
League, Jack W. Johnstone.155
It was a difficult undertaking to break the communist parties ignorance vis--vis the IAH.
Mnzenberg told Kuusinen that it did not matter whether the IAH had the ambition to create the
widest relief campaign so long as the communist parties took no notice of the organisation.
According to Mnzenberg, this point of view had been expressed in the reports from the IAH
sections in Germany, France, Czechoslovakia and England, fearing the imminent collapse of the
campaign. However, this represented a division of authority in Mnzenbergs opinion, telling
Kuusinen that the IAH had to remain in control of the campaign if the parties chose to provide
administrative and moral support.156 For the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, it was a
question of guaranteeing that the campaign would continue and, if so, Mnzenberg promised
Kuusinen and Piatnitsky to bring the campaign to a conclusive end, the impressive finale being a
great demonstration in Berlin.157
154

RGASPI 538/2/27, 95-96, Letter from Mnzenberg & Misiano, Berlin/Moscow, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow,
17/7-1925. Mnzenberg and Misiano informed the ECCI Secretariat of the work done to secure support from the
Amsterdam International. According to Mnzenberg, two Amsterdamers had contacted him merely to inform him
that the Amsterdam International was reluctant to co-operate with the IAH on this question. For biography on
Francesco Misiano, see Lazitch 1986, pp.319-320.
155
RGASPI 515/1/575, 4-5, Circular letter from Manuel Gomez, AAAIL, Chicago, 2/7-1925. Gomez informed that
the AAAIL, WPA and the Trade Union Educational League expected to use everything possible to attract the trade
unions, the Socialist Party and any workers and peasants organization to support the campaign. For Manuel
Gomez/Charles Shipman, see his autobiography, Charles Shipman, It Had to Be Revolution. Memoirs of an American
Radical, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1993. Harvey Klehr writes in the Foreword that the memoir provides a
fascinating picture of one journey of commitment and disillusion (p.xi).
156
RGASPI 538/2/27, 95-96, Letter from Mnzenberg and Misiano, Berlin/Moscow, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow,
17/7-1925; RGASPI 538/2/27, 97-98, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 19/7-1925.
157
RGASPI 538/2/27, 103, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 21/7-1925; RGASPI 538/2/27,
104, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 23/7-1925. Mnzenberg promised to send a detailed
report of the Hands off China campaign to Kuusinen. Further, Piatnitsky received an edited budget for the costs to
print a China Bulletin, a publication which aimed to illustrate the progression of the campaign in China. However, it
was another question, the internal controversy in the KPD, with its focus on the ultra leftist fraction (Ruth Fischer,
Maslow and the political line of the KPD Central [ZK KPD]) which gained attention in the German communist

70

*
The Finale of the Hands off China Campaign, Berlin, 16 August, 1925
The Hands off China campaign culminated in the Berlin Congress on 16 August, 1925. After
having organised public demonstrations throughout the summer, the IAH organised this congress
at the Herrenhaus, leaving Mnzenberg assured of the fact that the IAH apparatus had organised
the entire event, with the Herrenhaus Congress bringing together representatives of the European
trade union movement and intellectuals in support of the Chinese liberation struggle.158 However,
it was a congress prepared at the last minute. The IAH did not begin sending out invitations to
organisations, committees and associations to attend a congress to discuss the situation in China
until 1 August. On the invitation, Mnzenberg, together with the German socialist Georg
Ledebour, introduced themselves as the hosts for the congress, with the Central Committee of the
IAH as its organiser.159
Six hundred delegates attended the Herrenhaus Congress, according to a report from the
Chief of Police in Berlin, who had taken extra notice of the presence of twelve young Chinese.
Mnzenberg presented different figures in a letter to Zinoviev, stating that the congress had been
attended by almost 1,000 individuals, a third of which had been prominent intellectuals, e.g.
theosophist Graf von Reventlow, and Mnzenbergs friend the painter Kthe Kollwitz. The
Herrenhaus had been modestly decorated with flags and banners declaring Hnde weg von
China, according to Mnzenberg.160 The Berlin Chief of Police observed how Ledebour had
guided the congress with accuracy and that the delivered speeches were fiery and sincere,
primarily because the speakers had avoided criticising the German government. A number of wellknown communists had attended the event, e.g. the KPD member Wilhelm Pieck as the IRH
delegate, whilst the ZK KPD member Fritz Heckert attended as a Profintern delegate. The
performance of Tschang Pah Chung, a Chinese student and the KMT representative in Berlin, had
been a euphoric demonstration, urging the crowd to understand the need to unify the workers and
peasants in China. Ernst Meyer, a lawyer and journalist from Berlin, discussed the relevance of
the current struggle in China and criticised the ignorant bystander [] bourgeoisie press in
movement. In a letter to Zinoviev on July 21, Mnzenberg declared that he had publicly denounced the FischerMaslow leadership at several party district conferences; see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 65-66, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev in Moscow, 21/7-1925. The ECCI published a critical statement to Fischer and
Maslow in Inprecorr on September 4 1925, aimed at all organizations and members of the KPD, see Degras vol.II
1960, pp.223-227; Ben Fowkes, Communism in Germany Under the Weimar Republic, Macmillan Press London
(1984); Weitz (1997). For Fischers own interpretation, see Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism A Study in
the Origins of the State Party (Cambridge, 1948).
158
Mnzenberg 1926, p.120.
159
RGASPI 495/30/165, 72, Einladung zu dem Kongress Hnde weg von China, Berlin, 1/8-1925.
160
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Prs. Berlin, 27/8-1925; RGASPI
538/2/27, 110, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 18/8-1925. The congress was an event
characterized by its cheerful atmosphere according to the Berlin Chief of Police.

71

Germany. According to Meyer, the IAH had succeeded where everyone else had failed, to secure
material support for and declare solidarity in support of the Chinese struggle.161 Chung and
Meyers speeches functioned as somewhat of a prelude to Mnzenbergs performance at the
congress. The Berlin Chief of Police wrote that Mnzenberg had taken the rostrum, from where he
delivered a fierce attack against the bourgeois press, accusing the Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschland (SPD) of not understanding the colonial question. In connection with the turmoil in
China, the political ethos and pathos of the IAH had proven to be a correct attitude, in which the
non-party character of the organisation had been emphasised to the fullest, Mnzenberg argued. It
was not a question of the IAH acting as a leading army, acting uncritically everywhere but rather
of the IAH being a proletarian institution supporting the suffering innocent and proletarian
strugglers. This statement in itself implied a transformation of the IAH. Mnzenberg explained
that the IAH had the ambition to become a political force to be reckoned with in the imperialist
nations, and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The international success of the Hands
off China campaign was the evidence justifying the IAHs position, Mnzenberg stated. For
example, the IAH had collected one million Gold Marks since June, four fifths of which had been
collected in the Soviet Union, whilst over one thousand public meetings had been organised in
Germany, Austria, France, Holland, Norway, Czechoslovakia, England and the USA. In order to
bring the finale of the campaign to fruition, Mnzenberg wanted to send an objective delegation
to carry out a field study of the social situation in Beijing, consisting of well-known individuals
from Germany, England and France.162 However, any indication of such a delegation ever leaving
Europe and travelling to Beijing, remains unknown. Instead, the idea was (most likely) a publicity
stunt used by Mnzenberg to stir up the crowd. Ending the congress, Ledebour gave the final
speech, declaring that the IAHs proletarian solidarity was a logical consequence of the war that
socialism was carrying out against colonial policy. The crowd joined in at the ceremonial end,
urging for the realisation of world revolution before singing The International.163 Once the
congress was over, Mnzenberg realised that the Chinese campaign had brought to light other
aspects apart from relief support; that the colonial issue was one containing a broad spectrum of
ideological facets and organisational possibilities.
*
161

SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Prs. Berlin, 27/8-1925. The Berlin
police monitored the congress to see whether any participants expressed hostile comments against the German
government. For example, Meyer expressed concern over the fact that German business enterprises in Berlin and
Hamburg facilitated the transport of arms on Japanese ships to China.
162
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Prs. Berlin, 27/8-1925; RGASPI
538/2/27, 110, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 18/8-1925. Mnzenberg mentioned the figure of
one thousand to Zinoviev.
163
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115/123, 98-103, Abschrift aus Bericht des Pol. Prs. Berlin, 27/8-1925.

72

An International Anti-Colonial Congress

The success of the Hands off China campaign, and its climax at the Herrenhaus Congress,
convinced Mnzenberg that the IAH was capable of organising anti-colonial propaganda. Excited
with the results, Mnzenberg wrote to Zinoviev on 18 August, informing him of his intentions to
expand the IAHs colonial works remit. Apparently, a particular episode had aroused Mnzenberg
during the Herrenhaus Congress. A couple of professors from China and representatives of
Chinese trade unions (no names mentioned) had approached Mnzenberg after the congress,
suggesting that he encourage the Central Committee of the IAH to organise a real, allencompassing congress against imperialist colonial politics, in [either] Brussels or Copenhagen.
These representatives seemed to have been unaware that Mnzenberg was the man in charge of the
IAH; however, the idea confirmed Mnzenberg's original vision, telling Zinoviev that the idea
makes me happy. For Mnzenberg, the Herrenhaus Congress was the moment which confirmed
the IAHs position in relation to the colonial community in Berlin and, more importantly, the
potential of using this community as an intermediary in establishing contacts with anti-colonial
and nationalist organisations in Beijing, Morocco, Egypt, India and other colonial countries. In
fact, several of the delegates at the Herrenhaus had promised Mnzenberg to send delegations
from the colonies to this international anti-colonial congress. Thus, Mnzenberg assured Zinoviev
that the IAH had the capacity to fulfil the colonial work of the Comintern and to support the
current line, which suggested the coming of increased colonial wars. Thorough preparation
would be required to ensure that the international congress would produce a strong political
effect. The political impact of the Herrenhaus Congress had, according to Mnzenberg, proven
the possibility of polarising the Comintern's position on the colonial question vis-a-vis the LSI,
especially as the latter was also convening for its international congress in Marseille in August.164
Mnzenbergs first concern was not to construct a network with anti-colonial activists; his
focus was on the international anti-colonial congress. Suggesting convening the event sometime in
October or November, Mnzenberg intended to use the IAHs few existing colonial contacts, to
spread the word about the congress, and for it to convene in either Brussels or Copenhagen, cities
that offered the greatest opportunity to create a demonstration against the colonial politics of the
imperialists. For Mnzenberg, the initial challenge at this stage was to foster an understanding
164

RGASPI 538/2/27, 108-109, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 18/8-1925. Mnzenberg
eagerly anticipated fulfilling the request of the ECCI Secretariat to organize propaganda against the International
LSI congress, see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 67, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Wuletzki, Moscow, 17/81925. On 20 August, the ECCI declared in Inprecorr that the unprecedented accentuation of the colonial and semicolonial liberation struggles was a reflection of the international political situation; see [Extracts] A Letter from
the ECCI to All Organizations and Members of the German Communist Party, Inprecorr, v, 128, 4/9-1925, p.1863,
taken from Degras vol.II 1960, p.227.

73

amongst the disparate political camps in Germany of the IAHs philanthropy and proletarian
solidarity. Hence, this depended on stimulating his contacts with the German pacifist movement in
order to gain access to the political, social and cultural layers inaccessible to the German
communist movement. Nevertheless, Mnzenberg knew that the connections between the IAH and
the German pacifist organisation, the League for Human Rights (LHR), and his personal contact
with its secretary Otto Lehmann-Russbldt, made it possible for the IAH to introduce the LHR as
the co-arranger for this international anti-colonial congress. Mnzenberg told Zinoviev that if he
managed to convince Lehmann-Russbldt to support the idea, this would, in turn, provide the IAH
with access to the LHR network of 100 prominent artists and politicians to be used in the
propaganda against colonialism.165
Whilst the LHR connection seemed promising for Mnzenberg, negotiations with the
Amsterdam International to support the campaign were not successful. The Central Committee of
the Amsterdam International rejected the IAHs proposal at a meeting on 18 August, according to
Mnzenbergs man of trust (Vertrauensmann) in the Amsterdam International.166 Who was this
man of trust? Mnzenberg never disclosed the identity of this person. However, a plausible
candidate was the trade unionist and socialist Edo Fimmen from the Netherlands, a respected
character within the Amsterdam International. One of Mnzenberg's friends, their relationship
stretching back to the foundation of the Auslandskomitees zur Organisierung der Arbeiterhilfe fr
die Hungernden in Ruland in Berlin on 13 August, 1921. As the official representative of, and
holding the position as Secretary of the Amsterdam International, Fimmen used to travel to Berlin
where he would also meet Mnzenberg to discuss the progression of the Soviet Russian relief
campaign. Moreover, in the summer of 1925, Fimmen regularly visited Berlin to hold lengthy
discussions with Mnzenberg on the Russian question. For Mnzenberg, Fimmens contacts
with the European trade union movement were a particularly valuable source, Gross later stated in
her biography.167 Thus, it is likely that Fimmen was the man of trust Mnzenberg used as his
intermediary in conducting the negotiations with the Amsterdam International.
Despite this setback, Mnzenberg perceived the Hands off China campaign as being a source
of inspiration in developing the idea of organising an international anti-colonial congress. On the
165

RGASPI 538/2/27, 108-109, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 18/8-1925.
RGASPI 538/2/27, 110, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 18/8-1925. Mnzenberg promised to
send information to the ECCI if the Amsterdamers changed their attitude on the China campaign.
167
The trickle of correspondence between Fimmen and Mnzenberg is significant in the Comintern Archive. For
example, Fimmen told Mnzenberg that he had avoided mentioning the ties of the IAH to the Comintern during his
meetings with trade union representatives; see fol. RGASPI 538/2/24, 23-24. See Willy Buschaks biography on
Fimmen, Edo Fimmen. Der schne Traum von Europa und die Globalisierung, Klartext Verlag, Essen (2002); Gross
1967, p.129, 168-170. For Fimmens role and position in the European labour movement during the inter-war years
and the response of the Amsterdam International on Profinterns attempt to gain a foothold in the trade unions, see
Patrick Pasture, The Inter-war Origins of International Labours European Commitment (1919-1934), in
Contemporary European History, Vol.10, Nr.2 (2001), Cambridge University Press, pp. 221-237.
166

74

other hand, however, Mnzenberg and the IAH had to adapt themselves to existing structural
relationships, a pre-condition strong enough to either endorse or ignore their ambition to begin the
preparatory work. According to the table below, the IAH and its anti-colonial project was a narrow
structure, having at its disposal only a few, limited contacts outside the communist movement.

Table 2.2: The Colonial Question and Outline of Actors, 1925

Berlin: IAH /
Mnzenberg

Edo Fimmen

League for
Human Rights
(LHR), Berlin

Moscow:
Comintern /
ECCI /
Zinoviev / IAH
Headquarters

Amsterdam
International
Intellectuals

Source: RGASPI 538/2/27, 108-109, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 18/81925
Is this table representative of how the IAH conceived the anti-colonial project? So far, the anticolonial project of the IAH had only focused on China as the sole topic, but reactions outside this
context indicated a shift in direction for the IAH's colonial work during the latter half of 1925.
Mnzenberg had also begun to get a clearer picture of the existing anti-colonial movements in
Europe, actors who would be able to put forward, defend and support the IAHs propaganda
against oppressive imperialist systems. The Herrenhaus Congress experience had proven to
the IAH that the colonial question was a very constructive field to pursue, which in turn prompted
the IAH to seek closer ties and contact with the anti-colonial movement, a proposition outlined by
Mnzenberg to Zinoviev,
The question is so important and relevant that I will do what it takes to make it possible for
me to visit you [Zinoviev] within the next few days, and speak with you in person about this
plan.168
*
Ripening of the Hands off China Campaign, September-December 1925
Mnzenberg's ambition to organise the international anti-colonial congress in October or
November 1925 was not realised. In fact, the Hands off China campaign seems to have run out of
steam after both the Herrenhaus Congress and a couple of public demonstrations in Stuttgart168

RGASPI 538/2/27, 108-109, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 18/8-1925.

75

Cannstadt and Darmstadt in Germany.169 According to Mnzenberg, the major reason for this was
that the propaganda material was out of date. In a letter to Bela Kun, a Hungarian communist and
member of the ECCI in charge of the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow, Mnzenberg urged
him to revise the material and get someone to send it to IAH headquarters in Berlin.170
This went against Mnzenbergs expectations of keeping the campaign alive in either Germany
or in the European IAH sections. In an attempt to do this, Mnzenberg instructed the British IAH
section to investigate whether it would be possible to get the anti-colonial movements within the
British empire interested in supporting the Hands off China campaign. Mnzenberg proposed
that the most logical step would be to stimulate the establishment of a Pro-China-Aktion (Pro
China Campaign), in which the section should focus its propaganda on the colonial liberation
struggle, instead of introducing itself as an organiser of material relief. Additionally, Mnzenberg
argued that London was the epitome of a colonial metropolis and, therefore, the most logical place
to introduce anti-colonial campaigns, which hopefully would attract anti-colonial activists and
nationalist organisations known to use the city as a connective centre. In a letter to the ECCI
Secretariat, Mnzenberg explained that one only had to note the large participation of colonial
delegates who had attended the Imperial Labour Conference in London, an event organised by
the International Labour Organisation (the ILO, established on the initiative of the League of
Nations). However, much of the above depended on the need to construct an independent network,
free of any overt connections to the Comintern or to communists known for their involvement in
the colonial question, Roy in particular. Consequently then, Mnzenberg hoped that the IAH could
prepare and carry out the congress on its own, an ambition that relied on establishing independent
contacts in South Africa and India, where Mnzenberg mentioned Joshi, the secretary of the Indian
Society, as being a particular valuable candidate to approach. Yet, if the Hands off China campaign
had reached its climax, Mnzenberg urged the ECCI Secretariat to endorse a new campaign, India
for China, expecting the Comintern to work out the political aspects of the campaign.171
This was the essence of Mnzenbergs relationship to Comintern headquarters in Moscow, i.e.
a division of responsibilities between organisational and political questions. For Mnzenberg,
caught up in the euphoria and potential strength of the colonial question, he believed that the
169

SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67115, 89-103, Reichskommissar fr berwachung der ffentlichen Ordnung, 27/81925.
170
RGASPI 538/2/27, 119, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bela Kun, Moscow, 10/9-1925. Mnzenberg enclosed
posters and admission tickets for a China event (no date given) in Berlin, suggesting that Kun use this material as a
source of inspiration.
171
RGASPI 538/2/27, 123, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 12/9-1925. The
International Labour Organisation (ILO) established in 1919 in connection with the discussions of the Versailles
Peace Treaty negotiations. The ILO aimed to preserve the tradition, developed by the nineteenth-century labour and
social movements, which demanded social justice and higher living standards for the working class, see C. HowardEllis, The Origin, Structure & Working of the League of Nations, The Lawbook Exchange, Clark, 2003.

76

Comintern would not object to assisting in the work to provide new political material (resolutions,
theses and propaganda material) for the China campaign. Additionally, Mnzenberg also believed
that he had the right to act independently in administering the daily routines at IAH headquarters
in Berlin, particularly the activities of the committees, associations or campaigns established by
the IAH. Nonetheless, Mnzenberg, Misiano and the German communist Friedrich Fritz Platten,
assured the ECCI Secretariat that the IAH did not intend to deviate from the sanctioned policy of
the CPSU (B) or, for that matter, the adopted decisions of the Fifth International Comintern
congress in 1924, as well as those from the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum (21 March-April 1925).
Moreover, the IAH begged the ECCI Secretariat to remember that the IAH was not at all involved
in the on-going fractional dispute within the KPD.172
*
Closing of the Books
The Fourteenth Party Congress of the CPSU (B) convened in Moscow on 18-31 December 1925.
After Lenins death in 1924, a power vacuum had emerged within the Bolshevik elite; the congress
therefore expected to project the appearance of a unified party, guided by discipline. However, the
congress progressed in another direction, only mirroring the internal confusion of the party. During
the discussion of the Comintern, the CPSU (B) urged the world party to cease its demand for the
imminent realisation of world revolution which the leaders of the sections constantly repeated in
their propaganda. According to the CPSU (B), the Cominterns focus should instead be on
assisting to solve the current crisis within the party and explaining to the communist movement the
difficulties of building socialism in a backward country.173
At the Comintern, the discussion of China was carried out on a different level. For the
Comintern, the Hands off China campaign had created a positive, political effect in both Germany
and beyond, especially as the world party considered the coming of revolution in China as a
critical link in the chain of world revolution. For the IAH, the campaign had been a success.

172

RGASPI 538/2/27, 111-111a, Letter from Mnzenberg, Misiano and Platten, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow,
7/9-1925. For a summary of the Fifth International Comintern Congress, and the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum, see
Kahan 1990, p.21, 25. Mnzenberg, Misiano and Platten suggested that Clara Zetkin act as mediator for the contacts
with the ECCI. The fractional disputes concerned a controversy between the CPSU (B) and the KPD on the question
of Bolshevization, which had its origin in the Fischer-Maslow fraction. The conflict affected the activity at
Comintern headquarters and Mnzenberg wondered, therefore, whether the ECCI Secretariat was able to sort out the
delay, whilst in Germany, Mnzenberg had become involved to solve the dispute between the ZK KPD and the
Fischer-Maslow fraction.
173
Degras vol.II 1960, pp.243-244. Manuilsky was the author of these objectives, which the ECCI sent to the national
sections in August of 1925. In January 1926, the ECCI Agitprop Department published a complement to the above,
stating that: By perspectives of world revolution we do not mean a precise or approximate prediction of the date
when the revolution will break out in one country or another, or even in the world, see Degras vol.II 1960, p.239.
Taken from Inprekorr, vi, 10, 125, 14/1-1926.

77

According to the ECCI, by the end of 1925 the IAH stood on the threshold of becoming a genuine
mass organisation, especially as the organisation had grown in size and scope due to its
recruitment of intellectuals, artists and scientists supporting both the Bolsheviks and communism.
Finally, the IAHs real task of winning groups over to Soviet Russia and the CI [Comintern]
was no longer a far-fetched vision and, furthermore, the IAH was the instrument through which the
Comintern would establish millions of large sympathising organisations.174 Mnzenberg could
only agree, despite declaring that the IAH headquarters in Berlin was in a chaotic state.
Nonetheless, Mnzenberg promised in return to the ECCI Secretariat, that he, along with the
German communist and secretary of the IAH Paul Scholze, and the IAH functionary from the
Netherlands John William Kruyt,175 would do everything possible to fulfil the Cominterns
objectives:
The IAH has become an indispensable part of the communist mass movement. Within the
framework of the communist movement, the IAH has the task of acting as a cover
organisation for the Communist International, [] to gather masses of non-party and
independent workers and left-wing intellectuals and through our work draw them closer to
the Communist International and its ideology.176
This spurred the IAH on to continue developing its organisational activity. However, by displaying
ideological obedience to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, this statement
proves how much the IAH was dependent upon the arbitrariness of the ECCI in continuing to
support the organisation.177 The IAH had, in fact, become comfortable with the thought of
involving itself more deeply in the colonial question at the end of 1925, proposing to the ECCI
Secretariat that the organisation wanted to act as a socio-political actor in the backward
countries in order to pave the way for either the establishment of communist parties, or of a
communist movement. The Chinese question did, however, require a change in its modus
174

Degras vol.II 1960, p.240. Taken from Inprekorr, vi, 10, 125, 14/1-1926; RGASPI 538/2/27, 114-118, Report on
IAH [undated]; Mnzenberg 1926, pp.23-25.
175
For biography on Kruyt, see Internet: < http://www.iisg.nl/bwsa/bios/kruyt.html >.
176
RGASPI 538/2/27, 222-227, Report from IAH, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 10/12-1925. The IAH
considered its anti-colonial work as a precursor to establishing a communist movement in regions and countries which
either had no communist party or a weak communist movement. At the end of 1925, therefore, the moment in time had
arrived to formulate a strategy on how to develop its anti-colonial work. This proposition depended on getting the
ECCI to endorse the idea and, above all, get the headquarters of the IAH operational. According to this report, IAH
headquarters had only a minimal staff at the office, devoted to dealing with international contacts, correspondence as
well as developing and leading the propaganda work. Its staff consisted of Mnzenberg, the Dutch communist John
William Kruyt, the German Paul Scholze, two steno typists and a house cleaner. The IAH requested that the ECCI
Secretariat ask Clara Zetkin, who had visited IAH headquarters in December, whether they needed someone to verify
the desolation in Berlin.
177
Mnzenberg sent a similar report to the ZK KPD on 30 December, adding that he wondered why the ZK KPD had
avoided contact for several weeks. The IAH, IRH and the Roten Frontkmpferbund should act as a collective block to
support the unemployed in Germany against the SPD, argued Mnzenberg and, if successful, this would attract large
masses to join the communist movement, see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 70-71, Report from Mnzenberg in Berlin
to Zentrale der KPD, 30/12-1925.

78

operandi, the IAH stated, insisting on a more specific agenda which would focus more on
exposing the social situation of the Chinese workers. If endorsed by the Comintern, and if
successful, the IAH wanted to establish a united front against oppression in China, which would
have to include representatives from the trade unions in China as well as left-wing socialists and
academics in Europe.178
In December 1925, Mnzenberg finally informed Kornblum, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky that the
Hands off China campaign had yielded good results. The campaign had confirmed contacts
between the IAH and Kou Meng-yu, who had been appointed as the secretary of the Chinese IAH
section in Shanghai and was Headmaster at Beijing University, and also with other scholars at
Beijing University [no names mentioned], as well as with intellectuals in Europe and the USA.
According to Mnzenberg, the IAHs colonial work in 1925 had awoken interest in social,
cultural and political circles; however, the campaign was not yet strong enough to solidify the
colonial question within the IAH. To strengthen this field of activity, Mnzenberg advocated a
shift in direction, referring to the societal turmoil in Syria (see further below), which had similar
characteristics to the Chinese nationalist struggle. In December, the IAH organised a public
demonstration in Berlin, on the direct orders of the ZK KPD, with the slogan China in
Revolution, the Cruelties in Syria, and the International Working Class (China in Revolution, die
Greuel in Syrien und die internationale Arbeiterklasse). Thus, Mnzenberg required the ECCI to
authorise the IAH to pursue the Syria question, and merge it with the political pathos of the
Chinese campaign. This new campaign intended to follow the established patterns of the Hands off
China campaign, i.e. sending petitions to governmental authorities, collecting signatures and
money and organising both public demonstrations and international congresses. However,
Mnzenberg introduced a new strategy in comparison to the China campaign, suggesting building
the Syria campaign around a committee, rather than only focusing on public demonstrations of
solidarity.179 This strategy would serve a two-fold purpose for the IAH. Firstly, establishing the
IAH in the Middle East and North Africa, and secondly, gaining access to the Arab and North
African anti-colonial movement in Berlin.
*

178

RGASPI 538/2/27, 222-227, Report from IAH, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 10/12-1925.
RGASPI 538/2/27, 212-214, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky, Moscow,
8/12-1925; SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/148, 69, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 8/12-1925;
RGASPI 538/2/27, 222-227, Report from the IAH/Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 10/12-1925.
179

79

Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, 8 December, 1925

The foundation of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee was a rapid process. According to
its first public communiqu, published in Mnzenbergs Welt am Abend on 16 December, the
committee declared that the bloody colonial wars determined the nature of the current
international political scene. The committee declared that this was a system of political
expression, created and supported by the League of Nations in order to allow the Mandate powers
to maintain their repressive grip on their colonial dominions. With reference to the 1919 Versailles
Peace Treaty, the results of these negotiations had stimulated the growth of colonial disorder in the
Arab region. Hence, a focal point of protest for the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee was
against the rule of the great imperialist powers Great Britain and France in Egypt, Persia,
Morocco, Palestine and Mesopotamia. After the end of the Great War, the Arab region was an
unstable region, characterised by violent outbursts. The situation in Syria came to head in 1925
with a nationalist uprising, which focused on the identity of the Syrian state rather than being a
question of Arab nationalism. According to David K. Fieldhouse, this rebellion was one of the
major turning points in modern Syrian history, one which the French military suppressed in
1927.180
In comparison to the Hands off China campaign, the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee
did not focus solely on raising material or financial relief; on the contrary, the campaign was
overtly political in its support for the Syrian nationalist struggle. Mnzenberg used his connection
to the LHR to turn the committee into a forum for intellectuals in Germany to air their political
discontent, particularly by signing petitions. For example, author Ernst Toller, Ledebour, the artist
John Heartfield, the Manager of the left-wing theatre Weltbhne in Berlin Erwin Piscator and the
well-known communist figurehead Clara Zetkin, lent their names to the committee. Additionally,
the committee also organised a number of public demonstrations and one large meeting in

180

In June 1925, the Druze population attacked the French military. The unstable situation forced the work to complete
the first Syrian constitution to take a brief pause, whilst the French military curbed the rebellion with harsh discipline
and control. Armed opponents, e.g. the nationalist clique the Damascus radicals, which had connections to the
Shahbandars Peoples Party and the Druze populace, defeated the French army in the initial stage Whilst the
rebellion had spread itself across Syria by the end of 1925, described as a genuine nationalist rebellion, the French
army finally suppressed the uprising, causing extensive loss of human lives and the destruction of property, something
the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee highlighted in its propaganda. According to the committee, several
hundred Syrian individuals found themselves in prison, whilst the military siege of Damascus had lasted for 50 hours,
ending with over 6,000 casualties in Syria. Another actor, the PCF, used the Syrian uprising as an opportunity to
strengthen its network in North Africa. In connection with the Rif Revolt, the PCF established a section in Tunis which
distributed propaganda in support of the Syrian uprising, see further in David Kenneth Fieldhouse, Western
Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, pp.286-288; SAPMO-BA ZPA RY
22/V S.U.F./95, 18a-18b, Gegen die Greuel in Syrien, 1925. On the PCF branch in Tunis, see Young 2001, p.147,
taken from Maxime Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, London, Zed Books, 1979, p.88. See also Thomas
(2008). The Syrian rebellion ended in the middle of 1926, with France deploying 50,000 soldiers to Syria on a
permanent basis to secure control over the country.

80

Berlin, with active assistance from the IAH, managing to get colonial activists to deliver
speeches.181
The Syria Committee was formed as the result of a joint discussion between Mnzenberg, the
ZK KPD and Manuilsky. For Mnzenberg, this committee provided the IAH with an opportunity
to enhance its colonial work, an argument which had been introduced by Manuilsky in December.
While Manuilsky was reflecting on the general aims of the IAH, the ZK KPD instructed
Mnzenberg to organise a demonstration against the cruelties in Syria in Berlin in December
1925. Despite the positive response to the China campaign, Mnzenberg did not intend to set up a
new campaign. The Syria campaign should have a committee as a representative source. This also
corresponded with the ECCI Secretariat's demand that the IAH establish either sympathising
committees or organisations. According to Mnzenberg, the committee should be totally separate
in its organisation and have no connection with the IAH, and secondly, if the committee became a
success in Germany, the IAH intended to form similar committees in England, Switzerland and
France. To lead the committee, Mnzenberg nominated the non-communist Fritz Danziger, a
member of the Socialist Bund in Germany, an actor who would attract the German pacifist
movement's support for the committee. For the IAH, the Syria Committee could serve the purpose
of paving the way for its activities in Syria, e.g. to send material relief to Syria.182 Mnzenbergs
proposal implied a separation between the organisational capacities of the IAH and the political
181

SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 22/V S.U.F./95, 18a-18b, Gegen die Greuel in Syrien, December 1925; Mario Kessler,
Antikoloniale Bndnisse im syrischen Volksbefreiungskrieg (1925-1927), in Die Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr
nationale Unabhngigkeit, H. Piazza (ed.), Leipzig, 1987, p.102. Kessler refers to Welt am Abend, 16/12-1925.
Mnzenberg and the IAH did not manage to collect the names of 50 prominent characters, ending only with fortyfour signatures. For example: professor Schollenbruch, Gerhard Pohl, Dr. Flakc, Dr. Boenheim, Dr. Klauber, Dr.
Meng, Henry Guilbeaux, Frich Mhsam, Johannes B. Becher, Fritz Weiss, F. Rubiner, R. Schlichter, Bruno Boimann,
Dr. med. Schminko, Wieland Herzfelde [John Heartfields brother], L. Mrten, Dr. Ernst Schwarz and Carl Grnberg,
see fol. RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Mller/IAH office, Moscow, 26/1-1925. Ernst
Tollers first contact with the anti-colonial movement in Germany was in connection with the formation of the Against
the Cruelties in Syria Committee. Kirsten Reimers erroneously writes that Toller only became involved in July of
1926, as a member of the League against Colonial Oppression (LACO), see Kirsten Reimers, Das bewltigen des
wirklichen, Knigshausen & Neumann, 2000, p.159; Richard Dove, He was a German: a biography of Ernst Toller,
Libris, London, 1990, pp.144-145. Toller acted later as a delegate of the German LACO Section at the Brussels
congress in February 1927; see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.239.
182
SAPMO-BA, ZPA I 6/3/148, 68, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 8/12-1925; SAPMO-BA
ZPA RY 22/V S.U.F./95, 18a-18b, Gegen die Greuel in Syrien, December 1925. The office of the Against the
Cruelties in Syria Committee in Berlin was at Bambergerstrae 60. Furthermore, this idea never saw the light of day.
Mnzenberg had expected to divide the relief support campaign into two phases. The first phase would send a
commission to investigate Syria, represented primarily of socialists and consisting of prominent individuals from
Germany, in December 1925. During the second phase, the IAH intended to organize the sending of medicine,
bandages and sanitary assistance to Syria, under the supervision of German socialist doctors. Mnzenberg contacted
Manuilsky (Samuely), employed as the ECCI's representative in Berlin during 1924-25, in charge of the contacts
between the ZK KPD and the ECCI. According to Ruth Fischers biased account, Manuilsky found himself constantly
in conflict with the ZK KPD, charged with taking advantage of his mission to Berlin. For example, Manuilsky rented
several flats for himself and his colleagues and ignored the recommendations from the ZK KPD on how to act in
Germany. Manuilsky used to send instructors to the local KPD branches. He also held unauthorised meetings with
individuals in the party, organised trips for intellectuals to visit the Soviet Union and collected intelligence, see Fischer
1948, p.394; Lazitch 1986, p.296; Nollau 1961, p.160.

81

ethos of the Syria Committee. Additionally, the committee was the product of negotiations, with
Mnzenberg being the prime negotiator: Mnzenberg ZK KPD; Mnzenberg Manuilsky;
Mnzenberg Lehmann-Russbldt/LHR; Mnzenberg ECCI in Moscow.
Table 2.3: Actors in the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, December 1925
ZK KPD
Berlin

Mnzenberg
Berlin

LehmannRussbldt/LHR
Berlin

Manuilsky
Moscow/Berlin

ECCI
Moscow

However, this committee was a product of the mind and, in the end, the Against the Cruelties in
Syria Committee was not the answer to promoting the colonial question within the IAH. This was,
in a sense, a symptom of the political and social obstacles the communist movement faced in
establishing itself in the Middle East. According to Franz Borkenau, the Comintern's attempts to
exercise any influence in the region was more or less futile, but why? Firstly, the communist
parties in Syria, Palestine and Egypt were unable to establish themselves as active organisations.
Secondly, this failure defined itself by social explanations, e.g. the communist movement could not
compete with the religious and racial structures in the Arab countries. Thus, the Middle East and
the Arab region seemed immune towards the attempts of the international communist movement to
penetrate its sociological structures.183
The IAHs inability to carry out any operations of material relief in Syria was a temporary
setback. According to a report from the British Colonial Office, dated December 1926, the IAH
assured the ECCI that it would continue its work laying the groundwork for the communist
movement in colonial and semi-colonial countries at the beginning of 1926. Nevertheless, British
authorities suspected that the primary purpose of both the Chinese and Syrian campaigns had been
to unite the European left-wing movement around a common cause. Despite the claim that the
Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee had introduced itself as a global voice, it was an entirely
German affair striving to build on the benevolence of politically-conscious individuals,
associations and organisations in Europe. For example, the French author Henri Barbusse, one of
Mnzenbergs friends, had attempted to establish a branch of the committee in Paris, an effort
which went largely unnoticed and attracted only a minimal amount of attention in France.184
183

Borkenau 1938, p.295; Nuri El-Amin (1996).

TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, REPORT on the Activities of the League against Oppression in the Colonies, December
1926.
184

82

At the end of 1925, the IAH wanted to find a new direction for its colonial work, especially to
make the transition from being a sponsor of campaigns/committees/associations to sponsoring a
more organised entity. While the political message of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee
had, again, verified the political ethos of its anti-colonial rhetoric, making it possible for the IAH
to establish connections with social and political groups previously inaccessible to the German
communist movement, the challenge ahead was to expand its anti-colonial project. To do so, the
IAH had to secure an organisational platform which existed independently of the IAH. However,
to carry out this gargantuan task, the IAH had to devote additional energy to facilitating a
structural milieu for this organisational platform in Berlin, a project that had to find acceptance
among the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters in Moscow.
*
Selling the Anti-Colonial Project
The Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee never gained enough momentum to unify anticolonial movements into an organisational and political body. Mnzenberg had, however, no
intention of letting this opportunity disappear. Especially as the Chinese, Syrian and Moroccan
campaigns (part of the Syrian campaign)185 had been successful ventures undertaken by the IAH in
1925. Meanwhile, these campaigns had attracted the attention of the national state security
agencies in both Germany (the Auswrtige Amt) and Great Britain (the British Colonial Office;
CO, in London, in charge of administering, monitoring and supervising order in the British
colonies). In 1926, the CO concluded that political movements, with a special focus on the
colonial question, had taken advantage of the profound dissatisfaction that evidently existed
amongst European intellectuals and the trade unions. Movements which, more importantly,
capitalised on the resentment against the excessive use of military force in territories the British
Empire perceived as being mandates.186 The IAH was also aiming to fulfil the objective introduced
at the Fifth Enlarged ECCI Plenum, which urged the international communist movement to
establish contact with non-communist revolutionary organisations and to help them work out
their programme and tactics. However, this involved negotiations with the decision-makers at
Comintern headquarters. For the IAH, in the beginning of January, Mnzenberg had to sell the
anti-colonial project to the Eastern Department in Moscow. Mnzenberg formulated a vision
which aimed to transform the IAH's colonial work: i.e. rather than establishing committees and
185

The conflict between the Moroccan Rif Berber population and the Spanish and French militaries erupted in 1921
and ended in 1927, see David H. Slavin, The French Left and the Rif War, 1924-25: Racism and the Limits of
Internationalism, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp.5-32; Thomas (2008).
186
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, REPORT on the Activities of the League against Oppression in the Colonies, December
1926.

83

campaigns, to carry out the colonial work in an organised form. This vision was a moderate
construction. However, Mnzenbergs ambition was to get the Eastern Department to consent to
providing financial and political support.
Mnzenberg feared that the Syria Committee would experience a similar loss of momentum as
the one experienced by the China campaign. Contacting Mller at IAH headquarters in Moscow on
26 January, Mnzenberg explained the basic tasks for the IAHs colonial work, matters that needed
urgent solutions. Firstly, to re-organise the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee with the sole
purpose of creating a separation from the IAH which, in turn, would stimulate the formation of an
independent organisation against colonialism. Mnzenberg referred to the new committee as the
Action Committee against the Colonial Politics of the Imperialists or the Action Committee
(Aktionskomitee gegen die imperialistische Kolonialpolitik), a committee which had to make a
sharp distinction between organisational and political matters. What were the reasons for this? For
Mnzenberg, the IAHs main objective was to keep the committee steady in our hands. This was
a conclusion based on Mnzenbergs experience of the Syria Committee, which had introduced the
socialist/pacifist Fritz Danziger as leader and had, therefore, managed to display the eager
participation of left-wing intellectuals, socialist doctors and representatives of colonial groups in
Berlin. The Action Committee was to continue utilising non-communist figures in leading
positions, something that would secure the establishment of connections with the colonial
community in Berlin. Mnzenberg informed Mller, for example, about the strong groups from
the Rif region, Muslim associations, the Berlin Kuomintang office, Syria, Indian Muslims, Persian
student associations as well as active and politically-conscious individuals from India, Afghanistan
and Korea currently in Berlin. In fact, colonial individuals were already carrying out work for the
Syria Committee; persons who would later assume leading positions in the Action Committee, but
only if the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters authorised this anti-colonial project,
Mnzenberg stated.187
To commemorate the transformation of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee into the
Action Committee, Mnzenberg wanted to orchestrate a public, yet modest colonial conference in
Berlin in February. The Syria Committee had sent out invitations to the conference at the
Rathauskeller to specifically-selected guests in January. However, Mnzenberg explained to
Mller that the event should convene in a discrete fashion, thus, the invitation did not mention
either the time or the agenda or the list of speakers. In comparison to the Hands off China
Congress in August, the preparatory work for the Rathauskeller Conference was an undertaking
guided by conspiracy, with only a limited circle of people being allowed to know the initial idea of
187

RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Mller/IAH office, Moscow, 26/1-1925 [sic, 1926].

84

transforming the Syria Committee. Nevertheless, this was done through the service of colonial
specialists in Berlin linked to the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. The IAH had
received a number of addresses for some contacts in the colonies. According to Mnzenberg,
these addresses illustrated the chance to create a persistent connection with anti-colonial
activists and organisations.188
Yet, this vision was only a temporary one at this stage. Earlier attempts, particularly the failure
of the ICBu as well as Roys undertakings in 1924, had revealed the internal and external
difficulties in establishing functional colonial work. One of the few successful auxiliary
organisations to carry out any colonial work in the European communist parties was the PCF, with
its attention on the colonial disorder in North Africa in 1925 which, at the beginning of 1926, was
still a campaign playing a key role. For the IAH, therefore, the task was to establish reliable links
to colonial individuals, sustain the activities of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee before
taking the step towards transformation and, above all, to confirm an organisational strength which
did not depend on the approval of the communist parties. In comparison to the PCF and CPGB,
both having claimed to have produced modest results, the latter claiming to be the only party that
had existing contacts with communist parties and associations in the British colonies, the IAHs
colonial work was in its infancy. Nevertheless, the CPGB exaggerated its influence in the colonies,
particularly when the so-called parties and associations in the mid-1920s consisted of loose
structures and had at their disposal only a small membership in India, Egypt, Syria and
Palestine.189
The list of names of colonial contacts was the evidence Mnzenberg had striven to find, and he
instructed Mller to present the document to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters,
particularly to those at both the ECCI and at the Eastern Department. This document would
confirm that the IAH was doing everything to create a vigorous anti-colonial movement in Berlin.
What did this list contain? Firstly, the document contained the names and addresses of twenty-one
individuals, associations, trade unions and organisations in colonial and semi-colonial countries.
Secondly, the list was not a product of Mnzenbergs network but had instead been compiled by
the colonial members of the Syria Committee and other contacts. Thirdly, some of the names had
188

RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Mller/IAH office, Moscow, 26/1-1925 [1926].
Mnzenberg told Mller of the urgency of convening the colonial conference. According to Mnzenberg, a rumour
suggested that the conference had received great attention in the Berlin press, as well as in the English paper, the
Morning Post, and in the Egyptian press. In 1927, the British Head Office was one of the first to evaluate the founding
conference of the LACO, see TNA HO 144 10693, Labour Party Industrial Department THE LEAGUE AGAINST
COLONIAL OPPRESSION, year: 1927. For the location of the conference (Rathauskeller) in Berlin, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der deutschen
Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926.
189
For the Colonial Commission of the CPGB, see Degras vol.II 1960, p.247; Callaghan 1993, p.60, 90; Derrick
(2008). See further in Thomas (2008) for an analysis of the attitude and response of the British and French security
services towards the activities of the communists in the countries mentioned above.

85

surfaced in connection with the Hands off China campaign in 1925, e.g. Kou Meng-yu and Joshi.
Finally, the list was an expos of national IAH sections, e.g. the Mexican section and the Brazilian
IAH section in Rio de Janeiro with its secretary Paolo de Lacerda.190 The essential purpose of this
list was partly to vindicate the IAH's growth on a global scale, partly to show to the decisionmakers in Moscow that Berlin was the most logical place to locate the centre of their anti-colonial
project. At this stage, however, this was an undertaking that depended exclusively on the networks
of other actors. Achmed Hassan Mattar, a Moroccan nationalist and a journalist with ties to the Rif
region, was the link between the nationalist Klub der Zaglulisten (Zaglulist Club) in Berlin and
the Syria Committee, providing addresses to candidates in Egypt, Sudan, Djibouti and Kenya.
Travelling frequently between Tangiers and Berlin, Mattar had an extensive network which he
shared with the Syria Committee, e.g. four hundred addresses of potential anti-colonial contacts in
Egypt and the Sudan, including the addresses of the representatives of the Egyptian nationalist
party the Zaghlul Party Omar Tosoon and Yaur Bey, and that of the nationalist Ibrahim Hafis at
the Egyptian Ministry of Finance in Cairo.191
This list included the address of the American Negro Labour Congress (ANLC), a forum for
Afro-American activists but which was, in reality, a communist-initiated Negro-sympathising
organisation, established in Chicago 1925 on direct instructions from Lovett Fort-Witheman under
the guise of the WPA, and contrived in Moscow. According to the list, the ANLC had branches in
the West Indies, Philippines and in West Africa. However, the reference to a so-called AntiImperialist League in West Africa is ambiguous. One reason for suggesting the existence of such
a league was the result of intelligence, compiled in a list of 100 Negro organisations in Africa
and the West-Indies, which the ANLC had sent to either the Syria Committee or the IAH in the
beginning of 1926. This may also explain why the West African anti-colonial activists, the
journalist Casely Hayford from the Gold Coast and Samuel R. Wood, were on this list. According
to Imanuel Geiss, the discussions on colonial reforms in West Africa increased during 1923-25,
in connection with the establishment of the National Congress of British West Africa (the
Congress). This political movement engaged Hayford and Wood, the former being one of the
driving forces behind the foundation of the West African Students Union (WASU) in London in
1925. Additionally, the Congress organised a congress in Bathurst, Gambia, 24 December, 1925
190

RGASPI 538/3/47, 14, List of names [compiled by Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee], Berlin, to Mller,
Moscow, January 1926. For Kou Meng-Yu and Joshi, see Mnzenberg 1926, p.112, 131.
191
RGASPI 538/3/47, 14, List of names [compiled by Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee], Berlin, to Mller,
Moscow, January 1926. Manela writes that the Zaghlul Party dominated Egyptian politics in the inter-war years, a
nationalist movement established by Sad Zaghlul, a veteran of the Egyptian political scene during the first decades of
the twentieth century. Today described in Egypt as the Father of the Nation, see Manela 2007, p.9. For Gibartis
evaluation of Achmed Hassan Mattar, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/5, 4-5, Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern
Department, Moscow, 23/2-1926; Martin 2005, pp.261-269.

86

 10 January, 1926, which both Hayford and Wood attended. Therefore, it is logical to assume that
the attention created by this conference earned the two of them a place on this list, categorised as
being representatives of the West-African anti-colonial movement. If the Syria Committee ever did
have any contact with Hayford or Wood, this would most likely have been as either channels to
other activists or to the West African press.192 In conclusion, this list does not prove the existence
of nor does it reveal the nature of any of the networks of either the Syria Committee or the IAH.
On the contrary, these addresses were, in a majority of cases, the names of actors the IAH wanted
to involve in its anti-colonial project. In addition, it was a document frequently re-edited with the
inclusion of new names and addresses.193 For Mnzenberg, this list was a vital source of
intelligence Mller had to use in order to convince the Eastern Department to authorise the anticolonial project, which depended, ultimately, on Mllers legwork in Moscow.
*
The Selling Scheme
Mnzenberg instructed Mller to take a walk down to Comintern headquarters, where he had to
convince the decision-makers to authorise the colonial conference in Berlin. What particular tasks
did Mnzenberg give to Mller? Most importantly, Mller had to go to the Eastern Department
and hand over Mnzenbergs letter to either Kuusinen or Roy before giving a brief report on the
IAHs colonial work in Berlin. This report would give the impression, firstly, that the IAH was
following the directives of Kuusinen and Roy, which had been passed on to Mnzenberg during
his latest visit to Moscow (unknown). Secondly, Mller was to describe the scheduled colonial
conference at the Rathauskeller as a constructive idea in developing the anti-colonial project,
especially since colonial activists in the Syria Committee had spread the word about the
conference. If Mller got the feeling that the Eastern Department seemed reluctant to sanction the
conference, Mnzenberg recommended that Mller tell Kuusinen and Roy that the IAH did not
intend to take any further initiative until the ECCI had given its opinion on the question. However,
192

RGASPI 538/3/47, 14, List of names [compiled by Against the Cruelties in Syria committee], Berlin, to Mller,
Moscow, January 1926. In October, 1925, the ANLC established itself in Chicago. Its impact was, however, minimal.
According to George Sachs, a left-wing activist and journalist from South Africa, in his report to the Comintern on
January of 1926: The recent Negro Congress in America has seemingly not had any response on the African continent
as far as South Africa is concerned, see fol. RGASPI 495/64/49, 3-4, taken from Davidson 2003, p.143-144. Cofounders of the ANLC were the Afro-Americans Richard B. Moore and Cyril B. Briggs, who wanted the ANLC to
function as an instrument to unite Afro-American trade unionists and progressive intellectuals into one representative
body, see Anthony Bogues, Calibans Freedom. The Early Political Thought of C. L. R. James, Pluto Press, 1997,
p.79, 83. For Hayford, Wood, the Congress, and the conference in Bathurst, Gambia, see Geiss 1968, pp.173, 220226. Additional names on the list were Abd el Gader el Amin from the Khartoum province (translator, and
representative of the trade union Sudan Egyptian Union) and Hassar Rusdi; Mustafa Ibrahim Bey in Brazil; Juan
Pallot of the Rif Committee; Yussuf Khan, the President of the Islamic United Recr. Club in Aden; E. Bumkelle in
Mombasa, Kenya; and A. Benebilla, the representative of French Somaliland in the Djibouti region.
193
RGASPI 542/1/4, 46 [List of names], LACO, International Secretariat, Berlin, [undated] 1926.

87

if the above failed, Mller should contact Manuilsky at Comintern headquarters, introduce himself
as Mnzenbergs man, and be short in your report. The reason why Mnzenberg was focusing
on the Eastern Department the department in charge of colonial work at Comintern headquarters
in Moscow was based on the fact that the IAH needed support in the formulation of political
directives and material, as well as with administrative assistance and finance.194
Whether Mller visited the Eastern Department to carry out Mnzenbergs instructions remains
unknown. Empirical material (reports or correspondence) do not verify any of the above, aside
from one document, which indicates that Mller seems to have managed to sell the IAH's anticolonial project. In an edited version of Mnzenbergs letter to Mller, signed by Mller,
addressed to the All Union Central Council of Soviet Labour Unions (Allunionistischen Zentralrats
der Sowjetgewerkschaften; AUCCSLU, or its Russian acronym: WZSPS) in Moscow on 6
February, Mller requested that the AUCCSLU support the IAHs colonial work. Whilst this
represents only one observation, suggesting that the Eastern Department had approved of Mllers
presentation and endorsed Mnzenbergs idea, the conclusion is, however, that, without the
approval of the anti-colonial project at some hierarchical level within the Comintern apparatus,
Mller could not have sent the letter to the AUCCSLU.195 Is it possible to conclude that this
confirmed a connection between the IAHs colonial work and the Eastern Department? As the anticolonial project had been a gradual process since the beginning of 1925, who was involved to
guide the work in Moscow, and what was the nature of these relations in both Berlin and Moscow?
*
Interactionism Inside the Anti-Colonial Project
The actors in the anti-colonial project, represented by Mnzenberg and the IAH, the Syria
Committee and the Eastern Department, had to set up a functional network. Most importantly, they
had to link together individuals in Berlin and Moscow with the departments at Comintern
headquarters. Covering a chronological time-frame from December 1925 to February 1926, their
efforts to do this indicate a swift interactionist process, guided by determination and commitment
to strengthen the loose structure of the colonial work carried out by the IAH.

194
195

RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Mller/IAH headquarters, Moscow, 26/1-1925.
RGASPI 538/3/75, 3, Letter from the IAH Committee, Moscow, to WZSPS [AUCCSLU], Moscow, 6/2-1926.

88

Table 2.4: Interactionist Structure of the Anti-Colonial Project, December 1925 February
1926
IAH
Mnzenberg,
Berlin

ECCI

ZK KPD, Berlin:
December 1925

Louis Gibarti,
IAH, Berlin:
January, 1926
Against the
Cruelties in
Syria
ANLC,
Chicago

Manuilsky,
Moscow

Kurt Mller, IAH

Headquarters,
Moscow: JanuaryFebruary, 1926

ECCI Eastern
Department,
Moscow
Kuusinen
Roy

Kornblum
Mauno
Heimo

Eastern Commission
(Ostkommission)

LHR
Lehmann-Russbldt,
Berlin

Key actors in this network were Mnzenberg, Manuilsky and the ZK KPD, a structure which
expanded over a brief period in order to include other actors, with Kurt Mller assuming a key
position. Nevertheless, it was Louis Gibarti, the Hungarian communist and IAH functionary,
nominated by Mnzenberg as his right-hand-man on the colonial question, who took over the role
Mller once had. A decision most likely based on the fact that the Eastern Department had
assumed the functions previously carried out by Mller, e.g. establishing direct contacts with
Eastern peoples (the nationalist Cantonese government in China and with Chinese students at the
Kommunisticheskii universitet trudiashchikhsia Vostoka, [Communist University for Eastern
Workers; KUTV] in Moscow). Thus, Gibarti was left in charge of the colonial question in Berlin.
One of his first assignments for the Syria Committee was to complete a list of addresses of
colonial organisations in London and to send those on the list invitations to its colonial conference
in Berlin.196 Aside from the Eastern Department, individuals at Comintern headquarters were the
key to developing the anti-colonial project during the initial stages, e.g. Mauno Heimo, an migr
communist from Finland and Kuusinens close associate in Moscow. Additionally, Mnzenberg
had heard a rumour implying that the Eastern Department was planning to form an Eastern
Commission (Ostkommission). Therefore, Mller had to see to it that Mnzenberg became
involved in this commission.197 Nonetheless, Mnzenberg must have misread the Eastern
Department's intentions. In fact, the Eastern Commission only came into existence after the

196
197

Any trace of such a list in the Comintern Archive remains missing.

RGASPI 538/3/47, 9-13, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Mller/IAH office, Moscow, 26/1-1925.

89

colonial conference at the Rathauskeller in Berlin, an event which witnessed the establishment
of the League against Colonial Oppression (LACO) on 10 February, 1926.
*

90

Chapter 2. Birth
The Rathauskeller Conference was the official inauguration of the anti-colonial project in Berlin.
Convening at 6.30 pm on 10 February, 1926, the conference also witnessed the foundation of the
League against Colonial Oppression (Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung; LACO). Mnzenberg
imagined that this colonial conference would see the creation of a new anti-colonial committee,
based on the organisational structure of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. However,
the Rathauskeller Conference took a further step by advocating the formation a league instead
of just another committee. Attending the conference were 43 delegates representing a crosssection of anti-colonial activists, German left-wing organisations in Berlin and foreign delegates.
Otto Lehmann-Russbldt addressed the delegates before welcoming Gibarti, acting in the role as
IAH secretary and representative of the Syria Committee, who declared that the conference
represented an opportunity to discuss how to unify organisations of different colonial peoples and
the organisations on the political left in Germany. The primary aim of the LACO was, therefore,
to lay the foundations of an anti-colonial movement in Germany, which would focus on creating a
forum for grandiose ideas and organising the disparate characters of the existing anti-colonial
movements into one single movement.198
The aim of this chapter is to disclose and interpret the birth of the anti-colonial project that
Mnzenberg and the IAH had begun to conceptualise in 1925. Notwithstanding the success of the
IAHs colonial campaigns and committees in Germany, the LACO represented, in both spirit and
flesh, the practices and mobilisation of its colonial work in 1926. Interpreted in terms of birth, this
suggests that the IAH consciously separated itself from the anti-colonial project, partly in order to
pave the way for another sympathising organisation, and partly to realise Mnzenbergs ambition
of organising an international congress against colonialism and imperialism in Brussels in 1926.
This latest endeavour had been a process which had tested the relationship between Mnzenberg in
Berlin and Comintern headquarters in Moscow when it came down to finalising the preparatory
work for the anti-colonial congress. Most importantly, this chapter provides a prelude to the
foundation of the LAI in February 1927, and contradicts the conclusions outlined by Gross and
McMeekin which suggest that Mnzenberg wanted to use Paris as the venue for the anti-colonial
198

RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der
deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926; RGASPI 542/1/4, 5-6, Anwesenheitsliste der
im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der deutschen Organisationen und der
Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926; TNA HO 144 10693, Labour Party Industrial Department THE LEAGUE
AGAINST COLONIAL OPPRESSION, year: 1927. See Adam Hochschilds Bury the Chains (2005) for a similar
episode, which, however, took place in London in a different setting and chronological fixture. Yet, the similarity of
these two meetings is that these events inspired the recipients (the attending delegates), and therefore, represent a
symbolic value to initiate a movement around a common cause.

91

congress instead of Brussels. A proposition far removed from the actual initial idea. The primary
aim here is to delineate why Mnzenberg had determined to hold the international congress against
colonialism and imperialism in Brussels, an idea which had sprung into his head as early as August
1925. Brussels represented the locale and epitome of colonialism as a system of oppressive
imperialism, with Belgium's colonial policy in the so-called Congo Free State being a mixture of
the realities of colonisation and the ideology of imperialism.199

The Anwesenheitsliste (List of Attendance) tells us who attended the Rathauskeller

Conference and, furthermore, from the conference's protocol it is possible to determine the
delegates' reactions to, for example, Gibarti and Mnzenbergs speeches. German citizens
dominated the conference, individuals who belonged to either associations, organisations or
parties. For example, the LHR (Lehmann-Russbldt, Albert Cruter), KPD (Ferdinand Timps), IAH
(Mnzenberg, Fritz Weiss, and Dwell), the Socialist Bund (Ledebour), the Independent Social
Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) and the IRH, but there were also unaffiliated individuals,
e.g. Albert Einsteins personal secretary, Siegfried Jakoby. Foreign delegates also attended the
event: Teddy Johnsen of the Swedish IAH section; IAH functionaries John W. Kruyt from the
Netherlands (who was actually living in Berlin at that moment) and Federico Bach from
Switzerland; the Russian students Perevovnikov and Shapiro [first names unknown]; and Hans
Baer, the TASS representative. The colonial influx at the conference was a cross-section of the
anti-colonial movement in Berlin. For example, Virendranath Chattophadyaya (Chatto), was
misleadingly listed as the delegate of the Communist Party of India; A. C. N. Nambiar, the
representative of India an Indian journalist and Chattos personal friend; and Suraj Kishun
from India as the delegate of the Central European Indian Association (Verein der Inder in
Zentraleuropa). In fact, all three belonged to a clique in Berlin opposed to Roys vision of how to
achieve national independence in India. The Berlin clique wanted nationalism to be the impetus to
strengthen the anti-imperialist struggle, the proponents of which, in comparison to Roy, wanted to
stimulate the question of class struggle in India.200 Delegates of the KMT Wang Fen Sian, V. S.
Hsie and Richard Fischer were present, as were representatives of the Chinese student community
199

Gross 1967, p.199; McMeekin 2003, p.196; Young 2001, p.25; Adam Hochschild, King Leopolds Ghost. A Story of
Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa, Macmillan Publishers, London, (1999). The societal disorder and
violent repression caused by Belgian colonialism functioned, for example, as a source of inspiration for Joseph Conrad
to write the famous novel Heart of Darkness (published in 1899).
200
Chatto and Mnzenberg established a relationship in connection with the formation of the LACO. Chatto was
working as a teacher at the Municipal School Farm in Scharfenberg outside Berlin in the beginning of 1926 and was
contacted by Mnzenberg asking whether he would be willing to attend a meeting in February, which would focus
on a discussion to prepare an international anti-colonial congress in Brussels, see fol. RGASPI 495/213/186, 215-228,
Report from Chatto to the ICC on his political career and life in general, Moscow, 15/10-1931. See Introduction,
Barooah (2004), and Gupta 2006, p.38 for Chatto. A. C. N. Nambiar is introduced in the chapter Utopia Redefined,
Part I.

92

in Berlin Koegang Tong and Chi Chiang Chad. Jahia Haschni of the Arab Student Association,
Achmed Assadoff of the Communist Party of Persia, Mohammed Pour Reza of the Socialist Party
of Persia and N. Tschelebi of the Islamic Academic Association represented the Middle East and
North Africa, while Makube and Munumi represented the African continent.201
The Rathauskeller Conference was the opportunity to introduce the anti-colonial project to a
receptive public, arranged in a modest milieu. According to Gibarti, the conference aimed to
highlight the character of the protests against the increasing colonising appetite of the
Imperialist Grand Powers. In relation to Gibartis main idea, Mnzenberg registered the
attendees reactions after Gibarti had concluded that the methods of the anti-colonial movement,
e.g. the protest campaigns or the circulation of signed petitions to state governments, had had its
day. Thus, Gibarti stated that the IAH had the ambition to create a vigorous centre for the anticolonial movement in Berlin, represented by the LACO. The challenge for Mnzenberg was to
outline a vision on how to realise this.202
*
The Mnzenbergian Vision: the LACO, the Anti-Colonial Movement and the International
Congress
At the Rathauskeller Conference, Mnzenberg expected to receive responses on three topics: the
establishment and location of an anti-colonial movement in Berlin; getting the attending delegates
to approve the idea of allowing the IAH to organise an international anti-colonial congress; and to
put these objectives into practice. Mnzenberg declared in his speech that everyone had to
understand the necessity of broadening the political agenda of the Against the Cruelties in Syria
Committee and of endorsing the formation of a general league against colonial oppression.
According to Mnzenberg, this was a response to the giant global political processes taking
place in the Far Eastern countries, especially in China. This general league [LACO] aimed,
therefore, to support the anti-colonial movement by acting as an international information
service in the service of politicians and journalists. According to Mnzenberg, the general
functions of this league would be to distribute anti-colonial propaganda and function as a rallying
point for anti-colonial activists around the world, which meant that contacts would need to be
established with colonial associations and organisations in Berlin and in Europe (Paris, London,
Amsterdam and Brussels). Thus, the LACO would be the instrument Mnzenberg intended to use
in order to connect the anti-colonial movement in Europe with activists in the colonial and semi201

RGASPI 542/1/4, 5-6, Anwesenheitsliste, Berliner Rathauskeller, 10/2-1926.

RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der
deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926.
202

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colonial countries and, in order to do this, different methods of communication via correspondence
and propaganda would be utilised.203
The ambiance of the Rathauskeller Conference may have inspired Mnzenberg to introduce
the LACO as a public actor, a concept that would, in turn, convince the delegates to authorise the
IAH to organise an international anti-colonial congress. As specified in the LACO statutes
(publicly released in August/September 1926), the LACO's primary function was to promote
among the widest circles an understanding of the nature of colonial policy and its effects on the
oppressed peoples. Nonetheless, whilst propaganda would be the key to spreading the word on
the LACO, Mnzenberg was hoping for more. By letting the LACO assume a leading role in his
colonial work, through the regular organising of international congresses, its impact would be
global, Mnzenberg argued at the conference. The congresses and propaganda had to highlight
imperialist colonial policy, the struggle of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, the
importance of colonial policy in relation to the international proletariat and introduce a strategy to
the public on how to support the colonial struggle. Yet, it was the first international anti-colonial
congress serving a higher purpose for Mnzenberg. He expected the LACO to succeed in its
endeavours which, in conjunction with the anti-colonial congress, would lead to the birth of an
active anti-colonial movement and have an impact on all the major power centres in Europe, as
well as spread itself across India, China, the Middle East, North Africa and Latin America.
Mnzenberg conceded that this vision relied on the consent of the delegates at the Rathauskeller,
and declared that the IAH intended to withdraw the idea if they did not approve of the IAH being
the formal organiser of an international congress, suggesting instead the arrangement of an
enlarged conference with colonial liaisons. This was a hazardous proposition. Passing the
decision into the hands of the delegates, everyone nonetheless unanimously adopted the
approval of the LACO to function as the centre for a permanent campaign against colonialism,
and authorised the IAH to organise the international congress.204
The Rathauskeller Conference did not nominate any members for the LACO Executive. On
23 February 1926, the Executive held its inaugural meeting in Berlin and, as noted in a later report
by the Auswrtige Amt, Fritz Danziger acted as Chairman of the LACO, along with Helene
203

RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen Konferenz der
deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926.
204
The conference ended at 9 pm. Conference documents (the protocol and list of attendance) were sent to the Eastern
Department, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/4, 2-4, Protokoll der im Berliner Rathauskeller am 10. Februar abgehaltenen
Konferenz der deutschen Organisationen und der Kolonialvertreter, Berlin, 10/2-1926. RGASPI 542/1/4, 7, Vorlufige
Statuten der Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, Berlin, 4/6-1926. The LACO published its statutes in August or
September 1926, according to Auswrtige Amt. The draft was completed at the LACO International Secretariat in
Berlin on June 4 and sent to the Eastern Department in Moscow. According to its statutes, the LACO intended to
elucidate to the widest circles the nature of colonial politics and their effects on suppressing and the oppressed
peoples, organize public protest rallies against colonial imperialism and amass practical relief to the needy
people. A copy of these statutes is filed in the LAI Collection at IISG, see 3392.1/12.

94

Stcker, Baron von Schnaich, D. Bersius and Ledebour.205 In July, the LACO introduced the full
membership of its Executive, intelligence that the Auswrtige Amt would later use to delineate the
geographical spread of the organisation.
Table 3.1: Composition of the LACO Executive, July 1926
Fritz Danziger (Chairman)

Germany

Baron v. Schnaich

Germany

Alfons Paquet

Germany

Helene Stcker

Germany

Georg Ledebour

Germany

Willi Mnzenberg

Germany

Henri Barbusse

France

Albert Fournier

France

Henriette Roland Holst

The Netherlands

Dr. P. Berlage

The Netherlands

Professor Schelderup

Norway

Martin Andersen Nex

Denmark

Ivar Koge

Sweden

Landova Stychowa

Czechoslovakia

Professor Nedely

Czechoslovakia

Dr. I.U. Bartoscheck

Czechoslovakia

Dr. phil. Weisskopf

Czechoslovakia

Friedrich Adler

Austria

Herman Frischauf

Austria

Maria Lazar

Austria

Dr. Lukac

Austria

Alfons Goldschmidt

Mexico

F. Liebaers

Belgium

Fritz Brupbacher

Switzerland

Bishop W. Montgomery Brown

USA

Kou Meng-yu

China

Lin Wee Min

China

George C. Hsue

China

Shapurji Saklatvala

England206

The political composition of the LACO Executive was a continuance of the patterns established in
connection with the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. Avoiding introducing itself as an
overtly communist organisation and, especially, retaining Danziger as Chairman, the structure of
205

RGASPI 542/1/5, 4-5, Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/2-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA
R1001/6751, 4, Auswrtige Amt, eing., Berlin, 29/4-1926.
206
SAPMO BA-ZPA R1001/6751, 6-7, LACO, Abteilung Sekr. Berlin, 16/7-1926.

95

the Syria Committee continued on in the transformed shape of the LACO. Political actors from
Western Europe dominated the membership quota, although the Executive also displayed a
preference for intellectuals and scholars. Aside from Mnzenberg, Shapurji Saklatvala, a Member
of Parliament (M. P.) in Great Britain and CPGB member, was one of the few communists.
Moreover, Swiss author and Mnzenbergs friend, Fritz Brupbacher, was given a seat, whilst the
nomination of Friedrich Adler, the LSI secretary, must have been regarded as a political victory for
the LACO.
Mnzenbergs publishing house in Berlin, the Neuer Deutscher Verlag and its publications,
most notably the Arbeiter-Illustrierte-Zeitung (A-I-Z), reported on the establishment of the LACO
on 11 March, which also mentioned the plan to hold an international anti-colonial congress.
According to the article Gegen die Unterdrckung und Vergewaltigung der Kolonialvlker
(Against the Oppression and Rape of the Colonial Peoples), the IAH promised to assist the LACO
in the preparation of a colonial congress in Brussels in the near future.207
*
The LACO, Comintern and Berlin
The Comintern had to confront both external and internal challenges in 1926. The former
concerned two episodes which questioned the capacity of the international communist movement
to, on the one hand, initiate political collaborations and, on the other hand, capitalise on political
opportunities. With the increased relations between the Comintern and the KMT, Stalins direct
involvement in shaping the policy and strategy of the communists focused on the rapid upsurge of
the anti-imperialist movement in China, according to Alexander Pantsov. However, there existed
no sanctioned collaboration with the KMT and, as the Comintern had turned down a request from
the KMT to become members of the world party, Chiang Kai-shek staged an anti-communist
coup in Shanghai on 20 March, 1926.208 The second episode occurred in England when the
British labour movement supported a general strike in the mining industry in which the IAH chose
to get involved. Mnzenberg was proud of the swift action taken to support the striking miners
with brotherly demonstrations of solidarity, while others perceived the outcome differently. For
example, Franz Borkenau stated that the strike had swept away three years of the CPGBs work

207

Aus der Bewegung der Internationalen Arbeiterhilfe, in A-I-Z, 1924 Nov. 1927 Dez., Jahrg.IV, 11/3-1926, p.6.
The KMT request was turned down during a private meeting between Voitinsky, Zinoviev and Stalin, see Pantsov
2000, pp.89-92; Immediate Problems of the International Communist Movement, in Inprecorr, Vol. 6, No. 40, 13/51926, pp.613-624. Voitinskys role was pivotal in formulating the Comintern's attitude towards the Chinese revolution,
see for example the article HANDS OFF CHINA: The Situation in China and the Plans of the Imperialist, in
Inprecorr, published on 6 May, 1926.
208

96

to gain a foothold in the British trade unions, especially after the British Trade Union Council
(TUC) had refused any kind of collaboration with the communist movement.209
In Moscow, the Comintern was facing a re-organisation of its administrative apparatus. Also,
due to the on-going power struggle within the CPSU (B), its rhetoric and internal communication
became an expression of the conflict.210 Mnzenbergs correspondence to Zinoviev eased off, only
to suddenly end in 1926, after Mnzenberg had chosen Bukharin to be his new correspondent on
important matters. However, it was with the introduction of Kuusinens Solar System theory at
the Sixth ECCI Plenum in March (see further in Introduction), that the course of activities of the
mass and sympathising organisations found a new direction.211
Mnzenberg attended this plenum in Moscow, and returned to Berlin inspired by the
Cominterns attitude towards the mass and sympathising organisations, particularly Kuusinens
statement declaring the necessity of the international communist movement to support
organisations against colonial atrocities and oppression of Eastern peoples. Shortly afterwards,
Mnzenberg informed the Eastern Secretariat that the League [LACO] is a living and active
organisation.212
The LACO International Secretariat was located at 69 Bambergerstrae, with Gibarti working with
Danziger and Bach at the bureau.213 The principal aim of its work in the initial stages was to fulfil
three objectives. Its first objective was to distribute information and propaganda about the
foundation of the LACO in Berlin, focusing on giving the impression that the LACO and Berlin
was the centre for the European anti-colonial movement a proposition aimed especially towards
the Eastern peoples in China and India, according to Gibartis statement at the inaugural meeting
of the LACO Executive on 23 February in Berlin. Its second objective was to get the LACO to
start constructing a transcontinental network. The new addresses, which Hassan Mattar had
given to the LACO, had, as noted by Gibarti in a report to the Eastern Secretariat, provided the
209

Mnzenberg 1926, p.121; Borkenau 1938, p.280. The British communist, Jack T. Murphy, in response to the breach
in relations between the TUC and CPGB, published the book The Political Meaning of the Great Strike in 1926, where
he criticized the weak and politically mislead TUC.
210
For the political struggle within the CPSU (B) and its effect on the Comintern, particularly Zinovievs fall from
grace and removal as Chairman of the Comintern, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.309-310, taken from Inprecorr, vi, 128,
2208, 26/10-1926. Pantsov (2000) includes a detailed narrative on the power struggle between the Zinoviev opposition
and the Stalin camp; see also Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.68. For an introduction to the Seventh Enlarged
ECCI Plenum, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.312-354 and Kahan 1990, p.26.
211
The colonial work of the IAH was an activity administered by the Eastern Department in Moscow, where later,
after the Sixth ECCI Plenum, there was a department addressed as the Eastern Secretariat, see Adibekov &
Shakhnazarova 1996, pp. 66-68; Resolution on the Development of Methods and Forms of the Organisation of
Masses under the Influence of the Communist Parties, in Inprecorr, Vol. 6, No. 40, 13/5-1926, pp.649-650.
212
RGASPI 542/1/3, 1, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/3-1926.
213
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Information and analysis on the LACO, Colonial Office, London, [undated] year: 1926.
The bureau of the German LACO section was located at No.1b Schadowstrae. For a biography of Federico Bach, see
Jeifets, Jeifets & Huber 2004, p.41.

97

LACO with information on potential and useful contacts in both the Sudan and Egypt. Mattar had
also told Gibarti to consider the idea of organising a courier service to distribute LACO pamphlets
and other propaganda material which would follow the one-way route: Berlin Marseille Egypt
the Arab region Djibouti Kenya. Its third and final objective was control. Gibarti promised
the Eastern Secretariat, after having met the LACO Executive, that the LACO would remain
steady in our hands [the communists].214
The pice de rsistance was, however, the international congress against colonialism and
imperialism. Whilst Mnzenberg had introduced his vision at the Rathauskeller, Gibarti was in
charge of co-ordinating the process in Berlin. In order to commence the preparatory work, the
LACO International Secretariat began sending out invitations in March, a document which
discloses the political aim of the international anti-colonial congress:
The League against Cruelties and Oppression in the Colonies which unites the
representatives of responsible bodies of the international Labour movement and those of
cultural organisations and scientific and intellectual societies with the representatives of the
oppressed nations all over the world, intends to summon an International Conference against
the cruelties and oppression of the imperials rule in the colonies and dependencies or in
countries threatened with a similar fate.215
Included on the actual invitation, the political agenda declared that the LACO aimed to investigate
the working-conditions in the colonial lands and other countries in a semi-colonial state and to
create an international protest movement against the cruelties and oppression committed by the
military forces of the imperialist powers in China, Syria and Morocco. Also, to organise
international relief actions in support of the most endangered nations in dire need of moral and
material support, an initiative which would unite everyone engaged in the struggle against
imperialism and the establishment of permanent relations between all important parties and
political groups conducting this fight.216 Thus, the agenda implicitly suggested a prolongation of
the IAHs relief operations in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, whilst the LACOs ultimate
ambition was to establish a common platform for the anti-colonial movement.
The list of addresses at the LACO International Secretariat was a crucial source. Aside from
Mattars contribution towards connections with anti-colonial activists and organisations in North
214

TNA PRO KV 2/1401, CROSS-Reference, Subject: GIBARTI, Louis Otto, 23/2-1926; RGASPI 542/1/5, 4-5,
Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/2-1926.
215
SAPMO-BA, ZPA R1001/6751, 20-22, Invitation to the Brussels Congress, LACO Secretariat, Berlin, signed:
Gibarti, to Hasrat Mohani, Berlin, 9/3-1926. Hasrat Mohani was the official representative for the All India National
Congress (AINC) and spokesperson for Dr. Ansari in Berlin. On 28 April, the LACO sent an invitation to the secretary
of the Khilafat Committee, Maulana Shaukat Ali Saheb, in Berlin. The Khilafat Committee had Bombay as the centre
for its operations.
216
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 20-22, Invitation to the Brussels Congress, LACO Secretariat, Berlin, signed:
Gibarti, to Hasrat Mohani, Berlin, 9/3-1926.

98

Africa,217 the IAH also assisted efforts to find new contacts: Kou Meng-yu in China, the ANLC
and AAAIL in Chicago, while Alfons Goldschmidt sent a list of addresses of potential contacts in
Asia, Africa, Latin America and the USA to Gibarti.218 However, it was not only a question of
gaining a foothold in colonial countries, the LACO especially wanted to establish itself in the
imperialist nations. For example, in Chicago, Manuel Gomez of the AAAIL invited
representatives of the IAH and the ANLC to discuss the idea of forming an LACO section.
However, their sole recommendation was to establish a committee to seek out anti-colonial
activists in the USA who would be eager to contribute money to finance the journey for a
delegation to the anti-colonial congress. Gomez told Gibarti that there was neither the time nor the
energy to support an LACO section.219
Mnzenberg emphasised the use of correspondence as the most constructive method of
creating and sustaining the LACO network.220 In March, Gibarti sent an invitation to Joshi, the
general secretary of the All India Trade Union Council (AITUC) in Bombay, an individual
Mnzenberg considered a highly coveted character to involve in the anti-colonial congress.
Mahbubul Hug, Joshis personal secretary, responded to the invitation and to Gibartis letter and
promised to send a delegation to the Brussels Congress. However, Hug mentioned that one should
not disregard the travel restrictions imposed on particular individuals in India, administered by the
British colonial authorities.221 Another example was the invitation sent to Hasrat Mohani, a
member of the Berlin branch of the Muslim Khalifat Committee who had also attended the
Rathauskeller Conference;222 and the invitation to the Khalifat Committee branch in Alexandria,

217

The RKO uncovered the activities of Mattar in 1927. The main question was to find out why he was residing in
Germany, above all his contacts to the anti-colonial movement and the demonstrations, organised by the IAH. On 4
October, 1927, the Merseburg police authorities revoked Mattars residence permit with immediate effect. However,
prior to this decision, Mattar had attended the Brussels Congress as part of the African delegation, acting as the
representative for the Rifs population, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/67113, 2-6, Betr. Komm. Propaganda, Abschrift,
Mnster 5/9-1927, Merseburg, 4/10-1927, Berlin, 25/10-1927; Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.253.
218
RGASPI 542/1/5, 4-5, Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/2-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3,
36, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 31/8-1926. Bao 2008 pp.9-24; Erik Ching & Jussi
Pakkasvirta, Latin American Materials in the Comintern Archive, in Latin American Research Review, Vol. 35, No.1
(2000), pp.138-149; Manuel Caballero, Latin America and the Comintern 1919-1943, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge (1986).
219
RGASPI 542/1/3, 58, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum, Moscow, 7/7-1926 [copy]; RGASPI 542/1/3,
19, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 7/7-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 20-21, Letter from Manuel Gomez,
AAAIL, Chicago, to Gibarti, Berlin, 24/6-1926. Gomez requested from the IAH Central Bureau (Zentralbro) in
Berlin the transfer of some money to the AAAIL. In the end, Mnzenberg forwarded Gomez letter to Kornblum and
Roy.
220
RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926.
221
RGASPI 542/1/18, 10, Letter to Gibarti, Paris/London, from AITUC Secretary Mahbubul Hug, Bombay, 8/4-1926;
Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.234; TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, List of organisations and individuals to be invited to the
LACO/Brussels Congress. Intercepted by the Sudanese Government, transmitted to the British Colonial Office, 24/111926. The AITUC never sent a delegation to the congress as evidenced by the list of attendance in Das
Flammenzeichen; see Gibarti (ed.) 1927.
222
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 20-22, Invitation to the Brussels Congress, sent from LACO Secretariat, Berlin, to

99

sent through the secretaries Hajj Muhammad Jalabi and Mohammed Taraq Eminbawi in Berlin.
According to the Khalifat Committees reply to Gibarti, the intention was to get the leader of the
committee, Tassun Pascha, accompanied by a delegation, to attend the congress.223 Additionally,
Mnzenberg stated in a report to the Eastern Secretariat that the spread of information on the
LACO had confirmed reliable contacts with the Indian Labour Union and with the Executive
Committee of the Cantonese National Government in China.224
Not everyone appreciated receiving their invitation. The figurehead of the Indian National
Congress (INC) and symbolic leader of the Indian independence movement, Mahatma Gandhi,
also received an invitation. In his response to Gibarti on 3 April, Gandhi explained that neither he
nor the INC could support, from a moral perspective, the LACOs agenda. Gandhi declared that
his methods to break the system of British colonial rule in India, which referred implicitly to the
concepts of ahimsa (non-violence) and Shakti (soul force), did not correspond with the
message being broadcast by the LACO. According to Gandhi, the methods of the socialists []
are in an experimental phase of development, with the supposed purpose and aim of this so-called
anti-colonial movement bringing about a certain fright.225 Several responses to the invitations
did not provide any definite answer as to whether they were planning to send any delegations to
the congress or not. Several responses even suggested using the LACO as a channel to increase
anti-colonial propaganda in their own country, or territory. In a letter from Kou Meng-yu to the
LACO International Secretariat, dated 13 July, the KMT had with the greatest pleasure heard of
the creation of the LACO, asking whether the organisation could send circulars in English,
German and French languages to China for distribution amongst the widest public. In another
letter, this one from Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT expressed its profoundest gratitude and
sympathy, but could not guarantee to send a delegation.226
Propaganda was the key element for the LACO International Secretariat at this stage, however.
Protest meetings in Berlin and across Germany were the preferred forum and, perhaps due to its
Hasrat Mohani Esq., Berlin, 9/3-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 23, LACO, Berlin, to Mr. Maulana Shaukat Ali
Saheb, Secretary of the Khilafat Committee, Bombay, 28/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 8, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 4/5-1926. See Barooah 2004, p.249, 277.
223
Mnzenberg used the correspondence addressed to the International Secretariat as a means of illustrating to the
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters that the LAI had established contacts with colonial countries. For
example, Zinoviev received the letter from the Khalifat Committee, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 4, Answer from
Tschelebi, Tassun Paschas secretary, undated; RGASPI 542/1/3, 5, Answer from Moh. Tarag Elminbawi, undated;
RGASPI 542/1/3, 3, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, 17/4-1926. The intercepted list included Tassun
Paschas address in Alexandria (he never attended the Brussels Congress, see Gibarti [ed.] 1927, p.235).
224
RGASPI 542/1/3, 8, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 4/5-1926.
225
RGASPI 542/1/18, 8, Letter to Gibarti, Berlin, from M K Gandhi (Ashram Sabarmati), 3/4-1926; Young 2001,
pp.320-323.
226
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from Kou Meng Yu, Canton, to LACO, Berlin, 13/7-1926; TNA PRO CO 323 966
1, Letter from the Political Administration Military Council National Government, Canton, to LACO, Berlin, 26/61926. Chiang Kai-shek wrongly addressed the LACO as the League of Colonial Suppression. Whether the letter
ever arrived at the LACO International Secretariat is unknown.

100

infancy, to agitate against the colonial politics and imperialist policy in the Middle East, North
Africa and China, as well as to provide information about the congress.227 Gibarti explained the
general purpose of the meetings in an article, Warum Kolonial-Kongress?, published in the
LACO theoretical organ, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf, convinced that hundreds of mass
meetings against the cruelties [and] unlawful and unconstitutional dealing of the colonising
powers, had managed to stir the German people.228
National security services began to notice the increase in anti-colonial propaganda in Germany.
One of the first to react to the initiative of different pacifist organisations to form a league
against colonial oppression was the Auswrtige Amt.229 An observation which sparked off an active
collaboration between the Auswrtige Amt and the Reichskommissar fr berwachung der
ffentlichen Ordnung (RKO) in Berlin, in accumulating intelligence on the LACO.230
According to the RKO, the LACO was an organisation which appeared to be only broadcasting
a pacifist agenda aimed at the anti-colonial and pacifist movements, particularly the LHR, in order
to achieve some kind of higher purpose. The question was what kind of purpose. The Auswrtige
Amt, however, deployed a more subtle strategy: infiltration. Building its intelligence on reports
from the inside, Auswrtige Amt could analyse LACO pamphlets, leaflets and reports from

227

RGASPI 542/1/3, 1, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/3-1926; RGASPI
542/1/3, 2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow, 13/4-1926. The anti-colonial work
of the PCF in France progressed, at first, in a positive direction. This was about to change, however. In April, the ZK
KPD received a letter from the PCF, proposing the idea of holding a powerful demonstration and conference in Paris
in May. Its focus would be on the colonial atrocities committed by the French military in Syria and Morocco, the
socio-political situations in the above countries, the basics of French imperialism, the political situation in the
Mediterranean region and the development of the national liberation struggle in co-operation with the communist
movements in Syria and Morocco. The PCF requested that the ZK KPD send one, or several representatives to assist
with the preparations for the demonstration and conference. In the end, however, the PCF did not manage to realise
these ideas. Forced to cancel the entire event, the affair was an embarrassing episode for the PCF. Paul Reinhold
Dietrich (1889 1937), the secretary of the ZK KPD Secretariat in Berlin, notified the German ECCI delegation in
Moscow of the complete failure and incapacity of the PCF to organize a colonial demonstration. According to
Dietrich, the PCF had not made the necessary preparations, e.g. representatives from the communist parties in
Belgium, Italy and Great Britain had not received an invitation to the conference. Thus, in order to evaluate the
reasons for the failure, the ZK KPD Secretariat instructed the German communist, Philipp [?], to travel to Paris and
carry out an investigation; see SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/34, 94, Letter from PCF, Paris, to ZK KPD, Berlin, 23/4-1926;
SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 291-292, Report from Paul D. at ZK KPD Sekretariat, Berlin, to deutsche Vertretung
EKKI, Moscow, 26/5-1926. For Paul Reinhold Dietrich, see Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.155-156. On November 5,
1937, the Soviet Military Collegium sanctioned the execution of Dietrich in Leningrad.
228
Louis Gibarti, Warum Kolonial-Kongress?, in Der koloniale Freiheitskampf Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen
Unterdrckung, Nr. 3, Berlin, 5/7-1926, 29-30; TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Report on the Activities of the League
against Oppression in the Colonies, December 1926. The RK observed that the anti-colonial propaganda on the
streets in Berlin had suddenly increased during 1926. In particular, a Hands off China demonstration, which the KPD
had organised on 23 September, had taken on the character of a big political demonstration. The KPD and anticolonialism was, nevertheless a public act, the RK suspected, in order to satisfy the demands of Russian foreign
policy, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/111, 8, Analysis of subversive activities and movements in Germany, 1/11-1926.
229
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 4, Auswrtiges Amt, eing., Berlin, 29/4-1926. The information from the Auswrtige
Amt mentioned Helene Stcker, Freiherrn v. Schoenaich, Kapitn D. Bersius, Georg Ledebour and LACO chairman
Fritz Danziger, as well as the address of the LACO International Secretariat in Berlin at 60 Bambergerstrae.
230
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 5, Reichskommissar fr berwachung der ffentlichen Ordnung, signed: A. A., an
das Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 5/8-1926.

101

unknown informants. An example of the latter was the information from an undisclosed member
of the German pro-colonial association, Vereinigung fr deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung
(Association for German Settlement and Emigration, a pro-colonial lobbyist association in
Germany which demanded the retrieval of the lost colonies), who had become a member of the
LACO for the sole purpose of assisting the Auswrtige Amt.231 British intelligence (MI5 and
Scotland Yard) had also reacted to the LACO propaganda, especially to the argument that it was an
organisation against colonialism and imperialism with the ambition of evolving into a global actor.
Scotland Yard completed an analysis of the LACO in 1926, a report being forwarded to the CO in
London. According to this analysis, British security services had to focus on detecting whether any
British citizen was in contact with, or had any kind of associations to, groups or committees
critical towards the British Empires colonial policy. As for the LACO, its global ambitions had to
be monitored, Scotland Yard concluded. Apparently, British security services had detected
activities with explicit links to the LACO, e.g. in China, Japan, Persia, Arabia, Syria, Indo-China,
India, Indonesia, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, French West Africa, Madagascar,
Liberia, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, Rhodesia, French Somaliland, South Africa, USA, Mexico,
Cuba, the West Indies, Latin America and the Philippines. However, this was a conclusion based
on the LACOs official publications, with Scotland Yard focusing particularly on individual
connections to the LACO in England. For example, Saklatvala had, along with the British socialist
and former diplomat Reginald Bridgeman, organised LACO activities. Nonetheless, Scotland Yard
argued that the LACO may, however, have exaggerated the extent of its ramifications,232
whereas the CO recommended categorising the LACO as subversive due to its communist
connections, particularly as it was known to be an offspring of the IAH.233
*

231

SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/112, 119, Reichskomm. f.d. berwachung d. ffentl. Ordnung u.Nachrichtensammelstelle
im RMI, 1/11-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 10, Short note from unknown informant, Vereinigung fr
deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung, Berlin, to Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 30/9-1926. The undisclosed informant told
Auswrtige Amt that he/she had been a LACO member for six months.
232
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Information on and analysis of the LACO, [December 1926] author: Lidell, Scotland
Yard. Lidell used primarily official material, published by the LACO, to discern whether the organization had any
contact with British colonies, e.g. the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the West Indies.
233
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Information on and analysis of the LACO, [December 1926] author: Lidell. Federico
Bach, being the secretary of the LACO, was an indication that the LACO had a connection to the IAH, stated Lidell.
For R. C. Lindsay at the British Embassy in Berlin, this was sufficient evidence to consider the link between these two
organisations as valid, see TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from R.C. Lindsay, British Embassy, Berlin, to Sir Austen
Chamberlain, London, 18/11-1926.

102

En route to Brussels: Assembling the Anti-Imperialist Network

After having established the LACO in February, Mnzenberg expected Comintern headquarters to
provide a response to his idea of holding an international anti-colonial congress in Brussels.
However, the Comintern decided to put the question on hold until after the Sixth ECCI Plenum.
On 19 March, the ECCI Secretariat finally discussed the question of arranging a conference for
the purpose of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, instructing Roy to act as the
Eastern Secretariats representative in all contact with Mnzenberg and, above all, to conduct an
investigation before reaching a final decision on the idea. Nevertheless, the ECCI Secretariat
wondered whether Roy would be able to achieve any results, considering that there were no
documents on the LACO at Comintern headquarters. To solve this empirical dilemma, the ECCI
Secretariat endorsed the establishment of the Commission for the Examination of the Question of
a Colonial Congress in Brussels (CEQCCB), which had to outline the political details of the
congress, nominating Roy as the responsible leader, along with the Russian B. A. Wassiljew of
the ECCI Orgdepartment (Orgabteilung), the KPD representative Ottomar Geschke (1882 1957),
Jacob [unknown] and John Pepper (real name: Joszef Pogany; a Hungarian communist). Given
ten days to complete a report,234 Roy introduced the Resolution of the CEQCCB to the ECCI
Secretariat on 30 March. According to this resolution, the CEQCCB recommended it as being
desirable to organise an international anti-colonial congress, particularly as the event had every
chance of succeeding where the Comintern had previously failed, i.e. in establishing contacts with
anti-colonial activists. It was primarily a question of mobilising the struggles of the oppressed
colonial peoples in the European trade unions, and to convince the liberal bourgeois elements [in
Europe in] the struggling colonies to support a movement controlled by the communists. This
resolution highlighted the following elements to invite to the congress:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

European and American labour organisations.

Liberal and radical bourgeois organisations.
Well-known individuals interested in the colonial question.
National revolutionary organisations in the colonies.
Labour organisations in the colonies.
Democratic emigrant organisations in the colonies.235

Nonetheless, the CEQCCB suspected that there was a risk in approaching and involving some of
the groups above. However, for as long as the LACO, under the active supervision of the
234

RGASPI 495/18/424, 28-32, Protokoll Nr.63 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 19/3-1926. Present at the
meeting were Zinoviev, Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Humbert-Droz, Ercoli, Roy, Smeral, Kornblum, Pepper, Bela Kun,
Ferdi, Karl Kilbom and Heimo. The commission was given an additional three days to complete the assignment, see
RGASPI 495/18/425, 8, Protokoll Nr.65 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 29/3-1926. For Ottomar Geschke, see
Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.242-243. Geschke was one of the old guards in the German communist movement. The
son of a blacksmith, an active social democrat and, later, a Spartacist, he also joined the KPD in 1919. Geschke died of
heart failure in East Berlin on 17 May 1957. For B. A. Wassiljew, see Huber 1994, pp.457-458.
235
RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the CEQCCB, Moscow, 30/3-1926.

103

Comintern, convinced these groups to participate with enthusiasm, this would facilitate the
formation of a permanent organisation League against Colonial Atrocities or something
similar. This depended on Mnzenberg and Gibarti fulfilling the demand to regularly send
copies of all letters, printed matter and other documents received from the colonies, or
organisations and individuals connected with the revolutionary movement in the colonies to
Moscow. These documents were essential in order to prepare the congress from a political and
administrative perspective in a thorough and comprehensive way.236 Mnzenberg received the
CEQCCBs resolution in April. On 17 April, Mnzenberg suggested to Zinoviev in a letter that the
Brussels Congress and the LACO could prove to be the answer in realising the Cominterns desire
to establish contact with anti-colonial organisations and individuals.237
The CEQCCB was an instrument of control which aimed to supervise the activities of the
LACO and the Brussels Congress an organisational initiative which relied on the active
engagement of the Eastern Secretariat, the IAH and Mnzenberg, and the ZK KPD. According to
the CEQCCB resolution, the ZK KPD had to engage itself more actively in colonial work, e.g. by
nominating a member at the secretariat in Berlin to examine and write a report on the accumulated
results of the LACO in Germany, and send it within a fortnight to the ECCI Secretariat.
Additionally, a confidential preparation committee, consisting of representatives from the
European communist parties, was to also evaluate the LACO, whereas a propaganda and
organisational committee would popularise the idea of the Brussels Congress in left-wing
socio-political circles in Europe.238
*
What shall I do with this colonial movement?
Mnzenberg did not appreciate the CEQCCBs resolution. If this was their reaction to the LACO
and the congress as a political and organisational project, Mnzenberg questioned the adequacy of
the Eastern Secretariat to send a resolution as a first type of response. For Mnzenberg, the
primary motive was to set in motion the preparatory work; however, the Eastern Secretariat's
silence on the matter caused confusion about how to proceed. On 29 May, in a letter from the
ECCI Secretariat to Mnzenberg, the reason given for its silence was so that the CEQCCB would
236

RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the CEQCCB, Moscow, 30/3-1926. The content of the
documents the CEQCCB had at its disposal is not known; RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI
Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Moscow/Berlin, 29/5-1926. The modus operandi to keep the flow of information
running from Berlin to Moscow assisted, in turn, in shaping the character of the empirical material filed in the
Comintern Archive, i.e. extensive collections of reports, correspondence and miscellaneous material from the national
sections as well as from the mass and sympathising organisations.
237
RGASPI 542/1/3, 3, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 17/4-1926.
238
RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the Commission to guide the work of the colonial congress,
Moscow, 30/3-1926.

104

have time to examine the documents from Berlin. Nonetheless, both Mnzenberg and Gibarti
stated that the incommunicado had contributed to the difficulties in establishing daily routines at
the LACO International Secretariat and, more importantly, the LACO had not received any money
from the Comintern. The Eastern Secretariat had to solve the financial question so that the LACO
could pay salaries, a cost covered by the IAH.239
Mnzenberg argued that the CEQCCB resolution questioned his authority, as did the
involvement of the IAH in the LACO, due to the recommendation to get someone from the ZK
KPD to assess the LACO. A far better solution, according to Mnzenberg, was to send a reliable
Comrade from the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow to Berlin to assess the LACO. Moreover, the
ZK KPD Secretariat seemed completely uninterested in the activities of the LACO.240 Perhaps
Mnzenbergs aversion towards getting the ZK KPD involved was an expression of his fear that it
would endanger the IAHs influence on the LACO and its colonial work in Germany. Furthermore,
Mnzenberg most likely expected to continue negotiations with the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters on the colonial question (the ECCI Secretariat, the Eastern Secretariat, Zinoviev and
Roy), without the ZK KPD interfering in the discussions.241 The silence from both the ECCI
Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat in relation to the LACO appears to have made Mnzenberg
ponder the idea that a shift in power was imminent, which would leave the ZK KPD controlling
and leading the colonial work through the LACO. In order to get some kind of reaction from the
Eastern Secretariat, Mnzenberg asked what shall I do with this colonial movement?, a
movement which had received a lot of attention in the German bourgeois press (Die Weltbhne).
Mnzenberg expected to receive a definite answer from the ECCI and the Eastern Secretariat
during his visit in Moscow at the end of May, and to have a personal consultation with Roy.242
The ZK KPD obeyed the CEQCCBs instruction. Leo Flieg contacted the German ECCI
delegation in Moscow on 13 April, expressing how difficult it was to find a comrade in Berlin

239

RGASPI 542/1/3, 2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 13/4-1926; RGASPI
542/1/5, 4-5, Report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/2-1926. For the response from the
ECCI Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to
Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/5-1926.
240
RGASPI 542/1/3, 2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 13/4-1926.
241
RGASPI 542/1/3, 3, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Zinoviev, Moscow, 17/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 54,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Department, Moscow, 17/4-1926. In the letters, Mnzenberg repeated
the request to get the Eastern Secretariat and the ECCI to send a reliable Comrade to Berlin.
242
Mnzenberg wondered when the Eastern Secretariat intended to send concrete information, instructions, or
whatever kind of wish concerning the LACO. Furthermore, at the end of May, Mnzenberg visited Moscow but was
unable to meet Roy, who was preoccupied with political questions and travel arrangements, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/3, 6, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 7, Letter
from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 28/4-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 8, Letter from Willi [J.
W. Kruyt], Berlin, Eastern Department, Moscow, 4/5-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 12, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to
Roy, Moscow, 14/6-1926.

105

willing to assess the LACO and travel to Moscow to deliver a report to the Eastern Secretariat.243
In response to Fliegs information, the ECCI Secretariat wondered when the ZK KPD would
resolve the matter. In the end, the ZK KPD instructed the German communist Ernst Schneller, to
carry out the assignment in Berlin and then travel to Moscow.244 Perhaps Schnellers experience of
the Hands off China campaign was the reason given by the ZK KPD for its choice of candidate,
someone who had some knowledge of the IAHs colonial work. Schneller received the ZK KPDs
instruction to write a brief report on the LACO and, en route to Moscow, to study the
temporary statutes of the LACO.245
*
The Nature and Question of the LACO
Schnellers appointment earned him an omnipotent position within the LACO. For Mnzenberg,
this went completely against both his vision and the work being carried out by Gibarti. The
interaction between the LACO and the Comintern at this stage in developing the colonial work and
the Brussels Congress needs to be looked at more closely, including such factors as suspicion and
concealment, administrative and organisational solutions, and the question of an anti-colonial
pilgrimage. This was a process which revealed the initial purpose and intentions of the LACO
and the reason why the Comintern perceived the organisation as being a pivotal actor.
The Objectives: On 29 May, the ECCI Secretariat handed to Mnzenberg in person in Moscow
the confidential objectives on the question of the League against Colonial Domination and []
the Colonial Congress. According to these objectives, if the Comintern endorsed the LACOs
status as a permanent organisation, it had to be thoroughly built up [] intensified and
systematised and, if done so properly, the LACO could be very useful. In comparison to the
CEQCCB resolutions recommendations, which suggested the formation of a permanent
organisation as being desirable, the ECCI Secretariat expected the LACO to act as a neutral
intermediary between the Communist International and nationalist movements in the colonies.246

243

SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 249-251, Report from Leo [Flieg] ZK KPD Sekretariat, Berlin, to deutsche Vertretung
EKKI, Moscow, 13/4-1926. Flieg urged the German ECCI delegation to give its fullest support to the ZK KPD
representative once he had arrived in Moscow.
244
SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 6, Letter from Zentralkomitee der KPD, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 27/4-1926. The ZK
KPD told Heimo that the CEQCCB resolution had arrived in Berlin on 21 April; SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 10, Letter
from ZK KPD, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 18/5-1926.
245
SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 11, Note from ZK KPD, Berlin, to Ernst Schneller, Berlin, 19/5-1926. In 1927,
Schneller argued that the ZK KPD had to bring the mass organizations in Germany under the strictest party control,
see Christian Striefler, Kampf um die Macht, Propylen, Berlin, 1993, p.262.
246
RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Moscow, 29/51926. The ECCI Secretariat dissolved the CEQCCB on 30 March. In April, Roy continued to analyse the documents
on the LACO, and involved the ZK KPD in the process.

106

The Eastern Secretariat was the key, the ECCI Secretariat concluded. As the CEQCCB was no
longer involved, the ECCI Secretariat endorsed the decision to establish the Commission to
Guide the Work of the Colonial Congress (hereinafter: the CGWCC). This commission aimed to
strengthen its interaction with Mnzenberg, e.g. by sending regular instructions to him on how
to prepare the congress. Roy acted as the leader of the commission, who, along with Schneller and
Voitinsky (replaced by the Russian Fedor Petrov; real name: Fedor Feodorovich Raskolnikov on
28 June, 1926), began the work of organising the congress.247 The following table delineates the
actors and their links of communication in preparing the congress in 1926.248
Table 3.2: Communication Links within the Anti-Imperialist Network, February July 1926
ECCI Secretariat

ZK KPD, Berlin
Eastern
Secretariat

CEQCCB:
Commission to
Examine the Question
of Colonial Congress
in Brussels, March,
1926

Ernst Schneller

Leo
Alphonse
Flieg

M. N. Roy
Mnzenberg

LACO &
Gibarti

CGWCC: Commission to
Guide the Work of the
Colonial Congress, May,
1926

Suspicion: The CGWCC raised concerns about some of the active elements in the anti-colonial
movement in Berlin. Essentially a question of control for the CGWCC, which described Berlin as
a place overcrowded with opportunist and provocative elements who found the LACO
attractive; the question was to ensure that Mnzenberg did not admit any suspicious individuals
into the core. According to a confidential letter from the ECCI Secretariat to Mnzenberg on 2
247

However, Roy was the author of the confidential directives, despite the signature ECCI Secretariat. Mnzenberg
knew that the leader of the permanent commission [CGWCC] had written the document; hence, this makes it
logical to link Roy as the author of the directives, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from the
ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Moscow, 29/5-1926. The ECCI Secretariat nominated the members of the
commission, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/431, 1-4, Protokoll Nr. 79 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 28/6-1926.
Petrov replaced Voitinsky on 28 June, for unknown reasons. One possible explanation was the strained relationship
between the Comintern and the KMT which, in the summer of 1926 had, more or less, collapsed. Considering that
Voitinsky, the expert on the Chinese question, had to devote all his attention to this question, at the same time as
acting as the Head of the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau, he had to resign from this commission, see Pantsov, 2000, pp.9395, 295. Any records of the CGWCC meetings in Moscow are minimal. The only reference found informs us that a
meeting to discuss the congress preparations was convened at Comintern headquarters in Room 54 on 1 August, see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 28, Short note from Roy, Moscow, 29/7-1926.
248
Dotted links indicate informal contacts between some of the actors, for example, Mnzenberg and Flieg.

107

July, the LACO had to act very carefully in its contacts with colonial emigrant groups, and let
the CGWCC evaluate them in order to confirm whether they were bona-fide organisations and,
more importantly, whether they should be allowed to attend the congress. Therefore, any direct
contact with colonial organisations had to adhere to the following strategy in order to sort out the
bad eggs:
Before establishing contact with them, or inviting them to participate in the Congress, their
reliability and representative character should be carefully determined [] Immigrant
elements [in Berlin] might be used in the beginning to establish this contact, but to insure
[ensure; authors remark] that authoritative representative delegations come from the
colonial countries, it is absolutely necessary to eliminate intermediaries.249
This strategy was a re-conceptualisation of Roys opinion of the oriental peoples resident in
Berlin to Mnzenberg, in which he warned of the potential formation of a fraction aiming to
liberate the movement of communist control.250 However, after reading the instruction,
Mnzenberg concluded that it was an enormous task to screen the colonial contacts of the LACO.
In order to solve the dilemma, Mnzenberg asked Roy to get Piatnitsky to send a reliable
Comrade to Berlin, and for the instructor to guide the work politically in close collaboration
with the IAH (Communist Fraction).251
The Desirable Elements and Strategies of Concealment: Concealment ran parallel with Roys
suspicion, a frame of mind which defined the preparatory work of the IAH, LACO, and the
Eastern Secretariat. Gibarti's political vision had a broad remit, particularly as the LACO was an
actor that would gain the attention of desirable elements, represented by prominent left-wing
trade union and social democratic leaders, bourgeois radicals, pacifists and intellectuals. However,
the ECCI Secretariat were of a different opinion and wanted delegates of European trade unions
and liberal radical elements in the imperialist countries to dominate the congress. If any
delegates from colonial and semi-colonial countries were to attend the event in Brussels, they
should preferably belong to national revolutionary organisations or associations, trade unions,
liberal democrat movements or emigrant organisations.252
249

RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926.
RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Moscow, 29/51926. Roy warned Mnzenberg that some of the anti-colonial activists in Berlin whom he seemed to deeply trust,
e.g. the Syrians Hashin Bey and Tarak Muntas, were of a highly suspicious character. Additionally, Roy criticized a
conference Chatto had organized in Berlin on 30 April, at which Bey and Muntas had introduced the idea of
establishing an independent anti-colonial committee. However, Roy seems to have based his conclusion mostly (if not
all) on hearsay.
251
RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926.
Mnzenberg renewed the request of getting a reliable Comrade to Berlin in his letters to Roy and Piatnitsky, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/3, 18, Letter from Mnzenberg to Roy in Moscow, 6/7-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 57, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 6/7-1926.
252
RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926. The
250

108

The disparate political character of the congress made the ECCI Secretariats position
precarious, making it necessary for it to adopt conspiratorial methods in order to conceal and
preserve the hidden aim of the Brussels congress. Mnzenberg was instructed to form a
communist fraction, which would include representatives of communist parties from the most
important imperialist countries, to influence and direct the entire work of the LACO at the
congress:
The Communist Fraction should try to remain as much as possible in the background, so that
neither the League nor the Congress is too obviously identified with the Communists.253
This was a modus operandi which corresponded to the policy endorsed by the Sixth ECCI Plenum
in 1926.254 The ECCI Secretariat stated that the fraction operating in Brussels had to secure close
and constant collaboration between the delegates of the communist parties and colonial
organisations, as well as influence every delegation, yet behave cautiously and conceal every trace
leading back to the communist fraction. Prior to the Brussels Congress, the ECCI Secretariat
instructed the ECCI delegation to act vigilantly, and to organise its conferences cautiously
without advertising them and without admitting any outsiders. Additionally, if the delegation
knew of any groups or individuals who displayed an inclination towards, or eagerness to discuss
communism, the delegation had to secure communist influence on these elements.255
A Warning from Mnzenberg: The preparatory work for the Brussels Congress was, however,
not entirely a conspiratorial process; administrative and organisational questions were equally
relevant. According to Mnzenberg, after the Comintern had decided to involve the deutsche
Zentrale [ZK KPD] in the LACO, this damaged the LACOs relations with both the ECCI and the
Eastern Secretariat. Roy had no other option than to correct Mnzenberg. As leader of the
CGWCC, Roy stated that in accordance with the resolution of 30 March (a copy which was sent
to you), Mnzenberg could not object to Schnellers nomination as it served the purpose of

ECCI Secretariat seemed content with the satisfactory progress of the LACO in establishing contact with
organisations in China and India. For Gibarti and the desirable elements, see TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from
LACO Secretaries L. Gibarti & F. Danziger, 17/9-1926; RGASPI 495/18/425, 32-33, RESOLUTION from the
CEQCCB, Moscow, 30/3-1926. The CEQCCB resolution focused on the following groups: European and American
labour organisations, liberal and radical bourgeois organisations, well-known individuals interested in the colonial
question, national revolutionary organisations in the colonies, labour organisations in the colonies and democratic
emigrant organisations in the colonies.
253
RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926.
254
The Resolution on the Organisation and Structure of Communist Fractions in Trade Unions, adopted at the Sixth
ECCI Plenum, instructed fractions to carry out active fraction work at congresses and, further, to convene []
meetings before the event commenced, and to guide and supervise communist work together with a bureau
which had full political responsibility. Additionally, members of the fraction had to follow the strictest of discipline
and adopt a uniform attitude, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.268-271, taken from Inprecorr, vi, 65, p.986, 29/4-1926.
255
RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926;
RGASPI 495/18/534, 41-43, Instructions to the [ECCI] delegates to the Brussels Congress, Moscow, ECCI
Secretariat, Moscow, 4/2-1927.

109

stimulating the collaboration and general direction of the KPD, extended through Comrade
Schneller in order to assist the work of Mnzenberg and the LACO.256
Mnzenberg was not, however, content with Roys explanation, wondering whether the
Comintern even intended to support the preparations for the congress. Proud of the fact that the
IAH had managed to sustain the activities of the LACO, and for as long the Eastern Secretariat
ignored the request of a sending a reliable Comrade, Mnzenberg warned Roy that the congress
would most likely fail. Yet, the anti-colonial project would not slip through the IAHs fingers.
According to Mnzenberg, if the Comintern continued to ignore his requests, the IAH intended to
turn the congress into a genuine IAH affair, and convene the event in Berlin in September or
October. This warning was a response to the lack of information on political, administrative and
financial issues from the Eastern Secretariat, and Mnzenberg concluded that the Comintern
should not count on gaining access to the anti-colonial movement in Berlin, Europe and beyond.257
This was an act of blackmail, through which Mnzenbergs quite desperate attempt to threaten
Roy, in retrospect, only aimed to secure the Cominterns support. Mnzenberg's warning had the
desired effect. According to the ECCI Secretariat (authored by Roy),
The congress should not be a narrow I.A.H. Conference. It should be given a broad political
character and called the International Congress of Colonial People.258
Roy was the author of this response, which the ECCI Secretariat used to criticise Mnzenbergs
agenda. According to the ECCI Secretariat, Mnzenberg should forget the idea of staging a
narrow I.A.H. Conference, and his agenda needed correction. What did Mnzenbergs agenda
contain? Firstly, the congress should focus on the geographical spread and impact of IAHs relief
campaigns in colonial and semi-colonial countries. Secondly, Mnzenberg wanted Fimmen, the
British socialist George Lansbury, an unknown individual of the German left-wing movement and
colonial delegates in Berlin to lead the congress and to present reports on the colonial liberation

256

RGASPI 542/1/3, 10-11, (Confidential) Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/51926. Mnzenberg was not satisfied with Roy's explanation, and expressed doubt as to whether Schnellers
examination really intended to assist the LACO in its work. Instead, Mnzenberg suspected that this was an act of
exaggeration on behalf of the ECCI Secretariat and the ZK KPD; see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926.
257
RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926.
258
RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926. For a
copy of this document, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/432, 122-124, while the location of Roys original draft remains
unknown. On 5 July, the ECCI Secretariat examined the draft and decided to give Roy an additional three days to edit
and make a few changes to the document before despatching the instructions to Mnzenberg. Yet, the Small
Commission (Eng.kom) had to review the final version, and authorise a German translation of the document into
English, see RGASPI 495/18/431, 1-4, Protokoll Nr. 79 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 28/6-1926. Present at
the meeting were Piatnitsky, Stern, Smeral, Ercoli, Kornblum, Pepper, Petrov, and Roy; RGASPI 495/18/432, 1-4,
Protokoll Nr.80 der Sitzung des Sekretariats des EKKI, 5/7-1926. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Ercoli,
Codovilla, Smeral, Kornblum, Roy, Gyptner, Petrov and Heimo.

110

struggle.259 However, the ECCI Secretariats expectations for the congress appeared to be
somewhat different. According to the ECCI Secretariats secret instruction, the congress was a
forum at which reports were to be given on imperialist oppression in the colonies by
representatives of the respective countries; the liberation movement in the colonies and its
support by the working class in the imperialist countries, having Eddo [sic] Fimmen and
Lansbury delivering the speeches. The congress should also discuss the co-ordination of the
liberation and working class movements in the colonial countries in order to stimulate the
establishment of a permanent organisation to support the liberation movement in the colonies.260
Apparently, the 2 July agenda was only a revised version of the agenda which had been included
with the LACO congress invitation, which Gibarti had begun to send out in March. In September,
the LACO Provisional Committee adopted the final version of the agenda at a meeting in Berlin:
Proposed by the Provisional Committee to the Congress of the Oppressed Nations.
[1.] Reports on the oppression of the imperialist powers in the colonies and other countries,
menaced in their independence. (Speakers shall be the representatives of all oppressed
nations.)
[2.] The emancipation movement of the oppressed nations and its support by labour
organisations and progressive parties in the imperialist countries. (Speakers on this point
shall be: George Lansbury, M. P. London; Edo Fimmen, General Secretary of the
International Transport Workers Federation, Amsterdam and the General Secretary of the
LACO, Berlin.
[3.] The co-ordination of the forces of the national emancipation movement with the forces
of the labour movement in the colonial as well as in the imperialist countries.
[4.] The building-up of the LACO as a great International Organisation in order to link up all
forces combating international imperialism and to ensure the effective support of the
emancipation fight of the oppressed nations.261
Gibarti, Danziger, and Chatto circulated this September agenda to organisations, associations and
individuals around the world. In some cases, e.g. in Egypt and the Sudan, British security services
intercepted and thus prevented the invitations and agenda from reaching their final destinations.
However, the invitations did also reach some of the recipients, e.g. Robert Minor, the member of
the Central Executive Committee of the WPA in Chicago, did receive Gibartis letter. However, the
security services did successfully manage to disrupt the LACO International Secretariats

259

RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926. This is the first occasion
when Mnzenberg introduced the names of preferred actors to represent the political nature of the congress.
260
RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926.
261
RGASPI 495/18/484, 5, Agenda Proposed by the Provisional Committee, Gibarti, September 1926.

111

correspondence. In order, therefore, to attract attention to the congress, the LACO decided to
circulate the invitation in December 1926. This invitation itself also proved just how much the
LACO's reputation had improved by referring to the members of the Provisional Committee of
the International Congress against Colonial Oppression. This group was introduced as the official
organisers of the congress and comprised: Mme Sun Yat-sen; Kou Meng-yu; Jawaharlal Nehru; the
Egyptian Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan Bey; Ramon de Negri from Mexico; the German scholar
Theodor Lessing; Goldschmidt; Mnzenberg; Barbusse; the French author Fernand Buisson;
Albert Fournier; Lansbury; the leader of the Independent Labour Party (ILP) James Maxton;
Saklatvala; the scholar and representative of the National Association for the Advancement of
Coloured People (NAACP) William Pickens; the pacifist and leader of the American Civil
Liberties Union Roger Baldwin; as well as delegates of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico Jos
Vasconcelos, Manuel Ugarte, Louis Casabona and Csar Falcon.262 This Provisional Committee
was a reflection of the disparate political and cultural characters involved in the anti-colonial
movement, with the LACO representing itself to the public as a non-party organisation.
The Anti-Colonial Pilgrimage: The Brussels Congress was an event the ECCI Secretariat
wanted to use as a forum and channel to create an international demonstration against colonialism
and imperialism against the most important imperialist countries in Europe. It was a question of
stirring up interest and attention before the congress. According to Gibarti, this depended on
enlisting the widest possible support in Europe amongst the desirable elements, and on turning
the congress into an anti-colonial pilgrimage linking together believers from the labour
movement, from colonial, cultural and relief organisations, and from both intellectuals and
individuals. Gibarti expected that a demonstration against colonialism would tip the scale in favour
of centralising the movement and provide impetus to every anti-imperialist force around the
world. In fact, Gibarti argued that the IAHs philanthropy, symbolised by the Hands off China
campaign and the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, was evidence of the IAHs
constructive political work on the colonial question.263

262

Chatto had begun to work at the LACO International Secretariat after the Rathauskeller Conference in February
1926; TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from the LACO Secretariat, Berlin, signed F. Danziger & L. Gibarti, to
unknown individual/organisation, Egypt, 17/9-1926. British security services intercepted this letter in October. Neville
Henderson, the Acting High Commissioner at the Residency in Ramleh, notified the British Foreign Minister,
Austen Chamberlain on the LACO on 2 October, 1926. The reference on India is taken from Barooah (2004, p.249,
277); RGASPI 495/18/484, 1-2, Letter from Gibarti, International Secretariat, LACO, to Robert Minor, Chicago,
11/11-1926. For a biography of Minor, see Lazitch, 1986, p.318. The final version of the agenda and the invitation has
been located in the files of Auswrtige Amt, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1001/6751, 27, Invitation to the International
Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, Berlin, 15/12-1926, and the LAI Collection at IISG, see
3392.1/1, Invitation to the International Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, Berlin, 15/12-1926.
263
SAPMO-BA, ZPA R 3003/ORA/1218 Sammlung 6 Rote Hilfe, 29-30, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf
Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen Unterdrckung, Nr. 3, Berlin, 5/7-1926. Gibarti suggested a number of current
political topics, e.g. China, Syria, the Rifs rebellion in Morocco, the strike movement in the Dutch-Indies, and Egypt

112

After the ECCI Secretariat had resolved to disclose the intentions behind the Brussels Congress
and, especially in connection with the establishment of the CGWCC in Moscow, Mnzenberg was
able to calm down for the moment. It was now a question of when, and whether, the congress
would be able to be convened.
*
Postponement
From August 1926 till January 1927, the negotiations between Mnzenberg and the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters gained pace. For Mnzenberg, the LACO International
Secretariat had to distribute propaganda and information on the congress, increase its preparatory
work and verify its contacts with colonial activists.264 According to Mnzenberg in his article, For
an Colonial Conference (Fr eine Kolonialkonferenz), published in Inprecorr on 3 August:
[] the most important step which the League [LACO] has taken is the effort to convoke in
the course of the present year an International Conference which shall unite the
representatives of numerous colonial and semi-colonial countries, as well as the
representatives of organisations in all States which are sympathetically inclined towards the
endeavours of colonial peoples.265
While this article served as an opportunity to draw attention to the anti-colonial congress, for
Mnzenberg, however, it also served as an opportunity to put pressure on the decision-makers in
Moscow: Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky and Roy. Mnzenberg explained to Roy that one of the
reasons for going public in Inprecorr was due to the results of his negotiations with Roy, the ECCI
and the Eastern Secretariat in June-July. Yet this article was not Mnzenbergs own product. In
fact, Bukharin had given Mnzenberg some advice on how to formulate the text and strengthen his
argumentation.266 Mnzenberg seemed to believe that, once the ECCI Secretariat had given its
consent, and with the formation of the CGWCC, it would be possible to convene the congress in
October or November. The ECCI Secretariat was, however, of a different opinion and, already in
July, told Mnzenberg to wait until the spring of 1927. This was a recommendation that went

as focal points to centralise the movement, see RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17, Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat in
Moscow to Mnzenberg in Berlin, 2/7-1926.
264
RGASPI 542/1/3, 22, Letter from Mnzenberg, Carlsbad, to Roy, Moscow, 14/7-1926.
265
William Gillies, the International Secretary of the British Labour Party, used excerpts from Mnzenbergs
Inprecorr article as the basis for an analysis of the LAI in 1927, see TNA HO 144 10693.
266
Apparently, Mnzenberg stopped sending any letters to Zinoviev in August. One logical reason is that Mnzenberg
was keenly following how the internal power struggle within the CPSU (B) was progressing over time; Gross 1967,
p.199. Taken from Inprekorr, 3/8-1926, p.301; RGASPI 542/1/3, 35, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy,
Moscow, 24/8-1926.

113

against Mnzenbergs ambition to capitalise on the enthusiasm which organisations, committees

and individuals had expressed towards the congress.267
Mnzenberg knew, however, that Bukharin supported his vision of continuing the preparations
for the congress, despite the risk of postponement and the lack of support from the ZK KPD.
Additionally, Mnzenberg seemed to have avoided informing Roy of Bukharins support in writing
the Inprecorr article.268 In September, Mnzenberg requested that Manuilsky and Bukharin exert
pressure on both Roy and the CGWCC in order to change their minds about postponing the
congress.269 On 13 September, however, Mnzenbergs enthusiasm waned after a meeting with the
LACO Executive in Berlin. Gibarti reported on how the preparations were progressing, only to
conclude that it was both illogical and impossible to hold the congress in October or November
it is essential to prepare the Congress with the utmost care recommending that the LACO
Executive endorse the decision to postpone the event. The LACO kom.Fraktion authorised this
decision at its meeting on 14 September, where the members, the PCF representative, Pierre
Smard, Saklatvala, the KPD member Philipp Dengel and Gibarti, all questioned Mnzenbergs
motive for rushing the process, urging him to understand that January 1927 was a far better
option.270 The kom.Fraktion examined the lists of invitations, the nomination of key speakers
and Mnzenbergs budget (which he had sent to Bukharin). According to his budget, the congress
was estimated to cost $15,000, out of which the IAH intended to contribute $10,000 with the
additional $5,000 coming from the Comintern.271
*

267

RGASPI 542/1/3, 13-14, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/6-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 15-17,
Instructions from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 2/7-1926.
268
RGASPI 542/1/3, 35, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 24/8-1926.
269
RGASPI 542/1/3, 38, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Manuilsky, Moscow, 9/9-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3,
39-40, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 9/9-1926.
270
Otto Braun, member of the KPD, belonged to the kom.Fraktion. However, on 10 September, the Schutzpolizei in
Berlin arrested Braun, hence, he did not attend the meeting, TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from the LACO
Secretaries Gibarti and Bach to unknown recipient, Egypt, 17/9-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 39-40, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 9/9-1926. Mnzenberg urged that the Brussels Congress had to convene in
the first days of December. For Smard, see Lazitch 1986, p. 421; for Philipp Dengel, Lazitch 1986, p.89 and Otto
Braun, see Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.122-123. Smard visited Berlin en route to Moscow, where he attended the
Seventh ECCI Plenum (which Mnzenberg also took part in).
271
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Letter from the LACO secretaries Gibarti & Bach, to unknown recipient, Egypt, 17/91926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 39-40, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 9/9-1926. $15,000 in 1926
would be, according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 2009, equivalent to $185,000, a sum calculated with the
help of the historical database < http://www.measuringworth.com >.

114

Assembling Connections and the Pacifist Approach

I merely take care of the organisational and technical preparations; the political preparation
must, by all means, be taken care of by a responsible representative from the Comintern.
Mnzenberg to Bukharin, 9/9-192
Using Brussels as the arena for this anti-colonial congress had been an essential question for
Mnzenberg to resolve ever since August 1925. According to Gross, Mnzenberg instructed
Gibarti to visit Brussels in the autumn of 1926 and begin making enquiries with the proper
authorities in order to see whether the congress could be convened in the colonial metropolis.272
The reason why Mnzenberg wanted to locate the congress in Brussels needs clarification. Firstly,
the LACO hoped to capitalise on the symbolism of the city, especially its status as one of the
leading imperialist nations in Europe after the Great War. This made it logical for the LACO,
therefore, to use the colonial metropolis as a springboard for anti-colonial propaganda. The
challenge was to convince the Belgian authorities to approve of the idea, a process which involved
both ad hoc solutions and deliberate deceit, in which Gibarti assumed his role to perfection in
order to create smoke screens concealing the covert agency of both the LACO and the Comintern.
However, the congress in Brussels was a last minute call. On 11 November 1926, Gibarti sent a
letter to Robert Minor in Chicago, telling him that the anti-colonial congress in Brussels would
open on 20 January, 1927.273 However, this was not true. In fact, neither Gibarti nor the LACO had
received permission from the Belgian authorities in November; instead, the negotiations were an
uncertain and tedious process.
Gibarti initiated negotiations with Emile Vandervelde, the Belgian Foreign Minister, leader of
the Parti Ouvrier Belge (Belgian Labour Party) and secretary of the LSI, in October. Vandervelde
had a well-known reputation within the European left-wing political movement for his longstanding commitment against the social effects of Belgian colonialism, particularly the
implementation and administration of the system in the Congo Free State. Critical of the splendour
and decorations in Brussels, on one occasion in the Belgian parliament, Vandervelde made a
sarcastic remark about the monumental arches which will someday be called the Arches of the
Severed Hands. For Mnzenberg and Gibarti, one of the primary aims in approaching
Vandervelde was to expose the LSIs indifference and lack of commitment towards the colonial
question. Thus, Vandervelde experienced it as difficult to turn down Gibartis proposal,

272

Gross 1967, pp.199-200.

RGASPI 495/18/484, 1-2, Letter from Gibarti, International Secretariat, LACO, to Robert Minor, Chicago, 11/111926.
273

115

according to Gross. Yet, Vandervelde demanded a service in return from Gibarti. The LACO had to
promise that the congress would not contain any derogatory statements and avoid commenting on
Belgian colonialism, especially the social situation in Congo. Additionally, Gibarti had to send a
detailed list, containing the names and political affiliation of every delegate to the Belgian Foreign
Ministry, a document later passed on to the Belgian security service Sret. If the LACO fulfilled
these demands, Vandervelde promised Gibarti that the LACO could use Brussels as the venue,
placing the medieval palace Palais d Egmont at their disposal.274
Gibarti and Vandervelde concluded their negotiations in January 1927. However, prior to this,
the uncertainty of when and whether Vandervelde would answer the request resulted in
Mnzenberg developing a strained relationship to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.
This dilemma focused on determining who was responsible for completing the political, financial
and administrative preparations. In Mnzenberg's opinion, Kuusinen, Bukharin and Manuilsky had
to organise the political agenda, Piatnitsky the budget, while Mnzenberg expected to conclude the
administrative work in collaboration with both Roy and the CGWCC. To further pressurise the
decision-makers in Moscow, Mnzenberg frequently repeated: interest in this colonial conference
is growing.275 While Mnzenberg and the LACO waited for Vandervelde to decide whether the
congress would be able to convene in January or February, this went completely against the
explicit ambition of both the ECCI and the Eastern Secretariat. On 29 December 1926, Roy
submitted a draft resolution from the CGWCC, Resolution on the International Congress against
Imperialist Oppression to be held at Brussels, to the Political Secretariat, which recommended a
different date for the congress to the one given by Mnzenberg and Gibarti. Apparently, the
CGWCC emphasised the necessity to postpone the congress until June 1927 in order that
satisfactory preparations [could] be made. On 4 January 1927, at a meeting at Comintern
headquarters, Roy decided along with Petrov, Bukharin and the French communist Edgar Morin,
on the advisability of postponing the congress.276 Receiving information of this decision, as

274

Gross 1967, 199-200. For Vanderveldes quote, see Hochschild 1999, p.165.
RGASPI 542/1/3, 44, Letter from Mnzenberg, Moscow, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 26/11-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 52,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 24/12-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 53, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 24/12-1926. In the letter to Petrov, Mnzenberg enclosed a copy of an English
telegram (contents unknown), the unedited version in French and English of the congress invitation; a list of names
of the Chinese delegation; and a letter from Julio Antonio Mella in Puerto Rico.
276
RGASPI 495/60/116, 1, Secret protocol of a meeting with the CGWCC, Moscow, 4/1-1927; RGASPI 495/3/2, 1-2,
Protokoll Nr.3 der Sitzung des Polit-Sekretariats des EKKI, 5/1-1927. Present at the meeting were Bukharin
(chairman), Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Roy, Humbert-Droz, Smeral, Remmele, Ercoli, Schatzkin, Lozovsky, Murphy,
Heimo, Zetlin, Kachan and Lu. According to this protocol, Bukharin feared the reaction from Mnzenberg after
receiving the decision to postpone the congress; therefore, in order to calm him down, the ECCI Secretariat had to
send a short telegram to explain why it was necessary to do so. For the draft resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/2, 6970, DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AGAINST IMPERIALIST OPPRESSION
TO BE HELD AT BRUSSELS. For the adopted resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/2, 55-57, RESOLUTION ON THE
275

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included in the CGWCC resolution, Mnzenberg contacted Heimo appointed as liaison for
Mnzenberg and the IAH at Comintern headquarters in December 1926 telling him that Gibarti
had not yet concluded the negotiations with Vandervelde. According to Mnzenberg, Heimo had to
realise that:
One must not forget that the congress was [] suggested by us [the IAH], arranged by us
from the very beginning, of course in agreement and by a wish from our friends over there
[Comintern, Moscow] to organise as wide as possible in order to include bourgeoisie, petty
bourgeoisie, left-wing labour unions and social democratic layers [] The people actually
believe that they are leading the thing [Brussels Congress]. This belief has to be maintained
at any cost.277
Mnzenberg wanted the Comintern to understand the necessity of maintaining this belief about the
congress amongst the people, represented by the bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie, left-wing labour
unions and social democratic layers. However, the stress of not receiving an answer from
Vandervelde, combined with the pressure from the decision-makers in Moscow, forced
Mnzenberg to question whether the Comintern intended to support the congress at all.
Mnzenberg told the ECCI Secretariat that, during his recent visit to Moscow, in connection with
the Seventh ECCI Plenum in November, Bukharin, Kuusinen and Piatnitsky had agreed to let the
LACO hold the congress in February 1927. However, if postponement was the only option left, the
ECCI Secretariat had to guarantee a couple of Mnzenbergs demands. Firstly, the ECCI
Presidium had to propose a new date. Secondly, the Eastern Secretariat should send a reliable
Comrade from Moscow to conclude preparations with Mnzenberg in Berlin. This final demand
was all about money. Mnzenberg stated that Piatnitsky had to reach a decision on the budget and
deposit $5,000 in one of his bank accounts in Berlin in order to guarantee the continuation of the
congress preparations.278 Mnzenberg contacted Piatnitsky, urging him to understand that if the
congress was postponed ad infinitum, the Comintern had to send a large allowance [sum
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AGAINST IMPERIALIST OPPRESSION TO BE HELD AT BRUSSELS, 5/11927.
277
RGASPI 542/1/7, 2, (Original) Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the EKKI Sekretariat der Komintern, Moscow,
3/1-1927; RGASPI 538/2/40, 12-15, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 8/1-1927. Heimo informed
Mnzenberg that the ECCI Secretariat had adopted the CGWCC resolution, whereas the Political Secretariat intended
to discuss Mnzenbergs critical remarks. For Mnzenbergs reply to Heimo, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 13, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 11/1-1927. For Heimos nomination as Mnzenbergs liaison in Moscow, see
fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, 12-15, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 8/1-1927 (taken
from McMeekin 2003, p.197). Mnzenberg continued to protest against the postponement in his letters to Heimo and
the ECCI Secretariat, arguing that the Congress must begin, at any cost; see fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, 4, Telegram
from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 1927; RGASPI 538/2/40, 5, Telegram from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to
Heimo in Moscow, 1927.
278
RGASPI 542/1/7, 2, Letter (original) from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the EKKI Sekretariat der Komintern, Moscow,
3/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/3, 44, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 26/11-1926. The meeting,
which Mnzenberg referred to, took place in Moscow on 18 November, see fol. RGASPI 495/60/109, 52, Short note
from Roy, 18/11-1926.

117

unknown] to pay for the prolonged stay of the delegations in Brussels and Berlin, as well as to
cover the preparatory work of the kom.Fraktion, which would have to be cancelled unless the
money was forthcoming. This remark did the trick. Piatnitsky revised the budget and, in the case
of postponement, granted every delegate the sum of 15 Marks per day to cover extra expenses.279
In the beginning of January, the Belgian Foreign Ministry approved the LACOs application.
Nevertheless, the LACO was well prepared. According to the December invitation from the LACO
Provisional Committee: we heartily invite you to attend the Congress convoked by them on 10th
February 1927, in Brussels. A bold act and, furthermore, once the decision of the Foreign
Ministry in Belgium became a known fact, reactions were particularly harsh. How did the news of
the date of the Brussels Congress become known? Firstly, the Colonial Office in London received
intelligence informing them of the visit by a British communist, Andrew Rothstein, to the LACO
International Secretariat in Berlin on 10-11 January. At this meeting, Bach mentioned that the
Brussels Congress was definitely fixed for February 10th. Secondly, Mnzenberg told the ECCI
Secretariat that the protests by the Dutch and the USA governments had not influenced the
decision of the Belgians to authorise the congress. Additionally, the Belgian authorities had
promised Gibarti that they would neither interfere with nor harass the delegates at the first
International Congress against Imperialist Oppression at the Palais dEgmont in Brussels,
scheduled to convene on 10 February, 1927.280 Mnzenbergs statement did not, however,
convince the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters that it would be convenient to hold the
congress on 10 February, especially as the question of the desirable elements of the political
agenda had not yet been resolved.
The members of the CGWCC Roy, Petrov and Vittorio (Victorio) Codovilla, a communist
of Italian origin (who had emigrated to Argentina at an early age) warned Mnzenberg of the
potential risk that the congress could become a showcase of ideological confusion. According to
the CGWCC, the political and cultural nature of the contacts the LACO had established with the
different organisations, associations and individuals since February 1926, was the major reason for
279

RGASPI 542/1/7, 2, Letter (original) from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the EKKI Sekretariat der Komintern, Moscow,
3/1-1927; RGASPI 495/19/44, 6, Ausgaben fr den Brsseler Kongress bis zum 15, Jan., Piatnitsky, Moscow, 15/11927. One way of collecting money was through special funds. According to the Colonial Office in London, the
collection of money from Canton and Mexico financed the LACO Secretariat. Mnzenberg was addressed as the
treasurer of the LACO, and deposited money in one of his accounts at the Commerz- und Privatbank in Berlin, see
TNA PRO CO 323 971 1.
280
TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Letter from Lidell, New Scotland Yard, to Clauson, Colonial Office, London, 12/1-1927;
RGASPI 542/1/7, 9, Letter (copy) from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 10/1-1927. In
December 1926, the LACO International Secretariat sent out information that 10 February 1927 was the definite date
for the congress, despite not having received a formal decision from the Belgian Foreign Ministry. Mnzenberg sent
the congress invitation to Petrov and Kuusinen on December 24, see SAPMO-BA ZPA, R1001/6751, 27, Invitation to
the International Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism, LACO, Berlin, 15/12-1926; RGASPI
542/1/3, 52, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 24/12-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 53, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 24/12-1926.

118

raising this concern. However, once the CGWCC understood the ramifications and potential use of
the invited delegates, some of whom had an international reputation and could be recruits for
communism, the criticism eased off. Jawaharlal Nehru was a typical example of this. While
Gandhi refrained from any further contacts with Gibarti and the LACO, Nehru, on the other hand,
told Chatto of his intention to participate in the congress. For Gibarti, this was a major political
victory, and he urgently informed the ECCI Secretariat in a telegram, Gross writes, that Nehru
intended to attend the congress as an accredited delegate of the Indian National Congress. Hearing
that Nehru was planning to attend, the CGWCC relaxed its suspicious attitude.281
Nehru visited Europe in 1926, travelling with wife Kamila, and arrived in Berlin in December
1926. Nehru later wrote of his impressions of Berlin in his book, An Autobiography (1936) and, in
the context of the Brussels Congress, quickly realised the necessity of attending this international
demonstration against colonialism and imperialism:
I learnt there of a forthcoming Congress of Oppressed Nationalities, which was to be held in
Brussels. The idea appealed to me, and I wrote home [to his father Motilal Nehru and the
INC, authors own remark], suggesting that the INC might take official part in the Brussels
Congress.282
However, what tipped the scale in favour of Nehrus desire to participate in the congress was,
primarily, a personal reason. The relationship between Nehru and Chattos sister, Sarojini Naidu,
the renowned poet from India and anti-colonial activist, better known as the Nightingale of
India, who had also acted as the leader of the INC for a brief period in the 1920s, was a
contributing factor in convincing him to participate. According to Barooah, Nehru treasured his
friendly relations with many members of Chattos family in India, which also provided him with
access to political exiles and radical elements from abroad who were living in Berlin. The INC
had to approve of Nehrus request to attend as the accredited delegate of the organisation, which
his father, Motilal Nehru, confirmed in a letter to Nehru, dated 30 December.283
This was part of the administrative puzzle Gibarti masterminded in constructing an impressive
list of prominent delegates. Another example was the case of Casely Hayford, to whom Gibarti
sent an invitation, along with a second letter to the West African journal, The Gold Coast Leader,
in Sekondi. However, Gibarti seems to have been unaware of the fact that Casely Hayford was in
England, thus it was his brother, Sydney S. Hayford, who received the letter. In his reply to
281

Gross 1967, p.200. For Vittorio Codovilla, see Caballero 1986, p.156.
Nehru 1936, p.161.
283
Barooah 2004, pp.248-249, 277; Motilal Nehru to Jawaharlal Nehru, 30/12-1926. Taken from Jawaharlal Nehru, A
Bunch of Old Letters. Written mostly to Jawaharlal Nehru and some written by him, Asia Publishing House, Bombay,
1958, pp.53-54; Nehru 1936, p.161. Motilal told Jawaharlal: your expenses are to be paid by the INC. The secretary
of the INC, Rangaswami, sent a letter of confirmation to Nehru and Gibarti, confirming Nehru as the accredited INC
representative at the congress. For Sarojini Naidu, see Ahmad 2009, pp.106-117.
282

119

Gibarti, which British security services intercepted and passed on to the CO, Sydney S. Hayford
stated that he, along with his brother and The Gold Coast Leader, were in sympathy with the
LACO and, wondered whether Gibarti could send any additional material.284 A third example
illustrates the attempts to spread the word on the LACO's political agenda and the Brussels
Congress in Mexico. The LACO intended to use the strategy of the Hands off China campaign, in
particular the collection of names of prominent German intellectuals to sign petitions, in order to
establish a Hands off Mexico campaign in both Mexico and the USA in the autumn of 1926.
Mnzenberg informed Bukharin that the reason for this was to protest against the imperialist
attempts [the USA] to interfere in the internal affairs of Mexico.285
The despatching of congress invitations and other documents on the Brussels Congress made
the LACO prone to closer inspection by national security services. British security branches in
North Africa co-ordinated their monitoring to see whether any material from the LACO was being
circulated in the region. For example, British colonial authorities in the Sudan confiscated a
document which included the names and addresses of organisations and individuals invited to the
congress. From a theoretical perspective, this document depicted the transcontinental ambitions
and magnitude of the LACO in 1926. Apparently, the LACO had invited one hundred and one
organisations, represented by one hundred and thirty-four delegates, who either knew about the
Brussels Congress or were planning to attend it. For the British Empire, the agenda and possible
impact of the Brussels Congress posed a potential threat, especially if the invitations had reached
anti-colonial activists in India (21) and Egypt (75).286
However, the intercepted LACO document did not disclose the actual nature of the LACO
network. In fact, at this point in time, it was a sparsely-populated and small structure. Aside from
its German connections and its covert liaison with the Comintern, the LACO had only succeeded
in engaging a few individuals in Great Britain, especially the British socialist and avid anticolonial activist, Reginald Bridgeman. As the leader of the London-based Chinese Information

284

TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Letter from S. S. Hayford, Anona Chambers, Sekondi, Gold Coast, W. Africa, to Gibarti,
Berlin, 18/11-1926; TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Letter from Lidell at Scotland Yard to Clauson, 13/12-1926. British
security services circumvented Gibartis attempt, however. Liddell informed the CO on 13 December of the attempt by
the LACO International Secretariat to establish a link between the LACO and The Gold Coast Leader. Additionally,
whether Gibarti ever received Hayfords letter remains unknown.
285
RGASPI 542/1/3, 36, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 31/8-1926. The LACO
sent a protest telegram to the US government in September, which the LACO also included in one of its publications,
the Press Service, see TNA PRO CO 323 966 1. Mnzenberg provided Roy with documents that showed that the
LACO had established contact with the colonies. One example was a letter from an unknown Palestinian in Jerusalem
[?], requesting the IAH to send doctors and medicine to Syria, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/3, 41, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 16/9-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 42, Letter from an unknown author in Palestine to Mnzenberg,
Berlin, 8/9-1926 [Abschrift]).
286
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Secret letter from the War Office, Whitehall, London, to Clauson, Colonial Office, 24/111926; TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, List of invited organisations and individuals to the Brussels Congress, intercepted by
Sudanese authorities, November 1926.

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Bureau (CIB), which was reporting on the development and activities of the KMT in 1926, as well
as having a web of contacts to the Chinese anti-colonial movement in England, Bridgemans
network was a source coveted by the LACO. According to the Colonial Office, in a report on the
activities of the League against Oppression in the Colonies, Bridgeman and Saklatvala had
held meetings in London in November-December 1926 to discuss the necessary steps in forming a
British LACO section. On 2 December, a meeting was held in the House of Commons in London,
attended by representatives of the CPGB, the Labour Party and the ILP Saklatvala, Lansbury,
Ellen Wilkinson, J. Compton, J. J. Tinker and Ernest Thurtle, and a decision was made to establish
a British LACO section. Aware of the risk represented by the LACOs communist ties, Saklatvala
recommended that Gibarti and Mnzenberg treat the Russian connection boldly and without
reservations. Yet, it was through Bridgemans contacts, not Saklatvala, that the LACO
International Secretariat maintained its contacts with the British section in London. 287 Despite the
existence of a section in London, which existed merely on paper for the sole purpose of sending
delegates from a leading imperialist nation to Brussels, British security services suspected that
the organisation could become a future political force to reckon with. Hence, it was of particular
value for the security services to register any kind of evidence that indicated an increase in LACO
activities and, in general, any anti-colonial activism in Great Britain and the colonies. Nonetheless,
other governmental agencies in London, e.g. the British Foreign Office, concluded that, after
examining the composition of the [LACO] Executive, the security services could be assured of
a sufficient guarantee that nothing practical will ever be accomplished by this League.288
The situation in Germany was completely different. Towards the end of 1926, the LACO and
the Brussels Congress were both topics intertwined with the anti-colonial and pacifist movements
in Germany. The RKO had observed the chronological development of the LACO and
concluded that the organisation had intimate ties to nine pacifist organisations and associations:
Bund der religise Sozialisten, Bund Entschiedener Schulreformer, Deutscher Monistenbund,
Vereinigung der Freunde von Religion und Vlkerfrieden, Deutsche Bund fr Mutterschutz,
Grossdeutsche Volksgemeinschaft, Volksbund fr Geistesfreiheit, Bund freier sozialistischer
Organisationen and the LHR. The RKO did not, however, focus on the question of whether the
LACO was a communist organisation or not. Instead, it focused on why the LHR had a connection
to the KPD. Noting the relationship between Mnzenberg and Lehmann-Russbldt, which also
287

TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, REPORT on the Activities of the League against oppression in the Colonies, December
1926; Saville 1984, pp.40-50. Bridgemans personal archive at Hull University contains a list of organizations and
individuals who had accepted and those who had been approached in England. Scotland Yard concluded in
December, 1926, that the LACO was a communist organization due to its intimate connection to the IAH in
Germany and, furthermore, the British LACO section had come into being due to the efforts of CPGB members
Saklatvala and Bridgeman, see TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Letter from Lidell at Scotland Yard to Clauson, 13/12-1926.
288
TNA PRO CO 323 966 1, Short note by Halder, Foreign Office, London, 25/11-1926.

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implied an instrumental link to IAH headquarters in Berlin, the RKO increased its surveillance
of the LHR during November 1926 January 1927, for the purpose of verifying a link between
these two organisations. The RKO ended its investigation, completed a report in January and
passed on the material to the Prussian Ministry of the Interior (MdI). According to this report, the
LHR was a revolutionary, pacifist organisation which endorsed extreme deviationist
tendencies, e.g. the abolishment of the Reichswehr and the right to refuse military conscription.
Nevertheless, the greatest worry was the suspicion that the LHR seemed to be a channel for getting
its members into the KPD.289 This report did not mention the connection between the LACO and
the LHR, despite including the reference to Mnzenberg as a member of the LACO Executive.
Thus, it seems as though the RKO had not been able to confirm the location of the LRH office
in Berlin as the LHR shared the same corridor as the LACO and, according to the recollections of
Buber-Neumann in her book, Von Potsdam Nach Moskau (1957), she asked herself [O]ur
neighbour fought for human rights, we for anti-imperialism. Was this not in principle the
same?290
*
The Aggravated Network
In January 1927, Mnzenbergs relationship to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters on
the question of the Brussels Congress was irrational due to a number of incidents which ultimately
aggravated the network and threw the congress preparations into confusion. At this point in time,
some of the actors began to question the very essence of both the Brussels Congress and the anticolonial project, which culminated in the Cominterns demand to postpone the event. All of the
above was a result of the faltering administrative, financial and political preparations, a dilemma
that weighed heavily upon Mnzenberg, the IAH and the LACO. Indicative of this tense dilemma,
the earlier trickle of correspondence between Mnzenberg and Comintern headquarters suddenly
increased dramatically during January and up until the beginning of February. According to the
documents in the LAI and IAH fond, Mnzenberg despatched twenty-three letters and telegrams to
Heimo (17), the ECCI Secretariat (5) and Kuusinen (1), whilst Heimo and the ECCI Secretariat
sent seven letters to Mnzenberg.291 Additionally, the LACO International Secretariat looked as if

289

SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/111, 8, Reichskomm. f.d. berwachung d. ffentl. Ordnung u. Nachrichtensammelstelle

im RMI, 1/11-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67210, 162, Betrifft: Liga Kommunisten (o.D., Maschinenschrift),
1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67208, 30, Reichskommissar fr berwachung der ffentlichen Ordnung, Berlin, an
das Ministerium des Innern, Berlin, 8/1-1927.
290
Buber-Neumann 1957, p.110.
291
The estimated amount of correspondence to and from Berlin and Moscow is based on fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, and

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it was heading towards total chaos in January, an unwanted scenario, characterised by impatience,
indecisiveness and uncertainty, which placed the final phase of preparing the first international
demonstration against colonialism and imperialism in a critical situation. However, the attempted
revolutionary uprisings in Indonesia, first in Java in November 1926 and a second attempt in
Sumatra in January 1927, suddenly emerged as a convenient moment for the LACO to increase its
propaganda advertising the Brussels Congress in Germany.
*
From Indonesia to Berlin
The nationalist uprising in Indonesia was a violent protest against Dutch colonial rule. Organised
and staged by the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), the uprising also provided the communists
with the opportunity to infiltrate and assume control over the Indonesian nationalist organisation,
Sarekat Rakjat, and strengthen the opposition against the religious association, Sarekat Islam. The
colonial disorder in Batavia in November 1926, and in Silungkang, Sumatra, in January 1927, was
a blueprint of the kind of anti-colonial turmoil that was breaking out during the 1920s. Armed
forces confronted the police in Batavia and managed to destroy communication devices (telephone
exchanges and cables) before the Dutch military put an end to the chaos in December. The
Sumatran attempt ended in a similar way, leaving 13,000 arrested and several casualties in its
wake. In the aftermath of the disorder, a number of Indonesian communists escaped to Singapore
in what was then the British Straits Settlement in order to re-route the anti-Dutch activities and
find new recruits to the communist movement. The leader of the PKI, Tan Malaka, supervised this
work. However, later, in October 1927, he appeared in Berlin, suspected of acting as an LAI
agent, according to the RKO.292
The idea to raise awareness of the Indonesian disorder in Germany did not emanate from the
LACO International Secretariat. The ECCI Secretariat instructed Heimo to get Mnzenberg to
establish a proletarian solidarity campaign in support of the Javanese revolutionaries and to use the

fol. RGASPI 542/1/7. Mustafa Haikal made a similar calculation which focused, however, on the number of occasions
the ECCI, the Political Secretariat, the ECCI Secretariat, and the Eastern Secretariat discussed the anti-colonial
congress from March 1926 to February 1927, see Haikal 1992, p.241.
292
Boon Kheng Cheah, From PKI to the Comintern, 1924-1941, SEAP Publications, 1992, pp.9-10. For statistics on
the number of arrests in Java and Sumatra, see Internet: < http://archive.workersliberty.org/wlmags/wl61/indonesi.htm
>. For a background and narrative of the history of the PKI in its formative period, see Cheah 6-12. See also Ruth T.
McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta, (first edition 1965), 2006; On Tan Malaka,
see Lazitch 1986, pp.291-292; Cheah (1992, p.8, footnote 16); SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/67113, Reichskommissar fr
berwachung der ffentlichen Ordnung, Auslnder im Reich (1927-1929), Kriminal-Oberkommissar Oexle, Berlin,
26/10-1927. Inprecorr released information on 23 November 1926 concerning a support campaign established on the
initiative of the ECCI, which declared that the anti-imperialist revolt is spreading, from China it has reached Java,
where the oppressed have risen against Dutch imperialism, see the ECCI Manifesto on the Revolt in Indonesia,
Inprecorr, vi, 143, 2506, 23/11-1926, taken from Degras vol.II, 1960, pp.310-312.

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LACO for this purpose. The IAH apparatus in Berlin was to provide organisational assistance and
guarantee the carrying out of the campaign, however, the campaign was to, more importantly,
highlight the propaganda concerning the anti-colonial congress. The LACO adopted a pacifist
ethos for the Indonesian campaign which, according to Mnzenberg, would ensure that the protests
against the implementation of capital punishment in Java would get the LHR and German
intellectuals to support the campaign. Using similar propaganda methods to those that had been
developed by the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, the LACO sent a protest telegram to
the Dutch Foreign Ministry in The Hague on 11 January.293 According to this telegram, signed by
Gibarti, the General Secretary of the World League against Colonial Oppression, the LACO
opposed the draconian measures of oppression in Java and Sumatra. Prominent individuals
supported the petition, e.g. Barbusse, Georges Pioch, Emilie Chauvelon, Lon Werth, Albert
Fournier, Maxton, Helen Crawfurd, S. O. Davies, Frances Countess of Warridge, Arthur James (A.
J.) Cook, Lansbury, Arthur Holitscher, Goldschmidt, Alfons Paquet, Helene Stcker, LehmannRussbldt, Pfarrer Bleier and Eduard Fuchs, the German author and communist, who had been
involved in the covert operations of the West European Secretariat (WES) as cashier. This petition
urged the Dutch Foreign Ministry to allow an impartial commission to travel to Java and
Sumatra to conduct an investigation, this group consisting of the author Bernhard Shaw, the
French physicist Paul Langevin as well as the explorer and philanthropist Fridtjof Nansen from
Norway. However, nothing of the above happened and an LAI delegation left Europe to visit India
and the Far East in 1927-28. This visit will be more closely explored in the following chapter.
Nonetheless, for Mnzenberg, the Java campaign had finally begun to erode the value of using the
names of intellectuals and left-wing politicians, telling Heimo that unfortunately it is so, that the
frequent use of these signatures wears [them] out, and [they] are no longer that effective.294
The Java campaign in Germany was a vehicle used to raise awareness of the Brussels
Congress, e.g. at public meetings in Berlin. On 13 January, at 8 oclock in the Festsaal des
Herrenhaus, the LACO held a meeting, at which the NAACP representative, the American
Negro Professor William Pickens, was introduced. Pickens delivered a speech on Das
Negerproblem in Nordamerika, along with the Chinese delegate Chi Kai-chi [real name: Chao293

RGASPI 538/2/40, 17, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 11/1-1927; RGASPI 538/2/40, 29,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 17/1-1927. The ECCI Secretariat instructed Mnzenberg that the
Brussels Congress was a perfect opportunity to promote the pamphlet Indonesien hat das Wort, authored by the
Indonesian communist and member of the ECCI Presidium, A. Semaun. To do so, Mnzenberg had to use a publishing
company, not known to have any communist ties, to distribute the pamphlet, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, 59,
Information from the ECCI Secretariat to Mnzenberg, 28/1-1927. For Semaun, see Lazitch 1986, p.422. The Korean
Problem was another pamphlet circulated amongst the delegates at the congress, a pamphlet which focused on the
question of Japanese imperialism on the Korean peninsula; see IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/38.
294
RGASPI 538/2/40, 17, Letter from Mnzenberg to Heimo in Moscow, 11/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/14, 3, Telegramm
(an das) Auenministerium Den Haag, 11/1-1927. Heimo received a copy of the telegram; see fol. RGASPI 542/1/18,
2, Telegram Nr.21, Berlin, 11/1-1927.

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Ting Chi, delegate of the Association for the Spreading of Sun-Yat-Senism in America]. Both
Gibarti and the German journalist Leo Laina used the evening as an opportunity to provide
information about the Brussels Congress and to nominate candidates of the German LACO section
who would attend the event: Arthur Holitscher, Ernst Toller, Lucie Peters and the secretary Hans
Jger.295 An undisclosed informant in the service of Auswrtige Amt, who identified
himself/herself as a member of the pro-colonial association Vereinigung fr deutsche Siedlung und
Wanderung, also attended this meeting and sent a report on the pacifist nature of the LACO.
According to this report, the LACO had co-operated with the Bund der Kriegsgegener und
Kriegsverweigerer, an association suspected of nourishing communist links and, further, Pickens
speech was a lengthy and irrelevant oration on the Negro question. At the end of the meeting, the
informant had a private talk with Gibarti which left the unidentified informant with the impression
that Gibarti was not a German but instead a 28-year-old Jew from Hungary.296
Mnzenberg appreciated Pickens performance and physical presence in Berlin, especially as it
gave him a chance to meet and hold discussions with anti-colonial activists. However, Mnzenberg
was not capable of solving every personal issue. Jimmy La Guma, a South African communist
from Cape Town and delegate of the African National Congress (ANC), arrived either in Berlin or
in Brussels in January, although no preparations had been made beforehand to sort out where to
accommodate him, a question that left Mnzenberg dumbfounded and unsure as to how to act.297
The second question, characteristic of Mnzenbergs erratic behaviour during the final stages of
the congress preparations, was his relationship to the German communist press. It did not matter
that Mnzenberg had a media empire of his own, other journals and newspapers of the communist
press were a crucial factor in creating maximum exposure for the congress. However, Mnzenberg
argued that none of them seemed to care. The daily official organ of the KPD, Die Rote Fahne, had
failed completely by not including a single word on the congress, according to Mnzenberg.
Accusing the editors of sabotaging the IAH and the LACO, Mnzenberg urged Heimo to

295

A-I-Z printed a picture of Pickens from the Herrenhause in Berlin, under the heading: [T]he American Negro
Professor William Pickens, see A-I-Z, Jahrg. IV, Nr. 4, Berlin, p.16. SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 24, ffentlichen
Mitgliederversammlung, LACO, Berlin, 6/1-1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/115, 42, Report by Reichskommissar,
Berlin, 28/3-1927. Pickens never attended the Brussels congress. Yet, this did not prevent the LAI from including
Pickens name in Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont, along with explanation that he did not arrive in time,
and the NAACP was a participant organisation in the congress, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.236. For the German
LACO Section at the congress, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.238-239.
296
SAPMO-BA ZPA, R1001/6751, 30-31, (Secret report from unknown informant), Auswrtige Amt, Abt. III a1,
Berlin, Wilhelmsstr.74, 14/1-1927.
297
RGASPI 542/1/7, 2 (Original) Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Sekretariat der Komintern, Moskau (dated
Berlin, 3.1.1927); RGASPI 538/2/40, 8, Telegram from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Anderson [?], Hotel Lux, Moscow,
January, 1927. Mnzenberg asked if Anderson could send some instructions on how to solve the problem. Hotel Lux
was the preferred accommodation for the Comintern and its foreign delegates during their visits in Moscow; see Ruth
von Mayenburg, Hotel Lux. Das Absteigequartier der Weltrevolution, Mnchen (1991).

125

instigate an impartial investigation to find out the reasons for this mistake.298 Heimo had, however,
already advised Mnzenberg on how to solve the press question, a strategy which implied a
conscious separation from the KPD press. According to Heimo, the LACO and the IAH apparatus
should, as a first step, use every source possible to spread the word about the congress. The
second step was to let the congress Press Bureau (Presse-Bro) assess the political persuasion
of every newspaper that had declared an intention to attend. Thus, the only thing Heimo requested
of Mnzenberg was to distribute the agenda and general information concerning the congress to
the bourgeoisie press and its correspondents, material that had to get them to believe.299
*
Chaotic Preparations: Determination vis--vis Hesitation
Mnzenberg approached the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters differently, depending on
whom he chose to contact. Whilst he confronted Heimo in a straightforward manner, other actors
received a more reverent approach. On 24 January, Mnzenberg sent a letter to Kuusinen, asking
him to understand that the work with the communist mass organisations was a very personal
question, especially as the work contributed to building up a strong communist movement. As an
example of his sincere devotion to this work, Mnzenberg informed Kuusinen of his idea to create
a giant campaign in defence of Soviet Russia and for it to coincide with the celebration of the
Tenth Anniversary of the Russian Revolution. This idea also fitted the political framework of both
the LACO and the Brussels Congress.300 According to Gross, Mnzenberg was aware that he was
playing a high game, especially after having realised that the anti-colonial project symbolised
more than a mere support campaign for Soviet Russian foreign policy.301 Furthermore, in January,
Mnzenberg knew that relations with Comintern headquarters were about to reach a breaking
298

SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/361, 1-3, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo in Moscow, 17/1-1927. A copy of
Mnzenbergs letter is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 30-32.
299
Heimo informed Mnzenberg that Inprecorr intended to publish articles, short reports and release telegrams about
the congress, a procedure carried out using the strictest sense of selection and authorization of the material before
publication. An unknown correspondent, nominated by the chief editor of the Inprecorr in Berlin, the Hungarian
communist and journalist Gyula Alpri (pseudonym: Julius), would be in charge of this work. Additionally, a special
correspondent from TASS intended to leave Moscow and visit the congress in Brussels, where he/she planned to
write articles, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, 78, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 5/2-1927. For
Gyula Alpri/Julius, see Lazitch 1986, pp.4-5, and Morgan, Cohen, & Flinn (eds.) (2005).
300
The Russian campaign also involved a conflict between Mnzenberg and the German author and communist,
Eduard Fuchs, formerly the cashier of the West European Secretariat (WES). The nature of this conflict was a
competition, i.e. Mnzenberg and Fuchs competed as to who was going to be the first to establish a support campaign
in defence of the Soviet Union. On January 27, 1927, in a letter to Olga Kamenewa, Fuchs stated that the only good
thing Mnzenberg seemed capable of doing was to construct Potemkinesque faades. The LACO was a suitable
example of where Mnzenberg used the colonial liberation struggle as a strategy to lead the stupid and ignorant, see
further see SAPMO-BA ZPA, NY 4005/73, 33, Letter from Eduard Fuchs, Berlin, to Clara Zetkin, Moscow, 27/11927; SAPMO-BA ZPA NY 4005/73, 35-37, Letter from Eduard Fuchs, Berlin, to [Olga] Kamenewa, Moscow, 27/11927. For Fuchs and WES, see Vatlin (2009).
301
RGASPI 538/2/40, 37-41, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 24/1-1927; Gross 1967, p.202.

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point. Frustrated over the fact that the IAH apparatus had supported the LACO in preparing the
congress, instead of the Comintern, Mnzenberg questioned if and when the Comintern would
complete the political agenda and the material (the congress theses, resolutions and manifesto).
Mnzenberg notified Heimo that the Comintern had to understand that the anti-colonial movement
was an independent movement, strong enough to turn the Comintern into a bystander in
Brussels.302 Introducing the above to Petrov and Kuusinen, Mnzenberg nonetheless promised to
get the LACO to increase activity on all fronts in order to finish the preparatory work. Yet, the
Comintern had to send a politically responsible Comrade to Berlin to prepare the political
material.303 Additionally, Mnzenberg wanted Heimo to let him know when Bukharin and
Kuusinen had completed these theses and resolutions.304
Completing the Political Preparations and the reliable Comrade(s): Mnzenberg believed
that only a reliable Comrade from Moscow could complete the political preparations in
Berlin.305 A demand which, in turn, set in motion a process that, with hindsight, has proven
difficult to decipher and assess. The reliable Comrade arrived in Berlin in January; however, the
person had not travelled en route from Moscow, but from London. The identity of the reliable
Comrade was David Alexandrovich Petrovsky, Comintern emissary and ECCI representative in
the CPGB in London, who in Berlin had assumed the pseudonym Isolde (Isolde/Petrovsky). Any
formal decision at Comintern headquarters sanctioning Isolde/Petrovskys mission to Berlin
remains unknown, e.g. there is no mention of this decision in the protocols of either the ECCI, the
Political Secretariat or the Organisational Department. Apparently, prior to Petrovskys arrival in
Berlin, he had been in London in December to give, in total secrecy, instruction to a CPGB
functionary, Philip Spratt, before his departure from England to India on a Comintern mission.
This mission involved, for example, performing organisational work in India, establishing closer
ties to the INC, supervising the activities of the communist Bengal Workers and Peasants Party
and publishing a pamphlet on the Indian nationalist movement.306 According to a biographical

302

RGASPI 542/1/7, 9, (Copy) Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, January 1927.
RGASPI 542/1/3, 52, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 24/12-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 53,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 24/12-1926; RGASPI 542/1/3, 39-40, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 9/9-1926.
304
RGASPI 542/1/7, 15-17, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 15/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 19-20,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 17/1-1927. The Political Secretariat wanted Bukharin and
Kuusinen to write the material.
305
RGASPI 538/2/40, 20-21, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 11/1-1927.
306
According to the known pseudonyms used by Petrovsky presented in Davidson (et al.), Isolde was one of his
aliases. Furthermore, biographical accounts and documents shed some light on Petrovskys whereabouts during
December 1926-January 1927, see Davidson 2003, p.xxxiv; Haithcox 1971, pp.56-57; Degras vol.II 1960, p.558;
Worley 2002, p.60, 82; Philip Spratt, Blowing Up India. Reminiscences and Reflections of a Former Comintern
Emissary, Calcutta, Prachi Prakashan, 1955, pp.29-30. Clemens Dutt recommended sending Spratt to India. After
Spratt had received secret instructions from Petrovsky in London, Dutt accompanied him to Paris. Once he had arrived
in India, Spratt published the pamphlet India and China, which resulted in his arrest in August 1927. Later Spratt
303

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summary of Petrovsky compiled by MI5, Petrovsky had assumed Roys position at the Eastern
Secretariat in January 1927. The reason for this was that the Political Secretariat had assigned Roy
to travel to Hankow in China, along with Jaques Doriot (PCF), Tom Mann (CPGB), Earl Russel
Browder (WPA and Profintern) and the Chinese communist Tan Ping-shan, as representatives of
the International Workers Delegation to attend the Pan-Pacific Labour Conference in May.307
Thus, this required an administrative change in the anti-colonial project and its network, which left
Roy detached from the colonial work in Europe, while Mnzenberg expected Heimo to find a new
liaison on the colonial question in Moscow. Evidently, the rather swift solution was to nominate
Petrovsky, who depended on Roy to provide advice on how to approach this assignment in Berlin.
On 15 January, Mnzenberg sent a note to Heimo and thanked him for the arrival of the Moscow
delegate.308 Nonetheless, Petrovsky was not the only reliable Comrade active in Berlin. On the
contrary, traces of a second person, engaged to assist the machinery of both the Comintern and the
Brussels Congress, was someone who identified himself/herself as Irmgard. The identity behind
the pseudonym Irmgard remains a riddle. However, the strength of the information included in
the correspondence from both Isolde/Petrovsky and Irmgard makes up for this ambiguity. Most
importantly, these accounts provide an insight into how these two actors perceived the situation in
Berlin which, in comparison to Mnzenbergs abrasive estimations to Heimo and the ECCI
Secretariat, depict a completely different scenario.
Isolde/Petrovsky described the chaos and disorder at the LACO International Secretariat to
Roy thus: muddled as things are, we must try [] to make the best of it, realising that
postponement was no longer a valid option in January. With the continuing ignorant attitude of
the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, a shadow was cast over the actual successes
achieved by the LACO, especially the success in getting Nehru to participate in the congress
which was a political victory. Irmgard outlined a more negative picture, portraying the
machinery as being in total chaos, having only Gibarti and one steno-typist at the secretariat,
whereas Mnzenberg had spent too much money.309 Evidently, it seems that the assistance of
Irmgard and Isolde/Petrovsky was not enough. Marcel Rosenberg, the Russian Foreign Council
representative in Berlin, stepped in to help Mnzenberg examine some of the documents of the
wrote that the motive for this mission was not to act as an expert on the Indian question, but rather I was chosen
because I was unknown to the police, and my job was to be [] a messenger and reporter.
307
TNA PRO KV2/1433, Biographical information on Bennett/Petrovsky, 17/6-1928; RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter
from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 26/1-1927. The delegation wanted to establish contacts with Chinese
communists and radical trade-union leaders, see Lazitch 1986, p.457, and the IWD and KMT, see Pantsov 2000;
Haithcox 1971, pp.63-64.
308
RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 26/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 27,
Letter from Isolde/Petrovsky, Berlin, to M.N. Roy, Moscow, 17/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 15-17, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 15/1-1927.
309
RGASPI 542/1/7, 27, Letter from Isolde/Petrovsky, Berlin, to M.N. Roy, Moscow, 17/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7,
62, Letter from Irmgard, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 28/1-1927.

128

congress, e.g. reviewing lists of invited intellectuals and preparing the publication of bulletins for
the congress. According to Gross, while Mnzenberg was enthusiastic, Rosenberg did his best to
enforce the Moscow line on the congress.310
In the end, the services of the reliable Comrades were not enough to calm Mnzenberg
down. Expecting the ECCI Secretariat to send Manuilsky, who, however, had no intentions of
leaving Moscow, Heimo did his best to placate Mnzenberg by informing him of the composition
of the ECCI delegation.311 The Japanese communist, Sen Katayama, acting as the leader of this
delegation, together with Wright,312 Wassiljew, A. Semaun and CPGB member Iosif (Joseph)
Fineberg, planned to arrive in Brussels prior to the opening.313 This clashed with Mnzenbergs
original idea of organising a meeting with the delegation in Berlin first, yet, due to the short space
of time, the delegation had to travel directly to Brussels. Prior to their departure from Moscow, the
ECCI Secretariat gave the ECCI delegation confidential directives, which recommended that they
act carefully, be cautious of every speech, and work out together with the speaker the theses
and the plan. The principle was the following,
[1.] Our delegation organises its conferences cautiously without advertising them and
without admitting any outsiders. [2.] The delegation as a whole as well as its individual
members should by no means speak officially in our name. [3.] The task of the delegation is
to secure leadership over the work of the Congress. [4.] With this in view the delegation
distributes [sic] amongst its members present at the congress to find the elements nearest to
us and to exert through them, their influence on the respective delegations.314
Why did the ECCI Secretariat give the ECCI delegation these directives, and what was their
motive? Firstly, the congress was a forum uniting the delegates around a common cause, thus, it
was essential that the political agenda, the resolutions and the congress manifesto embodied this
spirit of unity. Thus, this would facilitate their motive to convert the anti-colonial congress into
a grand anti-imperialist demonstration. The second objective was to use the congress as a venue
at which to launch propaganda against the colonial policies of both the LSI, the Amsterdam
International and those of the social democratic movement and, above all, to portray the

310

Gross 1967, pp.200-202. Mnzenberg used his apartment at 9a Tiergarten for his meetings with Rosenberg.
RGASPI 538/2/40, 45, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 25/1-1927; RGASPI
538/2/40, 60, Information (unknown author), Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/1-1927. The Profintern did not
intend to send a delegation, see fol. RGASPI 538/2/40, 60, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/11927.
312
A pseudonym most likely used either by Malayan communist and British Special Branch agent in the 1930s and
1940s, Lai Tek, or the Australian communist Tom Wright (Kheng 1992, p.26).
313
RGASPI 495/60/115, 5-6, Minutes of the meeting of the Brussels Commission, 28/2-1927; RGASPI 495/6/5, 3333b, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.17 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekr., Moscow, 8/3-1927.
314
RGASPI 495/18/534, 41-43, Instructions to the [ECCI] delegates to the Brussels Congress, 4/2-1927.
311

129

international communist movement as the real supporter of the colonial struggle.315 The ECCI
delegation were not the only actors devoted to guaranteeing communist domination of the
congress. The so-called Fraktionsbro (Fraction Bureau) would finalise the resolutions and
theses on location in Brussels. At the end of January, the ECCI Secretariat nominated the members
of this Fraktionsbro, consisting of the ECCI representative [Petrovsky], Walter Stcker of the
ZK KPD, Mnzenberg, an unknown PCF delegate, and the leader of the CPGB Arthur MacManus
(1891/92 1927). The general plan was to combine the expertise of the ECCI delegation and the
Fraktionsbro in Brussels in order to realise the vision outlined in the CGWCC resolution:
[T]o set up an International Committee of the League Against Imperialist Oppression, and to
draw all political and industrial working class organisations, bourgeois radical, pacifist and
cultural bodies, sympathising with the liberation movements in the colonies [] into the
League.316
By the end of January, the political material was, however, nowhere near completion.
Consequently, Mnzenberg asked whether the ECCI Secretariat could allow the IAH to work out
the guidelines for the material, suggesting Roy, Rothstein, Doriot and Isolde/Petrovsky to assist
with the work.317 The ECCI Secretariat paid no attention to Mnzenbergs suggestion. However, at
the same time, Mnzenberg must have known that Bukharin and Kuusinen had not written the
theses and resolutions. Hence, the ECCI Secretariat suggested that the ECCI delegation work out
on the spot depending on the composition of the Congress together with the Fraktionsbro,
drafts for the theses and resolutions.318 This answer flew in the face of Mnzenbergs expectations.
Apparently, the congress material was an essential factor which had to be presented and examined
at the fractional meeting at the Hotel du Globe in Brussels at 4 pm on 7 February, Mnzenberg
stated. Disappointed that Comintern headquarters had been unable to finish the political material
despite my insistent demands, Mnzenberg nonetheless had the intention to leave Berlin on 6
February and visit Fimmen in Amsterdam before departing for Brussels.319 However, does this
imply that there were other actors at play, aside from the ECCI delegation and the Fraktionsbro,
in resolving this dilemma?

315

RGASPI 495/18/534, 41-43, Instructions to the [ECCI] delegates to the Brussels Congress, 4/2-1927.
RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 26/1-1927. For the resolution, see
fol. RGASPI 495/3/2, 55-57, RESOLUTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AGAINST IMPERIALIST
OPPRESSION TO BE HELD AT BRUSSELS, 5/1-1927.
317
RGASPI 542/1/7, 49, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 18/1-1927.
318
RGASPI 542/1/7, 9, (copy) Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, January, 1927; RGASPI 538/2/40, 65-66,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 31/1-1927; RGASPI 538/2/40, 60, Letter from Heimo, Moscow,
to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/1-1927.
319
RGASPI 538/2/40, 65-66, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 31/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 9,
Letter (copy) from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, February, 1927.
316

130

The choice fell on Karl August Wittfogel, the renowned Sinologist and scholar at the Institute
for Social Research at Frankfurt University, also a member of the KPD, to complete some of the
congress resolutions. G. L. Ulmen writes that Wittfogel received an urgent telegram from the ZK
KDP summoning him to Berlin a couple of days before the opening of the congress. Living in
Frankfurt, Wittfogel travelled immediately to Berlin and went straight to KPD headquarters. Once
there, a ZK KPD representative told him that his recent book, Awakening China, which focused
partly on the Chinese national liberation movement, had been brought to the attention of
Comintern headquarters in Moscow. Yet, the visit served a far more important purpose. Wittfogel
received the instruction that somebody from over there [Moscow] wanted to meet him in Berlin,
whose identity remained unknown to Wittfogel (a plausible candidate is Isolde/Petrovsky),
according to Ulmen. The primary purpose of this Comintern representative meeting Wittfogel was
to get him to write the political resolution for the Brussels Congress, especially considering both
his knowledge of and political engagement in the Chinese national liberation struggle. Initially
honoured by having received an assignment, the effort required to write the resolution turned,
however, into a gruesome experience. Understanding that he was not in any position to be able to
oppose the wishes of the Comintern representative, which would also implicitly mean opposing
the authority of the ZK KPD, Wittfogel chose to see it as an opportunity to attend the anti-colonial
congress, as the Institute of Social Research in Frankfurt did not want to pay for his journey to
Brussels. The Comintern representative gave Wittfogel only a few days in which to complete the
resolution. Wittfogel contacted his friend Fritz Weiss in Berlin to help him out, only to realise that
the task was overwhelming:
We just could not do it [] having spent one of the most tortured intellectual episodes of my
life, I went back to the [] great unknown man from Moscow, on Monday morning and he
said Where is the resolution?, and I said, There isnt one. I just could not do it.320
The Comintern representative reacted with distress. However, without showing any sign of
irritation, the representative invited Wittfogel to accompany him to Brussels and to assist the
great unknown man from Moscow in protecting the secret material kept in his suitcase.321
The preparatory work with the political material was a confused process, characterised by
inefficiency, which confirmed the tense relations which had emerged between Mnzenberg and the
ECCI Secretariat. In fact, the outcome of this tedious process altered the original concept of the
congress. According to the CGWCC resolution, the congress was supposed to support the
nationalist liberation movements in the Middle East (Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Hedjaz and
Mesopotamia), the French colonies in North Africa, India, Indonesia, China, Latin America and
320
321

Ulmen 1978, pp.83-85. Fritz Weiss was also connected to the IAH in Berlin.
Ulmen 1978, p.85.

131

all Negro organisations. On 4 February, the ECCI Secretariat instructed the ECCI delegation to
implement a change in focus on the congress agenda and devote attention to the establishment of
contacts with anti-colonial activists from India, Egypt and other British colonies.322
The Financial Solution: Gibarti expected to turn the congress into a large gathering for anticolonial activists, a vision which depended on finding a solution to the financial costs of arranging
the congress. According to Mnzenberg, the total cost for the event would be $15,000, however, as
Irmgard observed, the money poured right through his fingers. This did not seem to bother
Mnzenberg, demanding that Heimo secure a rapid influx of money and, if this was not
forthcoming, he could not promise to be able to arrange the preparations properly. Mnzenberg
argued that money was the key to a successful congress, with the IAH already having supported
the LACO financially which had drained the IAH of its finances. To approve Mnzenberg's
demand, the ECCI Secretariat granted him a part of the sum [unknown] on 25 January, which he
would receive in person at the fraction meeting in Brussels on 7 February. This was not enough
to satisfy Mnzenberg, who told Heimo that the Comintern had to reimburse the IAH after the
congress. On 7 February, Mnzenberg declared that the congress account was still $5,000 short.323
Despite Heimos promise to Mnzenberg that the budget was in the hands of the Political
Secretariat, it was still, nevertheless, a matter under Piatnitskys jurisdiction. According to the
document, Ausgaben fr den Brsseler Kongress bis zum 15, Jan (Expenses for the Brussels
Congress until January 15), authored by Piatnitsky, this account disclosed the actual costs for the
congress, and how Piatnitsky had meticulously calculated every cost. Estimating the cost of the
Brussels Congress at $13,625 which, in comparison to Mnzenbergs budget estimate ($15,000),
had reduced the budget estimate by $1,375, Piatnitzki had divided the budget into separate
sections: expenses for delegations arriving from outside Europe; colonial delegations from within
Europe; money to intellectuals and the staff of the LACO; and money spent by the LACO and
Mnzenberg. The delegations and individual expecting financial support for their travel expenses
were the South African delegation (South African Labour Congress, CPSA; $1,500); Manuel
Gomez and the American delegation ($2,500); the Labour Bund from Ceylon ($500); and the
Sudanese delegation ($200). Piatnitsky concluded that the sum of $3,000 would cover their return
journeys. Colonial delegations from France, the Committee in Defence of the Negro Race and its
322

RGASPI 495/3/2, 55-57, RESOLUTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS AGAINST IMPERIALIST

OPPRESSION TO BE HELD AT BRUSSELS, 5/1-1927; RGASPI 495/18/534, 41-43, Instructions to the [ECCI]
delegates to the Brussels Congress, 4/2-1927.
323
RGASPI 542/1/7, 15-17, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 15/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 57,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 25/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 57, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 25/1-1927; RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg,
Berlin, 26/1-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7, 10, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 7/2-1927; RGASPI
538/2/40, 83-85, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 7/2-1927.

132

representative, the Senegalese Lamine Senghor, received $750, while the Indonesian nationalist
organisation in the Netherlands, Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI), had received $500 in January. The
costs for the LACO staff (Mnzenberg, three political secretaries, three typists and three
translators) and ten intellectuals, amounted to $1,125. In the latter case, Piatnitsky referred to
Helene Stcker, Paquet, Lessing, and the scientist Friedrich Karl Lehnhoff Wyld (1871 1932),
who would each receive $150 to cover travel expenses and an additional 15 Marks per day,
dependent upon their appearance at the congress. The cost of sending telegrams, particularly those
despatched by the Fraktionsbro in Berlin prior to the opening of the congress, and to
delegations waiting in Brussels, Paris and London, was estimated at $1,600. Administrative costs,
e.g. the rental fee for the Palais dEgmont ($150), printed materials and stenograms ($600), extra
personnel and travel expenses for the LACO secretariats in Berlin and Brussels ($400), the
despatching of telegrams from the congress Press Bureau ($700), were all presented in detail by
Piatnitsky. On 26 January, the Political Secretariat endorsed Piatnitskys budget and Heimo
informed Mnzenberg of the final decision on the money question.324

The chaotic preparations ended just a few days before the congress. However, the Political
Secretariat had one final objection, asking Mnzenberg if Brussels really was the most suitable
place to hold the anti-colonial congress, suggesting Berlin, Basel, Geneva or Copenhagen instead.
The reason why the Comintern had proposed these other locations was their fear of the
repercussions from national security services, a factor that would most likely occur both during
and after the anti-colonial congress in Brussels. If Mnzenberg agreed to change location for the
congress, the Political Secretariat promised to establish a protest campaign against the Imperialist
intrigues of the Netherlands, USA and Belgium.325 Mnzenberg responded that the idea was illconceived, and told Heimo that the Brussels Congress would convene at any cost and under any
circumstance.326
In conclusion, the table below illustrates the chronological progression (1925-27) and
transformation of the anti-colonial project, a result of the continual negotiations between
Mnzenberg, the IAH, the LACO International Secretariat and Gibarti, with the Comintern.
324

RGASPI 495/19/44, 3, Ausgaben fr den Brsseler Kongress bis zum 15, Jan., Piatnitsky, Moscow, 15/-1-1927;
RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58, Letter (Betr. Kolonialkongress) from Heimo, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 26/1-1927.
325
RGASPI 542/1/7, 27, Letter from Isolde/Bennet, Berlin, to Roy, Moscow, 15/1-1927; RGASPI 538/2/40, 55-58,
Letter from Heimo [?] in Moscow to Mnzenberg in Berlin, 26/1-1927.
326
RGASPI 538/2/40, 65-66, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 31/1-1927. Despite the position of
Mnzenberg within the Comintern hierarchy, the congress preparations had progressed to the point that it was no
longer possible to restrain Mnzenberg and the IAH apparatus in Berlin. Additionally, Isolde/Petrovsky concluded that
if postponement was the only option available, this would confuse the delegates as well as the antagonists (national
security services and the LSI), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 67, Letter from Isolde/Bennet, Berlin, to Petrov/F. F.
Raskolnikov, Moscow, 31/1-1927.

133

Table 3.3: The Anti-Colonial Project, 1925 1927

IAH

League
against
Imperialism

Hands Off China,

June, 1925

Against the
Cruelties in Syria
Committee,
December, 1925

League against
Colonial
Oppression,
February 1926

The Brussels
Congress,
February 10-15,
1927

Action Committee
against Imperialist
Colonial Politics,
January 1926

The international congress against colonialism and imperialism in Brussels was an idea, spurred on
by the enthusiasm of the Hands off China campaign in Berlin in August 1925. In February 1927,
both Mnzenbergs and the LACOs vision was on the verge of turning into reality. The IAH
apparatus had acted as the organisational backbone in support of the LACO in 1926, a fact which,
according to Isolde/Petrovsky, had made Petrov in Moscow realise that the IAH machinery
worked in tune with philanthropy as its guiding political principle.327 Thus, the advance of the IAH
towards philanthropy had made it possible to approach and use the rhetoric of anti-colonialism to
stimulate the establishment of the LACO, a politically-attractive sympathising organisation which
had gained attention amongst widely divergent socio-political circles in Berlin and beyond.
Despite their anti-colonial project, and their centre being in Berlin, Brussels was the critical
stepping-stone to Mnzenberg and the Comintern realising their vision of establishing a vigorous
anti-imperialist movement.

327

RGASPI 542/1/7, 67, Letter from Isolde/Petrovsky, Berlin, to Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov, Moscow, 31/1-1927.

134

PART II
Chapter 3. Demonstration
Our congress requires no director [] All [political] parties and organisations, through the
participation of their delegations and representatives, have unanimously agreed upon the
establishment of [] a World League against Imperialism [] We are neither visionaries
nor utopian dreamers, we know very well the limit of our strength and abilities to perform.
Mnzenberg, Brussels, 13/2-1927
For the first time, the imprisoned, sacrificed and murdered peoples are united together in a
bloc.
Henri Barbusse, Opening
Brussels, 10/2-1927

Speech,

Der Kongress der Milliarde.

A-I-Z, Jahrg.VI, No.9, p.8, 1927
The Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism at the Palais dEgmont in Brussels
was convened on 10 February, 1927. On 13 February, after Mnzenberg had declared the
establishment of the international anti-imperialist organisation the League against Imperialism and
for National Independence, the crowd responded with jubilant cheers, marking the euphoric end of
the congress. The reaction of euphoria and collective joy was also captured and illustrated in the
official protocol, Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont (hereinafter: Das Flammenzeichen),
released in June 1927, through Mnzenbergs Neuer Deutscher Verlag.328 This title was an allusion
to the ideological vision for the congress: the spiritual and rapturous awakening of the
international anti-imperialist movement. Most importantly, the Brussels Congress marked the birth
of an active movement. The aim of this chapter is to analyse the first tentative and prudent steps
taken by the LAI in 1927. With particular reference to the milieu of the Brussels Congress, the
first congress against colonialism and imperialism witnessed the culmination of Mnzenbergs
anti-colonial project. The Brussels Congress was, above all, an international event displaying the
consent and eager participation of individuals who wanted to discuss anti-colonialism as both a
political phenomenon and a movement. Perceived as such, the euphoria of the congress
underscored the LAI's necessary desire to manifest itself as a global and political actor. To realise
328

Gibarti (ed.) 1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA I/2/5/33, 467-471, Report from Willi Mnzenberg to H. Remmele in Moscow,
10/6-1927.

135

this vision, it was necessary to form national LAI sections in the most important imperialist
nations and in the colonial countries. The demonstration in Brussels was, for the organisers
(Mnzenberg, the LACO, IAH and the Comintern), the pretext on which to capitalise on the
interactionism and collective joy displayed at the congress. The Brussels Congress answered the
question as to why the LAI was aiming to fulfil the aim of posing as an international antiimperialist force and to unify the anti-colonial movement. However, this question raises the need
to assess the Comintern's initial motive for supporting the congress. Hence, if this episode was the
pretext on which to establish the LAI, how did the communist and non-communist delegates
perceive the event, particularly the thematic shift from anti-colonialism to anti-imperialism? Vijay
Prashad claims that the Brussels Congress provided the foundation for the Third World as it
prepared the ground for an experiment in intra-planetary solidarity.329 It was undoubtedly an
experiment guided by spontaneity and, above all, control, sharing a common understanding that
the expectations of the delegates and, in particular, those of the Comintern had to be implemented.
In total, 174 delegates representing 134 organisations, associations or political parties from 34
countries attended the Brussels Congress. Mnzenberg observed in his speech on 13 February, that
104 delegates represented the colonial countries. However, a majority of the colonial delegates
lived in Europe, although some had travelled from the colonies to Brussels.330 Separated into two
geographical categories which, in a sense, mirrored the political and cultural mixture of the
congress: the first category was the oppressing imperialist nations and the second was the
oppressed and colonised nations themselves. The table below further illustrates the nationalities
and total number of delegates present in Brussels.

329

Prashad 2007, 22.

RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Manuscript of Mnzenbergs speech, Brussels Congress, 14/2-1927. The printed version
of this speech, taken from the manuscript, was later included in Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont (Gibarti
1927, pp.215-224). Gross' depiction of the Brussels Congress relied on Das Flammenzeichen. Geiss concluded in 1968
that the official protocol was a rare source, as well as Gross' narrative of the event, see Geiss 1968, pp.253-258.
Degras included a short note on the congress (vol. II 1960, p.354). The documents on the congress (manuscripts of
speeches, resolutions, notes, reports and other miscellaneous material) are filed in fond 542/1/69.
330

136

Table 4.1: Geographical Representation at the Brussels Congress, 10-13 February 1927
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

China
India
Indonesia
Indo-China
Korea
Syria
Persia
Japan
Palestine
Africa (South Africa, North Africa, Egypt)
Negroes from the French Colonies
USA & Latin America
England
France
Germany
Italy
Austria
Czechoslovakia
Switzerland
Netherlands
Belgium

25
7
6
6
4
3
2
1
1
10
4
15
15
14
26
3
2
2
2
11
15

Total:

174

Source: Bericht der Mandats-Prfungskommission, in Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais

Egmont, Louis Gibarti (Hg.), Neuer Deutscher Verlag, Berlin, 1927, p.229.
The delegates received a warm welcome upon arrival at the Palais dEgmont. Provided with the
pamphlet, Adressen an den Kongress gegen Kolonialunterdrckung und Imperialismus (Greetings
to the Congress against Colonial Oppression and Imperialism), which included salutations from a
number of distinguished individuals to the congress, the delegates could read how Albert Einstein
nominated as LAI Honorary President at the end of the congress stated that in your congress,
the solidly united endeavour of the oppressed to achieve independence takes bodily shape, whilst
Gandhi declared I wish you, however, from the depths of my heart, every success in your
deliberations. This continued with a greeting from the French author Romain Rolland, your
Colonial Conference is of the highest importance, a statement also re-phrased in the joint speech
by Barbusse, the British delegate, S. O. Davies and Andr Marteaux from Belgium, delivered in
connection with the opening ceremony. Unable to attend the first day of the congress, the elderly
and prominent British socialist leader George Lansbury, had, nevertheless, sent a telegram en route
to Brussels, which stated that the moment had arrived to form a League in support of the
oppressed and the oppressed nations.331
331

RGASPI 542/1/69, 97-100, Adressen an den Kongress gegen Kolonialunterdrckung und Imperialismus Brssel,
den 10 Februar 1927, Palais Egmont. A second version of this pamphlet also included greetings from the Indian
nationalist leader, Gauri Shankar Misra; the secretary of the central council of the Bombay Trade Unions, S. B.
Jhabwala; President of the Social Democratic Party in Switzerland, Ernst Reinhard; the aged leader of the Indian
Freedom movement, Rustom Cama Bhikhaiji; the WPA member, Scott Nearing; leader of the Egyptian Nationalist

137

The congress agenda was a reflection of the then current system of colonialism and
imperialism. However, in compliance with Vanderveldes directives from the previous year, the
congress avoided the sensitive issue of Belgian colonialism and the situation in the Congo Free
State. According to Das Flammenzeichen, the agenda focused on: 1. The Freedom Struggle of the
Chinese People; 2. British Imperialism in India, Persia and Mesopotamia; 3. North American
Imperialism and its Risks; 4. The Egyptian Liberation Struggle and the Arab People; 5. The
African Struggle and its Liberation; 6. The Negro Freedom Struggle; 7. The Struggle for
Indonesian Independence; 8. The Freedom Struggle of the Indo-Chinese Peoples; 9. The Struggle
of the Korean People against Japan; 10. Italian Fascism as an Expression of Imperialism; 11. The
Colonial Hunger of New German Imperialism; 12. The Connection of the National Revolutionary
Movement with the Proletarian Class Struggle; 13. Tactics of the Proletarian Class Struggle and its
Support of the Colonial Liberation Struggle; 14. The Freedom Struggle of the Oppressed Peoples
and the Trade Unions; 15. The Cultural Mission of the Western People; 16. The Establishment of
the League against Imperialism and for National Independence.332
Bridgeman was the accredited delegate of the British LACO Section. After the first day of the
congress, Bridgeman returned to his room at the Hotel Metropole and wrote a letter to W. N. Ewer,
the editor of the British left-wing paper the Daily Herald. According to Bridgeman, the event was
thoroughly international and, despite lacking in orderly arrangement, this was made up for in
enthusiasm due to the large attendance of colonial delegates.333 Jawaharlal Nehru attended the
congress together with his wife Kamala, and experienced the congress in similar terms. Nehru was
part of the session British Imperialism in India, Persia and Mesopotamia, along with the Persian
Ahmed Assadoff (who lived in Berlin) and, afterwards, fraternised with other delegates who
shared the same antagonism towards colonialism, e.g. individuals from Java, Indo-China,
Palestine, Syria, Egypt, North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. The congress left Nehru astonished
by the interactionism that had developed between colonial delegates, standing side-by-side with
representatives of European labour organisations which had been playing a leading part in
European Labour struggles for a generation. Nehru also remarked on the important attendance
of communist delegates, who he believed acted as representatives of trade union[s] or similar

Party, Hafiz Ramadam Bey, see IISG, see LAI Collection 3392.1/6, Adressen an den Kongress gegen
Kolonialunterdrckung und Imperialismus, Brssel, den 10. Februar 1927 Palais Egmont. For Barbusse, Davies and
Marteauxs joint speech, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.13-18, whilst Lansburys message is taken from the IISG LAI
Collection 3392.1/8, Message from George Lansbury to the Congress (is also included in Gibarti [ed.] 1927, pp.9-12).
332
Inhaltsverzeichnis, Gibarti (ed.), 1927, pp.282-284.
333
TNA KV2/1919, Intercepted letter [MI5], R. Bridgeman, Hotel Metropole, Brussels, to W. N. Ewer (editor of the
Daily Herald), London, 10/2-1027. Bridgeman feared that the Belgian authorities planned to close the congress due to
its aggressive anti-colonial rhetoric. Yet, it had been a highly successful opening day.

138

organisations.334 The contrasting colourfulness of the congress stunned Mohammad Hatta, the
leader of the Indonesian nationalist organisation, Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI):
However colourful and diverse the races and political colours, in purpose and aspiration,
people, we are of one mind. Never before had the world seen such a congress gather [] For
five days the accusations of suppressed peoples against acts of violence resounded in
colourful variety.335
According to Christian Albrecht Siebecks assessment of Hatta, Mohammad Hatta und der
indonesische Sozialismus Staatsdenken eines Indonesischen Nationalisten (1978), the Brussels
Congress provided Hatta with a life-long experience of the character of the European labour
movement through which, for the first time, he met and established contact with leading figures
such as Fimmen, Mnzenberg, Ledebour and Maxton.336
Manuel Gomez was the unofficial leader of the USA delegation, but introduced himself in
public as the AAAIL delegate. Later Gomez [Charles Shipman] wrote in his autobiography, It Had
to Be Revolution, that the congress was a star-studded affair, and remembered the
entrepreneurial genius Mnzenberg who, in the service of communism, was nonetheless also a
genuine supporter of the anti-imperialist movement. Gomez shared the rostrum with Jos
Vasconcelos, Carlos Quijano of the Revolutionary Party of Venezuela and Ismael Martinez of the
Tampico Labour Union from Mexico, giving a speech on the robbery politics of the USA in the
Caribbean and Latin America. As a political manifesto, the four of them signed a collective
declaration as a symbol of the beginning of the anti-imperialist struggle in every American
country (Erklrung der Delegation aller amerikanischer Lnder ber die Organisierung des antiimperialistischen Kampfes in der amerikanisch-pazifischen Region).337
For Josiah Tshangana Gumede, the ANC leader and delegate, emotions ran high during the
congress. According to Raymond van Diemels biography on Gumede, In Search of Freedom,
Fair Play and Justice (2001), the Brussels Congress gave Gumede an insight into the nature of

334

Nehru 1936, pp.162-163. Nehru was stunned by the moral demonstration expressed by quite a number of
distinguished persons the organisers had managed to invite, or who had become aware of the congress, e.g. Einstein,
Madame Sun Yat Sen and Romain Rolland. According to Das Flammenzeichen, the Nehru's speech was an act
extremely well received by the crowd, above all the statement: [the] The Indian problem is not a purely national
problem, but one which affects a large number of other countries directly and the whole world indirectly, in the sense
that it directly affects the greatest and most powerful imperialism of our time, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp. 55-60, and
fol. RGASPI 542/1/69, 62-64, Excerpt of Nehrus manuscript in Brussels, 1927.
335
Mohammad Hatta, The Brussels Congress against Imperialism and Colonial Oppression and our Foreign
Propaganda, in Portrait of a Patriot, Deliar Noer (ed.), The Hague, 1972, 158-164. Taken from Indonesia Merdeka,
1927.
336
Christian Albrecht Siebeck, Mohammad Hatta und der indonesische Sozialismus Staatsdenken eines Indonesischen
Nationalisten, Heidelberg, 1978, 82-83. Hattas speech was entitled Der Kampf um Indonesiens Unabhngigkeit,
focusing on the character, expression and economic exploitation by Dutch imperialism in Indonesia, see Gibarti
(ed.) 1927, pp.131-142.
337
Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.63-79, 236, 256; Shipman 1993, p.162.

139

European political engagement and ideology, an understanding which defined his perception of the
world. Having departed from Cape Town, South Africa, by boat, Gumede travelled in the company
of La Guma and Daniel Colraine, the delegate of the South African Trade Union Congress.
Arriving in London, the three of them went directly to Brussels. On the journey, La Guma and
Colraine tried to broaden Gumedes limited understanding of communism, a learning process
which continued in Brussels by meeting other African and Afro-American delegates, e.g. Richard
B. Moore, the delegate of both the ANLC and the Universal Negro Improvement Association
(UNIA), as well as a member of the WPA. Gumede met the Senegalese Lamine Senghor, the
delegate of the Paris-based association Committee in Defence of the Negro Race, Max Bloncourt
from the Antilles and delegate of the Inter-Colonial Association (section of the old colonies and
black peoples) and the Haitian Carlos Deambrosis Martins, the delegate of the Haitian Patriotic
Union. Gumede eagerly listened to Moores declaration at the congress, which concluded that the
fight against imperialism is an incessant struggle against imperialistic ideology. Afterwards,
Gumede listened to Senghor and Moore as they explained the necessity of unifying the national
liberation struggle in the colonies with the activities of the communist parties. The Negro
Commission, presided over by Senghor, represented the Negro question at the congress, through
which Moore introduced the United Resolution on the Negro Question. This resolution was,
however, a replica of another resolution which had been adopted by the UNIA at the Fifth Annual
Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World at Liberty Hall, New York, on August 1, 1926. For
Gumede, the Brussels episode was a satisfying experience, which implied the beginning of a
new era for the oppressed peoples.338
The euphoria at the congress also captivated the delegates from the Imperialist nations.
Lansbury, after having arrived in Brussels, felt the harmony at the congress, and as noted in his
article, A Great Week-End, published in Labour Weekly on 19 February: we were in truth an
international congress. According to Lansbury, ideal men [such as] Comrade Gibarti and Bach

338

Raymond van Diemel, In Search of Freedom, Fair Play and Justice. Joshia Tshangana Gumede, 1867-1947: A
Biography, see Internet: <
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/online%20books/searchfreedom/chapter6.htm >. Josiah Tshangana Gumede, Bericht ber die Behandlung der afrikanischen Neger, in
Gibarti (ed.), Berlin, 1927, pp.123-126. Gumede focused on the 500-year victimisation and oppression of the Negro
people in his speech. For the Negro question at the congress, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.113-130. The Negro
resolution and composition of the Negro Commission was later included in Richard B. Moore, W. Burghardt Turner
& Joyce Moore Turner (eds.), Caribbean Militant in Harlem Collected Writings 1920-1972, Indiana University Press,
Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1992, pp.53-54, 143-144. Raymond van Diemel discussed Gumede and La
Gumas European and Russian experience at a conference in Moscow on September 14, 2001. For the conference
paper, I have seen the new Jerusalem: Revisiting and re-conceptualising Josiah T. Gumede and Jimmy La Gumas
USSR visit of 1927, see Internet: < http://www.whatnextjournal.co.uk/Pages/History/Gumede.html > and Sechaba,
J. T. Gumede: ANC President 1927-1930, December, 1982, Internet:
< http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/gumede_jt.html >. The Negro resolution, as well as the resolution
from the UNIA conference on August 1, 1926, has been located at the IISG, LAI Collection 3392.1/54, 3392.1/55. A
copy of the UNIA resolution is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/5, 88-92 (German version).

140

 full of the Ideal of an international solidarity, proved that this was not a movement directed
from Moscow. Convinced that the congress was an act of spontaneity, Lansbury sincerely
believed the LAI to be a manifestation of the internationalist message of socialism with the
creation of an Anti-Imperialist International. Ellen Wilkinson, the ILP delegate and an M. P.,
shared Lansburys belief in the LAI, and later declared that the congress was not some
Machiavellian plot of the wicked Red Russians against the British Empire.339 Buber-Neumann
stated that the euphoria of the congress had blinded Lansbury, and left the grand old man
convinced that the idea that Moscow had initiated and directed the Brussels Congress was
nothing more than a rumour filled with total nonsense.340
One of the most illustrative examples of how the congress euphoria had entranced the
delegates was the case of A. Fenner Brockway, the General Secretary of the ILP. On the opening
day, Brockway delivered a speech on the Chinese liberation struggle and, towards the end, offered
his hand to the Chinese delegate and representative of the Central Executive Committee of the
KMT, Hansin Liau. As they joined their hands on the stage and raised them up in the air, the
congress hall erupted with an enthusiastic applause. It was an act symbolising the building of a
bridge between the oppressed and imperialist nations. However, this was not a spontaneous act.
Brockway re-collected in his autobiography, Inside the Left, that Mnzenberg had introduced the
idea:
End your speech by a declaration of unity with the Chinese workers and peasants,
Mnzenberg whispered as I stepped onto the rostrum. I did so and, as the sentences were
uttered, a Chinese comrade [Hansin Liau] stood at my side with an outstretched hand. I took
it and the whole audience, black, brown, yellow and white, rose and roared its applause.
Mnzenberg was a master of such strokes of drama.341
*

339

TNA HO 144 10693, George Lansbury M. P, A Great Week-End, in Labour Weekly, 19/2-1927. Ellen Wilkinson,
M. P. and ILP member, published the article Painted Saints in the same issue as Lansburys article. According to
Wilkinson, this was the most dramatic conference I was ever at, praising Gibarti for his truly remarkable organising
skill. The British HO used the articles to analyse the Brussels Congress.
340
Buber-Neumann 1957, pp.97-98.
341
Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.31-33. For Brockway and Liaus symbolic act, see p.33. Fenner Brockway, Inside the Left.
Thirty Years of Platform, Press, Prison and Parliament, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1942, (second impression
1947), 167. The British delegation consisted of Reginald Bridgeman (British LACO Section), Helen Crawfurd (IAH),
S.O. Davies (South Wales Miners Association), Harry Pollitt (National Minority Movement; NMM, however, off the
record, the CPGB), M. Brown (NMM), R. W. Postgate (Plebs League), George Stokes (London Labour Union
Council), William Brown (Secretary of the Amsterdam International). George Lansbury [Vice President of the British
Labour Party, M. P.], Ellen Wilkinson [ILP, M. P.], John Beckett [ILP, M. P.] whilst Arthur MacManus [CPGB, and
member of the Fraction Bureau], Herbert W. Jones, James Crossley and William Rust attended as private individuals,
see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.238-239, 253-254.

141

The Communist Perception of the Congress

Sen Katayama was the representative of the Japanese labour movement at the congress;
however, unbeknownst to those present, he was acting as the leader of both the ECCI delegation
and of the Fraktionsbro, secretly directing the activities of both. After the congress, Katayama
returned to Moscow and both compiled and provided Petrov with a report on the event. According
to his report, Katayama had been impressed with Brockway and Liaus demonstration to such a
degree that he described the act as a great step toward the international solidarity between the
oppressed and oppressing nationalities. The harmony of the Brussels Congress was a result of
the collective understanding amongst the delegates on the fight against Imperialism and for the
National Independence Katayama concluded.342 On 13 February, Mnzenberg sent a report to the
ECCI Secretariat immediately after his speech, in which he explained that the covert strategy of
the Fraktionsbro had greatly enhanced the work of the communists at the congress.
Mnzenberg explained that while a few important delegates from the colonial countries, e.g.
Nehru, had realised that the communists were acting behind the scenes, they had not declared a
single word of hostile criticism against the communists. Mnzenberg wrote that the reason for
this was that the delegates appreciated and expressed gratitude towards the organisers (us) for
having made the effort to hold a congress against colonialism and imperialism. Whilst the Chinese
delegation was entirely under our influence, Mnzenberg described how Nehru had
approached him at the Palais dEgmont, wondering whether it was possible to meet Russian
Comrades, e.g. the KIM delegate and communist from Georgia, Vissarion Vissarionovich (Besso)
Lominadze (1897 1935).343
Katayama had a more subtle approach to making contact with delegates, or with entire
delegations. By inviting the so-called desirable elements to an evening dinner, Katayama
evaluated the guests closely:
By this manner, we [got] all the responsible comrades ... acquainted with the delegates of
importance, so that when we met at the Executive or Presidium meeting we knew each other
and this greatly smoothed the business of the Congress.344
After the dinner was over, and as the guests were leaving, Katayama summoned the
Fraktionsbro for a discussion on the further use of the dinner guests. Apparently, Katayama was
342

RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, (Confidential) Report from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F.F. Raskolnikov, Moscow
24/2-1927. Katayama delivered a speech entitled The Struggle of the Korean People against Japan together with the
representative of the Korean Association in France, Kin Fa Lin, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.146-158.
343
RGASPI 542/1/7, 89, Letter from Mnzenberg, Brussels, to ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 13/2-1927. For the
influence of the ECCI delegation over the Chinese delegation, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter
from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F.F. Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/2-1927. For Besso Lominadze, see Gross 1967,
p.205; Buber-Neumann 1957, p.100; Chase 2002, p.485; and Lazitch 1986, pp.273-274.
344
RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F.F. Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/21927.

142

satisfied with how the Fraktionsbro had concealed its existence from all outsiders during the
congress:
No-one knew the existence of such a Bureau [had] been directing the congress []
everything [] was discussed and decided at the Small Buro [Fraktionsbro] beforehand
and carried out later by the Presidium or by a commission. Thus, the congress made the
desired progress to a successful end.345
The various national security services had, however, uncovered the manoeuvres of the communists
simply by assigning agents to attend the congress. The British ambassador in Brussels, George
Dixon Grahame, sent a report to the British Foreign Minister, Austen Chamberlain on 11 February,
noting the dominant feature of student elements and that a large number of [] representatives
[] seem to be foreigners resident in Belgium. Grahame had also heard from one of his
informants on location that a majority of the discussions are taking place behind closed doors,
only delegates being admitted. Furthermore, Auswrtige Amt received intelligence from the
German legation in Brussels which stated that last week, a fairly strong communist-biased
congress against the oppression of colonial peoples had been convened in Brussels.346
Mnzenberg wanted to capture the euphoria of the congress in print. An ambition which, most
importantly, inspired the publication of Das Flammenzeichen, including nineteen plates depicting
the beaconesque collective joy and passion among the delegates.347 Additionally, the European
communist press provided space by including vivid reports and summaries on a number of
important and stirring speeches, Mnzenberg stated. These included, for example, Wiener
345

RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, (Confidential) Report from Katayama, Moscow, to Comrade Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov,
Moscow, 24/2-1927. Das Flammenzeichen did not mention MacManus as a member of the CPGB, see further in
CoWoPa 5, Fredrik Petersson, Varfr en liga mot imperialism? Grundandet av League against Imperialism 1927,
bo Academy, 2005, Internet: < https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa5petersson.pdf >. For biography on
MacManus, see Lazitch 1986, pp.288-289; Davidson (2003); and Katayama, Lazitch 1986, pp.211-212.
346
TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Confidential report from George Dixon Grahame, Brussels, to Sir Austen Chamberlain,
London, 11/2-1927. Agents from various national security services attended the congress in disguise. Nehru later
wrote the following account of the Brussels Congress: [] it was viewed with some consternation by the Foreign and
Colonial Offices of the Imperialist powers. [] probably full of international spies, many of the delegates even
representing various secret services. We had an amusing instance of this. An American friend of mine [unknown], who
was in Paris, had a visit from a Frenchman who belonged to the French secret service. [] When he had finished his
enquiries he asked the American if he did not recognise him, for they had met previously. The American looked hard
but he had to admit that he could not place him at all. The secret service agent then told him that he had met him at the
Brussels Congress disguised as a Negro delegate, with his face, hands etc. all blacked over!, see Nehru 1936, pp.163,
164. For the report from the German legation in Brussels, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 36, Deutsche
Gesandtschaft, Brssel Inhalt: Kongress gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, to Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 15/2-1927.
347
Das Flammenzeichen included pictures that showed a message of unity and harmony at the congress. The delegates
crowded together during a plenary session in the large hall, the unity of the Indian and Chinese delegations and the
international composition of the congress. Furthermore, the images presented the LAI General Council with a
picture portraying Fimmen, Senghor and the general secretary of the KMT, Lu Chung Lin holding hands, with Nehru
seated beside them, and Mnzenberg and Katayama next to each other. Other illustrations show how Senghor clenched
his fist in his determination to continue the anti-colonial struggle; the establishment of relations between the EnglishChinese brotherhood (Lansbury patted Liau on the shoulder, while Mnzenberg stood in the background with a big
smile on his face), see Gibarti (ed.) 1927. The picture of Lansbury and Liau was also used as the cover for the March
issue of the A-I-Z (VI.Jahrgang, Nr.9, Berlin, 6/3-1927).

143

Arbeiter-Zeitung, Leipziger Volkszeitung, the Daily Herald, Le Peuple, Libre Belgique, Drapeau
Rouge, Inprecorr and Norrskensflamman. However, the social democratic newspapers were
discrete and cautious in their assessments, while the bourgeois press had at least commented on
the congress. The A-I-Z covered the event extensively. In two separate issues, articles and
photographs shed some light on Der erste Kongress gegen koloniale Unterdrckung and Die
unterdrckten Vlker stehen auf! Fotos vom I. Internationalen Kongress gegen Imperialismus und
Kolonialherrschaft.348
*
The Grand Finale: The Shift from Anti-Colonialism to Anti-Imperialism
The Brussels Congress built a bridge between disparate political and nationalist groups. In order to
consolidate this unity, the election of the LAI Executive and its Honorary Presidium left the crowd
with the impression that the moment had come to establish a dynamic movement.
This election had been a process preceded by Mnzenbergs speech, Die Grndung die Liga
gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, the final topic on the congress agenda.
For Mnzenberg, this speech and performance was the culmination of the anti-colonial project,
especially as it was a test of faith to see whether it was possible to form a permanent organisation
to secure the support of the European proletariat for the liberation movements in the colonies.
The fundamental aim of Mnzenbergs speech was to capitalise on the euphoria amongst the
delegates in order to be able to declare that the moment had arrived to make the shift from anticolonialism to anti-imperialism. Thus, while the LACO had functioned as a vehicle in coordinating and preparing the Brussels Congress, the foundation of the LAI served the purpose of
unifying the anti-colonial movement around the question of anti-imperialism. The LACO had been
acting as a centre of gravity for the anti-colonial movement in Berlin, focusing exclusively on the
question of colonial oppression, a focus which had, nonetheless, as suggested here, limited the
LACO's access to the anti-colonial movement. Thus, the Brussels Congress was the opportunity
for Mnzenberg, the IAH and the Comintern to switch the anti-colonial agenda over to focusing on
anti-imperialism a point which requires further clarification. While both terms involve forms of
348

Willi Mnzenberg, From Demonstration to Organisation, in The Anti-Imperialist Review, Berlin, Vol.1, No.1,
July 1928, pp.4-10. Other newspapers that included reports on the congress were the Temps, Frankfurter Zeitung,
Berliner Tageblatt, Klnische Zeitung and the Swedish conservative paper Nya Dagligt Allehanda. The Swedish
communist paper, Norrskensflamman (daily organ of the Communist Party of Sweden) included reports on the
Brussels Congress. For example, En antiimperialistisk konferens (An Anti-Imperialist Conference, published
February 19), Nationell frihet social jmlikhet (National Freedom Social Equality; 22 February), En vrldsliga
bildad mot imperialismen (The Establishment of a World League against Imperialism; 26 February).
Norrskensflamman used the reports from Inprecorr and TASS. See also Der erste Kongress koloniale Unterdrckung,
in A-I-Z, VI.Jahrgang, Nr.9, Berlin, 6/3-1927; TNO PRO CO 323 971 1, Confidential report from George Dixon
Grahame, Brussels, to Sir Austen Chamberlain, London, 11/2-1927; and The League against Imperialism, in Labour
Monthly, Vol.9, No.3, March 1927, 179-184.

144

subjugation of one people by another, the Brussels Congress agenda deliberately moved away
from colonialism, to focus explicitly on imperialism. The anti-colonial propaganda, introduced and
supported by the LACO, had protested, per se, against the administration of colonial oppression
by the imperialist nations in the periphery (the colonial and semi-colonial countries). For the
LAI, the intention was not to continue this form of agitation but rather to refer to anti-imperialism
as the principal aim of its activities. By shifting its focus from the situation in the colonies, the LAI
expected to aim its propaganda and activities towards the centre, i.e. the imperialist nations and
the grandiose projects of powers.349 This required a strengthening of the modus operandi the
LACO had tried to establish, particularly the formation of active national sections to support the
work of the LAI International Secretariat. If the Brussels Congress was the momentum of the
LACO, the rapturous climax of the first congress against imperialism and for national
independence gave birth to the LAI, for which, according to Mnzenberg, Brussels was neither
the end, nor the beginning of a new powerful movement. The establishment of the LAI was an
epochal event that honoured to dutifully support every worker, employee, every progressive and
anti-imperialist minded human, not guided by prejudice of divergent social, cultural, political or
national backgrounds, Mnzenberg stated:
Black or yellow, whether brown or white as skin colour, whether engaged for political or
religious reasons, do hereby declare that: we have here commonly forged a powerful weapon
against the common enemy, the equally oppressive Imperialism [] in Europe, [] Asia, in
Africa as well as in America.350
This historical moment in the history of colonialism had managed to summon delegates from the
imperialist nations in Europe and the USA, having pacifists, communists, socialists and trade
union officials seated next to each other to fulfil the principal aim of the congress:
Today [13 February], on this afternoon, it was decided to establish the League against
Imperialism [] The LAI [] shall invite [] organisations, parties, trade unions and
individuals [] to lead the struggle against capitalism, imperialist rule, in support of
national determination and national independence for every people, and for equal rights for
every class and human [] From today, we are no more a loose conference, but the first
international congress of the World League against Imperialism.351
Mnzenberg emphasised that the struggle against capitalism [and] imperialist rule was a
demarcation and a new beginning in the history of the labour and the national liberation
movements. In this context, Mnzenberg declared that the LAI was an actor determined to
349

Young 2001, pp.15-17.

RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Transcript of Mnzenbergs speech, Brussels, 14/2-1927.
351
RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Transcript of Mnzenbergs speech, Brussels, 14/2-1927.
350

145

counteract the existing social and institutional order of the world, particularly the notion that
Imperialism is always the one who takes home the game (der lachende Dritte ist der
Imperialismus). After Mnzenberg ended his speech, the Palais dEgmont exploded in a stormy,
continued cheering, as noted in the official transcript of the speech, while Colraine, the South
African delegate, and Albert Fournier, the delegate of the French LACO Section, joined
Mnzenberg on the rostrum to declare their fullest sympathy and understanding.352
The election of the LAI Honorary Presidium and the LAI Executive, was a celebration of the
achievements of the Brussels Congress. The former included Albert Einstein, Barbusse, Mme Sun
Yat-sen (not present) and General Lu Chung Lin of the KMT, while the latter included Lansbury as
Chairman of the LAI Executive and Fimmen as deputy Chairman. Nehru, Liau, Senghor,
Marteaux, Mnzenberg, Ugarte and Hatta were elected members of the Executive, having Gibarti,
Roger Baldwin and Bridgeman as substitutes. The constitution of the LAI General Council
included an array of different political actors, e.g. Chen Kuen of the Central Council of the
General Chinese Labour Unions, Kou Meng-yu, Katayama, Martinez, Vasconcelos, A. Alminia of
the Philippine Association for Independence, Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan Bey, Hadj-Ahmed
Messali of toile Nord-Africaine (ENA), Colraine, Semaun, Kin Fa Lin, Assadoff, Gomez,
Brockway, S. O. Davies, Harry Pollitt, S. Saklatvala (not present),353 the Dutch author Henriette
Roland-Holst, the secretary of the Belgian LACO Section Georges Grard, the Belgian journalist
and editor P. S. Spaak, Charles Plisnier from Belgium, the journalist and IAH representative from
Italy Victorio Verri, Guido Miglioli of the Italian association Katholische Gewerkschaften, the
representative of the French pacifist International Womens League for Peace and Freedom
Madame Duchne, Lessing, Ledebour, Helene Stcker and the IAH member Professor Nejedli
from Czechoslovakia.354
*

352

RGASPI 542/1/69, 37-49, Transcript of Mnzenbergs speech, Brussels, 14/2-1927; Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.224-227.
Saklatvala did not attend the Brussels Congress due to the fact that, from January to April 1927, he was visiting
India, see Sehri Saklatvala [Saklatvalas daughter], The Fifth Commandment (Miranda Press, UK, 1991), taken from
the Internet: < http://www.maze-in.com/saklatvala/pages/17.htm >.
354
Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp.241-242. The LAI Executive Committee and the General Council was included in an
abridged version of the Brussels Congress Der Brsseler Kongress gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale
Unabhngigkeit vom 10. bis 15. Februar 1927 im Palais Egmont Brssel (Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, March,
1927). Lazitch erroneously stated that Ho Chi Minh attended the Brussels Congress, which he never did. Firstly, the
known pseudonyms used by Ho Chi Minh around this time were Ly Thuy/Vuong Son Nhi/Thau Chin (19241928) and none of the above appear in Das Flammenzeichen. Secondly, Lazitch writes that Ho Chi Minh attended the
Brussels Congress in 1928, a statement which, in itself, is inaccurate from a chronological point of view since no LAI
congress ever took place in Brussels in 1928. In the same context, Lazitch mentioned that Ho Chi Minh was in
Canton, China, from December 1924 to April 1927, working as a translator at the Soviet consulate and as an assistant
for the emissary of the Comintern, Mikhail Borodin, see Lazitch 1986, pp.175-177; Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.235.
353

146

Merging the Anti-Imperialist Movement

The Organisation Resolution confirmed the shift from anti-colonialism to anti-imperialism, a
document outlining the organisational foundation of the LAI. According to Section 9, the LAI
needed to establish national secretariats/sections in countries where imperialism raged violently,
institutional actors who had to function as relay stations for the movement. This involved, above
all, the registration and provision of information to the LAI International Secretariat on the
character and nature of imperialist policy in the home countries. Thus, this practice not only aimed
to link together the national sections and the LAI Executive with the International Secretariat; this
implied that the International Secretariat was both receiver of intelligence and dispatcher of
directives back to the sections.355 Making a historical distinction between the LACO and the LAI,
the Organisation Resolution declared that the former had been the forerunner for the latter, thus,
transforming the organisational structure was the most logical step to take. This required the
merging of existing committees, associations or colonial campaigns into the LAI. As noted in
Section 10, which merely re-phrased the arguments introduced by Mnzenberg, the following step
was crucial:
The General Council, the Executive and established secretariats in different countries, must
make every effort to bring together [zusammenzufassen] and unite every existing
organisation and committee like the Hands off China [Hnde weg von China], Hands off
Russia [Hnde weg von Russland], Committee for Syria [Against the Cruelties in Syria
committee], Committee for Morocco [Komitee fr Marokko], League against Colonial
Oppression [LACO] and the All American Anti-Imperialist League [AAAIL] within the
newly-created League against Imperialism.356
The merging of these committees, associations and campaigns would place the LAI, from a
hierarchical perspective, at the centre.

355

Organisationsresolution, in Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.228.

Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.228; Der Brsseler Kongress 1927, pp.37-38. The British communist journal, Labour
Monthly, published the Organisationsresolution in its March issue (1927, pp.179-185), see paragraph 11.
356

147

Table 4.2: Merging of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: a Theoretical Outline

All American
Anti-Imperialist
League, AAAIL

Workers Party
of America,
WPA
Hands Off
China
campaign

League against
Imperialism and
for National
Independence
(LAI)

League against
Colonial
Oppression
(LACO)

Against the
Cruelties in Syria
committee
Action Committee
against
Imperialists
Colonial Politics
Committee
for Morocco

Internationale
Arbeiterhilfe
(IAH)

Hands Off
Russia

Source: Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.228; Der Brsseler Kongress gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale
Unabhngigkeit, LAI, Berlin, February/March, 1927, pp.37-38
The Organisation Resolution did not mention the LAIs intimate tie to the IAH. Apparently, it
was essential to keep the IAH separated from the LAI in order to fulfil the Cominterns strategy of
creating millions of large sympathising organisations. However, some of the actors included in
the merging process remained independent, e.g. the AAAIL continued its activity in the USA, and
the Hands off China campaign had proven to be a powerful institution of propaganda which was
not dependent upon the euphoria of the LAI and the Brussels Congress.
The establishment of the LAI in Brussels also indicated a separation from its forerunner in
Berlin, the IAH. This enabled the creation of an organisation capable of sustaining and performing
independent activity, shaped by an independent political discourse predestined by its own
ambitions and realities. This involved a separate control and administration of the political work
and the need to get the LAI to seek its financial support from Comintern headquarters in Moscow,
instead of depending on the services of the IAH. According to Gibarti, the LAI, as an independent
non-party organisation, was far from being a success, despite the euphoria of the Brussels
Congress; this was only the beginning of the creation of a strong movement.357 For Katayama, the
objective was obvious: [F]inally, there remains to make the League [LAI] grow in our interest.
[] The Congress was successfully concluded upon the election of the new executive [].358
*

357

Louis Gibarti, Vorwort, in Gibarti (ed.) 1927, pp. 6-7; Petersson 2007, p.14.
RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/21927.
358

148

Euphoria (not Utopia)

Attendance at the Congress was such that it even surprised me.
Mnzenberg to the ECCI Secretariat,
21/2-1927
The euphoria of the Brussels Congress was an unexpected surprise for both Mnzenberg and the
Comintern. Richard Stites once wrote that euphoria resembles the sensation of the good light
which, if applied to the Brussels Congress and the delegates, the establishment of the LAI
provided a feeling of relief, of collective joy, of being rewarded at long last for the patience and
suffering of generations of humanity. Stretching back to the Wilsonian moment in 1919, and
how the Versailles Peace Treaty negotiations had totally ignored the colonial question, this
moment in Brussels was a step forward for the anti-colonial movement on the international
political arena, referring back here to Stites, to realise all the beautiful dreams of achieving
national self-determination and independence.359
After the Brussels Congress, the LAI was determined not only to capitalise on the success of
the congress but, also, to co-ordinate the organisational structure of the anti-imperialist movement
and its network. While the functions of the LACO had merged into the LAI, its nerve centre, the
International Secretariat, had remained intact in Berlin. Hence, the process about to take place
served a twofold purpose: firstly, the International Secretariat had to secure a relationship with
Comintern headquarters in Moscow and, secondly, it had to support the work to establish national
LAI sections across the world. This monumental task focused on solving organisational, financial,
institutional and individual questions. In all of this, the LAI did not benefit from the increased
suspicion from its primary antagonists, i.e. the LSI and the national security services.

In February-March, the LAI organised demonstrations in Berlin and across Germany, to celebrate
and spread propaganda about the first international congress against imperialism. For
Mnzenberg, the decisive success of the Brussels Congress resided in the strong participation
of Chinese, Indian and [] English delegations. According to his report to the ECCI Secretariat
on 21 February, we had counted [] on 100 to 120 delegates and got 180 to 200, with the event
realising its objective of criticising the pro-colonial movement in Germany and the colonial
policies of both the SPD and the LSI.360 The euphoria among the delegates had, however, surprised
Mnzenberg who, in connection with the drama of the congress, invited some of the delegates to
visit Berlin and come to a private party at his apartment. Buber-Neumann was at this party, and
359
360

Stites 1989, p.39. For the Versailles Peace Treaty, see Manela (2007).
RGASPI 542/1/7, 120-123, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927.

149

later explained that Mnzenberg had made everyone aware that, due to his organising skills, the
Brussels Congress had been a success. Additionally, the party was a chance for Mnzenberg to
continue evaluating some of the guests and to continue gathering intelligence. Mnzenberg told
the ECCI Secretariat that the bulk of material accumulated both during and after the congress had
forced him to wonder: what will happen now? The decision-makers at Comintern headquarters
had to act swiftly for the simple reason of ensuring that the LAI remained steady in our hands
and, especially, in order to endorse the decision to support the creation of a large organisation,
Mnzenberg concluded.361
*
An Evening in Berlin and Demonstrations in Germany
Babette Gross invited her sister to meet international comrades in Berlin. When Buber-Neumann
arrived at the apartment Mnzenberg shared with Gross, the place was crowded with a mixture of
multicoloured races: Negroes, Chinese and Mohammedans [] all glowing nationalists, e.g.
Lansbury, the artist Kthe Gssfeld, Gumede, Senghor, Gomez, Mazhar Bey El Bakri of the Syrian
Rebels branch in Berlin (Hauptquartier der syrischen Aufstndischen), Besso Lominadze,
Mattar, Hansin Liau and La Guma. Stunned by the pathos and cheerfulness at the party, BuberNeumann observed how Mnzenberg paid extra attention to certain guests. While the
cheerfulness made Lominadze, Gomez, and El Bakri break out into singing funny songs,
Gumede considered this to be offensive, telling Mnzenberg that such behaviour was not
appropriate for genuine fighters. To rightfully honour the achievements of the Brussels
Congress, Gumede urged everyone to sing The International; an idea Mnzenberg put an end to,
by asking everyone to stop singing.362
The Brussels Congress had been an emotional experience for some of the delegates. Invited to
attend a closed meeting at the International Secretariat at 48 Wilhelmstrae (IAH headquarters in
Berlin), once there, Gumede declared his devotion to the anti-imperialist cause in the most
enthusiastic terms. His performance was described by Otto Schudel in an interview for the South

361

RGASPI 542/1/7, 120-123, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927. If one
reflects on the fact that the Brussels Congress ended on 14 February and that Mnzenbergs report was completed on
21 February, this party must have taken place sometime between February 15-21.
362
Buber-Neumann 1957, 97-107. For El Bahkri, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.253; van Diemel (2001). The German
communist Kthe Gussfeldt worked as a translator (French and English) during the Brussels Congress. Known also as
Ethel Chiles, British police arrested Gussfeldt in London in May, charged with conducting espionage in the service
of the CPGB and of organising workshop committees for control and supervision of the production and transport of
war material to China, see TNA KV2 1919, Letter from L. Gibarti to F. Brockway (copy to R. Bridgeman), 31/51927; TNA KV2 1919, Letter from G.M. Liddell, New Scotland Yard, to Harker, copy, original in P.F. 38688, copies
sent to MI5, 7/6-1927.

150

African journal, Sechaba, in 1982. Schudel, an IAH functionary from Switzerland, instructed to
work at the International Secretariat in 1927, described how:
Josiah Tshangana Gumede and I were standing side by side. He towered over most of those
present with his tall, powerful figure. Most of the whites he had met until then had treated
him with contempt and that was why this Berlin meeting was so infinitely important. For the
first time he stood as an equal among people of all races, all colours and various beliefs,
united in brotherhood with the purpose of putting an end to the contemptible system of
colonialism. Josiah Tshangana Gumede was so overwhelmed by this experience that his eyes
were filled with tears. "I am so happy!" he stammered. Then he drew himself up and added:
"I am going to fight!.363
Gumede appeared as a prominent figure in the LAI campaign (Anti-Colonial Day) in Germany
throughout February and March, which aimed to raise awareness of the Brussels Congress. At an
LAI rally in Hamburg on 27 February, Gumede compared the LAI with the League of Nations;
with the important difference, however, being that the LAI was the Vlkerbund aller
unterdrckten Nationen und Rassen.364 This campaign started in Cologne on 20 February, where
71 delegates, representing 28 cultural or labour organisations (several had also visited the Brussels
Congress) gathered to discuss the potential future of the LAI. At this meeting, Nehru, Chi-Kai-Chi
of the Canton government and Manrique from the Mexican Peasant Association [governor of
Santa Luis de Podosa, not present at the Brussels Congress] delivered lectures on the urgent task of
co-ordinating the links between the colonial liberation movements and the European labour
movement. Gibarti, appearing as LAI secretary, and the French communist and secretary of the
French LAI Section Jacques Vantadour, discussed the crucial step of establishing the LAI around
the world. Other LAI meetings of a similar character were convened in Berlin, Dresden and Essen.
On 29 March, Gibarti informed the ECCI Secretariat of the successful formation of local LAI
363

Schudel was interviewed in Basle on 19 December, 1977, see Sechaba (1982). For Otto Schudel, see Huber 1994,
pp.448-449; and the Swiss Sozialarchiv, Internet:
< http://www.sozialarchiv.ch/Bestaende/Archive/archWeb/Ar198_18frameset.htm >.
364
Peter Martin & Christine Alonzo (eds.), Zwischen Charleston und Stechschritt. Schwarze im Nationalsozialismus,
Dlling und Galitz Verlag, Hamburg, 2004, p.183. This public meeting took place at the Astoriapalast in Barmbeck
on 27 February, which began at 10 am, with an entry fee of 30 pfennig. Magda Hoppstock-Hut, the representative of
the Internationalen Frauenliga fr Frieden und Freiheit, delivered a report on the Brussels Congress, Wang-Chu from
Canton introduced a discussion on the chance to defeat Imperialism in China and Gumede ended the meeting with a
speech on the liberation struggle of the coloured races. Gumede left Germany as an avid devotee to the LAI and the
anti-imperialist movement, travelling together with La Guma to the Soviet Union. In November 1927, Gumede
belonged to a 917-strong delegation representing 40 countries and participated in the World Congress of the Friends
of the Soviet Union at the Dom Soiuzov (House of the Trade Unions), in Moscow on 10-12 November, 1927. Other
delegates in Moscow were e.g. Jawaharlal Nehru, Helene Stcker, Rudyard Kuczynski, the painter Diego Rivera from
Mexico, the journalist Egon Erwin Kisch from Germany and Goldschmidt. Diemel concluded that Gumede did not
admit to being a communist, hence, this made him especially targeted to be imprinted with the successes of the
Russian Revolution, above all the goal to achieve national independence. Harry Haywood, the Afro-American
communist and student at the International Lenin School (ILS) in Moscow, stated that Gumede was a special friend
of us Black students, see Diemel (2001), and Internationale Delegationen, in A-I-Z, Jahrg.VI, Nr. 45, Berlin, p.13.

151

branches in Hamburg, Cologne, Essen, Dsseldorf, Frankfurt am Main, Remscheid, Dresden,

Leipzig and Berlin.365 Many of the above undertakings were, however, carried out with the support
of the IAH administrative apparatus in Berlin. For example, the headquarters of the IAH was a
rallying point for the LAI, providing the organisation with a location where public meetings during
the initial phase could be held.366
The International Secretariat, along with the Berlin LAI branch, held a series of seminars as a
method of introducing an anti-imperialist agenda. In March, the course Imperialism and Colonial
Politics, held at IAH headquarters in March, included seminars with Lehmann-Lucas [?] on the
Imperialist Trends in Modern Times, while the German anti-colonial activist Martin
Hoffmann367 discussed Germanys Colonial Politics before the War. This continued with
Mnzenbergs opinion on Germanys Colonial Politics and its Danger for the Working Class,
Hansin Liau on The Chinese Struggle and its Meaning for the International Working Class,
Goldschmidt on The Latin American Struggle and Chatto holding a short course on India.368
These seminars were a project, preceded by the launch of the LAI organ, Kolonial Revue, in
February, a forum which aimed to discuss anti-imperialism as both a theory and practice. Released
through the IAHs media apparatus, the first issue of the journal included articles by Barbusse
(Selbstbestimmungsrecht

den

Kolonialvlkern),

Ledebour

(Kolonialer

Umschwung),

Chattophadyaya (Die historische Bedeutung des Brsseler Kongresses fr Indien), Wittfogel

(Zu den Kmpfen in China) and the Chinese S. E. Wang-King-Ky (Das heutige China im
Lichte der ungleichen Vertrge).369 Additionally, each member of the LAI had to sign a
Declaration of Membership (Beitrittserklrung), a symbolic as well as an organisational act
declaring the signatory's commitment to the cause. According to this Declaration, the members
of the LAI had responsibilities and obligations which included, for example, the dissemination in
large circles of information about the character of colonial politics and its effect on the oppressed
365

RGASPI 542/1/4, 8, Einladung Anti-Kolonial-Tagung, 20/2-1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1507/2032, 41-45, Liga
gegen koloniale Unterdrckung und Antikolonialer Kongress in Brssels. Reichskommissar fr berwachung der
ffentlichen Ordnung, Berlin, 28/3-1927; RGASPI 542/1/17, 1-14, Report from Gibarti/LAI International Secretariat,
Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 29/3-1927; Mustafa Haikal, Zwischen Brssel und Frankfurt am Main
Zum Anteil deutscher Kommunisten an der Entwicklung der Antiimperialistischer Liga, in Die Liga gegen
Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, H. Piazza (Hg.), Leipzig, 1987, pp.82-84.
366
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 48, Weltliga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung und Imperialismus. Deutsche
Geschftsstelle, Berlin, 28/2-1927. Intelligence on this meeting was sent to the Auswrtige Amt on 3 March, 1927.
367
Martin D. Hoffman worked with the documents in the LAI archive at the International Secretariat to write an
analysis of colonial ambitions in Germany, later published in the pamphlet Keine Kolonien! (1927), see Michael
Schubert, Der schwarze Fremde. Das Bild des Schwarzafrikaners in der parlamentarischen und publizistischen
Kolonialdiskussion in Deutschland von den 1870er bis in die 1930er Jahre, Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 2003,
p.344.
368
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 61, Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, Berlin, 7/3-1927.
369
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 83, Cover of Kolonial-Revue, No.1, I.Jahrgang, Berlin, Februar, 1927; SAPMOBA ZPA R1001/6751, 48, Weltliga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung und Imperialismus. Deutsche Geschftsstelle,
Berlin, 28/2-1927.

152

peoples.370 All of which was, nevertheless, a part of the propaganda machinery set in motion after
the Brussels Congress. In reality, the International Secretariat had no clear direction on how to
consolidate the LAI, nor was it appropriate to continue relying upon the assistance of the IAH. For
Chatto, the situation was intolerable, particularly as the International Secretariat had to share an
office with the LHR at IAH headquarters.371
*
The Direction of Euphoria
The Amsterdam Conference marks the decisive step towards the consolidation of the
movement to support the national liberation struggle.
Mnzenberg to the ECCI Secretariat, April 1927
By March 1927, just one month after the LAIs rapturous inception, the euphoria of the Brussels
Congress was over. For Mnzenberg, the situation had become uncomfortable, informing the
ECCI Secretariat that the LAI consumed much of his energy and, more importantly, it had caused
disorder in his management of the daily work at IAH headquarters. Mnzenberg addressed the
need to sort out the inner organisation of the LAI, i.e. the International Secretariat, and to
establish routines a prerequisite which would enable him to provide the LAI with advice and
recommendations, rather than merely solving administrative questions. A crucial step in this
direction was to establish communication links between the International Secretariat and the LAI
Executive members. Another step was to convince Lansbury and Marteaux not to resign from the
LAI. However, at the same time, Mnzenberg questioned whether it was prudent for Chatto to
continue negotiating with Nehru.372 The ECCI delegation refuted Mnzenbergs proposal to
dismiss Nehru as being rash. At a meeting in Moscow on 28 February, the ECCI delegation (now
re-named the Brussels Commission) wanted Hermann Remmele, the KPD representative in the
ECCI in Moscow, to devise a plan on how to maintain contact with Nehru during his visit to
Germany and Europe. The Brussels Commission perceived Nehru as a crucial intermediary in
establishing a link between the LAI and the prominent men in the Left Wing of the INC as well
as in persuading [the INC] to act in accordance with the tactics of the Kuomintang. Remmele
had to consider the idea of sending a member of the Brussels Commission from Moscow to
attend the KPD Parteitag in Essen. On location in Berlin, this representative could meet and

370

SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 49, Beitrittserklrung, Berlin, 1927. The German communist Lucy Peters acted as
secretary of the Berlin LAI branch. The annual LAI membership fee was the sum of two Marks.
371
RGASPI 542/1/16, 15-16, Letter from Chatto, Amsterdam, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 31/3-1927.
372
RGASPI 542/1/7, 120-123, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927.

153

invite Nehru to the KPD Congress and there discuss the steps necessary in forming an LAI section
in India. However, the Brussels Commission made the logical recommendation to summon
Mnzenberg to Moscow and get him to bring every scrap of paper on the congress. Aside from
organising the Anti-Colonial Day in Germany, the International Secretariat reinforced the work
distributing propaganda on the LAI to the democratic press and published special literature on
the methods of the Kuomintang and on the colonial struggle in India and Egypt.373
The LAI Executive had not held any inaugural meeting during the Brussels Congress.
Katayama concluded that the general consensus was to hold it within six weeks after the
congress, telling the Eastern Secretariat to prepare theses, write directives and complete the
statutes of the LAI.374 Thus, the manner of Katayamas reaction implies that none of the actors,
departments or individuals at Comintern headquarters, were prepared for the eventual success of
the Brussels Congress. This created a scenario centred on ad hoc solutions. On 8 March, the Small
Commission instructed Petrov to take care of the LAI Executive issue, and to use the ECCI
representatives travelling to Essen to attend the KPD Parteitag as couriers to pass on documents
for the communist members of the [LAI] Executive [Mnzenberg and Gibarti]. This coincided
with the information from Mnzenberg to the ECCI Secretariat that the LAI Executive meeting
would be convened in Amsterdam on 28-29 March. At this meeting, Mnzenberg and Gibarti
intended to focus on the question of how to co-ordinate relations between the International
Secretariat and the LAI Executive, as well as on the challenge of establishing national LAI
sections.375
The LAI Executive meeting tested the euphoria of the LAI. Present in Amsterdam,
Mnzenberg, Lansbury, Bridgeman, Nehru, Fimmen, Baldwin, Chatto and Hansin Liau, the
session approved Lansbury as the Chairman of the LAI, while Fimmen, in his role as vice-deputy,
was to also act as a contact between the LAI Executive and the International Secretariat. After the
meeting, Mnzenberg told the ECCI Secretariat in a report that the LAI was a real organisation,
in which the LAI Executive appeared to represent a constructive forum in which to discuss
organisational and political questions. In Amsterdam, the Executive members vowed to introduce
373

RGASPI 495/60/115, 5-6, Minutes of the meeting of the Brussels Commission, 28/2-1927; RGASPI 495/6/5, 3333b, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.17 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekr., Moscow, 8/3-1927. On 21 February,
the International Secretariat sent every resolution, thesis, speech transcript and congress manifesto to Heimo in
Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/44, 10-11, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 21/2-1927.
374
RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter from Katayama, Moscow, to Petrov/Raskolnikov, Moscow 24/21927.
375
RGASPI 495/6/5, 33-33b, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.17 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekr., Moscow,
8/3-1927. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Jules Humbert-Droz, Haken [?], Abramow, Heimo, Mehring, Rait,
Petrov and Kornblum. For Mnzenbergs letter to the ECCI Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 159-160, Letter
from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 11/3-1927; RGASPI 542/1/17, 1-14, Report from
Gibarti/LAI International Secretariat, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 29/3-1927. The ECCI Secretariat had
to endorse the idea of holding the inaugural meeting of the LAI Executive in Amsterdam.

154

the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement to the trade unions and political parties, as well as to
form important centres of the anti-imperialist movement [national LAI sections]. The latter was
a question related exclusively to the organising of LAI activities within the British Empire.
According to Mnzenberg, Bridgeman seemed eager to realise [the] branching out [of the LAI]
all over the world.376
Gibarti had a different perception of how to develop the LAI, compared to Mnzenberg. For
Gibarti, the Weimar Republic was the perfect location for the centre of the international antiimperialist movement, particularly due to the fact that Germany had lost every colony at the
humiliating Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919. Therefore, Gibarti argued that the LAI had great
freedom to organise anti-imperialist activism out in the open in Germany, e.g. the Reichstag could
be used to develop the parliamentary work of the organisation:
We believe that the LAI's function is in its parliamentary work, which for the [] British
colonies has an enormous meaning and is an inevitable necessity. We believe that this work
has to be developed and firmly rooted by arranging information meetings about the Brussels
Congress, [] China, Mexico and other questions.377
The LAI had the British colonies as one of its key targets; however, this was a daunting
challenge to solve. Nevertheless, according to Gibarti, since the LAI had prominent members
involved in parliamentary circles in Great Britain, e.g. Lansbury, Wilkinson, Brockway and John
Beckett, perhaps the colonial question could stir up some attention in the British parliament.
Evidence of the above occurred shortly after the Brussels Congress when Lansbury and Wilkinson
raised the question in the House of Commons in London. Gibarti informed the ECCI Secretariat
that the creative work of Lansbury and Wilkinson consisted of a protest against the British
authorities' decision not to allow Chinese citizens to enter England if they had participated at the
Brussels Congress. In the records and protocols of the British parliament, this protest has gone
missing, yet at the same time, British security services observed how LAI members in England
376

RGASPI 542/1/16, 83-86, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, April, 1927. The
British Embassy in Berlin closely followed the international aspirations which the LAI Executive had introduced in
Amsterdam. Lindsay at the Embassy notified Austen Chamberlain that the LAI planned to send a delegation to China,
consisting of Barbusse, Lansbury, Bridgeman, Purcell and Goldschmidt. According to an article in Die Rote Fahne,
which had caught Lindsays attention, a remark had made mention of the fact that the delegation intended to
investigate the practical effects of the imperialist system, see TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Report from the British
Embassy in Berlin to Sir Austen Chamberlain, 4/4-1927. Mnzenberg introduced this plan in a report to the ECCI
Secretariat. However, in the end, nothing ever happened, for two reasons: firstly, the KMT putsch in April had made it
impossible to send a socialist delegation from Europe to China and, secondly, the British authorities had no intention
(most likely) of authorising any visa applications.
377
RGASPI 542/1/16, 1-14, Ttigkeitsbericht des Sekretariats seit dem 18 Februar 1927 29 Mrz 1927. A copy of
the report is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/17, 1-14. Mnzenberg was aware of the content in Gibartis reports, especially
as Mnzenberg examined every document before passing on the material to Moscow. Jules Humbert-Droz, the French
communist and Comintern functionary, functioned as the receiver of Mnzenbergs reports on the LAI after the
Brussels Congress, see for example fol. RGASPI 542/1/17, 15, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Jules
Humbert-Droz, Moscow, 9/6-1927. For Germany and the colonies, see Poley 2005, pp.11-12.

155

confined themselves chiefly to the putting forward of a number of questions in Parliament on

Colonial subjects and to the holding of various Committee meetings which took place in
Committee Rooms of the House of Commons.378 This parliamentary approach did not confine
itself to the British parliament; a second episode played itself out in the Swedish parliament. Carl
Lindhagen, the mayor of Stockholm and member of the First Chamber of Parliament in
Stockholm, Sweden, as well as being a devoted pacifist and socialist, contacted Gibarti in a letter
dated 4 March. Lindhagen used this occasion to send his greetings to the organisers of the first
congress in support of the oppressed peoples, introducing himself as a long-standing and wellknown character in the Swedish parliament. Lindhagens primary reason for contacting the LAI
was to inform them that he had introduced the question of the Asian awakening in the First
Chamber on 22 February. According to the First Chambers protocol, Lindhagens interpellation to
get the Swedish government to react on the Far Eastern political situation was a futile exercise.
The Chairman of the First Chamber concluded during the session that the question had no
relevance whatsoever for the political situation in Sweden and kindly asked Lindhagen never to
raise the question again.379 Yet, Gibarti believed that, if the LAI was aiming to support the
parliamentary approach, this had to be co-ordinated with public demonstrations and political
meetings outside parliamentary circles.380
*
The Structure of the LAI and the Anti-Imperialist Commission
The vibrant mixture of nationalities in Berlin was a haven for the anti-colonial movement, a milieu
representative of a colonial metropolis in Europe during the inter-war years. For Mnzenberg, the
colonial community in Berlin convinced him that the city was the most logical place to locate
the centre of the LAI. However, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters were of a different
opinion. The Small Commission questioned whether Berlin really could provide the International
Secretariat with sufficient contacts. In fact, the Organisation Resolution adopted at the Brussels
378

RGASPI 542/1/17, 1-14, Report from Gibarti/LAI International Secretariat, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat,
Moscow, 29/3-1927. Gibarti informed the ECCI Secretariat that the British LAI Section had held a meeting in the
House of Commons to discuss the war plans of British Imperialism in China. Labour M. P.s and trade union leaders
attended this meeting, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/17, 24-30, Quarterly report from Liau & Gibarti, Berlin, to the ECCI
Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1927. For the meetings in the British parliament, see Internet: <
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com >; TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis on the LAI, 1929.
379
Lindhagen received information on the Brussels congress from Chatto, based solely on their contact since Chattos
sojourn in Stockholm between 1917-21, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/18, 6, Letter from Carl Lindhagen in Stockholm to
Gibarti, the International Secretariat, Berlin, 4/3-1927. For a brief biography of Lindhagen, which includes some of his
writings, see Hans Wahlgren (red.), Carl Lindhagen drmmare och stridsman, Munka-Ljungby, Humanistiska
frlaget (1997). Lindhagens contacts with the International Secretariat is a topic discussed in Fredrik Petersson
(CoWoPa5), Varfr en liga mot imperialism? Grundandet av League against Imperialism, 1927, see:
< https://www.abo.fi/student/media/7957/cowopa5petersson.pdf >.
380
RGASPI 542/1/17, 31-39, Quarterly report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, August, 1927.

156

Congress advocated Paris as the location for the International Secretariat. The question of settling
the definitive location of the International Secretariat evolved into an animated dispute, which left
Mnzenberg discontent with the character of the discussions, particularly the information from
Misiano, which claimed that the Small Commission expected Gibarti and Barbusse to lead the
International Secretariat in Paris, an idea which caused Mnzenberg to frown upon hearing it.381
The reason behind this idea was probably that the Small Commission did not want to create an
obvious link between the LAI and the German communist movement. A fear, grounded in the
public attention the Brussels Congress had created, particularly the claim that the LAI was a
German affair under the direct influence of the German communist movement. At the other
extreme, however, German authorities did their best to confirm whether or not the LAI was a
German affair. If so, as noted by the Auswrtige Amt, the idea of having an organisation that
devoted itself to co-ordinating an international anti-imperialist movement, using Berlin as the
centre for its activities, was a serious proposition. Additionally, the RKO questioned the real
nature of the LAI was it a communist, radical or a pacifist organisation? In an evaluation of the
LAIs activities in Berlin, the RKO increased its attention to confirming whether there existed
any connection between the LAI, the Comintern and the KPD. If the organisation turned out to be
subversive, controlled by the communists and harbouring desirable tendencies towards the
colonial community in Berlin, German authorities resolved to take every step to neutralise the
LAI, especially if the organisation circulated Bolshevik propaganda in Germany.382
Mnzenberg was obviously against the idea to transfer the International Secretariat to Paris.
The ECCI Secretariat had to understand that the proposition dishonoured and attacked
Mnzenbergs capacity as an organiser. According to Mnzenberg, Barbusse was a poor choice as
secretary, particularly as he frequently suffered from poor health and lived in Paris, whereas
Gibarti could not be trusted when left to his own devices. Why did Mnzenberg oppose the idea of
letting Gibarti lead the International Secretariat in Paris? At one point, Mnzenberg told Palmiro
Togliatti, a communist from Italy, also known as Ercoli, acting for a short period after the
Brussels Congress as the political advisor for the LAI at Comintern headquarters, that Gibarti had
to be strictly controlled almost every hour, every day. Mnzenberg believed that this would
381

Organisationsresolution [paragraph 6], in Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.228; RGASPI 542/1/7, 170, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat/Freund, Moscow, 14/3-1927; RGASPI 495/6/5, 33-33b, Auszug aus
dem Protokoll Nr.17 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekr., Moscow, 8/3-1927.
382
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/115, 41-45, Analysis by Reichskommissar, Berlin, 28/3-1927. The dossier SAPMO-BA
ZPA R1507/2032, 41-45, contains a copy of this analysis. Mnzenberg managed, for some reason, to get a hold of the
RKO analysis, which he sent to the Eastern Secretariat on 25 August. According to Mnzenberg, it was an
interesting document that depicted how the enemy perceived the LAI. Yet, in the end, the LAI could not use the
document in its propaganda as it endangered the original source, Mnzenberg concluded, see SAPMO-BA ZPA I
6/3/361, 15, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 25/8-1927. See Mnzenbergs
report SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/361, 16-17, a copy of this report is located in fol. RGASPI 542/1/9, 72-73.

157

prevent Gibarti from instigating political rubbish, as well as correct his poor skills as an
organiser.383 The underlying motive for Mnzenberg expressing such a harsh opinion of Gibarti is
unknown; however, a plausible explanation is that Mnzenberg's opinion had been influenced by a
personal dispute which had flared up between the two of them in 1926 in connection with the
discussion to postpone the Brussels Congress.384
Other actors were also involved in the location question. After the meeting of the LAI
Executive in Amsterdam, Fimmen questioned why the International Secretariat had to be located
in Berlin. Fimmen told Chatto and Nehru that Amsterdam was by far a better option from which to
administer the LAIs international activities, especially with its access to naval ports and, despite
London being one of the hearts of imperialism, the constant surveillance by British security
services would restrict the LAI from prospering. Chatto took note of Fimmens remarks and wrote
a report to Mnzenberg, informing him that the meeting had changed his opinion of Fimmen
(whom Chatto had, at first, believed to be a communist). According to Chatto, Fimmen claimed
not to be afraid of any communists and, despite the fact that the Comintern had had their eyes
everywhere at the Brussels Congress and that Mnzenberg had a nose for certain things, this
did not imply that he was a skilled organiser.385 A possible explanation for Fimmens critique
towards the location of the International Secretariat in Berlin, and his personal remark against
Mnzenberg, was his desire and, at the same time, his incapacity to control the development of the
LAI.
Mnzenberg did not intend to let this question pass by unnoticed, telling the ECCI Secretariat
that he could approve of a subsidiary bureau, similar to the International Secretariat, in Paris, an
idea the LAI Executive endorsed in August. This was the step confirming Berlin as the permanent
base for the International Secretariat, whereas the French LAI Bureau in Paris (established in
March-April 1927) had two employees who provided visiting representatives of the LAI and the
Comintern with auxiliary help. However, in August, Gibarti concluded that the surveillance of
the French Sret was preventing the bureau from doing any constructive work, and had more or
less brought the LAI in France to a momentary standstill.386 Others have interpreted the above
383

RGASPI 542/1/7, 170, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat/Freund, Moscow, 14/3-1927.
Mnzenberg described Gibarti as my man of confidence and executor of my directives. This letter also mentions that
Togliatti/Ercoli was a key person for the LAI in Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/7, 159-160, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 11/3-1927.
384
SAPMO-BA ZPA RY1/I 2/6/2, 95, [Kopie] Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Org.-Abtl. der B. L.
[Bezirksleitung der KPD], Berlin, 23/6-1926; SAPMO-BA ZPA RY1/I 2/6/2, 97-98a, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin,
to Bezirksleitung der KPD, Berlin, 29/6-1926.
385
RGASPI 542/1/16, 15-16, Letter from Chatto, Amsterdam, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 31/3-1927; RGASPI 542/1/7,
120-123, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927. Fimmen criticised
Mnzenbergs connections with the communist movement, yet he believed that Russian money had not financed the
Brussels Congress.
386
RGASPI 542/1/10, 59-60, Organising report, [undated]. The LAI secretariat in Paris was located at 10 Rue Notre

158

discussion in a different fashion, characteristic of the misconceptions which prevail in the earlier
research into the LAI and European anti-colonialism. For example, Martin Thomas discerning
analysis, Empires of Intelligence, which focuses on the efforts of French and British security
services to control colonial disorder, includes an erroneous reading of the history of the LAI.
Thomas writes that the LAI was not entirely under Communist control after the Brussels
Congress and, at the 1928 Congress in Amsterdam shifted its base [] to Paris and London
[authors note: the LAI on two separate occasions held meetings with its LAI Executive in
Amsterdam, in March 1927 and in April 1929, never any congresses]. 387 The causality and end
result of the location question was, however, somewhat different. On 28 April 1928, the LAI
Executive endorsed at its meeting in Brussels the decision to locate the International Secretariat
permanently in Berlin. The reason for this was that it had become impossible to sustain any kind
of anti-imperialist activity in Paris due to the surveillance of the French police and, as noted by
Chatto, the cost of financing two International Secretariats was too expensive.388
Another serious issue was the question of finance. Gibarti observed on 29 March that, due to
the shortage of funds at the International Secretariat, the LAI had retreated into a state of
vacillation, unable to sustain or establish large campaigns.389 This remark from Gibarti
indicates that the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters had not anticipated that the LAI
would create such an impact. However, it was not up to Gibarti to solve the question of securing
finance for the International Secretariat. This was a question under Mnzenbergs jurisdiction, so it
was Mnzenberg, along with his contacts in the ECCI, the Political Secretariat, the Eastern
Secretariat and Piatnitsky, who began these negotiations after the Brussels Congress. First,
however, Mnzenberg expected Piatnitsky to reimburse the IAH for every cost linked exclusively
to the congress. On 28 February, Mnzenberg explained to Piatnitsky that the business [IAH] in
Germany was on the threshold of collapsing due to its support of the LACO and the congress.
Hence, in order to pay the overhead costs for the congress, Mnzenberg had borrowed money from
other communist organisations and individuals [unknown], people who expected to get their
money back. According to Mnzenberg, the congress had cost 49,522.04 Marks, and the sum of
money handed over in Brussels ($4,880) was not sufficient to balance the IAH account, thus,
Piatnitsky had to authorise an additional sum of $7,000 to cover the extra costs and loans. In
relation to securing the activities at the International Secretariat in Berlin, Mnzenberg demanded
Dame de Lorette ; RGASPI 542/1/17, 31-39, Quarterly report by Gibarti, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow,
August, 1927.
387
Thomas 2008, p.100.
388
RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), Mnzenberg, Berlin,
to Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928.
389
RGASPI 542/1/17, 1-14, Report from Gibarti/LAI International Secretariat, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat,
Moscow, 29/3-1927.

159

a minimum of 5,000 Marks, per month.390 In his letter to Piatnitsky, Mnzenberg enclosed a
budget, Unterlage zur Beurteilung der finanziellen Bedrfnisse des Sekretariats fr einen Monat,
a document detailing the primary functions of the International Secretariat. For example, the
expected cost to print and distribute propaganda, and to send LAI representatives from Berlin to
visit the national LAI sections. Mnzenberg concluded that a monthly allowance of 6,755 Marks
would guarantee the existence of the International Secretariat.391
Piatnitsky did not send any response to Mnzenberg concerning the budget. Apparently,
Piatnitsky added this document to the pile of material the ECCI Secretariat and the Eastern
Secretariat had begun to gather on the LAI after the Brussels Congress in order to reach a
definitive decision on the LAI.392 In June, four months after the Brussels Congress, the Political
Secretariat endorsed a resolution from the ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission (Anti-Imperialist
Commission) granting the International Secretariat a monthly budget of $1,500, a sum which
would come up for renegotiation after six months. The primary purpose and aim of this sum was to
cover organisational and agitative tasks.
The Anti-Imperialist Commission, established on Piatnitskys direct order, assumed the
responsibilities of former commissions connected to the anti-colonial project. Its primary
obligation was to define political, organisational and financial guidelines for the LAI, solely for
the purpose of assisting the Political Secretariat's decision-making process in relation to the LAI
and its nerve centre, the International Secretariat. Petrovsky was the leader of the commission,
working together with Jules Humbert-Droz, Smeral, Mnzenberg, Pierre Semard, Petrov, Vittorio
Codevilla, Jay Lovestone, Besso Lominadze, Schller, Geschke and J. R. Campbell. The

390

RGASPI 542/1/7, 146-147, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Genosse Piatnitsky, Moscow, 28/2-1927;
RGASPI 542/1/7, 120-123, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927. Nehru had
promised to send 10,000 Marks to the International Secretariat sometime in 1927, a transaction, which according to
Mnzenberg, Motilal Nehru would organise. On the other hand, financial negations with the Englishman
[Bridgeman] had broken down.
391
The budget proposal from Mnzenberg to Piatnitsky tells the following: the weekly newsletter of the LAI,
Pressedienst, would be released in French, British, German, Arab, and Spanish versions, at the estimated cost of 50
Marks per language, and issue. Circular letters to the national LAI sections (in German, British, and French) at en
expected cost of 800 Marks, and the monthly cost for telegrams was estimated at 400 Marks (Piatnitsky marked the
later sum). The theoretical organ of the LAI, the Colonial Review (Kolonial Revue), should have a quarterly
circulation, and printed in a German, English, and French edition at the cost of 2,000 Marks. For the secretaries at the
International Secretariat, a crucial part was to carry out assignments in Europe; this required 600 Marks per month to
cover travel expenses. Administrative duties and costs, for example, salaries for secretaries, three steno typists with
language skills, and other kind of support, at an expected cost of 2,850 Marks. This also included social welfare for the
employed in Berlin (social security fund, and insurances). Taxes amounted to 300 Marks a month, see fol. RGASPI
495/19/319, Page 7, Unterlage zur Beurteilung der finanziellen Bedrfnisse des Sekretariats fr einen Monat:
[Februar], year: 1927, Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow.
392
Gibarti was the one who frequently complained about the lack of money, declaring, for example, to the Eastern
Secretariat and Petrov that the lack of organised finances had left the International Secretariat unable to carry out
any kind of work, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/15, 1-14, Ttigkeitsbericht des Sekretariate seit dem 18. Februar 1927 - 29.
Mrz 27, Gibarti, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 29/3-1927; RGASPI 542/1/16, 25-32, Report from
Gibarti and Liau, Berlin, to Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov, Ost-Abteilung/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1927.

160

outcome of discussions within the Anti-Imperialist Commission was pivotal for the future
direction of the LAI. Remmele, acting as the Political Secretariats spokesperson, instructed
Humbert-Droz and Petrovsky to complete and sign the LAI resolution in June, in order to provide
the International Secretariat with renewed impetus to generate activity.393
The Anti-Imperialist Commission was the institutional actor which defined the political
agenda of the LAI. The LAIs first objective was to vigorously support the Chinese revolution
and its second objective was to establish an energetic struggle against the war threat and
[Imperialist] preparations against the Soviet Union. This agenda contradicted the original and
central task of the LAI, endorsed by the Political Secretariat prior to the Brussels Congress in
January 1927: the creation of a permanent organisation to secure the support of the European
proletariat for the liberation movements in the colonies. This revised agenda suggested a more
radical and political approach, probably inspired by the absolutely successful demonstration in
Brussels. How did the Anti-Imperialist Commission imagine that the LAI would put this agenda
into practice? The first step was pragmatic. The LAI had to mobilise every proletarian force as
well as other layers and groups [] to assist in the support of the Chinese revolution and the
struggle against the war threat, an initiative which would enhance the chances of establishing
strong relations in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. For the Anti-Imperialist
Commission, the LAI was the Cominterns hope for success, where other attempts had failed, in
establishing a connection to the colonial world.394
*
Gather All Visionaries and Utopian Dreamers
After the Brussels Congress, a crucial element for the LAI was to find individuals eager to support,
contribute and assist the process of establishing national sections. This was the essential idea
behind gathering every visionary and utopian dreamer to join the cause. What kind of
expressions and consequences did this process entail? While Berlin was the LAIs focal point from
the beginning, the ambition, however, was to form vigorous sections where imperialism raged
violently, e.g. Great Britain, the Netherlands, India, USA and Latin America. According to
393

RGASPI 495/60/109, 13, Letter from the ECCI Anti-imperialist Commission, Moscow, to Alfred Kurella/Agitprop,
Moscow, 5/6-1927; RGASPI 495/7/2, 12a, Protokoll der Stndigen Kommission des EKKI, Moscow, 12/5-1927;
RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Decision by the ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow, 15/6-1927. Piatnitsky
ordered Smeral, Remmele, Murphy, Humbert-Droz and Kuusinen to obey this decision.
394
RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Resolution, ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow, 15/6-1927. The Political
Secretariat discussed the political agenda of the LAI on 8 August. The protocol was, however, filed in a
Sondermappe (Special Dossier); see fol. RGASPI 495/3/22, 1-2, Protocol Nr.38, Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI,
Moscow, 6/8-1927. Present at the meeting were Bukharin, Piatnitsky, Petrovsky, Remmele, Kreibich, Scheflo, Luhani,
Ratt (Ostabtl.), Wurm, Macci, Kornblum, Pepper, Reesema, Schller, Wassiljew, Neumann, de Bouque, Spencer, Reit,
Frnberg, Ferdi, Hies and Thibo.

161

Katayamas observation, the LAI had to portray itself as being the successor to the LACO,
concluding that it was inadvisable for the time being to dissolve such organisation[s] as the
League to Combat Colonial Oppression, Hands off China organisations.395 Hence, the national
sections were a crucial part of the idea to validate the creation of an international anti-imperialist
organisation.
At the beginning of 1927, the so-called communist solar system in Germany was in a state of
chaos. According to an analysis of the nature of the communist propaganda in Germany in January,
carried out by two members of the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow (Gnther, pseudonym
of German communist Hans Glaubauf and Jablonski [identity unknown]), the result exposed a
flawed and confused movement. Gnther/Glaubauf and Jablonski stated that the relation of the
KPD Agitprop department in Berlin to its counterpart at Comintern headquarters in Moscow was
beyond contempt. The activities and work of the mass organisations (the IAH and the IRH) were
inadequate, while the inherent weakness of the ZK KPD and the KPD Agitprop department did
nothing to co-ordinate the mass organisations. Hence, the result was a scenario which damaged the
party, having an array of actors carrying out similar work in competition with each other, and
outmanoeuvring the propaganda of the KPD.396 The only response the ZK KPD seemed capable of
coming up with was to impose bureaucratic restraints on the IAH and IRH, which contributed to
establishing a competitive milieu leaving the mass organisations to fight amongst one another on
the social and political arena in Germany, Gnther/Glaubauf and Jablonski concluded. It was
within this structural setting that the International Secretariat had to adapt itself after the Brussels
Congress. It also had to comply with the Small Commission's demand that the International
Secretariat stand in constant liaison with the Eastern Secretariat and with the LAI Executive's
kom.Fraktion.397
In Berlin, the colonial microcosm consisted of individuals from India, Indonesia, China, North
Africa, Equatorial Africa, the Arab countries and Latin America, some of whom showed an interest
in the LAI after the Brussels Congress. For the RKO, this was an unwanted scenario, causing it
to decide to increase its monitoring of the colonial influx into the city, filing intelligence in the
dossier Einreiseantrge, Auslnder auer Russen (Entry Permit, Foreigners except Russians),

395

RGASPI 495/60/115, 5-6, Minutes of the meeting of the Brussels Commission, 28/2-1927.
RGASPI 495/30/320, 36-39, Notizen zum Bericht ber die Agitproparbeit in Deutschland, March, 1927.
397
RGASPI 495/6/5, 33-33b, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.17 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekr. Moscow,
8/3-1927. The Political Secretariat wanted to establish a closer connection between the LAI and the Communist Youth
International (KIM/KJI), an idea originally introduced by Mnzenberg, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/44, 1-2, Protocol
Nr.21, Polit-Secretariat, Moscow, 15/4-1927. Present at the meeting were Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Humbert-Droz,
Murphy, Maggi, Smeral, Treint, Bela Kun, Schneller, Duncan, Manner, Pepper, Wassiljew, Kachan, Schubin and
Schumann.
396

162

material sent, for example, to the Auswrtige Amt on a regular basis.398 The case of a chemistry
student from India, Khwaja Abdul Hamid (29/10-1898, Aligarh), is a good illustration of this.
Hamid arrived in Berlin in September 1924 to conduct studies at Humboldt University and, at that
time, was not perceived as an anti-colonial activist. However, after the Brussels Congress, the
RKO began to register Hamids sudden interest and engagement in the anti-colonial movement
in Berlin, above all his contacts with Mnzenberg and the IAH. The Pension Puttfarken in
Berlin, Hamids place of residence, was, according to the RKO, a frequent meeting location
for Indian revolutionaries and other colonial activists, an observation which strengthened their
suspicion that Hamid had established a connection to radical and subversive movements.
Additionally, Hamid had most likely participated at the Brussels Congress, the RKO stated.
However, his name does not appear in Das Flammenzeichen, although Hamid could have attended
as a guest, not as a delegate of any organisation, association or party. This kind of monitoring
coincided with the RKOs decision to begin its surveillance of colonial associations in Berlin,
e.g. the Indische Vereinigungen and the Islamitische Kommission fr das Rifgebiet.399
Berlins political landscape determined the International Secretariats opportunities for
developing itself, while the establishment of national LAI sections in Europe, India, the USA and
Latin America all had different trajectories. In May, Gibarti informed the ECCI Secretariat of the
first, tentative steps taken in forming national LAI sections. While the work was proceeding as
planned, it was, however, an undertaking characterised by a lack of money:
The International Secretariat has, since the Brussels Congress, been doing its best to
establish branches of the LAI in different colonial and semi-colonial countries, or at least to
interest various political organisations in the special aims and objects of the League. The
results obtained would have been far more satisfactory and substantial if the machinery of
the Secretariat had been developed to deal with its enormous tasks, but the lack of financial
means and, consequently, of the necessary apparatus has constituted a very serious hindrance
in this respect to the work of the Secretariat during the period under review, viz. February to
May 1927.400

398

SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67115, Einreiseantrge, Auslnder auer Russen (1922-1929). Berlin became a centre for
anti-colonial activism after the Brussels Congress, which, in a majority of cases had a relation to the LAI. For the
German security services and police authorities, this called for an increase in monitoring of the LAI.
399
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67116, 10, Letter from Criminal Inspector Oexle in Berlin to the Reichskommissar, 1/31927; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67116, 128-129 Akten betr. Indische Vereinigungen in Deutschland (1926-1927) &
Akten betr. Islamitische Kommission fr das Rifgebiet (1927-1928). The Pension Puttfarken was located at 7
Agricolastrae in Berlin.
400
RGASPI 542/1/17, 24-30, Quarterly report from Liau and Gibarti, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 31/51927. Liau and Gibarti also sent the report to Petrov on June 6, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/16, 25-32, whilst Mnzenberg
enclosed the report to Humbert-Droz, and J. T. Murphy on June 9, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/17, 15 [Humbert-Droz], 23
[Murphy]. A fourth copy has been located in fol. RGASPI 542/1/16, 57-67.

163

The lack of financial means and a poorly developed apparatus are, however, not the only
reasons explaining why the task of supporting the formation of sections had become so complex.
For example, Mnzenberg argued at about the same time that the development of sections was
positive.401 Hence, it is essential to include other aspects rather than, for example, seek the
answers in the sectarian squabbles within the international communist movement.402 This entails
an evaluation which includes political context, suspicion and hesitance, and how some of the
actors were striving to capitalise on the euphoria of the Brussels Congress. In England and China,
for example, the political context determined the framework of LAI activity, where suspicion and
surveillance defined the formation of sections in England and the Netherlands. From the
perspective of the Anti-Imperialist Commission, the LAI had every chance of establishing active
and vigorous sections, if they followed the suggested path:
[] national organisations of the League must be built up on a mass basis through the
affiliation of trade unions, trade councils, local labour parties, peasant organisations and
individual membership as far as is possible. The Communist Parties of these countries must
give special attention to this task. At least one leading member of the Central Committee
should be in charge of the League work and actively participate in the Communist Fraction
of the International Executive of the League.403
*
The Provisional Character of the British LAI Section, 1927
The British Empire and its colonies were a coveted target for the LAI. The first step was to
establish a section in the heart of British imperialism, London. While Bridgeman and Saklatvala
had laid the foundation of an anti-imperialist organisation in England (LACO) prior to the Brussels
Congress, the follow-up and consolidation proved, however, to be more of a challenge. The
International Secretariat and the Comintern defined the LAI section in England as a provisional
institution in 1927, defined by hesitancy and internal doubt. This characterisation ended in July
1928, when a British LAI Section saw the light of day. Petrovsky remarked on the tedious process
of establishing an LAI section during his frequent visits to London, particularly the relations
between communist and non-communist members. Additionally, the LSI questioned why some of
its members, e.g. Lansbury and Fenner Brockway (see further below), also expressed their

401

SAPMO-BA ZPA I 2/5/33, 467-471, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Remmele, Moscow, 10/6-1927.
Nicholas Owen, Critics of Empire in Britain, in The Oxford History of the British Empire, Roger Louis et. al
(eds.), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p.203.
403
RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven fr die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-1927 [German version]; RGASPI
495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM,
18/11-1927 [English version].
402

164

devotion to the LAI, a dilemma which made it difficult to find a trajectory for the British LAI
Section.
Bridgeman was, from the beginning, the person who co-ordinated the work to form a section,
receiving support from e.g. Helen Crawfurd, the IAH representative, who provided both
administrative assistance and new contacts. Petrovsky later concluded in two reports in 1928 (4
March and 20 April), addressed to the Eastern Secretariat, that, despite Bridgemans enthusiasm, it
had been the CPGB that had sanctioned the idea to form a section. However, the CPGB
acknowledged the fact that Bridgeman was the key that made the difference between success and
failure:
A report was given to the Colonial Committee [CPGB] on 21st February. Steps were taken to
obtain publicity for the resolutions, and it was decided to approach Bridgeman with a plan of
procedure. Harry Pollitt reported on 28.2 that he had seen Bridgeman who was ready to call
a meeting of the British delegation in Brussels. It was decided to pressure Bridgeman into
calling the meeting, which was to style itself as the provisional committee of the British
Section of the League and summon a conference in London of sympathetic organisations.404
Presented with Pollitts instruction, Bridgeman contacted Lansbury and Brockway asking them to
assist in preparing the establishment of this provisional committee. However, a crack emerged
when Lansbury began making enquiries in March into the LAIs alleged communist ties.
Bridgeman then contacted Nehru, informing him that the LAI could very well be heading towards
an uncertain future in England if the Labour Party began questioning the LAI, something which,
in turn, would also affect the ILP and Brockway.405
Bridgeman, however, had other matters on his mind than launching an investigation into the
LAIs communist connections, and focused instead on the first meeting of the provisional
committee of the British LAI Section, which convened in the House of Commons in London on 7
April. Delegates who had also attended the Brussels Congress met and unanimously agreed to
form a so-called LAI sub-committee, the objective of which was to pave the way for the official
establishment of a British LAI Section. To co-ordinate this work, the meeting elected Brockway as
Chairman of the sub-committee, Bridgeman as secretary and Lansbury as treasurer. During the
meeting, Mnzenberg instructed Crawfurd to draw up a list of people and representatives of
organisations to be approached with a view to becoming associated with the League, as well as to
404

RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Petrovsky on the British LAI Section, 20/4-1928. The receiver of Petrovskys
report is unknown; however, the most plausible recipients were the Eastern Secretariat and the Colonial Commission
CPGB in London.
405
RGASPI 542/1/18, 5, Letter from Bridgeman, London, to Jawaharlal Nehru, Montana, 1/3-1927. This episode is
also included in Marcel van der Linden and F. L. van Holthoon's short narrative on the genesis of the British LAI
Section, in Internationalism in the Labour Movement, 1830-1940, Brill, 1988, pp.577-580. A narrative based on John
Saville (1984).

165

publish LAI propaganda in the Socialist and Communist press, with a particular focus on calling
for financial contributions to support this provisional section.406
Without further ado, Brockway began to contact prominent actors within the European socialist
movement. On 8 April, Brockway sent a letter to Friedrich Adler, secretary of the LSI, to explain
that the rumour implicitly suggesting that the communists were the actual organisers of the
Brussels Congress has been exaggerated. Admitting to Adler that he had been deeply involved in
the congress as an ILP delegate and had also been expected to lead the establishment of an LAI
section in England, Brockway wanted some kind of consent from the LSI and, above all, to get the
LSI involved in the LAI:
We felt, however, that it was a mistake to leave such a representative movement in the hands
of the communists. The nationalists and Latin American parties were represented, which
seemed to us a reason why the Socialists should actively participate. It is already serious how
weak the influence of the Communists is and, although we understand that they have
financial resources not open to us, we think all legitimate opportunity should be taken of
increasing our influence.407
The general idea Brockway had was to affiliate the ILP with the LAI as a collective member;
however, this required Adlers approval. The content of Brockways letter attracted Adlers
attention, and, in his response on 13 April, he told Brockway that the Communists, who are the
real founders of this league, had never shown any intention of wanting to collaborate with the LSI
on the colonial question. Adler assured Brockway that this was not, however, a definitive answer
to his ILP request, suggesting that Brockway wait until the next meeting of the LSI Executive in
September 1927. However, Adlers personal opinion on this issue revealed his attitude towards
Brockways involvement in the LAI:
[] we would weaken our International if we were not able, in such questions of first-rate
importance, to take action unitedly [sic] as an International. If we should come to a decision
to take part, we must, in my view, create conditions which would give us an influence in
such a league corresponding to the importance of our International which, with its seven
million members, would be by far the strongest organisation to come into consideration at
all.408

406

RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Petrovsky on the British LAI Section, 20/4-1928; RGASPI 542/1/20, 1-3,
Report on the British LAI Section, London, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 7/4-1927. Gibarti and Liau verified
the establishment of the provisional committee in a report to the ECCI Secretariat on May 31, 1927, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/17, 24-30.
407
IISG Labour and Socialist Archives, Dossier 284/1, Letter from Brockway, London, to Adler, Zurich, 8/4-1927.
408
IISG Labour and Socialist Archives, Dossier 284/2, Letter from Adler, Zurich, to Brockway, London, 13/4-1927.

166

In the period between Brockways request in April and Adlers inquisitive reply and, both prior to,
during and after the LSI Executive meeting in September, the LSI formulated its understanding of
the LAI. The sole reason for doing this was to be able to respond to and counteract the spread of
the LAI within the European socialist movement, a question further discussed below.
The provisional committee came into existence about the time that British and Soviet
diplomatic relations broke down in 1927. British security services, MI5 and the Special
Intelligence Service (SIS), had all increased their surveillance of the communist movement due to
the social unrest in China and the fact that both the Comintern and the Bolsheviks supported the
KMT. This particularly involved the monitoring of the activities of suspected Soviet agents known
to be residing in England. According to Zara Steiner, this was a result of Chamberlain yielding to
anti-Bolshevik attitudes in the British parliament. Fuelled by intelligence gathered by the SIS,
these documents were enough to confirm MI5s opinion that subversive communist movements
had gained a strong position on British soil and, on 12 May, this operation culminated in the raid
of the Soviet Trade Delegation and the All-Russian Co-operative Society, known as the ARCOS
raid, in London. During this raid, British authorities seized a number of documents which verified
that the Soviet Union had an extensive network of spies in England, manoeuvred by both the
Comintern and the CPGB. This all led to a break down in foreign relations between the Soviet
Union and Great Britain, reaching a climax on 23 May once the British Government had
authorised the decision to effectively deport every Soviet diplomat from British soil.409
While it may appear that the ARCOS raid had no practical effect on the provisional LAI
section, this episode may, however, have contributed to increased doubts about the LAI being
raised by some of the actors. Thus, to reach a consensus on the LAIs suspected communist ties,
Brockway contacted Gibarti in Berlin, asking him to clarify some points raised by the Labour
Party and the LSI. Apologising for the inquisitorial questions, particularly as Brockway was
very happy with the all-inclusive character of this movement, the least Gibarti could do was to
shed some light on whether you receive money from Russia. This also involved making an
account of what kind of organisations had funded the LAI after the congress, the total number of
communist members in the LAI and the Executive Committee, and whether Gibarti was a member
of the KPD.410 Gibartis answer was a typical smokescreen in order to conceal the connection
between the LAI and the Comintern. However, British security services intercepted Gibarti's reply
409

Steiner 2005, p.538; Michael Hughes, Inside the Enigma. British Officials in Russia, 1900-1939, Continuum
International Publishing Group, London, 1997, pp.216-218; Austen Chamberlain & Robert C. Self (ed.), The Austen
Chamberlain Diary Letters. The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his Sisters Hilda and Ida, 19161937, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.305-306.
410
Brockways letter has been located in the LAI fond, while Gibartis reply to Brockway and Lansbury has been
located in Brockways personal file at TNA. RGASPI 542/1/18, 20-21, Letter from Brockway, London, to Gibarti,
International Secretariat, Berlin, 16/5-1927.

167

to Brockway and were therefore able, via New Scotland Yard and MI5, to analyse some of the
correspondence between the members. According to Gibarti, avoiding mentioning the involvement
of the Comintern or the KPD, the International Secretariat had received money after the Brussels
Congress from Fimmen, Goldschmidt and the American journalist Agnes Smedley (who was also
Chattos partner) as well as from the KMT. On the question of whether Gibarti was a member of
the KPD, Gibarti stated, I am not a member of the Communist Party. This was an obvious lie.
According to a document in Gibartis personal file in the Comintern Archive, he had become a
member of the Communist Party of Hungary in 1919 and had had his membership transferred to
the KPD on 29 February, 1924.411
Brockway was, nevertheless, content with Gibartis explanation. However, Lansbury and the
LSI remained suspicious. On 16 June, at a meeting of the provisional committee in the House of
Commons, Lansbury resigned from the LAI, complaining of being overburdened with work as
the sole reason for leaving his position as Chairman of the LAI. In the eyes of Petrovsky,
Lansburys act of self-defence left Brockway shattered and he too was, for a brief moment,
disillusioned about the LAI.412 This critical moment raised serious doubts about the very idea of
establishing an LAI section in England. Hence, to save what was left of the provisional
committee, Gibarti left Paris and hastened to London. Yet, the RKO took note of Gibartis
journey and suspected that the reason for his trip was to exploit the current political conflict
between the Soviet Union and Great Britain. This was not the case, however. Apparently though,
Gibartis visit caused more harm than good which, according to the Anti-Imperialist
Commission, proved Gibartis incapability of co-operating with the CPGB to organise an antiimperialist congress in England during the summer of 1927.413 The step from a provisional
committee to becoming a British LAI Section turned into a complex process, with ideology
becoming the central issue in 1928.
*

411

According to Gibarti, the LAI had received funding from the KMT, the All China Labour Union, the National
League in Mexico, the Pacific Coast Hindustani Association, Professor Barakatualla Maulavie, Alfons Goldschmidt,
the German LACO Section, the Berlin branch of the Egyptian Nationalist Party and the IAH, see TNA KV2/1919,
Letter from L. Gibarti to F. Brockway (copy to R. Bridgeman), 31/5-1927. Lansbury received a similar explanation,
see TNA KV2/1919, Letter from L. Gibarti to G. Lansbury (copy to R. Bridgeman), 1/6-1927). For Gibartis personal
file, see fol. RGASPI 495/205/6048, 1, Biography on Gibarti, undated.
412
RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Petrovsky re. LAI, London [?], to the Eastern Secretariat [?], Moscow, 20/41928; RGASPI 542/1/18, 26, Report by Helen Crawfurd, London, to Gibarti, Berlin, 17/6-1927.
413
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 81, Report, Reichskommissar fr berwachung der ffentlichen Ordnung, Berlin,
to Polizeiprsidenten Abt.I.A., Berlin, 14/6-1927. The RKO passed on this report to the Auswrtige Amt. For this
assessment of Gibarti, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Resolution, ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow,
15/6-1927.

168

The Chinese Influx into Berlin: Hansin Liau and the Chinese National Agency
The Chinese national liberation struggle had been a central issue at the Brussels Congress, which,
with the attendance of a thirty-strong delegation, symbolised the anti-colonial struggle. Yet, it was
a delegation overtly European in character, nineteen of which lived in Europe. For example,
representatives of the KMT Executive Committee, the KMT European Centre in Berlin and the
delegates from the KMT sections were living in either France, Belgium, England or the
Netherlands. In Berlin, the Schutzpolizei noticed a sudden increase in the number of Chinese
individuals displaying an inclination towards anti-colonialism in February, e.g. Dr. Koyang Tong
of the Hauptverband Chinesischer Studenten in Deutschland, Sia Ting of the KMT European
Centre, Y. S. Hsie of the German KMT section and Hansin Liau. 414
Hansin Liau was the LAIs and the International Secretariats key actor in maintaining the
momentum of its Chinese propaganda. For Mnzenberg, Liaus symbolic performance at the
Brussels Congress and his connection to the KMT, proved Liau to be a character that Mnzenberg
could place at the front to lead the Chinese work in Berlin. According to Jen (Eugen) Varga (1879
1964), a Hungarian communist and chief theoretician on economic matters at the Comintern and
with whom Liau had worked in Berlin 1924-27 in the Statistical and Information Bureau (the
Varga Bureau, sanctioned on the direct orders of the ECCI), Liau was a trustworthy comrade.
In addition, after having been involved in establishing the CPCh in China, Liau travelled to
Germany and had his membership transferred to the KPD in 1923. Perceived as being the leading
expert on the Chinese question in Berlin, despite being connected with the dissolution of the
Varga Bureau in the beginning of 1927, Liau had to find a new occupation within the German
communist movement.415
In April, Mnzenberg handpicked Liau to lead a centre for Chinese nationalist propaganda in
Europe, entitled the Chinese National Agency, with covert links to the International Secretariat.
According to an outline of this agency as presented to Petrovsky by Mnzenberg on 22 April, with
Petrovsky presenting the idea to the Small Commission in Moscow, the plan struck a chord of

414

Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p26, 233-234. A majority of the delegates from the Chinese delegation travelled to Berlin after
the Brussels Congress, arriving by train on 17 February. The Chief of Police in Berlin informed the Head of the
Schutzpolizei, Oexle, about the activities of the Chinese populace in Berlin, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115, 180,
Der Polizeiprsident. Abteilung IA. Tgb. Nr.235 I.A.3.27., Berlin, 5/3-1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507 67115, 212,
Der Polizeiprsident. Abteilung IA. Tgb. Nr.235, 11/4-1927.
415
Varga described Liau as a hard-working and satisfying person who lived in a proletarian fashion [] active in
every matter in Berlin that related to Chinese questions, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/29, 3, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to the
ECCI Secretariat, arrived in Moscow 17/1-1928 (the letter was read by Heimo). For Varga, see Lazitch 1986, pp.492493; RGASPI 495/225/1043, 38-39, Letter from Hansin Liau and Dora Dombrowski-Liau to the German delegation of
the ECCI, Moscow, 3/2-1936; RGASPI 495/225/1043,41, Anlage Nr.5 Letter from E. Varga, Moscow, 1/3-1930. The
Statistical and Information Bureau, which had been established on the direct orders of Lenin and endorsed by the
ECCI Presidium on September 6 1921, functioned as a vehicle for the Comintern to collect full and truthful
information, see Sobolev (ed.) 1971, p.137.

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approval. The initial aim of the agency was to improve the telegraphic information service
regarding China in Europe, using Liau as its official representative. Mnzenberg stated that it was
essential to locate the agency in Berlin, especially as Germany had an absolutely neutral position
in its relation to China compared to that of Great Britain. By getting Liau to pose as the official
author of the propaganda, this would disguise the original authors of the material. According to
Petrovsky, Liau should never write any of the propaganda, a task assigned to the Soviet news
agency in Moscow, TASS. Hence, TASS would complete manuscripts for telegrams and other
political propaganda and, once completed, transmit the material to Liau. What was the reason for
doing this? Petrovsky believed that a crucial aspect of the agency was to conceal the original
source behind the propaganda. In fact, the propaganda released through the agency should give the
impression of working counter-clockwise, i.e. it had to appear as though the agency provided
TASS and Inprecorr with information on China. The Berlin Chief of Police chose to pay closer
attention to a different aspect of the Chinese National Agency which, in a sense, disclosed its
second aim, which was to establish contact with Chinese activists in Berlin, London and Paris.416
Why did Mnzenberg suggest the establishment of the Chinese National Agency? Political
developments in China provide a clear answer. On 12 April 1927, the KMT staged a violent and
bloody putsch against its former allies, the Chinese communists in Shanghai, assuming power over
the nationalist movement and establishing the Nanking government. This episode implied a
qualitative change for the Chinese anti-imperialist movement in China, as expressed by Edmund
S. K. Fung.417 Therefore, for Mnzenberg, the idea of the Chinese National Agency was a reaction
against the KMT putsch as well as a response to the LAIs need to re-assess its attitude towards the
Chinese national liberation struggle. While the connection between the European communist
movement and the KMT European Centre had suddenly disappeared, Liau, who had once
belonged to the Left KMT (which advocated closer collaboration with the communists in
China), appeared as the most logical person to lead the opposition. On 21 April, in an article in
Inprecorr, Liau argued that the treachery of Chiang Kai-shek does not come unexpectedly. This
danger has already existed for a year [] our people and our Party [CPCh] will adopt an
irreconcilable attitude to this treachery.418 The Chinese National Agency was a response to this
political change in China which had, above all, shattered any possibility of establishing an LAI
416

RGASPI 495/30/350, 18-19, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 22/4-1927; RGASPI 495/6/5,
70, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.23 der Sitzung der Eng-Kommission des Sekretariats, Moscow, 28/4-1927. The
protocol was made out in one copy, classified as Strictly confidential (Streng vertraulich!); SAPMO-BA ZPA R
1507/67115, 213, Betrifft: Chinesische Nationalagentur, 23/5-1927.
417
Edmund S. K. Fung, Anti-Imperialism and the Left Guomindang, in Modern China, Vol.11, No.1 (Jan., 1985),
Sage Publications Inc., p.39; Pantsov (2000); Karin-Irene Eiermann, Chinesische Komintern-Delegierte in Moskau in
den 1920er/1930er Jahren, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp.53-57.
418
Hansin Liau, Inprecorr, Vol.7, No.26, April 21, 1927, 527-528. Taken from Robert C. North & Xenia J. Eudin, M.
N. Roys Mission to China, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1963, pp.66-67.

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section in the country. The IAH representative in China, Kou Meng-yu, was no longer of any use.
As leader of the KMT Propaganda Section, Kou Meng-yu became, after the April putsch, the
Minister of Education in the Nanking government.419
On 30 April, the deliberations on the Chinese National Agency in Moscow were completed.
Once Mnzenberg had provided Petrovsky with additional material on the plan, the ECCI
Agitprop Department began preparing the details for the agency. With Liau as leader, and with
3,500 Marks per month (for the first three months) to cover all expenses, the editors of the
Inprecorr in Berlin, the Hungarian communist Gyula Alpri [pseudonym: Julius] and Boros
[identity unknown] were to supervise and control the agency, particularly Liaus contacts with the
bourgeoisie press and journalists in Berlin.420
An evaluation of the practical impact of the Chinese National Agency (CNA) is complex,
particularly as Liau combined his work for this agency with the activities of the International
Secretariat.421 However, the agency was, for a brief period, a visible actor in Berlin. The
Ministerium des Innern (the Prussian Ministry of the Interior; MdI) noted Liau as being a very
active leader of the agency; however, it was not possible to confirm whether the money came
from a Russian connection.422 In the end, however, money was the central question. The agency
found itself crippled by a constant shortage of funds and, despite minor contributions from the
International Secretariat; it did not have enough money to cover its costs. By July, several of the
actors began to perceive the endeavour as a failure. Bridgeman told Liau in a letter that the
propaganda of the agency in England had failed The English press is almost entirely in the
hands of the capitalists. According to Bridgeman, the main mistake from the beginning was to
locate the agency in Berlin, especially when the propaganda was aimed towards the British
Empire. How could Liau keep track of the daily political scenario in England when he did not live
in the country? Bridgeman concluded that the despatching of telegrams from Berlin to London on

419

Historical recollections of Kou Meng-yu are scarce. According to some documents, which explain how the KMT
prepared the putsch against the communists in China in 1926-27, his position and nomination as Minister of Education
after the April putsch is disclosed: Minister of Education: Dr. Kou Meng Yu. He is probably the best known of the
additions to the Nationalist Governments roster of portfolio holders. Dr. Kou Meng Yu was, for years, famous in
Chinese educational circles and was the Dean of the Faculties of the National University at Peking. His association
with the KMT finally made his continuance in that post impossible. He left Peking [in 1926], to the deep regret of the
student body at the National University. In Canton he was made head of the Propaganda Section of the Central party
headquarters. He has long been a member of the Central Executive Committee of the party and during the past year
has been a member of the Political Council, see the Internet: < http://119.97.209.45/shownews.asp?id=43673 >.
420
The Chinese National Agency was located at Friedrichstrae 232, RGASPI 495/30/350, 18-19, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 22/4-1927; RGASPI 495/30/350, 20-21, Reply from Agitprop
Department, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 30/4-1927.
421
RGASPI 542/1/16, 25-32, Report on the activities LAI, Gibarti & Liau, to Petrov/F. F. Raskolnikov, Ost-Abteilung,
Moskau, signed: 31/5-1927, despatched from Berlin, 9/6-1927.
422
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/67115, 238, Der Preuische Minister des Innern, Berlin, an der Regierungsprsident,
Berlin, 3/8-1927.

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a daily basis was not enough; it was also a rather costly and inefficient operation.423 It was the
combination of surveillance by German authorities and the lack of money which led to the Chinese
National Agency disintegrating under its own weight. In August, in order to save whatever was
what left, the agency merged with the International Secretariat.424 For Liau, the dissolution of the
Chinese National Agency was not a disappointment; in fact, he believed that he was a key figure in
both the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement, an ambition which assumed a completely
different trajectory towards the end of 1927.
*
Nehru's Euphoria and Jhabwala's Loneliness
The Brussels Congress created a reaction within the Indian national liberation movement. For
example, it had convinced Nehru of the strength of the anti-imperialist movement in Europe.
However, the political and social backdrop to forming an LAI section in India was completely
different from the political milieu in Europe. The LAI appeared, therefore, to be an answer to the
call from the anti-colonial movement in India to establish a network connecting India with Europe.
After the Great War, Berlin was a haven and centre for the migr Indian nationalist
revolutionary community in Europe. In 1921, Chatto assumed a leading position within the group
of Indian nationalists, whilst for the Comintern, Roy was the leader expected to co-ordinate a
connection from Europe to India. Whilst the Brussels Congress sent vibrations throughout the antiimperialist movement in Europe, this did not imply that in 1927 there existed any functional
connection which the LAI could use.425 According to Nehru, the Indian community in Berlin was a
group which primarily engaged itself in quarrels amongst themselves, leaving out any kind of
coherent political discussion. Perceiving Chatto as a very able and [] delightful person, and
not a regular communist [] but communistically inclined, Roy impressed Nehru with his
intellectual level. The impact of the Brussels Congress shaped Nehrus understanding of the
global dominance of colonialism and its politics and, after the congress, Nehru concluded that the
event helped me to understand some of the problems of the colonial and dependent countries.426
423

RGASPI 542/1/18, 29-32, Letter from R. Bridgeman, London, to Hansin Liau, Berlin, 30/6-1927. Bridgeman stated
that the Chinese National Agency was a valuable propaganda instrument: [A]ll the persons and Members of
Parliament who receive them [telegrams], as well as for our Service as they can be used in the bulletins and speeches
and, moreover, they give the representatives of the workers party in the Parliament the opportunity to make
interpellations in the House of Commons. However, the cost of sending telegrams on a daily basis from London to
Liau in Berlin was a difficult undertaking for Bridgeman, particularly to allocate funds.
424
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/67115, 242-244, Betrifft: Chinesische Propaganda, 14/7-1927.
425
Overstreet and Windmiller 1959, p.40, 77-87; Barooah (2004).
426
Nehru 1936, pp.151-154, 163. Nehru travelled to Moscow together with his father Motilal, where he met Roy in
Moscow in October 1927 in connection with the celebration of the 10th Anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.
The Soviet Russian agency, the Society for Cultural Relations to Foreign Countries (VOKS), functioned as the main
organiser and covered all expenses and practical arrangements for their journey to the Soviet Union. Nehru visited

172

Nevertheless, Nehru had a pragmatic and realistic understanding of the congress and made the
distinction between the euphoria of the congress and the political reality facing the INC in India.
For example, Nehru told Bridgeman that the LAI should not count on the INC affiliating. This
statement was based on the dictum introduced by Gandhi, which declared that the INC did not
look to socialism as the answer to solve the Indian independence struggle. In fact, Nehru argued
that it could be dangerous for the INC to enter into an alliance with an organisation which was
professedly socialist and partly communist and would most likely be perceived as suspicious in
India.427 This did not, however, make Nehru conceal his enthusiasm for the Brussels Congress
from Gandhi:
I do not expect much from it [LAI] and indeed I am quite sure that none of the members of
the so-called imperialist or oppressing nations will help us in the least whenever their
interests conflict with ours. [] But I welcome all legitimate methods of getting into touch
with other countries and peoples so that we may be able to understand their viewpoint and
world politics generally. I do not think it is desirable [] for India to [go it alone] now or in
the future. It is solely with a view to self-education and self-improvement that I desire
external contacts [and] study of other people and their ideas.428
Nehru understood that if the INC developed a connection with the LAI, this would contribute to
strengthening his perception of the anti-imperialist movement and, above all, expand his network
into Europe. The INC did not, however, condone Nehrus activities after the congress, regardless
of Nehrus symbolic performance at the event. Gandhi explained in a letter to Nehru: I myself do
not expect much from this league [] because its free activity depends upon the goodwill of the
very powers that are partners in the exploitation of the oppressed nations.429 Nonetheless, the
Brussels Congress did represent a turning-point for Nehru, Sarvapelli Gopal writes in his
biography of Nehru, an event which had provided him with both political awareness and practical
experience, the latter as a result of assisting Chatto in Berlin with the preparations for the
congress.430 The International Secretariat realised at an early stage that Nehru would not easily
convince the INC to support the establishment of an LAI section in India. Thus, the LAI had to
find a contact elsewhere in India.
Moscow for four days, impressed with the capital of international communism. After his return to India, Nehru
published a number of random sketches and impressions in the literary form of a panegyric on the Soviet system
in the Indian nationalist press, see Haithcox 1971, p.90.
427
TNA PRO CO 323 971 1, Secret report on the Congress in Brussels, author: Lidell, no date, year: 1927.
428
Letter from Nehru to Gandhi, 22/4-1927. Taken from Gopal 1975, pp.105-106. Nehru told Gibarti that the
international co-operation of the national movement in India opens up unlimited prospects and is likely to strengthen
the Indian nationalists, intelligence which Gibarti passed on to the Eastern Secretariat, fol. RGASPI 542/1/17, 24-30.
429
Mahatma Gandhi, Nandi Hill, Mysore State, to Nehru, 25/5-1927, in Nehru, 1958, pp.54-55. Gandhi told Nehru,
you are on the spot and you may see an altruistic improvement in the atmosphere there which I miss altogether.
430
Gopal 1975, p.100.

173

S. H. Jhabwala, the Parsi labour leader and secretary of the Bombay Central Labour Board,
became the International Secretariat's contact in India. According to Philip Spratt, Jhabwala was a
queer, dreamy but energetic person who was secretary or president of fifteen or twenty unions
round Bombay.431 In the aftermath of the Brussels Congress, Jhabwala contacted Gibarti with the
ambition of forming an LAI section in Bombay, introducing himself as the spokesperson for the
Bombay labour movement, a position Jhabwala intended to use in order to write and publish
articles on the LAI in India. This required a favour in return, however. To get the work started in
Bombay, Gibarti should send him material about the LAI, and some financial support. Jhabwala
explained that he only had 50 Rupees in his wallet and, since this poor country was under no
circumstances comparable to Europe, Gibarti had one choice if the LAI wanted to establish a
section in India: the International Secretariat had to provide money.432
The International Secretariat did not ignore Jhabwalas financial request. However, this
question was part of the general discussion about how much money the LAI needed to build up an
international organisation. For Gibarti, Jhabwalas interest was used as a pretext to introduce him
to the LAI Executive as our Indian secretary (whether Jhabwala knew this remains unknown).
However, this does not imply that he received any money. Thus, on 30 September, 1927, Jhabwala
sent a second request to Gibarti wondering how much money he could expect, particularly as the
Bombay Central Labour Union was considering joining the LAI as a collective member.433 This
question was ultimately sorted out by Mnzenberg and Piatnitsky. Mnzenberg sent a financial
report to Piatnitsky, informing him that the Bombay secretariat, Jhabwala had required a sum of
100 to commence activity.434 The question is whether Jhabwala ever received any money.
One year later, on 19 October 1928, Jhabwala wondered when the monthly allowance of 100
Rupees would arrive. The situation in India had worsened since 1927, caused by the increasing
surveillance of British security services which, according to Jhabwala, had thwarted the activities
of the LAI. The lack of money, combined with the prohibitive measures of the British colonial
authorities, was the root of Jhabwalas loneliness in Bombay. Jhabwala concluded in his letter to
Chatto that the political situation in India was a constant battle against every vindictive cynic,
with every parcel from the International Secretariat seeming to disappear.435 The British
authorities in India systematically confiscated packages containing subversive political material,
431

Spratt 1955, pp.36-37. Spratt met Jhabwala for the first time at the session of the All Indian Trade Union Council
(AITUC) in Delhi in March 1927, at which Saklatvala also delivered a speech (Haithcox 1971, p.98).
432
RGASPI 542/1/18, 7, Letter from Jhabwala, Bombay, to Gibarti, Paris or Berlin, 30/3-1927.
433
TNA KV2/1919, Letter from L. Gibarti to G. Lansbury (copy to R. Bridgeman), 1/6-1927; RGASPI 542/1/18, 57,
Letter from S. I. Jhabwala, Bombay, to Gibarti, Berlin, 30/9-1927.
434
RGASPI 495/19/319, 8, Folgende Zuwendungen sind an nationale Sektionen zur Ermglichung des Beginns der
Arbeit zu senden, Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, year: 1927. According to Piatnitsky, $100 was
equivalent to 2,000 Marks.
435
RGASPI 542/1/29, 81, Letter from S.H. Jhabwala, Bombay, to Chatto, Berlin, 19/10-1928.

174

which was a crucial source of information with which to evaluate the nature of the Indian
nationalist movement. In February 1929, the British Head Office in London took a further step in
refining this strategy. According to a directive to the India Office in London, it was of particular
necessity to destabilise the relations between subversive movements in Europe and the Indian
independence movement. Head Office recommended the confiscation of every letter, telegram and
package sent from the LAI International Secretariat to specific individuals in India, e.g. Jhabwala.
With this directive, the British authorities aimed to restrict the LAIs political space; above all, to
intercept and prohibit literature from the LAI and to refuse to grant passports to Indians who
were known to be connected with the League.436 In 1929, Jhabwalas connection with the LAI
ended. Arrested in 1929, and as one of the defendants in the Meerut conspiracy trial in 1933 (see
Utopia Redefined, Part II), Jhabwala received a sentence of four years rigorous
imprisonment.437 The Indian question thus became a topic which continued to haunt and
challenge the International Secretariat, much dependent upon the capacity of one person: Chatto.
*
Little Help for the Starting: the LAI in the USA and Latin America
To organise LAI activities in the USA and Latin America was a major undertaking, carried out by
specific individuals. The AAAIL delegate, Gomez, was one of many who had attended
Mnzenbergs party in his apartment in Berlin and, additionally, was one of many foreign
fraternal delegates at the KPD Party day in Essen. Other actors, on whose services the
International Secretariat depended, were Julio A. Mella and the LAI functionary Federico Bach,
who prepared the way for the establishment of LAI sections in Latin America, leaving Gomez in
charge of the USA section. Gomez/Shipman remembered that the forerunner of the LAI section in
the USA, the AAAIL, was largely a matter of propaganda, which had attracted radical liberals
such as Pickens, Baldwin and Robert Moss Lovett, alongside well-known American communists
such as Scott Nearing, William Z. Foster and William (Bill) F. Dunne.438 At the beginning of
1927, the AAAIL existed, however, only on paper. The Brussels Congress was, therefore, the
impetus needed to revive the American anti-imperialist movement, through the formation of an
LAI section. A document, the Outline for the Work of the League against Imperialism and
436

TNA HO 144 10693, Peel, Secret Information regarding LAI, India Office, Whitehall, 27/2-1929. Peel described
the case to Amery and Austen Chamberlain: I am seriously perturbed by the dangerous possibilities of the Leagues
interference in Indian affairs, particularly in view of the great interest which Moscow is known to be taking in India
[] I am convinced of the necessity of taking any steps that may be possible to limit its capacity for mischief. The
Government of India [] have [sic] announced their intention of treating the League as a definitely hostile
organisation.
437
Robin Page Arnot, Labour Monthly, Volume 15, February 1933, Number 2, pp.96-101.
438
RGASPI 542/1/7, 120-123, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 21/2-1927;
Shipman 1993, pp.153-157, 163-164.

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Colonial Rule and for National Independence [LAICNI] in the United States, dated 24 February
1927, introduced the necessary measures. The author(s) of this document remain unknown;
however, it is logical to assume that Gomez and Mnzenberg worked out the fundamental
guidelines for the project in Berlin and, after its completion, sent the outline to Comintern
headquarters in Moscow for further deliberation.439 What does this outline reveal, and what were
the principal reasons for establishing an LAI section in the USA? To supervise the initial
establishment phase, a directing committee, consisting of Gomez as the leader, the American
author Baldwin, the left-wing activist Upton Sinclair, and Pickens, would assume the former
responsibilities and contacts of the AAAIL, especially those with Latin America, resulting in the
gradual and quiet disappearance of the AAAIL. The USA LAI Section was to focus its activities
on relief campaigns, e.g. temporary Hands off Mexico committees were channels distributing
the LAIs propaganda and agenda. Through these campaigns and committees, the section would
acquire and secure contact and work directly with movements in US colonies. This depended on
solving a number of issues guaranteeing the cover and relations of the section to the Comintern.
The press bureau of the section would release a theoretical journal on anti-imperialist questions,
while other tasks involved the sending of inquisitive commissions to US colonies, developing
parliamentary activity by attending hearings before the US Senate and House of Representatives,
establishing communication links with US colonies and semi-colonies and organising public mass
meetings, demonstrations and conferences. Without any reasonable doubt, the theoretical
framework of the USA LAI Section was a part of the sympathising communist organisation
strategy envisioned and supported by Mnzenberg. Above all, the section had to follow the
Cominterns dictum to demonstrate in public its sympathy for the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet
Union. Thus, the section's primary aim was to build an international consciousness, [] among
the US workers and the oppressed peoples movement through the use of covert methods with
extreme care, which would guarantee the clear conception that Soviet Russia and the Comintern
are the best friends of the oppressed peoples. The inauguration of the USA LAI Section was held
in New York on 14 July 1927, at a large conference, at which Gomez and Richard B. Moore
introduced the fundamental principles of the paragraphs described above.440

439

RGASPI 542/1/19, 28-29, OUTLINE FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND
COLONIAL RULE AND FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE [LAICNI], IN THE UNITED STATES, 24/2-1927;
Shipman 1993, p.164.
440
RGASPI 542/1/19, 28-29, OUTLINE FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND
COLONIAL RULE AND FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE [LAICNI], IN THE UNITED STATES, 24/2-1927.
This document was divided into methods of work, tasks of the US Section, program of the US Section,
finance and organisational principles; RGASPI 542/1/18, 28, 28, Letter from W. Pickens, New York, to Gibarti,
Berlin/Paris, 14/7-1927. Present at the meeting were, e.g. Lewis S. Gannet of the Nation, Scott Nearing, Bishop Jones
of the Reconciliation Society and Nevin Sayre. In the summer of 1927, New York was the centre of LAI activity in the

176

While Gomez co-ordinated LAI operations in the USA, the Cuban nationalist Julio A. Mella
had a similar function in Mexico, initially. According to the February Outline, Mella was to
supervise the formation of a central bureau in Mexico City, an undertaking which required
money. Mnzenberg consulted Codovilla on how much it would cost to establish the Mexican
secretariat and the USA LAI Section, choosing in the end to give the former $200 and the latter
$500.441 Just as Gomez had done, Mella had attended Mnzenbergs private party in Berlin in
February, travelled to Moscow in March and then returned to Paris. Waiting to begin his journey
home, Mella began to doubt the very idea and strength of the LAI as an organisation. Mella told
Mnzenberg that he wanted to organise a sympathising public rally in Paris in support of the
Cuban anti-imperialist movement and the LAI, asking Mnzenberg whether he could contribute
with some money for a little help for the starting. Mella warned Mnzenberg of the risk that
scepticism could thwart the intentions of the LAI. Therefore, Mnzenberg should deploy all
available means and measures to sustain the vitality of the movement.442
Federico Bach turned out to be Mnzenbergs candidate to establish the Mexican secretariat
in Mexico City. In June, Bach left Berlin for Mexico to perform this service, on Mnzenbergs
instructions, as intermediary for both the LAI and the IAH. After arriving in Mexico, Bach
introduced himself as a journalist for the A-I-Z with the purpose of his visit being to conduct and
write articles on the social situation in Mexico.443 Nevertheless, this decision was also firmly
rooted in Moscow. According to the expectations of the Anti-Imperialist Commission, the LAI
should act swiftly to establish sections in Mexico and across Latin America during the summer of
1927. On 8 July, the Political Secretariat expressed concern after having heard a report from

USA and one could find the office of the USA LAI Section in a dusty room at 32 Union Square, see Shipman 1993,
pp.165-166.
441
RGASPI 542/1/19, 28-29, OUTLINE FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM AND
COLONIAL RULE AND FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE [LAICNI], IN THE UNITED STATES, 24/2-1927;
RGASPI 495/19/319, 8, Folgende Zuwendungen sind an nationale Sektionen zur Ermglichung des Beginns der
Arbeit zu senden, Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, undated, year: 1927. Mnzenberg downsized the budget
by half, and explained that: The LAICNI (international headquarters) should contribute $1,000 cash, and should take
out a loan of an additional $1,000 to help establish the office and bring out the first issues of the magazine, [] The
loan to be made to Baldwin and Gomez, and the $1,000 donation to be a private arrangement between the international
headquarters [LAI/Berlin] and the All-American Anti-Imperialist League (US Section), which should immediately
turn the money over to Baldwin and Gomez as a contribution from the AAAII. According to the outline, the section
should collect money from different sources: the Garland Fund; donations from time to time, based upon contribution
lists for specific campaigns; dues; sale of the magazine. The Garland Fund was founded in 1922 by Harvard College
student, Charles Garland, after making a donation of $800,000 to The American Fund for Public Service, and located
in New York. Its initial aim was to provide radical actors that wanted to bring change to the social reform system in the
USA with material and financial support. For example, the NAACP received 100,000 $ to study the legal status of
African Americans and plan a legal campaign, see Internet: < www.loc.gov/exhibits/brown/brown-segregation.html
>.
442
RGASPI 542/1/19, 104, Short note on Mella, Moscow, 23/3-1927; RGASPI 542/1/18, 19, Letter from Mella, Paris,
to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 6/5-1927.
443
SAPMO-BA ZPA I/2/5/33, 467-471, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Remmele in Moscow, 10/6-1927.

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Codevilla on the poor turnout at the LAI attempts to establish activity in Latin America.444 Bach
had, however, only just arrived in Mexico, and was faced with an immense task from the start.
Apparently, the contacts in Mexico had not done any preparatory work, a dilemma which
worsened over time. In the beginning of 1928, Bach explained to Mnzenberg in a letter that he
wanted to leave Mexico, being stuck in a country far from home; however, without any money
and no valid visa to enter the USA, he could not leave. In the end, Bach did not receive any money
from Mnzenberg but chose to remain in the country.445 However, the LAIs forsaking of Bach
was not the last attempt to establish LAI activities in Mexico.
Alfons Goldschmidt, described by Mnzenberg as my old brother-in-arms, had been an avid
follower of the IAH since 1921 and had a deep engagement in the socio-political situation of the
Latin American countries. In comparison to the tedious experience of Bach in Mexico,
Goldschmidt assumed the role as Mnzenberg's intermediary in Mexico and assisted in the work to
establish Mnzenbergian committees and organisations. Goldschmidt lived in Mexico City where
he worked as a lecturer in national economics at the university and, thus, had access to a broad
academic network. However, returning to Mexico after the Brussels Congress, Goldschmidt met
the well-known painter Diego Rivera for the first time. According to Goldschmidt, Riveras new
form of revolutionary art left him stunned and, as Rivera was on the left side of politics,
Goldschmidt invited him to accompany him to Moscow to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of the
Russian revolution. As a result of Goldschmidt and Riveras journey to Moscow, and their
subsequent participation in the LAI General Council in Brussels (see next chapter) on 9-11
December 1927, Rivera gained a seat on the LAI Executive.446
During the initial phases, the impetus and political enthusiasm to establish LAI sections in the
USA and Latin America looked promising. However, from 1928 to 1932, the practical
undertakings required to realise these plans took a turn for the worse, characterised by an internal
crisis within the American communist movement as well as by personal tragedies. On 10 January
444

RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Resolution, ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow, 15/6-1927; RGASPI
495/3/18, 9-11, Protocol, Nr.33, Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI, Moscow, 8/7-1927. Present at the meeting were
Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Remmele, Braun, Petrov, Maggi [Egidio Gennari], Nin, Codevilla, Ferdi, Smeral, Manuilsky,
Bennet/Petrovsky, Schubin, Schneller, Cremet, Kornblum, Gnther, Orloff, Smoliansky, Manner, Setlin, Virtanen and
Heimo. The content of Codevillas report remains unknown.
445
RGASPI 542/1/28, 1-2, Letter from Bach, Mexico City, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 10/1-1928. Henrick Stahrs study
of the discursive use of photographs in the context of the racial question, include an analysis of A-I-Z. According to
Stahr, Bach cancelled his KPD membership and broke with the German communist movement in 1929 and remained,
for the entirety of his life, in Mexico, Henrick Stahr, Fotojournalismus zwischen Exotismus und Rassismus.
Darstellungen von Schwarzen und Indianern in Foto-Text-Artikeln deutscher Wochenillustrierter 1919-1939, Verlag
Dr. Kovac, Hamburg, 2004, pp.438-439.
446
For Mnzenbergs description of Goldschmidt, see NA SPO SE/RA/420640.01, Stockholms Krimavd., 6:e
Roteln, serie FIII, 1929-1941 Rapport rrande IAH, september 1933. Goldschmidts meeting with Rivera is mentioned
in Stahr 2004, p.443. The international delegation to Moscow is given in A-I-Z, Jahrgang VI (1927), No.45, Berlin,
p.13. For Riveras nomination as a member of the LAI Executive, see Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Nr.1, International Secretariat, Berlin, 15/3-1928.

178

1929, a suspected agent of the Cuban government murdered Mella in Mexico City. The consequent
reaction from the international anti-imperialist movement was to portray Mella as a martyr and as
a victim of imperialist policy. On an organisational level, the internal and fractional struggles and
expulsions within the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA, see further in Utopia Redefined, Part
I) after the Sixth International Comintern Congress in Moscow 1928, had a serious impact on the
USA LAI Section. Gomez was not content with the unabashed praise of Stalin in the CPUSA,
criticising the party for its lack of understanding and, in 1932, he was forced to resign from the
directorship of the Anti-Imperialist Department in New York.447 From an individual perspective,
the original candidates destined to establish LAI sections in the USA and Latin America: Gomez,
Bach and Mella had either been expelled, forsaken or murdered.
*
A Conflict of Interest in the Netherlands and Beyond
The LAI and the Brussels Congress also attracted attention in the Netherlands in 1927. According
to Katayamas evaluation after the congress, Hattas and Fimmens performances indicated a bright
future for the LAI, particularly the services of the latter who turned the congress into a success
due to his experienced and well-mannered behaviour. Thus, if the LAI and its International
Secretariat could expose and utilise the Indonesian conflict to its fullest, this would ease the
process of establishing an LAI section in the Netherlands.448 However, the Sociaal Demokratische
Arbeiderspartij (SDAP) reacted against how the LAI began to develop itself in the Netherlands,
above all, against Fimmens role as deputy. On 19 September, the Secretary of the SDAP, Cornelis
Werkhoven (1887 1928), sent a letter to Adler in Zurich, requesting advice on what to do with
the LAI and Fimmen and asking if the LSI could confirm whether the LAI really was an organ of
Moscow. The primary reason for Werkhoven contacting Adler was that some members of our
party had joined forces with Dutch communists in order to publish the official newspaper of the
Dutch LAI Section, Recht en Vrijheid (Right and Freedom). Adler replied to Werkhoven, telling
him merely to observe the fact that the official protocol of the Brussels Congress, Das
Flammenzeichen, had been released through the communist company Neuer Deutscher Verlag in
Berlin, which was run by the infamous German communist Mnzenberg. Based on this
information, Adler told Werkhoven to draw his own conclusions and, if he needed any additional

447

The WPA renamed itself the CPUSA at the Sixth International Comintern Congress in 1928, Caballero 1986, p.160;
Shipman 1993, pp.173-185. Shipman claimed that he was not bothered about his expulsion from the Anti-Imperialist
Department.
448
RGASPI 542/1/7, 131-132, Confidential letter from Sen Katayama, Moscow, to Comrade Petrov/Raskolnikov,
Moscow, 24/2-1927. Fimmen's linguistic skills in English, German and French had been a useful asset at the congress,
according to Katayama, who believed Fimmen to be in thought and action fully on our side.

179

information on the LAI, Adler told him that the LSI intended to go public in October with an
analysis of the LAI in the LSI organ, Internationale Information.449 According to Adler, the
primary aim of this analysis (further introduced and discussed below) was to disprove the LAIs
ideological platform and to reveal the organisation as a Moscow-product. Thus, the analysis
aimed to revise the current and popular opinion of the LAI which had emerged in the European
socialist movement and, above all, to send out a warning to every member of the LSI about the
risk of affiliating with the LAI. In October, after the publication of the LSIs analysis, the Dutch
social democratic newspaper, Het Volk, stated that the LAI was an unofficial arm of Russian
foreign policy. One of its most shameful acts was Fimmens defence of the organisation at public
SDAP meetings; hence, Het Volk concluded that it was not the social democrats task to act as
henchmen for Russian foreign policy.450 Mnzenberg knew that the Dutch social democratic
movement had criticised Fimmen harshly for his involvement in the LAI. However, it seems that
Fimmens precarious situation was of minor relevance for Mnzenberg, informing Petrovsky that
the newspaper, Recht en Vrijheid, had reached a circulation of 2,000 issues per month in the
Netherlands. Nonetheless, despite this newspapers success, the Dutch LAI Section was more or
less a loosely-knit committee focusing on establishing propaganda campaigns against the
harassment of Indonesian students in the Netherlands, e.g. by declaring its support for
Perhimpunan Indonesia.451
In 1924, amidst the academic milieu of and radicalism amongst Indonesian anti-colonial
activists living in the Netherlands, the PI had emerged as an outspoken voice against Dutch
colonialism and was a group targeted by the Dutch security service for being subversive.452 For the
Comintern, the PI was a highly coveted group on which to exert influence after the Brussels
Congress, particularly considering Hattas influential position within the PI as well as being a
member of the LAI Executive; thus, the Comintern had found its candidate. Raden Darsono, cofounder of the PKI and member of the Indonesian Section at the ECCI Information Department
in Moscow in 1927, informed the Small Commission that the secretary of the Communist Party of

449

IISG LSI Archives 3050/29, Letter from Cornelis Werkhoven, Amsterdam, to Adler, Zurich, 19/9-1927; IISG LSI
Archives 3050/33-35, Letter from Adler, Zurich, to Werkhoven, Amsterdam, 28/9-1927.
450
IISG LSI Archives 3050/44-45, Het Volk, Leitartikel: Die Liga, 21.X.1927. At the top of this document, Adler had
written: Kolonialliga.
451
RGASPI 495/30/350, 27, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 23/10-1927. See Buschak (2002,
p.134) for a brief account of Fimmens involvement in the LAI.
452
Hatta was a leading actor in the Indonesian liberation movement. According to Siebacks thesis on Hattas political
career, the Indonesian nationalist movement merged in Europe by linking together student clubs, the Sarekat Islam,
with associations such as the Muhammadiyah, Jong Islamietenbond and the Perhimpunan Indonesia, the latter
functioning as the driving force. In connection with the aftermath of the rebellions in Java and Sumatra, the activism
of the Indonesian nationalist movement in the Netherlands increased, including providing support for the
establishment of the National Party of Indonesia in Indonesia which, by July 1927 was under the leadership of
Sukarno, see Siebeck 1978, p.81.

180

Holland (CPH) Pieter Bergsma, had befriended Hatta in Brussels. According to Darsono, this
relationship with Bergsma could be expected to convince Hatta to support the Dutch communist
movement which, in turn, would lead to the CPH gaining access to the Indonesian student
community. To confirm the accuracy of his statement, Darsono passed Hattas letter to Bergsma
(dated 6 March) on to the Small Commission. This letter included a description of their meeting in
Brussels and how the encounter had inspired Hatta to ponder the idea of associating the PI with the
CPH.453
The Dutch security service responded, however, by thwarting any attempts by the PI to
confirm a close relation with the CPH. By increasing its surveillance in the Netherlands and in the
colonial dominions, the Dutch government depended, nonetheless, on the services of other foreign
security services to gather intelligence on the PI. For example, an enquiry concerning the PI from
the Political Intelligence Department in Amsterdam to MI5 set off a chain reaction. At the British
consulate in Batavia, the official J. Crosby began the process of accumulating intelligence on the
PI. Prior to providing the Dutch East Indian government in Batavia and the Dutch Political
Intelligence Department with any material on the PI in July, Crosby sent a summary to Austen
Chamberlain in London which concluded that the organisation was violently nationalistic []
has shown to be in contact with Moscow.454 Crosbys report definitely contributed to making the
Dutch security service decide to begin to register every person known to be, or suspected of being,
a PI member in the Netherlands. For Hatta, this had drastic consequences. After Hatta had visited
Switzerland in August, and en route to the Netherlands, travelling in the company of other fellow
Indonesian nationalists Nazir Pamontjak, Ali Sastroamidjojo and Abdul Madjid Djojoadiningrat,
they were all arrested by the Dutch border authorities who charged them with sponsoring a
prohibited organisation which promoted the realisation of revolution by distributing
propaganda against the Dutch kingdom. After a lengthy legal process, the verdict was handed
down on 9 March 1928 acquitting Hatta and his fellow travellers of all charges. For the Dutch LAI
Section, the Hatta case functioned as a mobilising factor in centralising the anti-imperialist
movement in the Netherlands, e.g. via anti-imperialist campaigns which focused on the continued
harassment by Dutch authorities towards the Indonesian community.455
It was another episode, however, which exposed the internal conflict of interest within the LAI
and the European anti-imperialist movement in 1927-28: the adventure of the Dutch-Indies

453

RGASPI 495/6/44, 121, Letter from the Polit-Secretariat [signed: Raden Darsono], Moscow, to the Small
Commission, Moscow, 6/8-1927. For Darsono, see Lazitch 1986, p.87. Darsono wrote that the Dutch police kept the
Indonesian students in the Netherlands under constant surveillance. Bergsmas name was not included in Das
Flammenzeichen, fol. RGASPI 495/154/747, 1, Letter from Hatta, Den Haag, to Bergsma, Amsterdam, 6/3-1927.
454
TNA PRO 323 971 1, Confidential report from J. Crosby, Batavia, to A. Chamberlain, London, 26/7-1927.
455
Siebeck 1978, p.85-86.

181

Delegation an idea which, from the outset, aimed to get the LAI to exploit the political situation
in Indonesia. Although the LACO had introduced the idea of sending an impartial delegation to
the Dutch-Indies already in January 1927, this had proven to be impractical. However, due to the
success of the Brussels Congress, Piatnitsky re-assessed this question in July, asking Mnzenberg
to investigate whether it was still possible to organise and send a delegation to the Dutch-Indies.
Nevertheless, the adventure of the Dutch-Indies Delegation begins with a desperate letter, dated
30 May 1930, from Saklatvala to Piatnitsky, who for the time being was in Glasgow, requesting
assistance to solve a very uncomfortable situation.456 As an isolated episode, this letter is barely
coherent. However, other documents in the Piatnitsky secretariat fond explain the background for
Saklatvalas desperate plea for help, a matter which originated with the Dutch-Indies Delegation
and which involved the very core of the LAI network.
Mnzenberg introduced the question of the Dutch-Indies Delegation to the CPH Secretary
Louis de Visser, in July, as, according to Piatnitskys instructions, the issue had to be raised before
the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne on 20-21 August, 1927.457 According to Mnzenberg, the
general idea was to send a delegation to Java and Sumatra, with each and every member of the
delegation having to be nominated with caution and having to stay in the country for at least for
one and half month to investigate the social outcome of the January uprising. This would, for
example, enable them to gain an understanding of the extent of Dutch colonial oppression as well
as provide an opportunity to establish contacts with Indonesian anti-imperialist activists.458
Piatnitsky expected Mnzenberg to convince the LAI Executive to sanction the idea of the
Dutch-Indies Delegation. Thus, after de Visser had informed Mnzenberg that the CPH had
approved the plan in general, the LAI kom.Fraktion (Mnzenberg, Gibarti and Saklatvala) held a
secret meeting in a left-wing bookshop in Cologne on 19 August, to sort out the details before the
LAI Executive meeting.459 On 20 August, Mnzenberg, Saklatvala and Gibarti met the other LAI
Executive members and other functionaries: Chatto, Fimmen, Brockway, Barbusse, Nehru, Liau,
Hatta, Marteaux, Bridgeman, Dhuni Chand from India, M. P. and member of the Labour Party
Mardy Jones, the leader of the Dutch LAI Section and left-wing socialist Henri Lefbre, the
456

RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927; RGASPI 542/1/44,
68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930.
457
RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927; Piatnitsky passed on
Mnzenbergs letter to the Small Commission, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/319, 3, Note from [H.] Kurella, Moscow, to
Kleine Kommission, Moscow, 25/8-1927.
458
Louis de Visser guaranteed Mnzenberg that the CPH had received his first plan for the Dutch-Indies delegation,
which the CPH endorsed on 22 July, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/319, 1, Letter from Louis de Visser/C. P. Holland,
Amsterdam, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 18/8-1927; RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to
Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927.
459
TNA KV/1919, Secret. G.S. (S). No:2211. Extract relating to Fenner Brockway. Author: G.S.I British Army of the
Rhine, 2/9-1927. An undisclosed informant in the service of British security services in Germany had gathered
intelligence on this secret LAI meeting in Cologne.

182

Indonesian Abdul Manaff and Mme. Duchne of the French-based pacifist association the
International Womens League for Peace and Freedom. Gibarti introduced the primary topic for
discussion at the meeting, i.e. the LAI and its support for the Chinese liberation struggle, a topic
which merely satisfied the expectations of the Anti-Imperialist Commission in Moscow. After
the meeting, Gibarti stated in his report to the Eastern Secretariat that the LAI aimed to focus its
activities on the imperialist nations:
It is evident, that the intensive activity of our organisation and the expressed sympathies in
the colonial and semi-colonial countries have produced a reaction from the imperialist
governments.460
The Dutch-Indies Delegation was one of those so-called responses, which the LAI Executive
readily endorsed. On 22 August, Mnzenberg informed Piatnitsky of the composition of the
delegation: Barbusse, Jones, Lefbre and Goldschmidt (who for the time being was in Mexico).
The last two members were the lawyer Gatot and the leader of the Dutch IAH section H. van
Walree, who were both living in Amsterdam and, according to Mnzenberg, belonged to our
circle.461
The original composition of the Dutch-Indies Delegation never left Europe. What happened
and what were the reasons for this? Firstly, any definite decision or discussion disclosing the
reasons for this, e.g. from Piatnitsky, Mnzenberg or the Small Commission in Moscow, remain
unknown. Secondly, a possible explanation is that the delegation was expensive. According to the
budget sent from Mnzenberg to the CPH Secretariat in Amsterdam, the Dutch party had estimated
the cost of sending the delegation to Java and Sumatra at $12,000 ($2,000 per delegate, covering a
minimum of 50 days) and expected to be reimbursed later by Piatnitsky. The CPH Secretariat
explained to Mnzenberg that it was not possible to endorse this budget, particularly as the plan
had been so indistinctly presented.462 Mnzenbergs reaction to the CPH Secretariats critique is
unknown; however, it must have indicated some kind of foreclosure on the idea of sending a
delegation to the Dutch-Indies. However, as it turned out, the central question was to secure the
necessary visas for the members in the delegation. Petrovsky informed Mnzenberg, in a letter
dated 13 October, that the delegation could not leave Europe until the communist members had
460

Mme Duchene acted as Lamine Senghors substitute, Senghor being unable to leave Paris due to illness, SAPMOBA ZPA R1507/127, 107-110, 15.) Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung. Bezug R.No.In.Ber.Nr.121,s.44 ff., Berlin,
15/10-1927; RGASPI 542/1/9, 69, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bennet/Petrovsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927;
RGASPI 542/1/17, 31-39, Manuscript, Gibartis report from the LAI Executive Committee, Cologne, 20-21/1927.
461
RGASPI 495/19/319, 2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 22/8-1927.
462
RGASPI 495/19/319, 22, (Abschrift) Letter from the Secretariat of the CPH, Amsterdam, to Mnzenberg, Berlin,
24/9-1927. According to CPI (2009), $12,000 is equivalent to $148,000, while $2,000 is $24,700 (CPI/2009).
Mnzenberg passed on this letter from the CPH secretariat to Petrovsky, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/319, 21, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 30/9-1927. Petrovsky explained to Mnzenberg that we are not going to
approve of a single Pfennig beyond the existing limits of the budget, see RGASPI 495/30/367, 224, Letter from
Bennet [Petrovsky], Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 3/10-1927.

183

received their visas.463 Ultimately, this did not happen and, as mentioned in Petrovskys letter, one
member of the delegation had already left Europe. On 11 October 1927, Mardy Jones left
Marseilles by a boat destined first for India, and then for Indonesia, where he aimed to fulfil his
duty of conducting a social and political survey of colonial oppression. The crux of the matter was
that neither Mnzenberg, Piatnitsky nor the LAI had sanctioned Jones journey. Apparently, the
explanation for and reason why Jones left Europe were the result of a breach in communications:
The telegrams despatched to him by the League informing him that the delegation which it
had been proposed should visit Indonesia had been abandoned had never reached him.464
In 1930, Saklatvala faced up to the effects of Jones journey. In his letter to Piatnitsky, Saklatvala
told of his resistance to electing Jones as a member of the delegation:
It was under the advice of other Party members [Gibarti and Mnzenberg], that Mardy was
elected by the League [kom.Fraktion]. I was personally opposed to it, and was
recommending W.T. Kelly [?], but I was instructed to withdraw my objection and to back up
Mardy Jones' selection at the Leagues meeting [in Cologne]. The Party idea was to secure a
T.U. figure, and Mardys connection with the MFGB [Miners Federation of Great Britain]
and also his position as Secretary of all the T.U. groups of MPs in the House were considered
very valuable.465
Evidently, the very valuable Jones corresponded to the party idea of sending a neutral
individual to the British and Dutch colonies. Considering Jones position as an M.P. (Labour Party
representative for the Pontypridd district), and his connection to the British trade union movement,
the LAI and the CPGB expected that this would be sufficient to avoid the scrutiny of the British
and the Dutch security services. Ultimately, this did not matter as the information on the apparent
cancellation of the delegation by the International Secretariat and the LAI provisional committee
in London, did not reach Jones in time. Most importantly, the adventure of Jones journey exposed
the weak structure of the LAI.
Jones arrived back in England on 6 March, 1928, after a journey which had included stopovers
in British India, Bengal, Malaya and Singapore. After arriving in Batavia, a Dutch official had
confronted Jones, making enquiries about his connections to the LAI, deciding to deny him any

463

RGASPI 495/30/367, 243, Letter from Bennet [Petrovsky], Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 13/10-1927.
Reginald Bridgeman, Information Bulletin, No.2, Supplement, 15/4-1928.
465
RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930. Petrovsky later
reported that the provisional British LAI committee had decided on July 26, 1927, to send Brockway and Saklatvala
to the LAI Executive in Cologne. After the meeting, Mardy Jones received the request to travel to Jarva [sic] as a
British delegate on [sic] a League delegation, see fol. RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Bennet/Petrovsky on the
British LAI Section, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 20/4-1928.
464

184

chance of leaving the ship. Thus, Jones had no other option left than to return to England.466
Nonetheless, Bridgeman was content with the result of Jones' journey:
[] Jones had attended the All-India National Congress in Madras [] Throughout his stay
in India he had received valuable assistance from Mr. Joshi, [] Jones had met most of the
Indian leaders including Gandhi and Ansari, [] spent a good deal of time in the Bengal
coalfields and had been able to collect valuable information regarding coal-mining
conditions in India. He addressed numerous public meetings, []467
Whilst the short-term effect of Jones journey was a success, ultimately, it turned into a conflict
which lasted several years, focusing exclusively on who had funded the journey and the settling of
debts.
The total cost for Jones journey, including travel arrangements and additional costs (clothes,
food), came to 587. This sum also corresponds to the one Saklatvala had notified Piatnitsky about
(600). For Saklatvala, this was a question of who had contributed with money and, above all, who
expected reimbursement. In September 1927, the LAI Executive had instructed the International
Secretariat to give every delegate 500 (300 cash in hand and an additional sum of 200 after
their departure from Marseille). Saklatvala was the financial contact for Jones in London. Securing
300 in London, Saklatvala handed over the money to Jones. However, the money did not come
from Saklatvala, but was a loan issued by the lawyer Thompson [unknown], who made
Saklatvala liable for payment. Thompson had in all confidentiality advised Jones to leave
London as quickly as possible after receiving the money. This was not the end of it as the trickle of
money continued:
Mardy went ahead. He took our money [underlining made by Piatnitsky, authors remark]
first. He bought clothes etc. and obtained his 1st class return passage and secured his
passport. We kept [] 300 for the League. We got evasive replies. Then we got a [] letter
that Gibarti had 250 cash at his office in Paris, and was to pay some in cash to Mardy Jones
on his way to Marseilles. This was quite definite and unconditional. Mr. Thompson agreed to
make a tariff 350. Mardy however refused to more without being paid first, as the League
had shown too many changes of mind. Chattophadyaya again assured us that this was all
quite certain. Mardy Jones then only agreed to shift if we paid him in London further cash as
loan, on his note [] but that we were to be paid only when the League paid up. [] Thus
Mr. Thompson obtained from Mardy Jones a letter of authority to collect direct from the LAI
466

The Batavian port authorities questioned why Jones wanted to visit Java and, furthermore, it is likely that the
British authorities in Madras, India [which had been Jones' point of departure], had informed the Dutch mandate
authorities of Jones' arrival, see Reginald Bridgeman, Information Bulletin, No.2, Supplement, Berlin, 15/4-1928.
467
RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930; Reginald
Bridgeman, Information Bulletin, No.2, Supplement, 15/4-1928.

185

150 as soon as possible. Mardy had 500 cash. Subsequently he wired to Bridgeman from
Madras before leaving for Java and obtained his other 100 from Bridgeman.468
Thus, three actors funded Jones journey: the Thompson loan (350); the LAI (150); and
Bridgeman (100). The original idea was to settle the money question at the LAI General Council
meeting in Brussels in December 1927. However, as Saklatvala handed over the affidavit
concerning the Thompson loan to Chatto and Gibarti, and Bridgeman expected to receive his
100, Chatto suddenly turned and said that 300 of Mardys budget had been sent back to some of
the [communist] parties. Saklatvala later remembered how Chatto had said that the reason for this
was that he was dissatisfied with Mardy Joness speech in India. For Saklatvala, this was a
disaster, especially when the Thompson loan had not been authorised from the beginning by his
client, and only on my recommendation and liability. Thus, the money Jones had procured did, in
fact, belong to a third party, apparently unaware of the transaction. It did not matter that Saklatvala
urged the International Secretariat to give him the money (which they refused to do), the dilemma
haunted him over the following years. By 1930, Saklatvala was no longer capable of brushing the
question aside. In a letter to Piatnitsky, Saklatvala explained that it was hopeless dealing with the
International Secretariat:
I must appeal to the Comintern to enable Berlin to settle this a/c [account] with me. []
Berlin has still to pay 200, which is [] 50 for Bridgeman and 150 for me to repay
somebodys a/c. My position right now is very uncomfortable.469
Whether or how Piatnitsky responded to Saklatvalas desperate plea for help remains unknown.
However, for the LAI, the Jones journey was a nominal propaganda victory, stating that he had
established connections in Indonesia with the PI and Sarekat Islam.470 The LAI ignored the fact
that Jones had never even set foot on Indonesian soil. According to the table below, the
interactionist process of the Dutch-Indies Delegation only managed to send one person, Jones,
on an adventure to British India and the Far East in 1927-1928.

468

RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930. In 1927, Gibarti
travelled on a regular basis between Berlin and Paris.
469
RGASPI, 542/1/44, 68-72, Letter from Saklatvala, Glasgow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 30/5-1930.
470
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus. Internationales Sekretariat, Nr.1, 15. Mrz, 1928, Berlin.

186

Table 4.3: The Dutch-Indies Delegation, 1927 1930

LAI Executive
Committee
Cologne, 2122/8-1927

CPH
Louis de Visser
Amsterdam

The Dutch-Indies
Delegation
August 1927

Mnzenberg
Berlin

Marseilles
British India
Bengal
Malaya
Singapore
Batavia
Liverpool [?]

Piatnitsky
Moscow

Heinrich Kurella
Moscow
ECCI Small
Commission
Moscow

Mardy Jones, M. P.
London/Pontypridd

Petrovsky
Moscow/England

Thompson: lawyer,
London

S. Saklatvala
London/Glasgow

The establishment of national LAI sections, or propaganda sections (the Chinese National Agency
in Berlin) had, towards the end of 1927/beginning of 1928, either not been successful or were
complete failures. It had been a process influenced by external circumstances, e.g. the KMT putsch
against the communists in China and the confirmed strained foreign relations between Great
Britain and the Soviet Union in connection with the ARCOS raid. However, the process had also
established the nature of the relationship between the International Secretariat in Berlin and
Comintern headquarters in Moscow. From February to June 1927, this was a process characterised
by both silence and a lack of money from Moscow. At the same time, the International Secretariat
had to confront factors such as reluctance and suspicion among some of its members, which also
affected the LAIs chance of capitalising on the euphoria of the Brussels Congress. Once the LSI
took action, the political understanding of the LAI faced a drastic change.
*
The LAI Organism Investigated and Experienced
The LAI had broached the colonial question within the European labour and social democratic
movements. Appearing on the political arena as one of the few credible actors actively criticising
colonialism and imperialism, the LAI left the LSI initially confounded as to what to do and how to
respond. The LAIs success, confirmed by willing support from a number of prominent left-wing
personalities, both during and after the Brussels Congress, proved that the colonial question was a
potent issue. According to Fimmen, the Brussels Congress illustrated that it was unfortunate that
the colonial question had not received proper attention from the LSI and the Amsterdam

187

International.471 Hence, the only credible solution was to mobilise and unify every
International in the struggle against colonialism and imperialism, which would also involve
seeking support from the Comintern and Profintern, Fimmen stated. Additionally, the Brussels
Congress Manifesto, signed by Lansbury, Fimmen and the LAI Executive, described the LSI as
an institution of ignorance:
The national liberation movement of the Asian, African and American peoples is, in its
scope, a world phenomenon. And now it [the movement] is organically connected and
united [own italics] with the freedom struggle of the proletariat of the old capitalist society
transforming our planet into an entirely civilised world, opening up a new chapter in world
history, the history of mankind all over the world. [] We encourage anyone [] who does
not live from the fruits of this oppression, who hates modern slavery and bondage [] to
join and support us. The oppressed and enslaved peoples expect to receive support from the
working class in the advanced countries, []472
By linking the organic metaphor to the colonial struggle against the old capitalist society, in
which the LAI represented itself as the leader of a movement capable of transforming the world,
this statement challenged the LSI. If one speaks in terms of making the leap from a Gemeinschaft
to a Gesellschaft, the LAI therefore expected to merge colonial kinship and organic ties with
organisational heterogeneity and political competitiveness. However, this compelled the LAI to
act, according to the analogy introduced by Gareth Morgan, as an organism [] open to their
environment, an organism which had to achieve an appropriate relation with that environment
in order to succeed.473
Meanwhile, the LSI was observing how the LAI introduced itself in the public sphere after the
Brussels Congress. Realising at an early stage that the LAI had penetrated deep into the European
socialist movement, the LSI understood that, in order to confront the LAI, it would need to expose
the very structure (ideological, organisational and individual) of the LAI. On 7 October, 1927, the
publication of the LSIs analysis of the LAI, Zur Geschichte der Liga gegen koloniale
Unterdrckung (On the History of the League against Colonial Oppression), in the Internationale
Information, announced the LSIs objective to expose the LAI. The release of this analysis also
indicated that the European socialist movement intended to confront the LAI on the colonial
question. Additionally, national security services would refer to this analysis as a source of
information on the LAI.

471

See Introduction for the LSI and the Amsterdam International.

For Fimmen, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.196; and the Brussels Congress Manifesto, p.246, 250.
473
Bryan S. Turner & Chris Rojek, Society and Culture. Principles of Scarcity and Solidarity, Sage Publications,
London, 2001, p.26; Morgan 1998, p.38, 40.
472

188

The release of the LSIs analysis in October was no great sensation. While Lansburys
resignation from the LAI Executive in June had given a hint of what was to come, by August,
during the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne, Fimmen, Nehru and Brockway were questioning
the very purpose of the organisation, accusing Gibarti of dishonest behaviour and of having
disguised the activities of the International Secretariat. Nehru later described the LAI Executive
meeting in Cologne as a decisive experience for him, especially in the way the episode had
revealed the dynamics and inner conflicts of the Western Labour world, and the aggressive
and rather vulgar methods of the communists and their habit of denouncing everybody who did
not agree with them.474
The manner in which the communist members in the LAI Executive interacted with the noncommunist members did not, however, have any rational explanation. According to the AntiImperialist Commission in Moscow, there existed a risk that the non-communist element in the
LAI Executive were plotting a possible take over of the LAI. Thus, Mnzenberg had to
guarantee the exertion of communist influence by getting communists to assume leading
positions in the LAI Executive, e.g. by giving the KIM a permanent seat, while the International
Secretariat was to remain in constant contact with the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow in
order to receive regular instructions on Comintern policy. In the latter case, this would imply
receiving instructions on the propaganda campaign against the KMT and signal its protest against
the collaboration between the LSI and the British Labour Party to liquidate the LAI.475
*
The LAI Detonated. The LSI and the History of the LAI

The LAI is the legitimate child of the well-known German communist M.d.R [Author's note:
Member of the Reichstag] Willi Mnzenberg.
Internationale Information, 7/10-1927
The LSIs 7 October analysis focused on the political and organisational nature of the LAI.
Accusing the LAI of being a sham, the LSI argued that, in reality, there was no Executive
representing the LAI; Mnzenberg, the spiritus rector [and] well-known German communist,
474

RGASPI 542/1/17, 31-39, Manuscript, Gibartis report from the LAI Executive Committee, Cologne, 20-21/1927;
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/2035, 107-110, Report on LAI, Berlin, 15/10-1927. Nehru supported the opinion of the
Anglo-American members (the non-communist members in the LAI Executive) despite their attraction to
communism and the Comintern line (distaste) against the LSI and the colonial question, see Nehru 1936, p.163.
475
RGASPI 495/3/18, 136-139, Resolution, ECCI Anti-Imperialist Commission, Moscow, 15/6-1927. On 13 July, the
Political Secretariat adopted the Guidelines for a Campaign against the Amsterdam International Congress, which
aimed to protest against the leaders of social democracy and the socialists in Europe, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/18, 101104, Richtlinien fr die Kampagne gegen den internationalen Kongress von Amsterdam, 13/7-1927.

189

was in charge and, consequently, the LAI was another United Front tactic of the Bolsheviks.476
This analysis had been an undertaking meticulously planned and organised by the LSI, under the
direct supervision of Adler and William Gillies, the secretary of the Labour Party International
Department in London. Its primary aim was to expose the LAIs communist connections and, with
any luck, create a split between the prominent socialist characters who had expressed an emotional
engagement in the LAI, e.g. Brockway, Fimmen, Maxton, A. J. Cook, John Beckett and Wilkinson.
For Adler, a principal motive was to question how they could defend the LAI, while at the same
time posing as leaders of socialist parties which were members of the LSI. Brockway was an
exceptional figure in this context. As introduced above, Brockway quickly assumed the role as the
strongest defender of the LAI, telling Adler to understand the necessity of letting the ILP affiliate
with the LAI. Adler was horrified by the thought that Brockway might succeed in convincing the
ILP to affiliate with the LAI, which, in turn, would call into question the LSIs political credibility
as well as being a breach of its statutes: the Parties associated with the LSI undertake not to
affiliate with any other political International.477
Brockway remained convinced that the LAI was an issue that went beyond political borders,
and that every member in the LAI Executive had equal rights and responsibilities ignoring the
question of political affiliations, despite Gibartis omnipotent influence at the International
Secretariat in Berlin. For this reason, Brockway informed Adler of his intention to raise the issue
of the LAI at the next LSI Executive meeting in Brussels in September.478 Meanwhile, Adler
remained silent. However, with the release, on 26 August, of Brockways article, The Coloured
Peoples International, in the British left-wing paper, The New Leader, Adler was left with no
other option than to respond. The question was how to present a response to Brockways
conclusion that the LSI and the Amsterdam International seemed indifferent towards the colonial
question, and that the rumour of the communist connections of both the LAI and the Brussels
Congress was nonsense. According to Brockway, the anti-colonial struggle was a topic which
extended beyond the political sphere:
I have attended many conferences which have been described as International, but only
one of them was international, [] At the last International Socialist Conference at
Marseilles [August 1925], there were no coloured representatives among the delegates.
[] But one international conference, in my experience, placed the whites in their proper
476

SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Zur Geschichte der Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, in Internationale
Information, IV, No. 52, 7/10-1927, Zrich, pp.438-448.
477
IISG LSI Archives, 284/2, Letter from Adler, Zurich, to Brockway, London, 13/4-1927.
478
IISG LSA Archives 284/8-10, Zur Sitzung der Exekutive der SAI [LSI], Zrich, September 1927. Petrovsky later
wrote that Brockway had collected 50 prominent signatures [unknown] prior to the LAI Executive in Cologne, aiming
to create an advisory committee for the LAI. However, and if the committee ever held a meeting is unknown, see
fol. RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Petrovsky on the British LAI Section, 20/4-1928.

190

place. It was held at Brussels last February. From the platform the conference hall was a
remarkable sight. Every race seemed to be there.479
The question of race, as a social and cultural demarcation, convinced Brockway of the
international scope and aim of the LAI. Brockway stated that the LSIs suspicion and even
opposition contradicted the inert nature and goodwill of the socialist movement in supporting a
political actor such as the LAI:
The whisperings of Labour officials suffering from the Communist complex have been
supplemented by reports that Scotland Yard is keeping an eye upon the organisation and that
one should consequently be careful before associating with it. [] Personally, I think it
would be suicidal if Socialists refrained from any association with this movement, even if it
had been initiated by the Communists. It has done what the Socialist International has failed
to do seriously begin the task of uniting the proletarian movements among the coloured
races.480
Brockway argued that any of the qualms he had had about the LAI had disappeared after a very
close and careful examination, and were absolutely unjustified. The constitution of the LAI
Executive was proof of this where, out of twelve members only three [were] communists and
they by no means exert a decisive influence. What was the reason for Brockway going public
and announcing his commitment to the LAI in such explicit terms? In a letter from Gibarti to
Brockway prior to the release of this article in The New Leader, Gibarti explains why Brockway
acted as he did:
We understand that once more the accusation has been put forward that our League is a
semi-Communist organisation, financed and led by the Soviet Government or by the
Communist International. More than once we have officially and emphatically repudiated
these [] statements and have proved that our funds are not derived from Russian money.
[] However, we declare ourselves prepared to meet any representative body of the
Socialist International, [] We have nothing to hide.481
After the publication of this article, Brockway informed Adler that the LAI had nothing to hide.
By repeating Gibartis words in his letter to Adler, Brockway stated that the LSI was about to
479

The article is filed in the LSI Archives at IISG, and constituted a part of the working material Adler and Gillies had
at its disposal to analyse the LAI, see IISG LSA Archives 284/5-7, The Coloured Peoples International, by A.
Fenner Brockway (The New Leader 26 August, 1927) [copy].
480
IISG LSA Archives 284/5-7, The Coloured Peoples International, by A. Fenner Brockway (The New Leader 26
August, 1927) [copy].
481
IISG LSI Archives 284/4, Letter from Gibarti, Cologne, to Brockway, London, 21/8-1927. Brockway requested a
couple of changes from Gibarti and Mnzenberg after the Cologne meeting. For example, according to Petrovskys
report, Brockway wanted to locate his personal secretary at the International Secretariat in order to gain access to all
documents, see fol. RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Bennet/Petrovsky on the British LAI Section, to the
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 20/4-1928.

191

commit a great mistake if they remained indifferent to this movement. For Adler, both
Brockways article and Gibartis letter were the confirmation that Adler had been waiting for,
particularly after hearing that Brockway intended to re-route the communist tendency of the
organisation in a more socialist direction and, thereby, turn the LAI into one of the biggest
factors in the future development of the world.482 Adlers reaction was one of anxiety, suspecting
the LAI of being well on the way to usurping the ILP, and becoming a political force the LSI
would have to combat. A logical step for Adler was to instigate an analysis of the LAI; however,
this required empirical observation. On 30 August, Gillies contacted the Russian migr journalist
and member of the Menshevik Party, Rafail Abramovic, who was living in Berlin. Perceived as
being the LSIs expert on the Russian question, Gillies wondered whether Abramovic had any
material on the LAI. Additionally, Gillies requested that Adler send back the file on the Brussels
Congress of the Colonial League.483 In England, Brockway continued to declare his belief in the
LAI in public arenas. On 16 September, The New Leader published a second article from
Brockway, in which he concluded: whatever the truth about the Communist initiative in creating
the League, it had succeeded in combining the anti-Imperialist movements of the subject races and
that it is suicidal for Socialists to remain outside a development of such immense possibilities.484
Brockway was one of many focal points in Adlers and Gillies investigation of the LAI. Their
primary aim was to get their analysis and additional documents on the LAI prepared in time for the
LSI Executive meeting in Brussels in September. From the end of August to the middle of
September, Gillies carried out his work with diligence and compiled a thick dossier of material
which revealed the communist connection of the LAI, documents which included, for example,
the article by Mnzenberg in Inprecorr (August 1926) the theoretical organ of the LAI, copies of
the Kolonial Revue, miscellaneous articles in Klnische Zeitung and in A-I-Z, as well as the LAIs
circular letters. At the LSI Executive meeting in September, Gillies provided each delegate with
copies of these documents,485 confident that this material would stimulate a discussion on the LAI.
In comparison to Brockways nave ambition to get the LSI Executive to endorse the decision to
let the ILP affiliate with the LAI, Adler and Gillies expected the LSI Executive to both approve
their analysis and to publish their results in the Internationale Information. Brockway attended the
482

IISG LSI Archives 284/3, Letter from Brockway, London, to Adler, Zurich, 30/8-1927. Brockway enclosed a copy
of Gibartis letter to Adler.
483
IISG LSI Archives 3050/9, Letter from Gillies, London, to R. Abramovic, Berlin, 30/8-1927. In 1931, Abramovic,
together with Adler, Vandervelde and the French socialist Leon Blum, published the book Der Moskauer Prozess und
die Sozialistische Arbeiter-Internationale (Berlin, Verlag J. H. W. Dietz Nachfolger); IISG LSI Archives 3050/10,
Short note from Adler, Zurich, to Gillies, London, 3/9-1927. Adler explained to Gillies that he had sent back the LAI
file on 24 February, wishing him the best of luck in finding the documents in your office.
484
Quote taken from Saville Vol. VII 1984, p.43.
485
IISG LSA Archives 284/8-10, Zur Sitzung der Exekutive der SAI [LSI], Zrich, September 1927. Gillies' summary
constituted the very basis of the LSI's analysis of the LAI.

192

meeting, only to realise that the LAI question and his defence of the organisation would be the
focus of the meeting. The LSI Executive confronted Brockway, demanding him to explain why he
deserved to remain as the ILPs representative within the LSI. Brockway later wrote that this
episode had been a horrible experience. The leader of the SPD Otto Wels made a terrific attack
[] stormed like a mad bull, accusing Brockway of running the errands of the KPD in organising
anti-social democratic propaganda in Germany, whereas Gillies and Adler denounced Brockways
contacts with the LAI. At the end of the session, condemned by all, the LSI Executive demanded
that Brockway resign, either from the LAI or from the LSI Executive. Opposing the harsh
statements against his persona, Brockway argued that the LSI had no colonial agenda, only to
receive the answer that the LSI was on the verge of mobilising and pressing forward with its
colonial work.486
After this meeting with the LSI Executive in Brussels, Gillies continued to evaluate the
connections and patterns linking prominent non-communists members with the LAI. For example,
Gillies provided Adler with information on Fimmens behaviour as an LAI member. In his letter,
Gillies informed Adler that he had met a delegate of the Mexican Federation of Labour
(Confederatin Regional Obrera Mexicana; CROM) in Paris, who had denied that Fimmen had
posed as a CROM delegate at the Brussels Congress. Fimmen had acted deceitfully, particularly as
this trade union did not want to have any kind of association with the LAI, and it was a shameful
performance as he had not asked for permission to introduce himself as their representative.487
Nevertheless, other actors chose to continue to defend the LAI. Roger Baldwin sent a letter to
Adler on 24 September, stating that the International Secretariat would soon move to Paris, thus,
this would be the end of Mnzenbergs close supervision in Berlin. Urging Adler to understand
that the LAI not was a Communist faade, Baldwin explained that the anti-imperialist movement
had developed just as we who are not Communists had determined it should, while the LAI
existed and worked above party and factional interests in support of colonial freedom.488
Perhaps Baldwins letter convinced Adler that the LAI had become a success amongst prominent
left-wing personalities, as Adler contacted Gillies on 28 September, requesting him to send him a
copy of an article which included quotations on the Colonial League the LSI Executive had
discussed in Brussels. These quotations had originally come from an issue of the Inprecorr
(published on 13 May 1926), which had introduced Kuusinens communist solar system theory

486

Brockway 1942 (second impression 1947), pp.167-169; Saville Vol. VII 1984, pp.40-50.
IISG LSI Archives 3050/30, Letter from Gillies, London, to Adler, Zurich, 22/9-1927. For Fimmen and the CROM,
see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.236.
488
IISG LSI Archives 3050/31-32, Letter from Baldwin, Paris, to Adler, Zurich, 24/9-1927.
487

193

(see Introduction). After receiving the copy, Adler highlighted the following quote, the main gist of
the LSIs October analysis,
[] organisations against colonial atrocities and oppression of Eastern peoples are new
types of sympathising mass organisations which will become more evident in many
countries in the immediate future.489
The LSI feared that the LAI would evolve into a mass organisation. Thus, for Adler and Gillies,
their October analysis would expose the LAI as being nothing less than a front organisation in the
service of the Comintern.
The publication of the LSIs analysis on 7 October shook the very foundation and credibility of
the LAI as a non-political actor. Once news of the LSIs History of the League against Colonial
Oppression had been made public, national security services considered this analysis to be a
useful source. On 15 October, the RKO in Berlin used the document as reference material to
describe the LAI as a relief organisation for Soviet Russian foreign policy and propagandist for
Cominterns world revolution propaganda.490 The analysis questioned the LAI as a political actor,
but it also initiated a process to deprive the LAI of political credibility within the European
socialist movement. However, the communists only had themselves to blame, the LSI stated.
Firstly, by giving Mnzenberg a distinguished role on the LAI Executive had been a serious
mistake, a crucial fact used by the LSI to categorise the organisation as being communist. The LSI
analysis introduced an understanding that the LAI and the anti-colonial project had been under
Mnzenbergs patronage from the beginning. While the International Secretariat was located in the
same building as IAH headquarters in Berlin, the LAI did not disguise its similarities to other
Mnzenbergian leagues and to the IAH. Secondly, the LSI warned the European socialist, social
democratic and trade union movements against getting in contact with the LAI, especially as it was
an offspring of the IAH, created and refined in line with Bolshevik united front manoeuvres. The
LAI was the creation of the policy advocated by the Comintern at the Sixth ECCI Plenum in 1926,
the LSI argued. Hence, the European socialist movement had to begin to grasp the extent of the
far-stretching ambitions of the communists, and to realise that the LAI was only a part of a grander
scheme that the Comintern had conceived in order to establish a communist solar system under
the pretext of exerting communist influence on the masses. Thirdly, Adler and Gillies exposed
the origins of the anti-colonial project from a genealogical perspective. By linking the LAI with
489

IISG LSI Archives 3050/36, Telegram from Adler, Zurich, to Gillies, London, 28/9-1927. For Gillies' reply and
confirmation to Adler, see IISG LSI Archives 3050/37, Short note from Gillies, London, to Adler, Zurich, 29/9-1927;
IISG LSI Archives 3050/38, Extract from Resolution, Inprecorr (13/5-1926, Vol.6, No.40). Adler had written his name
at the top of this document.
490
SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Zur Geschichte der Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, in Internationale
Information, IV, No. 52, 7/10-1927, Zrich, 438-448; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/2035, 107-110, Report on the LAI,
Berlin, 15/10-1927.

194

the transformation of the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee to the LACO in 1926, the LSI
stated that the IAHs anti-colonial project had culminated in the transformation of the movement in
Brussels in 1927.491
A couple of days after the release of the LSIs analysis, Brockway chose to resign from the LAI
Executive. He had been planning to visit Gibarti in Paris, together with Maxton, in the beginning
of October; however, after reading this analysis, Brockway cancelled this journey. On 11 October,
Brockway sent his letter of resignation to Gibarti, describing how the political situation and
critique had broken his spirit. Unable to maintain any official connection to the League,
Brockway had finally taken a stand, explaining that his position on the LSI Executive was more
valuable than retaining his LAI Executive membership. Yet, this did not imply a definitive end,
Brockway stated, asking Gibarti to understand the difference between official and unofficial ties.
Brockway had evidently instructed Maxton to assume the role as liaison, a decision which would
guarantee the ILPs continued fullest sympathy and support towards the LAI.492 Hence, when
Gillies contacted Brockway on 22 October, expecting to hear some kind of public announcement
of his resignation from the LAI Executive,493 this belief remained intact. In what way did
Brockway assist the LAI? According to Petrovsky, prior to the LAI General Council in Brussels in
December 1927, Brockway had wired for money in advance to cover the travel expenses of the
British LAI Section back to England.494
The LAI and the colonial question caused an upheaval within the LSI in 1927. Yet, on the other
hand, it also initiated a discussion on colonialism and imperialism within the LSI. The
establishment of the LAI, and also Brockways criticism of the lack of any discussion on the
colonial question, and on the question of a coloured peoples international, had certainly
contributed to this. The LSI Executive meeting held in Brussels in September 1927 had included
the colonial question on its agenda and resolved to establish a colonial commission to begin the
work of examining the colonial problem. The primary aim of this was to get the LSI to instigate
an independent colonial agenda. The LSI Executive instructed the commission to send
questionnaires to every affiliated party, including questions aimed at discerning the political,
social and structural effects of the colonial mandate system, but also whether there existed any
labour movements in the colonies, as well as the question of race. The results of these
491

SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Zur Geschichte der Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, in Internationale
Information, IV, No. 52, 7/10-1927, Zrich, 438-448. The LSI had collected the official publications of the LAI (Die
koloniale Freiheitskampf, various LACO and LAI pamphlets, Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont) and
Inprecorr.
492
RGASPI 542/1/18, 58, (Confidential) Letter from Brockway, London, to Gibarti, Paris [3 Rue Parmentier, Neully
s/Seine], 11/10-1927.
493
IISG LSI Archives 3050/46, Letter from Gillies, London, to Brockway, 22/10-1927. Gillies urged Brockway to
explain in reality his position in the LAI, something he would be very grateful to hear.
494
RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Bennet on the British LAI Section, 20/4-1928.

195

questionnaires would assist the commission in presenting a structural understanding of the colonial
question to the LSI Executive in December 1927.495
How did the International Secretariat react to the LSIs analysis? Initially, the International
Secretariat chose silence. The Anti-Imperialist Commission in Moscow instructed the
International Secretariat to wait until a response had been thoroughly prepared, a response, which,
above all, should not be too overtly antagonistic and demagogic towards social democracy in order
not to lose the support of the left-wing movement in Europe. The proper moment to deliver their
response would be during the LAI General Council in December, the Anti-Imperialist
Commission concluded.496 This was a major mistake. Hence, the LAIs silence strengthened the
LSIs analysis as it rampaged through the European labour movement. At the same time, after the
release of the LSI analysis, another explanation shed light on why the International Secretariat
seemed unable to send the LSI an answer. Apparently, the hierarchy of relations at the International
Secretariat in Berlin had evolved into a scene of conflict
*
I am an oppressed colonial slave of the LAI!
Hansin Liaus narrative portrays the International Secretariat both in a state of chaos and
embroiled in a power struggle. With the dissolution of the Chinese National Agency in July 1927,
and with Liau becoming a member of staff at the International Secretariat, he had expected to
strengthen his position within the anti-imperialist movement. However, by assuming a position at
the International Secretariat, a drastic change had occurred in Liaus life. In January 1928, Liau
sent a letter to Petrovsky in Moscow reminding him that you at one time offered me your
support. What was the reason for Liaus plea for help? Firstly, Liau argued that the LAI and its
International Secretariat were futile enterprises. Secondly, Liau described how Mnzenberg and
Gibarti oppressed and harassed some of the colonial members at the bureau in Berlin, stating, I
am an oppressed colonial slave of the LAI!497 His loss of faith in the LAI was a process that had
begun when Liau had wanted to gain access to the International Secretariats core. However, for
the LAI, Liau was an ideal actor to head its propaganda campaign against the treacherous KMT,
an idea which Liau had, initially, willingly accepted. According to confidential instructions from

495

IISG LSI Archives 285/1, Z.74 [Directives of the LSI Executive] Fragebogen, September 1927. The result of the
investigation, the answers from the affiliated parties and the ensuing analysis, are questions for further examination.
For example, to evaluate whether the report contributed to either establishing or revising the LSI's attitude on the
colonial question in connection with the LSI's international congress in Brussels, 5-11 August, 1928.
496
RGASPI 495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST
IMPERIALISM, 18/11-1927.
497
RGASPI 542/1/29, 2, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 13/1-1928.

196

the ECCI Secretariat to Mnzenberg in connection with the LAI General Council, the LAI was to
use Liau in the following manner:
At the next sitting of the Enlarged General Council of the League, the Chinese question must
be raised. The attempt of the European reformists to support the counter-revolutionary
bourgeoisie and Fascist trade unions in China should be met with a sharp criticism of the
Kuomintang. Chinese delegates, particularly some of the former Kuomintang members
[Hansin Liau, own italics], should lead this attack upon the Kuomintang.498
The crux of the matter was that Liau perceived himself as something more than just a tool of
propaganda. In August 1927, Liau expected Mnzenberg to give him the position as political
secretary at the International Secretariat, and to be in charge of the Chinese question. However,
Mnzenberg seemed reluctant to meet Liaus request and, when Liau confronted Mnzenberg,
Mnzenberg refused to answer. Liau informed Petrovsky that he was at a loss as to how to act, or
what to say and, finally, he asked the steno-typist at the International Secretariat, the German
communist Ella Windmller, what was really happening at the bureau. The only recommendation
Windmller gave Liau was to approach Mnzenberg again and, at a second meeting between the
two men, Liau realised that he could forget the position as political secretary. Liau stated that the
indifference of Mnzenberg and Gibarti towards dealing with personal disputes constituted the
very essence of the inherent problems that had emerged at the International Secretariat. Critical of
the unequal distribution of power, Liau denounced Mnzenberg and Gibartis despotic
behaviour, which would, in the end, prevent the LAI from taking the leap from demonstration to
organisation.499
In October, Liau felt that discipline at the International Secretariat had completely broken
down and that the unified opposition of the Mnzenberg and Gibarti fraction was a major issue.
Codevilla visited the International Secretariat in October, telling Liau that Gibarti intended to
fight till the end to curtail his ambition of becoming political secretary. Additionally, Liau
informed Petrovsky that Mnzenberg continuously harassed him by expressing mocking
comments every time they met, e.g. suggesting that Liau collect some money for the LAI. The
money issue was a satirical and malicious statement which Mnzenberg used to degrade Liau,
particularly as Liau had not received any salary at all from the LAI between October 1927 and
498

RGASPI 495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST
IMPERIALISM, 22/9-1927. Liau financed the printing of the pamphlet with his own money (105 Marks), in order to
be able to distribute it among the delegates attending the Fourth Congress of the International Federation of Trade
Unions in Paris in July. Expecting Mnzenberg to reimburse him for the costs, Liau complained about not having
received any money. Petrovsky received a copy of this pamphlet; see fol. RGASPI 495/30/339, 5-6, Pamphlet by
Hansin Liau, 28/7-1927; RGASPI 542/1/29, 4.
499
RGASPI 495/30/350, 23-24, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 10/10-1927; RGASPI 542/1/29, 2,
Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 13/1-1928.

197

January 1928. Thus, living on the edge with his wife, KPD member Dora Dombrowski-Liau, the
ZK KPD granted Liau a short-term loan. This loan became due in January, but Liau had no money.
Because of all this, at the beginning of 1928, Liau desperately wanted to find a way out of the
LAI.500 However, is it possible to discover the reasons for Liaus isolation at the International
Secretariat, and why he accused Mnzenberg and Gibarti of harassment?
The root of the dispute seems to have been focused on issues relating to re-organisation and
political engagement. The discussion on whether to locate the International Secretariat in Berlin or
Paris had also involved Liaus position within the LAI. Codevilla had told Liau to consider Paris
as an option if he wanted to find a solution to his problems in Berlin and, if he accepted this offer,
the position as political secretary would be his. However, despite the good intentions of
Codevillas proposal, Liau explained that he could barely speak a single word of French. This
would prevent him from carrying out any kind of work and, more importantly, he dreaded the idea
of having to share the Paris office with Gibarti. Liau had already criticised Gibartis frequent
journeys between Berlin and Paris, a cost which drained the already strained LAI budget. For Liau,
the most convenient solution was to locate Gibarti permanently, along with one steno-typist, in
Paris, while he could assume the role as political secretary in Berlin, working together with Chatto
to sort out the important correspondence, edit the Kolonial Revue and have Windmller and one
assistant take care of the administrative business (store all documents).501 It was a question of reorganising the International Secretariat in order to increase the LAI's activism and, by doing so,
establishing the LAI as an international organisation, Liau argued. In January 1928, Liau
nonetheless concluded that the LAI was nothing more than a faade. One of the principal reasons
for Liau coming to this conclusion was that none of the members at the International Secretariat
discussed the colonial question, although Mnzenberg did not allow him to take part in any
political discussions. In November 1927, Liau was in Moscow, where he met Heimo at Comintern
headquarters and explained to him how the core at the International Secretariat were excluding
him, a dilemma which prevented him from doing any constructive work, just as it confirmed that
the LAI was nothing more than a illusion. Heimo told Liau to contact Petrovsky in the future if the
situation in Berlin worsened and, in the meantime, to continue working on the Chinese question.502
Liau informed the ECCI Agitprop Department that the LAI could be more than a vehicle for antiimperialist propaganda; however, this required a new impetus:
500

RGASPI 542/1/29, 2, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 13/1-1928. Perhaps the ZK KPD granted
Liau a short-term loan; see fol. RGASPI 495/225/1043, 41, Anlage Nr.4 KPD delegation of the ECCI, 10/2-1930.
501
RGASPI 495/30/350, 23-24, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 10/10-1927; RGASPI 495/30/350,
32, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to ECCI Agitprop Department, Moscow, November, 1927.
502
RGASPI 495/30/350, 23-24, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 10/10-1927; RGASPI 542/1/29, 3,
Letter from Liau, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat/Heimo, Moscow, 17/1-1928. If Liau wanted to contact Goldfarb,
Heimo told him to use Petrovsky as a reference.

198

[] to establish an international organisation of struggle, then the existing manner of work,

which is only built on airy propaganda, must cease to exist. Solid work has to start, and be
prepared to confront suspicions from different circles.503
Liau urged the ECCI Agitprop Department to understand the necessity of reinforcing the spirit of
struggle within the LAI; however, the euphoria of the Brussels Congress was a moment which
had passed. The challenge ahead, therefore, looked insurmountable, especially as the International
Secretariat depended more and more upon receiving directives on a regular basis from the
Comintern, while at the same being forced to confront the effects of the LSI analysis. As if this
were not enough, Liau concluded that the constant lack of money was due to the minimal budget
endorsed by the Comintern and the fact that some of the money being handed over to Mnzenberg
in Berlin from couriers arriving from Moscow were in bad or non-exchangeable currencies. Liau
could not grasp why the International Secretariat preferred this method of payment to regular
credit transactions.504
This conflict with Mnzenberg left a lasting impression on Liaus life. Due to the intolerable
situation in Berlin, Liau handed over two letters of resignation in January 1928, one to the ECCI
Secretariat and the other to Mnzenberg and Gibarti. Liau declared that it was impossible for him
to remain in Berlin, promising to stay on at the International Secretariat until the ECCI had
approved his resignation. Mnzenberg did not object to Liaus wish to leave the International
Secretariat.505
In December 1928, Liau left Berlin and travelled, with his wife, to Moscow. Arriving in
Moscow, Liau had to confront the charge from the Chinese communist migr group in Berlin
accusing him of condoning deviationist policies. However, the International Control
Commission (the cadre department and repressive organ within the Comintern; ICC) acquitted
Liau of this charge and, in April 1929, Liau and his wife had their KPD memberships transferred
to the CPSU (B).506 During the investigation, the ICC nevertheless wanted to know why Liau had
resigned from the International Secretariat. As noted in a letter from Liau to the German ECCI

503

RGASPI 495/30/350, 32, Re-organisation of the LAI, Liau, Berlin, to ECCI Agitprop Department, November 1927
(from the original in German).
504
RGASPI 495/30/350, 32, Re-organisation of the LAI, Liau, Berlin, to ECCI Agitprop Department, November 1927.
505
RGASPI 542/1/29, 3, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Heimo/ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 17/1-1928; RGASPI
542/1/29, 4, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Mnzenberg and Gibarti, Berlin, 17/1-1928. Mnzenberg passed on a copy of
Liaus letter to the ECCI Secretariat, fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 6-7, Report from Mnzenberg, Brussels, to the ECCI
Secretariat, Moscow, 29/4-1928.
506
The question of Liau and his political dishonesty concerned his former contact with the Berlin section of the KMT,
a question the Chinese ECCI delegation in Moscow wanted to investigate. Fritz Heckert supported Liau in this respect,
telling Wang Ming, the representative of the Chinese delegation in Moscow, that Liau was an honest and reliable
individual, thus, it was an illogical act to suspect him of deviationist activities, see fol. RGASPI 495/225/1043, 42,
Anlage Nr.7 Letter from Heckert, Berlin, to Wang Ming, Moscow, 1930; RGASPI 495/225/1043, 40, Anlage Nr.2,
ICC Protocol, Moscow, 13/3-1929.

199

delegation (Pieck, Heckert and Weber, real name: Heinrich Wiatrek), the reasons for my
resignation were based on Mnzenbergs lies and behaviour. For example, Mnzenberg had
spread the false rumour that Liau had wanted to leave Berlin for the sole purpose of pursuing
studies at the KUTV in Moscow. If the German ECCI delegation did not believe him, Liau
suggested that they contact Codevilla or Chatto, individuals who would be able to verify the
accuracy of his account. For Mnzenberg, on the other hand, the whole ordeal with Liau was a
burden. At a meeting with Robin Page Arnot, CPGB member and Comintern emissary, in
Frankfurt am Main on 3 January 1929, Mnzenberg asked him to finally sort out the controversy
with Liau, a matter concerning a quarrel over Lebensmittel (means of life; money).507
The narrative on Liau introduces an in-depth understanding of the LAI in 1927. While early
1927 had witnessed the euphoria of the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement in Brussels after
the 10-14 February Brussels Congress, towards the end of the year, one of its fervent supporters
experienced the organisation as a vision about to disappear. Despite the Brussels Congress having
paved the way for the establishment of the LAI, a majority of its activities in the aftermath of the
event only verified the difficulties encountered in trying to achieve a global influence. For
example, the idea and practical efforts required to establish national sections and to respond to
both the antagonism from the LSI and the increased suspicion from domestic and foreign national
security services. Yet, the defining factor was the Cominterns ambivalence towards reacting
immediately upon the success of the Brussels Congress, a conundrum which created tense
relations between the International Secretariat and the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.
By the time the Comintern had begun to understand the potential political and organisational
strength of the LAI, particularly with the formation of the Anti-Imperialist Commission in
Moscow in June 1927, the euphoria of the Brussels Congress had passed. Nonetheless, for the
Comintern, the Anti-Imperialist Commission represented its instrument of control, essential to
scrutinising the International Secretariat in Moscow. According to Mnzenberg, the LAI had to
create a second, forceful political demonstration in 1927; hence, the inaugural meeting of the LAI
General Council was to be a pivotal event, aimed at correcting the feeling of insecurity that had
begun to manifest itself within the LAI.

507

RGASPI 495/225/1043, 38-39, Letter from Hansin Liau and Dora Dombrowski-Liau, Moscow, An die deutsche
Vertretung bei EKKI, z.H. der Genossen Pieck, Heckert und Weber, Moscow, 3/2-1936; RGASPI 542/1/30, 1,
Handwritten letter from Robin Page Arnot, Frankfurt a/M, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/1-1929. Arnot recommended to
Kuusinen that the matter can very well lie over.

200

Chapter 4. Brussels Revisited

Experience has demonstrated that the League can be a powerful instrument to unite the
colonial peoples and the working classes of the imperialist countries in the struggle against
imperialism.
ECCI Anti-Imperialist
Moscow, 22/9-1927

Commission,

The League will become a powerful organ.

Sen Katayama, Moscow, 6/2-1928
On 25 November 1927, Lamine Senghor passed away at the age of 38 in Frjus, France. Paralysed
by tuberculosis and suffering from a loss of speech, Senghors death was caused by having served
in the French army during the Great War. An ardent defender of social rights for the black race,
and an outspoken anti-colonial activist in France, Senghors demise was a severe blow to the anticolonial movement in France. As the leader and co-founder of La Comit de Dfense de la Race
Ngre (CDNR) and a member of the PCF, Senghors fiery performance at the Brussels Congress
had given him a prominent position within the anti-imperialist movement. His performance in
Brussels also made the French Sret aware of the need to rigorously monitor Senghors
movements in 1927. As a member of the LAI Executive, Senghor was the spokesperson for the
African liberation struggle, especially for the West African movement in Europe. However, in the
summer of 1927, Senghor had resigned from the CDNR due to fractional disputes, only to
establish, together with the French Sudanese (now Mali) activist Garan Kouyat, the radical
organisation Ligue de Dfense de la Race Ngre (League for the Defence of the Negro Race;
LDRN).508 Senghors death was not, initially, given martyrdom status. However, in July 1928,
Mnzenberg wrote in the LAIs political organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review:
In France, the African Lamine Senghor, the brave representative of his suffering race, who
was elected a Member of the Executive Committee of the LAI, and whose speech at the
Congress was a passionate and mordant denunciation of French Imperialism, fell victim to

508

Langley 1973, pp.305-306. After July 1927, Senghor was a marked man, bedridden by disease and prior to his
own demise, both his father and son (Diene, 22 August 1927) had died. The LDRN organ in France, La Race Ngre,
published on May 1928, Senghors obituary, which declared un bon ngre, un sincre africain [] soldat de sa race,
RGASPI 542/1/10, 52-57, Summary of meeting with the LAI communist fraction, Brussels, 6/12-1927; Young 2001,
pp.263-269; Geiss, 1968, p.241; Holger Weiss (CoWoPa6), Glimpses of African Political Engagement in Weimar
Germany, bo Akademi; Philippe Dewitte, Les Mouvements ngres en France, 1919-1939, Paris, Harmattan (1985).

201

the rancour of the authorities. He was arrested and cast into prison, where he died a few
months later of tuberculosis.509
In a bizarre way, Senghors demise illustrated the fragile internal status within the LAI at the end
of 1927. The LSIs October analysis had contributed to enhancing the difficult work to solidify the
organisational work of the LAI in Europe, e.g. by establishing active national sections, while the
hierarchical relations at the International Secretariat and the lack of secure finances had defined its
structural limitations. Thus, the LAI General Council in Brussels on 9-11 December 1927, would
be a chance for the LAI, Mnzenberg and the Comintern to rectify former mistakes in order to
make the leap from demonstration to organisation.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse and interpret the continued endeavours of the LAI to
secure its organisational structure. The LAI General Council in Brussels emphasised the end of
euphoria, while at the very same moment the International Secretariat was struggling to establish
functional patterns of organisation. Hence, the passing of euphoria made the LAI liable to begin
answering to the protagonists (the Comintern, the national sections and the LAI Executive) for its
actions, as well as responding to the antagonists (the national security services and the LSI). The
LAI General Council served a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, to confirm the LAI as a
transcontinental actor and as the leader of the anti-imperialist movement and, on the other hand,
the International Secretariat expected that the moment had arrived to increase its control of the
national sections, by beginning to use the LAI as a hub for anti-colonial activists in Germany,
Europe and beyond. The LAI kom.Fraktion and the Comintern referred to control as being the
overriding guiding principle behind the preparations for the LAI General Council meeting.
Moreover, the LSI analysis had forced the Anti-Imperialist Commission in Moscow to concede
that there existed a real chance of losing control over a powerful instrument uniting the colonial
peoples and the working classes of the imperialist countries. This required, therefore, the
kom.Fraktion to act vigilantly against the representatives of the socialist movement within the
LAI:
[] the Social Democratic and Reformist leaders of the labour movements in the imperialist
countries, together with the radical intellectual defenders of imperialism, are trying to
sabotage the League and capture its leadership. In view of this danger, the activities of the

509

Mnzenberg 1928, pp.4-10. The British LAI Section protested against the arrests of Senghor in France. On 7 April
1927, at a meeting of the provisional committee of the British LAI Section in the House of Commons in London, the
section adopted [A] protest against the arrest signed by all the members and forwarded to the French government
due to Senghors arrest in Paris on his return from the Brussels Congress on account of his speeches, see RGASPI
542/1/10, 1-3, Report on the British LAI Section, London, to International Secretariat, Berlin, 7/4-1927.

202

Communist

fraction

organisationally.

inside

the

League

must

be

strengthened

politically

and

510

From a chronological and thematic perspective, this chapter depicts and analyses the evolutionary
road travelled by the LAI prior to the Sixth International Comintern Congress (17 July 1928 1
September) in Moscow.
*
The Road to Revisiting Brussels
Mnzenbergs original idea was to arrange the first LAI General Council in Paris in November
1927. The Reichskommissar in Berlin noticed how Mnzenberg described this first meeting of the
council as being more of an enlarged anti-colonial conference announcing the unification of the
anti-imperialist movement on an organisational and ideological level, one which would link the
LAI to the revolutionary struggle.511 In comparison to the improvised and hasty preparatory
work prior to the Brussels Congress, the LAI General Council needed proper organisation. On 10
September 1927, Mnzenberg sent a list of the delegates who would be receiving an invitation to
Petrov at the Eastern Secretariat. If Moscow had any additional names to add to the list,
Mnzenberg had to have the names as soon as possible.512 However, at an early stage, Mnzenberg
had to find a new location for the council after the French Sret denied the LAI the possibility of
convening the event in Paris, leaving Mnzenberg with a second option: Amsterdam.513 In
October, Mnzenberg met Fimmen in Amsterdam. During their discussion, Fimmen told
Mnzenberg that the Dutch government intended to refuse every visa application from party
comrades planning to enter the Netherlands. The only option left for Mnzenberg was to revisit
Brussels.514
Mnzenberg had counted on inviting 89 delegates at a total cost of $10,695, a figure that
would cover both travel and administrative expenses. The document, Zur Sitzung des
Generalrates werden eingeladen, compiled by Mnzenberg and sent to Petrovsky (who passed it
on to Piatnitsky), reveals who the invited delegates were: the LAI Honorary Presidium (Barbusse,
510

RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven fr die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-1927 [German version]; RGASPI
495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM,
18/11-1927 [English version].
511
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/127, 109, 15. Reichskommissar: Liga gegen koloniale Unterdrckung, November 1927.
512
RGASPI 542/1/10, 20, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrov, Moscow, 10/9-1927; RGASPI 542/1/10, 21-22,
Zur Sitzung des Generalrates werden eingeladen, Mnzenberg, Berlin, 10/9-1927.
513
RGASPI 495/19/319, 9, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky/Bennet, Moscow, 15/9-1927; RGASPI
542/1/10, 23, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 15/9-1927. The letters from Mnzenberg to
Petrovsky and Kuusinen were identical, and arrived in Moscow on September 26.
514
RGASPI 495/30/350, 26, Letter from Mnzenberg, Amsterdam, to Bennet, Moscow, 23/10-1927. Any documents
clarifying why Mnzenberg opted for Brussels as the arena for the LAI General Council remain missing. However, it
must have been a logical choice, suggesting that Gibarti only had to renew his contact with Emile Vandervelde.

203

Einstein, Frau Sun Yat-sen and Lu Chung Lin), the LAI Executive (Fimmen, Nehru, Liau,
Senghor, Marteaux, Mnzenberg, Ugarte, Hatta, Gibarti, Baldwin and Bridgeman), the General
Council (Chen Kuen of the Central Council of the All Chinese Labour Union from Canton, Mella,
Martinez, Katayama, Semaun, Colraine, Vasconcelos, A. Alminiana of the Verband fr die
Unabhngigkeit der Philippinen, Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan Bey, Hadj-Ahmed Messali, Kin Fa
Lin, Assadoff, Gomez and Pollitt [for the remaining members, see footnote below]). Additional
guests Mnzenberg wanted to invite were the leader of the Tripoli-based Islamic organisation
Senussi (in French: Sanussi) Sidi Ben Achmed, the general secretary of the Destour Party [Destour
is the Arabic term for constitution] in Tunisia Ahmed Assafi, the chairman of the Arab Congress
Djemal Effendi El Husseini, the representative of the India LAI Section in Bombay Jhabwala,
Hasrat Mohani, Diego Rivera, the member of the Brazilian parliament Mauricio de Lacerda,
Clements Kadalie of the trade union Industrial and Commercial Union in South Africa, the South
African communist William Henry (Bill) Andrews as delegate of the South African Trade Union
Congress and an unknown representative by the name of Smith from the trade union Sierra
Leone Railway Workers Union.515
Getting everyone to attend the council was easier said than done. In October, Nehru visited
Paris, where he frequently met up with Gibarti. At one of their rendezvous, Nehru told Gibarti that
he could not attend the General Council because he was intending to visit Moscow, with his father
Motilal, to witness the celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Russian revolution. After
Moscow, Nehru expected to return to Paris (he arrived in Paris at the end of November), before
travelling back to India. Apparently, Nehru left Marseille by boat on 2 December, in the company
of his wife, sister and daughter, and returned to India, where he attended the INC congress at
Madras. Nonetheless, Motilal Nehru stayed behind in Europe for an additional three months and,
among many things, attended the LAI General Council.516 The African delegates were a challenge
for Mnzenberg. At the Brussels Congress, Richard B. Moore and the Negro Commission had
sorted out the Negro question. However, and despite Senghors deteriorating health and frequent
confinement in prison, the General Council had to introduce some kind of revised policy on the
515

RGASPI 495/19/319, 10-12, Zur Sitzung des Generalrates werden eingeladen, Mnzenberg, Berlin, to
Petrovsky/Bennet, Moscow, 15/9-1927. Additional members of the LAI General Council were: Brockway, S. O.
Davies, Saklatvala, Henriette Roland-Holst, the secretary of the Belgian LAI Section Georges Grard, the editor P. S.
Spaak and Charles Plisnier from Belgium, journalist Victorrio Verri (from Italy, but living in Moscow), Guido Miglioli
from Italy, Madame Duchne, Lon Vernochet, Albert Fournier, Theodor Lessing, Alfons Goldschmidt, Ledebour,
Frau Helene Stcker and Nejedly from Prague, Czechoslovakia. For a copy of the list (addressed to Kuusinen), see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/10, 24-26.
516
RGASPI 542/1/18, 59, Letter from Nehru, Paris, to Chatto, Berlin, 22/10-1927. The International Secretariat
forwarded Nehrus letter to Petrovsky in Moscow. Nehru later described the Moscow visit as worthwhile,
particularly as the experience provided a background which contradicted his somewhat preconceived understanding
of Soviet Russia and the Bolshevik regime. For Motilal Nehru, the journey was a novel, Nehru 1942 (1953), pp.164165.

204

African question, as well as begin the work of securing connections with the African continent.
Mnzenberg began the search in Moscow by contacting both the KUTV and other contacts who
knew of African individuals who were either living in or were visiting the city. Early on,
Mnzenberg omitted Smith, the unknown delegate of the Sierra Leone Railway Workers Union,
and replaced him with the Chairman, E. A. Richards. Richards was visiting Moscow in the
company of a delegation in connection with the celebration of the Tenth anniversary of the Russian
Revolution. For Mnzenberg, he was a suitable candidate to send directly en route from Moscow
to Brussels. Yet, this idea came to nothing. In November, Richards informed the International
Secretariat that he had no chance of arriving in time for the council in Brussels. Nevertheless,
Richards suggested a replacement: the West African Kweku Bankole Awooner-Renner (later the
founder of the Ashanti Freedom Society in West Africa in the 1930s), who, in 1927, was pursuing
studies at the KUTV in Moscow. Awooner-Renner had received the invitation from Richards in
person in Moscow and asked whether the Eastern Secretariat could approve sending him to
Brussels.517 Another example was the case of Ngyuen Ai Quoc (Ngyuen the Patriot, better
known as Ho Chi Minh) and his experience of the LAI General Council. According to William J.
Duikers biography, in 1927 Ngyuen Ai Quoc was on the verge of becoming an experienced
Comintern emissary. The LAI General Council in Brussels was a rewarding event for Ngyuen Ai
Quoc, after a tedious journey from Moscow, Berlin and Paris, arriving in Brussels only to meet and
discuss with other anti-colonial activists, e.g. Sukarno, Soong Qingling (Sun Yat-sens widow) and
Katayama.518
The General Council agenda focused on the LAIs political and organisational development
since its inception in Brussels. This included a discussion on China, India, the Arab countries,
Indonesia, the imperialist terror in the colonies, the war threat [against the Soviet Union] and the
colonial exploitation and the labour unions in the imperialist countries.519 A-I-Z published an
517

RGASPI 542/1/10, 24-26, Zur Sitzung des Generalrates werden eingeladen, Mnzenberg, Berlin, September, 1927.
In October 1927, Clements Kadalie published the article, The Old and the New Africa, in Labour Monthly, London,
Vol.9, No.10, pp.624-631; RGASPI 542/1/8, 171, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 1/10-1927.
Mnzenberg calculated with the participation of La Guma and Gumede at the General Council, however, their visit to
the Soviet Union made it impossible to attend; fol. RGASPI 542/1/8, 190, (copy) letter from E.A. Richards, Moscow
(Hotel Passage), to the Secretary, LAI, Berlin, 12/11-1927; RGASPI 495/64/166, 1-2, Handwritten letter from Kweku
Bankole [Awooner-Renner], Moscow, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 14/11-1927. For Awooner-Renner, see
Weiss (2011), and for an analysis of African and Black Americans students at the educational units of the Comintern in
Moscow, see Woodford McClellan, Africans and Americans in the Comintern Schools, 1925-1934, in The
International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol.26, No.2 (1993), Boston University African Studies Centre,
pp.371-390; A-I-Z, II. Brsseler Kongress, VI Jahrg., Nr.50, 14/12-1927. See also Linden Lewis, Richard B.
Moore: The Making of a Caribbean Organic Intellectual, in Journal of Black Studies, Vol.25, No.5 (May, 1995), Sage
Publications, pp.589-609.
518
The activities of Ho Chi Minh in Europe prior to his participation at the LAI General Council were of a diverse
nature. In October, he carried out work at the International Secretariat in Berlin, while in November he visited the PCF
in Paris, see William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, Hyperion, New York, 2000, pp.148-149.
519
The bulk of documents relating to the LAI General Council (resolutions and protocols), are located in the LAI fond,

205

account, which stated that the council was the second Brussels Congress (II Brsseler
Kongress); however, this event was not open to the public. According to the German legation in
Brussels, the council convened behind closed doors in the Madeleine Haal, and the delegates
seemed to act upon a directive not to utter a single word to the press.520 This was a strategy which
complied with the instructions contrived by the Anti-Imperialist Commission directing the
council to focus on the political situations in China, India and North Africa (Egypt), and to
establish a consensus to protest against the social democratic movement in Europe, the LSI and the
KMT. The Anti-Imperialist Commission warned the International Secretariat of the possible risk
of having to confront the danger of becoming an organ of reformist penetration into the colonial
nationalist and labour movements. Hence, to curb such a development, the International
Secretariat needed to act cautiously, while still reinforcing the basic tasks of the LAI:
The League must base itself on all classes and elements antagonistic to imperialism. The
basic task of the League is to penetrate the broad democratic mass organisations in the
colonial countries. With this purpose in mind every available means should be utilised. The
intellectuals in the colonial countries play an important role in the anti-imperialist struggle.
[] Anti-imperialist propaganda must be distributed among the colonial students in Europe
who can be used to establish contact with the nationalist revolutionary movements in their
respective countries. In the imperialist countries the League must carry on an anti-imperialist
campaign inside the workers, peasants and democratic organisations. It must find support
in the trade unions, co-operatives, peasant organisations, []521
The Anti-Imperialist Commission did, however, introduce a more radical approach for LAI
activities which, in a sense, indicated a departure from its original outline. Above all, the
suggestion to replace leading figures in the social democratic and bourgeois radical circles in the
imperialist countries in the LAI with elements [colonial students] antagonistic to imperialism
pointed towards a shift. If the LAI carried out the above, the Anti-Imperialist Commission
believed that this would be the beginning of a united front in the colonial countries which, in
yet, a list of the attending delegates is missing. Further, the IISG LAI Collection contains resolutions and the agenda of
the council (3392.1/111, Provisorische Tagesordnung der Generalratssitzung, LAI, Brssel, December 1927). A copy
of the agenda is also filed at SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Provisorische Tagungsordnung [undated] 1927.
According to the agenda, the key speakers were Fimmen, Gibarti, Mme. Sun-Yat-Sen, Motilal Nehru, the Arab Shekib
Arslan, Scott Nearing and Barbusse.
520
A-I-Z, 1924 Nov. 1927 Dez., Jahrg.VI, Nr. 50, 14/12-1927, Berlin, 2. A-I-Z reported that the conference was
convened under different circumstances in comparison to the first Brussels Congress, whereas the German legation
in Brussels notified the Auswrtige Amt that it seemed as if the LAI was a genuine German affair, see SAPMO-BA
ZPA R1001/6751, 89, Deutsche Gesandtschaft, Brssel, an das Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 14/12-1927.
521
RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven fr die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-1927 [German version]; RGASPI
495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM,
18/11-1927 [English version]. The Anti-Imperialist Commission defined Egypt and the backward colonial
countries (African colonies and some Latin-American countries) as falling within the political boundaries of the
LAI's general political line.

206

turn, would win over anti-colonial organisations and national revolutionary activists in the
struggle against both colonialism and social democracy. Why did the Anti-Imperialist
Commission advocate a possible purge of the LAI Executive? Evidently, this was due to a fear
emanating from the LSIs October analysis. Thus, the Anti-Imperialist Commission expected the
General Council to protest against the LSI, and those who did not should preferably leave the LAI.
However, this proposal also had the potential to shatter the very concept of the LAI. In the end, the
General Council responded to the LSIs analysis in the Resolution of the General Council of the
League against Imperialism on the attitude of the IInd International. According to this resolution,
the LAI objected to the misleading, unjustified and untrue analysis by the LSI, particularly as it
violated the principles of Socialism, in support of the capitalist and imperialist governments.
However, the endorsed resolution was serene, in comparison to the original version. The original
version of the resolution (authored by the Anti-Imperialist Commission) was a verbal attack
against the LSI, using callous terms, e.g. branding the leaders of social democracy as agents of
imperialism. The endorsed resolution omitted these kinds of phrases, recommending that every
worker and member of social democratic and socialist parties (known to be affiliated to the LSI)
protect socialist values by becoming either individual or collective members of the LAI.522
The LAI General Council was a test of faith for the Comintern to see whether the LAI could
remain steady in our hands. Katayama was the unofficial ECCI representative at the council.
According to Katayamas report to the Eastern Secretariat on 6 February 1928, the council was the
first gathering of importance after the Brussels Congress to enshrine the LAI as the leader of a
movement in support of the colonial peoples. Katayama seemed convinced that the communists
were in total control over the aim of the LAI:
[The LAI] aims to connect with national revolutionary parties in the colonial and semicolonial countries, and with fighting anti-imperialist groups in Europe and America. The
communists shall hold the most important authoritative positions within the national sections
of the LAI and in the International Secretariat, and a majority in the [] Executive, and
function more or less indiscreetly.523

522

According to the introductory note in the resolution, the LAI based their response on the document of 7th October
1927, published by the LSI (Second International) presenting itself as a History of the League against Imperialism
and denying the claim that the LAI was nothing but a communist manoeuvre, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/13, 11,
Resolution of the General Council of the League against Imperialism on the attitude of the II:nd International, LAI
General Council, Brussels, 9-11-1927. RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven fr die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/91927 [German version]; RGASPI 495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE
LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM, 18/11-1927 [English version]. The pamphlet Rsolutions adoptes la session
du conseil gnral tenue Bruxelles, included every resolution.
523
RGASPI 542/1/26, 18-32, General Council of League Against Imperialism, Sen Katayama, 6/2-1928; RGASPI
542/1/13, 51-54, Resolutions Entwurf, 6/12-1927.

207

The authoritative positions of the communists in the LAI were kept secret from the noncommunist members. After the council, Mnzenberg stated in his article, Against Colonial
Oppression, published in the European communist and socialist press, that the General Council
had focused essentially on solving organisational questions, rather than discussing political
questions. Admitting that the teething problems associated with establishing functional and active
national sections were proving to be far more difficult than expected, Mnzenberg emphasised the
necessity of finding a solution to this organisational problem.524
Roy did not attend the council; however, he summoned the Anti-Imperialist Commission in
Moscow to a meeting in the Red Corner at Comintern headquarters to discuss the event, the LAI
and anti-imperialist propaganda.525 Katayama observed in his report to the ECCI Secretariat that
the LAI was still in its formative period, although we have had two Conferences, in February and
December 1927. Despite the international circulation of pamphlets, resolutions and manifestos,
the results were inadequate:
The basis of the League is weak and not wide enough. The League is still in the state of
preparation and planning. The League is not yet based on mass organisation and, in the
colonial and semi-colonial countries, propaganda work has hardly been started. It must be
improved and developed, by all possible means, into a real mass organisation. [] The
supreme task of the LAI is to apply the theory and practics [sic] contained in the writing and
deeds accomplished by Lenin.526
Katayama criticised the incapacity of the International Secretariat to turn the LAI into or at least
get the organisation to pose as a mass organisation. According to Mustafa Haikals analysis, the
council was the start of a disintegrative process within the LAI.527 This observation partly
explains why the Comintern pressured the LAI into carrying out the directives from Moscow, and
partly confirms why the council served as an opportunity to see whether the communists were still
in control of the LAI. However, the Comintern had, from the very beginning, controlled the LAI, a
point of view overlooked by Haikal.
The new constitution of the LAI Executive at the council confirmed the continuing strategy of
the Comintern to support a sympathising communist organisation. Maxton assumed Lansburys
524

RGASPI 542/1/13, 1-2, Organisationsresolution, Brsseler Tagung, 9-11 Dezember 1927. The
Organisationsresolution was merely a reprint of the one introduced in Brussels on 14 February, 1927; Willi
Mnzenberg, Mot kolonialt frtryck, in Norrskensflamman, Lule, 30/12-1927, 6-7.
525
Hans Piazza referred to Roys report in the article Manabendra Nath Roy. Ein alter und bewhrter Soldat in
Indiens Freiheitskampf, in Ketzer im Kommunismus. 23 biographisches Essays, Theodor Bergmann/Mario Kessler
(Hrsg.), VSA-Verlag Hamburg, 2000, p.206, see fol. 542/1/8, 185ff. For the meeting in the Red Corner, see fol.
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 1, Short note (in French) [stamped date] 13/1-1928.
526
RGASPI 495/18/613, 20-23, Information regarding the Press Organ of the LAI (English version), Katayama,
submitted to the ECCI Secretariat, 24/1-1928.
527
Haikal 1992, pp.239-252.

208

position as Chairman (Brockway had temporarily held this position during the autumn of 1927),
and Fimmen continued as vice-deputy. Liau and Gibarti were, despite Liaus on-going conflict
with both Mnzenberg and Gibarti, nominated as secretaries at the International Secretariat. The
LAI Executive comprised Nehru, the delegate of the toile Nord-Africaine Mustapha Chedli,
Hatta, Saklatvala, Mme. Duchne, Mnzenberg, Marteaux, Rivera, Bridgeman and Baldwin.
According to the International Secretariat, the General Council celebrated the LAI as a
transcontinental actor, with active sections and members in Europe, North Africa, USA, Mexico,
India, Indonesia and China.528
*
An Excursus: The Chinese Question
The Anti-Imperialist Commission instructed Mnzenberg to address the Chinese question
decisively at the General Council. The primary aim of this request was to increase the LAIs
contacts with revolutionary organisations in China, rather than depend on the benevolence of
bourgeois nationalist and reformist labour leaders in China.529 According to the resolution on
China adopted at the council, the next urgent political task for the LAI was to popularise the
Chinese nationalist movement in Europe and the USA by strengthening the anti-imperialist
propaganda within the labour movement. Above all, the LAI General Council had to demonstrate
to the public that, despite the set-backs suffered by the movement for freedom in a number of
colonial countries, these did not provide any reason for pessimism. The supporters of the
Chinese revolution had to organise and mobilise world-wide resistance, regardless of the LSIs
official policy, which merely defended imperialist intervention in China.530 The explanation
for the tone of this resolution was, however, the outcome of a hasty, internal discussion.
Prepared just in time for the opening of the General Council, the Chinese resolution was a
result of the recent turn of events in China, i.e. the Canton [Guangzhou] insurrection in November
1927, which had ended with the KMTs repression of the Chinese communist movement. After the
KMTs putsch in April 1927, the CPCh had primarily focused its activities on organising and
supporting peasant rebellions. According to the leaders of the CPCh, it was essential to sustain
528

Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nr.1, 15/3-1928.

RGASPI 495/103/155, 6-11, Direktiven fr die Arbeit der LAI, Moscow, 22/9-1927 [German version]; RGASPI
495/103/155, 23-27, Confidential, DIRECTIVES FOR THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE AGAINST IMPERIALISM,
18/11-1927 [English version].
530
For the draft, see RGASPI 542/1/13, 51-54, Resolution Entwurf, December, 1927; RGASPI 542/1/13, 43-44,
Resolution des Exekutiv-Komitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, LAI, Brussels,
General Council, 9-11/12-1927. Copies of the resolutions on China and the political resolution are filed at the IISG
LAI Collection 3392.1/118, Political Resolution of the General Council of the LAI, Brussels Conference, 9-11/1927,
and, 3392.1/112, Resolution of the General Council of the LAI on the Chinese Question, Brussels Conference, 911/1927.
529

209

social unrest in cities and villages at any cost and, if successful, this would lead to a general
insurrection and the establishment of local Soviets, an undertaking supported by the Comintern.
In November, Heinz Neumann left Moscow with the instruction to travel to Canton and assist
Lominadze in organising an insurrection in the Canton commune, a historic reference to the
1871 Paris commune. However, the insurrection failed embarrassingly and was an extraordinarily
violent episode and, for both Neumann and Lominadze, a personal disaster. The Canton
commune lasted only three days, ending with a heavy loss of human life, leaving the Soviet
consulate in Canton ransacked and five Soviet diplomats executed by the KMT. This conclusive
end also marked the definitive end of diplomatic relations between the KMT and the Soviet Union,
as well as making it more difficult for the Comintern to organise covert operations in China.531
For Liau, the Canton insurrection was an ideal opportunity to organise proletarian solidarity
demonstrations in Germany and Europe; however, he soon realised that neither Mnzenberg nor
Gibarti seemed willing to publish a single publication on the topic. On 28 December, with the
help of a loan conceivably issued by the ZK KPD, Liau published an official LAI protest against
the KMTs conduct in suppressing the insurrection.532 The China question was Liaus source of
inspiration, a devotion he shared with other activists of Chinese origin. Thus, one method to spread
an opinion on what was happening in China was to send some of these activists on missions within
Europe. For example, Liau instructed the Chinese Chao-Ting Chi (see Birth) to travel to London
and assist the British LAI Section in organising an extensive campaign for the defence and
support of the Chinese revolution. For Liau, Chi was the ideal candidate due to his commitment
to anti-colonial ideals. Nevertheless, this undertaking ended abruptly. When the ship Stadt
Antwerpen docked in Dover, England on 11 January, British port authorities refused to let Chi
enter the country.533
531

In compliance with a direct order from Stalin, the communists in China staged the Canton insurrection. However,
comparing the Canton commune with the socialist Paris commune, which lasted for only about two months
(March to 28 May 1871) was bold, see Degras vol.II 1960, pp.414-415, and Sassoon 1996, p.12.
532
RGASPI 542/1/29, 2, Letter from Liau, Berlin, to Petrovsky, Moscow, 13/1-1928.
533
On 14 January, Chao-Ting Chi sent a letter to Liau, which provided details on the failure of the mission. Chi left
Berlin on 10 January and boarded the boat Stadt Antwerpen at Oostende, final destination Dover. Arriving on
January 11, British port authorities refused Chi permission to enter the country because his passport had a Russian
visa. According to Chi, the port authorities turned hostile, subjected him to interrogation and conducted a thorough
search of his luggage. Requested to answer whether he had any personal relations with any suspected individuals
[unknown] in England, or whether Chi had any information about King Street in London [CPGB headquarters] and
whether the name Larkin meant anything to him. According to Chi, the officers received the following statement: I
am a student of good standing at the Law School of the University of Chicago. As I intended to spend a few months
studying in Great Britain and on the continent of Europe, I obtained an English visa for a whole year as well as French
and German visas for the same period [inserted in handwriting in the document]. I left America on 15th October 1927
and arrived in Berlin [Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont states that Chi attended the Brussels Congress,
however] via Havre at the end of October. As some countrymen of mine intended visiting Moscow to witness the 10th
Anniversary Celebrations I joined the group and was in Russia till 7th December. I have since been in Germany. Early
in the present month I announced to the International Office of the LAI my intention to go to Great Britain and the
Secretary [Liau] suggested that I should help the British League to place the true facts regarding the situation in China

210

By the beginning of 1928, the International Secretariat seemed incapable of organising

independent campaigns, at least in Liaus opinion. Furthermore, on 28 June 1928, Liaus
scepticism was more or less confirmed when Mnzenberg informed the International Secretariat at
a meeting in Berlin that the IAH aimed to assume responsibility over the Chinese campaign.
Mnzenberg stated that the IAH was preparing to launch the relief campaign, Aid to the Chinese
Workers (Hilfe fr die Chinesischen Arbeiter), and expected to use both LAI and LHR networks
to circulate propaganda. Prominent intellectuals and left-wing politicians in Germany had
promised to both sign petitions and defend the campaign in public, Mnzenberg stated. Hence, the
campaign was a replica of the strategies developed in connection with the Hands off China
campaign and the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee.534
The aftermath of the LAI General Council indicated that the LAI was suffering from
organisational constraints. On 11 December 1927, several of the delegates left Brussels with the
feeling that the LAI was heading towards an uncertain future.
*
Pre-empting the Disintegration: The Case of the British LAI Section
The provisional British LAI Section faced an ideological confrontation after the LAI General
Council. Maxton, Bridgeman and Beckett, the non-communist members, questioned the real
motives of the LAI and its communist representatives. Furthermore, Pollitt questioned the doubts
and the incompetence of its non-communist members:
You people said that this was a communist manoeuvre. But for twelve months we
communists have deliberately kept out of it in order to let you have a chance. And now, we
and the working class can see that you have sabotaged it for twelve months, that you were
not capable of doing anything.535
The communist connections had taken on an overt character at the General Council, thus, the noncommunist members pondered over the available options for leaving the LAI. For Pollitt, the fear

before the British people. Chi explained to Liau that he had managed to avoid a body search by protesting that it was
a violation of his personal rights. However, the authorities had examined every slip of paper. In the end, British
authorities decided to prohibit Chi from stepping onto British soil (paragraph 1/3g), hearing from a police officer
that we do not want you in England, thats all, see Gibarti (ed.) 1927, p.234; RGASPI 542/1/29, 6-7, Report by
Chao-Ting Chi to Liau, International Secretariat, Berlin, 14/1-928. Liau edited the report from Chi and included it in
the March issue of the Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus (Berlin, Nr.1, 15/3-1928).
534
RGASPI 542/1/27, 31, Excerpts, protocol from a meeting at the International Secretariat, Berlin, 29/6-1928;
RGASPI 542/1/27, 29-30, Protocol, International Secretariat, Berlin, 29/6-1928. To strengthen the campaign,
Mnzenberg used the services of the Rote Front Kmpfer, the German Peace Association (Deutschen
Friedensgesellschaft), the Socialist Association (Sozialistischer Bund) and Profintern. The campaign also
established local branches in Hamburg, Frankfurt and Dresden.
535
RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Report from Great Britain, author: Petrovsky, London, to the Eastern Secretariat,
Moscow, 4/3-1928.

211

and hesitancy of Maxton, Bridgeman and Beckett exposed the need to coerce them, and to
convince the section to adhere to the CPGBs instructions. Apparently, in 1928 the situation within
the provisional British LAI Section was mirroring the political context of the British labour and
communist movement. According to Matthew Worley, in 1927-32 the CPGB found itself
increasingly detached from the mainstream of the British labour movement due to its support
and endorsement of a political culture which focused on revolutionary class-consciousness.536 In
1928, the provisional British LAI Section was no exception to the above. The communist
members in the provisional LAI committee seem to have considered the LAI as an enigma,
particularly from the perspective of transforming the committee into a vigorous section. On 7 July,
1928, at the Essex Hall in London, the question was, in a sense, solved at the inaugural
conference of the British LAI Section. From the beginning of 1928, right up until the Essex Hall
conference in July, it had been a process whereby the communists tried to coerce but also to save
the provisional LAI committee from collapsing under its own weight.
On 15 December 1927, the members of the provisional LAI committee had a meeting in
London, at which Bridgeman spoke of his shattered faith in the LAI, suggesting the formation of
an Imperialism Committee of the ILP in order to salvage his devotion to the anti-colonial cause.
Petrovsky (whether or not he was present at the meeting is unknown) wrote that Saklatvala had
told Bridgeman to wait before reaching a final decision. However, after the meeting, Saklatvala
notified Rothstein at the CPGB Colonial Commission about what had happened. Rothstein asked
Saklatvala whether it was necessary to re-organise the committee, then told Saklatvala to compile
a list of names of suitable candidates to replace the ILP representatives.537
Bridgemans cynicism caused the CPGB to react in order to maintain control of the
provisional committee. To test the gloomy attitude among the non-communist members, the
committee had to establish anti-imperialist activism in London and convince the non-communist
members to support the cause. Apparently, nothing happened in January and, on 27 February, the
communists strode into action. Saklatvala and Pollitt accused Bridgeman, Beckett and Maxton of
ignoring the LAI, to which they responded that the LAI was a hopeless proposition, referring to
the opinion of the Labour Party, which had stated that the LAI was very bad from the principal
[sic] point of view and also politically.538 This was the lowest point in the provisional LAI

536

Worley 2002, p.3, 194.

RGASPI 495/100/545, 2-5, Report by Petrovsky on the British LAI Section, 20/4-1928. Saklatvala suggested that
the CPGB member, Vera Crossly, should assume Bridgemans position as secretary.
538
RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to unknown receiver, 4/3-1928. The receiver of
Petrovskys letter is unclear; however, the most likely recipients must have been either the Anti-Imperialist
Commission, the Eastern Secretariat or the Colonial Commission of the CPGB.
537

212

committee, indicating that the LAI had reached a dead-end in Great Britain. However, Petrovsky
emerged as the architect capable of solving the crisis.
In the beginning of March, Petrovsky returned to London after having attended the Ninth
ECCI Plenum in Moscow (9-25 February, 1928). In Moscow, Petrovsky had been involved in the
discussion of the English question, an experience Petrovsky most likely had on his mind when
he attended a meeting of the provisional LAI committee in London in March. According to
Petrovsky, Maxton threatened to resign as LAI Chairman, whereas Bridgeman accused Gibarti of
spoiling everything all the time. The response from the communist members was fierce, and the
very strong attack by Pollitt and Saklatvala had been a very funny scene to witness, Petrovsky
concluded. Nevertheless, the meeting did not signal the definitive end and, before the session was
over, Maxton, Beckett and Bridgeman requested some time to consult the ILP Executive before
reaching a decision on how to act. A couple of days after the meeting, Maxton contacted
Saklatvala in London and explained that the LAI had a glorious future in England, and promised
to remain in the LAI along with Bridgeman and Beckett.539 What was the reason for Maxtons,
Becketts and Bridgemans change of heart? The most likely explanation is the realisation that if
they left the provisional LAI committee, the communists would completely control the LAIs
work in Great Britain and, therefore, be able to influence the British anti-imperialist movement.
Petrovsky informed the Eastern Secretariat that the CPGB had to be more aggressive with the
Maxton people. Hence, Petrovsky appointed Saklatvala as his liaison to supervise the
provisional LAI committee and, if Bridgeman and Maxton chose to leave or if the Colonial
Commission of the CPGB deleted their names, the communists had to increase their influence over
the committee. A part of this scheme was to nominate Joan Thompson, CPGB member, to assume
Bridgemans position as organiser, while getting Bridgeman to act as political secretary. Thus, at
some level, Petrovsky still considered Bridgeman to be a valuable asset for the LAI in Great
Britain. The nomination of Thompson as organiser was, however, of a more subtle nature. In fact,
Emile Burns, CPGB member and secretary of the British section of the Friends of Soviet Russia as
well as Head of the Labour Research Department (LRD) in London, had a huge influence over

539

TNA KV2/1433, Biographical information, Bennet/Petrovsky/Goldfarb, 1928-1929. MI5 concluded that Petrovsky
was the leader of a group within the ECCI which favoured a closer rapprochement with the CPGB. This concerned a
policy shift in the CPGB, linked to the then current political situation in Great Britain. While the bourgeois
dictatorship in Great Britain was no longer a liberal force, but rather a reactionary force according to the
Comintern, the Ninth ECCI Plenum adopted a resolution which instructed the CPGB to begin to act as an
independent organisation rather than seeking collaborations with the Labour Party and the Trade Union General
Council. At the Ninth ECCI Plenum, Petrovsky was one of the central actors to discuss the English question, see
Degras vol.II 1960, 427-428; RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to unknown receiver, 4/31928.

213

Thompson and could therefore monitor the work of the provisional LAI committee and
influence the political agenda via Thompson.540
Petrovskys primary aim, however, was to transform the provisional committee into an active
and organised section, capable of carrying out anti-imperialist activism in Great Britain. In
comparison to Mnzenbergs vision, Petrovsky had a different approach planned for this section.
While Mnzenberg expected the British LAI Section to focus primarily on propaganda (campaigns
and public demonstrations), Petrovsky understood that the political realities and cultures in Great
Britain and Germany were different. For Petrovsky, parliamentary activism was the key in a
British context, rather than taking the movement out onto the streets. Yet, this did not
underestimate the value of propaganda, especially as parliamentary activism went hand-in-hand
with propaganda, e.g. the publication of a weekly LAI bulletin in England. The parliamentary
approach was more than an idea. On 4 April, Saklatvala delivered a speech (prepared in advance
by the CPGBs Colonial Commission) in the House of Commons, a performance Petrovsky
described as the first big public advertisement in England of the LAI. Shortly after the speech,
the provisional LAI committee released a British LAI bulletin, enclosed in Mitteilungsblatt der
Liga gegen Imperialismus, published by the International Secretariat. In this bulletin, Bridgeman
explained the inherent weakness of the provisional LAI committee:
The main difficulty which confronts the Committee of the British Section is that those
associated with it can only devote a fraction of their busy lives to the work of the League.
The members have neither time nor money, while to make the work of the League effective
full-time work is required.541
To celebrate the leap from a provisional LAI committee to becoming an LAI section,
Mnzenberg instructed Maxton and Bridgeman on how to prepare the Essex Hall conference in
London.542
540

RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to unknown receiver, 4/3-1928. According to Emile
Burns' autobiography, filed in his personal file (lichnye delo) in the Comintern Archive, Burns was in charge of
informal group discussions of the Party fraction at the LRD. The CPGB had infiltrated the LRD, an institution
which, from the beginning, functioned as an independent actor in the service of the British labour movement, which in
the 1920s, had become a centre and liaison service for the Comintern emissaries on covert missions in Great Britain.
Located in London, the public character of the LRD was to facilitate with left-wing information and propaganda of a
scholarly character on the socialist and labour movement, statistics and on the trade unions. According to Philip Spratt,
the communists penetrated the LRD and used it as a cover and an agency for dispensing propaganda, see RGASPI
495/198/11, 64-68, Autobiography, Emile Burns, 11/1-1932; Haithcox 1971, p.52; Spratt 1955, p.22.
541
Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen Imperialismus. Internationales Sekretariat, Berlin, Nr.2, 21/4-1928. Supplement.
British Section, Reginald Bridgeman, 15/4-1928; RGASPI 495/100/545, 1, Letter from Petrovsky, London, to
unknown receiver, 4/3-1928.
542
Maxton and Bridgeman acted as the formal organisers of the LAI conference at Essex Hall in London. However,
Mnzenberg provided Maxton with the original agenda for the event, whereas the latter received the instruction to
make the best of the opportunity to join up thousands of individual members, to win them over to support the LAI
and, finally, to establish a united front against imperialism together with left-wing social democrats, fol. RGASPI
542/1/29, 28-29, Confidential letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Maxton, London, 6/6-1928. A copy of this letter was

214

The organisational confusion prevalent within the LAI was not solved during the LAI General
Council in Brussels; it merely increased or exposed existing problems. Nevertheless, Mnzenberg
believed that the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement were heading towards a brighter future,
due to the Brussels Conference and on the initiative of the LAI [] in numerous countries over
the past months strong sections of the League have been formed.543 Nevertheless, the LAI
General Council marked the definitive end of the euphoria.
*
The End of Euphoria
I consider the situation to be bleak. There is no energy, diplomacy or moral strength [] The
LAI is an extremely important movement, and we must try to return to its 1927 basis []
The LAI, for the moment, has neither head nor feet.
Fimmen, LAI Executive Committee,
Brussels, 28/4-1928
The International Secretariat organised a public meeting in Berlin on 16 December, 1927, at which
Mnzenberg proclaimed both the results of the LAI General Council and the LAIs international
expansion.544 After Fimmen had arrived back in Amsterdam after the General Council, he sent a
letter to Mnzenberg explaining that he was thinking of resigning as vice-deputy because the LAI
was turning into a bluff. For Mnzenberg, however, the council did not mirror Fimmens
disillusion, telling Kuusinen that it was a victory for the communists.545 With a focus on the sine
qua non of both the LAI and the International Secretariat, what were their obligations and
restrictions after the General Council, and how dependent was the LAI on receiving support from
the Comintern and the IAH? Mnzenberg considered it to be obvious that the LAI was an
independent organisation which, as a result of the Brussels Congress, was no longer under the
jurisdiction of the IAH, and was expected to carry out activity without receiving any financial and
administrative assistance from the IAH apparatus. The ECCI Bureau Secretariat did not, however,
agree with Mnzenberg. On 18 August 1927, the ECCI Bureau Secretariat resolved that the IAH

also filed in the CPGB fond; fol. 495/100/545, 11 [English version], 12-13 [German version]. British Head Office
intercepted the letter, later used as empirical material in an analysis of the LAI by the British secret police in 1929
(TNA HO 144 10693).
543
Willi Mnzenberg, Mot kolonialt frtryck [Against Colonial Oppression], in Norrskensflamman, Lule, 30/121927, 6-7.
544
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 88, Invitation, Report on results of LAI General Council, LAI, Berliner Sekretariat,
9/12-1927.
545
Taken from Haikal 1992, pp.251-252. Haikal refers to the LAI fond 542, opis 1, delo 8, but left out any reference to
the list or the date for Fimmens letter. For Mnzenbergs letter to Kuusinen, Haikal referred to the IAH fond 538, opis
2, delo 40 (neither list nor date).

215

must energetically support the LAI in establishing national sections. A question re-addressed by
the ECCI Organisational Department (Orgotdel) in 1929:
The initiative to create the organisation [LAI], its establishment and achievement at the large
anti-imperialist Congress in February 1927 in Brussels, came from the Communist
International and the Central Committee of the IAH.546
The central question for the LAI in 1928 was to understand that the euphoria of the Brussels
Congress was over. For the International Secretariat, it was all about adapting to the current
situation, e.g. the changes in structural and individual relations, as well as adhering to Comintern
policy.
*
Back in Berlin
The LAI left the inner sanctums at IAH headquarters in Berlin in the beginning of 1928. While the
German LAI Section found an office at 10 II Monbijouplatz, the International Secretariat had a
bureau at 24 Friedrichstrae. At the same time, the LAI attempted to amplify its anti-imperialist
propaganda on the political scene in Berlin. On 20 January, the German section organised a public
meeting at the Sturmsaal, at which Ledebour called out to every sympathiser to begin
understanding the ambitions and expectations of Germany in regaining its former colonies.547
According to the political scientist Mary J. Townsend, who had conducted a field survey of the
political situation in Germany in 1928, the escalating propaganda of pro-colonial societies and
associations in Germany, demanding the recovery of the lost overseas Empire,548 also served the
interests of the LAI. The LAIs agitation against Germanys colonial desires did not pass by
without attracting attention. Informants, working in the service of the Auswrtige Amt initially
observed that it seemed as though the LAI was no longer an organisation of any importance, and
546

The ECCI Bureau Secretariat put the wrong date on this document. Via the statement, which suggests that that IAH
had to organise agitation on a large scale in favour of the USSR [] the forthcoming X Anniversary of the October
Revolution, to further the organisation of the Friends of the New Russia [the Friends of Soviet Union], indicates
that the resolution was a document introduced in 1927, not 1928, see fol. RGASPI 495/103/149, 13-16, Resolution on
the question of the International Workers Relief, ECCI Bureau Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1928 [correct year:1927];
RGASPI 495/25/1255, 71, Bericht ber die Ttigkeit der IAH in den letzten Jahren, [IAH.-Kommission], Moscow,
6/2-1929. The IAH.-Kommission in Moscow in 1929 used this document in its analysis of the IAH, see RGASPI
495/3/86, 54, Protokoll No.22 der Sitzung des Politsekrt. am Freitag, Moscow, 8/2-1929.
547
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 88, Invitation, Report on results of the LAI General Council, LAI, Berliner
Sekretariat, 9/12-1927; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 99, Information from the LAI, Berlin, 15/1-1928. The Friends
of the Soviet Union shared the same office of the International Secretariat at 24 Friedrichstrasse in 1928, see SAPMOBA ZPA R 1507/67113, 112, Reichskommissar: Vermerk: Aus privater Quelle, Berlin, August 1928.
548
Townsend 1928, p.65. Townsend wrote that literature and propaganda in the shape of colonial histories, treatises,
novels depicting life in Africa and in the South Seas, pamphlets replete with statistics, magazine and newspaper
articles have literally poured from the press since 1918, telling the Germans more about their former colonies.
Magazines such as the Koloniale Rundschau and Kolonialdeutsche were the leading actors in developing pro-colonial
propaganda.

216

was pretty much a shadow of its former self in Berlin. According to separate reports from two
informants belonging to the German pro-colonial movement, one was V. Lindequist, a secretary in
the Vereinigung fr Deutsche Siedlung und Wanderung and the second, a member of the Deutsche
Gesellschaft fr Eingeborenenkunde [identity unknown], Auswrtige Amt had pieced together
intelligence on the Sturmsaal meeting. The informant from the Deutsche Gesellschaft fr
Eingeborenenkunde had in fact taken the assignment seriously by becoming a member of the LAI,
and attended the Sturmsaal meeting on location. The following report describes the event as
having been a bizarre experience. Having arrived at 7.30 p.m., the informant noticed that one male
and two females were just sitting and waiting for the meeting to begin. Yet, at 8 pm, nothing had
happened, whereupon the informant left, only to find out a couple of days afterwards that the
meeting had later been cancelled due to poor attendance.549 Additionally, a third source notified the
Auswrtige Amt of the International Secretariats plan to stage a big demonstration on 4 March at
the Piscator-Bhne, the well-known avant-garde and leftist theatre scene in Berlin. Entitled
Koloniale Welt in Flammen!, the demonstration was scheduled to include speeches from
Goldschmidt, the author Arthur Holitscher and the journalist Armin T. Wegner, and to be a display
of colonial culture and music, e.g. the performance of a Persian trio and the singing of Indian
and Javanese melodies.550
*
Resignation, Renunciation and a Breach in Communications
In the beginning of 1928, the International Secretariat introduced an organ in the service of its
members and the LAI Executive, the Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus. A second
publication, Pressedienst, launched around the same time, was aimed towards the left-wing press.
The primary aim of these two publications was to introduce the LAI to a broader public. Despite
these publications being both edited and printed in Berlin, they were, in essence, a product of the
Eastern Secretariat and the ECCI Agitprop Department in Moscow. The International Secretariat

549

SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 98, Short note from Vereinigung fr Deutsche Siedlung U. Wanderung an
Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 16/1-1928; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 101, Report from Deutsche Gesellschaft fr
Eingeborenenkunde, Berlin, to Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 3/2-1928.
550
Mnzenberg wanted the demonstration to leave a good impact, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/28, 22, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Roy [Sekr. Scho./K.], Moscow, 13/2-1928. SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 102, Short note
from Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Eingeborenenkunde, Berlin, to Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 14/2-1928; SAPMO-BA
ZPA R1001/6751, 103, [Poster] Piscator-Bhne Koloniale Welt in Flammen, Berlin, 4/3-1928. A copy of this
poster is located in the LAI fond fol. RGASPI 541/1/28, 23. Mnzenberg enclosed this poster in his letter to Roy.
Further, Armin T. Wegner, journalist and photographer, born in Germany in 1886, illustrated through his photos during
the Great War the atrocities taking place in Armenian deportation camps in 1915-1916. This turned Wegner into a
prominent spokesperson against how Ottoman Turkey treated its Armenian population and, after the Great War,
Wegner was an engaged pacifist and anti-militarist. Wegner passed away in Rome at the age of 92 on 17 May, 1978,
see Internet: < http://www.armenian-genocide.org/wegnerbio.html >.

217

received prepared articles for inclusion in these publications, e.g. articles on Egypt and the Middle
East, as well as the KMTs white terror in China. The official development of the LAI at the
beginning of 1928 was a line of activity which nonetheless had to confront the complications at the
International Secretariat, a question which challenged the internal individual and organisational
structure in Berlin. After Liau had handed in his resignation in January, he nevertheless stayed on
at the International Secretariat out of gratitude towards Petrovsky and the ECCI, and in February,
Gibarti suddenly resigned from his position as secretary.
The Informationsbulletin stated on 15 March 1928, that Gibarti had left the LAI due to health
problems, which had forced him to take a longer vacation.551 His sudden disappearance remains
a mystery, however, and whether or not it was based on Mnzenberg's criticism of Gibartis
capabilities as a poor organiser, is pure speculation. Yet, Gibartis resignation appears to have
been caused not by health problems but by other factors. According to Gibartis personal file in the
Comintern Archive, there is not a single clue indicating the reason for his resignation. The only
reference is that he was assigned to conduct international missions for the IAH, for example in
the USA.552 One of Gibartis first public appearances occurred in New York on 15 June 1929,
acting as the representative of the International League against Imperialism at a public rally at
Irving Plaza which had been organised by the AAAIL.553 This suggests a time gap of over one year
and four months. Furthermore, Gibartis personal file in the TNA does not provide any additional
information about his whereabouts after February 1928, while stating, as does his file in the
Comintern Archive, that Gibarti acted as an international representative of the IAH and LAI in
the USA in 1928-29.554 The crux of the matter is to verify Gibartis whereabouts during this
period. The most logical assumption is that, after Gibarti left the International Secretariat, he went
to Moscow as a student at one of the Cominterns educational units, e.g. the International Lenin
School (ILS).555 Completing a political education that lasted for about one year, Gibarti became a

551

Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, Nr.1, 15/3-1928. For the decision on Paris, see
Mitteilungsblatt der Liga gegen Imperialismus. Internationales Sekretariat, Berlin, Nr.2, 21/4-1928.
552
RGASPI 495/205/6048, 1, Biography on Gibarti, undated.
553
FOIA 61-6065-60, AAAIL.
554
On June 14, 1939, N. D. Borum, representative at the Embassy of the USA in London, sent a letter to Lidell to
inform him about Gibartis career as an international communist. According to Borum, whatever Gibarti had to say
carries little weight. For example, that Gibarti had resigned from the International Secretariat because the LAI was
under communist influence was nothing short of utter nonsense, TNA KV2/1401.
555
The International Lenin School (ILS) was an instrument of Bolshevization that existed from 1926-1938 in
Moscow. More specifically, the ILS was as a curricular institute which, according to Cohen and Morgan, aimed to
produce a new stratum of leading communist party cadres, young, proletarian, disciplined and free of the taint of
reformism which, after the Second World War, assumed leading positions in the international communist movement.
Famous ILS alumni were, for example, Yugoslavias Marshal Tito, Wladyslaw Gomulka from Poland and the General
Secretary of East Germany, Erich Honecker, Gidon Cohen & Kevin Morgan, Stalins Sausage Machine. British
Students at the International Lenin School, 1926-37, in Twentieth Century British History, Vol.13, No.4, 2002,
pp.327-355.

218

fully-fledged agent in the service of the Soviet Foreign Department and acted as a Comintern
emissary, having the USA and Europe as his operative field.556
The disappearance of Gibarti symbolised the uncertain road ahead for both the LAI and the
International Secretariat in 1928. At the same time, other events were occurring which would have
a lasting impact on the international communist movement, e.g. the Ninth ECCI Plenum held in
Moscow in February 1928. This plenum determined the pace for the Cominterns political and
organisational development, and highlighted the expulsion of the Trotsky opposition from the
CPSU (B), as well as evaluating the reports from the Chinese, English, French and trade union
commissions.557 The focus of the plenum was a critical examination of the New Economic Policy
(NEP) and its societal and ideological implications for Soviet society, a question that suggests the
start of the conflict between Bukharin and Stalin.558 This plenum put forward an understanding
that the communist movement had to act carefully in its contacts with the social democratic
movement. This, in turn, strengthened antagonism which the Comintern endorsed, urging the
national sections to follow the general turn to the left. However, several of the communist
parties, e.g. the CPGB and the PCF, did not agree with this policy.559 In conclusion, the Ninth
ECCI Plenum signalled an imminent policy shift within the Comintern, which revealed itself in all
its full glory at the Sixth International Comintern congress (17 July 1 September 1928). For the
LAI, the ideological message introduced at the Ninth ECCI Plenum did not correspond with its
aim to sustain a united front against colonialism and imperialism.560
This likely Comintern policy shift was not, however, the only sign. On 16 February,
Mnzenberg sharply criticised Bukharin for the extreme indifference at Comintern headquarters in
556

For a similar discussion on Gibartis presumed role as an agent in the service of Bolshevism and the Comintern,
Koch writes that Gibarti was a willing participant in espionage recruitment, see Koch 1995, p.343 (footnote 23).
However, and according to the empirical dilemma outlined above, any documents verifying that such was the case
have not been found and, if any exist, the documents are most likely kept in the KGB archive in Moscow.
557
Kahan 1990, 28.
558
Research and scholarly interpretations of the origin of the NEP, its practical implementations and consequences for
Soviet society, as well as the plots connected to the decision to shun the policy in 1928-29, is a topic evaluated and
analysed in, for example, David Priestland, Stalinism and the Politcs of Mobilisation. Ideas, Power, and Terror in
Inter-war Russia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, pp.154-155, 164; Acton & Stableford, 2005, pp.149-183,
263-264; Figes 2007, pp.86-87; Robert Himmer, The Transition from War Communism to the New Economic Policy:
An Analysis of Stalins View, in The Russian Review, vol.53, Hoover Institution, Stanford, 1994, p.516; Fitzpatrick
(1999).
559
According to Borkenau, the Comintern took a leap into the abyss after 1927, Borkenau 1938, pp.334-335.
560
A majority of the discussions and disagreements at the plenum centred around Bukharins excessive belief in the
revolutionary potential of the Western labour movement, and the impatience of the international communist
movement to transform world revolution into a political reality. Furthermore, this also concerned the dilemma of
having properly bolshevised national sections, whereas the isolated centre of the international communist movement
Comintern headquarters in Moscow had more or less lost its contact with the national sections, the mass and
sympathising organisations, see Degras vol.II 1960, 423-425; Nicholas N. Kozlov & Eric D. Weitz, Reflections on
the Origins of the Third Period: Bukharin, the Comintern and the Political Economy of Weimar Germany, in
Journal of Contemporary History, Vol24, No.3, (Jul., 1989), Sage Publications, pp.387-410; Matthew Worley,
Courting Disaster? The Communist International in the Third Period, in In Search of Revolution. International
Communist Parties in the Third Period, Matthew Worley (ed.), London, 2004, pp.6-7; Priestland 2007, p.178.

219

Moscow, urging him initiate a re-organisation of the entire apparatus. Mnzenberg emphasised the
necessity of establishing effective administrative routines, e.g. smaller departments and of
restoring the system which supported regular contact with the international sections. According to
Mnzenberg, the prevailing bureaucratic malpractice in Moscow had sabotaged much of his work
in January-February, and it seemed as though the situation at Comintern headquarters was in a
truly poor state, not even comparable to the situation of 1919.561 The International Secretariat
sided, of course, with Mnzenberg. The International Secretariat sent information to the LAI
Executive and to the LAIs collective and affiliated members, declaring that due to circumstances
beyond their control [neglecting to mention that a breach in communications with Comintern
headquarters in Moscow was the sole reason], it had become troublesome to carry out routine
work, e.g. sending material and directives to the national sections.562
The liaison question alluded to by Mnzenberg was, however, part of a challenge the entire
European communist movement was facing in the beginning of 1928. At the Ninth ECCI Plenum,
the Comintern resolved to improve relations between Moscow and the communist parties in
Western Europe and, therefore, in accordance with the ECCIs directive, endorsed the
establishment of the West European Bureau (WEB). However, this was a process already set in
motion on 13 April 1927, when the Political Secretariat had discussed the idea of a foreign bureau
of the ECCI in a closed session in Moscow. The Political Secretariat instructed Bukharin,
Kuusinen and Piatnitsky to work out details for a bureau in Western Europe, which had to
include the aim and purpose, methods and strategy, individual composition and location of the
bureau.563 The confidential document, Entwurf eines Beschlusses des EKKI ber die Errichtung
eines Westeuropischen Bros, perhaps the result of an evaluation carried out by Bukharin,
Kuusinen and Piatnitsky, contains the directive that the WEB should establish urgently a contact
(Fhlung) between the ECCI and the West European sections, although the bureau was to be
561

Mnzenberg explained to Bukharin that his long relationship with the international communist movement and the
Bolsheviks, stretching back to 1914, had given him an insight into how the bureaucracy and administrative structure in
the Comintern functioned and, above all, how Moscow positioned itself in relation to the national sections, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/25/1-2, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 16/2-1928. An erroneous interpretation
of Mnzenbergs relation to Bukharin is introduced by Sean McMeekin in a research note (2002), published in
Jahrbuch fr Historische Kommunismusforschung. According to McMeekin, Bukharin was probably the greatest
Mnzenberg sucker of all in the Comintern, frequently and intentionally deceived by the Red Millionaire
[Mnzenberg], who pushed the argument that he never received any money from Moscow to an extreme, see
McMeekin 2002, pp.418-419. However, the relationship between the two of them was much more intricate than this,
based not entirely on money, but also on hierarchical relations and structure, ambitions for power as well as historical
ties and a commitment to the communist movement, something McMeekin ignores.
562
Informationsbulletin der LAI, Nr. 1, 15/3-1928.
563
Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69; RGASPI 495/3/13, 66, 66, (Streng vertraulich!) Protokoll Nr.20 der
geschlossene Sitzung des Polit-Sekretariats vom 13. April 1927, [Moscow]. Present at the meeting were Bukharin,
Kuusinen, Murphy, Piatnitsky, Humbert-Droz, Maggi, Petrov, Schneller, Duncan, Zetlin and Heimo. See Fredrik
Petersson, Melting Down the Iceberg: the Communist International, Organisational Perspectives and Archival Issues.
A Research Report, CoWoPa 7, bo Academy, 2006.

220

located in Berlin. The second objective was to guarantee that couriers provided the ECCI with
intelligence on the Brderparteien [the national communist parties], i.e. on the day-to-day
routines within the parties. This included whether the parties put the ECCIs instructions and
decisions into practice, as well as reporting any internal disputes or conflicts. This was an
arrangement which also applied in the other direction. The WEB was the ECCIs monitoring
agency and relay station in Western Europe, and oversaw whether the Brderparteien were
carrying out its instructions, or neglecting to do so.564
In 1928, the WEB had no direct influence on the International Secretariat. Another episode
produced a more dramatic effect: the decision of the Political Secretariat on 16 March to remove
Roy as LAI liaison in Moscow, resulting in a breach in relations between the International
Secretariat and Comintern headquarters. The sole reason given by the Political Secretariat was on
the future use of Comrade Roy, no decision.565 For the International Secretariat, this meant the
loss of a personal liaison at the Eastern Secretariat, thus, Mnzenberg suggested that Petrovsky
assume Roys position. However, Petrovskys commitment to the CPGB consumed all of his time
and energy, leaving him unable to look after the LAI. It was not until June that the Political
Secretariat found a temporary solution by nominating Heimo to supervise the foreign activities of
the LAI.566 Thus, from March to June 1928, the International Secretariat had no regular contact
with the Eastern Secretariat at Comintern headquarters. During this period, however, the decisionmakers in Moscow kept discussions on the LAI to a minimum. One of the few occasions it was
discussed was prior to the LAI Executive meeting in Brussels on 28-29 April, as Piatnitsky and the
Political Secretariat were preparing the details for its agenda, once the ECCI Bureau Secretariat
had re-examined the preparations of the Brussels Congress in 1926-27.567 While the LAI General
564

This confidential draft functioned as consultative material for the ECCI, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/33, 132,
(Vertraulich) Entwurf eines Beschlusses des EKKI ber die Errichtung eines Westeuropischen Bros, Moscow,
[undated] 1928 [copy]; Vatlin 2009, p.141.
565
Roy was sick when he left Moscow in February or March. After arriving in Switzerland, Roy never returned to the
Soviet Union. He was unable to attend the Ninth ECCI Plenum, despite having been re-elected to the ECCI Presidium
and, as noted by Piazza, around this time the Comintern began its demontage of Roy, Piazza 2000, p.210, taken from
fol. RGASPI 495/3/72, 9.
566
Mnzenberg sent Heimo a copy of the March issue of Der koloniale Freiheitskampf, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 10,
Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo [Wi./K.], Moscow, Berlin 18/6-1928; RGASPI 542/1/28, 33-34, Der
koloniale Freiheitskampf, Berlin, 1/3-1928.
567
RGASPI 495/3/89, 4-5, Protocol No.23, ECCI Polit-Secretariat, Moscow, 15/2-1928. Present at the meeting were
Lozovsky, Barb, Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Chitarow, Bell, Ulbricht, Bela Kun, Keirowa, Furman/Purman, Manner,
Miezkewisch, Gusev, Angaretis, Heimo, Martinov, Wurm, Wassiljew, Schubin, Wolfe, Rwal, Stassiak, Michailov,
Krastin, Stassowa, Riess, Gerisch, Bebedova, Glaubauf, Kachan and Krastina (steno-typist). However, this resolution
remains missing in the files at Comintern Archive. At the receiving end (most likely), Mnzenberg was the recipient of
the resolution. The examined documents in Moscow were the Resolution on the International Congress against
Imperialist Oppression to be held at Brussels, Adopted by the Political Secretariat of the ECCI (5/1-1927, reviewed 4
April); INSTRUCTIONS TO THE DELEGATES AT THE BRUSSELS CONGRESS (4/2-1927, reviewed 9 April);
Resolution of the Commission for the Examination of the Question of a Colonial Congress in Brussels (30/3-1926,
reviewed April 20); and a confidential letter from the ECCI Secretariat to Mnzenberg (2/7-1926, reviewed April 21),
see fol. RGASPI 495/103/154.

221

Council in Brussels in December 1927 indicated the end of euphoria, the LAI Executive meeting
in Brussels in April, confirmed its end.
*
Confirming the End of Euphoria: The Return to Brussels
The LAI Executive meeting in Brussels on 28-29 April focused on the purpose and aims of the
LAI. With its return to Brussels, some of the Executive members chose to confront the
organisation. Fimmen stated at the meeting, as noted in the protocol, that the LAI had neither
head nor feet, an observation which, in a sense, described the end of euphoria, while the session
highlighted the LAIs inability to make the leap from demonstration to organisation. Even several
of the LAI Executive members themselves were conspicuous by their absence, e.g. Nehru had
returned to India, Rivera was living in Mexico, Baldwin was in the USA, Hatta was unable to
attend despite his recent acquittal (see previous chapter) and Mme. Duchne remained in France.
Thus, only a few members were present at the meeting: Maxton, Bridgeman, Saklatvala, Fimmen,
Marteaux, Abdul Manaff and Pamontjak (as substitutes for Hatta), Liau, Chatto and Mnzenberg.
According to Mnzenberg, in his report to the ECCI Secretariat, the session resembled the
convening of a small office meeting.568
Fimmen highlighted the question of a possible disintegration of the LAI, a fear resulting from
the lack of tangible results. It did not matter that the Dutch LAI Section had distinguished itself in
connection with the propaganda campaign to free Hatta; Fimmen initiated a discussion on why the
other sections had failed. For example, in Belgium, the Sret had effectively prevented the
Belgian LAI Section from taking any tentative steps. In France, the LAI section faced a different
problem apart from the continued hostility of the French security services, Fimmen stated,
describing how the PCF's indifference had crippled any kind of initiative. Furthermore, on the
other side of the Channel, the incapacity of the provisional LAI committee in England to exploit
British imperialism and its slogan the leading imperialist nation was nothing more than
shameful. Fimmen accused Maxton of not succeeding in raising any awareness of the LAI within
the British labour movement, concluding that the common worker in England did not even know
about the LAI, despite the debacle of Lansburys and Brockways resignations in 1927. Maxton
tried to explain that the LAIs outlook in Great Britain looked promising, though Chatto
remained unconvinced. For Chatto, Bridgeman was the key to building up a functional LAI
section, urging him to establish connections with colonial individuals in England by focusing on
colonial associations in London, e.g. the Workers Welfare League of India, the Indian Information
568

RGASPI 542/1/25, 6-7, Report from Mnzenberg, Brussels, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 29/4-1928.

222

Centre and the Indian Defence League. However, before admitting them into the LAI, Bridgeman
had to evaluate their political leanings and reliability. However, Bridgeman explained that contact
with the Indian groups had ended in nothing; instead, they refused to have anything to do with the
LAI due to their affiliation with the Labour Party. The political and organisational deadlock within
the provisional LAI committee in London had to be broken, therefore Chatto told Maxton and
Bridgeman to focus on finding individuals rather than seeking the membership of collective
members (organisations and associations). According to the protocol, Fimmen had listened to the
discussion, only to conclude that it seemed as though the LAI only had two functional sections in
1928: the Dutch and the German. Nevertheless, Fimmen queried the validity of this statement,
telling Mnzenberg that the German section was only managing to survive due to the IAHs
support. For Mnzenberg, the situation was far more complex, explaining to the LAI Executive
members the reasons why the LAI had an active section in Germany:
Two reasons explain why it was easy to establish the LAI in Germany. Germany does not
possess any colonies, and the resistance from the government is not so strong concerning the
work of the LAI. The development of big propaganda campaigns against the demand in
Germany to acquire colonies is, therefore, thoroughly developed.569
Germanys lack of colonies as an outcome of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and the inattentiveness of
the German security services towards an organisation such as the LAI, explained its success, not
the IAHs active support, Mnzenberg argued. However, the LAI Executive should not forget
Mnzenbergs expertise and experience in organising propaganda campaigns, committees,
associations and organisations, a process initiated in Germany in 1921. Thus, Mnzenberg argued,
this had made it easy [to] get and to direct the German worker to participate in political
movements. As proof of the above, the German LAI Section had sixteen branches in the country.
In Frankfurt am Main, for example, the branch had 600 registered members under the supervision
of a teacher [Karl August Wittfogel] and, in total, the LAI had about 5,000 members alone in
Germany. The only response that Fimmen could give was that the LAI newspaper, Recht en
Vrijheid, had had 600 subscribers before the Dutch authorities decided to ban it in the beginning of
1928.570

569

RGASPI 542/1/25, 6-7, Report from Mnzenberg, Brussels, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 29/4-1928; RGASPI
542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by Mnzenberg, Berlin, to
Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928. For a copy of the protocol, see LAI fond fol. 542/1/26, 38-49.
570
The LAI had active branches in Cologne, Dsseldorf, Dresden, Leipzig and Berlin. According to Mnzenberg,
members had to fulfil two essential tasks. Firstly, organise public meetings every second week and secondly, distribute
(under the supervision of the Berlin section) Der koloniale Freiheitskampf. In response to Mnzenbergs confident
report, Fimmen stated that non-party individuals, socialists, anarchists and Indonesians constituted the bulk of the
Dutch LAI Section membership. The journal, Recht und Freiheit, had a steady circulation of 600 copies and, despite
the frequent prohibition of the journal, the LAI had a good following in seven or eight regions, RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-

223

Despite the LAIs lack of progress, a more serious issue was the LSIs relentless antagonism,
Fimmen stated, informing the LAI Executive that the LSI did not intend to tone down its criticism
of the LAI. In fact, the LSI campaign against the LAI would most likely be discussed at the LSIs
international congress in Brussels on 5-11 August, 1928. Maxton agreed with Fimmen, explaining
how the LSI report had created an ideological divide within the socialist and labour movements in
Europe, with the LAI having become more or less an ostracised political object.571 After the LAI
Executive meeting, the information from Fimmen and Maxton on the LSIs intentions was a task
for the International Secretariat to solve. The question was how and whether the LAI was capable
of responding to the LSIs hostility. The first step was to gather intelligence on the LSIs colonial
policy. From an unknown source, Mnzenberg knew that the LSIs Colonial Commission had
convened a meeting in Brussels on 2-3 June. Thus, Mnzenberg drafted an article, based on the
intelligence from his source [content unknown], Die Beschlsse der II Internationale gegen die
unterdrckten Vlker, and sent it to Bukharin on 22 June, along with the request to please use
and publish this article in Pravda. According to Mnzenberg, the primary aim of this article was to
accuse Adler and the LSI of their ignorance of the real purpose of the LAI: to raise awareness of
the revolutionary movement in colonial and semi-colonial regions in Europe an undertaking
the LSI had neglected to acknowledge in connection with the establishment of the League of
Nations in 1919.572 Yet, this article was a constituent part of Mnzenbergs propaganda machinery,
frequently used when responding to the socialist movement. For the International Secretariat, the
preferred strategy to disrupt the LSIs colonial policy was of a more subtle nature. Firstly, the LAI
could not refute that the LSI was the gravitational centre of the socialist movement in Europe and,
secondly, if the LSI chose to include the colonial question on its agenda at its congress in August,
the International Secretariat knew that it would attract political attention. On 29 June, during a
meeting at the International Secretariat, Mnzenberg, Chatto, Liau and Hatta decided to approach
colonial organisations, associations and students in Berlin and London which they knew had
received invitations to the LSI congress. Their primary aim for doing this was to influence and
convert these colonial elements to act as messengers and to present resolutions of protest at
the congress. According to the International Secretariat, these protests had to focus on the
cowardice of social democracy in not supporting the LAI. For Chatto, this was a chance to
28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin,
Moscow, 24/5-1928.
571
RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928.
572
RGASPI 542/1/28, 40, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 22/6-1928; RGASPI 542/1/28, 4154, Manuscript, author: Mnzenberg, June, 1928. Bukharin edited the manuscript. Mnzenberg believed that the LSI
had a strategy for the colonial question, urging Fimmen to understand that the LSI Colonial Committee did nothing
more than throw sand in the eyes of the oppressed peoples, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/29, 28-29, (Confidential) Letter
from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Maxton, London, 6/6-1928.

224

evaluate his network to Indian nationalists in Berlin, Europe and India, contacting, for example,
the India Association in England, Nehru and Jhabwala in Bombay, with the latter providing
additional contacts to the workers and peasants movements in India. This plan revived Liaus
interest in the LAI; he introduced the idea of approaching radical political circles in European
ports, preferably among seamen in Hamburg and Amsterdam, contacts which could spread the
word about the LAI and its attitude towards the LSI congress. Additional groups the LAI should
contact were the colonial student associations and Latin American organisations in Berlin, Liau
concluded. Yet, how could the International Secretariat guarantee that the LSI congress would hear
the LAIs protests? Evidently, the International Secretariat considered it wise to infiltrate the LSI
congress, having Chatto and Liau attend the event disguised as journalists but, in reality, as LAI
representatives.573 It is unknown whether this plan was carried out; however, according to an
RKO report, Chatto was planning to travel to Brussels in August 1928 under the pseudonym
Hussein.574
The LAI Executive meeting wanted to find a solution to two particular problems in order to
explain the internal weakness of the LAI. Firstly, the LAI Executive had to endorse a decision
granting the International Secretariat the right to use Berlin as its permanent base and, secondly,
reach a decision on the political representation of the International Secretariat, hence, a decisive
step to turn the LAI into a mass organisation. For Maxton, the logical step was to grant the
International Secretariat a more authoritative position, stating, I am a politician and a tactician,
organisational and financial questions are not for me. However, after Gibartis sudden resignation,
the division of labour at the International Secretariat was in a state of chaos, as it was lacking in
both skilled co-workers and a shortage of funds, e.g. Chatto informed those present that occasional
contributions of money had ceased, Nehru had sent a one-off contribution and nothing more, while
Baldwin refused to send any money as long as the International Secretariat was in a state of
confusion and none of the staff in the French and British sections had any money. On 29 April,
Mnzenberg sent a request to the ECCI Secretariat, wondering why the International Secretariat
had not received its monthly allowance of $1,500 since January 1928, concluding that if no money
arrived, the only solution left was perhaps to liquidate the LAI.575 With reference to the political
constitution of the International Secretariat, Mnzenberg wanted to nominate a communist and a
non-communist to work as political secretaries in Berlin. However, Maxton did not agree, arguing

573

RGASPI 542/1/27, 29-30, Protocol, LAI International Secretariat, Berlin, 29/6-1928 ; RGASPI 542/1/27, 32-33,
Protocol, LAI International Secretariat, Berlin, 30/6-1928.
574
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/67113, 112, Reichskommissar: Vermerk: Aus privater Quelle, Berlin, August 1928.
575
RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928; RGASPI 542/1/25, 6-7, Report from Mnzenberg, Brussels, to
the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 29/4-1928.

225

that the LAI would benefit from a broader political representation, suggesting that the International
Secretariat should include a representative of the socialists (Maxton), the trade unions (Fimmen),
the colonial national revolutionary movement (Chatto) and the communist movement
(Mnzenberg). The LAI Executive endorsed Maxtons proposal and approved Chatto as the new
International Secretary of the LAI.576
The Brussels LAI Executive was Chattos rise to prominence. Before the meeting, Chatto sent
a letter to Nehru, explaining how he believed that the political future of the LAI depended on a
dynamic collaboration between the communist, social democratic and trade union movements in
the imperialist countries, in order to support the colonial revolutionary movement. In May, Chatto
contacted Nehru again, stating that the latest LAI Executive meeting had confirmed his
assumption, proud of the fact that he was now acting as the political secretary of the LAI.577 For
Mnzenberg, Chatto's election was a decent choice, informing the ECCI Secretariat that he trusted
Chatto to be capable of carrying out the duties entrusted to him. At this point in time, Mnzenberg
needed someone he could trust at the International Secretariat. Preoccupied with organising an
anti-fascist campaign, with Barbusse and Rolland as symbolic leaders of the campaign,
Mnzenberg had neither the time nor the energy to get involved with the LAI.578
The determination of its political representation and Chattos endorsement as International
Secretary did not, however, solve the LAIs organisational gridlock. Now that the International
Secretariat had no personal liaison at Comintern headquarters Heimo was a temporary solution
in June the LAI nerve centre in Berlin could only observe how some of the sections engaged
themselves in internal squabbles. After the Ninth ECCI Plenum, the international communist
movement had to adapt itself to the policy direction and rhetoric of the event. For example, the
CPH, the CPGB and the PCF were struggling to grasp the theoretical ramifications of Comintern
policy. The internal confusion within the CPH was also affecting the Dutch LAI Section.
According to Hatta, fractional struggles had almost consumed the section in May, a fight
sponsored by both the CPH and the SDAP which ended in a definitive split between the
576

RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), sent by
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928.
577
British security services intercepted Chattos letters to Nehru. The first letter to Roy is also included in Barooahs
biography on Chatto; yet, Barooah wrongly concludes that the LAI Executive convened on April 2 (no location given).
Barooah refers to Horst Krueger's [Krger] dated article Zum Einfluss internationaler Faktoren auf die Herausbildung
und Entwicklung der antiimperialistischen Haltung Jawaharlal Nehrus, in E. N. Komarov et al. (Hrsg.), Politik und
Ideologie im gegenwrtigen Indien, Berlin, 1976, p.333; Barooah 2004, p.256, 278 (see footnote 47). The second letter
is located in the files of British Head Office, see TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis of LAI, MI5, year: 1929.
578
It was not possible for Mnzenberg to assist Chatto due to other commitments. Firstly, he had to visit Frankfurt
am Main on a party assignment and, secondly, co-ordinate the IAH apparatus in Berlin in May, in order to prepare for
an anti-fascist campaign together with the WEB. A campaign Mnzenberg was expecting would to turn into a euphoric
demonstration, like the Brussels Congress, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 6-7, Report from Mnzenberg, Brussels, to the
ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 29/4-1928., see fol. RGASPI 542/1/29, 20-22, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to WEB,
Berlin, 18/5-1928.

226

communist and non-communist members. Witnessing this political struggle, Hatta felt both
dissatisfaction with and contempt towards the communist members behaviour, informing the
secretary of the Dutch LAI Section, the journalist and communist Gijsbert Jasper van Munster, that
the conflict would lead either to the dissolution of the section or turn it into a subsidiary section of
the CPH. Thus, if the PI resigned from the LAI for tactical reasons, this would leave the section
completely isolated. At the same time, Hatta left the Netherlands and moved to Locarno,
Switzerland, in May, a decision taken after having experienced the Dutch legal system.579
Nonetheless, and quite similar to Brockways commitment to the anti-imperialist movement, Hatta
made the distinction between organisational and individual engagement. Hatta attended a meeting
of the International Secretariat in Berlin on 29 June 1928, and explained that he expected to
maintain contact both with the International Secretariat and with Chatto. His primary reason for
doing this was to remain on the LAI Executive in the capacity as an individual member, not as a
delegate of the PI.580 However, the International Secretariat was looking in a different direction at
this point in time, expecting to secure the collective membership of the Profintern, an objective
which tested both the credibility and the organisational strength of the LAI.
*
The Profintern Connection
The International Secretariat had tried to get the Profintern to support the LAI ever since the
Brussels Congress. In March 1927, the General Secretary of the Profintern, Solomon Abramovich
Lozovsky, concluded that, for the time being, the Profintern had no intention of associating with
the LAI unless the organisation corrected a few practical measures.581 What were these
practical measures? What Lozovsky was referring to was the size and scale of the LAI; this was
also a matter devoid of ideological connotations. Achieving the Profintern's confirmation and
consent turned into a long, drawn-out process for the International Secretariat. On 18 June, 1928,
Mnzenberg requested that Heimo make a few enquiries at Comintern headquarters to see whether
it would be possible to convince the Profintern to become a collective member. What was
Mnzenbergs primary aim? In April, the LAI Executive had concluded at its meeting in Brussels
that the LAI had very few trade unions as members, to which Maxton had suggested approaching
Russian organisations to affiliate. Later, in June, Mnzenberg told Maxton that this was a wise
579

RGASPI 542/1/29, 23, Letter from G. J. van Munster, Amsterdam, to the LAI Executive, Berlin, 23/5-1928;
RGASPI 542/1/29, 24, Letter from G. J. van Munster, Amsterdam, to Hatta, Locarno, 23/5-1928; RGASPI 542/1/29,
25, Letter from Hatta, Locarno, to Munster, Amsterdam, 10/5-1928.
580
RGASPI 542/1/27, 29-30, Protocol, International Secretariat, Berlin 29/6-1928.
581
TNA HO 144 10693, [Intercepted] Telegram from the General Secretary A. Lozovsky of the RILU/Profintern, To
all Trade Union Organisations that Participated in the Anti-Imperialist Congress held in Brussels, Moscow, No.160/7,
15/3-1927.

227

suggestion, telling him that the process to get the Profintern to affiliate as a collective member
had begun.582 However, at this stage, Mnzenberg had only thought of initiating negotiations with
the Profintern. A second motive for Mnzenberg was money, telling Heimo that if the Profintern
became a member, this would guarantee the LAI an annual contribution of 25,000 Roubles in
membership fees. However, Mnzenberg and the LAI had to first answer Lozovskys demand that
a minimum of five important trade unions be affiliated as collective members of the LAI.583
Mnzenberg had set in motion a cautious project, telling Heimo to act carefully. Firstly, Heimo
was to consult with Petrovsky before trying to arrange any meetings with Profintern
representatives in Moscow, suggesting that he approach the Ukrainian Grigorij Natnovic
Melnitschansky (1886 1937)584 and the Russian Ya. K. Yaglom (1898 1939).585 In connection
with Heimos enquiries, the International Secretariat started to collect the addresses of important
international trade unions in Europe.586 Nevertheless, the Profintern turned down Heimos request
for the simple reason that the LAI could not present any tangible contacts with trade unions,
forcing the International Secretariat to adopt a new approach. On 20 September, Mnzenberg and
Chatto sent a letter of enquiry to the AUCCSLU (Zentralrats der Sowjetgewerkschaften) in
Moscow, asking whether they would consider becoming a collective member. The AUCCSLU
then sent on their enquiry to the Secretariat of the Profintern. To convince the AUCCSLU that the
enquiry was a serious and sincere act, the International Secretariat introduced a minimum of five
big trade unions as members of the LAI, covering a geographical representation from Cuba, West
Africa and India (the Municipal Workers Union, Railway Workers Union and the Railway
Administration Workers Union in Bombay, the Cuban Labour Association and the Santo Domingo
582

RGASPI 542/1/29, 28-29, Confidential letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Maxton, London, 6/6-1928. A copy of
this letter was also filed in the CPGB fond, see fol. 495/100/545, 11 [English version], 12-13 [German version]. The
British security services intercepted this letter and passed it on to Head Office, see TNA HO 144 10693.
583
RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protocol, LAI Executive Committee meeting, Brussels (28/4-1928), from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to Bukharin, Moscow, 24/5-1928; RGASPI 542/1/25, 10, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo [Wi./K.]
Moscow, 18/6-1928.
584
Grigorij Natnovic Melnitschansky (1886 1937) became a member of the Russian Social Democratic Workers
Party in 1902. In 1910, he emigrated to the USA where he worked as a journalist, publishing articles in the Russian
socialist paper Novyj mir, and he remained in the USA until 1917. After the October Bolshevik coup in 1917,
Melnitschansky returned to Russia together with Trotsky and began his career as a trade unionist (functionary) in the
1920s. Delegated to carry out an international mission in 1928, Melnitschansky had a prominent position within the
LAI in 1929-31. In 1937, during the purge of the Comintern apparatus in Moscow, Melnitschansky received the death
sentence, see Reiner Tosstorff, Profintern. Die Rote Gewerkschaftsinternationale 1920-1937, Paderborn, 2004, p.738.
Archival staff at RGASPI have provided me with additional information on Melnitschansky.
585
Ya L. Yaglom (1898-1939) became a member of the Russian Communist Party in 1918 and, during the 1920s,
worked for the Profintern. Expelled from the party in 1930, accused of supporting rightist-opportunist activities,
Yaglom regained his membership after having subjected himself to the act of self-criticism. Arrested by the NKVD in
Moscow (unknown date) during the Great Terror, he died in prison in 1939, see Yaglom, Ya. K., in Heinrich E.
Schulz, Paul K. Urban, Andrew I. Lebed (eds.), Who was who in the USSR. A Biographic Directory Containing 5,015
Biographies of Prominent Soviet Historical Personalities, The Scarecrow Press, New Jersey, 1972, p.600.
586
Mnzenberg requested that Heimo send addresses of trade unions and workers organisations in Finland and
Norway to the International Secretariat, RGASPI 542/1/25, 13, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow,
20/8-1928.

228

National Labour Union Association in Havana and the West-African Sierra Leone Railway
Workers Union). Mnzenberg and Chatto argued that if the Profintern chose to become a
collective member, this would be a step that would strengthen the work to build a bridge
between the coloured workers and the trade unions in the imperialist nations.587 On 5 October
1928, the Profintern Presidium endorsed the decision to join the LAI as a collective member.588

The establishment of a connection with the Profintern strengthened the trade union character of the
LAI. The International Secretariat expected to use the trade union question as a topic to counteract
the LSIs antagonism. Thus, with a rapid influx of new members on a collective basis, the LAI was
on the threshold of becoming a mass organisation, rather than merely an ideological defender of
the anti-imperialist movement. However, this was a theory which had to face the hardship of
reality. In comparison to the euphoria of 1927, 1928 had been far from a thriving period for the
LAI. Epitomised by the LSIs hostility and the momentary breach in communications with
Comintern headquarters in Moscow, the International Secretariat had also lost three central actors:
Roy, Gibarti and, in some respects, Liau. Despite the short time-frame, the first half of 1928 was a
decisive period in that it defined the end of euphoria and exposed the LAI as being a frail
organisation. To curb this negative trend, the International Secretariat published the first issue of
the LAI organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review, in July 1928. This release also coincided with an
event which had a lasting impact on the international communist movement: the ideological turn
to the left at the Sixth International Congress in Moscow. Hence, the third period of the
Comintern came into being.
*

587

RGASPI 542/1/25, 28-32, Letter from the Sekretre [Mnzenberg + Chattophadyaya], Berlin, to Zentralrat der
Gewerkschaften der USSR, Moscow, 20/9-1928.
588
Profintern sent this decision to the International Secretariat in November, see Pressedienst, Nr. 11, Internationale
Sekretariats, Berlin, 7/11-1928.

229

230

Chapter 5. Utopia Redefined, Part I

It must be admitted that, up till now, not all the parties in the Communist International have
fully grasped the decisive importance which the establishment of close, regular and
unbroken relations with the national revolutionary movements in the colonies has in
affording these movements active and practical help.
Theses on the Revolutionary Movement
in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries,
adopted by the Sixth Comintern
Congress, Moscow, 1/9-1928
Following on from the visit of a member of the Eastern Secretariat to you, and on his
discussion with you of the possibility of holding a conference of Western European parties
on Colonial work, [] for the purpose of reviewing the work of the parties and putting into
operation the decisions of the Congresses of the CI on colonial questions.
Arnot to the Secretariat of the PCF, Paris,
25/3-1929
The Sixth International Comintern Congress in Moscow (17 July 1 September 1928) was the
ideological watershed for the international communist movement during the inter-war years. Four
years after the last congress in 1924, two years late by its own statutes, leaders and delegates of
communist parties 515 delegates representing 58 parties gathered at the Palace of Labour of
the Soviet trade unions in Moscow. The congress was the scene of a muted, but none the less real,
struggle which, according to McDermott and Agnew, functioned as the ceremonial introduction
and celebration of the third period, better known as the class-against-class policy and referred
to in the Comintern as the new line. The congress was also the scene of visible conflicts and
appraisals, e.g. the crystallisation of a personal conflict between Bukharin and Stalin as well as the
public disavowal of NEP. Thus, the Comintern gave its support to the Bolshevik regimes decision
to take the leap into the collectivisation and industrialisation of Soviet society.
The Comintern's new line represented, firstly, an ideological panorama which corroborated
the inherent strength of communism to act as an independent political entity, capable of existing
detached from the influence of social democracy. Secondly, the Comintern and the national
sections portrayed themselves as the genuine radical representatives of a working-class party.
Bukharin conceptualised the theoretical framework of the new line, in which he predicted the
coming of a global capitalist crisis. This was the essence of the third period during which,
231

according to Bukharin, the crisis would lead to a second wave of international revolutionary
activity. The first wave, after the end of the Great War, had failed rather embarrassingly, despite
the struggle of the working-class against the ruling structures of social, political and economic
systems. The prerequisite of the third period depended, therefore, on the inherent strength of the
international communist movement. However, the new line required the Comintern and its
sections to apply a sterner attitude towards the social democratic and trade union movements, the
LSI and the nationalist reformist movements, referring to the latter category as defenders of
Gandhism, Sun Yat-senism or Garveyism, all of which were working in the service of
imperialism, while brusquely categorising the former as social fascists. The new line
witnessed the ultimate end of the united front strategy and, instead, the Comintern sanctioned
and favoured the modus operandi of establishing collaborations with movements from below,
i.e. the workers and peasants.589
The Cominterns historiography and vocabulary throughout the period 1928-1933 constitutes
one of its most notorious and disputed periods, displaying tendencies of isolation and sectarianism
as well as the decline of the communist movement on a global scale. The third period is a topic
covered in several studies and interpreted en masse, thus, my primary aim here is not to re-enact
the comprehensive history of the Sixth Comintern Congress. Yet, one has to recognise and
understand that the congress laid out a new structural setting and ideological point of departure for
both the Comintern and the international communist movement. Additionally, the paragraphs of
the General Rules adopted at the congress confirmed the end of democratic centralism.
According to Adibekov and Shakhnazarova, these paragraphs stressed the necessity of observing
strict party discipline and immediately carrying out the Cominterns decisions. Nevertheless, the
understanding of the Sixth Comintern Congress and its ideological implications had a perpetual
impact within the parties. For example, the CPGB interpreted the new line in terms of
consolidation from below; however, the practical imprint was one of frustration and chaos.
Alternatively, for the KPD, the new line was the continuing and strengthening of control, which
the Comintern apparatus administered in Moscow vis--vis the German communist movement.
McDermott and Agnew suggest that in order to put the logic of the third period in its proper
589

The class against class concept had first surfaced when the PCF had been evaluating the results of its electoral
tactics in 1927, and was a term first coined by Jules Humbert-Droz. The term social fascism/fascists became the
political lingua franca of the Comintern after the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in July, 1929, see Theodore Draper,
American Communism & Soviet Russia, Transaction Publishers, 2003, p.300; McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.67, 72-73,
77; Programme of the Communist International Adopted at its Sixth Congress, Protokoll, vi, 4, September 1, p.45.
The programme for the congress was published in June, introduced by Bukharin in the opening speech at the congress,
taken from Degras vol.II, 1960, pp.471-526. Esmonde Higgins, delegate of the CP of Australia, wrote that 515
delegates from 55 countries had attended the congress, out of which 100 came from outside of Europe and 74 from
actual
colonial
countries,
see
fol.
RGASPI
495/94/44,
taken
from
the
Internet:
<
http://epress.anu.edu.au/oul/mobile_devices/ch02s20.html >; Kozlov & Weitz 1989, p.387.

232

context, one has to assess and understand the complex interplay of socio-economic analysis,
internal factional struggles in the USSR, Soviet foreign policy concerns and the concrete
experiences of the communist parties themselves.590 The higher principle was the quest for the
continued Bolshevization of the international communist movement. Thus, this placed both
ideology and the structures of the communist movement in a vice, having the Comintern serve as
an instrument in settling tactical controversies of Russian rather than international
significance.591 This chapter aims to investigate and analyse the nature of colonial work within
the communist movement in Europe. My focus will be centred mainly on the communist parties in
Europe, for the simple purpose of establishing a deeper understanding of the complexities the LAI
and its International Secretariat were facing while trying to pose as an ardent defender of the antiimperialist movement in Europe.
The Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries,
introduced and endorsed at the congress, defined the political and organisational trajectory for the
LAI and the communist parties in their colonial work. The author responsible for the theses was
Kuusinen, who also presented the document at the congress. The primary aim of the theses was
to question the earlier nature of colonial work in both the Comintern and the sections. Firstly,
Kuusinen had reassessed the communist movements expectation of gaining a permanent foothold
in China which, after the KMT putsch and the Cantonese debacle in 1927, had been dashed. Thus,
India and its national revolutionary movement was the new target that the Comintern and the
parties should support. Secondly, Kuusinen urged the communist parties of the metropolitan
countries to establish lively connections with corresponding organisations in the colonies, a
line of activity that up until 1928 had been inadequately followed up. However, the colonial
theses was primarily the product of Stalins active and direct involvement. Before the congress
convened, Kuusinen had sent extensive drafts of his theses to Stalin, asking for consultation and
advice. According to Stalins corrections, Kuusinen had to narrow down the extensive material,
which left the impression more of a commentary than a theses on the colonial question. Thus,
Stalin instructed Kuusinen to focus on the class perspective and to apply it to typical colonies
(India, Indonesia), semi-colonies (China, Egypt) and the dependent states (Mexico and Persia).592
After Kuusinen had presented the theses, the ensuing debate at the congress exposed a split
between the delegates on the colonial question. Wassiljew, Saklatvala and the Indian delegate
590

Statutes of the Communist International Adopted at its Sixth Congress, taken from Degras vol.II 1960, pp.464470; Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69; Worley 2002, pp.1-20; Hoppe 2007, p.33; McDermott & Agnew 1996,
p.68.
591
Fowkes 1984, p.195.
592
Documents on how the colonial theses was prepared by Kuusinen, and corrected by Stalin are filed in fol.
RGASPI 82/2/221, 11, 119-161, 162-163. On 12 July, Stalin told Kuusinen that he was sorry for his late reply. These
documents were given to me for my perusal by Professor Kimmo Rentola, University of Turku.

233

Sikandar S. Usmani, accused the communist parties in the imperialist nations of their
indifference towards supporting the anti-colonial movement in the colonial and semi-colonial
countries. The main question was, however, the decolonisation debate, which highlighted the
question of whether the metropolitan country promoted or retarded the development of
industrialisation in the colonies. According to Kuusinen, this was nothing but an imperialist lie,
while some members of the CPGB delegation, Rothstein and Petrovsky (attending the congress as
Bennet), argued that the theses underestimated the level of industrialisation in the colonies.
Two members of the CPGB, Arnot and Murphy, refuted Rothstein and Petrovskys statement as
nonsense. Thus, the debate produced a split in the CPGB on the colonial question. Later, in
December 1928, according to the observations of MI5, Petrovsky was no longer a person of much
importance in questions relating to Great Britain and India.593
The Sixth International Comintern Congress was a clash between experience and
understanding for both the delegates present and for those who were not. The official consensus
was that the congress had been a formal affair pointing out the bright future of the international
communist movement, although several delegates had perceived the event in other terms. 594 For
example, the Catalan and Profintern delegate, Andreu Nn (1892 1937), concluded that the
congress and the shift from the united front to the third period had been typical of the epileptic
zigzags that only ended in complete disarray in the world party.595 Roy did not attend this
congress. On 17 December 1928, Roy sent a letter to Arnot in which he declared, I am an
outcast. However, this did not prevent him from objecting to the implications of the new line,
telling Arnot that the International has become insane.596 The Swedish socialist Karl Kilbom

593

Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted by the Sixth
Congress, taken from Degras vol.II 1960, pp.526-547, originally published in Protokoll, vi, 4, p.154; Petrovsky was
not re-elected as a member of the ECCI, instead, he was no longer a person of much importance in matters relating
to India, MI5 stated. Yet, Petrovsky continued the secret work of the Comintern and, connected to the WEB in 1929,
Petrovsky performed liaison and secret work in Great Britain and the USA, while in May 1929, he briefly filled in as
the ECCI representative in the WEB in Berlin, see TNA PRO KV2/1433, Biographical information concerning
Bennett/Petrovsky, 1928-1929; Worley 2002, p.139.
594
Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69; Borkenau 1936, p.336.
595
Degras vol.II 1960, p.652; McDermott and Agnew 1996, p.86; For Andreu Nn, see Reiner Tosstorff, Andreu Nn
und Joaqun Maurn. Vom revolutionren Syndikalismus zum antistalinistsichen Kommunismus, in Ketzer im
Kommunismus, Bergmann/ Kessler (Hrsg.), VSA-Verlag Hamburg, 2000, pp.218-241.
596
The Comintern had not yet categorised Roy as a persona non grata. Residing in Berlin, Roy began to experience
his isolation from the movement. Writing to Arnot, Roy wrote: You know I am entirely ignorant of what is happening
in the Centre [Comintern; Moscow]. I had been patiently waiting for John [?]; but he could not enlighten me any more
than others before him had done. As a matter of fact, he confessed that he himself did not know what was happening. I
do not wish you to divulge official secrets to an outcast; but would it be very inconvenient for you to inform me as to
the general tendency of the new policy [class against class]. For example, I have not the slightest idea where I stand
and what am I expected to do in the future. I presume that it is not desired that I should be pushed out of things
altogether. I cannot believe that the International has become insane. Nevertheless, when I am not told anything
officially, very mean rumours are being spread throughout the International. And by its attitude, the International gives
moral support to these mean intrigues against me. I know that it is very difficult to get to the root of these dirty things;
but they injure my position just the same. I do hope you would send me a word from time to time so that I might keep

234

(1885 1961) was, both during and prior to the Sixth International Comintern Congress, a
member of the Communist Party of Sweden and carried out covert missions as a Comintern agent
in Europe. However, Kilbom did not attend the Sixth Comintern Congress due to illness. Kilbom
was a friend of Mnzenberg, and visited him in Berlin shortly after the congress had ended.
Mnzenberg asked him why he had been absent and Kilbom gave his explanation, to which
Mnzenberg replied, so you were politically ill! That was a wise decision on your behalf, because
now everything is coming apart in the Russian governance.597 The Sixth International Comintern
Congress was, above all, an ideological demonstration and a continuance of the work to re-route
and adjust the organisational structure of the Comintern. Hence, the new line was the ideological
varnish which justified why the Comintern chose to ignore former policies, strategies and
methods, in its aim to create a world of communism. The crux of the matter was to make the
colonial question comprehensible and even logical enough for the communist movement to be able
to support.

This chapter is part one of two consecutive parts which focus on analysing the hierarchical
relations of the Comintern apparatus (institutions and departments). Essentially, my primary aim is
to discern how the Comintern implemented objectives such as control, focus and the defining of
the colonial work of both the LAI and the communist parties in Europe.598 The terms above
demonstrate how and why the relations and functions (and dysfunctions) between the centre
Moscow/Comintern headquarters and the periphery Berlin/the International Secretariat
assumed a new phase after the Sixth Comintern Congress. This calls for the need, firstly, to
elucidate the character and structure of the relations between the centre and periphery and,
secondly, to evaluate the theoretical and practical ramifications of the colonial work at Comintern
headquarters and in the national sections. According to Kuusinen at the congress, the communist
parties had not fully grasped the important task of developing and supporting its colonial work.

in touch with the general line of affairs, RGASPI 495/215/18, 167, Letter from Roy, Berlin, to R. P. Arnot,
Moscow/Berlin, 17/12-1928.
597
Kilbom remembered Mnzenberg fondly, describing him as a genius in questions relating to organisation and
propaganda. According to Kilbom, Mnzenberg was one of the few capable men who actually achieved something in
the Comintern, primarily due to his ability to predict which way the political current was shifting. In 1928, and after
the Sixth International Comintern Congress, Kilbom visited Mnzenberg in Berlin, where Mnzenberg told Kilbom
his idea of establishing an independent communist party in Germany. However, Mnzenberg recognised that this
would be an impossible task to realise, see Karl Kilbom, Cirkeln slutes, Stockholm, 1955, p.109. For a biography on
Kilbom, see Lazitch 1986, pp.214-215.
598
Arch Getty & Naumov 2010, p.96. Despite the fact that Getty and Naumov focus on different periods, the terms
control, focus and defining are, by their semantic nature, useful as illustrations of how the Comintern attempted to
correct and get the colonial work operational. Additionally, Brigitte Studer suggests in her analysis on Stalinization as
a complex system of power relations, that the exercise of power through hierarchical structures was, until 1936-38,
effected by subtler means, see Brigitte Studer, Stalinization: Balance Sheet of a Complex Notion, in LaPorte,
Morgan and Worley (eds.), 2008, p.54.

235

Thus, this was a prerequisite which forced the parties to begin supporting organisations such as the
LAI and the LDRN. This chapter focuses, therefore, on how the Comintern scrutinised and reassessed the colonial work of the European communist parties. Robin Page Arnot, the CPGB
member and Comintern emissary, was the candidate Kuusinen instructed to evaluate and direct the
Cominterns colonial work. This was an agreement which also worked in the other direction, i.e.
Arnot only answered to Kuusinen. This was a process which relegated the LAI and its
International Secretariat to the role of bystander in this chapter. The reason for this is as follows:
the methodological analysis of the empirical material has provided an understanding as to why the
Comintern decided in 1928 to solve the existing problem of the colonial question in the communist
parties. It is, therefore, relevant to emphasise the contextual milieu, i.e. the ideological and
organisational setting in which the LAI re-structured itself. Furthermore, the colonial question was
the focal point of two separate and parallel investigations at Comintern headquarters in 1929:
firstly, Arnots investigation and secondly, the preparatory work for the second international LAI
congress, the former having a binding effect on the latter. This chapter and the one following aim
to confirm that the machinations at Comintern headquarters in 1928-29 determined how the
hierarchy of relations at the International Secretariat linked itself together with both the national
LAI sections and the anti-imperialist movement, and, more importantly, with the departments and
individuals at Comintern headquarters in Moscow.
The Comintern and the LAI were both facing changes as a result of the ideological impact of
the Sixth Comintern Congress. Interpreted in terms of utopia, and if one considers Richard Stites
definition of administrative utopia, a thematic framework focusing on those holding power,
the utopian strivings to turn the LAI into a mass organisation contradicted the aims of the
hierarchy. By this I mean the character of the discipline and rationality of the administrative
utopia, put forward by those holding power, i.e. the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.599
This scenario emerged at the Sixth Comintern Congress during the debate on the role and use of
the sympathising organisations. Mnzenberg complained of the general neglect of work in nonparty organisations under the umbrella of both the Comintern apparatus and the communist
parties, stating that if this ignorance continued, it was possible to see the development of political
opportunism in these organisations. The communist parties did not seem to understand that the
sole purpose of the sympathising organisations was to awaken the apathetic, to build bridges to
non-party people reluctant to join the communist party but, at the same time, expressing their

599

Stites 1989, pp.19, 23-24. Stephen Kotkin argued against several of Stites' contentions and his interpretation of
Stalins administrative utopia, stating that Stites had failed to acknowledge the co-existence of genuine enthusiasm
with widespread coercion, see Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1995,
pp.15-16.

236

sympathy towards the Soviet Union, Mnzenberg stated. The international communist movement
simply had to understand that these organisations both counteracted social democratic influence
and found recruits for communism. Mnzenberg referred to the Friends of the Soviet Union, the
Red Front Fighters and the LAI as exceptional examples of the above. However, several of the
congress delegates merely responded that the abundance of such subsidiary organisations was a
heavy burden on small [communist] parties.600
*
Adapting to Ideology, and Chattos Network
Mnzenberg left Moscow and the Sixth International Comintern Congress before it was over.
However, he left with the feeling that the question of the sympathising organisations was a
sensitive topic. This did not prevent Mnzenberg from introducing the rhetoric of the new line at
the meeting of the LAI Executive in Berlin on 18-19 August. How did this find its expression?
One evident sign was that, while the former ambition of the LAI Executive had been to find a
long-term solution to the political and organisational issues, after the Sixth Comintern Congress,
however, these decisions ended up becoming more like short-term agreements. For example, the
political representation at the International Secretariat, previously agreed to include a proportional
division between the representatives of the socialist, communist, trade union and national
revolutionary movements at the Brussels LAI Executive meeting on 28-29 April 1928, was a
decision Mnzenberg wanted to change. For Chatto, however, this made it possible for him to
strengthen both his network and the Indian question within the LAI.
Saklatvala, Maxton, Mme Duchne, Ledebour, Lessing, Mnzenberg and Chatto were present
at the LAI Executive meeting in Berlin in August. According to a report in Labour Monthly and
the summary by the RMdI (the Reich Ministry of the Interior), this meeting revealed
Mnzenbergs intention to adapt the new policy of the Comintern to the LAI. As noted in Labour
Monthly, the LAI approved of the decisions and resolution on the colonial question at the
Congress of the Third International, which correspond entirely to the aims and principles of the
organisation on the questions of China and India. During the discussion on the LSI, a split between
the LAI Executive members became evident, particularly with regard to the statement that the LAI
presented itself not [as] a section of the Comintern, or of the Communist Party and the
challenging of the LSI to answer for its service to imperialism.601 According to the RMdI,

600

Degras vol.II 1960, p.465.

INTERNATIONAL Executive Meeting of the League against Imperialism, in Labour Monthly, Vol.10, Number
10, October 1928, London, pp.634-635. After the Berlin meeting, the LAI Executive released a resolution on the LSI
and the Comintern on the colonial question, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/27, 41-42.
601

237

Maxton had not approved of Mnzenbergs harsh critique of the LSI, urging him to understand that
the LAI depended on the support of organisations which were also affiliated with the LSI.
Mnzenberg allegedly replied that any future collaboration with organisations, parties or
associations affiliated with the LSI, would be like embarking upon the wrong political road. The
RMdI concluded that the dispute between these two leading characters was peculiar from the point
of view that this was the first visible proof of the communist circle acting in a hostile manner
towards the socialists.602
This remark and his ongoing debate with Maxton irritated Mnzenberg, fearing that this would
lead to a deep crisis in the British LAI Section. Apparently, a rumour was circulating that both
A. J. Cook and Ellen Wilkinson were considering leaving the LAI. Thus, Mnzenberg advocated
the use of direct diplomacy to avoid any sudden change within the section.603 Babette Gross
received Mnzenberg's instruction to leave Berlin as soon as possible, and to visit the LAI office in
London. On 13 November, Gross had a closed meeting with Rothstein, Saklatvala, Bridgeman and
Maxton to discuss the political arguments and, more importantly, to find out whether Maxton
really was a devoted anti-imperialist. According to Mnzenbergs report to Kuusinen and Arnot,
Gross listened to how Maxton regretted putting forward the statement that the LAI depended on
the support of the labour movement in Europe, promising Gross that he intended to remain at any
cost on the LAI Executive. Gross mission to London was a success for Mnzenberg, and it
averted a potential crisis within the British LAI Section.604
The International Secretariat organised two public events in Berlin in August. The first took
place at the Lehrer-Vereinshaus on Alexanderplatz on 20 August, where Saklatvala, the anticolonial activist and Indian nationalist Mohammed Ali, Pen-Bei of the All Chinese Labour
Association, the representative of the Egyptian national revolutionary movement Abd El Mansir
and Mnzenberg all delivered speeches.605 The second event was of a different nature. Saklatvala
and Mnzenberg invited members of the pacifist association, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, to
attend a meeting at the restaurant Rheingold on 26 August. The only tangible result of this

602

SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/146, 72-73, 10, Liga gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrckung, RMdI, Berlin,
September 1928.
603
RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928.
604
RGASPI 542/1/25, 52, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen & Arnot, Moscow, 22/11-1928. Mnzenberg
kept sending letters to Kuusinen, informing him of the suspected ideological deviation of the British LAI Section, see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 55, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow [arrived in Moscow 6/12-1928].
With Gross back in Berlin, the crisis was at an end.
605
Additionally, the information to the members mentioned the obvious duty of distributing a minimum of ten
membership cards in circles that might show an interest for the LAI, SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 107,
Information an unsere Mitglieder, LAI International Secretariat, Berlin, 8/8-1928.

238

meeting was that some of the delegates visited the International Secretariat, e.g. Wissa Wassef Bey
and Mohammed Sabri from Egypt, and Carl Lindhagen.606
*
Chattos Egocentric Network: The Origins of the Anti-Imperialist Hub
Chattos position as International Political Secretary at the International Secretariat was an
authoritative position within the LAI. In 1928, Chatto's primary focus was to re-organise the LAI
network with an emphasis on individual contacts, and turn the LAI into a hub for anti-imperialist
activists in Berlin, Europe and beyond. Having experienced the tremors and temporary isolation of
the International Secretariat during the first half of 1928, characterised by Gibartis sudden
resignation and the breach in communications with Comintern headquarters in Moscow, Chatto
began the project of turning his egocentric network into reality.607
Chattos life and career as a devoted Indian nationalist and anti-colonial activist, and as a
national revolutionary in the service of communism, is a topic covered in Barooah and Milton
Israels studies. However, these studies do not present the dynamics of Chattos egocentric
network in the context of the LAI. By re-constructing Chattos network in 1928-29, a
transcontinental network emerges linking together India, Berlin and Moscow. The table below
introduces the key actors in Chattos network, a structure which not only exclusively focused on
Chatto; the table shows that some of the ties went beyond his remit. These ties nevertheless
depended on the knowledge Chatto possessed, e.g. in shaping the anti-imperialist agenda of the
Comintern. This was a precondition which existed particularly in relation to Chattos relations with
Mnzenberg and Nehru, the former being the link between the International Secretariat and both
the Comintern and the KPD, with the latter trying to mobilise the activities of the LAI in India.

606

RGASPI 542/1/27, 34-36, Report, Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow 28/8-1928. Chatto, Ella Windmller
and Otto Schudel attended this meeting. Furthermore, Babette Gross appeared as an accredited journalist for the A-I-Z,
whereas Lehmann-Russbldt of the League for Human Rights delivered a speech declaring his continued support of
the colonial independence struggle. Founded in 1887, the Inter-Parliamentary Union wanted to stimulate a discussion
on international conflicts on a governmental level. Similar organisations and institutional actors established at the end
of the nineteenth century were, e.g. the Institute of International Law (1873), the International Peace Bureau (1891)
and the Nobel Committee, see Davies 1996, p.874.
607
The above discussion draws inspiration from Barry Wellmans evaluation of network theory, which suggests that
egocentric (or personal) networks strive to avoid confusion, as well as to define structural boundaries from the
standpoint of focal individuals, see Wellman 1997, p.27.

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Table 6.1: Chattos Egocentric Network, 1928-29

Comintern,
Moscow

Mnzenberg,
Berlin

Chatto,
Berlin

A. C. N. Nambiar,
Berlin

KPD,
Berlin

The Indian Bureau,

Berlin, 1929

Lindhagen,
Stockholm

Hatta,
Locarno

S. Iyengar
Jhabwala,
Bombay

Nehru, India

Bridgeman,
London
Independence for
India League

INC

Chatto perfected his egocentric network in 1928-29. Some of his contacts, e.g. with Bridgeman
and Hatta, were realised in 1928, while his connection to Lindhagen could be traced back to the
time Chatto was living in Stockholm in 1917-21.
India was the main challenge for the International Secretariat in 1928. Jhabwala's loneliness
and the surveillance of the British security services symbolised the problematic scenario of
distributing the LAIs propaganda, and of sending money to India. The International Secretariat
relied therefore on the services of Comintern emissaries, e.g. from the CPGB, to carry out
missions in India. This was an arrangement Chatto wanted to change. Nevertheless, when the
emissaries passed through Berlin en route to India, they received additional instructions from
Chatto. For example, the case of the British journalist and CPGB member Hugh Lester
Hutchinson, sent on a mission to India in 1928, tells the tale of how the scheme worked in
practice. According to Haithcox, Hutchinson left London in September 1928 and stopped over in
Berlin, where he visited the International Secretariat and met (most likely) Chatto before
departing. On the other hand, as Mnzenberg informed Kuusinen, a British Comrade [was]
sent to India. Arriving in Bombay, Hutchinson assumed the position as editor of the left-wing
journal New Spark a zealous allusion to Lenins journal Iskra working together with Shushani
Nambiar (Chattos sister), the two of them ending up having an affair.608
However, Shushani Nambiar was also married to the Indian journalist, A. C. N. Nambiar,
Chattos close friend and collaborator who helped him organise Indian anti-colonial propaganda in

608

Hugh Lester Hutchinson published Conspiracy at Meerut (Allen & Unwin, London, 1935), a tale of his adventures
in India. During Haithcox's interview with Philip Spratt, he received details about Hutchinson and Nambiars love
affair and about Hutchinson's editorial role at the New Spark. However, to verify Spratt's information, Haithcox
consulted the papers of the Home Department, Government of India, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928; Haithcox 1971, 54, 308 (footnotes 51 & 52).

240

Berlin, an undertaking which was at odds with Roys work to unify the Indian nationalist
movement in the city. In May 1923, Chatto provided both his sister and her husband with
assistance to leave London and move to Berlin and, in February 1926, Nambiar attended the
Rathauskeller conference, as well as the Brussels Congress in 1927.609 Aside from his personal
connection and contact with Chatto, working as a correspondent for the pro-nationalist agency
Free Press of India and a member of the All India Congress Committee (AICC), Nambiar also had
an independent network ready to respond to the instructions of AICC officials.610 As Chatto was
also the brother of the renowned poet Sarojini Naidu, Chatto agreed to act as protector and advisor
for her son, M. J. S. Naidu. The Indian connections at the International Secretariat became evident
in the summer of 1928, with the visit of the former leader of the INC, Srinivasa Iyengar, to Berlin.
Prior to this, Iyengar had been in England, where he both attended and delivered a speech at the
inaugural conference of the British LAI Section in London. In Berlin, Iyengar met Chatto, Sarojini
Naidu and her son at the International Secretariat. The RKO registered these meetings and
suspected that the aim of Iyengars visit in Berlin was to meet Bolshevik officials at the Soviet
consulate. For Sarojini Naidu, the purpose of her stopover in Berlin during the summer of 1928
was to see whether her son was coping with his studies at Humboldt University, but also to work
with her brother Chatto at the International Secretariat, the RKO concluded.611
The major achievement of Chatto and Nambiar was the establishment of the Berlin Indian
Students Information Bureau (the Indian Bureau) in Berlin in February 1929. The Indian
Bureau was a sub-section of the International Secretariat, a result of the interactionism between
Chatto, Nambiar and Nehru, the latter having convinced the INC to give its moral consent and
provide financial support to the LAI. In fact, the Indian Bureau had a historic tie to The Indian
News Service and Information Bureau which Chatto had established after having been deported
from Sweden in 1921 and ending up in Berlin. In 1929, the primary aim of the Indian Bureau
was to recruit Indian anti-colonial activists and students in Berlin. One year later, on 5 November
1930, Chatto sent a report to the Eastern Secretariat entitled Courses for Colonial Students in
Berlin, a document Piatnitsky also consulted, which included a description of the purpose and
aim of the Indian Bureau:
609

Nambiar and Chatto had, for example, organised propaganda against British imperialism by publishing papers: the
anti-colonial Indo-German Commercial Review and its successor, the Industrial and Trade Review for India, in 192324, publications which also competed with Roys pro-nationalist publication, Vanguard, in Berlin, see Barooah 2004,
pp.189-190.
610
Israel 1994, p.260.
611
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/67113, 112, Reichskommissar: Vermerk: Aus privater Quelle, Berlin, August, 1928. In the
summer of 1928, Iyengar visited Moscow and met Stalin; however, whether he attended the Sixth International
Comintern Congress is not known, see Overstreet & Windmiller 1956, pp.112-113. Sarojini Naidu was a
distinguished female member of the INC; see Haithcox, 1971, p.54. The above is also introduced and discussed in
the article, Fredrik Petersson, Hub of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: The League against Imperialism and Berlin,
1925 33, in Interventions: International Journal of Post-Colonial Studies (Taylor & Francis, 2013).

241

In connection with the Indian students work we would like to draw special attention to the
importance of the Indian Bureau which was created in February 1929 by the National
Congress at Chattos suggestion and placed by the Congress under the control of Nambiar
and Chatto. We have found it extremely useful as a centre for recruiting students, for finding
out the best and most reliable among them [added by hand], to take up the question of
sending literature [added by hand] and also for obtaining journals, books and other literature
on India, which are not directly available without payment by the League.612
The Indian Bureau advocated a radical approach towards British imperialism and the Indian
question, which resonated with Chattos vision of constructing a viable channel for anti-imperialist
activism. For Nehru, the bureau represented a channel through which to improve relations with
both the LAI and with the anti-imperialist movement in Europe. In 1928, after Nehru had returned
to India, politically invigorated after his experience of the Brussels Congress and the nature of the
anti-colonial movement in Europe, Nehru assumed the role as the leading advocate of []
international connections for Indias freedom fighters in India. Hence, the LAI and Chatto were
decisive links to radical, nationalist and anti-colonial movements in the West for Nehru. In October
1928, Nehru and Iyengar formed the anti-colonial association, Independence for India League, in
India; an organisational initiative which evidently made Chatto particularly happy as it was more
or less a blueprint of the anti-imperialist agenda supported by the LAI. However, at the end of the
day, Nehru also had an independent agenda, according to which he aimed to use the LAI for his
own purposes. For example, the LAIs transcontinental network was a perfect vehicle to use and
with which to participate in orchestrated letter-writing campaigns to change views among
Congressmen [INC representatives in India and Great Britain] as well as outsiders in the direction
of a further radicalisation of the movement.613 For a short period, the Independence for India
League was one of the few existing LAI channels into India. However, in India, some people
perceived the association as a hostile actor and, therefore, chose to ignore it entirely. According to
Motilal Nehru, as noted in a letter to theosophist Annie Besant in India, I have no fear of this
group and it would be easy to dispose of their colourable imitations by simply leaving them to
stew in their own juice.614
Chattos connections in Europe were of an intimate nature. As Hatta had decided to establish a
more personal relation to the International Secretariat in 1928, Chatto acted as his contact and

612

To avoid any linguistic misinterpretation from German to English, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for
Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930. For the original, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 38-42,
Kurse fr koloniale Studenten in Berlin, Chatto, Berlin, Piatnitsky [?], Moscow, 5/11-1930. The date stamped on the
document: 6.NOV.1930, informs us of the date of its arrival at Comintern headquarters in Moscow.
613
Israel 1994, p.256-259; Barooah 2004, p.259.
614
Letter from Motilal Nehru, Allahabad, to Annie Besant, Adyar, Madras, 30/9-1928, in Nehru 1958, pp.63-67.

242

receiver of intelligence on the PI, once Hatta had resigned from the Dutch LAI Section in June
1928. However, this did not imply that he chose to ignore the development of the section in the
Netherlands, informing Chatto, for example, of how the fanatical behaviour of the CPH had
destroyed the section.615 Hatta also performed a service for Chatto by recruiting anti-colonial
activists in the Netherlands who seemed open to influence and suited to receiving political
education. According to Mnzenberg, commenting on 20 January 1929 to Kuusinen on Hattas
efforts in finding candidates, Hatta is very close to us.616 A particular case further illustrates this
collaboration between Chatto and Hatta. When Hatta notified Chatto of his intentions to resign as
leader of the PI in January 1929, the candidate selected to assume the leadership, an Indonesian
law student at the University of Leiden, Abdullah Sukur, had to receive an in-depth education on
the colonial question under the tutelage of the LAI in Berlin. According to Hatta, Chatto should
accept the still young Sukur to come to Berlin and receive a thorough education:
I judge it necessary that he comes to Berlin to undergo a practice school in our bureau. I
hope to send him on the 10th of October. Because he cannot expende [sic] more than Mk. 100
(60 Gulden) per month, please let me know as soon as possible, if this sum is sufficient for
living in Berlin. Can you find a cheap but rather good boarding-house for him [] on
payment of Mk. 85 a 90 per month?617
Hence, this case suggests that the International Secretariat was functioning both as a hub and as an
educational centre for inexperienced anti-colonial activists in Berlin and beyond.
*
The Indian Debacle and the LAI's Turning Point
Chattos egocentric network represented one of the LAIs transcontinental communication links
outside Germany. However, through the attempts and manoeuvres of the Comintern emissaries, the
LAI made an effort to establish itself in India at the end of 1928: at the annual INC conference in
Calcutta. Scheduled to convene in December, Nehru sent a request in October to the International
Secretariat asking Chatto to send a fraternal delegate to the conference.618 Nehrus letter arrived
615

Members of the Dutch LAI Section and the PI had a meeting in Amsterdam on 19 November, to discuss the
conflict, see RGASPI 542/1/29, 77, Letter from Hatta, The Hague, to Chatto, Berlin, 27/9-1928; RGASPI 542/1/29,
83.
616
RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929.
617
Whether Sukur ever travelled to Berlin to undergo political training is unknown. Rudolf Mrzeks study, Sjahrir.
Politics and Exile in Indonesia (SEAP Publications, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1994, p.66), indicates that Sukur
became duly elected as the leader of the PI in 1929. However, Mrzek does not mention that Hatta wanted to resign
from the PI, a point of view Hatta had introduced to Chatto in 1928, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/29, 77, Letter from Hatta,
The Hague, to Chatto, Berlin, 27/9-1928.
618
Nehru wondered whether the International Secretariat would have the courtesy to convey the invitation to every
organisation affiliated or associated to the LAI, RGASPI 542/1/29, 78, Letter from Nehru to the International
Secretariat, Berlin, 9/10-1928.

243

in Berlin on 11 November (perhaps due to the interception of the British security services in
India), thus, Mnzenberg asked Chatto for advice on how to proceed, while Kuusinen was
assigned to find a candidate in Moscow to travel to Calcutta as a representative of the LAI.
Mnzenberg made it clear that he simply did not have the time or energy to find a candidate in
Berlin, as he was mainly preoccupied with the ZK KPD and with the Friends of the Soviet
Union.619
In Moscow, Kuusinen instructed the WPA member Jack W. Johnstone, who had also attended
the Sixth International Comintern Congress, to travel to India as the LAI representative and to
deliver a programme speech at the INC conference. After the mission, Johnstone had to send a
report to the Eastern Secretariat, with a focus on the INCs attitude vis--vis the LAI.620
From the outset, Johnstones mission to India turned into a disaster. On 22 November,
Johnstone arrived in Calcutta only to have the local police strictly monitor his whereabouts in the
city. Nevertheless, Johnstone managed to attend and deliver his speech at the INC conference on
18-20 December in Jharia, Bihar. However, after having given his speech, the police arrested
Johnstone outside the conference hall and placed him in custody. After having been incarcerated
for sixteen days in an Indian prison, British colonial authorities put Johnstone on a British ship
destined for Genoa, Italy. The farce continued when the ship docked in Genoa, where Italian port
authorities arrested Johnstone. Johnstones tragedy and ordeal nevertheless provided the LAI with
renewed impetus to organise a propaganda campaign against the legal systems of both the British
and Italian authorities. According to Pressedienst, Johnstones strange imprisonment was a
symptom of the oppressive techniques the imperialist nations repeatedly put into practice against
both the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement. In the USA, the AAAIL organised public
meetings in both New York and Washington, while representatives of the British LAI Section
introduced a discussion on Johnstones arrest in the House of Commons. Once Italian authorities
had released Johnstone from prison, he travelled back to Moscow where, in 1931, he assumed a
position at the ECCI Caribbean Bureau.621

619

RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928.
The reason why Kuusinen delegated Robin Page Arnot the task of nominating the LAI representative was a logical
decision, particularly since Arnot worked at the II. Sektion at the Eastern Secretariat, a sub-department in charge of
the India question at Comintern headquarters, see fol. RGASPI 495/6/16, 30, Vorschlag an das Polit-Sekretariat fr die
Zusammensetzung der Lnder-Sekretariat, Moscow, September, 1928. For a biography of Jack W. Johnstone, see
Jeifets, Jeifets, & Huber (eds.) 2004, p.160; RGASPI 542/1/25, 78-79, Confidential letter to Mnzenberg from R Page
Arnot in Moscow, 20/12-1928; TNA KV2/1783, Intercepted letter, Arnot to Spratt, 1929.
621
Spratt met Johnstone in India and told him what an opportunity you have got to make a name for yourself in the
International, see Spratt 1955, p.41; Pressedienst, Nr. 4, 7/2-1929; Haithcox 1971, p.106. Paul Crough, the secretary
of the New York Section of the AAAIL, feared that Johnstone would face execution after his arrest in India. This was
the impetus to establish a mass protest movement in the USA, represented by the AAAIL, the International Labour
Defence, Trade Union Educational League and the ANCL. Moreover, this support campaign also provided an
opportunity to broadcast propaganda against the war threat and in defence of the Soviet Union, see fol. RGASPI
620

244

The debacle of Johnstones mission to India reflects the problems the LAI was facing in its efforts
to establish itself in India. This episode was also somewhat of a watershed for the LAI as an
international actor on the public, political scene. For Mnzenberg, Johnstones adventure only
confirmed the fear that the LAI was unable to establish itself as an organisation in the colonial and
semi-colonial countries. Despite contacts with organisations and individuals in Egypt, Palestine,
both North and South Africa and Latin America, Mnzenberg informed Kuusinen that these
contacts were of an insufficient character as long as the LAI could not carry out the simplest of
anti-imperialist activity, e.g. either distribute anti-imperialist propaganda or organise public
meetings. Thus, the International Secretariat could only become efficient and productive if its
work focused more on securing contacts with individuals rather than organisations in the
colonies.622 Mnzenbergs conclusion was a confirmation of Chattos 1928 vision, i.e. of turning
the LAI into a hub and educational centre for the anti-imperialist movement, an insight spurred on
by the meagre results of Johnstones misadventure, as well as the fiasco of having sent Mardy
Jones as a one-man delegation to the Dutch-Indies in 1927. These two missions further
complicated the LAIs efforts to establish itself outside Europe.
*
The Reversed Trojan Horse

So the League faces a new period, the second period, a period not of demonstration and
betrayal on the part of certain elements, but the second period must be an organised,
systematic campaign against imperialism. [] the League must have a strong workers and
peasants basis, a strong trade union basis. We must draw wide masses into the League. []
in the second phase of the second period of the League we must be for MILITANT
STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM.
James W. Ford, Cologne, 16/1-1929

The Cominterns new line had a reversed Trojan horse effect within the LAI, characterised by
political rhetoric which rejected political associations with both non-communist individuals and
organisations. According to the mythology of the Trojan horse, a strategy aimed at infiltrating the

515/1/1840, 1, Letter from Paul Crough, secretary in New York, to all branches of the AAAIL, organisers and
affiliated organisations, 3/1-1929.
622
RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 12/11-1928. Chatto was in
regular contact with La Guma in South Africa, and the ECCI South American Secretariat in Buenos Aires.

245

bastion of the enemy from within, for the LAI, the Cominterns policy change questioned its
agenda and very existence.623 In Cologne, at the meeting of the LAI Executive on 15-16 January
1929, the reversed Trojan Horse scenario emerged as a political reality within the LAI. In the
words of the Profintern delegate and WPA member James W. Ford (1893 1957), who at the
meeting told the LAI Executive that the LAI was facing a new period of radicalism and needed,
therefore, to reinforce its struggle against the betrayal on the part of certain elements, his
statement nevertheless indicated a split. According to Ford, the LAI had to make the leap from
demonstration to militancy.624 Ford's aggressive rhetoric was particularly aimed at the British trade
unionist and general secretary of the Miners Federation of Great Britain (MFGB) A. J. Cook, as
well as Maxton, accusing both of them of harbouring reformist tendencies Cookism and
Maxtonism. In Fords report to the ECCI Negro Bureau, he concluded that:
It is clear, however, that the League is dominated by the reformists. In the future, if we are to
pursue and carry out our new line, especially at the World Congress of the League we must
begin immediately to mobilise our forces and bring large masses of workers and peasants,
especially of the colonies, who are under our influence, into this congress. We must begin
immediately to prepare organisationally and ideologically.625
Fords conclusion was a re-phrasing of the Cominterns new line, an observation which also
served the purpose of affirming the correctness of Kuusinens colonial theses. By defining Cook
and Maxton as defenders of a reformist policy, Cookism and Maxtonism, this also stigmatised
them as political degenerates, an act which indicated the beginning of a split between the different
political camps within the LAI. However, Ford had only adopted the Comintern's lingua franca
and endorsed political discourse, which sponsored verbal attacks against reformists as justifiable
political targets.626 For Mnzenberg, the LAI Executive meeting had been a delightful event
623

The Trojan Horse metaphor is not a bold suggestion I must argue. Historian David McKnight uses this analogy in
his study of the origins of the Cold War, especially in the context of when the Comintern introduced its Popular Front
policy in 1935, see David McKnight, Espionage and the Roots of the Cold War. The Conspiratorial Heritage, Frank
Cass Publishers, New York, 2002, pp.153-154.
624
RGASPI 495/155/70, 74-76, Copy of speech, delivered by J. W. Ford at the meeting of the EC of the LAI in
Cologne, ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 16/1-1929. In April 1932, Ford concluded in his autobiography (filed in his
personal file in the Comintern Archive) that he formally entered the revolutionary movement in 1925 by joining the
ANLC in Chicago. At the Fourth International Profintern Congress in Moscow in 1928, Ford was elected as a
member of the Executive Bureau and charged with developing the work of the Negro Bureau of the RILU, see fol.
RGASPI 495/261/6747, 67-71. See Weiss (2011) on Fords work to prepare the First International Conference of
Negro Workers. For a biography on Ford, see Jeifets, Jeifets, & Huber (eds.), 2004, p.113.
625
RGASPI 495/155/70, 62-68, Report from J. W. Ford to the ECCI, Moscow, January, 1929. For A. J. Cook, see
Ralph H. Desmarais & John Saville, Dictionary of Labour Biography, Volume III, Bellamy & Saville (eds.),
Macmillan Press, London, 1976, pp.38-49.
626
According to Kuusinens colonial theses: the formation of any kind of bloc between the communist party and
the national-reformist opposition must be rejected; this does not exclude temporary agreements and the co-ordination
of activities in particular anti-imperialist actions [underlining by author], provided that the activities of the bourgeois
opposition can be utilized to develop the mass movement, [] Of course, in this work the communists must at the
same time carry on the most relentless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois nationalism and against the

246

where the communists for the first time had been in the majority. In his report to Kuusinen,
Mnzenberg described how the LAI Executive meeting had almost functioned as a means of
delineating an ideological divide between the communist and non-communist members on the LAI
Executive. Furthermore, according the analysis by LaPorte and Morgan of the Stalinist leadership
cult, which is comparable to the context outlined above, the communist strategy and behavioural
scheme followed the logic of a little like war communism in its fantasy of a tabula rasa on
which a revolutionary party or society could be established.627 Therefore, Cook and Maxton
represented the enemy, in the flesh, the main opponents against the communists in the rush to
secure domination over particular issues, which, in the case of the LAI, was the trade union
question. Additionally, the LAI meeting in Cologne also witnessed how the International
Secretariat celebrated both the recent affiliation of the Profintern as collective members and having
had a Profintern delegation attend its session. This Profintern delegation was the result of
Mnzenbergs having requested that Kuusinen see whether it would be possible to send a large
Profintern delegation to Cologne, which would put the trade union question at the top of the
agenda.628 Kuusinen presented this request to the Political Secretariat, which endorsed the decision
to instruct the Profintern Executive Committee to prepare a theoretical guideline on the
precarious trade union question and to provide the LAI kom.Fraktion with this material prior
to the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne.629
*
The Litmus Test: the LAI Executive Meeting in Cologne 15-16 January 1929
The LAI Executive meeting in Cologne, which would expose the LAI as a fragile organisation,
was the prelude to the second international LAI congress (later known as the Frankfurt Congress).
Attending the meeting off the record, Robin Page Arnot observed how the colonial question as a

slightest signs of its influence inside the labour movement, see Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial
and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted by the Sixth Comintern Congress, taken from Degras vol.II, 1960, p.541.
627
RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929; Norman LaPorte &
Kevin Morgan, Kings among their subjects? Ernst Thlmann, Harry Pollitt and the Leadership Cult as
Stalinization, LaPorte, Morgan & Worley (eds.) 2008, p.138.
628
RGASPI 542/1/25, 45-46, Letter from Mnzenberg to Kuusinen in Moscow, 12/11-1928. On October 17,
Mnzenberg stated in a letter to Heimo that the International Secretariat had invited trade unions in England, Norway,
Finland and Egypt. However, in order to define a strategy on the trade union question at the LAI Executive meeting,
Mnzenberg wanted to hold a closed pre-conference meeting with representatives from British, French, German,
Belgian and Italian communist parties. The initial idea had been to convene the LAI Executive in either Brussels or in
Paris on 1-2 December; however, Mnzenbergs commitments to the ZK KPD, and the Friends of the Soviet Union
delayed the meeting for at least one month, opting finally for Cologne, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/61, 246, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Heimo, Moscow, 17/10-1928; TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis of the LAI by MI5,
year: 1929.
629
The Political Secretariat instructed the International Secretariat to avoid holding the LAI Executive meeting on the
same date as the Tenth Party Day of the CPGB (19 January 1929, Bermondsey), RGASPI 495/3/61, 90a-91, Protocol
Nr.9, Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI, 26/10-1928.

247

topic was being treated by the socialist and communist movements in Europe, an experience which
confirmed the need to carry out a vigorous investigation of the European communist parties
colonial work. Additionally, Fimmen, Mme Duchne, Cook, S. O. Davies, Maxton, Bridgeman,
Alex Gossip, the secretary of the LAI bureau in London and Arnots wife Olive Budden,
Saklatvala, Pollitt, the leader of the Arab National Congress Suri, the Chinese Ju Fei, Hatta,
Goldschmidt, Chatto, Mnzenberg, Arnot and the Profintern delegation (Melnitschansky, KPD
member Fritz Heckert and Ford) had arrived in Cologne to attend the LAI Executive meeting.630
For the British LAI Section, the LAI Executive meeting was a tedious episode. In Arnots report to
Kuusinen, the journey from London to Cologne had confirmed for the members of the section the
authorities increasingly antagonistic attitude towards the Liga [LAI], as Maxton, Bridgeman
and Saklatvala were held up by Belgian police en route to Cologne. Once the session had ended,
and travelling back to London after having docked in Dover, a special commissar of the British
port authorities subjected Budden to a thorough interrogation, asking her about her connections
with the LAI.631
The Cologne meeting followed a logic determined by the communists. Mnzenberg opened the
session, declaring that he was proud of the proletarian participation which the Profintern
represented:
The Executive Committee of the LAI sincerely salutes the representatives of the Profintern,
present at this meeting of the LAI Executive. The Executive Committee considers the
collective affiliation of the Profintern with the LAI as a step [illegible] start for the
development of the anti-imperialist movement in the world.632
Mnzenberg also outlined the LAIs ideological direction since the Brussels Congress. Firstly, the
LAI had managed to establish a firm organisational structure and, secondly, the LAI was no longer
a forum for intellectuals, in fact the LAI was a representative for proletarian organisations and
trade unions.633 This argument was a reference to the agenda for the session which, according to
Arnots notes, focused on the relation of the anti-imperialist League to the trade unions on an
international scale and in semi-colonial and colonial countries, the position of the liberation
struggle and position of trade unions in the Arab countries especially in Palestine, the suggestion
of an Anti-Imperialist World Congress in Summer 1929, India, Afghanistan and the anti630

Rivera, Nehru, Baldwin, Chedli and Marteaux did not attend the meeting due to geographical or other reasons, see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929.
631
RGASPI 542/1/32, 18, Letter from R. P. Arnot, Cologne, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 16/1-1929. For the British LAI
delegation, see TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis of the LAI, MI5, year: 1929; Internet:
<
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1929/jan/31/customs-examination-papers-and-documents
>;
Pressedienst, Internationales Sekretariats, Berlin, Nr.4, 7/2-1929, p.1.
632
RGASPI 542/1/32, 3, Begrssungsadresse fr die russische Delegation [Profintern] an der EK-Sitzung der LAI in
Kln, 14/1-1929.
633
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/151, 125-129, Liga gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrckung, 1929.

248

imperialist Youth. This agenda also proved to both the RK and the RKO the necessity of
continuing to monitor the activities of the LAI in Germany.634
The trade union question was the ideological litmus test for the LAI. The whole thing []
was a clash with the reformists, according to Ford, which had established a fear among our
comrades that the non-communists were looking for an opportunity to withdraw from the
League.635 Ford took charge of the discussion, while Maxton refused to provide any response to
the accusation of being a reformist. However, Cook urged the LAI Executive to be realistic as
well as Marxist, suggesting the constructive option to link the trade unions with the LAI, an
initiative guided by the spirit of internationalism. In fact, Cook believed that the attendance of
Russian comrades in Cologne was evidence that it was possible to unify Communists and
reformists under one objective: to turn the LAI into a real international organisation. The
communists rejected Cooks argument with contempt. Pollitt accused Cook of not having any
faith in the masses, concluding that the LAI faced the challenge of harnessing the trade
unions, as well as developing a consistent leadership within the LAI Executive capable of
carrying out LAI resolutions in practice.636 Melnitschansky continued by categorising every word
from Cook as the purest nonsense, demanding that the LAI Executive understand that the class
struggle was the only method at hand to prevent war. Yet, Melnitschansky gave an assurance that
the Profintern had no intention of turning the LAI into a Red International. Heckert developed
Melnitschanskys argument and concluded that the LAI had to increase its propaganda with a
focus on the overthrow of Imperialism and the liberation of the colonial peoples. MI5 observed
in a secret report that the discussions had gotten out of hand at the meeting, whereupon
Mnzenberg had had to step in and end the intense debate by explaining that the LAI was neither a
communist, socialist nor a social democratic movement, participation based solely on ones
support for its political agenda.637 Mnzenbergs argument was, however, a contradiction.
634

RGASPI 542/1/32, 14, Agenda, Cologne, 15-16/1-1929 [compiled and sent by R. P. Arnot to Kuusinen]; SAPMOBA ZPA R1507/151, 125-129, Liga gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrckung, 1929. According to the
Reichskommissar, the development of the anti-imperialist movement in Latin America had also been discussed at the
LAI Executive meeting, based on a report from the Professor, Alfons Goldschmidt, who had recently arrived in
Germany after a trip to Latin America. Goldschmidt also published the impressions of his journey in A-I-Z and
Weltbhne. The RK included an assessment of how Goldschmidt's activities in Mexico had been a topic of interest. In
reference to a published article [unknown source and author], the RK realised that some people perceived
Goldschmidt as an agent voyageur in Mexico and an avid supporter of Bolshevism. Hence, the RK suspected that
Goldschmidts Latin American journey was a mission sanctioned by the Comintern.
635
RGASPI 495/155/70, 62-68, Report from J. W. Ford to the ECCI, Moscow, January 1929. This report has been
found in fond 534/3/450, 53-59, Report on Trip in Interest of the Work of the International Trade Union Committee of
Negro Workers of the RILU and the Negro Bureau of the Comintern and the Meeting of the Executive Committee of
the League Against Imperialism (Ford) [January 1929; written 14.2.29?].
636
RGASPI 542/1/32, 19-21, Report (R. P. Arnot) on trade union question, Cologne, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 15/1-1929.
637
TNA HO 144 10693, Secret report, analysis of the LAI by MI5, year: 1929; RGASPI 495/155/70, 62-68, Report
from J. W. Ford to the ECCI, Moscow, January, 1929. Mnzenberg argued that the British LAI Section was very
apathetic; however, if the section followed the example of the Mexican comrades [who had established] 30

249

According to its adopted resolution on the trade union question at the session Die
Gewerkschaften und die Liga gegen Imperialismus, the LAI urged every trade union in Europe to
understand that the daily struggle against imperialism was in essence based on class character.
Also, that class-aware trade unions should establish connections with similar revolutionary
organisations in the colonies, a step which would preserve the independence of the antiimperialist movement in order to avoid any influence of national and bourgeoisie parties.638
Convinced that the trade union debate had produced no negative impact on the LAI,
Mnzenberg told Kuusinen that the Cologne meeting seemed to have strengthened the belief
amongst the bourgeoisie and social democratic circles within the LAI that the organisation was a
non-party organisation, rather than a section of the Comintern. Accordingly, Mnzenberg
explained how Bridgeman and Maxton had fallen for the illusion that the LAI Executive was a
forum for open political discussions,639 while branding Cook, the Englishman, to be no longer
of any use, telling Kuusinen that other candidates might as well assist in the work to establish
LAI sections in India, the Arab region and other colonial countries. Fimmen, however, experienced
the Cologne meeting as a disappointment, particularly the behaviour of the Profintern delegation,
which led to him telling Mnzenberg that he was considering resigning from his position as vicedeputy. However, if Fimmen continued down this path, Arnot told Kuusinen, the LAI would have
to launch a political campaign against Fimmen.640
After Cook had returned to England, disturbed by the callous atmosphere of the Cologne
meeting and suffering from poor health, he had to confront an investigation initiated by the
MFGB. In June 1929, Labour Monthly published the article, Cooks Break with the
Revolutionary Working Class, accusing Cook of treachery. This article included a statement from
Cook, responding to the critique as being false and misrepresentative of my actions and
opinions, explaining how he did not understand how the communists interpreted the message of
socialism. In conclusion, Cook stated, Comradeship means something higher and nobler than the
example set by the British Communist Party in their campaign of personalities, hate, vilification
and destruction.641
organisations of the League, this would alter the level of anti-imperialist activism in the British Empire, rather than
just having a movement located exclusively in London, see RGASPI 542/1/32, 22, Report of the EC of the LAI,
Tuesday Session/Latin America.
638
SCA CL Collection, volume 130, Resolution, Kln. Die Gewerkschaften und die Liga gegen Imperialismus, 1516/1-1929.
639
RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929. Pressedienst
published the LAI's resolutions on India, the Arab region and Youth on 7 February, see Pressedienst, Nr. 4, 7/2-1929.
640
RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Report from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 20/1-1929. For Arnots idea, see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 3-4, Letter/report, probably written and signed by Willi Mnzenberg, Berlin 20/1-1929;
RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7, Handwritten letter from R. Page Arnot to Otto Kuusinen in Moscow, 29/1-1929. Arnot told
Kuusinen to contact the International Secretariat if he wanted a copy of A. J. Cooks speech in Cologne.
641
A. J. Cook, Cooks Break with the Revolutionary Working Class, in Labour Monthly, Volume 11, June 1929,

250

*
Deceit as a Strategy of Control: From London to Moscow, Berlin and Back Again
The trade union question had an immediate political effect on the LAI. Most importantly, the
International Secretariat had to reinforce its control over the British LAI Section. Bridgeman was
nevertheless enthusiastic and, after arriving back in London, he published an article on both the
LAI and the trade union question in the British socialist paper, the Manchester Guardian.
However, this article caused irritation and was not appreciated. According to Arnot, neither the
British LAI Section nor the Colonial Commission of the CPGB had sanctioned Bridgeman to
publish this article, and Arnot accused Bridgeman of having caused considerable trouble, which
had infuriated him. One reason for Arnots irritation was that Bridgeman had stated that if the
British trade unions followed the example set by the LAI, they would be making a big concession
to the Russians. In an attempt to coerce Bridgeman and Cook, Arnot summoned them to a
meeting in London on 21 January, only to hear that neither of them appreciated the obvious
communist dominance within the LAI. Arnot decided to inform Mnzenberg of this attitude, which
constituted a threat in the fight against imperialism, and that Bridgemans misinterpretation
required correction.642 Pollitt sided, of course, with Arnot in this case, telling Mnzenberg that the
Colonial Commission of the CPGB had decided not to publish the trade union resolution,
recommending that the International Secretariat act swiftly in order to put an end to Bridgemans
wrongful report by sending him the correct version of the trade union resolution.643 The crux
of this matter being that, at this point in time, no correct version of the trade union resolution
even existed.
On 8 February, the Political Secretariat in Moscow evaluated the results of both the LAI
Executive meeting and the trade union question, deciding to correct Bridgeman at all costs and
resolving to use the International Secretariat as the key to finding a solution to this problem,
preferably by releasing its correct version. However, the International Secretariat could not act
before the speedy publication of Comrade Melnitschanskys speech at the Plenum of the League
in Great Britain, the USSR and other countries had created some kind of political impact. The
Political Secretariat's scheme was an idea characterised by intentional deceit from the very
beginning, in which it had to appear as though Bridgeman and the British LAI Section had
Number 6, pp.342-348. The LAI Executive resolved at its next meeting (Amsterdam, 13-14 April 1929) to remove
Cook from the agenda of the second international LAI congress, explaining, representatives of affiliated organisations
should have first place and, since Cook was present in January only by virtue of his personal position which he has
since abandoned..., see fol. RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51. For the investigation against Cook, see Desmarais & Saville
vol.III 1976, p.44. Cook passed away on 2 November, 1931.
642
RGASPI 542/1/30, 8, Letter from Arnot, London, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 28/1-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7,
[Handwritten] letter from R. Page Arnot, London, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 29/1-1929.
643
RGASPI 542/1/30, 9, Letter from Pollitt, London, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/1- 1929.

251

received the correct version of the trade union resolution from the International Secretariat, while
this was an idea contrived by the Political Secretariat. Mnzenberg attended the meeting in
Moscow on 8 February and was, therefore, aware of the Political Secretariats intentions, and he,
along with Melnitschansky, Tom Bell and Petrovsky as leader, was instructed to write a declaration
that had to avoid using reformist expressions.644 On 16 February, the Political Secretariat
endorsed the correct version, Resolution ber die Tagung der Exekutive der antiimperialistische
Liga, instructing the International Secretariat to publish the resolution, and to send a personal
copy to Bridgeman, with an emphasis on the following statement:
The Executive Committee of the League is guided in its work by the decision of the
Inaugural Congress of the League (February 1927) which clearly formulated the general line
of struggle against imperialism and colonial oppression and the method of active aid to the
defence of the revolutionary movement in the colonial, semi-colonial and subordinate
countries [] The work of the League has been crowned with success in the sense that the
trade union organisations of a number of countries, including the Trade Union Federations of
the USSR [Profintern] and India, have joined the League. [] The League will consider it
its duty to criticise and expose the activity of the trade union organisations directed in overt
or covert form towards the support of imperialist plunder and colonial oppression [] The
League will be most critical and will advance the most determined demands in relation to the
unions belonging to the League.645
Accordingly, Bridgeman had to believe that the original aim and purpose of the LAI remained
firm, i.e. to be a supporter of the struggle against imperialism and colonial oppression, although
this now also entailed the obligation to criticise and expose the opponents and supporters of the
imperialist system.646 For the LAI, the trade union question and the ensuing debate in Cologne
exposed the fragile non-political character of the LAI, confirming a split between the communist
and non-communist members.
*

644

RGASPI 495/3/89, 365, Protocol, Polit-Secretariat, Moscow, 8/2-1929. For a copy of this protocol, see fol.
RGASPI 495/20/722, 45-46. Melnitschanskys article, Die Klner Tagung der Exekutive der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, was published in Inprecorr (Nr.6, 9.Jahrgang, 18/1-1929), see fol. RGASPI 495/3/86, 184. Present at
the meeting were: Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Bennet/Petrovsky, Mnzenberg, Bell, Pollitt, Gusev, Chitarow, Heller,
Melnitschansky, Figatner, Gerich and Heimo; RGASPI 495/3/86, 174, Vorschlge des Genossen Petrovsky [Bennet],
Moscow, 8/2-1929.
645
RGASPI 495/3/86, 168-169, (Confidential) Statement regarding LAI Cologne meeting, Moscow, [endorsed 16/21929]. For a copy of this statement, see fol. RGASPI 495/20/722, 47-48, however, this version does not mention the
date of adoption of the document.
646
RGASPI 542/1/30, 18, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 27/2-1929. It is unknown when
Bridgeman received this statement from the International Secretariat.

252

The Arnot Connection: Evaluation of the Colonial Work and the Colonial Conference
In the presentation of his colonial theses at the Sixth International Comintern Congress,
Kuusinen stated that the communist parties colonial work was one of the weakest sides of
Comintern activity. From the Cominterns inception in 1919, up until 1928, the communist
parties had either chosen to ignore their colonial work completely or considered it to be a complete
waste of time, despite the formation of colonial commissions as sub-departments within the
parties, e.g. the Colonial Commission of the CPGB and the Colonial Committee of the PCF.
According to Kuusinen, the parties endeavours to establish connections with colonial countries
were insufficient, especially in countries which had no strong communist party. Thus, the parties
in the imperialist countries Europe and the USA had to support the establishment of
communist parties in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.647 Yet, this demand was both a
contradiction and a utopian vision, particularly as it gave the parties the momentous task of
fulfilling the objectives of the colonial theses. According to the biased Outline History of the
Communist International, the relationship between the colonial question and the communist
movement in Europe was one characterised by contradiction in 1928:
[] the theses of the Sixth Congress on the colonial question contained several erroneous
and contradictory propositions on the questions of the strategy and tactics of the national
liberation struggle [] The Congress required the communist parties of the imperialist
countries [authors italics] to establish close, regular and constant contacts with the
revolutionary movement in the colonies in order to give this movement active support and
practical assistance.648
Apparently, the communist parties were puzzled about how to support, or even understand, the
nature of the colonial question. Towards the end of 1928, the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters strode into action to find some kind of direction for the colonial work in Western
Europe, focusing on the close examination of colonial work in the parties and the sympathising
organisations (the LAI and the LDRN). In December, Arnot received an instruction from
Kuusinen, endorsed by the Small Commission, to visit the Western European parties in order to
gather intelligence on their colonial work, an objective which culminated in the effort to organise a
Colonial Conference in the spring of 1929.

After the Sixth Comintern Congress, the Comintern apparatus in Moscow was facing a reorganisation of its organisational structure. For the International Secretariat, this implied a new set
647

The Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries Adopted by the Sixth
Comintern Congress, taken from Degras vol.II 1960, pp.526, 537-547.
648
Sobolev (ed.) 1971, p.286.

253

of liaisons for the LAI at Comintern headquarters. On 24 September 1928, the Small Commission
endorsed the decision to appoint Kuusinen as the LAI liaison, charging him to revise the practical
connections (administrative and political support) of the organisation.649 Arnot had assumed
Petrovskys position after the congress which, in practice, entailed sorting out the practical details
of the colonial work, as well as taking over Heimos temporary position as LAI administrator. The
re-organisation of the Comintern apparatus had been a process initiated on the direct instruction of
the Political Secretariat in September, focusing primarily on establishing eight LnderSekretariats (Regional Secretariats) with the aim of strengthening contacts with and
communicating directives to the communist parties. This re-organisation completely re-shuffled
the structure of existing secretariats. For example, the Eastern Secretariat went from being one
section to becoming three sections, having Kuusinen, Mif, Joel Schubin, the Chinese Ch Chiu-pai
(Strakhov) and Arnot acting as secretaries. The II. Sektion focused primarily on the Indian
question, according to the Political Secretariat, a section that Arnot found himself located in.650 For
Mnzenberg, it was a question of securing a personal liaison at Comintern headquarters to
administer the LAI question. In December, Kuusinen appointed Arnot as Mnzenbergs contact,
who in confidentiality informed Mnzenberg that he had replaced Petrovsky as correspondent
[liaison]. Taking the initiative to discuss the LAI with other actors in Moscow, Arnot contacted the
Profintern Presidium in December and explained that the LAI was planning to introduce a new
political direction at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne in January 1929. This would mean
developing its propaganda against the war threat, distributing propaganda on the colonial policy of
the Comintern and establishing contacts with trade unions in both Europe and the colonial and
semi-colonial countries.651 However, this was a vision formulated by Arnot which the LAI and its
Executive Committee had not endorsed.
Despite Arnots authoritative position within the CPGB, perceived as an ardent defender of
the new line, the Central Committee of the CPGB did not appreciate his appointment at the
headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow. The CPGB was, however, not in a position to either
649

Heimo and Piatnitsky were delegated to act as liaisons for the IAH at Comintern headquarters, see fol. RGASPI
495/6/16, 28-29, Protokoll Nr.7 der Sitzung der Engeren Kommission, Moscow, 24/9-1928. Present at the meeting
were Piatnitsky, Remmele, Kuusinen, Heimo and Henrikowski.
650
RGASPI 495/6/16, 30, Vorschlag an das Polit-Sekretariat fr die Zusammensetzung der Lnder-Sekretariat,
Moscow, September, 1928. Heimo co-ordinated the re-organisation of the secretariats, an undertaking which proved
difficult, forcing Heimo to concede in December to the Small Commission ENGKOM that the complex
bureaucracy of the apparatus was an impeding factor which delayed the process, see fol. RGASPI 495/6/45, 28, Letter
from Heimo to the members of ENGKOM, 19/12-1928. For the Lnder Sekretariats, see further in Adibekov &
Shakhnazarova (1996, p.68).
651
RGASPI 542/1/25, 78-79, (Confidential) Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 20/12-1928. On
December 10, Arnot completed the draft of this letter (in English). Realising that Mnzenberg had limited English
skills, Arnot translated the document into German and apologised for his bad German (Entschuldigung bitte meine
schlechte deutsch. R.P.A.). For the English version, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/25, 71-72; RGASPI 495/154/364, 44, Draft
of letter from Arnot, Moscow, to the Presidium of the Profintern and AUCTU, December 1928.

254

protest or interfere in a routine involving the interchange of personnel between headquarters and
national sections. According to the historian Andrew Thorpe, Arnot remained in Moscow for
about one year, where he both attended and participated in ECCI and Profintern meetings.652
However, Arnot achieved more than just attending meetings in Moscow; in fact, he assumed a
leading position in the colonial work of the communist parties in Europe and became involved in
solving the fractional struggle of the CPUSA in 1929.
Arnots position as a secretary at the Eastern Secretariat provided him with authority while he
was evaluating the colonial work of the communist parties in Europe. The LAI and its
International Secretariat were key factors in this process, which makes it logical to suggest that the
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Vyacheslav Molotov and
Piatnitsky, referred to the LAI as the sympathising organisation best suited to adopting the
ideological implications of the new line in 1929. This also determined the hierarchy of relations
between Kuusinen, Arnot and other leading individuals at Comintern headquarters in their
discussions of the LAI, although the LAI still had to fulfil the Cominterns instructions. This
proposition still depended on the communist parties in Europe both supporting and being willing
to carry out their colonial work in a routine fashion. In the beginning of 1929, the Comintern
finally realised that its system of sending instructions from Moscow to the parties was insufficient,
and demanded an improvement in their colonial work. On 1 January 1929, the ECCI
Organisational Department (Orgotdel) introduced a Plan of Work which stated that one of the
most important tasks for the parties was to conduct organisational work among foreign
workers, especially among the workers from the colonial and semi-colonial countries.653 This was
a response to the lack of interest from the parties in carrying out any of the above in 1928. Thus, in
order to evaluate the organisational work of the parties in implementing colonial work as a daily
routine, the Small Commission instructed Arnot on 29 December 1928 to visit the Western
European parties in order to discuss their colonial work and the advisability of holding a
conference thereon.654 On 30 December, Arnot left Moscow.
*

652

For Arnots nomination, and a discussion on why foreign communists had to work in Moscow, see Andrew Thorpe,
Comintern Control of the Communist Party of Great Britain, in The English Historical Review, Vol.113, No.452
(Jun.1998), Oxford University Press, p.645.
653
RGASPI 495/25/129, 39-43, Plan of work of the Organisational Department, December-February 1929, 1/1-1929.
654
RGASPI 495/154/406, 1-2, Proposed Colonial Conference of Western European Parties, 4/3-1929.

255

Inspection of the Anti-Imperialist Movement and the LAIs Colonial Work in Europe
Arnots mission to Europe was an intense experience, taking place in different settings and cities:
Frankfurt am Main, Cologne, London, Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam. In mid-February, Arnot
returned to Moscow.655
Table 6.2 : Robin Page Arnots European Journey, 20/12-1928 10-11/2-1929
Letter from Arnot to
Mnzenberg, 20/12-1929

Amsterdam:
departure
10-11/2 [?]

ECCI Small Commission,

29/12-1928

Moscow
December 1928
February 1929

Brussels
(unknown)
Meeting
with PCF
Secretariat

Frankfurt
am Main
3/1-1929

Cologne
15-16/1-1929

Paris
5/2

London
29/1

Meeting
with
Mnzenberg
LAI
Executive
Meeting
Meeting with
Colonial
Commission
CPGB

Arnot travelled directly to Germany from Moscow. On 3 January, Arnot met with Mnzenberg in
Frankfurt am Main to discuss Liga questions: the second international LAI congress and the idea
of organising a Colonial Conference. Reporting in all haste to Kuusinen, Arnot wrote that
Mnzenberg seemed worried about holding a colonial conference.656 The reasons why became
obvious after Arnot had witnessed the discussions at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne in
January, an experience which made Arnot realise that the colonial question was a far more
complex issue than expected and, furthermore, a matter suggesting that the LAI was an isolated
entity in the European communist movement.
London: Arnot left Germany in order to attend the Tenth Party Congress of the CPGB in
London on 19-22 January. According to Arnot, it was a good congress judging by the spirit
displayed by the delegates, where he had managed to convince the Central Committee of the
CPGB to accept without demand the proposes [proposals] of the Comintern. Yet, it seemed as
though the leadership in the CPGB had trouble understanding the ramifications of the new line,
Arnot argued. However, at one of the Central Committees sessions, Arnot stated that there existed
no other option than to carry out the task of [the] ideological strengthening of the Party. In
655

Arnot told Kuusinen: this week I leave for Paris, Brussels and Amsterdam: but I do not expect to be finished with
these parties until about the 8th. So that if I were to stay for the 10th-11th C.C. meeting it would not mean a further
delay of more than two or three days. But if you wish me to return, and not to wait for C.C., will you please telegraph
to that effect?, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7, Handwritten letter from R. Page Arnot to Otto Kuusinen in Moscow,
29/1-1929.
656
RGASPI 542/1/30, 1, [Handwritten] letter from Robin Page Arnot, Frankfurt a/M to, Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/1-1929.

256

Arnots report to Kuusinen, this was based on the fact that the party must be patient and take
some time and much vigilance to weed out the Rightist tendencies that have shown themselves
after the errors of the past years. The report more or less summarised the CPGBs teething
problems in adjusting itself to the new line, while, according to Matthew Worley, the policy
change plunged [the CPGB] into a period of communist civil war lasting from September to
December 1929. Aside from coercing the Central Committee into implementing the new line,
the second reason for Arnot attending the congress was to observe how the party discussed the
colonial question. Apparently, on the last day some delegates raised the question in a passing
fashion, forcing Arnot to concede that the CPGBs capacity to carry out colonial work was in a
poor state. While visiting London, Arnot also observed how the LAI section was nothing more
than a mere committee, which had to improve its work in establishing connections with
proletarian organisations and colonial residents. In reference to the earlier prominent position of
the intellectuals within the LAI, Arnot considered that this was no longer an important question,
but, if the opportunity presented itself, they are [to be] utilised in the service of the LAI.657
Paris: Arnots next stopover was Paris. Compared to the situation within both the CPGB and
the British LAI Section, Arnot realised that the state of the colonial work in the PCF was even
worse off. While the Colonial Commission of the CPGB and the British LAI Section had at least
some contact with anti-colonial activists, in Paris the LAI section had no relations with the party,
described by Arnot as being a very sore point. Arriving in Paris, Arnot faced the covert and
secretive milieu of the French communist movement due to the surveillance of the Sret.
However, on 5 February, Arnot managed to meet the secretary of the PCF Secretariat, Pierre
Semard, for a brief evaluation of its colonial work and the relations between the party and the antiimperialist organisations in France (the LAI and the LDRN). Semard described how the repressive
situation in Paris had made it difficult to carry out any colonial work on a regular basis. In fact,
Semards brief assessment is similar to the experiences of Ngyuen Ai Quoc/Ho Chi Minh during
his Paris sojourn, working for the PCF in 1928. The PCF had an indolent attitude towards its
colonial work, as William Duiker writes in his biography of Ho Chi Minh, a dilemma proven by
the fact that the PCFs colonial work existed only on paper and not in reality. Despite the
Colonial Commission of the PCF having authorised a budget for colonial operations, no money
was at anyones disposal to develop such operations when the box [money] was empty
Quoc/Minh observed. Thus, Quoc/Minh requested that the Eastern Secretariat instigate an
657

According to Arnot, the CPGB should continue to carry out the task of ideological strengthening of the Party, a
process that will [] take some time and much vigilance to weed out the right way tendencies. An observation,
which corresponds with Matthew Worleys conclusion, the CPGB, was around this time plagued by internal conflict
and [] political stupefaction, RGASPI 542/1/30, 5-7, Handwritten letter from R. Page Arnot to Otto Kuusinen in
Moscow, 29/1-1929; Worley, 2002, p.116.

257

investigation to evaluate why the PCF seemed to have no money to organise colonial work in
France, as well as demand the Colonial Commission of the PCF to submit reports to other
comrades on its operations and plans. This narrative is comparable to Arnots experience of the
situation in Paris, which also convinced him of the necessity to organise a Colonial Conference.
Writing from Paris, Arnot told Kuusinen that the following points became clear, one of which
demands a rather speedy decision the Party [must] be in favour of such a Conference on
Colonial questions.658 Arnot left Europe convinced that Kuusinen had been correct in his
assessment that colonial work was one of the Cominterns weakest points. Therefore, the Colonial
Conference would be the solution to finding a new course for the European communist parties
colonial work. However, what was the purpose of this Colonial Conference?
*
The Report on the Parties
In Moscow, Arnot began the work of analysing the intelligence from his journey; writing down his
impressions in his brief Report on the Parties; a document which not only contained a number of
opinions introduced in his letters to Kuusinen but which also described the deterioration of the
colonial work in the communist parties in Europe. The initial purpose of this report was to guide
the decision-making process of the Political Secretariat to endorse the Colonial Conference.
According to this report, the parties in France, Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands
shared the stigma of not being able to carry out the simplest of tasks, e.g. finding colonial contacts,
and at the moment not much is being done. The shortcomings of the Belgian and Dutch parties
were the result of having no reliable connections with their colonies, the Congo Free State and
Indonesia, where intra-party problems had brought the relations with the LAI to a standstill. The
PCF only had a functional contact with the colonies, via the tolie Nord-Africaine in North Africa.
Hence, Arnot conceded that the impact of Senghors death in 1927 had been a decisive blow to the
anti-colonial network in both France and beyond. As a solution to the conundrum in France, Arnot
expected the recently established ECCI Negro Bureau in Moscow to assist the PCF in recommencing work amongst the Negroes and Negro sailors in the ports of Paris, Havre,
Marseilles and Bordeaux, as well as in establishing connections with the still almost unexplored
Equatorial Africa.659

658

RGASPI 542/1/30, 10-16, [Handwritten] letter from Arnot, Paris, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 5/2-1929 (someone had
removed Kuusinens name at the top of the letter with a pair of scissors, yet on the second page, Kuusinen is
mentioned as the recipient). For Ho Chi Minh, see Duiker 2000, pp.148-150, quotes taken from fol. RGASPI
495/154/556 (no list). Doriot acted as Ho Chi Minhs PCF contact.
659
RGASPI 495/154/364, 52-54, Report on the Parties, Arnot, February, 1929. The Political Secretariat endorsed the

258

The CPGBs colonial work was an inefficient and unproductive line of activity, Arnot
concluded, suggesting that the CPGB pay attention to the global spread of the British Empire. For
the CPGB, the party should divide its perception of the world into four sections: India; the socalled White Dominions [the national minority movements] in Europe, Egypt and the Near East
[the Middle East]; Africa and the Caribbean Crown Colonies; and the semi-colonial countries in
Latin America and China. This was an idea of grandiose proportions, Arnot realised, observing,
that with an extremely small party, only a tithe of this has been covered in any manner
whatsoever. However, despite the breadth of the issue, the party should avoid using London, one
of the shipping centres of the world, as a connective centre in which to develop colonial work.
The CPGB also had to confront the problem of having minimal contacts to important auxiliary
bodies in England, e.g. the LAI and the LRD and to all kinds of associations of colonial races in
London and [] Christian and philanthropic [sic] agencies.660 The primary aim of Arnots
Report on the Parties was, however, not to introduce a solution to the current problem of
colonial work; it served only as a document clearly defining the issue in preparation for the
Colonial Conference.
*
The Concept of the Colonial Conference
The Report on the Parties introduced a ruthless criticism of the incompetence of the Western
European communist parties. For Arnot, the Colonial Conference represented the only available
option to solving the crisis. In turn, this required that the Eastern Secretariat narrow down the
concept of the conference before even being able to introduce the idea to the Political Secretariat.
What was the concept of the conference and how did Arnot intend to mobilise the Comintern
apparatus in order to bring the conference into being? This is essentially a question of chronology,
i.e. the Colonial Conference was a continual process following the logic and pressure of time, a
factor which ultimately determined its outcome. According to the chronology of the Colonial
Conference, the timing of this conference coincided with two events in July 1929: the Tenth
ECCI Plenum in Moscow and the second international LAI congress:
Decision of the Small Commission regarding Arnot
Arnots Mission to Europe
Report on the Parties
Proposal/Outline of Conference

29 December, 1928
January-February
February
4 March

formation of a Negro Bureau at the Eastern Secretariat on 12 December, 1928. The Eastern Secretariat expected
five comrades to begin with to represent the bureau, which later [should be] enlarged through comrades from
Negro countries, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/637, 151-152, On the Session of the Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI,
Moscow, 10/12-1928.
660
RGASPI 495/154/364, 52-54, Report on the Parties, Arnot, February, 1929.

259

Endorsed by the Political Secretariat

First meeting of the Commission on Colonial Conference
Budget
Letters to communist parties
The Magyar Thesis
Second Meeting of the Commission on Colonial Conference
Decision to Postpone
The Tenth ECCI Plenum
The Second International Congress against Imperialism and
Colonialism, Frankfurt am Main

14 March
19 March
20 March
25 March
29 March
29 April
25 May
3-19 July
21-27 July

Arnot relied first and foremost on the assistance of the Eastern Secretariat to organise this
Colonial Conference. During the initial stages of the preparatory work, the LAI was also to be
involved in the conference. However, while the LAI expected to begin preparing for the second
international congress at the beginning of 1929, the idea of holding the Colonial Conference was
mooted at the same point in time, one suggestion having been made that the two events were the
same. On the contrary, such a proposition does not hold any water, particularly as the Colonial
Conference had an authoritative position over the second LAI Congress. Is it possible to
determine when the preparations for the Colonial Conference did commence; what does the
process tell us about the Cominterns colonial work; and, finally, did the conference ever convene?
On 4 March, the Eastern Secretariat presented to the Political Secretariat its fundamental concept
of the Colonial Conference:
The Colonial Conference should have as its purpose the putting into operation of the
decisions of the CI on colonial questions, more especially by means of a closer co-ordination
of all colonial activities.661
This required Arnot to co-ordinate individuals and departments at Comintern headquarters in
Moscow to get involved in the Colonial Conference. The table below focuses on the structure of
this preparatory work and presents the actors involved in the Colonial Conference:

661

RGASPI 495/154/406, 1-2, [Eastern Secretariat] Proposed Colonial Conference of Western European Parties, 4/31929.

260

Table 6.3: Structure and Actors in the Colonial Conference, March-June 1929
Alex Bittelman,
May 22

Robin Page
Arnot

Political Secretariat

Small
Commission

Eastern Secretariat

Commission on Colonial
Conference
Members:
Arnot
Arthur Ewert
Ludwig Magyar
Freyer
Virtanen
Obuhov

Colonial
Conference

Communist Parties in
Europe:
Holland
Belgium
Great Britain
Germany
France
Italy
Portugal

WEB
KIM
OMS
LAI
ECCI Negro Bureau
Eastern Secretariat

The Political Secretariats consent was the key for Arnot and the Eastern Secretariat. After
completing his general impressions of the communist parties in his Report on the Parties, Arnot
passed on the principal aim of the Colonial Conference to the Political Secretariat. The
conference had to focus on getting the parties to report on past work and be an examination of
difficulties while pondering future tasks and practical steps in their realisation. Yet, the road to
bringing the conference to fruition was one obstructed by structural constraints. Firstly, Arnot
reflected on the fact that the parties did not seem to know how to find colonial contacts in their
home countries, a defect the parties also neglected to inform the Comintern about. This pattern of
ignorance had established a mentality that made it difficult to send documents, minutes and either
legal or illegal leaflets on the colonial question. Secondly, the communist parties should therefore
accept the active service of colonial students who were pursuing studies at the KUTV in Moscow,
primarily to develop their theoretical and practical work on the colonial question in Europe. In
conclusion, Arnot stated that the Colonial Conference represented a perfect opportunity to
discuss the possibility of linking colonial work with the anti-war movement. Hence, the Colonial
Conference should comprise a representative picture of the Comintern:
The composition of the Conference should be such as to ensure the presence of political
bureau members, specialists in colonial work and colonials. On the other hand, it must be as
small a conference as possible for obvious reasons. Representatives from the WEB and the
Liga should also be present. The location, it is suggested, should be either Berlin or Kln
[Cologne, authors remark] and the time should, if possible, be the middle of April.662
662

RGASPI 495/154/406, 1-2, Proposed Colonial Conference of Western European Parties, [Eastern Secretariat],
Moscow, 4/3-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 10-16, [Handwritten] Letter from Arnot, Paris, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 5/21929.

261

On 14 March, the Political Secretariat endorsed Arnots proposal. However, on 19 March, the
Eastern Secretariat declared the need to postpone the conference until the beginning of May, and
for it to convene in Berlin. The primary reason given was to ensure that delegates from the
communist parties, special representatives of the Comintern, the KIM, the LAI, the WEB, the
OMS and of the ECCI Negro Bureau, as well as technical workers would be able to make it to
the conference.663 From a broader perspective, the Colonial Conference was to involve a range
of actors and would, therefore, be an event highlighting the hierarchy of relations within the
Comintern structure as well as questioning the idea of the Comintern purely as a monolithic body.
In order to devote attention to the preparation of the conference, the Political Secretariat
endorsed the establishment of the Commission Appointed to Prepare Conference on Colonial
Work of Western European Parties, also referred to as the Eastern Secretariat Commission on
Colonial Conference (Commission on Colonial Conference). Arnot acted as the leader of this
commission, working together with Kuusinens deputy at the Eastern Secretariat, the Hungarian
communist Ludwig Magyar, as well as with the German communist Arthur Ewert, Freyer [first
name unknown], the migr communist from Finland and functionary at Comintern headquarters
Niilo Virtanen and the KIM delegate Obuhov. On 19 March, the commission held its inaugural
meeting in Moscow in order to start considering which of the European communist parties to
invite. At the end of the meeting, the Commission on Colonial Conference resolved to wait until
the reports from the parties had arrived in Moscow, documents which were expected to arrive by
31 March. The members of the Commission on Colonial Conference were in charge of separate
questions. Administrative questions and the budget were under Virtanens and Ewerts jurisdiction,
the latter also being responsible for evaluating the incoming reports from the parties; Freyer
prepared the Agitprop material; while Obuhov examined the colonial work in the communist
youth movement. According to Virtanens estimated budget, completed on 20 March and passed
on to the Small Commission, the cost of the Colonial Conference would come to $1,956, which
included the travel arrangements and living costs for the delegates in Berlin, as well as salaries
for the technical workers, the hire of the conference room and other expenses. The Small
Commission nevertheless concluded that the budget was too high, instructing Arnot and Ewert to
revise the costs, which they did, reducing the overall cost by $718, ending with a final estimated
cost of at $1,238.664 Even though preparations were already under way in Moscow, the reports

663

Although the Political Secretariat had approved in principle of the conference, the Commission on Colonial
Conference and Arnot had to complete Draft Proposals outlining the work of the Conference already submitted to
the Eastern Secretariat which both elaborated on and was put in the shape of a proposal to go before the Political
Secretariat for decision. The anticipated number of delegates at the conference was thirty-one, RGASPI 495/18/670,
3-5, [copy] Proposal from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/3-1929.
664
Arnot and Freyer evaluated the CPGB, Virtanen (the PCF), Ducrot (the Communist Party of Belgium), and Resema

262

from the parties had not yet arrived in Moscow. When sending out the conference invitations to the
parties, Arnot took advantage of the opportunity to remind the parties to provide the Eastern
Secretariat with the reports on their colonial work:
Following the visit of a member of the Eastern Secretariat [Arnot] to you and his discussion
with you of the possibility of holding a conference of Western European parties on Colonial
work, it has now been decided to hold such a conference [] Reports of parties, not only on
work since the VIth Congress but on all sections of work on all colonial territories hitherto
not dealt with. [] With regard to this report, we have already sent a telegram asking that
the report which was already discussed with the vice-chairman of the Eastern Secretariat
[Ludwig Magyar] should be despatched to us by 31 March. [] If you can suggest other
items which should come up for discussion, please put them into your report, or indicate
where they should go on the Agenda outlined above. [] The conference should not last
more than three days, but its shortness will depend exactly on the extent to which all
participants prepare beforehand.665
This was an obligation the Commission on Colonial Conference expected the communist parties
to fulfil. In Moscow, however, Arnot was relying on Magyars theoretical expertise to adapt the
new line to the conference.
*

(the CPH), RGASPI 495/18/670, 1-2, Minutes of Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 19/3-1929.;
RGASPI 495/18/670, 1-2, Minutes of Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 19/3-1929; RGASPI
495/18/670, 14, Estimated budget for [Colonial] Conference from Virtanen to the Small Commission, Moscow, 20/31929; RGASPI 495/18/670, 23, Revised budget for conference, Moscow, April/May.
665
RGASPI 495/18/670, 30-32, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Communist Party of Italy, Rome, 25/3-1929.

263

The Magyar Thesis

It is very difficult to organise the practical work in the colonies [] the ECCI is mainly
dependent in the field of practical work and application of instructions [] on the activities,
initiative and steady growth of the Communist Parties in the corresponding imperialist
countries [] must bring about proper collaboration with other colonial organisations such
as the Anti-Imperialist League.
Ludwig Magyar, The Organisation of
the Colonial Work of the European
Communist Parties, 29/3-1929
Arnot realised that the Colonial Conference was lacking in its ideological approach. On 19
March, the Commission on Colonial Conference concluded that it was essential to formulate
lines of political information, hence, to get the thesis prepared by comrade Magyar.
Addressed here as the Magyar thesis, Magyar completed his work on 29 March, its full title
being The Organisation of the Colonial Work of the European Communist Parties, which was
more or less a testimony of how a leading official at Comintern headquarters interpreted the
colonial work among the national sections after the Sixth Comintern Congress. Magyar argued that
the ignorance and apparent failure of the communist parties in Europe to conduct any kind of
colonial work deserved critique. Additionally, Arnot observed how the Magyar thesis could also
guide the ideological preparations for the second LAI congress.
Aside from Arnots Report on the Parties, the Magyar thesis was the first critical survey of
colonial work after the Sixth Comintern Congress, which also served the purpose of confirming
the substance of Kuusinens colonial and semi-colonial theses. Apparently, Magyar referred
explicitly to Kuusinen, concluding that:
The most important tasks of the Communist Parties of the imperialist countries with regard
to the colonial question is: first the establishment of a direct contact between the Communist
Parties and the revolutionary trade union organisations [] The relationships existing up to
now between the Communist Parties and the revolutionary movement in the respective
colonial countries cannot be considered [] as satisfactory. [] not all of the Parties of the
CI have so far grasped the great significance of regular close connections with the
revolutionary movements in the colonies for the active immediate practical support of these
movements. Only to the extent that the Communist Parties in the imperialist countries
actually support the revolutionary movement [] assist the struggle of [the] colonial

264

countries against imperialism, can their position with regard to the colonial question be
accepted as truly Bolshevik. This is the criterion for their revolutionary activity in general.666
According to Magyar, the communist parties had not acted in a truly Bolshevik manner by
having failed to establish any direct contact with colonial revolutionary trade union
organisations. This breach in communist discipline warranted coercion, Magyar stated. Magyar
had distinguished five fields of activity which the parties had to implement in their colonial work,
the first two being to organise a liaison system to distribute political literature from Europe to the
colonies and to ensure that correspondence from Europe arrived in the hands of revolutionary
parties, associations, organisations and individuals in the colonies. In addition, members of
European communist parties should accept their duty to travel to the colonies, acting as
emigrants and not as representatives or emissaries of the Comintern. Once on location, the
emigrants should blend in with the everyday life of the workers and carry out manual labour in
order to establish contacts with political activists at the grass root level. The fourth field of activity
focused on getting the parties to establish contacts with sailors, workers, soldiers and students
from colonial countries, people living in the big cities of the capitalist countries and known to be
eagerly wanting to get involved in colonial work. Once contact was an established fact, the
communists then had to penetrate into the ranks of the colonial communities in the metropolitan
cities with the sole purpose of exerting Communist influence [] among them. Magyar
concluded that this final question focused on the failure of the central committees in the
communist parties to organise routine colonial work, a crucial question for the Comintern, which
the parties had to cease ignoring. Magyar questioned why the European parties could not find any
anti-colonial activists, thus intimating that the parties had to begin giving much more attention to
the activity, composition and structure of the colonial commission than it has done up to the
present time. While the colonial commission in the parties was a sub-department, primarily
assigned to lead and develop colonial work, Magyar observed how the lack of education and
incapacity to organise even internal discussions on the colonial question were evidence of the low
level of academia in these so-called commissions. The only solution at hand for Magyar was to
recommend a ceaseless activity in the organisational field, with the colonial commission being
the centre of gravity for the parties in developing their colonial work. For example, in order to
gather intelligence to facilitate the decision-making process of its central committee:
The colonial commissions in the various Parties shall be in touch with each other, arrange
small conferences now and then for the co-ordination and further development of the work,
666

RGASPI 495/18/670, 22, Confidential report from Arnot, Moscow, to Magyar, Moscow, 28/4-1929; RGASPI
495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, Moscow, 29/3-1929.

265

etc.; furthermore, they must bring about proper collaboration with other colonial
organisations such as the Anti-Imperialist League, etc.667
The administrative utopia, as formulated by Magyar, left him also contemplating that the initial
purpose of the colonial commissions, to gather intelligence, was nothing but a farce, meaning, the
information received up till now [at Comintern headquarters] amounts to absolutely nothing. For
Magyar, money was a part of the solution, suggesting that the strengthening of the work of the
colonial commissions calls for still greater financial means in order to counter the ignorance
within the parties.
From a broader perspective, Magyars criticism is supported by other explanations. After the
Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, the international communist movement had to confront a series
of serious developments. For example, the CPGB encountered intra-party struggles, while the
CPSUSA was on the verge of devouring itself due to fractional struggles (see further below), thus,
the insecure situation also affected the preparatory work for the Colonial Conference, with the
lack of party reports largely contributing to bringing the work to a halt. The parties had received
the instruction to complete and send in their reports by 31 March; however, on 26 April, Arnot had
only received one report from the CPH. Apparently annoyed by their neglect and continued
indifference, Arnot informed some of the individuals involved in preparing the LAI congress in
Moscow, e.g. Pyotr Kitaigorodsky, Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai, the French communist Henri Barb
and the Russian Joel Schubin about the parties malpractice.668 Yet, at the same time, Arnot told the
members of the Commission on Colonial Conference to expect the arrival of these reports:
No Party except the Dutch Party had sent any reports in spite of repeated telegrams, but
reports are now expected from the British Party within a few days and from the French Party
later.669
The Magyar thesis was not primarily an ideological guideline for colonial work, but instead
aimed to introduce a concept on how to re-construct the methods used by the parties, e.g. by
gathering intelligence on the anti-colonial movement. Magyar argued that the gathering of
information was an essential part of the colonial work, one which had to run smoothly in order to
assist the decision-making process at Comintern headquarters in Moscow. However, Magyar
conceded that the third period had increased the white terror against the international
communist movement on a global scale, forcing the Comintern and its sections to organise every
667

RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929.
668
See fol. RGASPI 495/18/670, 82-90, 29/4-1929.
669
For the CPH report, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/670, 93-94, Report from the Communist Party of Holland/Colonial
Commission, Amsterdam, to Arnot, Moscow, 26/4-1929. Members of the Colonial Commission of the CPH were van
Munster, de Visser, de Vries, Bergsma and Bykstra. Any record of how Arnot reacted remains unknown; see fol.
RGASPI 495/18/670, 27-28, Minutes, second meeting of Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 29/4-1929.

266

campaign in a very vigorous manner. Hence, the liaison service of the OMS was not, therefore,
enough to salvage the situation in the European communist parties which, according to Magyar,
mirrored the widespread indolence in the parties towards colonial work:
With regard to the establishment of [colonial] connections there is a false conception
prevalent in our Parties. It is generally considered that it is the duty of the centralised OMS
apparatus to establish connections everywhere and to take care of the sending of material.
This is entirely false. The Parties must change their attitude with regard to this and discover
for themselves ways to forward material to comrades in the colonies.670
Magyars criticism focused on the parties' organisational inability not only to send out the political
material and instructions to their comrades in the colonies but also to organise travel
arrangements for party members to visit the colonies. It was not up to the OMS to supervise this
line of activity; in fact, Magyar considered that it was the duty of each party to supervise this with
vigilance in order to avoid the censorship, probation and hostility of the national security
services. This organisational weakness and, in some cases, the lack of organisational work, had
made the parties dependent on receiving directives from the Comintern, as well as counting on the
OMS to organise every detail pertaining to colonial work. Thus, the Magyar thesis strove to lay
the foundation for routine colonial work by getting the parties to form an independent field of
work. The critical essence of this organisational incapacity in the communist parties in Europe
since the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928 lay in:
The carrying out of the other tasks laid down in the colonial theses [Sixth International
Comintern Congress 1928] with regard to the support of the struggle of the colonial peoples
against imperialism (mobilisation of the broad masses of workers in the capitalist countries
against the capitalist colonial regime, struggle against the colonial policy of the Social
Democracy) form, so to say, a part of the general daily work of our Parties.671
According to Magyar, in order to salvage a dire situation, the parties had to act in a vigorous
manner and, with the greatest exactness, care and system of individual attention and personal
treatment, carry out colonial routine work. This would thereby contribute to strengthening the
current guiding principle within the communist movement of mobilising the broad masses in the
struggle against social democracy.672 Arnot nonetheless perceived the Magyar thesis as an

670

RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929.
671
RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL WORK OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929.
672
Arnot appreciated Magyars critique of the European communist parties, and the formulations on how to alter and
develop the colonial work, telling Magyar to rework the political interpretation on the colonial and semi-colonial
countries, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/670, 49-55, Confidential resolution: THE ORGANISATION OF THE COLONIAL

267

ideological document which facilitated the preparatory work of the Colonial Conference.
Moreover, the document also reflects the ideological belief, strength, commitment and obedience
within the international communist movement towards interpreting the Cominterns new line.
*
An Uncertain Road Ahead
Preparations for the Colonial Conference ran parallel with the preparations for the second LAI
congress in Moscow. Arnot was forced to separate these two events from each other, particularly
as he was involved in both. During the initial preparatory stage of the Colonial Conference,
Arnot considered it to be crucial to get Mnzenberg to attend the conference as the LAIs
representative. For some reason, however, in March Arnot decided to delete both the LAI and
Mnzenberg from its agenda but why? Is it possible that Arnot and the decision-makers in
Moscow deliberately kept the LAI and Mnzenberg out of the conference?
The decision to omit the LAI was a practical one. Included initially as one of the delegations at
the conference, in March, according to the budget, the Commission on Colonial Conference had
chosen to delete the LAI.673 Yet, this decision was not motivated by a need to cut expenses, rather,
as noted by Arnot to the Commission on Colonial Conference on 29 April, one of the primary
aims of the Colonial Conference was to discuss the relations between the delegates of the
European communist parties and the Anti-imperialist League and other bodies. Therefore, the
conference was an event which had to be convened without Mnzenbergs direct involvement. It
was also a question of time and place. At the second meeting of the Commission on Colonial
Conference in Moscow on 29 April, Arnot concluded that it was unrealistic to hold the conference
in Berlin for not more than 6/7 days in the beginning of May, recommending to postpone the
event until June 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. The reason for this was two-fold: firstly, to prepare all
materials therefore to be ready by the 20th May, and secondly, Arnot had requested that Kuusinen
nominate candidates for the conference.674 The crux of the matter was that the parties were still
refusing to send in their reports to Arnot and, with reference to the direct involvement of the LAI,
he knew that the Colonial Conference was a relevant factor in the important preparation for the
Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League.675 This explains why Arnot intentionally concealed the
purpose of the Colonial Conference from Mnzenberg. In May, however, after the sudden
WORK OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES, author: Ludwig Magyar, 29/3-1929; RGASPI 495/18/670,
22, Confidential report from Eastern Secretariat/Arnot, to Magyar, April-May, 1929.
673
RGASPI 495/18/670, 3-5, [copy] Proposal from Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/3-1929; RGASPI 495/18/670, 14,
Estimated budget for [Colonial] Conference from Virtanen to the Small Commission, Moscow, 20/3-1929.
674
RGASPI 495/18/670, 27-28, Minutes, second meeting of the Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 29/41929.
675
RGASPI 495/18/670, 101, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the CC of CPGB, London, 25/5-1929.

268

disappearance of Arnot from Moscow, the preparatory work for the Colonial Conference was
given a new direction.
*
Arnot's Mysterious Disappearance
On 18 May, Arnot requested that Virtanen ask Comrade Kuusinen to assign Alexander
Bittelman, a CPUSA member and functionary at the ECCI Anglo-American Secretariat in Moscow
in 1929, as LAI liaison in Moscow for the International Secretariat in order to detach him from
his natural pre-occupation with America and to convince him to busy himself with Liga
questions.676 The reason why Arnot suddenly resigned from his positions as both LAI liaison and
leader of the Commission on Colonial Conference is, initially, ambiguous. Without telling
Virtanen why he had decided to abandon his work with the LAI, what was the effect of Arnots
non-appearance at the conference? Arnots letter to Virtanen is the last trace of his involvement
with the Colonial Conference, and the mystery of Arnot reveals an intricate narrative focusing
on both the causes and consequences of the fractional struggle within the CPUSA in 1929.
The CPUSA was a party which, like other communist parties, found itself confused by the
policy shift of the Comintern's new line, the result of which was the radicalisation of the CPUSA
once the party had unconditionally celebrated Stalin as the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union.
The impact of the new line on relations between the CPUSA and the Comintern is a question
which has been meticulously evaluated ever since the opening of the Comintern Archive. For
example, Randi Storchs study of the Chicago foreign communist locale in 1928-35 partly supports
the Weberian and Draperian centre and periphery paradigm, which concludes that Stalinism
did matter to the American communist movement to such an extent that CPUSA members were
required to follow party policy.677 Throughout the 1920s, the American communist movement
had been the scene of continued factional wars fought out within its own ranks which, in 1929,
were finally sorted out once the CPUSA was better able to fulfil the goals laid down for it by the
Comintern.678 However, how was Arnot involved in this conflict? As noted in a letter from Arnot
to Max [Petrovsky's pseudonym] on 14 May, the internal conflict within the CPUSA tested
whether the party was capable of sorting out its internal crisis:

676

RGASPI 542/1/30, 44-45, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Virtanen, Moscow, 18/5-1929.
Randi Storch, Chicagos Foreign Language-Speaking Communists 1928-35, in Bolshevism, Stalinism and the
Comintern, Laporte, Morgan & Worley (eds.), Palgrave MacMillan, Houndmills, 2008, pp.264-265.
678
Klehr, Haynes, & Firsov 1995, p.72.
677

269

[] the tasks of the American Party [CPUSA] had been to mobilise against the danger of the
Right and to liquidate factionalism; that these two tasks were bound up together and that
they had failed; that the factional leaders were responsible.679
In fact, the solution to the problems of the CPUSA had never been in the hands of the CPUSA
factional leaders, rather, it was a matter under the jurisdiction of the American Commission in
Moscow. According to Edward P. Johanningsmeiers biography of the CPUSA leader William Z.
Foster, the specially-organised American Commission served only one purpose in 1929: to find
a solution to the internal crisis within the CPUSA. The fractional struggle focused essentially on
the alleged failure of the CPUSA leaders, particularly Jay Lovestone, to conform to the new line,
as well as Lovestones support for Bukharin. In this respect, the Political Secretariat perceived
Foster as a more suitable candidate to both lead the party and to curb the turbulence within the
CPUSA leadership and, therefore, endorsed the establishment of the American Commission to
sort out the fractional struggle. By summoning the CPUSA leadership (Foster, Lovestone, Bertram
D. Wolfe and Bittelman) to Moscow, and once on location in the Red capital, the American
Commission, with the active participation of Stalin, decided to settle this matter with their
American comrades. Stalin assumed a leading role in guiding the discussions with the American
Commission, asking questions and demanding answers. According to Arnot, who attended the
conclusive meeting of the American Commission, Stalin even questioned whether the American
leadership understood what it meant to be a communist:
Stalin then said that he regarded Wolfes [suggestion] as shameful. That a fundamental
question, which even a party candidate could answer, had been put to them: will you accept
the discipline of the CI and carry it through? He [Stalin] said: I would be offended if I were
asked such a question and if you [Wolfe] here cannot answer it, I wonder what sort of
Communist you are.680
The American Commission was as an instrument of coercion. One outcome of this final meeting
was that the Comintern sanctioned the decision to remove Lovestone from the leadership,
Lovestone later assuming the role as the symbolic representative of the Rightist Opposition
679

RGASPI 495/18/740, 32-33, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Max/Petrovsky, Moscow, 14/5-1929.
Edward P. Johanningsmeier, Forging American Communism. The Life of William Z. Foster, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1994, p.245-247. Johanningsmeiers depiction of the American Commission is taken from Theodor
Drapers American Communism and Soviet Russia (2003), Max Eastmans Love and Revolution: My Journey Through
an Epoch (New York, Random House, 1964), Benjamin Gitlow, The Whole of Their Lives (C. Scribners Sons, New
York, 1948) and Harry Haywood, Black Bolshevik (Chicago, Liberator Press, 1978). For Arnots letter to Petrovsky,
see fol. RGASPI 495/18/740, 32-33, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Max/Petrovsky, Moscow, 14/5-1929. Kuusinen,
Bela Kun, Wolfe, Molotov, Gitlow, Pepper, Stalin, Arnot and Ford attended the final meeting of the American
Commission. The debates of the American Commission had affected the members of the CPUSA members who
were working at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, e.g. Arnot wrote that they had reduced Williams to a shadow of
his former self, Violet to a jibbering [sic] scarecrow and the other stenographer (Kathleen), though with a lighter task,
has already been in bed for several days.
680

270

within the party, which the Comintern would refer to as the Lovestoneites.681 How did this
CPUSA factional struggle affect the Comintern? Arnot observed how the American question had
paralysed the Comintern apparatus in Moscow in 1929: [T]he impossibility of getting [sic]
discussions is due entirely to this American business, which is taking up everybodys time.682
Thus, while the controversy nearly consumed the top strata of the CPUSA, the conflict also left the
organisational structure of the Comintern in disarray.
What role did Arnot play in all of this? While it may seem as though Arnots decision to resign
from his LAI and Colonial Conference duties was a rash and illogical step, he was, however, not
in a position to decline the authority of the ECCI Standing Commission and Piatnitsky. On 15
May, Piatnitsky instructed the ECCI Standing Commission to give Arnot confidential and full
powers to conduct work in the CPUSA as the plenipotentiary representative of the ECCI with all
rights as set out in Section 22 of the C.I. statutes (See Section 22 of the C.I. statutes as adopted at
the VIth World Congress of the C. I.) Moscow 15th May 1929. For Arnot, this meant leaving
Moscow as soon as possible and travelling to the USA and, once on location, enforcing the new
line on the CPUSA as ECCI plenipotentiary, responsible only to the ECCI, not to the Central
Committee of the CPUSA.683 Later, in 1937, Arnot recalled his mission to the USA in his
Autobiographical Note:
In May 1929 following on Presidium ECCI went to USA as representative of Comintern
with responsibility for carrying out of struggle against Lovestone and Cannon groups (Right
opportunists and Left Trotskyists) on basis of C. I. decisions. Returned to United Kingdom
December 1929, participated in December Congress CPGB at which Right opportunist
majority routed.684

681

For Lovestone and Lovestoneites see Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, & Dan Georgakas (eds.), Encyclopedia of the
American Left, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1992, pp.435-437, Lazitch 1986, pp.277-278.
682
RGASPI 495/18/740, 32-33, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Max/Petrovsky, Moscow, 14/5-1929.
683
Arnots mission was administered via the ECCI Presidium and the ECCI Standing Commission, see fol. RGASPI
495/7/9, 62, Short note re. Arnot, Piatnitsky, Moscow, 15/5-1929. Section 22 in the statutes, adopted at the Sixth
Comintern congress in 1928, reads: The ECCI and its presidium have the right to send representatives to the various
sections of the Communist International. Such representatives receive their instructions from the ECCI and are
responsible to it for their activities. The plenipotentiaries of the ECCI have the right to participate in meetings of the
central party bodies as well as of the local organisations of the sections to which they are sent. They may, however, act
in opposition to the central committee of the given section at congresses and conferences of that section, if the policy
of the central committee in question diverges from the instructions of the ECCI. Representatives of the ECCI are
obliged in particular to supervise the execution of the decisions of the world congresses and of the ECCI. The ECCI
and its presidium also have the right to send instructors to the sections of the Communist International. The powers
and duties of instructors are determined by the ECCI, to whom the instructors are responsible, see General Rules,
taken from Degras vol.II, p.469.
684
The whereabouts of Arnot after having been nominated as ECCI plenipotentiary have remained unclear up until the
present day. For example, Worley writes that Arnots commitments to the Comintern in 1929 prevented him from
participating actively in the Central Committee of the CPGB. Johanningsmeier concludes on the arrival of a
Comintern agent (G. William) in the USA in October 1929, who assisted with the reorganisation of the Party in
the wake of Lovestones expulsion. However, whether G. Williams and Arnot were one and the same, remains

271

With Arnots disappearance, the International Secretariat received a new liaison at Comintern
headquarters: Alexander Bittelman. On 22 May, Bittelman informed Mnzenberg in a letter that, I
have been placed in charge of the League work in place of Page. I shall identify myself as the
comrade who, along with Page, worked with you in Amsterdam.685 For Bittelman, this
appointment meant that he no longer had any authority to get involved with the American work
and, according to the ECCI Standing Commission, this prohibited Bittelman from uttering a single
word to his American comrades on his current work with the LAI. This assignment nevertheless
granted Bittelman access further up the hierarchical structure of the Comintern, e.g. attending
meetings of the ECCI Presidium and of the Political Secretariat to provide information about the
LAI and the Colonial Conference.686
*
Uncertainty Confirmed
The mystery of Arnots sudden resignations does, in a sense, characterise the ambiguous nature of
the Colonial Conference. While Arnot and the Eastern Secretariat had been the gravitational
centre for the conference preparations in Moscow, Bittelman never managed to assume the same
authority over the project that Arnot had had. Hence, the undertakings to realise the Colonial
Conference only ended in unresolved illusions. Firstly, the communist parties did not send their
colonial work reports (aside from the CPH) in to the Eastern Secretariat, a fact which contributed
to the postponement of the Berlin conference till June. Secondly, the preparatory work was
becoming a difficult project to see through. On 25 May, the Commission on Colonial
Conference despatched a confidential letter both to the communist parties and to the leader of the
WEB in Berlin Felix (Manuilskys pseudonym), informing them of the decision to postpone the
conference yet again. This time the conference was set for July and would to be convened in
connection with the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow (3-19 July), a suitable occasion at which to
discuss the colonial work, as well as to settle the question of the LAI and its second international
congress:
As the colonial conference is to serve as an important preparation for the Congress of the
Anti-Imperialist League, it has been decided to postpone it once more, and to hold it just
before the Congress of the League [LAI], i.e. about the middle of July. In this connection, we
remind you that we are still minus a report on the colonial work of your Party and proposals
unknown, see fol. RGASPI 495/198/13, 158-161, Autobiographical Note, author: R. P. Arnot, Moscow, 19/10-1937;
Worley 2002, p.134, 140-142, 151 (footnote 95); Johanningsmeier 1994, p.247.
685
RGASPI 542/1/30, 47, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 22/5-1929.
686
RGASPI 495/7/9, 96-98, Protokoll N.45 der Sitzung der stndigen Kommission des Sekrt. des EKKI, Moscow, 1/61929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Barb, Garlandi, Lebedewa, Heimo, Kirsanova and Wassiljew.

272

in regard to the conference. We beg of you to let us have your reports and proposals not later
than the [Tenth] Plenum of the ECCI. This will give us an opportunity to discuss them with
your representative during the Plenum.687
The idea to hold the Colonial Conference during the Tenth ECCI Plenum seemed to be an
obvious solution to the problem of finding a date. However, did the Colonial Conference
convene during the ECCI plenum in July? According to the documents relating to the plenum
protocols, transcripts and theses, there is no trace of any Colonial Conference nor, for that
matter, is there any discussion of either the colonial question or of the LAI. Yet, a number of actors
involved in the preparatory work of the Colonial Conference were present at the plenum, e.g.
Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Josefowitsch, Ford and Bittelman.688 The Tenth ECCI Plenum is
a pivotal episode further discussed in the following chapter. However, it is worth noting at this
stage that several of the delegates who had attended this plenum left Moscow immediately after it
had ended on 19 July, and travelled directly to Frankfurt am Main to attend the Second
International Congress against Colonialism and Imperialism, which convened on 21 July, 1929.
*

687

The Eastern Secretariat informed Felix/Manuilsky in Berlin that this letter had also been sent to the PCF and CP
Belgium, see RGASPI 495/18/670, 100, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to WEB and Felix
[Manuilsky], Berlin, 25/5-1929; RGASPI 495/18/670, 101, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the Central
Committee of the CPGB, London, 25/5-1929.
688
The documents on the Tenth ECCI Plenum are filed in fond and opis RGASPI 495/168, see fol. RGASPI
495/168/151, 1-8, Lists of participants, 10th ECCI Plenum, Moscow, 3-19/7-1929.

273

274

Chapter 6. Utopia Redefined, Part II

When do you think the Congress should be held? Not, as one thinks in Spring, but later
towards the end of Summer.
Robin Page Arnot to Mnzenberg,
10/12-1928
The date set for the Congress (21-31 July) is approved. The question whether this gathering
should be a Congress or Conference shall be decided depending upon Comrade
Mnzenbergs ability to give more detailed information on the representation of the various
countries.
Political Secretariat to Mnzenberg,
8/2-1929
The LAI had not managed to transcend from the stage of demonstration to organisation after the
Brussels Congress in February 1927. In July 1928, Mnzenberg concluded that the LAIs impact
and results had, at best, been moderate, however, this did not prevent him from wanting to create
an international anti-imperialist echo during the Second International Congress against
Colonialism and Imperialism in 1929.689 According to the LAI Statutes, the governing body of
the League shall be the International Congress, which shall meet biennially; hence, this demanded
that the International Secretariat begin the preparatory work for the congress in the beginning of
1929. The question was, however, whether the LAI was capable of convening such a congress. The
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters were receptive to the above and, as Arnot told
Mnzenberg in December 1928, much depended on the attitude of the League of the Indian
nationalists [Nehru and Iyengars Independence for India League], the African National Congress
(ANC) and the trade unions.690 However, Arnot had not given Mnzenberg the entire picture: the
LAI congress also depended upon the will and authority of the Political Secretariat. For
Mnzenberg, the second LAI congress had to follow his own agenda, yet, this was a scenario the
Comintern chose to confront Mnzenberg with.691
This chapter shares the same overarching theme as the one introduced in the previous chapter:
to analyse the ideas and undertakings of the Comintern to organise, structure and control the
colonial question. While the former chapter focused on the interactionist process of the Colonial
689

Mnzenberg 1928, pp.4-10.

RGASPI 542/1/31, 1-6, Statutes. League against Imperialism and for National Independence, International
Secretariat, Berlin, 1927; RGASPI 542/1/25, 71-72, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 10/12-1928.
691
RGASPI 542/1/30, 1, [Handwritten] Letter from Arnot, Frankfurt a/M, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/1-1929.
690

275

Conference, this chapter focuses on how the Comintern prepared the Second International
Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism. Initially scheduled to convene in Paris, the
International Secretariat was forced, by external causes, to re-schedule and relocate the July
congress to the Zoological Gardens in Frankfurt am Main, where it opened on 21 July and ended
on 27 July. The main question to answer is how and why the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters expected to create their own version of an anti-imperialist utopia? The fundamental
difference between the expectations of the Colonial Conference and the LAI Congress was that
the former strove to correct the failure among the European communist parties to carry out any
colonial work, while the latter expected to fulfil the visions of the LAI and its International
Secretariat, i.e. to make the leap from demonstration to becoming an international mass
organisation. However, this had the reverse effect on the LAI and, instead, the second LAI
congress announced the increase in and exertion of control over the International Secretariat by the
Comintern. In fact, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters resolved to steer the
preparations for the LAI Congress in a completely different direction than the one envisioned by
the International Secretariat. The process in itself contained elements of anticipation and
expectation as well as of coercion and isolation. The aim of the following narrative is two-fold:
firstly, to re-construct and introduce the authoritative leaders, functionaries and departments in
Moscow involved in preparing the congress and, secondly, to discuss and evaluate the methods
and strategies used by the Comintern in relation to this event. Above all, the discussion will be
focused on why the Comintern decided to strengthen its control over the International Secretariat
during this third period. In conclusion, a detailed study of the Frankfurt Congress and its
proceedings will analyse how the LAI was forced to undergo a change at its second international
congress in 1929.

The preparatory work for the congress was commenced at the same time in 1929 as the
international communist movement was facing and dealing with considerable internal turbulence.
As described in the previous chapter, the CPUSA fractional struggle was preoccupying the
Comintern apparatus, and consumed much of the political and administrative strength at
Comintern headquarters in Moscow. The conflict was a part of the ideological confusion which
had evolved after the Sixth Comintern Congress, which had left both the communist parties and
the mass and sympathising organisations feeling confused about how to act. For the LAI, with its
ties to a communist movement that was subjecting itself to a new and more radicalised political
discourse, colonial work was an issue which faced harsh scrutiny in 1929, especially in connection
with Arnots investigation. Additionally, a series of other incidents and episodes placed extra
276

burdens upon the shoulders of an already troubled international communist movement. In 1928,
the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Union had resolved to put an end to the NEP policy, thus, in
1929; the Soviet state was rushing towards the realisation of a rapid industrialisation and
collectivisation of its society. The economic drive of the first Five-Year-Plan (1928 1932)
resulted in drastic societal consequences, characterised by widespread famine and a large-scale
repression of its population. This was a vision supported by ideological conviction and moral
impetus, endorsed by the Soviet top strata, with the Soviet state authorising and carrying out the
persecution of specific social groups within the Soviet Union; e.g. the wealthy peasant class
(kulaks) was labelled as enemies of the state. The milieu of antagonism was also looking inwards,
with Bukharins end as an influential ideological actor within the CPSU (B) and the Comintern in
1929 being a typical example.692
In Germany, the scandal of the Wittorf Affair in September 1928, exposed internal cracks
within the KPD, including accusations of corruption and fractional struggle, matters which put the
spotlight on the party leader, Ernst Thlmann. However, this affair did not cause any clear
disruption in the relations between the KPD and the CPSU (B). According to Bert Hoppe, this
affair signified the start of a stricter control by the Comintern apparatus over the ZK KPD,
particularly once Stalin had decided to give Thlmann his personal support. The second episode
was the May Day celebration in Berlin 1929, better known as Berlins Bloody May (Berliner
Blutmai), a violent commotion for all to see on the streets of Berlin, which sent tremors throughout
the German communist movement after 31 people were killed in the riots and 1,200 confined to
prison.693 May Day was an event traditionally arranged under the patronage of the German trade
unions and the SPD, which the KPD had chosen to support; however, in 1929, the political context
in Germany had assumed a different character. According to the principles of the new line, as
noted in the instructions from the ECCI to the KPD, the party was to organise an independent
demonstration on 1 May: this year the proletarian vanguard will have to break through the
barbed-wire barriers which the bourgeoisie have erected to prevent the May Day celebrations. []
the social democrats are doing everything to stop the workers from pouring into the streets on May
Day [] this year [is] one with the task of organising the struggle on the streets.694 On 1 May, the
Berlin police responded to the KPDs demonstration with brute force, ending in increased
692

The rush towards industrialization and collectivization in the Soviet Union and Bukharins fall from grace is
Outlined in, e.g. Acton & Stableford 2005, pp.263-329. Priestlands analysis (2007) illustrates the mobilization of
Soviet society to correspond with the expectations meted out by Stalin and his cohorts, while Fitzpatricks (1999)
narrative provides an understanding of everyday life in Soviet society and Paul Hagenlohs detailed study, Stalins
Police. Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926-1941 (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington,
2009) focuses on the repressive measures carried out by Soviet state authorities.
693
Hoppe 2007, pp.31-33, 141-146.
694
Prior to the May Day celebrations, the Berlin police had adopted a decree prohibiting the organising of public
communist meetings. The motive for this was to restrict and avoid public disturbances, Degras vol.III 1965, p.26.

277

antagonism from the communists. The leader of the WEB in Berlin, Felix/Manuilsky, published
a public protest on 5 May, Aufruf des Westeuropischen Bros der Kommunistischen
Internationale zu den Berliner Ereignissen, a document re-edited and published in Inprecorr on 7
July.695 Berliner Blutmai did not, however, stop the KPD from convening its Twelfth Party
Congress in the working-class district of Wedding in Berlin on 5-10 May. In fact, this KPD
congress was the final legal meeting of its kind during the Weimar years. At the congress, the KPD
declared its solidarity with the Soviet Union and with Stalins leadership. Gross later wrote that
Mnzenberg had delivered a speech in salute of Stalin as the undisputed and ardent defender of
socialism, stating how the KPD expected to follow as one together with French communists, the
English communists, with the Russian revolution, [] in its support of Stalins leadership.696
For Mnzenberg, 1929 was a hectic year, characterised by an increased workload and
continued antagonism from the SPD. The second international LAI congress was one of many
projects on Mnzenbergs agenda, with other events, e.g. the Anti-Fascist Congress, being
political projects of a similar magnitude, in which Mnzenberg collaborated together with the
WEB and Manuilsky in Berlin. Before this congress, for conspiratorial reasons (aus
konspirativen Grnden) the organisers circulated a rumour that the congress would be convened in
Brussels, not in Berlin. The primary aim for doing this was to cause confusion amongst the
European national security services and within the socialist movement. According to the report of
the ECCI Information Department in Moscow, completed after the congress on 25 April, those
attending the Anti-Fascist Congress included 234 communists, 13 social democrats, 225 trade
unionists, 4 anarchists and 55 non-party individuals.697 The German social democratic movement
nevertheless tried to curtail Mnzenbergs enthusiasm, particularly the SPD leader Eugene Prger,
who accused the Mnzenberg Konzern of using dubious methods to conceal the LAIs true
nature as a centre for communist activities, with Mnzenbergs LAI contacts being an obvious
695

RGASPI 499/1/14, 1-3, Aufruf des Westeuropischen Bros der Kommunistischen Internationale zu den Berliner
Ereignissen, Brssel, den 5 Mai 1929, WEB Bro der Kommunistischen Internationale; Degras vol.III 1965, 23-27.
On July 7, Inprecorr (No.22, p.473) published a manifesto, signed by the WEB, in response to the bloody May Day
demonstrations. The WEB declared its Solidarity with the German Workers and accused the social democratic
Chief of Police, Karl Zrgiebel, of having sanctioned the use of violence against the demonstration: For several
days, police gangs made brutal attacks on the working class population, they opened fire on houses without the least
provocation, armoured motorcars endangered the streets, they used their rifles against the wives and mothers of the
workers standing on the balconies, they pursued passers-by and brutally ill-treated them. The modern achievements of
military technique; armoured cars, aeroplanes, searchlights were brought into play to restore law and order in the
rebellious districts. This was the revenge of the Berlin social democrats for the loss of workers votes at the recent
factory council elections. For the quote above, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/18, 13-15 (copy of the article).
696
Gross 1967, p.220; Degras vol. III 1965, p.28.
697
Count Michael Karolyi, Fritz Heckert and Ledebour delivered speeches at this congress. After the congress,
Mnzenberg observed that the event had been a demonstration of how syndicalist, anarchist, social democratic,
pacifist, democratic groups and left-wing radicals could unite into an anti-fascist movement, fol. RGASPI 495/33/203,
107, Informationsabteilung des EKKI, Bericht Nr.812, Moscow, 25/4-1929; RGASPI 495/33/203, 131-178, Report on
the Anti-Fascist Congress in Berlin, Information Department of the ECCI, 27/4-1929; Degras vol.III 1965, p.23, 26.

278

example of this. Prgers criticism was an expression of the SPD-organised anti-communist

campaign in 1929, referred to as Gegen die Kommunisten (Against the Communists) and
Gegen Moskau (Against Moscow), which strove to disrupt the KPDs political arena in
Germany. Mnzenberg chose to give Prger an explanation, declaring that his position within the
LAI was in the role of a secretary, not as a representative for the IAH, but rather as a
representative of the KPD in his capacity as M.d.R [Mitglied des Reichstag]. In conclusion, the
LAI Executive had complete control over the organisation.698
It was the political impact and longevity of the Meerut Conspiracy Trial in India, however,
which became the centrepiece of LAI propaganda in 1929, particularly for the British LAI Section.
The Meerut trial was the result of the British colonial authorities in India deciding to arrest thirtyone leaders of the Indian labour movement in March, charged with conspiracy against the King.
This trial would assume both a symbolic and a huge role in developing the activities for the antiimperialist movement in both Europe and India. According to Milton Israel, the Meerut trial
resembled a remedial response by the British mandate in the Indian Raj to obtain maximum
propaganda advantage for its anti-communist, anti-terrorist campaign with the arrest of wellknown left-wing activists, communists, trade unionists and members of the INC. What was the
background leading up to these arrests? The cotton mill industry in India was experiencing an
extensive and protracted strike which had lasted about six months. In March 1929, the Millowners
Association in Bombay and Calcutta had no other option than to appeal to the British government
to rid them of the nuisance caused by the strike.699 Once news of the arrests had begun to
circulate, Bridgeman contacted Mnzenberg on 20 March, to inform him that the British LAI
Section had addressed the question at a special session in London, with a decision having been
made to publish a public protest in the press against the British authorities in India. Additionally,
in India, Nehru contacted Chatto as well as Bridgeman with the request to see whether it would be
possible to organise solidarity demonstrations in the German and British trade unions in support of
their fellow Indian colleagues.700 Mnzenberg passed on this intelligence from Bridgeman to
Kuusinen, promising that the LAI aimed to establish a large campaign in Europe in support of
the arrested. Once the Eastern Secretariat had approved the idea and co-ordinated the details of
698

Willi Mnzenberg, Unser Konzern I, in Der Rote Aufbau, II. Jahrg., Berlin, Juli 1929, pp.97-107; Gross 1967,
p.211; TNA PRO KV2/772, Secret information regarding W. Mnzenberg, 25/9-1929.
699
Israel 1994, p.261; Spratt 1955, pp.47-58; John Saville, The Meerut Trial, 1929-1933, in Dictionary of Labour
Biography. Volume VII, Bellamy & Saville (eds.) Macmillan Press, London, 1984, pp.84-90. Spratt was one of the
arrested.
700
RGASPI 542/1/33, 6, (bersetzung) Letter from R. Bridgeman, London, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 23/3-1929. For
Nehrus letter to Chatto (June 20, 1929), see Israel (1994, p.261). According to Nehru, the Meerut Conspiracy Trial
forced the British populace to recognise the extent of the LAIs influence in India, but the LAI propaganda had also
frightened away the timid folk of the TUC. For Nehru, the Meerut trial was a case that offered an opportunity to
develop contacts with and use the LAI to create anti-colonial propaganda, contacting, for example, Bridgeman to
suggest the organisation of solidarity demonstrations in London to declare its support for the Indian workers.

279

the campaign with the International Secretariat, Mnzenberg expected to locate the centre for the
Meerut conspiracy trial campaign in London, under the leadership of Maxton and Bridgeman. In
Germany, the International Secretariat intended to collect signatures from prominent left-wing
intellectuals in support of the campaign.701 The socio-political setting at the beginning of 1929,
right up until the opening of the second LAI congress in July, was not comparable to the situation
in 1926-27 and, most importantly of all; the road to the Frankfurt Congress began and ended in
Moscow.
*
Mobilising the Structure: Institutional and Individual Actors
The concept of the second LAI congress evolved around three particular factors: time, location and
the invention of a strategy to maintain control. On 8 February, the Political Secretariat held a
meeting to discuss when the LAI congress should convene, proposing to Mnzenberg, who was
attending the meeting in Moscow, that 21-31 July was a possible date.702 Vague directives and
opinions on behalf of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters during the initial phase of
preparing the LAI Congress, contributed to the characterization of the second LAI congress as a
work in progress. Thus, it is of the utmost relevance to delineate a series of chronological events
linked to the organisation of this congress:
Enquiry from Arnot to Mnzenberg
Letter from Arnot to Kuusinen
Approval of the Political Secretariat
Meeting of the Eastern Secretariat Commission of the LAI
First meeting of the Commission on the LAI
Second meeting of the Commission on the LAI
Meeting of the Sub-committee
Third (extended) meeting of the Commission on the LAI
Meeting of the ECCI Standing Commission
Tenth ECCI Plenum, Moscow
Meeting of the LAI Executive, Frankfurt am Main
Second International Congress Against Imperialism
and Colonial Oppression, Frankfurt am Main

10 December 1928
16 January 1929
8 February 1929
30 March 1929
3 May 1929
22 May 1929
5 June 1929
18 June 1929
6 July 1929
3-19 July 1929
20 July 1929
21-28 July 1929

The dates above represent the chronological structure of the congress, also indicating that the
preparatory work was not a static process, but rather an interactionist process focused on
701

On March 20, the British LAI Section decided to release a manifesto demanding that every British labour
organisation express sympathy for the Meerut prisoners, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 25-26, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 25/3-1929.
702
RGASPI 495/3/89, 365, Protocol from a meeting of the Polit-Secretariat of the ECCI, Moscow, 8/2-1929. Present
at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Petrovsky, Mnzenberg, Bell, Pollitt, Gusev, Chitarow, Heller,
Melnitschansky, Figatner, Gerich and Heimo. For a copy of the protocol (English translation), see fol. RGASPI
495/20/722, 45-46.

280

developing correlating relationships. From here, we need to discover how and when the actors,
individuals and departments at Comintern headquarters became involved in the preparations for
the LAI congress, with a number of different commissions being established on the initiative of the
Political Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow. The organisational procedure followed
its own inherent logic, determined by the hierarchies of relations within the Comintern apparatus,
an evaluation which focused on discerning the direction of the communications links (decisions,
directives and assignments) within the structure. Additionally, this also discloses the
interactionism, relations and authority between the actors from top to bottom and from bottom to
top during the preparation of the second LAI congress.703 Below are two tables which illustrate the
links and ties in this process. The first table, The Second LAI Congress: Institutional Actors,
focuses on the hierarchical relations between various commissions and some of the secretariats
within the Comintern, while the second table, The Nerve Centre: The Commission on the LAI
and the Sub-Committee, focuses its attention on the individual members within the
commissions. The tables also mention the duration of the commissions (as far as it has been
possible to do so), with arrows defining the direction of the links of communication from a
hierarchical perspective. For example, the Sub-Committee had an authoritative position over the
Commission on the LAI, however, the Sub-Committee had to carry out the directives of the
Political Secretariat or the Small Commission. Dotted lines denote either an unverified tie, e.g. the
link between the Political Secretariat and the Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission, or a
process of transformation, e.g. the Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI and the
Commission on the LAI,
Table 7.1: The Frankfurt Congress Institutional Actors in Moscow, 30/3-27/6-1929
ECCI VKP
(B) [?]
MolotovGusev-Kuusinen
Commission
(? May, 1929)
Preparing
Commission
(8/2 15/21929)

Political
Secretariat

Sub-committee
(3/5 5/6-1929)
Eastern
Secretariat
Commission on the
LAI
(3/5 July, 1929)

LAI Political
Commission
(5/4 14/4-1929)
Eastern Secretariat
Commission on the
LAI (30/3-1929)

703

Editorial
Commission
(3/5- 28/6-1929)

The empirical sources, documents filed in a dossier in the fond Raznye komissii IKKI (ECCI Temporary
Commissions), consisting of protocols, drafts of resolutions and correspondence, illustrate every step of the political
and organisational preparations and, above all, the fact that the preparatory work was an undertaking contrived,
administered and put into practice at Comintern headquarters.

281

In total, six commissions and one committee assisted with the work of planning and preparing the
LAI congress, at various stages along the way.704 The Commission on the LAI, despite being
located lower down in the hierarchy, was the operative centre in the direction of the administrative
and political work, e.g. the gathering of intelligence, the co-ordination of those responsible for
completing the agenda and resolutions for the congress, and the budget. A dotted line between the
Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI and the Commission on the LAI suggests a
transformation, at some stage, between these two commissions. On 3 May, the Eastern Secretariat
received an instruction from the Political Secretariat to establish the Commission on the LAI to
direct the preparatory work of the congress, while the Eastern Secretariat Commission on the
LAI was to function as a consultative, temporary commission laying down the theoretical
foundation for the event in March 1929. The Commission on the LAI had Arnot as leader,
working together with Kuusinen, Wassiljew, the German communist Arthur Ewert, the functionary
of the CPSU (B) Yuriy Petrovich Figatner (1889-1937)705 and the Profintern delegate Josefovitsch.
The Sub-Committee represented an authoritative organ over the Commission on the LAI, as
well as functioning as its communicative link to the Political Secretariat. The primary function of
the Sub-Committee was to assess and discuss the work carried out by both the Commission on
the LAI and the Editorial Commission.706 The members of this committee were authoritative
actors within the Comintern apparatus: Piatnitsky, Arnot (re-assigned in May), Melnitschansky, the
Profintern delegate, Johnson, and Bittelman (as Arnots replacement).707
Secrecy still surrounds the Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission. On 3 January 1929,
Arnot told Mnzenberg to get in contact with the commission in Moscow if he wanted
additional information on its attitude towards the LAI congress. The question is, however, whether
Arnot was referring here to the Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen commission. The fact that the
Commission on the LAI did not exist at this time does suggest that he was referring either to the
Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI or to the Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission.
Additionally, on May 9, Arnot mentioned the Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission in a letter
to Max [Petrovsky], telling him that the commission is nearly at an end.708 However, it is also
possible that this commission was devoting itself to solving the fractional struggle of the CPUSA;
704

The analysis of the protocols of the Commission on the LAI, the Small Commission, the Standing Commission
and the Political Secretariat discloses the hierarchical position of the individuals, located either in commissions or
committees.
705
Figatner, Yuriy Petrovich, in Schulz, Urban & Lebed (eds.), 1972, p.165.
706
The Commission on the LAI knew of the Sub-Committee, although it is plausible to assume that the committee
did not inform the commission of their discussions. Furthermore, the Editorial Commission was a sub-section of the
Commission on the LAI; see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 37, Minutes of the organisation sub-committee for the
preparation of the LAI congress, Moscow, 5/6-1929.
707
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, Moscow, 3/5-1929.
708
RGASPI 542/1/30, 1, (Handwritten) Letter from Robin Page Arnot, Frankfurt a/M, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 3/11929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 40, Note from R.P. Arnot, Moscow, to Max/Petrovsky, Moscow, 9/5-1929.

282

yet, at the same time, it is also possible that Molotov, Gusev and Kuusinen were assisting in
formulating the ideological strategy of the LAI Congress as well as that of the Colonial
Conference. The Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission probably had information on the
status of the colonial work within the communist movement in 1929, especially if one considers
the intimate collaboration between Arnot and Kuusinen, thus, this does suggest the following
assumption: that the Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission was the link to Stalin on matters
relating to the LAI and its second congress, particularly if one takes into account the fact that
Molotov had an informal, yet authoritative position within the Comintern in 1929, acting incognito
as the Chairman of the Comintern after the Sixth Comintern Congress, later described as Stalins
lieutenant within the ECCI. Moreover, Sergei Ivanovich Gusev (1874 1933, known pseudonym:
Travin), was the representative of the RCP (B) [CPSU (B)] within the ECCI.709 Thus, whether or
not the Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission ever discussed or assisted in the process of
preparing the LAI Congress, it is logical to suggest that this commission was the communicative
channel to Stalin on LAI matters.
The Preparatory Commission existed for only a week. According to the Political Secretariat's
instructions, the primary purpose of this commission was to evaluate the ideological tendency
within the LAI, determine the geographical spread of the organisation in order to decide upon
tasks, necessary measures that need to be taken in preparing the congress, date of congress,
resolutions and so forth.710 Kuusinen acted as leader who, together with Mnzenberg, Petrovsky,
Lozovsky, the KIM representative Rafael Moiseevich Khitarov, Gusev, Piatnitsky and Josefovitsch
assessed the nature of the LAI.711 Furthermore, the LAI Political Commission was a
plenipotentiary constellation which aimed to enforce the Political Secretariats dictates on the
non-communist members of the LAI Executive, especially on the question of the congress agenda.
Arnot was the leader of this commission, assisted by Mnzenberg, Bittelman, Melnitschansky as
well as the Polish communist and Profintern representative Vitkovsky (real name: Adam LandyWitkowski; 1891 1937).712

709

For Gusev, see Lazitch 1986, pp.160-161. For Molotovs role in the Comintern, see Rosenfeldt 2009, p.203 and
Derek Watson, Molotov. A Biography, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, p.86. Molotov became a member of the
ECCI in 1926.
710
RGASPI 495/3/86, 54, Protokoll No.22 der Sitzung des Politsekrt. am Freitag, Moscow, 8/2-1929. Present at the
meeting were: Barb, Chitarow, Ulbricht, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Humbert-Droz, Lozovsky, Gusev, Ewert, Bela Kun,
Kolarev, Moirova, Schubin, Heimo, Wassiljew, Wurm, Martinov, Mif, Mnzenberg, Misiano, Stasova and Wolfe.
711
Khitarov, Rafail Moiseyevich (1901 ?) in Schulz, Urban & Andrew I. Lebed (eds.) 1972, p.269. Ralph Talcott
Fisher, Jr.'s study of the Komsomol states that Khitarov was a stern believer in enforcing the policy of class against
class in 1929. For example, Khitarov completely renovated the KIM leadership in Germany, and had publicly
renounced Trotsky and the United Opposition in 1928-29, Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth. A Study of
the Congresses of the Komsomol, 1918-1954, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, p.177.
712
RGASPI 495/20/722, 26-27, Preparations for the Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League meeting in Moscow,
Polit. Secretariat, 5/4-1929.

283

Despite its short existence, the Commission on the LAI nevertheless faced a frequent
interchange of its members, relying extensively on instructions from the Sub-Committee,
comprising Arnot, Bittelman, Khitarov, Figatner, Johnson, Piatnitsky, the representative of the
Russian International Secretariat for Work Among Women Varvara Akimovna Moirova and the
Mexican communist leader Manuel Diaz Ramirez.713

Table 7.2: The Nerve Centre: The Commission on the LAI and the Sub-Committee
Eastern Secretariat
Commission on the
LAI
30/3-1929

Meeting, Moscow,
30/3-1929
Arnot
Ewert
Figatner
Kuusinen
Wassiljew
Josefovitch

Omitted:
Ewert
Wassiljew
Josefovitch

Commission on the
LAI
3/5 July 1929

Nomination & First

meeting, Moscow,
3/5-1929:
Arnot
Figatner
Bittelman
Khitarov
Johnson
Piatnitsky
Moirova
Ramirez
(Absent):
Barb
Strakhov/Ch Chiupai
Williams

Omitted:
Arnot
Figatner
Johnson
Williams
Barb
Khitarov

Subcommittee,
3/5-5/6-1929

Piatnitsky
Arnot
Bittelman
Melnitschansky
Johnson
Second Meeting,
Moscow, 22/5
Bittelman
Kuusinen
Piatnitsky
Moirova
Manuilsky
Lozovsky
Bela Kun
Schubin
Melnitschansky
Strakhov/Ch
Chiu-pai
Kitaigorodsky
Freyer
Mif

Omitted:
Arnot
Last Conference,
Moscow, 18/6
Bittelman
Ramirez
Piatnitsky
Moirova
Manuilsky
Schubin
Melnitschansky
Kitaigorodsky
Freyer
Mif

Twenty-eight individuals at the headquarters of the Comintern were, at some stage, involved in
preparing the LAI congress, an organisational structure focusing on factors such as obedience,
dependency and the flexibility of the Comintern apparatus. For the Comintern, the second LAI
congress was a pivotal event for the colonial issue within the international communist movement.
The question is how and why did this come to be so? Furthermore, under what pretext did the
commissions in Moscow develop a strategy to control the congress, and why did the decisionmakers deliberately endorse turning the LAI congress into a scene of political controversy?
713

Moyrova, Varvara Akimovna (1890 1951), in Schulz, Urban & Lebed (eds.) 1972, pp.397-398.

284

At the International Secretariat in Berlin, the political and administrative space had become a
place of restriction as a result of the increased Comintern control, particularly in relation to getting
involved in preparations for the congress. Yet, in the beginning of 1929, before the preparatory
work had even started in Moscow, the Eastern Secretariat still had no idea of the size and scope of
either the LAI or its transcontinental network.
*
Theoretical Ramifications and Practical Implications
The Political Secretariat wanted Mnzenberg to provide more detailed information on the
representation [of the LAI] in various countries. This intelligence was behind the decision to
grant the LAI permission to convene either a large congress or a smaller conference. At the
meeting on 8 February, Petrovsky nonetheless objected to the idea of arranging a LAI congress on
21-30 July, suggesting putting everything on hold ad infinitum in order to gain time to analyse the
character of the global anti-imperialist movement, as well as the organisational spread of the
LAI.714 For Mnzenberg, the instruction from the Political Secretariat meant that there was a need
to establish a clear understanding of the LAIs transcontinental contacts.
Mnzenberg returned to Berlin after completing the work with the Preparatory Commission
in Moscow and, together with Chatto, examined a document listing the affiliated or associated
organisations which the International Secretariat had drawn up in December 1928.715 Rather
quickly Mnzenberg and Chatto realised that the document was not representative nor, for that
matter, was it adequate to meet the expectations of either the Eastern Secretariat or the Political
Secretariat, particularly as the document did not include any contacts with national revolutionary
trade unions in the colonies. Thus, by mid-February, they had completed a new document, Kurze
bersicht ber die Ttigkeit des Internationalen Sekretariats, der Sektionen und angeschlossenen
Sektionen (A Short Outline of the Activity of the International Secretariat, the Sections and
Affiliated Members) depicting the entire scope of the LAI and its transcontinental network.
According to Mnzenberg and Chatto, the Eastern Secretariat should approach the report from a
quantitative perspective, bearing in mind that the LAI by now had 204 affiliated, associated and
sympathising organisations as members.716 This report arrived in Moscow in March, and was the

714

RGASPI 495/20/722, 22, Protocol from a meeting with the Political Secretariat of the ECCI, Moscow, 8/2-1929;
For Petrovskys point of view, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/86, 174, Vorschlge des Genossen Petrovsky, Moscow, 8/21929; RGASPI 495/18/740, 4, An den Genossen Mnzenberg: Die Beschlsse ber Kolliga lauten, Moscow, Political
Secretariat, February, 1929.
715
RGASPI 542/1/26, 99-102, Liga gegen Imperialismus. Angeschlossene und sympathisierende Organisationen,
December, 1928; RGASPI 542/1/26, 74-87.
716
In December 1928, the International Secretariat completed the first draft of the list, see RGASPI 542/1/26, 99-102.

285

fundamental source which shaped the basic structure of the congress. From Mnzenbergs
perspective, the report was a statement expressly urging the decision-makers in Moscow to
understand that the International Secretariat nourished the ambition to organise an impressive antiimperialist congress. Hence, this required the Comintern to be willing to provide financial support,
Mnzenberg concluded. In the temporary budget, compiled by Mnzenberg and despatched to
Kuusinen on 18 March, Mnzenberg expected the Comintern to finance the travel expenses for
colonial delegations, the printing of congress material and to fund public LAI meetings in Europe
and USA prior to the congress. Additional costs were administrative costs (food, printed material,
telegrams, opening ceremony and unforeseen expenses) and the establishment of an administrative
apparatus (interpreters, press agency, congress secretariat and protocol bureau) in connection with
the congress.717
The report drawn up by Mnzenberg and Chatto indicates that the LAI had connections with
organisations and individuals around the world: India, Goa, Ceylon, the British Mandate in
Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Persia, Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, North Africa, South Africa,
Mexico, the Caribbean, Latin and South America, USA, Great Britain, France, Ireland, the
Netherlands, Germany, Soviet Russia and Switzerland. With reference to China, the LAI had not
succeeded in establishing any activity; however, its contacts with India looked far more promising.
The connection between Chatto and Nehru was a channel into the INC, while the Independence for
India League, as well as the communist Workers and Peasants Party, were distributing LAI
propaganda in India. LAI contacts with the Indonesian liberation movement went primarily
through Hatta and the PI in Europe; however, the International Secretariat had also provided
financial support to print a Malaysian version of the LAI newsletter, Pressedienst, in the Dutch
Indies in 1929. The LAI had few but stable relations in the Middle East and North Africa, e.g.
Soubri, the leader of the socialist-biased Arab National Congress, had attended the LAI Executive
meeting in Cologne in January, and intended to send a delegation to the congress. Chedli, the
leader of the toile Nord-Africaine, was an active representative of the LAI in North Africa.
However, the International Secretariat was awaiting some kind of response from the Egyptian
nationalist organisation, Wafd, to its invitation to affiliate with the LAI. Gumede and the ANC
maintained steady relations with the International Secretariat after the Brussels Congress and,
across the Atlantic, LAI connections in Latin America were essentially focused on Mexico, relying
on the capacity of three people: Federico Bach, Rivera, and the leader of the Mexican nationalist
The revised version was finished in February 1929, see IISG, 3392.1 LAI Collection, p.128, Affiliated, Associated and
Sympathising Organisations. While the introduction in these documents is the same, the February version included
more organisations.
717
RGASPI 542/1/30, 21, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 18/3-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 2223, Provisorisches Budget Antiimperialistischer Weltkongress, March, 1929.

286

army Augustino Sandino. In the leading imperialist countries in Europe (France and Great
Britain) and the USA, the LAI sections acted as liaison centres for the anti-imperialist movement
while, at the same time, co-ordinating and developing propaganda against imperialism. In the
USA, from December 1928 till January 1929, the LAI section organised public rallies in New
York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland and Washington, with a focus on a number of issues, e.g. Johnstones
arrest in India and Italy (see previous chapter), the treatment of 1,400 banana workers in
Columbia, the imperialist co-operation of the USA and Great Britain in Latin America, the
Nicaragua-Politics of the USA and the murder of Julio A. Mella in Mexico. In Europe, the
French LAI Section was a source of trouble for the International Secretariat, a result of the severe
surveillance by the Sret. 718 Pressedienst introduced additional LAI contacts on 26 March, 1929,
e.g. the Philippine Workers Party, Philippine Peasants Association, the leader of the National
Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association in Great Britain Alex Gossip, the War Veterans
International, the Teachers International (Bildungsarbeiter) and the Religious Socialist
Association, while the Sportintern was planning to send a delegation to the congress.719 On 29
December 1928, Mnzenberg and Chatto contacted the Secretariat of the Sportintern in Moscow,
requesting a big delegation [] we expect a minimum of 10 men. On 20 February 1929, the
ECCI Standing Commission endorsed this request.720 Sportintern was only one of many mass and
sympathising organisations Mnzenberg wanted to invite to the congress, along with the Friends
of Soviet Russia, the IAH, Profintern, the KIM and the Krestintern.721 The reason for involving
these organisations was also to enable Mnzenberg to use their networks. For example,
Mnzenberg wondered whether the general secretary of the Krestintern, Kornblum, would
consider sending a delegation and, more importantly, be willing to spread the word on the LAI and
its congress through the Krestintern network.722

718

RGASPI 542/1/29, 65-71, Kurze bersicht ber die Ttigkeit des Internationalen Sekretariats der Sektionen und
angeschlossenen Sektionen, Berlin, February, 1929.
719
On 26 March, Pressedienst included the advertisement for the congress (in German): Die Vorbereitungen zum
antiimperialistischen Weltkongress (Anko). Welch groes Interesse fr den Weltkongress, der im Juli in Paris
stattfinden soll, vorhanden ist, beweisen die Anmeldungen der verschiedenen Organisationen, die bereits vorliegen.
Sowohl aus den Kolonien wie auch aus den imperialistischen Lndern laufen Berichte von Versammlungen ein, in
denen die Sendung von Delegierten beraten wurde. In letzter Zeit meldeten sich zur Teilnahme am Kongress folgende
Organisationen an: Philippinische Arbeiter-Partei, Philippinischer Bauernverband, Mbelarbeiterverband
Grobritanniens (N.A.F.T.A.), Internationale der Kriegsdienstgegner, Internationale der Bildungsarbeiter, Rote
Sportinternationale und der Verband der religisen Sozialisten, Pressedienst, Berlin, Nr. 12, 26/3-1929.
720
RGASPI 495/7/6, 82, (Copie-Abschrift) Letter from Mnzenberg and Chatto, Berlin, to Sportintern Secretariat,
Moscow, 29/12-1928; RGASPI 495/7/6, 60-62, Protokoll No.30 der stndigen Kommission des Politsekrt. des. EKKI,
Moscow, 20/2-1929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Ulbricht, Bell, Heimo, Kachan, Barb, Lebedewa,
Kirsanova and Michael E. Kreps.
721
RGASPI 542/1/30, 22-23, Provisorisches Budget Antiimperialistischer Weltkongress, March 1929.
722
Mnzenberg wanted Kornblum to confirm that he had received the congress invitation and whether the Krestintern
would be able to send a large delegation to the congress, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 1, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to Kornblum, the Krestintern secretariat, Moscow, 27/2-1929; RGASPI 535/1/212, 3, Letter from Mnzenberg,

287

LAI connections with both North Africa and South Africa were strong in comparison to the
weak, almost non-existent contacts with organisations and individuals in Equatorial Africa. In an
effort to solve this dilemma, Mnzenberg instructed Olive Budden at the British LAI Section in
London in February to listen to Arnots advice on the African question as he had entered into
communication with [] representatives from West Africa. Hence, it was crucial for the LAI to
continue its work to ensure that the West African contacts attended the congress.723
By mid-April, the International Secretariat had a list of 250 delegates from different social,
political and cultural organisations in Europe and the USA who were planning to attend the
congress. Delegates from the colonies and semi-colonies, e.g. ten delegates from India, fifteen
Indonesians, ten Latin American delegates and fifteen delegates from Negro organisations had
declared an intention to visit the congress. On 25 April, Pressedienst stated:
The Second World Congress of the LAI will become the largest anti-imperialist
demonstration ever [] to manifest the genuine front struggle, uniting revolutionary
workers organisations in the capitalist countries with national revolutionary movements in
the colonial and semi-colonial world [] To expose the need to fight against Imperialism,
and connect the national revolutionary struggle [] to establish a strong national
revolutionary movement.724
The LAIs transcontinental network was the result of individual connections administered at the
International Secretariat, an undertaking under Chattos supervision. However, shortly after
Mnzenbergs return from Moscow in February, Chatto informed Mnzenberg that he would not
be able to carry out the work demanded of him due to poor health, offering to resign as
International political secretary, a request Mnzenberg nevertheless turned down. Yet, in
February, Chatto left Germany in order to recover his strength, travelling to Brussels where he
remained for a couple of months. What was the reason for Chattos health problems and his sudden
distress? These were essentially of a personal nature as, after Chatto had separated from his
fiance Agnes Smedley in 1928 and she had left for China in January 1929, Chatto suffered a
nervous breakdown. Another factor contributing to Chattos distress was the constant surveillance
by the Schutzpolizei in Berlin. British security services had also sent a request to German
authorities to monitor Chattos activities in Berlin. Hence, this surveillance had forced Chatto to
Berlin to the Krestintern secretariat, Moscow, 21/3-1929; RGASPI 535/1/212, 6-7, Letter from Willi Mnzenberg to
Kornblum of the Krestintern in Moscow, 17/4-1929.
723
TNA KV2/1783, (Intercepted) Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Budden, London, February 1929. Olive Budden
was married to Robin Page Arnot; see Nigel West, MASK: MI5's Penetration of the Communist Party of Great Britain,
Routledge, London, 2005, p.95.
724
Pressedienst, Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nr.13, 18/4-1929; Pressedienst, Nr.
15, 25/4-1929. Arnot also included a reference to 250 delegates in his report on the LAI Executive meeting in
Amsterdam, see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of Commission of the LAI meeting, Moscow,
3/5-1929.

288

move to new lodgings in Berlin on a regular basis. On 23 January 1929, Chatto described his
living conditions in a letter to Nehru:
My health has been causing me some anxiety [] There are also a number of private
difficulties of long standing with which I have to contend, and the fact that my position in
Berlin was desperate [] I am now living under my own name, but find that this causes me
innumerable difficulties with Governments. The French have now refused to give me a
visa.725
After Chatto had left Berlin, A. C. N. Nambiar assumed authority over the co-ordination and
supervision of the activities of the Indian Bureau (see previous chapter). Chattos brief sojourn
in Brussels lasted until the end of March, after which he returned to Berlin;726 however, he had to
hide in a clandestine way in order to avoid the attention of the police.
Chattos temporary resignation caused confusion. As Mnzenberg suspected that Chatto would
be unable to carry out any work for the International Secretariat for an indefinite amount of time,
the Political Secretariat had to appoint a suitable replacement, e.g. Bittelman, Emile Burns or
another candidate. On 27 February, Mnzenberg informed Kuusinen that Burns was the best
candidate to assume Chattos position. Apparently, Mnzenberg had met Burns at the International
Secretariat in February and had asked him whether he would consider assisting the LAI in Berlin.
For Mnzenberg, Burns linguistic skills had convinced him that he was the most appropriate
person, particularly as Burns spoke and read German, French, English and Russian fluently.
Mnzenberg nevertheless suggested, in order to appease the Central Committee of the CPGB, that
Kuusinen should send a letter giving the impression that Mnzenberg had not simply stolen
Burns. In fact, Kuusinen should instruct the CPGB Secretariat in London that Burns temporary
mission in Berlin was to assist the LAI with the preparation of its second congress.727
*

725

RGASPI 542/1/30, 18, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 27/2-1929; Barooah 2003, p.254,
278, see footnote 38. This letter from Chatto to Nehru is located at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New
Delhi, India.
726
According to Israel, Chatto suspected the British Government of pressuring the Belgian authorities to expel him
from the country, Israel 1994, p.260.
727
RGASPI 542/1/30, 18, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 27/2-1929. The Colonial
Commission of the CPGB approved the request to send Burns (together with his wife Eleanor) to Berlin to work at the
International Secretariat on April 15. However, with Burns temporarily gone, the CPGB had to strengthen [the]
London Committee of the LAI, nominating Nora Thomas from Hackney to act as secretary in the London office, see
RGASPI 495/18/670, 97-98. In November 1932, Burns wrote his Biography (filed in his personal file in the
Comintern Archive): Germany (Berlin) in 1929, as one of the secretaries of the League against Imperialism (helping
to organise the Frankfurt Congress of the League), see fol. RGASPI 495/198/11, 64-68, Biography of Emile Burns,
author: Emile Burns, 11/1-1932.

289

The Provisional Agenda: Coercion and Staging the Plot

We were similarly successful with other changes. I will now take the Agenda point by point
and show what the alterations are.
Arnot to the Commission on the LAI,
Moscow, 3/5-1929
Although Mnzenberg had sent the list of LAI-affiliated organisations to the Eastern Secretariat,
the preparatory work in Moscow was still up in the air. In the beginning of March, the only
confirmed question was the date of the congress. For the International Secretariat, beginning the
work of sending out information as well as propaganda about the congress was now top priority.
Hence, the International Secretariat took the decision, under Mnzenbergs supervision, to
circulate a provisional agenda, an unsanctioned initiative which resulted in the Eastern
Secretariat accusing Mnzenberg of negligence. Firstly, Mnzenberg should have consulted the
Eastern Secretariat prior to releasing the agenda and, secondly, the circulation of a provisional
agenda was an ill-conceived act. Apparently, the release of the agenda placed the preparatory
work under the authority of the Eastern Secretariat and, later, the Commission on the LAI. It was
a question of control and coercion, with the decision-makers in Moscow striving to correct any
behaviour which contradicted the intentions of the Comintern. This episode of the provisional
agenda indicates that Comintern headquarters categorised its relation with the International
Secretariat as secondary, with the release of the agenda precipitating the need to curtail any future,
independent activity of the LAI apparatus in Berlin prior to the LAI congress. Why was this
provisional agenda such a controversy?
The idea of a provisional agenda had been on the table since 1928. On 14 April 1928, the
LAI Executive had endorsed the International Secretariat's proposal to locate the second LAI
congress in Paris. Nevertheless, the International Secretariat had waited until September to release
a circular letter728 informing the national sections and affiliated members (organisations,
committees, individual members and sympathising friends [Freunde]) of this decision. The crux of
the matter was that neither the Eastern Secretariat nor the Political Secretariat had approved the
idea of locating the congress in Paris. When Mnzenberg left Moscow in February 1929, the only
thing he knew for certain was the date for the congress, while waiting to get the preparatory work
under way. For the International Secretariat, the preparations had to commence at once in February
and, aside from completing the list of affiliated organisations in Berlin, Chatto assisted
728

RGASPI 542/1/27, 16-28, Protokoll der Sitzung des Exekutiv Komitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus am 28 April
1928 nachmittags 2.30 in Brssel; IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/66, An alle nationale Sektionen der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, International Secretariat, Berlin, September, 1928.

290

Mnzenberg in writing and beginning to send out invitations to the congress along with the
provisional agenda. For example, the invitation and agenda reached both Kornblum, the KPD
representative in the ECCI Walter Ulbricht, and the delegates of the Chinese Labour Association
(Chinesischen Gewerkschaftsbundes) in Moscow.729 The leader of the West African Farmers
Union (WAFU) in the Gold Coast I. K. Mensah, the South African nationalist organisation
Lekhotla la Bafo (Sesotho for Council of Commoners) and its general secretary Maphutseng
Lefela, as well as Carl Lindhagen also received invitations.730 By addressing the agenda as
provisional, Mnzenberg and Chatto had nevertheless acted with caution. Yet in the end, this
was not enough to curb the irritated reaction amongst the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters in Moscow. Realising that the International Secretariat had circulated a provisional
agenda, the Eastern Secretariat Commission on the LAI suspected that this operation had been
entirely planned by Mnzenberg, requesting that the Political Secretariat reprimand Comrade
Mnzenburg [sic]:
[] he sent out without previous consultation an agenda which opens up considerable
political dangers, especially the preponderance of speakers of an anti-Communist colour
(Cook, Dr. Pickens, etc.): and to warn him that any further instance of indiscipline will be
more severely dealt with.731
The public release of this provisional agenda literally infuriated the Eastern Secretariat, which
stated that Mnzenberg had shown poor political judgement in acting without permission. The
Political Secretariat observed how the agenda, in general, exposed an anti-communist colour,
thus, Mnzenberg had deserved the personal warning. In April, at a meeting of the LAI Executive

729

SAPMO-BA ZPA I 6/3/185, 10, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Ulbricht, Hotel Lux/Moscow, 14/3-1929.
Ulbricht was the KPD representative in the ECCI from December 1928 to December 1929; see Mario Frank, Walter
Ulbricht. Eine deutsche Biographie, Siedler Verlag, Berlin, 2001, p.78; RGASPI 535/1/212, 1, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum/Krestintern, Moscow, 27/2-1929; RGASPI 542/1/33, 5, Letter from Mnzenberg,
Berlin, to the Sekretariat des Chinesischen Gewerkschaftsbundes, Moscow, 21/3-1929.
730
RGASPI 535/1/208, 15-16, [Original] letter from the West African Farmers' Union/Mensah to The International
Secretariat, League Against Imperialism, 24, Friedrichstrasse, Berlin SW 48, 20/3-1929. For a brief description of
Lekhotla la Bafo, see Davidson et al. (2003). Mensahs letter was, however, not the response the International
Secretariat had expected, particularly his enquiry as to whether request the LAI could provide him with contacts to
European individuals and organisations: We shall therefore be glad if you [International Secretariat] will put us in
touch with some influential individuals or group of European Gentlemen who are interested in the African and have
his welfare at heart so that we may negotiate a possible understanding, For Lindhagen's invitation, see SCA CL
Collection volume 131. The document, Provisional Agenda, is located in the IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/68,
Einladung zur Teilnahme am 2. Anti-Imperialistischen Weltkongress der Liga gegen Imperialismus in der Zeit vom 20.
Juli bis 31. Juli 1929 in Paris.
731
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929.
Present at the meeting were Arnot as leader, Ewert, Figatner, Kuusinen, Wassiljew and Josefowitsch. The copy of the
protocol in RGASPI 495/20/722, 26-27 (Preparations for the Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League, meeting in
Moscow, Polit. Secretariat, 5/4-1929) states that the Political Secretariat endorsed its decision on 5 April.

291

in Amsterdam, Arnot gave the warning to Mnzenberg, convincing him to agree to revise the
agenda with unanimity on almost all points.732
The Eastern Secretariat feared that the LAI congress could evolve into a political
demonstration outside the direct control of the Comintern. Thus, what had the provisional
agenda proposed which had caused the Eastern Secretariat to react with such anger? Arnot stated
that the agenda made it possible for non-communist elements to break out in unwanted political
demonstrations, which would necessitate the presence of a number of reporters who are
Communists or party sympathisers to meticulously observe the atmosphere at the congress in
view of the possibility of a sharp struggle at the Congress. Hence, Arnot suggested enacting a
coup at the congress, more specifically to turn the event into a demonstration in support of the
struggle of the workers and peasants in India and China, as well as getting delegates from trade
unions and colonial revolutionary organisations to dominate the proceedings.733 In comparison to
the agenda of the 1927 Brussels Congress, this provisional agenda also revealed that the
International Secretariat wanted to re-enact the Brussels Congress, i.e. by nominating well-known
non-communist leaders to introduce the key speeches. For example, the Chairman of the LAI,
Maxton, should, together with Barbusse, open the congress and lead the introductory ceremony,
while individuals such as Pickens, Baldwin and Rivera would all have leading roles. This
provisional agenda also included a minimum number of communist delegates, competing with
socialists, social democrats and nationalists to chair the topics. For example, Melnitschansky
would share the trade union question with A. J. Cook and the delegate of the South African Trade
Union Congress William H. Andrews.734 Hence, by even including Cook on the agenda, the
International Secretariat had committed a serious mistake, particularly considering the dispute in
connection with the trade union debate at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne back in January.
732

RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929. For
the English version, see fol. RGASPI 495/20/722, 26-27 (which has, however, deleted the names). On 2 April, Arnot
edited this protocol and sent it to the Political Secretariat; RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P.
Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929.
733
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929.
734
The provisional agenda included the following topics and speakers (in parenthesis): 1. The Unification of all
Anti-Imperialist Groups and Organisations in the League against Imperialism (Barbusse, Maxton); 2. The All-India
National Congress, the All-India Trade Union Congress and their Role in the National-Revolutionary Struggle (no
suggested speaker); 3. The Nanking Government, the Kuomintang and their Attitude to the Anti-Imperialist
Movement in China (Madame Sun Yat-sen); 4. The Latest Stage of the National-Revolutionary Struggle in
Indochina, Indonesia and the Philippines (no suggested speaker); 5. The Necessity of a Joint Struggle of all Arabian
Countries against Imperialism (no suggested speaker); 6. The Struggle of the Persian People against Imperialist
Aggression (no suggested speaker); 7. The Struggle for the Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and America
(Professor W. Pickens); 8. The Struggle of Latin-America against British and North American Imperialisms (Roger
Baldwin & Diego Rivera); 9. The Tasks of the Trade Unions in the Struggle against Imperialism (A. J. Cook,
Melnitschansky, W. H. Andrews); 10. The Social, Political and Economic Situation of Women in the Colonial and
Semi-Colonial Countries (Madame Duchene, Helene Stcker); 11. Two Years of the League against Imperialism,
being a political and organisational report of the activity of the League (Willi Mnzenberg); 12, Organisational
Questions; 13. Miscellaneous, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 42-42b, Invitation to the Second Anti-Imperialist World
Congress (English version), February, 1929. For the German version, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 4-5b.

292

While the decision-makers had been waiting to begin the preparatory work for the LAI congress in
Moscow, the release of this provisional agenda precipitated a reaction to enforce the new line
on the LAI and the congress. In fact, the Comintern did not intend to turn the event into a euphoric
demonstration, like the one held in Brussels in 1927.
The Political Secretariat consequently sanctioned the decision to establish the LAI Political
Commission, appointing Arnot as its leader, a commission which aimed to fulfil two special
purposes: on the one hand, to prepare ideological guidelines for the LAI Executive meeting in
Amsterdam on 13-14 April and, on the other hand, to correct the damage done in connection with
the publication of the provisional agenda. The LAI Political Commission met for the first time
in Berlin, prior to departing for Amsterdam. In Berlin, Arnot told Mnzenberg of the necessity to
revise the agenda, especially with a focus on the struggle of the workers and peasants in the
Indian revolution. Thus, this demanded the nomination of speakers from the Workers and
Peasants Party capable of responding to Nehru should he choose to attend the congress. The
congress would also be a perfect opportunity, according to Arnot, to protest against the KMT and
to denounce the LSI as an Imperialist ally.735
In Amsterdam, only a few LAI Executive members managed to attend the meeting. According
to Arnot, the session included Chatto, Bridgeman, Saklatvala, Hatta, Fimmen, Mnzenberg,
Bridgeman, Vitkovsky and Melnitschansky. Prior to the meeting, Mnzenberg realised that he
needed Fimmens moral support to carry out the directives given to him by Arnot, and he asked
Fimmen to make the necessary changes to the agenda, a decision Arnot later described as having
been wise as it had meant that a debate on the revised agenda had been avoided.736 Yet, the
communists dominated the meeting in Amsterdam and, therefore, Fimmens performance was
merely a symbolic act. Apparently, the small print of the congress details and the agenda were
issues settled once the LAI Executive meeting was over, when the LAI Political Commission
gathered for a final session, to discuss the work of solving the political, administrative and budget
issues for the congress. Arnot returned to Moscow and, on 3 May, during the Commission on the
LAI's inaugural meeting, Arnot delivered a general report on the Amsterdam meeting.737 From
Arnots perspective, what did he expect of this second LAI congress and, furthermore, is it
possible to discern how the Comintern perceived the non-communist members in the LAI
Executive after this provisional agenda episode?

735

RGASPI 495/60/134a, 28, Protocol der Ostsekretariatskommission zur anti-imperialistischen Liga, 30/3-1929.
RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929,
Moscow (3/5-1929).
737
RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929,
Moscow (3/5-1929); RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of Commission of the LAI meeting, Moscow,
3/5-1929.
736

293

The revision of the agenda complied with the political discourse of the class perspective.
According to Arnot, the ideological demonstration of both the LAI and the congress was the
unification of the anti-imperialist movement under the slogan the World Situation, the War
Danger and the Struggle Against Imperialism. Thus, other pivotal questions on the agenda, e.g.
China, India, USA, and the political attitude of the LAI vis--vis the social democratic movement,
the LSI and the Imperialist nations suddenly became secondary political objectives. Arnot
expected the congress to provide an overview of both the LAIs political progression and the antiimperialist movement since 1927, solely for the reason of making it known that the difference
between the LAI that came into existence in February 1927 and the one appearing in mid-1929
was truly enormous. Thus, the report on the World Situation and the War Danger was a
statement only a Communist could give, Arnot argued. This also meant that other candidates in
Moscow, or in Europe, had to be found to assume the positions held by non-communists in the
provisional agenda. During this process, Arnot and the Commission on the LAI chose to
evaluate several of the non-communist speakers. For example, it was hard to delete Baldwin, bad
though he is, whereas it was essential to strike out Pickens as the leader of the session on The
Struggle for the Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and America and to get Ford (Profintern)
and Laguma (SA) as replacements.738 Pickens was a sensitive case. William Patterson
(pseudonym: Wilson), a member of the CPUSA, visited Moscow in 1929 and became the person
who advised how the communists should approach Pickens at the congress. Working for the ECCI
Negro Bureau, Patterson composed a draft of a letter, originally addressed to the International
Secretariat but, in the end, passed on to Arnot in April. According to the draft, Patterson argued:
We [the ECCI Negro Bureau] sincerely believe that the League has no desire to be
represented by an agent of a vacillating reformist conciliatory organisation. Yet we are aware
that you have probably obligated yourselves to use Mr. Pickens.739
As noted above, the International Secretariat never received this letter. The question is why not.
Evidently, Arnot or someone else at Comintern headquarters had classified the draft as Sekretno

738

Arnot, Bittelman and Vitkovsky stated that Mnzenberg was the most suitable candidate to deliver the speech on
the world situation, a proposition which Mnzenberg did not appreciate. Thus, as a temporary solution, Arnot
included Mnzenbergs name on the agenda to function as a visible comrade, which would give him a chance to find
and suggest another candidate to the Political Secretariat. On June 18, at the final meeting of the Commission on the
LAI in Moscow, the decision was taken to nominate Pollitt as Mnzenbergs replacement, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/32,
49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929, Moscow (3/5-1929), see
fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, Protokoll der Kommission zur Vorbereitung des Kongresses der Antiimperialistischen
Liga, Moscow, 18/6-1929.
739
RGASPI 495/18/664, 1-3, Draft letter to the LAI by comrade Wilson (W. Patterson), Moscow, 25/3-1929.
According to information in Pattersons personal file in the Comintern Archive, Patterson: carried on agitational work
[] in Germany after the II Congress of the Anti-Imperialist League in Frankfurt 1930 [sic], spoke at mass
demonstrations in Berlin, August 1930, with our brother German Party, RGASPI 495/261/3072, 101-102, Strictly
Confidential. William Lorenzo Patterson, Moscow, 16/4-1932.

294

(Secret) and, furthermore, Arnot had perhaps decided that the content was not suitable for
Mnzenberg to read. Pattersons draft was instead used for another purpose to get one of our
strongest Negro comrades to be allotted an equal amount of time as Pickens, having Ford
assume a leading role in the Negro question at the congress.740
For Arnot, the removal of Cook from the agenda was a clear-cut case, informing the
Commission on the LAI that the LAI Executive in Amsterdam was charged to remove A.J.
Cook if possible from the Agenda. In Amsterdam, Arnot declared that representatives of
affiliated organisations should have first priority and since Cook had been present in January only
by virtue of his personal position which he has since abandoned, there was no difficulty in
removing him from the agenda. However, Arnot was merely carrying out the directives issued by
the Political Secretariat, meaning that for the Commission on the LAI, the question of
appointing Melnitschansky, the French communist Gaston Monmousseau, the KPD member
Heckert, and the English non-communist trade unionist Gossip to assume leadership over the trade
union question had not been a difficult decision to make.741 In order to emphasise the domination
of the communists, the Commission on the LAI nominated Rajani Palme Dutt to introduce the
session on the Indian independence struggle in India (Struggle for the Independence of India)
and the Chinese communist Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai, to deliver the keynote speech on China and
the KMT (The Chinese Revolution: Struggle Against Imperialism and the Nan-King
Government). This was a question of organisation for the Commission on the LAI, meaning
that every communist at the congress had to ensure that no delegates created any disturbance
during the congress proceedings. Thus, the communist delegates nominated in the congress
presidium had to evaluate anyone who expressed a wish to give a speech, or who wanted to
comment on the speeches.742
*

740

RGASPI 495/18/664, 1-3, Draft letter to the LAI by comrade Wilson (W. Patterson), Moscow, 25/3-1929.
RGASPI 542/1/32, 49-51, Confidential report by R. P. Arnot, re. LAI Executive in Amsterdam, 13-14/4-1929,
Moscow (3/5-1929).
742
RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, Commission on the LAI, Moscow, 18/6-1929. The delegates
were given a document that explained the Standing Orders of the congress [see the fourth topic]: 1. The time
allowed for each main speech is 45 minutes. 2. The time allowed for Commission Reports is 20 minutes. 3. The time
allowed for participants in the discussion is 10 minutes. 4. Delegates wishing to speak in the discussion must inform
the Presidium of the Congress of their wish in writing [italics by the author]. 5. Where points of Order are concerned,
one speaker may speak in favour and one speaker against, IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/73, Standing Orders,
Frankfurt am Main, July 1929.
741

295

Consolidation Models
With the inauguration of the Commission on the LAI on 3 May, as well as having attended the
LAI Executive meeting in Amsterdam in April, Arnot expected to get preparations under way.
However, the conundrum was that there existed no organisational or ideological model on which to
consolidate a structure for the congress, e.g. there was no congress budget, no resolutions and no
definite agreement on the composition of the delegations. An extra problem was that the
International Secretariat was becoming more and more excluded from what was happening in
Moscow.
In May, Mnzenberg began to question why nothing was happening in Moscow, requesting
Kuusinen to get the Eastern Secretariat to send a reliable Comrade to Berlin to assist the
International Secretariat with the administrative work of the congress, e.g. travel arrangements and
finding accommodation for the delegations in Paris. Yet, as long as there was no decision on the
congress budget, Mnzenberg felt that the International Secretariats hands were tied. Hence, it
was impossible to be certain that the LAI would reimburse the delegations travelling from Mexico
and the Philippines for their journey to Europe.743 According to Mnzenbergs temporary budget
presented on 18 March, the congress would cost $20,000, an amount divided between three
parties: the LAI ($5,000), the IAH ($5,000) and the Comintern ($10,000).744
This temporary budget was one of many documents which Kuusinen, Piatnitsky and Arnot
consulted in order to reach a decision on the final budget. With regard to Mnzenbergs
temporary budget, Kuusinen chose not to respond.745 However, Mnzenberg also had other
preoccupations, and from 17 April until 4 May he was in Erfurt, Mnzenbergs electoral district,
carrying out work for the KPD. Yet, when Mnzenberg returned to Berlin, he had not still heard a
word about what was happening with the congress preparations at Comintern headquarters. What
was it that made Mnzenberg react? Apparently, after the LAI Executive meeting in Amsterdam,
Mnzenberg contacted Kuusinen and Arnot, asking how the congress preparations were
743

The reliable Comrade would send congress invitations and focus on establishing contacts with delegations in
East Asia: Indochina, Japan, Mongolia, Indonesia and Korea. Mnzenberg expected the comrade to leave Moscow
when the person was able to come. In a letter to Kornblum, Mnzenberg presented a shrewd plan, in which the LAI
would consider financing the journey for some of the peasant delegations to the congress, but that the Krestintern had
to pay for their return, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 31-33, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, Kuusinen, Moscow, 17/41929; RGASPI 535/1/212, 6-7, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum, Krestintern, Moscow, 17/4-1929.
744
RGASPI 542/1/30, 21, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 18/3-1929. This temporary
budget illustrates the international scope of the LAI congress, based on Mnzenbergs perspective. The representation
of national and regional delegations originating from 32 countries, was calculated to cost 51,520 Marks. Mnzenberg
used the German Mark as the preferred currency in the budget to allocate the cost between telegrams (1,500 Marks),
the printing of a congress Bulletin in English, German, French, Spanish and Arabic (5,000 Marks), administrative
costs (14,000 Marks) and apparat (translators, Press agency, congress bureau/secretariat, 9,080 Marks), see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/30, 22-23, Provisorisches Budget Antiimperialistischer Weltkongress, Mnzenberg, Berlin, to
Kuusinen, Moscow, 18/3-1929.
745
Kuusinen was, at this moment, deeply engaged in solving the fractional struggle within the CPUSA, as well as
observing how the Meerut trial campaign was progressing in Europe.

296

proceeding. While awaiting some kind of response, Mnzenberg explained to Kuusinen that the
International Secretariat had retreated into a state of muted activity. To test Kuusinen, Mnzenberg
threatened to tell the International Secretariat to stop its preparatory work for the congress, but also
that, as long as the Comintern did not provide the LAI with any proper funding, Mnzenberg could
not guarantee that the delegation from South Africa would attend the event.746
On 3 May, the Commission on the LAI discussed the budget, deciding to pass the issue on to
the Sub-Committee. However, Arnot realised that Mnzenberg had to be calmed down, and on 9
May Arnot sent him a letter reassuring him that the Commission on the LAI was working on
sorting out every detail for the congress in Moscow:
It was not until yesterday that we were able to have a commission [meeting] and full report
of the happenings three weeks ago [LAI Executive meeting, Amsterdam, 13-14 April]. The
lines we agreed upon have been accepted in general; more details have yet to be worked out
in several cases. I hope this week, along with comrade Piatnitsky, that we shall get the points
carried through.747
The information was as misleading as Arnot had intended it to be. Thus, Arnot avoided telling
Mnzenberg that the issue was far more complex than he had described. Working together with
Bittelman to organise the budget for the congress, Arnot had in fact already passed the proposed
costs for the event on to Piatnitsky before he informed Mnzenberg that:
Yesterday before you [Piatnitsky] came in, comrade Bittelman and myself reported on the
budget question, which we were charged to examine and report upon. We reported that we
had made very considerable alterations [to] the budget, cutting out the European expenses
but, on the other hand, adding certain colonial expenses, in order to ensure the largest
possible number of delegates [from] the colonial countries.748
Arnots motive for not giving Mnzenberg the whole picture was a question of control, especially
with regard to the difficult process of reaching a decision on the budget.749 Furthermore, after
Arnots resignation, Bittelman had assumed the role as LAI liaison, and on 22 May he notified
Mnzenberg that the amount requested had been approved in principle. However, Bittelman
stated that Piatnitsky had concluded that it would be enough for our Firm [the Comintern] to
746

Mnzenberg questioned whether Kuusinen had really understood how serious the situation in Berlin was,
explaining that he could write a whole novel based on the complaints, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 37, Letter from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 4/5-1929.
747
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, Moscow, 3/5-1929;
RGASPI 542/1/30, 41, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 9/5-1929.
748
RGASPI 495/18/670, 103, (Strictly confidential) Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 9/5-1929.
Arnot reduced the budget by 8%. These documents are most likely located in the files on Piatnitsky (75 % of which
remain closed to research). The content of the documents were: World Congress Budget as revised, Remarks on
Congress Budget, League Normal Budget, League Proposed Budget and Details of Delegations to World
Congress.
749
RGASPI 542/1/30, 44-45, Letter from Arnot, Moscow, to Virtanen, Moscow, 18/5-1929.

297

contribute $5,000, while Mnzenberg had to secure the additional sum of $15,000. For example,
Mnzenberg could either use the LAI and the IAHs financial contacts or contact the Profintern
and the IRH. Mnzenberg did not approve of the endorsed budget, concluding that $5,000 was not
enough to secure the travel arrangements for the colonial delegations. However, Bittelman had
anticipated Mnzenbergs displeasure and therefore suggested that the International Secretariat
organise a fund to raise money. In June, the International Secretariat set up the Fond fr
Kolonialdelegationen (Fund for the Colonial Delegations), calling for financial contributions in
support of the delegations travelling to the congress.750 Whether the initiative ever managed to
raise any money, remains unknown.
*
Resolving the Anti-Imperialist Agenda: The Congress Resolutions
The resolutions for the LAI congress epitomise the Cominterns ideological attitude towards the
colonial question. In contrast to the rush to complete the resolutions before the Brussels Congress
in February 1927, the completion of the resolutions for the second LAI congress was a cautious
and meticulous process in Moscow. For example, Arnot had instructed the authors to keep the
resolutions as short as possible and to get the documents completed by 25 May.751 Most
importantly, these resolutions were the key to correcting the mistakes in the provisional agenda.
On 3 May, Arnot laid down the principle guidelines for the resolutions in the document,
Confidential Decision on Resolutions for the second LAI congress, Annexe (b), an account
which illustrates the political goals of the congress, based on the Cominterns new line.
According to Arnot, the following eligible candidates, who were then currently either living in or
visiting Moscow, were to write the congress resolutions: Freyer and Schubin (The Struggle for
the Independence of India), Pavel Mif and Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai (The Chinese Revolution:
The Struggle against Imperialism and the Nanking Government), Pyotr Kitaigorodsky (The need
for a common struggle in Egypt, Syria and other Arabic countries of the Near East against
Imperialism), Johnson and Bittelman (The Latest Stage of the National Revolutionary struggle
in Indo-China, Indonesia and the Philippines), Arnot (The Struggle for the Emancipation of the
Negroes in Africa and America special resolution or sections of this resolution should deal with
East Africa and South Africa), the ECCI Latin-American Secretariat (The Struggle of Latin

750

Bittelman promised Mnzenberg to send the monthly payment for June [] immediately, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/30, 47, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 22/5-1929. 535/1/212, 10, Short note from
Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum/Krestintern, Moscow, 25/5-1929; Pressedienst des zweiten antiimperialistischen
Weltkongresses, Nr. 1, 1/6-1929.
751
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, 3/5-1929. Barb,
Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai, and Williams were not present at the meeting.

298

America against British and North American Imperialism), Melnitschansky and Lozovsky (The
Tasks of the Trade Union in the Struggle against Imperialism), Moirova (The Social, Political
and Economic Situation of Women in the Colonial and Semi-Colonial countries), Freyer and
Krestintern (The Struggle for the Emancipation of the Peasant Masses), Khitarov (the Youth
Resolution) and, finally, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Bela Kun, Arnot, Bittelman and Khitarov (the
General Political Resolution).752
A careful approach from a political perspective was also required when drawing up these
resolutions. Arnot knew that some of these topics would be likely to cause controversy at the
congress, e.g., the possible debate [] between the INC representatives [] young Nehru if he
comes, and the delegate of the Indian Workers and Peasants Party, Rajani Palme Dutt. Thus,
before Freyer and Schubin began writing their resolution on India, Arnot told them to keep in mind
a possible controversy at the congress.753 The completion of the resolutions also indicates that the
preparatory work was a work in progress, in which actors such as Arnot or Bittelman had to
improvise along the way to reach some kind of conclusion. However, for Arnot, the crucial issue to
solve was ensuring that well-known communist leaders, e.g. Palme Dutt and Pollitt, would appear
as leading figures to guarantee the political aims of the congress, an objective Bittelman also
strove to effect. On 19 June, Bittelman sent instructions to Burns in Berlin to contact Dutt and
Pollitt preferably by telephone, in order to receive confirmation that they would be attending the
congress. If they showed any sign of reluctance, Burns merely had to tell them both that the
transcripts for the speeches had already been prepared.754
The African question the emancipation of the Negroes had been a long series of zigzags
before reaching its conclusion. At first, Arnot instructed Ford and Harry Haywood to write an
account of the situation in Africa especially since the VI Congress, with a separate section on
South Africa and Kenya.755 However, Arnot had expected to write the congress resolution on
Africa, while utilising the account by Ford and Haywood as political information at the
752

RGASPI 495/60/134a, 35, Confidential decision on resolutions for the second LAI congress, Annexe (b), 3/5-1929.
A copy of this same list (in German) does not disclose the connection between the nominations and the Commission
on the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/32, 47-48, Anhang (B) Vertraulich, Beschluss, author: Arnot, April/May, 1929. If
Arnot was thinking of the Colonial Conference in this context is mere speculation, however, it corresponds with the
fact that the Commission on Colonial Conference expected all materials to be ready by the 20th of May, see fol.
RGASPI 495/18/670, 27-28, Minutes, second meeting of Commission on Colonial Conference, Moscow, 29/4-1929.
753
Schubin knew the Comintern's position on India. On 25 March, Inprecorr published an article by Schubin which
included criticism of the AIWPP Conference in Calcutta, and of Roy, see Harkishan Singh Surjeet, History of the
Communist Movement in India, Leftword Books, 2005, p.143.
754
RGASPI 542/1/30, 75, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow to Burns/International Secretariat, Berlin, 19/6-1929.
Bittelman expected to arrive in Berlin ten days prior to the congress, and instructed Pollitt and Dutt to be in Berlin
one week prior to the opening of the congress.
755
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 35, Confidential decision on resolutions for the second LAI congress, Annexe (b), 3/5-1929;
RGASPI 495/18/670, 78, Confidential letter from Arnot/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ford, Moscow, 29/4-1929;
RGASPI 495/18/670, 79, Confidential letter from Arnot/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Haywood, Moscow, 29/41929.

299

Colonial Conference. This all changed once Arnot received the instruction to act as the ECCI
plenipotentiary in the CPUSA in May and, as he had not yet completed his Africa resolution, the
only available material on Africa at Comintern headquarters was the account by Ford and
Haywood. Moreover, when Arnot left the Commission on Colonial Conference, the African
question disappeared from the agenda altogether. To complete the resolution on Africa, then, the
Commission on the LAI let the ECCI Negro Bureau (Patterson and Haywood) write and edit a
new Negro resolution. On 27 May, Haywood and Patterson completed a first version, The
Negro World Question and the Negro Question in different countries of Africa and America and,
once Ford had edited the material, they passed on the final version to the Commission on the
LAI on 29 May.756
The Tasks of the Trade Union in the Struggle against Imperialism proved to be a prolonged
process. Arnot assigned Melnitschansky and Lozovsky to write the resolution but, and considering
the aftermath of the trade union debate at the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne on 15-16 January
1929, the Political Secretariat was aware of the risk that the trade union question might cause a
crisis at the congress. Once Melnitschansky and Lozovsky had finished their first version, the
Political Secretariat reviewed the draft, only to conclude that some false parts still needed
correction. The reason for this was that the Political Secretariat wanted to avoid, as far as possible,
any criticism of the LSI. Apparently, this was a question of establishing a political image around
the LAI, which focused on getting the organisation to cultivate more intimate relations with the
trade union movement and to assume the position as the leader of an aggressive struggle against
imperialism. Hence, the trade union resolution had to make it clear that the LAI would not
tolerate any hostility from either the LSI or the reformist trade unions.757 Bittelman carried out the
task of correcting the draft, and on 28 June, the Political Secretariat endorsed the resolution.758
*
756

RGASPI 495/155/67, 15, Minutes of meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 27/5-1929; RGASPI 495/1/67,
16, Minutes of meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 29/5-1929. The draft resolution is filed in fol. RGASPI
495/155/72, 40-58.
757
RGASPI 542/1/31, 32, Message from the Political Secretariat, Moscow, to Bittelman, Moscow, 25/6-1929;
RGASPI 495/20/722, 43-44, Resolution Trade Unions and the LAI, 27/6-1929 (authors: Melnitschansky and
Lozovsky); RGASPI 495/20/722, 22, Protocol, meeting of the ECCI Political Secretariat, Moscow, 8/2-1929. For a
copy of the note from the Political Secretariat to Bittelman on 25 June, see fol. 495/20/722, 18.
758
RGASPI 495/3/111, 1a, Protokoll Nr.40 der Sitzung des Politsekr. des EKKI, 28/6-1929. Members of the Political
Secretariat who attended this meeting were Ulbricht, Barb, Garlandi (real name: Ruggero Grieco, communist from
Italy), Piatnitsky, Lozovsky, Chitarow, Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai and Bell. Mnzenberg also attended this meeting of
the Political Secretariat, where he heard Bittelman explain the basic purpose and outline of the resolutions. After the
meeting, the protocol was filed in a Sondermappe (Special Dossier). However, on closer reading of Protokoll
Nr.40, it states that the focal point for the Political Secretariat was the trade union resolution. Additionally, the dossier
contains the resolutions of the ECCI Negro Bureau (French versions): PROJET DE RESOLUTION SUR LA
QUESTION NEGRE-INTERNATIONALE (25/6-1929), and LES COLONIES ANGLAISES Afrique Occidentale
anglaise (Sierra Leone, Cte dOr, Gambie et Nigeria) (26/6-1929).

300

Deciphering the Nature of the Anti-Imperialist Movement: The Congress Delegations

The International Secretariat wanted the second LAI congress to become an impressive antiimperialist demonstration which would provide renewed impetus to unifying the anti-imperialist
movement. In September 1928, the International Secretariat appealed to the following national
sections to attend the congress: England, France, Holland, and Germany, the AAAIL, the Latin
American LAI sections in Argentine, Columbia, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Puerto
Rico, San Salvador, Santo Domingo and Uruguay. In reference to the affiliated organisations and
collective members, the International Secretariat requested the attendance of the INC, the PI, the
Socialist Party of Persia, Etoil Nord-Africaine, Confederacion Obrera National Dominicana in
Santo Domingo, the IAH, Bildungsarbeiter Internationale, the International Womens League for
Peace and Freedom, Internationale der Kriegsopfer and the International Anti-Militarist
Bureau.759 For Mnzenberg, the congress represented an opportunity to summon the old guard
of the LAI the left-wing intellectuals: Emil Ludwig, Ernst Toller, Arthur Holitscher, Alfons
Paquet, Lehmann-Russbldt, Lessing, Alfons Goldschmidt and the representative of the socialist
organisation the Freethinkers Angelica Balabanov.760 Yet, Balabanov's appearance at the congress
was a sensitive issue. Bittelman informed Mnzenberg that comrades Kuusinen, Piatnitsky,
Manuilsky, Magyar and Mif had stated that Balabanov would bring harm to the congress.761
The Commission on the LAI both supervised and authorised whom to accredit as delegates
to the congress. After the meetings of the LAI Political Commission in April, Mnzenberg
requested that Kuusinen, Arnot and Ford assume full responsibility for the important and urgent
task of co-ordinating the composition of the delegations in Moscow. What was the primary reason
for Mnzenberg making such a request? Without Chatto at the International Secretariat,
Mnzenberg had lost access to a majority of the LAIs colonial contacts both in Berlin and beyond,
particularly those with the Indian community. Thus, it was up to Arnot to begin the work of coordinating the delegations in Moscow. For example, Arnot could tell the delegate of the San
Francisco-based Hindustan Ghadr Party Rattan Singh, who was in Moscow in 1929, to function as
the leader of the Indian delegation.762 Despite the existence of the Indian Bureau, during
Chattos temporary withdrawal from the International Secretariat in March and while Chatto
remained in hiding in Berlin in April and May, Mnzenberg did not mention the bureau in any of
his correspondence to either Kuusinen, Arnot or Bittelman. Thus, it appears that A. C. N.
759

IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, 66, An alle nationalen Sektion der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Internationale
Sekretariat, Berlin, September 1928.
760
SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Letter from Mnzenberg & Chatto, Berlin, to Lindhagen, Stockholm, 3/6-1929.
761
RGASPI 542/1/30, 72, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929.
762
RGASPI 542/1/30, 31-33, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 17/4-1929.

301

Nambiars control over the Indian Bureau created, for the time being, a separation from the
International Secretariat, leaving Mnzenberg without any contacts to the Indian anti-colonial
movement at all. According to Bittelman, the efforts to co-ordinate the desired Indian delegation
in Moscow had become a complicated process. The International Secretariat had, therefore, to
utilise all the connections you have to secure delegates from worker and peasant organisations in
India and, if not, Bittelman stated that there was a plausible risk that the congress would
collapse.763 Mnzenberg, on the other hand, realised that it seemed as though the LAI had lost
every connection with India, as well as with Indian anti-colonial activists in Europe.764 Yet,
Chattos temporary resignation from the International Secretariat was not the only reason for this.
The restrictions and surveillance put into effect by the British security services in India, sanctioned
and administered from London, also contributed to hampering the International Secretariats
connections to India in 1929. According to the minutes of the British Home Office in London on
29 February 1929, the India Office had to use every measure to prevent known members of the
LAI in India from travelling to Europe by denying passports. Thus, the Home Office anticipated
that this sufficient step would put an end to LAI activities in India which, in turn, would help to
prevent the organisation turning into a very nasty thing.765
At the end of May, Chatto assumed his position as International political secretary and
attempted to mend the LAIs contacts with Indian activists. An opportunity arose at the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) conference in Geneva on 1-15 June, an event attended
by representatives from several Indian organisations e.g. the renowned leader Joshi of the Indian
Trade Union Council (ITUC). For Mnzenberg, this conference represented an opportunity to
secure the colonial character of the LAI congress, admitting to Bittelman that it seemed as
though the ILO had succeeded where the LAI had failed. Hence, Mnzenberg explained that the
ILO had invited leaders from trade unions in Europe, e.g. the Amsterdam International, to discuss
the colonial question with delegates from the colonies. The conference also posed a threat to the
LAIs ambitions, Mnzenberg stated, forcing the International Secretariat to act to disrupt a
possible collaboration between the Amsterdam International and Joshi, a development which
would be a long-term political blow for the LAI. The International Secretariat first contacted
Nehru and Bridgeman, calling for the rapid establishment of a protest campaign aimed against the
763

RGASPI 542/1/30, 47, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 22/5-1929.
Mnzenberg informed Kornblum of the positive contacts the LAI had with the Philippines, e.g. the peasant
organisation the Confederation of Philippine Peasants. Further, Pressedienst stated that the Fourth Peasants
Congress in Manila on May 1, an event attended by 30,000 workers and peasants, had declared its solidarity with
and greeted the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 10, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kornblum/Krestintern,
Moscow, 25/5-1929.
765
The Home Office recommended that individuals, suspected or confirmed as members of the LAI, should have the
following stamp in their passports: Not valid for India and be prevented from undertaking Empire-wide travel,
TNA HO 144 10693, Minutes (Home Office), 27/2-1929.
764

302

Amsterdam International in both India and England. Additionally, Mnzenberg wanted to see
whether it was possible for the LAI to invite and send both Joshi and the Indian delegation on a
tour of the Soviet Union and Moscow in particular, before proceeding directly to the LAI congress.
However, Bittelman explained that it would not be advisable to invite Joshi to Moscow for
political reasons.766
Fimmen had notified the International Secretariat of his intention to attend the ILO conference,
thus Chatto wondered whether he could function unofficially as an LAI representative at the event.
Furthermore, the International Secretariat knew that the ILO was intending to address the question
of forced labour at the conference. Towards the end of May, the International Secretariat
completed and released the pamphlet Memorandum on Forced Labour, which portrayed the LAI
as a political force within the anti-imperialist movement. A closer scrutiny of the pamphlet
nevertheless reveals the difficulties the LAI were experiencing in adapting the new line of the
Comintern, and in ignoring the rhetoric of the united front strategy:
The League against Imperialism, which stands for the united action of organised workers in
imperialist countries with colonial workers in the struggle against international capitalism,
calls upon all working class representatives of the ILO Conference to reject absolutely all
proposals for the regulation of forced labour, [] These abuses will never be abolished
through the agencies of capitalism. Only the determined action of working class
organisations in imperialist countries, fighting side by side with the workers of all countries
and all races, can remove this danger from the standards of international labour.767
The primary aim of this pamphlet was to circulate it among the delegates at the ILO conference, an
objective that required the services of an individual linked to the International Secretariat.
Mnzenberg and Chatto assigned this mission to Otto Schudel, the functionary at the LAI bureau
in Berlin, instructing him to travel to Geneva and use Fimmens contacts to gain access to the
conference and to its delegates.768
For Schudel and the International Secretariat, his mission to Geneva was a moderate success;
however, he did manage to inform both journalists and some of the delegates about the LAI and its
second congress. After arriving in Geneva, Schudel met Fimmen and told him that he wanted to
766

RGASPI 542/1/30, 56, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bittelman, Moscow, 6/6-1929; RGASPI 542/1/30, 72,
Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929.
767
W. Mnzenberg, V. Chattophadyaya, E. Burns, Memorandum on Forced Labour, International Secretariat, Berlin,
1/6-1929. For the pamphlet, see IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, p.129.
768
The mission to Geneva was a rushed affair for Schudel. On 30 May, Schudel received a note informing him that
Mnzenberg and Chatto wanted to meet him at the Bahnhof in Berlin. On the platform, the two of them instructed
Schudel on the mission before he set off straight away by train to Geneva. According to Chatto, Schudel had circulated
the pamphlet at the ILO conference among workers delegates and the press, where the latter had used it as reference
material to discuss forced labour, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/31, 26-27, Report by Chatto, the ILO Conference/Geneva,
Berlin, June, 1929.

303

organise a meeting with Joshi and the Indian delegation. Fimmen managed to convince Joshi to
meet a representative of the LAI, informing Schudel not to expect too much. As Fimmen had
implicitly suggested, once Schudel had told Joshi to consider the option of attending the LAI
congress and encouraging the ITUC to join the LAI, Joshi's reaction was one of irritation. Schudel
informed Chatto that Joshi had stated that the ITUC would never affiliate either to Amsterdam or
to Moscow and, if the communists continued to pressure him, he intended to resign from the
ITUC and form a rival organisation in opposition against the communists. Additionally, Joshi
said that the LAI should not count on Nehrus appearance at the LAI congress, as he did not intend
to leave India.769 Once Bittelman learnt of Joshis chauvinistic opinion of the LAI, he instructed
Mnzenberg to ensure that the money sent to India by the LAI in support of the workers
movement did not fall into the hands [] of Joshi and his crowd.770
Yet, what Joshi had told Schudel merely confirmed the existing hostility within the socialist
movement towards the LAI. At the ILO conference, there was a widespread antagonism towards
the LAI amongst the delegates. Some of the delegates told Fimmen that the LAI was as an
instrument of M. [Moscow], financed and controlled by the communists, functioning solely to
convince the oppressed races to be [] used by the communist movement.771 Moreover, on 20
July, prior to the opening of the LAI congress, the LSI published its second analysis of the LAI,
The League Against Imperialism and the Labour and Socialist International, in International
Information. In connection with the release of this analysis, for example, Adler contacted
Brockway to inform him that the LSI was paying attention to the still existent link between the ILP
and LAI, particularly to Maxtons role.772 The LSIs second analysis had been carefully planned by
Adler to be published just prior to the opening of the LAI congress on 21 July, warning every
member of the LSI not to participate in the event. Nevertheless, the LSI had neither the authority
nor the capacity to prohibit individuals from visiting the LAI congress, observing how Maxton
would assume a decisive role in the coming event:
For Mnzenberg and the Communists especially this participation of Maxton in the Congress
is of the highest strategical value. Under the presidency of Maxton the purely Bolshevist
769

Fimmen realised that if he did not manage to arrange a meeting with Joshi, Schudel would do whatever it took to
set up a meeting of his own. Schudels letter was addressed as Briefe Nr.2, the whereabouts of Briefe Nr.1 remain
unknown, RGASPI 542/1/30, 60-63, Briefe Nr.2/ Schudel, Geneva, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 2/6-1929;
RGASPI 542/1/31, 26-27, Report by Chatto, the ILO Conference/Geneva, Berlin, June, 1929.
770
RGASPI 542/1/30, 56, 72, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929. Bittelman referred
to a strike in the metal industry in India, whereas Mnzenberg had previously enquired as to whether the Profintern
intended to provide the Indian workers with money. Apparently, the Profintern seemed unwilling to do so; therefore,
Mnzenberg asked Kuusinen for advice on what to do, concluding that if the Profintern was considering contributing,
the sum had to be big and transferred through existing channels of the International Secretariat. , see fol. RGASPI
542/1/30, 56.
771
RGASPI 542/1/30, 50, Letter from Fimmen, Geneva, to Chatto, Berlin, 2/6-1929.
772
IISG LSI Collection 1717/14, Letter from Brockway, London, to Adler, Zurich, 5/7-1929.

304

character of the real leadership of the League and of the Congress will be concealed from
the Socialist workers.773
The LSIs analysis concluded that Maxton certainly would have to confront a similar treatment as
the one meted out to Cook, and receive a flood of insults from the communists as a reward for
his services. In comparison to the LSIs analysis in October 1927, their analysis in 1929
scrutinised the leadership of the LAI even more harshly. Above all, it portrayed Mnzenberg as an
unabashed and ruthless individual who was working in the service of Bolshevism, and who used
every strategy available to convince socialists to partake in all kinds of united front and similar
manoeuvres. According to the LSI, the LAI was only a part of the grand conspiracy of the
communists, thus, the socialist movement had to understand that the organisation was an
expression of the provocative and barbarous methods international communism implemented to
establish influence.774

The undertaking to nominate delegates and assemble the delegations in Moscow followed a
different rationale compared to one used by the International Secretariat. It was a meticulous
process, e.g. the preparatory work in relation to the Negro delegation confirms how carefully the
candidates were selected. Arnot assigned Ford to supervise the work who could, in turn, use his
contacts with the Profintern and the ECCI Negro Bureau. Nevertheless, for Ford, the LAI congress
represented a perfect opportunity to begin the work of preparing the upcoming RILU [ITUCNW;
International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers] conference in July 1930. Hence, Ford
counted on getting the Negro delegation to hold a preliminary conference at the LAI congress
in order to discuss the idea of organising an ITUCNW conference:
[] the success of such a Conference depends upon the number of Negro delegates
representative of Negro workers' organisations. [sic] who will attend this Congress. To give
such a conference the proper political and future organisational effect, it is necessary to be
assured of representatives of Negro workers from America [illegible] Africa and the West
Indies as [sic] least.775

773

SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, The League Against Imperialism and the Labour and Socialist International,
in International Information, Zrich, Vol.VI, Nr.28, 20/7-1929, pp.300-302.
774
SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, The League Against Imperialism and the Labour and Socialist International,
in International Information, Zurich, Vol.VI, Nr.28, 20/7-1929, pp.300-302. On 22 July, two days after the release of
the report, the Mitteilung of the ECCI Information Department (Informatsionnyi otdel IKKI), an information service
for the staff working at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, included the LSI analysis, see fol. RGASPI 495/33/203,
226-228, Copy of the LSI article on LAI 20/7-1929, INFORMATIONSABTEILUNG DES EKKI, Mitteilung No. 727,
Moscow, 22/7-1929.
775
RGASPI 542/1/30, 48, Letter from Ford/Profintern, Moscow, to the Commission on the LAI/Bittelman, Moscow,
31/5-1929.

305

This objective depended, however, on the consent of other actors. Ford informed Bittelman of the
idea and, on 5 June, the Sub-Committee endorsed Fords proposal on the condition that the
informal conference incurred no additional expense to the congress budget.776
The Sub-Committee instructed Ford on the political composition of the Negro delegation,
which had to include a member of the ECCI Negro Bureau who under no circumstance should
pose as a representative of the Comintern. Apparently, the comrade must be included in the
American delegation while posing as a delegate of one of the American organisations. On 8 June,
the ECCI Negro Bureau suggested Patterson as its representative, using the cover as a delegate of
the ANLC,777 while Ford aimed to appear as a delegate of the Profintern, representing the
International Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers of the RILU. In a letter to the
International Secretariat, Ford wrote that the coming World Congress was of great importance
for the anti-imperialist movement, with the LAI realising that it was one of the few strong
leaders uniting the struggles of colonial and oppressed peoples. Furthermore, Ford hoped that
the LAI would allow the ITUCNW to hold small preliminary conferences:
The coming Congress of the League offers us an opportunity to hold in connection with your
Congress a one day conference of Negro trade union and worker delegates and
representatives of Negro workers who shall attend the League Congress. We therefore ask
your permission and co-operation in the holding of such a conference.778
The delegations from China, Japan, the Philippines, Indochina, Singapore, Java and Korea were
assembled through Bittelman, consisting essentially of colonial comrades who were either
working at Comintern headquarters or pursuing studies at the KUTV. In June, these delegations
received their instructions to attend the congress.779

The Delegationsliste (List of Delegations) presents the colonial element at the LAI congress, a
document which includes the names and nationality of every delegate, political party

776

RGASPI 495/60/134a, 37, Minutes of organisation sub-committee for the preparation of the LAI congress, 5/61929.
777
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 37, Minutes of organisation sub-committee for the preparation of the LAI congress, 5/61929; RGASPI 495/155/67, 17, Minutes of meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau, Moscow, 8/6-1929. Present at the
closed meeting of the ECCI Negro Bureau on June 8 were Bittelman, Nasanov, Ford, Patterson and Whitman
(pseudonym: Charlton). According to the minutes, Bittelman reported for the Small Commission of the Eastern
Secretariat [the Commission on the LAI]. The Complete list of attendance for the LAI congress include Patterson
as the ANLC delegate and member of the American delegation, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 26, Complete [list of
attendance], July 1929. Mnzenberg was informed of Pattersons nomination by Bittelman in June, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/30, 72.
778
RGASPI 542/1/33, 7, Letter from the ITUCNW, Moscow, to the Commission on the LAI (Moscow) &
Mnzenberg (Berlin), 14/6-1929. Ford acted, on the one hand, as representative for the Negro Committee of the
Profintern and, on the other hand, as delegate of the Soviet delegation, RGASPI 542/1/92, 30, Complete [list of
attendance], July 1929.
779
RGASPI 542/1/30, 72, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 11/6-1929.

306

representatives, organisations, associations and those appearing in their capacity as individuals.

This document represents a joint effort by Mnzenberg, Chatto and Bittelman.780 Thus, thanks to
the Delegationsliste, it is possible to analyse the size and political character of the colonial
delegations and to verify these delegates locale of activity, with the latter disclosing the actual
places of residence of the colonial representatives expected to attend the congress.
The Delegationsliste suggested 286 delegates from 41 countries, including imperialist
(16), colonial and semi-colonial countries (25), regions (the Balkan, North Africa, West and East
Africa), and international organisations (21). However, the actual physical residences of the
colonial and semi-colonial delegates were primarily located in colonial metropolises such as
Berlin, Paris and London. The second LAI congress was therefore, despite its ambition to pose as a
colonial pilgrimage linking together the imperialist nations with the colonial world, bound
within a European framework. The table below makes the following distinctions between colonial
representation and physical residence to clarify this postulation:

780

The International Secretariat gathered intelligence on suitable candidates, the material then being despatched to
Bittelman for further consideration who, in turn, added or deleted delegates before sending the final list to Kuusinen
for approval. In June, Bittelman confirmed that he had received a lot of material (administrative documents and
information on the delegations) from the International Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 72, Letter from
Bittelman, Moscow, to Mnzenberg/Berlin, [blueprint], 11/6-1929.

307

Table 7.3: Geographical Division and Colonial Representation Invited to the Second
International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism 1929
Invited
India
Indonesia
Mexico
Venezuela
Cuba
Bolivia
Panama
Columbia
Argentina
Brazil
Ecuador
Paraguay
Uruguay
Iraq
Egypt
Syria
Palestine
Persia
Korea
China
Japan
Indochina
Philippines
Mongolia
South Africa
North Africa
East Africa
West Africa
African Organisations
outside Africa
Arab Organisations
Total:

Total No.:

Europe

USA

27
13
2
2
2
1
1
1
3
2
1
1
1
2
1
5
2
3
5
8
3
2
2
1
4 [6]
2
1
1
4

Colonial &
Semi-Colonial
12
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
5
2
2
1
4
-

14
11
2
1
1
1
1
1
3
2
4
3
3
2
1
1
4

1
1
-

7
110

46

7
62

Source: RGASPI 542/1/92, 1-16, Delegationsliste, May-June 1929

The total number of colonial delegates were 110, a criteria based on nationality. A majority of the
delegates lived in Europe (62), while a fraction came from the USA (2), thus, the actual colonial
representation was in the minority (46). This verifies the assumption that Europe represented the
centre for anti-imperialist network(s), especially the fact that the continent had anti-colonial hubs
such as Paris, London and Berlin. Furthermore, Europe provided the anti-imperialist movement
with a political space in which to develop and carry out political, organisational and social
activism, a prerequisite lacking in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Yet, one must also
understand that the Delegationsliste was only a prognosis of the anticipated colonial
308

participation, and that it was a reflection of a vision created by the International Secretariat and the
Commission on the LAI (Bittelman). External explanations are also equally relevant, e.g. the
national surveillance carried out by the German, British and French national security services,
while internal explanations shed light on the difficulties of the International Secretariat to secure
money to fund the travel costs for colonial delegations. The South African delegation was an
illustrative example of this.
Josiah. T. Gumede intended to represent three organisations at the congress: the ANC, the
native Bantu organisation La Bafe, and as the leader of the South African LAI Section. Other
members in the South African delegation were Andrews of the South African Trade Union
Congress (SATUC) and two unknown delegates of the Furniture Workers Association (FWA) and
the communist Native Federation of Trade Unions (NAFTU).781 Despite the International
Secretariats grandiose ambitions, in the end, everything depended on finance. At the end of May,
Mnzenberg needed a first contribution to guarantee the travel arrangements for the South
African delegation. Eventually, Andrews ended up being the only delegate from South Africa at
the congress, representing both the SATUC and the FWA.782
The Indian and Indonesian delegations illustrate the Eurocentric character of the anti-colonial
movement. The Indian delegation consisted of 27 delegates from the INC, the AITUC, the
Workers and Peasants Party (WPP), the All Indian Youth League, the London INC section, the
student group Indian Association from Oxford, the Central European Indian Association and the
Glasgow branch of the India Union. Twelve of the delegates were planning to travel from India,
while fourteen lived in Europe and the Ghadr Party delegate Rattan Singh was in Moscow. The
Indonesian delegation had 13 delegates which, compared to the Indian delegation, was more of a
homogenous group, dominated by Hattas leadership and 10 delegates of the PI. The trade unionist
Moesso, and Achmed Sukarno of the National Party of Indonesia, were planning to leave
Indonesia for Europe.
The delegates from Middle Eastern and African countries lived mainly in European cities. The
delegate from East Africa, Johnstone (Jomo) Kenyatta of the Kikuyu Central Association, lived in
London, as did the delegate of the West African Students Association (WASU) Lapido Solanke.
The Delegationsliste also referred to invited Negro organisations outside Africa which
included Kouyat of the LDRN, the anti-colonial journal Courir des Noirs and unknown
representatives from Guadeloupe and the Antilles, all of whom had Paris as a base for their

781

RGASPI 542/1/92, 1-16, Delegationsliste, May-June, 1929. The South African delegation belonged to the Britisch
Afrika delegation.
782
RGASPI 542/1/30, 37, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 4/5-1929; RGASPI 542/1/92, 29,
Complete [list of attendance], July, 1929.

309

activities. The Middle Eastern delegates also had Europe as their base: the Pan-Arab Committee
was based in Paris, while the Islamic association Islamia and the Arab Association were active in
Berlin.783
For the Commission on the LAI, despite its efforts to establish organisational and ideological
models for the congress, the major challenge now was how to turn theory into practice.
*
Bound for Utopia
Chatto believed that the second international congress against imperialism and colonialism would
celebrate the LAIs achievements, and link together anti-imperialist forces all over the world.784
A utopian vision further elaborated by Bridgeman:
Of the highest importance to that ever growing number of men and women throughout the
world who are menaced either with unemployment or exploitation by reason of the growth of
imperialism. It is to the working class both in the capitalist countries and in the colonial
countries that anti-imperialist organisation is particularly important.785
The comprehensive aim of the second LAI congress was to demonstrate a transformation of the
sympathising organisation into a mass organisation. In England and the USA, the national sections
organised public events from May to July, to draw attention to the LAI congress. The British LAI
Section held a Garden Party in London in order to raise money to finance the journey and
accommodation for the delegation in Paris. This was, nevertheless, an idea concocted by the
Colonial Commission of the CPGB, instructing Olive Budden to arrange meetings (referred to by
the CPGB as attempts) for the sole purpose of raising money, explaining that the party did not
intend to finance the British delegations journey.786 In the USA, the AAAIL organised three public
demonstrations in New York, on 17 and 30 May and on 2 June, whilst on 15 June, a final large
conference at Irving Plaza was held. During these meetings, the AAAIL managed to consolidate
the transcontinental character of the anti-imperialist movement in the USA, e.g. nationalists and
anti-colonial activists from the West Indies, China, and East Asia, together with members of Afro-

783

RGASPI 542/1/92, 29, Complete [list of attendance], July 1929.

Virendranath Chattophadyaya, Zum antiimperialistische Weltkongress, in Der Rote Aufbau, II. Jahrgang, June,
1929, Berlin, 134. According to Chatto, the second LAI congress would be a good place to discuss the Indian question
and the situation in the Arab countries and a good venue for the First International LAI Youth Conference.
785
Reginald Bridgeman, The World Struggle Against Imperialism, in Labour Monthly, Volume 11, July 1929,
Number 7, pp.417-424.
786
Pressedienst, Nr. 22, 21/6-1929, 2; RGASPI 495/60/134a, 97-98, Minutes of Colonial Committee of CPGB, 15/41929.
784

310

American and Asian organisations: the ANLC, the Harlem Tenants League, the Haitian Patriotic
Union and the Chinese Students Alliance of America.787
In June, both the Political Secretariat and the Standing Commission wanted to examine the
work being done by the Commission on the LAI in Moscow. Hence, the Commission on the
LAI had to urgently complete its resolutions, confirm the key speakers and nominate the
delegates of both the ECCI delegation and the congress communist fraction, material and decisions
which had to be finalised before being passing on to the Standing Commission. On 18 June, the
Commission on the LAI set about finding a solution to most of these issues at its final meeting
in Moscow, a session which confirmed just how far the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters were willing to go in order to secure control over the LAI congress. Present at the
meeting were Manuilsky, Schubin, Melnitschansky, Ramirez, Freyer, Moirova, Kitaigorodsky,
Mif, Piatnitsky, Bittelman and Mnzenberg. Bittelman acted as Chairman and presented every
issue on the agenda: the congress resolutions, the report on the Krestintern788 as well as the revised
agenda for the congress. Furthermore, the Commission on the LAI suggested Pollitt as the
speaker on the international political situation and the war threat, and introduced the members of
both the ECCI delegation and the congress communist fraction. Most importantly, the attitude of
the communists in the Congress Presidium vis--vis the non-communists was formulated during
this final session of the commission.789
Mnzenbergs statement at the session implied an alteration to the original plan, informing the
Commission on the LAI that the International Secretariat had changed the location for the
congress from Paris to Frankfurt am Main for technological reasons. These reasons were that
787

The national office of the AAAIL was located at 799 Broadway, Room 433, New York City, FOIA 61-6065/1e
All American Anti-Imperialist League, Call for a Conference Against Imperialism and Imperialist War, 9/6-1929
[written on invitation]; FOIA 61-6065/1e All American Anti-Imperialist League, Letter from the FBI Director to
Robert F. Kelley, 17/6-1929; Pressedienst, Nr. 22, 21/6-1929, 2. Robert F. Kelly, Chief of Division of Eastern
European Affairs in Washington, heard of the Irving Plaza conference from a strictly confidential source, who
notified him that the foreign office of the Soviet Government had financed the conference. Kelly could not,
however, confirm any connection between the AAAIL and the CPUSA.
788
The prospect of sending a Krestintern delegation to the congress never materialised. Once the Commission on the
LAI had reviewed the Krestintern's demands, e.g. that the LAI had to guarantee a member of the Krestintern a
permanent seat in its Executive, allow the Krestintern to use the congress to hold informal conferences and include the
peasant question on the agenda, the idea was dropped. Freyer considered the peasant question an easy task to solve. By
writing a resolution, together with a member of the Krestintern (The Struggle for the Emancipation of the Peasant
Masses), which a Russian peasant had to present at the congress with a focus on the collectivisation process in the
Soviet Union; however, the Commission on the LAI did not approve of the other demands. If so, the Krestintern had
to contact the WEB, which in turn had to endorse the idea and assist with the preparatory work for the conference,
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of Commission of the LAI, 3/5-1929; RGASPI
535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the Commission on the LAI (German), Moscow, 18/6-1929.
789
RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the Commission on the LAI (German), Moscow,
18/6-1929. For a copy of the protocol (English version), see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 38-40. The English version
contains a section (omitted in the German version), stating that Melnitschansky, Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai and Bittelman
intended to leave Moscow for Berlin not later than 3rd July. For Bittelmans request, see fol. RGASPI 495/7/9, 9698, Protokoll N.45 der Sitzung der stndigen Kommission des Sekrt. des EKKI, Moscow, 1/6-1929. It was Arnot who
had invited Mnzenberg to attend the conference.

311

French authorities did not intend to allow the LAI to organise a congress in Paris.790 This was a
major setback for the International Secretariat, forcing them to do what Arnot had warned against:
avoid if possible Germany.791 Mnzenberg stated that the congress might expose political
risks, particularly as the LAI was expecting a turnout of some 200 delegates, a majority of whom
were Socialists [] liberals and radicals. Rumours also suggested that within these elements
there existed a plot to stage a coup in opposition to our leadership, with Baldwin as coup leader,
Mnzenberg concluded. What Mnzenberg was implying found support in the sanctioned attitude
and preferred modus operandi amongst the communists at the congress, e.g. the session of the
Commission on the LAI stated that every communist had to use every opportunity to protest
against the staggering nature of the so-called left-wing national reformists, as well as the position
of the Baldwin-Maxton elements.792 On 27 June, the Political Secretariat endorsed this strategy,
adding that the new General Council and the LAI Executive Committee shall be put together in
such a way that a communist majority is secured.793
The ECCI delegation was the key to securing a communist majority at the congress,
consisting of delegates from the KPD, the CPGB, the PCF, the CPCh, the CPH, the KIM, the
WEB, the Profintern, Mnzenberg and Bittelman.794 Shrouded in secrecy, the Standing
Commission evaluated and nominated the composition of the congress communist fraction on 6
July, having Piatnitsky sign the document (written in 1 copy), before placing it in a
Sondermappe (Special Dossier). Thus, according to the Standing Commission, Ferguson
(pseudonym: Neptun) of the WEB, Pollitt as the KIM representative, Tsiu Wito [Ch Chiu-pais
party name] of the CPCh, Melnitschansky and Sachianov of the Profintern, Heckert as the KPD
delegate, Mnzenberg and Bittelman would be representing the communist fraction. Additionally,
790

The basic message of the articles instructed the delegations and individuals, who were already on their way to
Paris, to change their destination. At the opening session of the congress in Frankfurt am Main on July 21,
Mnzenberg declared that the change of venue was a result of the French government's erratic behaviour and desire to
cause confusion within the anti-imperialist movement. Furthermore, it was not possible to hold the congress in London
due to the hostility of MacDonald and the Labour government, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential)
Protocol, meeting of the Commission on the LAI (German), Moscow, 18/6-1929; Pressedienst der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Nr.22, Berlin, 21/6-1929; Der Weltkongress der Liga gegen Imperialismus in Frankfurt a. M., in
Inprecorr, 4/7-1929, Nr.58, 1393-1394; Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Nr.58, Frankfurt a. M., 21/7-1929,
p.1519.
791
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 31, (Confidential) Minutes of meeting of the Commission of the LAI, 3/5-1929.
792
The communist sector (see further below) intended to fulfil two objectives at the congress. Firstly, the attending
participants had to declare their support of the congress resolutions and, secondly, every communist delegate had to
put forward arguments from a communist point of view, which essentially focused on the need to unite movements
of a proletarian, communist or colonial revolutionary nature into a vigilant anti-imperialist movement, see fol.
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 38-40, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the Commission on the LAI (German), Moscow,
18/6-1929.
793
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 55, Confidential directives from the Political Secretariat to the Commission on the LAI,
Moscow, 27/6-1929.
794
Mnzenberg expected the ECCI delegation to arrive in Berlin in not later than 10 days to assist with the final
preparatory work, see fol. RGASPI 535/1/212, 16-18, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the Commission on the
LAI (German), Moscow, 18/6-1929.

312

in Moscow other individuals received the instruction to act as ECCI deputies: Worowsky,
Tschaplina, Magyar, Katayama, Haidar, Patterson and Ford. However, they were also duty bound
to attend the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in July and, therefore, would not be able to travel to
Frankfurt before the plenum had ended. The ECCI delegation and the communist fraction were to
guarantee that the LAI congress was turned into a demonstration in defence of the Soviet Union
and a protest against the war threat, the Standing Commission concluded, something that would
contribute to enforcing the new line on the LAI. Hence, the ECCI delegation had to gain control
over the congress proceedings:
As the ECCI delegation has to control the progression of the Congress and, if a Comrade
from Moscow travels to the Congress, another Comrade must immediately be ready to leave
the Congress. Comrade Wassiljew is instructed to mobilise Comrades [in Moscow, authors
own remark].795
The idea was, therefore, to sustain the system of control for the duration of the congress, a
prerequisite requiring the delegation and the communist fraction to hold closed and, above all,
secret meetings with other communists: an undertaking which Bittelman, along with Magyar,
Ferguson and Smeral (if he is in Germany during the congress) would supervise. According to
the Standing Commissions instructions, every deputy, as well as the members of the ECCI
delegation, would have to conceal their activities in order to be able to infiltrate the delegations in
Frankfurt am Main.796 This exceedingly conspiratorial behavioural scheme was nevertheless
already familiar to the communists and, thus, the stage was set to impose the new line on the
LAI.
Mnzenberg returned to Berlin only to find the International Secretariat on the verge of panic.
Without any money in the congress account and the congress about to begin, it seemed
impossible to be able to finalise the administrative preparations. Mnzenberg contacted Bittelman,
to explain, I will not take the responsibility of organising the congress when every possible
method of securing money has failed. I am therefore forced to take an aeroplane and visit you, and
convince you.797 In the end, however, Mnzenberg did not travel to Moscow; instead, the
Standing Commission assisted in solving the crisis in Berlin. Was this the end of the LAIs

795

RGASPI 495/7/10, 96, Sondermappe, streng vertraulich, Protokoll No [illegible] der Sitzung der stndigen
Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI, Moscow, 6/7-1929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Ulbricht,
Garlandi, Kuusinen, Bittelman, Wassiljew and Heimo. The Standing Commission had, however, not yet agreed on the
delegates from the CPH and PCF.
796
RGASPI 495/7/10, 96, Sondermappe, streng vertraulich, Protokoll No. [illegible] der Sitzung der stndigen
Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI, Moscow, 6/7-1929. The strategy was not a new one, but rather the ECCI
delegation was merely continuing the practice adopted at, for example, the Brussels congress in 1927.
797
Mnzenberg demanded that Bittelman transfer $500 to the International Secretariat as soon as possible, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/30, 77, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Bittelman, Moscow, 4/7-1929.

313

organisational and ideological preparations? Apparently, a final episode contributed to defining the
political discourse of the second LAI congress: the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in July.
*
Confirming Class against Class: the Tenth ECCI Plenum, 3- 19 July 1929

The united front strategy, which we used to carry out from below, we have since then no
longer pursued from below, but from above. We have through our tactic a stable position
among the broad working masses, [and] in the mass movements of the proletariat.
Kuusinen, 16th Session, 10th
Plenum, Moscow, 13/7-1929

ECCI

At the 16th Session of the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow on 13 July, Kuusinen urged the
delegates to understand his fear that the international communist movement was about to become
an isolated political phenomenon. However, this observation was not a critique of the Cominterns
policy shift at the Sixth International Congress. Far from it, Kuusinen believed the doctrinal shift
from below (the united front) to from above (the new line) had been a correct and wise
decision. Above all, the new Comintern policy had improved the ties between leading Comrades
in the national sections (the communist parties), as well as strengthened connections with the life
of the proletarian mass movement, Kuusinen argued.798 This was an argument which, in itself,
verifies Kuusinens ideological belief, as he delivered his reflections on the international
communist movement in front of 108 delegates, representing parties and organisations from 30
countries, at the plenum.799 The peculiar and extraordinary impression left by the Tenth ECCI
Plenum, is that the event served the purpose of confirming the correctness of the Cominterns
policy change, with the involved actors using the opportunity to both praise and demand obedience

798

RGASPI 495/168/120, 1-25, X Plenum, 16. Sitzung/nachmittags, Moscow, 13/7-1929.

The delegates were categorised as Present Members of the ECCI; Absent [Members of the ECCI]; Present
ECCI Candidates; Absent ECCI Candidates; National Representatives with Consultative Rights; Krestintern;
Profintern; IAH; KIM; IRH; ILS; and ECCI Apparatus. For the lists of attendance, see fol. RGASPI 495/168/151, 38. The number given in Kahan (1990, pp.43-44) 108 corresponds with the lists of attendance; however, Kahans
summary did not include the 153 delegates who were expected to attend the plenum. This document also discloses
pseudonym/real name and origin: Banderas/Stanislaw Pestkowski (Poland); Bennett/David Lipec [Petrovsky] (USSR);
Boskovic/Filip Filipovic (Yugoslavia); Chang Piao/Chang Kuo-tau (China); Ercoli/Palmiro Togliatti (Italy);
Garlandi/Ruggero Grieco (Italy); Gorkic/Josip Cizinski (Yugoslavia); Ledo-Amerigo/Fernando Lacerda (Brazil);
Leo/Walter Hbich (Germany); Lovera/Luigi Amadesi (Italy); Miff/Michail Firman (USSR); Tanaka/Yamamoto
Kenzo (Japan); Tsju Vito/Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai (China); Vitkovsky/Adam Landy (Poland). The Tenth ECCI Plenum
essentially focused on the international situation and the tasks of the Comintern; the economic struggle and the tasks
of the communist parties; the international day of struggle against the imperialist war; and the expulsion of Bukharin,
Benjamin Gitlow, Serra and Humbert-Droz from the ECCI Presidium, as well as Jilek, Lovestone and Spectors
expulsion from the ECCI. The colonial question was not the focus of attention according to the agenda, see Degras
vol.III 1965, p.36.
799

314

to the new line. The phraseology of the new line had by now gained its credentials within the
Comintern, e.g. without any exception, the new line endorsed the categorisation of political
opponents as social fascists. Thus, by 1929, this harsh policy sanctioned the political agenda of
class against class, which had begun to filter through in the Comintern in 1927-28. Hence, the
above was part of the process whereby the Comintern commanded the national sections to learn
and apply Bolshevization as the guiding principle for their political and organisational work. The
new line abided by its own chronological rationale, including resentment and a radicalised
attitude towards the social democratic movement. Introduced formally during the Ninth ECCI
Plenum in 1928, and endorsed at the Sixth International Congress, the new line approach
reached its zenith at the Tenth ECCI Plenum. Additionally, the plenum officially relieved Bukharin
of his functions within the Comintern. For Kuusinen, however, the primary question was how to
maintain and develop the antagonism of the communist movement vis--vis social democracy.
According to Kuusinens report on The International Situation and the next task of the C. I., the
Comintern imposed the obligation of all the Sections of the Communist International to intensify
their fight against international Social Democracy as the social base of capitalism [added in
handwriting by Kuusinen].800 This was a central argument within the rhetoric of the class against
class policy, and, with reference to Kuusinen's statement at the plenum, the session was the
Cominterns watershed, as it explicitly declared obedience towards the omnipotent influence of
Stalin and also revealed the militant agenda of the Third Period. This plenum also witnessed
the definitive end of democratic centralism, only to be replaced by the milieu and rigid structure of
bureaucratic centralism within the Comintern apparatus.801 Before the opening of the plenum,
Manuilsky introduced the principal aim of what looks like a militant agenda:
Firm Bolshevik foundations have now been laid in that all elements which attempt to split
the communist movement must suffer shipwreck [] there can be no communist movement
outside the Comintern.802
Despite the increased militancy of the Comintern at the plenum, which professed firm Bolshevik
foundations, did any of the sessions address the colonial question? If so, how did the plenum
conceptualise this question in the context of class against class? As introduced in the previous
chapter, is it possible to distinguish a discussion in terms of a Colonial Conference, which the
800

According to Kuusinen: [T]he Plenum of the ECCI proposes that special attention be paid to an energetic struggle
[inserted by hand] against the Left wing of Social Democracy [inserted by hand] which retards the process of the
disintegration of Social Democracy by sowing the illusion that it represents an opposition to the Social Democratic
leadership whereas, in fact, it whole-heartedly supports the policy of Social Fascism, see fol. RGASPI 495/168/14,
50-69, (English version) The International Situation and the next task of the C. I., (Report by Kuusinen, vertraulich),
July, 1929.
801
McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp.85-103. For the militant agenda, see Worley 2002, pp.119-120.
802
Degras vol.III 1965, 36.

315

Eastern Secretariat was expecting to hold in connection with the ECCI Plenum? The final question
addresses whether it is possible to verify how many of the delegates at the plenum also attended
the second LAI congress which opened on 21 July, i.e. two days after the plenum had ended. The
Tenth ECCI Plenum and the second LAI congress do not only share a chronology; apparently, the
plenum determined the ideological nature of the LAI congress. Retrospectively speaking, the shift
from the united front strategy to the principle of class against class was a contradiction in terms
of the LAIs activities, thus, it had a long-term effect on the purpose and aims of the LAI as a
sympathising communist organisation. It is therefore plausible to assume that the decision-makers
at the headquarters of the Comintern in Moscow deliberately deceived the LAI at the congress in
1929, driven by a motive to assess the practical implications of the class against class principle.
Manuilskys conclusion on the historical heritage of the united front, delivered at the plenum,
bears witness to this:
We [Comintern] never thought of the united front as a formula valid for all times and
countries. There was a time when we negotiated with the Second and Two-and-a-half
Internationals, with the General Council of the Trade Unions and Purcell. Now we are
stronger and therefore use more aggressive methods in our struggle to win the majority of
the working class.803
Manuilskys conclusion was not only a repeat of Kuusinens statement on the isolation of the
international communist movement; it also addressed the Cominterns criticism of the very raison
d'tre of a sympathising organisation such as the LAI. Thus, Manuilsky had expounded the
theoretical platform for the communists at the LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main.
At the plenum, some delegates briefly discussed the colonial and semi-colonial question during
the sessions. For example, Lozovsky argued that the Indian strike movement was a complicated
issue in the context of organising proletarian support campaigns, particularly the Meerut
Conspiracy Trial. Yet, in the end, Lozovsky realised that it was up to the communist parties in the
imperialist countries to systematically aid the colonial freedom struggle, a remark that had
been merely taken from Kuusinens colonial theses. According to the draft of a telegram
(completed at the plenum), the primary concern for the Comintern was to protest against the
henchmen of English Imperialism in India and, by doing so, ease the process of establishing a
movement of proletarian solidarity in support of the defendants.804 Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai [Tsiu
Vito] addressed the Indian question in similar terms and included an accusation of betrayal

803

Degras vol.III 1965, 37.

For Lozovsky, see Degras vol.III 1965, pp.62-63. Taken from Inprecorr, ix, 46, 979, 4/9-1929; RGASPI
495/168/148, 7, Telegramm-Entwurf. An die im Meerut-Prozess angeklagten Vertreter der indischen Arbeitern und
Bauern, X Plenum ECCI, Moscow, July, 1929.
804

316

against Nehru for having deceived the revolutionary masses in India by simply posing as a leader
of social democracy. This, therefore, meant that the colonial communist parties had to execute a
more intensive struggle against right-wing deviations. It was, nevertheless, on the basis of the
opinion of G. A. K. Luhani, a communist from India, that the Comintern chose to define its
approach towards India at the plenum. At the plenum, Luhani performed the act of self-criticism in
relation to his former ties to and support of Roy, concluding with an appraisal of Kuusinens
colonial theses in the context of India:
The de-colonisation of India can only be the result of a strong anti-imperialist policy
(Colonial Theses), a policy expressed in the revolutionary action of the mass of exploited
under the leadership of the proletariat. [] Roy systematically deceived the Communist
International through his double political book-keeping []805
There is no explicit discussion or reference to the LAI in the published and unofficial protocols of
the plenum. However, interjections by Lozovsky, Luhani and Manuilsky indicate a two-fold
understanding of the colonial question in the Comintern in 1929. Firstly, the Cominterns colonial
policy was following the correct ideological direction and, secondly, the attitude introduced by
Manuilsky supported a frame of mind which the actors involved in preparing the Colonial
Conference or the LAI congress in Moscow, and who later attended the LAI congress, eagerly
carried out in practice.
The thematic connection between the Tenth ECCI Plenum and the second LAI congress is easy
to identify for reasons other than pure ideology. The group of delegates at the plenum involved in
preparing the LAI congress, and who would later travel to Frankfurt, all had a thorough
understanding of the LAI. According to the list of attendance from the plenum, it is possible to
discern which actors were directly connected to the LAI, the congress and the Colonial
Conference. As noted in the categories below, my aim is to verify the extent of knowledge of the
new line among the actors (present at the ECCI Plenum) who later travelled to the LAI congress.
For example, Bittelman had been in tune with the final and critical phase of the organisational and
political preparations, while Pollitt had been at the plenum and then travelled to Frankfurt to
deliver a speech authored by Pavel Mif.

805

Degras vol.III 1965, p.41, 45, 49. Taken from Inprecorr, ix, 46, 973, 4/9-1929; RGASPI 495/168/148, 10-11,
Declaration of Comrade Luhani, X Session, X Plenum ECCI, Moscow, 8/7-1929; On Luhani, see Lazitch 1986, p.282.

317

Table 7.4: Making the Connection: The LAI Congress and the Colonial Conference
1. Colonial Conference (7) Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Bittelman,
Josefowitsch, Ford, Ewert
2. LAI Congress (Commissions & Preparations) (19) Piatnitsky, Kuusinen,
Manuilsky, Bittelman, Bell, Kolarov, Bela Kun, Lozovsky, Molotov, Mif,
Gusev, Moirova, Ulbricht, Kornblum, Ford, Ch Chiu-pai/Tsiu Wito,
Wassiljew, Schubin, Petrovsky
3. Frankfurt congress (9) Bittelman, Ford, Misiano, Monmousseau, Pollitt, Ch
Chiu-pai/Tsiu Wito, Heckert, Darsono, Dimitrov
Note: Names in italics refer to absence at the Tenth ECCI Plenum.
Source: RGASPI 495/168/151, 1-8; RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, Complete [lists of delegations],
July, 1929.
The final category, the Frankfurt Congress, indicates that six delegates attended both the plenum
in Moscow and then later the congress, whereas three individuals who were not present in Moscow
nevertheless turned up in Frankfurt. Thus, it is logical to assume that these delegates acted as
apprentices of the Manuilskyan theme there was a time when we negotiated, a commitment
carried out to the fullest by Ford, Pollitt and Ch Chiu-pai, while Bittelman observed how the
policy of the new line and the communists put the envisaged strategy into practice. The Tenth
ECCI Plenum was an event which set the scene for the political discussion and results of the
second LAI congress; thus, it had a lasting effect on both the LAI and on the anti-imperialist
movement, once the communist sector had crashed head-on with the non-communist elements in
Frankfurt am Main.
*

318

Utopia Disrupted, Frankfurt am Main, 20 28/7-1929

The First Congress of the LAI in Brussels worked out the theoretical [authors italics]
programme of the League and set up the principles of the anti-imperialist struggle. The
Second World Congress of the League in Frankfurt must forge the weapon to carry out the
programme which has been adopted. The Frankfurt congress must help to transform
[authors italics] the LAI from an association of loosely connected propaganda groups into a
strong an active fighting mass organisation.
Letter from Chatto to Lindhagen, Frankfurt
am Main, 18/7-1929806
The Second International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism convened at the
Zoological Gardens in Frankfurt am Main on 21 July. Before the official opening in the congress
hall, the LAI had organised an impressive demonstration on the streets in Frankfurt, an event
described as a passionate anti-imperialist phenomenon, according to Inprecorr.807 However, the
Frankfurt Congress was an event and tumultuous scene which witnessed the derailment of the
utopian vision of turning the LAI into a mass organisation. My aim here is not to disclose or
evaluate every question addressed and debated at the congress; but rather to analyse the topics
which caused controversy during the congress debates. A fundamental starting point is to make it
clear that the communists referred to here as the communist sector more or less reduced the
non-communist delegates to passive bystanders at the congress. Above all, this perspective
discloses the rationale and logic for how and why the congress spiralled out of the control of the
official organiser: the International Secretariat. The focal point at the congress was the agenda and
its political discourse, yet, who were the supporters and targets? The congress turned into a scene
characterised by non-pluralistic debates on India, China, the role of the trade unions and the Negro
question, in which the pice de rsistance was the pre-determined repetitive mantra in defence of
socialist construction in the Soviet Union, and against the war threat. For the communist sector, the
congress functioned as a forum to urge the LAI to cleanse its ranks of the agents of
imperialism. After the congress, Emile Burns summarised the event in Labour Monthly thus: the
agenda contained one general subject the political situation and the war danger and a number
of more limited subjects. On 20 July, the LAI Executive gathered for a meeting in Frankfurt with

806

Chatto welcomed Lindhagen after he had arrived at Pension Winkler in Frankfurt am Main on 18 July, SCA CL
Collection, volume 131, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Lindhagen, Frankfurt, 18/7-1929; SCA volume 131,
Information and Press Service Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress. From the 20th to the 31st July 1929 in
Frankfurt am Main, No. 1, English edition, pp.1-4.
807
McMeekin erroneously concludes that the LAI was liquidated in 1929, see McMeekin 2003, p.208; Inprecorr, Der
Verlauf des Kongresses, Nr. 64, p.1519; Gross 1967, p.210.

319

the sole purpose of endorsing the congress agenda, concluding [T]here can be no doubt [that] the
most valuable question was the international situation and the war danger.808 One of the
communist sectors fundamental aims was to target some of the non-communist delegates,
addressing them in callous terms, e.g. Maxton and the ILP, or the delegate of the INC, Shivaprasad
Gupta. In comparison to the 1927 Brussels Congress, an event where the communists had
remained in the background in order to evaluate the reactions and behaviour of the congress
crowd, the Frankfurt Congress displayed a diametrically opposed attitude. Nonetheless, the
behaviour of the communist sector was not an expression of spontaneity; it had been a
meticulously planned strategy, conceived with precision at Comintern headquarters and, once on
location, it assumed a harsh and brutal nature. For the International Secretariat, the initial belief
had been to use the Frankfurt Congress as a mobilising source to unify the anti-imperialist
movement. However, the congress was convened at the moment in the history of international
communism when the Comintern had resolved to show no tolerance towards its principal enemy:
the socialist movement.
*
A Note on the Sources: Biographies, Scholarly Interpretations and their Limitations
Recollections and scholarly interpretations of the Frankfurt Congress are scarce and, in some
cases, inaccurate. Babette Gross biography is one of the few accounts describing the actual
congress. However, Gross account has, therefore, assumed the character of a seminal book in the
historiography of the LAI, with, for example, Imanuel Geiss depiction of the congress being a
rehash of Gross narrative on how the Comintern pushed aside the bourgeoisie nationalist
element. Another erroneous factor is intentional negligence. Vijay Prashad avoids mentioning the
congress at all in his discussion of the LAI, only to concede that the Comintern simply strove to
implement a homogenous strategy for world revolution without explaining either how or why.
Furthermore, Gross narrative is, in some respects, flawed by misconceptions which have acquired
a second life in Barooah and McMeekins biographical accounts.809 Gross wrote that Manuilsky
attended the congress, where he led the ruthless attack against the socialist and colonial delegates.
The crux of the matter is that Manuilsky was never in Frankfurt, but in Moscow, and, according to
808

Emile Burns, World Congress of the League against Imperialism, in Labour Monthly, Vol.11, September 1929,
No.9, London, p.559-563; RGASPI 542/1/32, 52-53, Sitzung und Beschlsse des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Frankfurt am Main, 20/7-1929. Mnzenberg, Chattophadyaya, INC representative Shivaprasad Gupta,
Maxton, Fimmen, Bridgeman, Saklatvala, Baldwin, Hatta, Melnitschansky, and Chedli attended the meeting. The
protocol is also filed at IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/71, (copy) Sitzung und Beschlsse des Exekutivkomitees der Liga
gegen Imperialismus und koloniale Unterdrckung, Frankfurt am Main, 20/7-1929.
809
Gross 1967, p.210; Geiss 1968, p.258; Prashad 2007, p.30; Barooah 2004, p.267, 281 (see footnote 103);
McMeekin 2003, p.208.

320

the document, the Complete list of attendance from the congress, Gross must have simply
confused Melnitschansky with Manuilsky,810 particularly as the day-to-day reports of the congress,
published by Inprecorr in July-August, did not mention Manuilskys name on one occasion. In
fact, Manuilsky had returned to Moscow in June to assume a leading position within the
Comintern after having completed his tenure as the leader of the WEB in Berlin. Thus, if
Manuilsky had been in Frankfurt, his name would have appeared in these Inprecorr reports.
Any empirical analysis of the Frankfurt Congress is a daunting task, characterised by obstacles
one has to surmount and overcome. The documents, printed commentaries and summaries of
speeches, congress material, lists of attendance, correspondence and published articles do,
nevertheless, provide a thorough picture of the congress.811 However, what do these sources tell
us? In comparison to the empirical richness of the Brussels Congress, the documents connected
with the Frankfurt Congress are not orderly, particularly if one compares them with the clarity of
the official protocol from the Brussels Congress (Das Flammenzeichen vom Palais Egmont), and
in light of the fact that Mnzenberg seemed disinclined to write any reports at all during the
congress. The closest account, in time, were the Inprecorr reports, however, their biased nature
contributes to a lack of accuracy, a criticism which also applies to other articles on the congress in
the communist and socialist press.812 Nevertheless, what has previously been a gap in the history
of the LAI has achieved a fuller understanding through the narratives in the writings of Emile
Burns, Bela Kun and Ludwig Magyar, in addition to the reports Mnzenberg wrote after the
congress, and those from Bittelman, the Eastern Secretariat, Hatta and the socialist Bjarne Braatoy,
as well as Ulmens biography on Wittfogel.
*

810

Gross 1967, p.209.

The LAI Collection at the IISG contains the majority of official documents from the congress (commentaries and
summaries of speeches, printed material, telegrams handed out during the congress, leaflets, a printed form to be filled
in by the delegates, resolutions and the congress manifesto). The British pacifist, Oscar H. Swede (1900 1942),
gathered a variety of documents on location, later handed over to the IISG. Two reports by the socialist Bjarne Braatoy
in the LSI Collection (sent to Adler in August), recorded the atmosphere and behaviour of the congress crowd, above
all that of the communist sector. Additionally, Chatto had invited Carl Lindhagen to deliver a speech (which he did)
and, while on location in Frankfurt, he collected a number of documents (summaries of speeches by Pollitt, Ford,
Ledebour and others and administrative information on the congress proceedings), later filed in the LAI dossier at the
SCA.
812
Communist journals, or newspapers, for example, Labour Monthly, the IAH journal Mahnruf, Frankfurter Zeitung,
Berlin am Morgen, Welt am Abend, and A-I-Z, the French communist paper Monde and the organs of the KPD,
Arbeiter-Zeitung and Die Rote Fahne, published articles on the congress. Another biased source is the antagonism of
the German pro-colonial journal, bersee-und Kolonialzeitung which in an article discussed the apparent weakness
of the LAI at the congress.
811

321

A Note on the Delegates and the Delegations

On 20 July, Chatto informed the LAI Executive that the International Secretariat was expecting
400 delegates to turn up at the congress. This is, however, a problematic figure to confirm.
According to Braatoys observation, after having participated at the congress, there were 200
delegates representing 169 organisations along with an additional 100 guests at the Zoological
Gardens. Alternatively, as noted in the official material, Information and Press Service, released by
the International Secretariat and handed over to the delegates upon arrival at the congress hall,
there were 399 delegates and 2000 guests representing 124 organisations, along with 11 national
LAI sections from 33 countries.813 All of the above are clearly estimates. Rather it is from the
Complete [list of attendance], compiled by the International Secretariat on location, that a
concise understanding of the size of individual participation at the Frankfurt Congress emerges,
confirming that 263 delegates from 31 countries and regions representing 99 organisations
attended the congress.814 Additionally, the Complete list discloses the political leanings of
almost every delegate:
Table 7.5: Political and Colonial Representation, Frankfurt am Main, 21-27/7-1929
LAI Members

58 (22%)

Communist

88 (33%)

Non-communist

57 (22%)

Colonial Organisations

60 (23%)

Total:

263 (100%)

The communist sector dominated the congress, having the delegates located with all due caution in
national delegations. Particularly within the LAI sections, the communists dominated the
representation, e.g. Mnzenberg, Hans Jger, Lucie Peters, Olive Budden, Wittfogel, Saklatvala
and Burns. In addition there were the non-communist members, Maxton, Bridgeman, Hatta,
Fimmen and Leon Feuchtwanger. The LAI also introduced itself as a transcontinental organisation,
boasting sections in Germany, England, France, Holland, USA, Mexico, Cuba, Columbia,
Argentina, Uruguay and Peru. However, this list also exposed the inability of the LAI to establish
itself in either Asia or Africa.
813

RGASPI 542/1/35, 52, Sitzung und Beschlsse des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Frankfurt am
Main, 20/7-1929; IISG LSI Collection, 3050/61, Report from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zrich, 6/8-1929. Both Chatto
and Mnzenberg had mentioned the figure of 400 delegates prior to the congress, Willi Mnzenberg, Vor dem
Antiimperialistische Weltkongress in Frankfurt, Inprecorr , No. 62, pp.1475-1476,; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131,
Information and Press Service. Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress, No.1 (English Edition). According to
Degras, total number of delegates was 260, out of which 84 were of a colonial origin, Degras vol.III 1965, pp.78-79.
814
The figure of 99 organisations does not, however, include the national LAI sections, instead, the sections have to be
viewed as being representatives for one organisation, the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, Complete [list of
attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929.

322

Anti-colonial organisations in Europe attended the congress in droves, although the anticipated
appearance of colonial delegations arriving en route from the colonies turned into a
disappointment. The Indian, Chinese and Indonesian delegations dominated the Asian influx in
Frankfurt. The Indian delegation consisted of 23 individuals, only four of whom (the INC
representative Gupta and his wife, G. L. Amin and Annapamandanda) had travelled from India,
whilst fourteen lived in Europe, Rattan Singh had arrived from Moscow, and Rajani Palme Dutt,
who appeared as the delegate of the London-based Workers Welfare League of India, lived in
Brussels.815 A logical explanation as to why the Indian delegation had such a predominantly
European character was the sanctioned policy of British security services to restrict the approval of
valid travel permits for LAI activists in India. Gupta stated at the congress that owing to passport
and other difficulties it was impossible to send a strong delegation from India. The delegations
from China and Indonesia had faced a similar dilemma; hence, a majority of the delegates arrived
from different places in Europe, rather than from their countries of origin. The Indonesian
delegation was under the control of Hatta and the PI, consisting of delegates from Switzerland and
the Netherlands. The Chinese delegation had thirteen delegates and was of a more diverse
character, yet not one of them had arrived from China. Six delegates lived in Moscow (Tsiu
Wito/Ch Chiu-pai, the trade union delegates Li Fang and Huang Ping, Dschau Hau of the Chinese
IRH section, Lo-tin-ju of the Chinese KIM section and Hansin Liau, who had briefly returned to
Germany), while the others lived either in Berlin, The Hague, or Delft in the Netherlands. The
Korean delegation consisted of two individuals: Sue Ring Hei of the Korean Association in Paris,
and Kim of the Berlin-based Association of Korean Students. The well-known Japanese
revolutionary leader Sen Katayama attended as the delegate of the Communist Party of Japan,
along with two Japanese delegates from Germany, Yamada and Teido Kunizaki of the KPD
auxiliary organisation the Japanische revolutionre Gruppe. The places of residence for Senda of
the Japanese Anti-war Association and Migake [?] remain unknown. Two Palestinian delegates
acted as the Middle Eastern delegation Karmi of the Arbeiterfraktion and Ben Saul of the Leftsection of the Poale Zion, while A. Thransky and Alimard of the Communist Party of Persia
represented the Persian delegation.816

815

The Indian delegation consisted of Chatto as LAI secretary, A. C. N. Nambiar (Association of Indian Journalists),
the INC London section (Mazumdar, the Jussuf sisters, and Sinha), Naidu, Mirza and Saikh from the Central
European Association of Indians, the Indian Student Union in Glasgow (N. N. Bose, J. J. Saha, and A. Roy) and
Muhammed Iqbal Schedai of the Indian Revolutionary Association in Tashkent. Five individuals remain impossible to
confirm: Sedhi (Indian Trade Union), Thoia (Jugendliga Bombay), Satyadev, Lal, and Dinkar (guests), RGASPI
542/1/92, 17-32, Complete [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131,
Letters of Greeting etc. sent to the Congress, Frankfurt am Main, July 1929 [published and handed out at the
congress]; see Callaghan (1993, p.99) for Workers Welfare League of India, and Rajani Palme Dutt.
816
RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, Complete [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929.

323

The Latin American delegation was a homogenous group. The International Secretariat had
hoped to see eleven delegations, but ended up with seven delegations from Mexico, Venezuela,
Cuba, Columbia, Argentine, Uruguay and Peru, consisting of sixteen individuals, out of which ten
had travelled from Latin America, and six from Europe.817 The African and Afro-American
movement nevertheless had a widely-spread representation around the world. Andrews from South
Africa; the North African Boukur of the Paris branch of the toile Nord-Africaine and Ibrahim
Youssef from Egypt. Patterson was a member of the USA delegation and acted as the ANLC
delegate. Other members were Henry Rosemond, who represented three organisations (the
Furriers Union in New York, the USA LAI Section and the Haitian Patriotic Union), and
Pickens. Kouyat who was the representative for West Africa as the LDRN delegate, was included
in the French delegation. Jomo Kenyatta appeared as the delegate of Eastern Africa. According to
the Information and Press Service, Kenyatta perceived the congress as an opportunity of putting
the case of my people in Kenya to the European anti-imperialist movement.818 Ford belonged to
the delegation from the Soviet Union (USSR), and acted as a delegate of the Profintern Negro
Committee [ITUCNW]. During the congress, Pickens openly questioned Ford and his ties to the
communist movement and demanded an honest explanation of Fords adventures during his longterm residence in Moscow.819 Braatoy observed how Ford avoided giving Pickens an answer.
Additionally, Ford was the informal leader of a Negro Delegation with 10 members
representing 13 organisations.820
How did the individual character and distribution of the communist sector come across at the
congress? Firstly, a majority of the communist delegates introduced themselves as representatives

817

Latin America was represented by Mexico (Hurwitz, representative of the LAI Executive and the KIM in Mexico
and the Caribbean; L. G. Arzubide of the LAI Section in Mexico City), Venezuela (Alfons Goldschmidt, Pedro Brito
Alfonso, and Aurelio Fortiul from the Revolutionary Party of Venezuela), Cuba (J. Chelala-Aquilera and J. Borges of
the Verband der kubanischen Emigranten in Paris; Fernandez Sanchez: the Cuban LAI Section and Trade Union
Federation), Columbia (trade unionist Ravel Mahecha, Laureano B. Cayredo of the Columbian LAI Section and
Communist Party of Columbia), Argentina (Jose Vital Mata from the Argentinean LAI Section), Uruguay (Martinez of
the Labour Association in Montevideo; Luis Pierre of the Antiimperialistische Jugend; A. Fierro from the Uruguay
LAI Section), Peru (Indorio R. Perez from the Peru LAI Section and Lateinamerikanische Studenten in Paris; Estelle
Perez as guest), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, Complete [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929.
818
SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Information and Press Service. Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress, No.1
(English Edition) 1929.
819
RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, Complete [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929; IISG Labour and
Socialist International Collection, 3050/64-64b, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zrich, 13/8-1929.
820
Ford recognised his supervision of the Profintern Negro Bureau at the congress in his Autobiography, RGASPI
495/261/6747, 6, Autobiography by Ford, April 1932; RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro Question of
the League against Imperialism Congress, Moscow, 3/10-1929. The members of the Negro delegation were [in
brackets: affiliation and nationality/race]: Ford (the ITUCNW; USA/Negro), Pickens (the NAACP, the John Brown
Memorial Association; USA/Negro), Henry Rosemond (the Haitian Patriotic Union, the Furriers Union in New
York; USA/Negro), Garan Kouyat (the LDRN; France/West Africa/Negro), Johnstone Kenyatta (the Kikuyu Central
Association; Kenya East Africa/Negro), Josef de Keersmaecker (the KIM, the Colonial Commission of the Communist
Party of Belgium; Belgium/White), Andrews (the South African Trade Union Congress; South Africa/White) and Ali
(the CGTU; Algeria/Paris/White).

324

of organisations and associations, rather than as members of communist parties. However, the aim
here is not to postulate on some kind of stigma based on guilt by association for the simple reason
that these individuals were communists in belief and appearance. Rather, the purpose here is to
illustrate and discuss how the communist sector controlled the congress on all levels. While some
of the communist delegates have already been introduced (Ford, Patterson, Katayama, Tsiu
Wito/Ch Chiu-pai and Mnzenberg), an in-depth analysis will, nevertheless, illustrate the breadth
and strength of this sector. For example, Melnitschansky was the leader of the Profintern
delegation, supported by the Soviet delegates Timsch and Sachianova.821 The European communist
movement had an array of actors present in Frankfurt. Monmousseau and Herclet acted as
delegates of the CGTU, Ferguson as a delegate of the CPGB [unofficially as a member of the
WEB], Saklatvala appeared as a member of the LAI Executive, Pollitt of the National Minority
Movement (NMM) and Dimitrov attended under the pseudonym Helmuth as a delegate of the
Kommunistische Balkanfrderation, de Visser of the CPH, Gabrielle Cormon of the PCF and Josef
de Keermacker of the KIM section in Belgium. The communist delegates from Germany
nonetheless dominated the scene at the Frankfurt Congress. For example, Flieg and Heckert
attended as members of the ZK KPD, Peter Schiffer of the KPD Cologne party district, Fritz
Knittel and Robert Leibrand of the KIM and Josef Dnner from the Kommunistische Studenten
Fraktion (KOSTUFRA). In total, the German delegation consisted of 79 delegates, dominated by
organisations linked to the communist movement either overtly or covertly, e.g. the IRH, the IAH,
and Sportintern. 822
The agenda for the congress, and its anticipated outcome amongst the decision-makers at
Comintern headquarters, was the central issue. As presented below, a review of the agenda reveals
how the communist sector dominated every topic at the congress, which illustrates how the event
seemed to follow a pre-destined rationale in order to comply with the Cominterns endorsed
strategy. The following chronological table outlines the congress and its agenda from 20 July to 28
July, and its key speakers (in brackets):

821

T he delegation from the Soviet Union (USSR) consisted of Mller (MOPR), Kossarew and Boretzky (Russian
Communist Youth Association/KIM), William Rust, Kuno [?], Diek [?] (KIM), Alfred [?] (Profintern Youth secretariat)
and Ford.
822
RGASPI 542/1/92, 17-32, Complete [list of attendance], Frankfurt am Main, July 1929; SCA, CL Collection,
volume 131, Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress. Agenda, 1929.

325

Date

Activity, Agenda and Themes

20/7

LAI Youth Conference, meeting of LAI Executive

21/7

Demonstration at the Hippodrome ; opening session at Zoological Gardens

22/7

The World Political Situation and the War Danger (Harry Pollitt); debate on
anti-imperialism and pacifism

23/7

The Struggle for Indian Independence (Rajani Palme Dutt); debate on the state
of the anti-imperialist movement

24/7

Continued debate on India; criticism of ILP

25/7

The Chinese Revolution: the Struggle against Imperialism and against the
Nanking Government (Strakhov/Tsiu Wito/Ch Chiu-pai); Irish question

26/7

The Struggle for Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and America (Ford);
the war threat against the Soviet Union; the Arab region; Indonesia; liberations
movements in Europe; Indochina; North Africa; criticism of Poale Zion;
intellectuals

27/7

The Work of the Trade Unions in the Struggle against Imperialism

(Melnitschansky); Latin America; closed ITUNWC conference; speech by
Maxton

28/7

Political and Organisational Report on the Activity of the League

Organisational Report (Mnzenberg); continued debate on Melnitschanskys
speech; administrative questions and election of the LAI Executive
Committee823

823

Inprecorr, No.62, 64, 66-68, 1929. The official invitation introduced the running order of the congress: 1. Opening
Speeches and Greetings; 2. The World Political Situation and the War Danger; 3. The Struggle for Indian
Independence; 4. The Chinese Revolution: the Struggle against Imperialism and against the Nanking Government; 5.
The Present Stage in the Struggle for Freedom of the Oppressed Peoples of the Pacific; 6. The Need to Co-ordinate the
Struggle of all Arabian Countries against Imperialism; 7. The Struggle for Emancipation of the Negroes in Africa and
America; 8. The Struggle of Latin America against British and North American Imperialism; 9. The Work of the Trade
Unions in the Struggle against Imperialism; 10. The Social, Political and Economic Position of Women in Colonial
and Semi-Colonial Countries; 11. Political and Organisational Report on the Activity of the League; 12. Report on the
First International Anti-Imperialist Youth Conference; 13. Organisation Questions: a. Constitution, b. Elections; 14.
Miscellaneous, SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Second Anti-Imperialist World Congress. Agenda, 1929.

326

Implementing the Plot: Cleanse the Ranks

The League against Imperialism would have to cleanse its ranks of those vacillating and
confused elements who were a source of weakness in the struggle against imperialism. The
League had grown greatly in strength since its last Congress and must also strengthen its
struggle against imperialism and become the most powerful instrument in the struggle of the
colonial peoples.
Harry Pollitt, Frankfurt, 22/7-1929
The LAI Congress quickly turned into a scene of disputes and controversy, demonstrating the
vindictivness of the communist sector in dominating the proceedings. On 22 July, Pollitt declared
the communists current ideological platform in his speech on the war threat, emphasising the need
for the LAI to cleanse its ranks and rid itself of vacillating and confused elements. If one may
be so bold as to state that this speech in itself was confirmation of how the LAI had begun its turn
to the left.824
At the opening ceremony on 21 July, Maxton welcomed the delegates at the Zoologischer
Garten and delivered a short introductory speech. According to Inprecorr, Mnzenberg then took
the floor and proceeded to accuse the leader of the British Labour Party, Ramsey MacDonald, who
had recently been elected leader of a Labour minority government in Great Britain, of having
sanctioned the restriction of LAI activities within the British Empire. Mnzenbergs criticism was
aimed to function as a response to the fact that British authorities had refused to give the LAI a
permit to organise the congress in London, as a substitute for Paris. Hence, this refusal signified
how the Labour government was continuing the oppressive tradition and structures of the British
Empire, a peculiarity particularly evident in India, Mnzenberg stated; a theme further elaborated
upon as Mnzenberg attacked the former Chairman of the LAI, Lansbury, for having been a lackey
in the service of the imperialist system. Inprecorr observed how Mnzenbergs conclusive
statement had been applauded with jubilant cheers from the congress crowd, who, in turn,
demanded that Maxton explain how the socialist movement intended to position itself on the
question of colonialism and imperialism. Maxton retorted that he was speaking here only as a
representative of the League, not on behalf of other organisations. However, from a broader
perspective, Mnzenbergs speech had introduced the main thread of the congress.825 Thus,

824

Ulmen 1978, p.103. Ulmen did not, however, mention the turmoil at the congress, thus, it is likely that Wittfogel
either neglected to mention or had forgotten about the nature of the event. According to Ulmen, Wittfogel attended
primarily for the reason that he lived in Frankfurt am Main, and functioned as the leader of the LAI section in the city.
In August 1929, Wittfogel moved to Berlin and became intimately connected with the radical culture and intellectual
life of the capital.
825
Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Nr. 64, p.1519-1520; The British Labour Party won the parliamentary

327

Maxtons evasive statement gave the communist sector the impetus to initiate its carefully planned
strategy of attacking both the staggering nature of the so-called left-wing national reformists and
the position of the Baldwin-Maxton elements at the congress in Frankfurt. In connection with
Mnzenbergs speech, and after Maxtons evasive reply, a number of communist delegates
appeared on the rostrum to outline the agenda for the event. For example, Tsiu Wito/Ch protested
against the brutality of both the KMT and the Nanking government, urging everyone to sing The
International, while Ferguson stated that it should be a logical step for every delegate to support
the Chinese liberation struggle and demonstrate their allegiance towards the Soviet Union. The
opening ceremony ended with Melnitschansky charging the LAI to begin making a distinction
between friend and foe, selecting Maxton and the ILP as its principal targets.826 The stage was
now set for Pollitt.

Hear, hear!: The Crisis of the Anti-Imperialist Movement and the War Threat: Pollitts speech
had a profound impact on the audience, with shouts of hear, hear during the long drawn-out
applauses being heard as he left the rostrum, according to the Information and Press Service. In
his speech on the international political situation and the war threat, the first topic on the
congress agenda, Pollitts performance determined the political discourse of the congress. What
were the principal arguments in Pollitts speech? The primary aim of his speech was to introduce
and declare the necessity of defending the Soviet Union and its construction of socialism, a social
experiment threatened by the war threat of imperialist nations. Pollitt argued that the
collaboration of the colonial native bourgeoisie and international social democracy assisted the
plans of the imperialist nations for a military invasion of the Soviet Union. Hence, this explained
why imperialism continued to plague the world after the end of the Great War, Pollitt stated. What
role did the LAI play in all of this? Pollitt argued that the LAI and its support of the colonial
freedom struggle constituted a strong political actor, capable of disrupting the politics of the
imperialist power bloc. Yet, the LAI was facing a crisis both in its organisation as well as in its
political outlook, e.g. the LAI had commenced the work of defending the building of socialism in
the Soviet Union and had established propaganda campaigns against the war threat of the
imperialist nations. As global politics had entered the final struggle between the imperialist

elections in England on 30 May, 1929 and, for the second time since the Great War, was in power, see Matthew
Worley, Labour Inside the Gate: a History of the British Labour Party Between the Wars, I. B. Tauris, London, 2005,
pp.119-120.
826
RGASPI 495/60/134a, 38-40, (Confidential) Protocol, meeting of the Commission on the LAI (German),
Moscow, 18/6-1929; Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Nr. 64, p.1520.

328

countries and the Soviet Union, Pollitt declared that no anti-imperialist could remain neutral
[and] a real anti-imperialist must out of necessity support the Soviet Union.827
Aside from his ideological support for the Soviet Union, Pollitts speech was rooted in
realpolitik. In May 1929, Chinese militarists [the Nanking government] had intervened against
Soviet military forces in a border dispute, creating a sensitive situation which culminated in July in
an undeclared state of war between the two nations. For the Soviet Union, this conflict confirmed
its fears of the war threat against the socialist fatherland. Hence, this required that the LAI and its
congress function as a forum to mobilise the communist movements propaganda against the
KMT, Pollitt concluded, a statement further developed by Tsiu Wito/Ch Chiu-pai in the
Congress considers an attack upon the Soviet Union as an attack upon the oppressed throughout
the world.828 The responses to what Pollitt had said brought forward other perspectives than just
simply an increased militant support of the Soviet Union. For example, the Swedish socialist
Lindhagen suggested that pacifism would be a more appropriate solution in confronting the war
threat rather than a military response. According to Lindhagen, the class struggle is not the best
method with which to destroy imperialism, a statement Pollitt repudiated as being a concept
embraced by well-meaning politicians, a position the LAI had to avoid. Other actors in the
communist sector also reacted with fiery speeches and verbal attacks against Lindhagen.
Melnitschansky stated that the war threat was a real fact and that no White soldier was going to
put his foot on Soviet soil without being punished.829
Pollitt continued and observed how the LAI had failed to understand the international political
situation, and that, therefore, both the organisation and the anti-imperialist movement themselves
had retreated into a crisis due to the compromises given to both Maxton and the ILP as well as
Gupta and the INC, actors advocating reformism rather than a revolutionary approach in the
colonial struggle. There was no room for reformists within the LAI, Pollitt stated, hence this
827

Sachianova from Russia supported Pollitts argument, demanding that the LAI pay more attention to the anti-war
movement, see Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Nr. 64, p.1520; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131,
Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, July 22, 1929. Issued by the League against Imperialism
(English version), p.1-3. On 22 May, Manuilsky, Lozovsky, Kuusinen, Schubin, Kitaigorodsky, Freyer and Piatnitsky
discussed the question of the report on the war danger and the international situation, giving Mif the instruction to
write Pollitts speech, as well as the resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/60/134a, 36, Minutes of meeting Commission on
the LAI Congress, 22/5-1929.
828
SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, July 22, 1929. Issued
by the League against Imperialism (English version), p.1-3; The Sino-Soviet dispute in 1929 is discussed in Bruce A.
Ellerman, Diplomacy and Deception: The Secret History of Sino-Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917- 1927 (Sharpe,
Armonk NY, 1997, p.282). This conflict concerned a border dispute between the Nanking government and the Soviet
Union, with a focus on the railway in the borderlands. For Witos protest, see IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, p.79,
Summary of Comrade Tsiu WITOs report on the Chinese Question, Frankfurt am Main, 21/7-1929.
829
SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, 22 July, 1929. Issued
by the League against Imperialism (English version), 1-3; Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am
Main 23.Juli 1929, Nr.66, p.1545. Georg Ledebour described Lindhagens speech as rubbish, whereas Helene
Stcker only concluded that she was delighted to see the building of socialism in the Soviet Union.

329

meant that the LAI had to cleanse its ranks. Later, as noted in the Congress Manifesto, Pollitts
demand was further expounded:
[] the anti-imperialist forces throughout the world must wage an uncompromising struggle
against the allies and agents of imperialism within the national movements. [] fight against
its agents in the labour movement, against international Social Democracy, the Amsterdam
Trade Union International and, the most brazen of all the British Labour Party [] Each
national social reformist group is trying to promote the imperialist interests of its own
bourgeoisie by demoralising the anti-imperialist front at home and in the colonies.830
The antagonism of the communists on the question of reformism was the key issue in a majority
of the speeches at the congress, particularly in the performances by Pollitt, Melnitschansky and
Ford. Illustrative of the above was Fords attack, describing the LSI and the British Labour
government as being chauvinistic, urging the LAI to mould the anti-imperialist movement upon
the Soviet model in order to increase the struggle against reformism within the colonial
liberation movements. Ford later reported to the ECCI Negro Bureau that the question of
reformism had revealed that some of the Negro delegates nourished social democratic
tendencies, e.g. the South African Andrews had given a social democratic speech.831

Sources of Fire: India and China: In the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress, as noted in the
Congress Manifesto: [I]n China and in India forces are maturing for decisive battles against
imperialism. The working class of China and its revolutionary organisations stand at the forefront
of the national revolution leading into the liberation struggle of the oppressed peasantry and the
whole working population. For Rajani Palme Dutt, who delivered the keynote speech on India,
the country was a source of fire which had to confront the system of imperialism and
colonialism with a militant response, suggesting the Meerut conspiracy trial to be the signal for a
new war in India. Dutt observed nevertheless that the colonial fire in India was facing two
principal obstructions. Firstly, the surveillance by the British security services had succeeded in
curbing the colonial struggle and, secondly, the reluctance of the INC and the All-Indian Trade
Union Council towards affiliating with the LAI had created a problem in unifying every antiimperialist force in India. Thus, as a solution to the above, or at least to the latter problem, Dutt
called on the LAI to purge itself of its weak elements. Dutt was referring particularly to Guptas

830

SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Information and Press Service No. 5. Afternoon session, 22 July, 1929. Issued
by the League against Imperialism (English version), 1-3; For the LAI Congress Manifesto, see IISG LAI Collection,
3392.1, p.78.
831
Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main, 25.Juli 1929, Nr.66, p.1546; Inprecorr, Der Verlauf
des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main, 26.Juli 1929, Nr.67, p.1565; RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro
question at the League against Imperialism Congress, Ford, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/10-1929.

330

attendance at the congress as the INC delegate, a typical example of a reformist actor who seemed
content with accepting Dominion status rather than national independence. In Guptas response to
Dutts accusation, he urged the congress delegates to understand the most basic fact that India was
the prey for the most violent Imperialism. Yet, the solution to achieving national independence
in India was not through a revolutionary struggle, but rather along the path introduced by
Gandhi.832
Guptas statement caused the communist sector to react with disdain. According to Ibrahim
Youssef, the accomplishment of revolution in India would send a signal to the oppressed peoples
around the world, while Rattan Singh stated that the INC had failed to unify the workers and
peasants into one class conscious movement. Huang Ping, the Chinese trade unionist, likened
the INCs betrayal to the acts committed by the KMT prior to the April 1927 putsch. For Gupta,
these fierce reactions were an unpleasant experience. In an attempt to calm the tense discussion,
Gupta stated that the INC would not compromise on the question of attaining national
independence, conceding nevertheless that achieving it would be a question of time and method.
Thus, it was not merely enough to deploy revolutionary tactics, or accuse the British Labour
government of being a supporter of Imperialism.833 After the congress, Gupta returned to India
and informed Nehru of his ordeal in Frankfurt, information that Nehru later referred to when
criticising the LAIs attitude towards the INC:
The attitude adopted towards our delegate, Shivaprasad Gupta, [] recommended to us,
after his experience of that Congress, that we should not formally affiliate or associate (he
did not appreciate the difference) ourselves with your League.834
Guptas reaction did not come as a surprise; however, the communists antagonism at the congress
essentially contributed to damaging the International Secretariats links to India, e.g. the relation
between Chatto and Nehru.
The agitation continued as Tsiu Wito/Ch introduced the Chinese question, describing the
social situation for the industry worker in China. According to Tsiu Wito/Ch, the state
administered repression by both the fascist KMT and the Nanking government kept the Chinese
industry workers in a vice. However, if the workers and peasants succeeded in unifying their

832

Gupta addressed Gandhi as the great leader, whose methods of boycottism and acts of aggressive nonviolence were the real way to solve the situation in India, methods that would finally win over the feudalists and
capitalists, Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 23.Juli 1929, Nr. 66, p.1545.
833
Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 24.Juli 1929, Nr. 66, p.1546; Inprecorr, Der Verlauf
des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 26-27.Juli 1929, Nr. 67, p.1564-1565.
834
RGASPI 542/1/44, 51-54, Official letter from Nehru, Allahabad, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 30/1-1930.

331

forces, and took up arms against both the KMT agents of Imperialism and the Sino-Soviet
conflict, it would end in favour of the freedom struggle, Tsiu Wito/Ch argued.835

Tendencies Hostile to the Negro Liberation Movement and the ITUCNW: The Negro question
epitomised the strategy of the communist sector. According to the Resolution on the Negro
Question, the Negro movement had to confront hostile elements of reformism and Garveyism
by preparing a militant struggle to cleanse its ranks for the sole purpose of transferring the
liberation question from race to class. At the congress, Ford was the leading actor to exploit
the Negro question to the fullest.836 According to Fords speech, the modern history of the Negro
was divided into three specific categories: the Negro trade and the historical traits of the slave
trade, the plantation industry in the USA, and the necessity to radicalise the Negro workers. Fords
report was 19 pages and given in full, while some of the delegates, e.g. Bjarne Braatoy
perceived Fords performance in Frankfurt as having been very extreme.837 How did Ford link
together the modern history of the Negro with the LAI? Ford stated that the LAI had not
understood that the Negro movement did not concern either a native disposition or a racial
dimension, instead the question of emancipating the Negro was focused on social aspects and
the class struggle rather than race. In connection with Fords speech, Patterson stated that the LAI
had to speed up its organisational work in the USA and cleanse its ranks. The latter was a
remark made against Pickens, who had questioned why Ford had made a distinction between class
and race. According to Pickens, statistics indicated the difference in the economic and social
progression of the Negro race in comparison to the ruling elite in the imperialist nations; hence, the
Negro movement was essentially a question of race, not of class.838 However, Ford and Pattersons
criticism was aimed solely at demoting Pickens position within the LAI, a strategy formulated by
Patterson in March 1929:
Link the struggle of [the Negro] masses up with the imminent danger of imperialist war, with
the feverish preparation of the imperialists for an attack upon the Soviet Union and of the

835

Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 24.Juli, 1929, Nr.66, p.1546.
Prior to the congress, Mnzenberg described Ford as a young and active politician, in charge of organising and
leading North American Negro organisations, see Willi Mnzenberg, Die Negerfrage auf dem Antiimperialistischer
Weltkongress, Inprecorr, Nr. 60, 1929, pp.1442-1444.
837
IISG LSI Collection, 3050/64-65, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zrich, 13/8-1929. Gross later used
Braatoys reports in her recollection of the congress. Additionally, Braatoy does not mention that Manuilsky appeared
at the congress, see footnote 1 in Gross 1967, p.210.
838
Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 25 July 1929, Nr. 66, p.1546. Other speakers on the
Negro question were Kouyat, who discussed the horrors of French colonialism in West Africa; Andrews,
Rosemond, Bellam and Mary Adams. Adams is also known as Williana Burroughs (Mary Adams was her party name)
and she had attended the Sixth International Comintern Congress in 1928 as the CPUSA delegate, who during 1928-30
carried out a variety of duties for the CPUSA and visited Moscow on a frequent basis to deliver reports, see Klehr,
Haynes, Firsov 1995, pp.199-200.
836

332

tremendous importance the continued existence of the Fatherland of the exploited toiling
colonial masses has for them. We [the ECCI Negro Bureau] do not believe that any report
Mr. Pickens might make would enhance the development of the revolutionary movement,
[] We do not feel that Mr. Pickens can draw a clear picture of the uncompromising
position of the League, towards the international bandits who have raped and ravished Africa
and degraded and dehumanised the Negro masses everywhere.839
This dispute at the congress, and its aftermath between Pickens on the one side, and Ford and
Patterson on the other, was a question resolved by the ECCI Secretariat on 9 October 1929, by its
endorsement of the decision to withdraw Pickens LAI membership. Ford and Patterson had
objected to Pickens resistance towards some of the formulations in the Negro resolution, e.g. the
designation of the USSR as the fatherland of workers and oppressed peoples. According to the
ECCI Secretariats verdict, there was no room in the LAI for a person who aided the forces of
imperialism.840
Fords major achievement in Frankfurt, however, were the two separate ITUCNW conferences
held during the congress. The Negro Delegation invited selected delegates to attend these
conferences, e.g. Saklatvala, Burns and Gupta, and discussions were focused on both how to
outline the work of the RILU [Profintern] with regards to Negro workers and the idea to
convene the first international conference of the ITUCNW in London in July 1930.841 Additionally,
after the congress had ended, Ford organised a trip for Kenyatta, Burroughs and Kouyat to visit
the Soviet Union and Moscow, an undertaking which Ford experienced as having been rather
complicated:
I had to take care of all of the technical details in connection with bringing these comrades
here from Frankfurt, arranging their travel, securing their passports in Berlin, which took a
whole day, their travel, on the way, etc. I raise this question because of the extra time and

839

RGASPI 495/18/664, 1-3, (Secret) Draft letter to the LAI by comrade Wilson (W. Patterson), Moscow, 25/3-1929.
RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro Question of the League against Imperialism Congress,
Moscow, 3/10-1929; RGASPI 495/18/664, 108-112, (Confidential) Draft letter to Communist Fraction of LAI,
unknown author, endorsed by ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 9/10-1929. The last part of this statement reads as follows:
Shades of Banquos ghost. Enough! We welcome the announcement frank and open as it is. One more betrayer of the
masses has proclaimed himself. The membership role of the League can know his name no longer. Farewell friend
Pickens.
841
Bridgeman received the assignment to act as liaison for the ITUCNW in London, assisting with the preparatory
work of preparing the congress. According to the report in Inprecorr (perhaps due to conspiratorial motives), an
international Negro workers congress would take place in Berlin in 1930, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/450, 50-52,
Report on the Negro Question at the League Against Imperialism Congress, 91.3.X.29.242.8; RGASPI 495/155/77,
184-186, Report on the Negro Question of the League against Imperialism Congress, author: Ford, Moscow, 3/101929; Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 26.Juli 1929, Nr. 67, p.1565; RGASPI 534/3/450,
34, (copy) Letter from Ford, Moscow, to, unknown recipient and location, 9/10-1929. See further in Weiss (2011) and
Adi (2008).
840

333

expense that was placed upon me. In the future, assistance could be given by comrades in
Berlin, in matters of this nature.842
Consequently, the Frankfurt Congress and Kouyats journey to Moscow established the
collaboration between the International Secretariat and the LDRN. In September 1929, the LDRN
organised a German section in Berlin and located its activities in the bureau of the International
Secretariat office at 24 Friedrichstrae.843

Confirming Friend and Foe: The Trade Union Question and the Maxton Dispute
The Resolution on the Trade Unions observed how [T]he Congress considers the affiliation of
the Soviet Labour Unions, the organisation of the workers in the land of the proletarian
dictatorship, to be of first-rate importance. The affiliated class trade union organisations represent
the mass basis of the LAI. [] The Congress appeals to the workers of the imperialist and colonial
countries to close their ranks. The trade union question at the congress embodied the antagonism
of the communist sector towards the non-communist delegates; especially the callous rhetoric
against Maxton. According to Melnitschansky, Maxton had hampered the LAIs efforts to establish
contacts with workers in the imperialist and colonial countries. The sole reason for making this
accusation was to create a split between the LAI and Maxton in order to topple him from his
position as Chairman of the LAI. Thus, for Melnitschansky it was all about forcing the LAI to
recognise the distinction between friend and foe. Maxton epitomised the inherent weakness in
the LAI, displaying above all else an incapacity to understand class-oriented ideology. This had
resulted in reformist actors as the INC and ILP being given political space, which had led the antiimperialist movement into the abyss. Braatoy witnessed Melnitschanskys performance and
concluded that it had been such a harsh speech that, on the evening of 26 July, everyone felt as
though the congress was over.844 How did Maxton respond to Melnitschanskys speech? For
Maxton, he needed to find a way of making everyone grasp the fact that the LAI had only existed
for two years, thus, it had a long way to go in tackling one of the biggest tasks:
To produce a world of men and women free from the terror of war and the shackles of
Imperialism. [] No organisation has as yet set themselves the task of the League nor
endeavoured to bring these people together.845
842

RGASPI 495/155/77, 184-186, Report on the Negro Question of the League against Imperialism Congress, author:
Ford, Moscow, 3/10-1929.
843
RGASPI 495/155/77, 404-408, Kurzer Ttigkeitsbericht der Liga zur Verteidigung der Negerrasse, author:
Kouyat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 30/11-1930.
844
Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 27.Juli 1929, Nr. 67, p.1565-1566; IISG Labour and
Socialist Archives, 3050/60-61, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zrich, 6/8-1929.
845
IISG, Labour & Socialist Archives, 3050/62-63, Maxtons statement during the evening session, July 26, 1929,
Frankfurt am Main.

334

Maxton admitted that Melnitschansky and the congress deserved an explanation on the question of
reformism, as well as a reflection on the LAIs demand to cleanse its the ranks. Firstly, the
LAI was a symptom of the world today, an organisation aiming itself towards voluntary
participation. Secondly, Maxton referred to himself as being a revolutionary Socialist who
wanted to change a world in political and economic bondage, affected by a political and
economic mechanism, controlled by a small body of capitalist exploiters. Thus, the question as to
how to change the world was the very core of the dispute, with Maxton questioning the unrealistic
illusion, introduced by the communist delegates at the congress, that a military overthrow would
result in a social revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries in order to achieve national
independence. According to Maxton, this was a perspective which ignored the facts of the current
and existing political reality, suggesting that parliamentary activism would be a far more
prosperous and constructive approach to exerting influence over the question of colonialism and
imperialism. In a British context, the parliamentary arena could question the imperialist policy
of the Labour Party, Maxton stated. However, for the present moment, Maxton declared that the
Labour Party was in a minority in a capitalist country, thus producing the image of a party
which had assumed the role as a caretaker of Capitalism and Imperialism.846
The German communist newspaper, Frankfurter Nachrichten, stated that the congress had
been a Sturm ber Maxton (Storm over Maxton).847 Is it possible to give a rational explanation
for this storm? One explanation is found in the observation made by Burns about Maxton, i.e. that
he lay low and said nothing.848 Nonetheless, the initial idea was to diminish Maxtons
importance at the congress, a strategy which had been proposed by the Commission on the LAI
in Moscow, thus, the communist sector only had to wait for the most opportune moment.
Furthermore, Maxtons silence encapsulated the powerlessness of the non-communist delegates to
respond to the attacks from the communist sector. For the communist delegates, this made it
possible to increase its criticism of the ILP, the INC and the reformists, declaring themselves as
being the only ones capable of adapting a class-conscious ideology.849
The communist sectors plot was a pre-determined strategy carried out to perfection from the
beginning until the end of the congress. The Manuilskyan theme of there was a time when we co846

IISG, Labour and Socialist Archives 3050/62-63, Maxtons statement during the evening session, 26 July, 1929,
Frankfurt am Main; Emile Burns, World Congress of the League against Imperialism, in Labour Monthly, Vol.11,
September 1929, No.9, London, pp.559-563.
847
Mohammad Hatta, A Retrospective Account of the Second Congress of the League against Imperialism and for
National Independence held in Frankfurt, in Portrait of a Patriot, The Hague, 1972, pp.200-204. The Indonesian
nationalist paper, Indonesia Merdeka, published the article in the autumn of 1929. On 29 July, the Frankfurter Zeitung
presented a summary of the congress, only to conclude that the event had primarily served the interest of Soviet
foreign policy, in which the Russians [Melnitschansky] had taken charge of leading the attacks against Maxton,
IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/102.
848
Burns (1929).
849
Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 27July 1929, Nr. 67, pp.1565-1566.

335

operated had been a framework redefined by the communists while repeating the mantra of the
war threat, in defence of the construction of socialism in the Soviet Union, and getting across the
message that the LAI had to cleanse its ranks. Class was the ideological scaffold upon which
the communist sector created a split with the non-communist delegates at the second LAI
congress, rather than focusing on the discussions of colonialism and imperialism. The Frankfurt
Congress turned into an event characterised by the practical implications of the new class against
class policy, thereby initiating a process to definitively subordinate the LAI and its International
Secretariat to the Comintern. In an attempt to bring the congress to a successful close, Mnzenberg
managed to end the congress on a contradictory note.
*
Finale

The League finds itself [] still in the phase of organisation and preparation. The time has
come to unify every movement [] and create a storm all over the world.
Mnzenberg, Frankfurt am Main, 27/71929
Mnzenberg was the last speaker at the congress. After having introduced the congress
proceedings on 21 July, Mnzenberg kept himself in the background for the duration of the event,
only to re-appear and summarise his impressions on 27 July. Mnzenberg had, from the beginning,
planned to deliver a report on organisational questions and on the geographical spread of the LAI,
although, due to the turmoil at the congress, he apparently changed the focus of his speech. His
decision to do this might seem like a contradiction, especially as Mnzenberg was well aware of
the communist sectors intentions prior to the congress. Yet, it seems as though Mnzenberg could
not refrain from addressing and reminding the congress crowd of the LAIs purpose and aim,
declaring a profound pride in the fact that the LAI was the first attempt to create a movement
which aspired to uniting millions and linking the proletarian strugglers in their mother
countries with the oppressed colonies. Hence, this was a political and social initiative which
relied on its sources of support (the socialists, communists, anarchists and pacifists). For the
LAI, in order to strengthen its struggle against imperialism and connect it with the liberation
struggle in India, the organisation depended on the continued support of the INC, Mnzenberg
argued.850 This conclusion differed markedly from that of the communist sector. However, shortly
after the congress, Mnzenberg changed his opinion. In August, Mnzenberg stated in Inprecorr
850

Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 27July 1929, Nr. 67, p.1566.

336

that he scorned the idea that the LAI was an arena for everyone. What had caused Mnzenberg
to change his mind? Mnzenberg believed that the Frankfurt Congress had been a considerable
step to the left for the LAI, thus the organisation no longer depended on any moral support from
intellectuals or liberal women and men in order to establish connections with workers and
peasants in the oppressed countries.851 This turn to the left marked a fundamental difference
from the picture Mnzenberg had painted at the congress. In September, another explanation
emerged when Mnzenberg visited Moscow and stated the following to the Political Secretariat:
One must not forget that the Frankfurt Congress took place under completely different
circumstances than the Brussels Congress, and its execution was a hundred times more
difficult []852
Other actors perceived the Frankfurt Congress as a general failure with respect to the LAI. The
Frankfurter Zeitung stated that the congress had witnessed the definitive end of the enthusiasm
(Begeisterung) in relation to the LAI, while Braatoy concluded that the real congress had taken
place behind the scenes, with the communist delegates struggling to establish its control over the
event.853 Hattas retrospective account also interpreted the result of the communist strategy:
At the moment and no-one will deny this the League finds itself in a difficult crisis. A
reconciliation of opposing views did not materialise in Frankfurt. [] The differences are
too great, the Prinzipienreiterei has gone too far. [] The communists regard it as their holy
duty to fight the left-wing socialists and nobody would deny them this right. But to transfer
this bitter fight to the League with the ensuing danger that the League will collapse, is
irresponsible.854
Mnzenbergs speech was the final act at the congress, a performance which pointed towards an
end of the LAIs original aim. Bringing the congress to its formal end, the crowd applauded, a sign
of its approval for the new LAI Executive: Dr. Thengdi from India as Chairman, Nehru, Hatta,
Ford, Rivera, Sandino, Maxton, Bridgeman, Pollitt, Saklatvala, Herclet, Mnzenberg, Georgi
Dimitrov and Melnitschansky.855
On 28 July, the congress hall at Zoologischer Garten closed its gates at 3 pm. According to
Gross, Mnzenberg went, along with Fimmen and other congress delegates, to the restaurant
851

Willi Mnzenberg, Der Frankfurter Kongress der Liga gegen Imperialismus, in Inprecorr, Nr. 68, pp.1577-1578.
RGASPI 495/3/120, 72-75, Erklrung des Gen. Mnzenberg, Moscow, to the Political Secretariat, Moscow, 25/91929.
853
Frankfurter Zeitung, Der Weltkongress gegen Imperialismus, 29/7-1929, see IISG LAI Collection 3392.1, p.102;
IISG Labour and Socialist Archive 3050/60-61, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to Adler, Zrich, 6/8-1929.
854
Hatta [1929] 1972, pp.200-204.
855
RGASPI 542/1/92, 33-34, [List of proposals for the LAI Executive, presented by the Mandatsprfungskommission] Frankfurt am Main, July 28 1929; Inprecorr, Der Verlauf des Kongresses, Frankfurt am Main 27 July
1929, Nr. 67, p.1566. Olive Budden, the leader of the Examining Commission of the Congress (Mandatsprfungskommission), confirmed 257 authorised voters had elected a new LAI Executive. The new Chairman, Thengdi, the
leader of the All-India Trade Union Council, had been a defendant in the Meerut conspiracy trial.
852

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Heyland am Rmberberg, located in the old quarter of Frankfurt am Main, with the feeling that
the idea of the LAI had been ditched, leaving a feeling of farewell in the air.856
The Frankfurt Congress had witnessed a clash of ideologies. The essence of the entire congress
had been the question of control. The second international LAI congress had been an event
contrived from the very beginning at Comintern headquarters in Moscow, carried out en masse on
location by the communist sector. The meticulous preparatory work done by the Commission on
the LAI in Moscow had, consequently, restricted both Mnzenbergs and the International
Secretariats ability to influence the organisational and ideological framework of the second LAI
congress. The Frankfurt Congress marked the end of a chronological process which had begun
with the Hands off China campaign in 1925, which had led to the inauguration of the LAI in 1927
and the International Secretariats efforts to create a vigorous organisation in 1927-28. The LAIs
life and purpose was, however, far from over. The end of the congress was the start of a new phase
for the LAI and the International Secretariat. The central question, nevertheless, is what was left of
the LAI after the Frankfurt Congress, with later erroneous interpretations of the history of the LAI
having concluded that the organisation simply disappeared.857 Finally, did the Frankfurt Congress
imply the end of the idea of turning the LAI into a mass organisation? The drama of the Frankfurt
Congress and its aftermath marked the beginning of a rigorous pressure on the International
Secretariat, a scenario which developed itself into a year of confusion which would, ultimately,
transform the LAI.
*

856
857

Gross 1967, p.210.

McMeekin 2003, p.208.

338

PART III
Chapter 7. Anni confusionis
My opinion is that the congress was not a powerful demonstration against imperialism and
for the defence of the Soviet Union [] but a considerable organisational improvement
compared to the first congress.
Mnzenberg to the Eastern Secretariat,
12/8-1929
In relation to the further organisational consolidation of the anti-imperialist movement of
workers and peasants in the colonial countries, which is the main task of the League, the
achievements of the II Congress must be considered insignificant.
Eastern Secretariat, Draft Resolution on
Results of the II World Congress of the
LAI, 27/8-1929
The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress marked the beginning of a year of confusion within the
LAI, characterised by uncertainty, internal commotion and the confirmation of a crisis. However, it
is misleading to speak in terms of one year since the confused state of affairs at the International
Secretariat, perceived here as the Anni confusionis the year of confusion lasted from August
1929 till September 1930.858 Developments in the wake of the Frankfurt Congress proved to be
both tedious and difficult for both the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement, and did nothing
whatsoever to improve the European communist parties colonial work. However, was this all part
of a greater purpose? The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress was characterised by numerous
unresolved questions, e.g. the idea of splitting the International Secretariat into three secretariats,
with representation in Berlin, Paris and London, as well as the critique against the International
Secretariat for not seeming capable of understanding the full extent of the political situation in the
colonial countries. More importantly, opinions suggested that the LAI had not adopted the
endorsed working methods introduced at the Tenth ECCI Plenum.859 The criticism against the
LAI and its International Secretariat came to a head when the Eastern Secretariat submitted a
detailed report on the Frankfurt Congress, Draft resolution on Results of the II World Congress of
858

A similar chronological perspective is adopted in Weitz narrative of the KPD after the NSDAP had assumed power
in 1933, coined as the Anni terribli for the German communist movement, see Weitz 1997, pp.280-310.
859
RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Sch [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 3/8-1929;
RGASPI 542/1/33, 9, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Manuilsky, Moscow, 13/8-1929; RGASPI 495/18/740, 7273, Letter from Heimo/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 21/8-1929.

339

the LAI and its direct tasks (hereinafter: DR LAI), a document which would later function as
consultative material for the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.860 After the Frankfurt
Congress, there was a sudden increase in activity and exchanges of opinion concerning the LAI at
Comintern headquarters, discussions which concluded that the LAI had retreated into a crisis.
Thus, the Comintern decided it was necessary to re-organise the LAI, primarily in order to get the
International Secretariat to succumb to its dictates. This process took place at the same time as the
European communist parties were continuing to refuse to support or even to carry out colonial
work. Hence, the colonial question would prove to be (despite several attempts to correct it in
1929) a daunting task to solve during the Cominterns third period.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the anni confusionis and its ensuing crisis at the
International Secretariat. The Frankfurt Congress had resulted in a situation which forced the
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters to both seriously discuss and find a way of reorganising the structure of the LAI, as well as to restore its political credibility. These discussions
involved arguments about why it was essential to sustain the activities of the LAI rather than
recommend a swift liquidation. However, the anni confusionis was a progressive process which,
once it had surfaced and become an established fact, gained pace in three chronological phases.
Firstly, in August and September 1929, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters discussed
and evaluated how to solve the confusion that had arisen after the Frankfurt Congress. These
discussions involved scrutinising the hierarchy of relations at the International Secretariat, the
purpose and aim of the LAI, and the non-communist elements within the LAI Executive. At the
beginning of 1930, the second phase confirmed the crisis. This also strengthened the position of
the decision-makers in Moscow during the deliberations on how to solve the crisis, which in turn
led to the International Secretariat not taking any independent action. Thirdly, the final phase was
the trial of the LAI at Comintern headquarters in August-September 1930. The drama of this
particular process included the evaluation and final assessment of the LAI, which only ended once
the decision-making elite at the headquarters of the Comintern had resolved to discuss the
organisational functions and ideological value of the LAI within the international communist
movement. This latter act illustrates how the elite performed its own variant of self-criticism.
The LAIs crisis reflected, in a sense, the indifference amongst the communist parties in
Europe to support and to carry out routine colonial work. For the Comintern, the LAI was a
pivotal actor in establishing colonial connections and in contributing to the development of the
860

RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft resolution on results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its direct tasks,
passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929. Translations of the draft resolution (original language: Russian)
to English and German versions were completed on 29 August; RGASPI 495/3/120, 1, Protokoll Nr.51 von der
Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 2/9-1929; RGASPI 495/7/11, 64-67, Protokoll Nr.55 von der Sitzung der
Stndigen Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI, Moscow, 4/9-1929.

340

colonial question. Nevertheless, in November and December of 1929, once various departments at
Comintern headquarters (the ECCI Secretariat, the Political Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat)
had chosen to re-examine the LAIs colonial work, despite Arnot and Bittelmans previous
evaluations in 1929, their conclusion would be one of disappointment. Apparently, the lack of
enthusiasm for colonial work was an expression of the continued confusion which had manifested
itself within the parties. The CPGB struggled to adapt itself to the new line, e.g. one attempt was
made to reconstitute and co-ordinate its revolutionary leadership. In Germany, the KPD pursued
its ambition to manifest itself as the only and genuine representative for the German labour
movement, while at the same time encountering difficulties in both interpreting and implementing
the social fascist doctrine in practice.861 The time and energy spent understanding the doctrine
drained the parties of administrative strength, which consequently meant that their colonial work
was not given due attention. In December 1929, the Eastern Secretariat criticised the ZK KPD for
having failed to carry out any colonial work, e.g. the LAI had not received any active support,
while the KPD had neglected to establish any systematic connection between the Comintern and
the revolutionary movement and the communist parties in the colonies. The Politbureau
CPGB received similar critique from the Political Secretariat, who urged the party to expose
ruthlessly, perseveringly and systematically the counter-revolutionary, social-imperialist and
social-fascist nature of the Labour Government on the colonial question. In order to achieve this,
the CPGB was supposed to form a united front of the British proletariat and the oppressed
colonial peoples from below in order to intensify the struggle against the Colonial policy of
British social-imperialism.862 The Eastern Secretariat and the Political Secretariat criticised both
the PCF and the CPGB for their low efficiency and inability to carry out even the simplest of tasks
concerning colonial work, e.g. supporting the anti-imperialist organisations (the LAI, the LDRN).
The British communist and member of the WEB, Aitken Ferguson, tried to explain to the
International Secretariat the CPGBs failure to support the British LAI Section, realising that no
other section of the League could attain the same political impact as the British. However, one
could not avoid the fact that the party takes all necessary measures to see that the Comintern line
is carried through on these auxiliary bodies, while at the same time trying to establish connections
with colonial immigrants and students in England, an undertaking which had apparently failed
completely.863 Additionally, the KPD representatives within the ECCI in Moscow, Ulbricht and

861

Worley 2002, p.132; Hoppe 2007, p.157.

SAPMO ZPA-BA I 6/3/198, 1-3, Vertraulich. Ostsekretariat des EKKI, Moskau, an das Z. K. der KPD, Berlin,
23/12-1929; RGASPI 495/4/5, 201-205, (Confidential) On Colonial Work of the CPGB, Political Secretariat, Moscow,
to the CPGB, London, 27/11-1929.
863
According to Ferguson, the NMM should organise immigrants from the colonial countries in the revolutionary
862

341

Philipp Dengel, demanded that the ZK KPD find communists in Germany known to be skilful in
colonial languages, and register Comrades who had colonial contacts.864
In 1929, the international communist movement was in a crisis. While the Tenth ECCI Plenum
had confirmed the accuracy of the class-against-class policy in July, this plenum had also
initiated an ideological purge and well-orchestrated attack against Rightist functionaries
within the ECCI departments at Comintern headquarters. This purge sent shudders through the
national sections, resulting in the parties turning inwards only to uncover internal flaws.865 This
process ran parallel with the Cominterns objective to strengthen its hierarchical structure and to
increase its control over the national sections. More importantly, the establishment of the Political
Commission in August/September 1929, on the suggestion of the Political Secretariat, answered
the need to have a forum in which to discuss political and administrative questions of a peculiar
and sensitive nature.866
In 1929-30, while the industrialisation and collectivisation drive within the Soviet Union was
following its own rationale,867 other contextual explanations also contribute to elucidate the
dynamics of this anni confusionis. According to Zara Steiner, the global restructuring and then
disintegration of economic, political and social relations during the 1920s and the 1930s was the
hinge, with the 1920s representing a decade of reconstruction, while the 1930s witnessed a
decade of crisis in international relations.868 In Germany, the hinge saw the emergence of the
NSDAP as a political actor actively opposing the KPD and the SPD, all actors striving to increase
their parliamentary influence and position in the Reichstag.869 Outside Germany, the Wall Street
crash in New York on 24 October 1929 had a considerable global impact, causing the Great

unions in order to bring them closer to the Party and necessary steps should be taken to give them a political
education. Furthermore, the LAI section in England functioned as the channel for the CPGB to get in contact with
immigrant students [] and to bring the most revolutionary, tried and reliable elements into the Party, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/33, 49, Letter from A. F. [Aitken Ferguson/Neptun], London, to the International Secretariat, Berlin,
17/12-1929.
864
OMS would be in charge of their political education, see SAPMO ZPA-BA I 6/3/198, 1-3, Vertraulich.
Ostsekretariat des EKKI, Moskau, an das Z. K. der KPD, Berlin, 23/12-1929.
865
This forced the Standing Commission to advocate the need to establish a Purge Commission at Comintern
headquarters (active from September 1929 to January 1930). This commission screened and purged communists
suspected of nourishing deviant political views. It consisted of the following members, as noted in Peter Hubers
analysis: Ulbricht, Piatnitsky, Wassiljew and Mirov of the Cells Bureau, Heimo and Abramov of the OMS. 239
officials at Comintern headquarters were screened, out of which 201 were confirmed as loyal party cadres, 31 received
a warning and seven were expelled from the CPSU (B), see McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.85; Peter Huber, Structure
of the Moscow Apparatus of the Comintern and decision-making, in Rees & Thorpe (eds.) 1998, p.42.
866
The Political Secretariat appointed the members to the Political Commission, an institutional actor that functioned
as a consultative sub-department to the Political Secretariat; see Adibekov & Shakhnazarova 1996, p.69.
867
Kotkin (1995); Hagenloh (2009).
868
Steiner 2005, p.635.
869
Striefler 1993, pp.48-51; Babette Gross, German Communists United Front, in The Comintern: Historical
Highlights, Drachkovitch & Lazitch (eds.), Stanford University, Stanford, 1966, p.115. Gross wrote that while the
NSDAP peaked in the German elections on September 14, 1930, the KPD focused essentially on strengthening the
struggle against the SPD. According to Gross, the German communist movement pursued a suicidal general line.

342

Depression and economic recession during the 1930s. The economic collapse of Western societies
provided the Soviet Union with an ideological confirmation that the Bolshevik analysis of
capitalist society and its impending crisis had been correct. Thus, the societal crisis would amplify
the war threat and the likelihood of an intervention by the imperialist nations in the Soviet Union,
resulting in global revolution. According to Hobsbawm, the Great Depression was paradoxical for
the defenders of communism, as it portrayed the Soviet Union as being immune to the global
recession. The economic crash therefore provided the international communist movement with one
of its strongest ideological weapons, while in Germany; the recession paved the way for a
completely new political scenario.870
*
Aftermath: The Onset of the Anni confusionis
The Frankfurt Congress left the International Secretariat shaken by its internal tremors. In August
and September, all activity ceased in Berlin, while the Comintern failed to send its monthly
budget. Chatto wrote to Piatnitsky to explain that the International Secretariat would be on the
verge of closing down if no money arrived in the LAI account.871 However, the German LAI
Section did not experience complete desolation as an immediate consequence of the Frankfurt
Congress. On 8 August, the local IAH branch in Hamburg assisted the German LAI Section in
organising a public meeting in the Altona district a stronghold for the German labour and
communist movement where Pickens delivered a speech on the significance and meaning of race
as a factor in the anti-colonial struggle. The Hamburg police authority noted that the event was
obviously communist since a majority of the delegates focused the discussion on class
consciousness. When it came to mentioning the Frankfurt Congress, the meeting addressed it as
being the beginning of a new and more radical phase for both the LAI and the anti-imperialist
movement, especially the task of unmasking the social democratic movement as an agent of
imperialism and disposing of the treacherous Maxton.872 The Frankfurt Congress and its
aftermath marked the beginning of the anni confusionis, a period which signifies a thematic and
chronological divide in the history of the LAI. However, for the International Secretariat, this

870

McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.89; Hobsbawm 1997, p.425; Brendon 2002, pp.92-95.
Chatto declared that if the money arrived in Berlin at the end of October, he promised Piatnitsky to stop sending
complaints about how the financial question was draining the International Secretariat of energy and efficiency.
However, for the time being, the LAI had borrowed money from neighbouring organisations connected to the IAH
which were also experiencing a shortage of funds, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/4, 44, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to
Piatnitsky, Moscow, 12/10-1929.
872
SAPMO ZPA-BA R8051/82/2, 462-465, 8/8-1929. The Hamburg LAI section expected to hold a public meeting on
27 August, and scheduled to appear were Eleonore Midgley from England, Goldschmidt, the Indonesian Abdur
Raman, and the German Rudolf Kappe. If the meeting happened, remain unknown.
871

343

process extended beyond its sphere of influence; rather, the future of the LAI depended on the
goodwill and consent of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.
On 13 August, Bittelman informed Manuilsky that the first draft of a resolution on the results
of the 2nd Congress of the LAI had been discussed at a meeting in Berlin, with part of the ECCI
delegation, consisting of comrades Heckert, a representative of WEB [Dimitrov or Ferguson],
Bittelman, [] comrades Burns and Chatto. Unable to attend the meeting, Mnzenberg
nevertheless told the Eastern Secretariat that he regretted having missed the opportunity to discuss
the political results of the congress with Bittelman.873 For Mnzenberg, the primary aim of the
congress was nevertheless not its political outcome; it was the organisational future of the LAI in
Europe, a topic raised at the meeting. Apparently, Emile Burns wanted to split the International
Secretariat in three divisions, thereby making it easier to develop LAI activities throughout
Europe, especially in Berlin, Paris and London. Mnzenberg dismissed this idea with over a
hundred reasons and urged the Eastern Secretariat to understand that the LAI was such a
complex organisation to control and lead. For example, the International Secretariat had to
supervise and control contacts with political and colonial groups which themselves had no
relations whatsoever with each other. Mnzenberg argued that the homogenous centre of the
European anti-imperialist movement was Berlin. For Burns, the scenario developed itself into an
uncomfortable situation, explaining to the Eastern Secretariat that he did not want to enter into a
personal confrontation with Mnzenberg. Since it was obvious that no compromise could be
reached, e.g. Burns had said that Mnzenberg had threatened to resign, and [] fight against
the false line, Burns chose to leave Berlin in August.874 Mnzenberg reflected further over the
fact that class against class questioned the LAIs very raison dtre and aims, particularly its
vital collaboration with socialist, syndicalist and national revolutionary groups in order to
strengthen the anti-imperialist movement. However, Mnzenbergs critique did not focus on the
ideological essence of class against class, far from it; his objective was to ensure that the
International Secretariat could continue with its work to centralise the anti-imperialist movement
in Berlin. Mnzenberg actually believed that the Frankfurt Congress had been a powerful
demonstration against Imperialism and for the defence of the Soviet Union, in which the LAI had
demonstrated a considerable organisational improvement since the Brussels Congress.875

873

RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/8-1929; RGASPI
542/1/33, 9, Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Manuilsky, Moscow, 13/8-1929.
874
RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/8-1929; RGASPI
542/1/30, 100, Letter from Burns, Berlin, to the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, 15/8-1929. Burns intended to continue
League activity in the British section. On August 16, he left Berlin together with his wife.
875
RGASPI 542/1/30, 82-84, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Sch [Wi/Sch.]/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 12/81929.

344

Mauno Heimo did not agree with Mnzenberg. On 21 August, Heimo sent a letter informing
Mnzenberg that the Political Secretariat would soon be discussing the question regarding the
Frankfurt Congress proceedings, adding a personal observation on his (Mnzenbergs) grave
miscalculation of the LAI congress. Firstly, the congress had been convened in a completely
different political context than the Brussels Congress, referring to the KMTs betrayal and the
evident failure of the revolutionary struggle in China. Secondly, the LAI had not implemented the
theoretical framework of Kuusinens colonial and semi-colonial theses, e.g. the congress had
neither forcefully demonstrated its support of the Indian revolutionary movement nor highlighted
the global radicalisation of the proletariat. Thus, Heimo questioned whether the International
Secretariat was even aware of the fact that the world was rapidly heading towards revolution,
hence it seemed almost as if the LAI did not understand the working methods endorsed by the
Tenth ECCI Plenum in July.876 According to Heimo, the LAI had to urgently adjust and find a
new orientation by replacing its invalid collaborations with left-wing social democracy and
individual figures such as Maxton and Gupta with new reserves of real anti-imperialist and
revolutionary layers within the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The question of the LAI and
its future was, nevertheless, in the hands of the Political Secretariat to decide upon, Heimo
concluded.877 The Political Secretariat relied, though, on Bittelmans expertise to initiate a
discussion of the LAI.
*

876

Heimos critique of the working methods of the LAI was harsh, particularly considering the fact that the ECCI
plenum ended on July 19 and the Frankfurt congress commenced on July 21. There was, therefore, no time to adjust
the apparatus of the LAI. Some of the congress delegates had attended the Plenum, so they acted as messengers of the
working methods advocated at the ECCI Plenum.
877
RGASPI 495/18/740, Letter from Heimo/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 21/8-1929.

345

The Apparatus at Work: Bittelman and the DR LAI

[] one will have to admit that the chief reason for the inadequate results of the II Congress
and for the unsatisfactory composition of the delegations was the fact that the policy of the
League had lagged behind the class processes which had taken place lately in colonies and
dependencies.
Draft Resolution on Results of the II
World Congress of the LAI and its
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern
Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929
Bittelman intentionally avoided any public attention at the Frankfurt Congress. The primary reason
for this was so that he could observe and register both the reaction to and outcome of the strategy
put into practice by the communist sector. Mnzenberg also knew that Bittelman had a key
position. Thus, on 3 August, Mnzenberg urged the Eastern Secretariat to wait with its final
decision on the LAI until he had visited Moscow in September.878 Despite this request, Bittelman
proceeded to complete his consultative report (the DR LAI) after returning to Moscow, a document
the Eastern Secretariat adopted on 27 August. The primary aim of this report was to provide a
deeper insight into the LAI to the members of the Political Secretariat. What were the principal
arguments included in the DR LAI and how had Bittelman perceived the Frankfurt Congress?
On 2 September, Bittelman introduced the DR LAI to the Political Secretariat, an analysis
which more or less confirmed the correctness not only of Kuusinens colonial and semi-colonial
theses, but also of the Magyar thesis. Bittelman argued that the shortcomings of the Frankfurt
Congress could be interpreted by using Kuusinens perception of the fact that the national
bourgeoisie in colonial countries do not adopt a uniform attitude to imperialism [] the
commercial bourgeoisie directly serves the interests of imperialist capital in its promotion of
national reformism. In fact, the Frankfurt Congress had avoided any discussion of the rapid
transition of the colonial national bourgeoisie to the imperialist and counter-revolutionary camp
[and] the process of differentiation in the camp of national reformism. Much of the blame for this
was, according to Bittelman, due to the incapacity of the International Secretariat to understand the
colonial class processes. Yet, despite this critical shortcoming, the congress had:
[] developed into an imposing demonstration against reformism, imperialism and
imperialist wars, and for defence of the Soviet Union. [] the fact that it took place at the
start of the military provocations of the Nanking Government against the Soviet Union, 879
878
879

RGASPI 542/1/30, 140, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/8-1929.
Theses on the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries, adopted by the 6th Comintern Congress, 1928. Taken from

346

The DR LAI mirrored Bittelmans and the Eastern Secretariats expectations of the LAI and its
congress. Moreover, the document also reveals the confused understanding of the international
situation amongst some of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. The DR LAI stated that
the LAI congress did not reflect a historical fact of world importance, as it likewise had not
showed any further organisational consolidation, while confirming the failure of the LAI to
orient itself towards the workers and peasants movements in colonies. Thus, the DR LAI
avoided the fact that the LAI Congress had been a project directed from its inception, at the
beginning of 1929, by the Eastern Secretariat and the Commission on the LAI. Bittelman also
argued that its political manifestation had been inadequate,
[] colonial countries were very inadequately represented [] delegates from non-colonial
countries predominated, trade unions were inadequately represented, and the peasantry was
hardly represented at all. [] Even if one takes into consideration police and financial
reasons.880
However, Bittelman acknowledged the fact that the tactical line to subvert the non-communist
delegates had been a successful undertaking by the communist sector, manoeuvred with care by
the ECCI delegation:
[] the delegation was confronted by the bloc of Nationalists and the Maxton group which
is in the course of formation and which reflects the ever-growing tendency of national
reformism establishing co-operation with social-reformism and fascism. Under these
conditions, the tactical line [] which aimed at demonstrating the united front [] formed
between the Nationalists and the Maxton group by isolating the latter, was perfectly
correct.881
The success of the ECCI delegation was, however, not a result due to the support of the
International Secretariat. According to Bittelman, the International Secretariat had failed
completely in this respect by not providing a bureau of the [communist] fraction to organise the
work for Communist delegates to canvass among non-communist delegates. This criticism
against the International Secretariats administrative shortcomings was, however, not comparable
with the evaluation of the purpose and aims of the LAI in the DR LAI. The DR LAI realised that
the primary purpose of the LAI was to attract individuals, organisations, associations and political
parties outside of the communist movement. However, the indifferent behaviour of the non-

Degras vol.II, 1960, pp.530-548; RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress
of the LAI and its Direct Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929.
880
RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its Direct
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929.
881
RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its Direct
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929.

347

communist LAI Executive members at the congress, e.g. Maxton, Fimmen and Hatta made
Bittelman question the reasons for their involvement, ignoring the fact that the communist sector
had rhetorically smashed the non-communist delegates at the congress. Receiving Bittelmans
report and having examined the DR LAI, the Political Secretariat resolved to push through a
structural change within the LAI. Setting the Comintern apparatus in motion in Moscow, the
Political Secretariat instructed the Standing Commission to examine the individual composition
at the International Secretariat, and to assess whether Berlin really was the most logical place for
the headquarters of the LAI. These administrative measures were a part of the larger question
aiming to scrutinise the entire organisational structure of the LAI. The Political Secretariat urged
the Eastern Secretariat and the Organisational Department (Orgabteilung) to examine the level of
activity within the national LAI sections, and more importantly, whether they were reliable from
an ideological perspective. Once this examination was at an end, the Political Secretariat
envisioned the LAI and its sections commencing the work of establishing connections with the
national minority movements in Eastern Europe.882
The reaction to the DR LAI, and the ensuing recommendation from the Political Secretariat
was, initially, favourable. However, the Standing Commission objected to the opinions expounded
both in the DR LAI and by the Political Secretariat. What was the reason for their objection? The
Standing Commission wanted to give Mnzenberg a chance to explain himself in relation to the
congress results. For Bittelman, the DR LAI marked the end of his assignment as the LAI liaison
in Moscow. On 4 September, the Standing Commission approved Bittelmans application to spend
a vacation at a sanatorium (location unknown), with all expenses paid.883
Despite the Standing Commissions objections, the Comintern apparatus work evaluating the
LAI had gained pace in Moscow. The Political Commission instructed Pavel Mif to write a
comprehensive article on how the Comintern perceived the LAI and the Frankfurt Congress.884
The most serious question was nevertheless the evaluation of the individual composition of the
International Secretariat. For the Political Secretariat, the Czechoslovakian communist and
882

RGASPI 495/3/120, 1, Protokoll Nr.51 von der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 2/9-1929. Present at the
meeting were: Paul Reimann, Manuilsky, Ulbricht, Strakhov/Ch Chiu-pai, Bell, Piatnitsky, Heimo, Bittelman,
Wiesner, Melnitschansky, Oskar and Mller. The Political Secretariat instructed the Eastern Secretariat to work out the
details on the national minority question together with the ECCI Balkan Secretariat. Furthermore, Bela Kun
introduced the question at a meeting with the Political Commission on 13 September, which concluded that it was
necessary to form a commission to examine the idea. The Political Secretariat endorsed Kuns proposal and authorised
him to act as leader of the commission, working together with Reimann, Georgi Safarov, Voitkovitsch [?], Oscar [?],
Walecki, Stepanov and a KIM delegate, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/1, 13, Protokoll Nr.5 von der Sitzung der Politischen
Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 13/9-1929; RGASPI 495/3/122, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.53 der Sitzung der
Politsekretariats, 20/9-1929.
883
RGASPI 495/7/11, 64-67, Protokoll Nr.55 von der Sitzung der Stndigen Kommission des Sekretariats des EKKI,
Moscow, 4/9-1929. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Bell, Ulbricht, Heimo, Feinberg, Miff and Wassiljew.
884
RGASPI 495/4/1, 1-3, Protokoll Nr. 1 von der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats 4/9-1929.
Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Manuilsky, Ulbricht, Heimo, Bell, Petrovsky, Wuletzki and Wassiljew.

348

Comintern emissary, Bohuml Smeral, was the most reliable candidate to assume a leading
position at the International Secretariat as a secretary, guided by the motive to strengthen the
League in Berlin. The reasons why Smeral emerged as a candidate seem to have been two-fold:
firstly, Smeral would co-ordinate the day-to-day routines at the International Secretariat, write
articles and visit the LAI sections in Europe. The second reason was, however, of a more subtle
and ambiguous nature. Due to the apparent inconsistencies existing at the International Secretariat,
a dilemma highlighted by the DR LAI, it seems as though Smerals primary objective would be to
monitor the activity and behaviour of the other members at the International Secretariat,
impressions Smeral would compile in confidential reports addressed to designated persons at the
headquarters of the Comintern. This is, however, an objective which is almost impossible to verify,
particularly as there does not appear to exist any clear-cut decision in print, despite much allusion
to the fact that such was the case. For example, once Smeral had arrived in Berlin in November, he
began the work of providing Michail in Moscow, a pseudonym used by Piatnitsky, reports on the
International Secretariat on a regular basis.885 Furthermore, Smeral was also involved in the
activities of the WEB in Berlin, an actor the DR LAI had recommended in order to organise
systematic continuous leadership in regard to the work of the League.886 The Political
Commission approved the proposal to nominate Smeral as a secretary of the International
Secretariat on 13 September. Smeral was in Berlin in September and received the instruction to
return to Moscow in order to obtain detailed information on the work of the LAI.887 Smerals
appointment was accompanied by a revision of the composition of the comm. [communist]
fraction of the LAI, including comrade Mnzenberg, Chatopadya [sic] and Smeral. The Small
Commission gave the final approval to Smerals new assignment on 28 September.888
Smerals appointment was, nonetheless, perceived as an error by Chatto. On 14 October,
Chatto sent his reaction to the Small Commission, a document which reveals how one of the
leading figures at the International Secretariat reacted against the dominance of the Comintern to
define the political, administrative and financial business of the LAI. Additionally, Chatto wanted

885

For Michail/Piatnitsky, see Jeifets, Jeifets & Huber (eds.) 2004, p.263.
RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its Direct
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929.
887
According to the protocol, Smeral was in Berlin in September. The Political Secretariat approved his request to visit
his family in Czechoslovakia for a week before he returned to Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/120, 1, Protokoll Nr.51
von der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 2/9-1929; RGASPI 495/4/1, 11-12, Protokoll Nr.4 von der Sitzung der
Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 13/9-1929. Present at the meeting were Manuilsky, Ulbricht,
Piatnitsky, Heimo, Miff, Tsiu Wito/Ch Chiu-pai and Lozovsky.
888
Smeral had taken part in the discussion on the Palestinian question at a meeting of the Political Secretariat on 16
October, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/125, 29-31, Protokoll Nr.58 der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 16/10-1929;
RGASPI 495/4/2, 18, Protokoll Nr.8 von der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Sekrt., 28/9-1929. Present at the
meeting were Piatnitsky, Manuilsky, Garlandi, Heimo, Reimann and Kachan. As noted in Chattos letter, the final
discussion on Smeral in the Small Commission took place on 28 September, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106.
886

349

Mnzenberg to support him in his case, pleading to him, I hope that you agree with me on this.
Why did Chatto disapprove of Smerals nomination as a secretary? Chatto told the members of the
Small Commission (Kuusinen and Manuilsky):
Smeral has no connection whatsoever in the colonial countries. [] We shall only be adding
a superfluous, superficial politician to the Secretariat, instead of comrades with real
knowledge of and connections in the colonies.889
Chattos verdict harshly exposed the contradictory nature of relations between the International
Secretariat and the Comintern. Without passing any judgement on the Cominterns colonial policy,
Chatto nonetheless questioned how the Comintern chose to deal with the LAI question. For
Chatto, Smerals nomination was a clear-cut decision designed only to facilitate the need to carry
out the political line of the ECCI, while simultaneously adding to the workload of the staff in
Berlin to meet the expectations of a talent [Smeral] for writing manifestos and pamphlets or
giving Direktiven. The rash decision to appoint a well-known [] European communist to
represent the International Secretariat would cause unwanted attention from national security
services, as well as increase the already existing conflicts with national revolutionary
organisations, Chatto argued. Above all, Chatto would prefer to employ ten colonial
communists, or a communist from one of the imperialist countries [] specialised in some
definite group of colonial countries to work at the International Secretariat. Chatto continued to
question how the Small Commission could approve sending a person with restricted linguistic
skills in the German language. Smeral could not even deal with the correspondence at the
International Secretariat, particularly letters and documents in English, French and Spanish. If
Smeral wanted access to any correspondence, this would therefore force someone to translate the
letters, and add a fresh burden upon our technical staff. Chatto also reflected over the fact that
Smerals nomination also obliged the International Secretariat to give him a monthly salary ($150
per month), something which would drain the already meagre monthly Comintern subvention.890
Chatto wondered whether the nomination had been based on other reasons, rather than on the
objective to carry out the political line of the ECCI:
There is no special employment at present for Smeral in the Comintern, and that the vacancy
caused by the resignation of Burns is being used as a convenient solution of the Smeral

889

RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/10-1929. A copy of
Chattos letter is filed in fond 495/4/4, 41-43 (German version), a document that does not include Chattos signature.
890
Chatto accepted Smerals appointment on one condition, he expected in hope and belief in the Comintern that
Smerals salary [would] at least [be] paid by the Comintern, if no increase was made in the subvention to the LAI,
see fol. RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/10-1929. For
Smerals salary in 1030, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 32. The GDP in 2009 for $150 is equivalent to $1,880 (1929),
and $1,930 (1930).

350

problem at the cost of the efficiency of one of the most important and valuable auxiliary
organisations of the Comintern.891
A far more constructive solution would have been to assign Smeral as a special representative
[liaison] for the LAI in Moscow at Comintern headquarters, to co-ordinate and maintain speedy
contacts with the Comintern, Profintern and other mass and sympathising organisations. Did
Chattos letter receive any response? It seems as though the decision-makers in Moscow chose to
ignore his letter and, on 14 November, the Political Commission considered the matter closed,
telling the LAI kom.Fraktion to accept and abide by the Small Commissions decision.892 While
the Political Commission was still evaluating Chattos letter, Smeral had already arrived in Berlin
from Moscow to assume his position as LAI secretary at the International Secretariat.893
*
Mnzenbergs Speech for the Defence
On 22 September, Mnzenberg left Berlin in the company of Chatto on a trip to Moscow, where
they both remained for a couple of weeks.894 On 25 September, acting on the request of the
Standing Commission, Mnzenberg gave his explanation (Erklrung) to the Political Secretariat
on the results and consequences of the Frankfurt Congress. Mnzenbergs speech was an act of
defence, both for himself, as well as for the International Secretariat.
According to the running commentary of the Erklrung des Gen. Mnzenberg (Explanation
by Com. Mnzenberg), recorded at the meeting in Moscow, it has been possible to retrace how
Mnzenberg addressed the Political Secretariat and defended his interpretation of the congress.
Thus, for Mnzenberg, it was a question of making a distinction between the past, present and the
future of the LAI. The central issue was to refute the conclusions presented by the Eastern
Secretariat in the DR LAI. According to Mnzenberg, this document had been a typical example of
an account crammed with false information, presenting a misrepresentative picture of the
congress, the preparatory work and of the International Secretariats colonial network. For
example, the DR LAI had misinterpreted the Maxton question, and left the impression that the LAI
had only weak and fragile connections with national revolutionary organisations. For Mnzenberg,
the LAI faced a monumental task to combat the existing ignorance and indolence within the
891

RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/10-1929.
RGASPI 542/1/30, 104-106, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/10-1929; RGASPI
495/4/4, 26-27, Protokoll Nr.19 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariat des EKKI, 14/11-1929.
Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Ulbricht, Heimo, Garlandi, Guralski, Lebedewa and
Sokolik.
893
Smeral arrived in Berlin in the beginning of November; see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 5-11, Letter from Smeral,
Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 2/1-1930.
894
IISG Fritz Brupbacher Papers 4249.10/168, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Brupbacher, Zrich, 21/9-1929.
892

351

European communist parties, a perspective that Bittelman had neglected to mention in the DR
LAI. This fact alone had contributed to bringing the Frankfurt Congress to its chaotic end,
confirming the difference of opinion between the ECCI delegation and the entrusted comrades
from the International Secretariat. The tactical disagreements in the Comintern delegation had
therefore inflicted damage on such an important event yet, if the ECCI delegation had allowed
the comrades of the LAI to attend its closed meetings, this conflict of interest would not have
become an issue, Mnzenberg stated. In fact, the so-called failure of the congress could be
explained by external causes, especially the intervention of local police authorities and money,
rather than the explanation given in the DR LAI, which lay the blame on the International
Secretariat. Giving support to the advice given by Heimo, Mnzenberg concluded that it was not
advisable, or for that matter, logical to compare the Frankfurt Congress with the Brussels congress.
Mnzenbergs explanation was a ritual of self-criticism; however, he did not concede that the
organisational failures of the Frankfurt Congress could be blamed on the International Secretariat.
Despite the mistakes made in Berlin, e.g. the failure to secure the attendance of leaders of the
anti-imperialist struggle in the most important colonial countries (China and India), Mnzenberg
argued that the reasons for this could be found in the widespread repression administered by
colonial security services in the colonies. The source of this problem could also be found in the
Cominterns refusal to guarantee the money aimed to finance the journeys of colonial delegations.
Yet, this had not stopped some colonial delegates from attending the congress. Mnzenberg
explained that Guptas struggle to travel from India to Frankfurt was an exceptional example,
Gupta having financed his trip with his own money. This statement from Mnzenberg contradicted
the Eastern Secretariats conclusions in the DR LAI, which had described Gupta as a big
landowner, a Right nationalist, an observation that Mnzenberg considered to be contradictory to
the LAIs view. How did Mnzenberg respond to the Eastern Secretariats criticism and accusatory
labelling of Gupta? Mnzenberg believed that the LAI was an organisation with an international
reputation, thus it was crucial to treat the few existing links to India with extra care due to the
increased pressure from the British police (Polizeischikanen).895 Essentially, the question was
how to maintain the fragile connections the International Secretariat still had to India. Another
serious question raised by Mnzenberg at the meeting was to protest against the idea to split the
International Secretariat into three secretariats and to locate them in Berlin, Paris and London. If
realised, Mnzenberg stated that this would lead to the destruction of the LAI. Describing a
possible scenario, Mnzenberg predicted that the LAI secretariat in London would have to turn to
895

Mnzenberg explained that the policing techniques of the German Schutzpolizei had contributed to curb the
enthusiasm of the congress, for example, restrict congress delegates to arrive from other countries, see fol. RGASPI
495/3/120, 72-75, Erklrung des Gen. Mnzenberg, Moscow, Political Secretariat, 25/9-1929.

352

illegal means due to the surveillance of British security service. Hence, if the Comintern apparatus
motive was to correct the errors of past times, Mnzenberg stated that, instead of seeking a cureall as outlined in the DR LAI, the issue of the LAI required more subtle and sophisticated
solutions. Firstly, the Comintern had to rectify the passive and complete indifference of the
communist parties in Europe towards supporting the LAI, and ensure an understanding within the
parties that, despite the LAI posing as a non-communist organisation, it was working exclusively
in the service of communism. Secondly, Mnzenberg wanted to re-define the ideological work at
the International Secretariat. This implies that he already was aware of the idea to appoint Smeral
as a secretary in Berlin, yet this did not restrict him from asking that the candidate had to be in the
possession of an independent network with colonial activists, rather than have skills in fractional
techniques.896
Mnzenbergs explanation is a significant episode in the history of the LAI, which reveals
that a sympathising organisation such as the LAI was a both sensitive and complex issue for the
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters to deal with. Mnzenbergs speech for the defence also
leaves us with the following suggestion: his performance is proof of the fact that Mnzenberg was
retreating from the daily routine work at the International Secretariat, leaving all decisions on the
future of the LAI completely up to the decision-makers in Moscow.
*
The prominente Persnlichkeiten: Expulsions and Voluntary Resignations
The purging of the prominente Persnlichkeiten is a sad finale to the non-party nature of the
LAI, defining how the policy of class against class was used to purge the non-communist
members on the LAI Executive. After the Frankfurt Congress, there was also an ideological
cleansing of the LAI. According to Hatta, this purification process emerged because of the chaos
in Frankfurt. Smeral was the one who initiated the process in Berlin, following the distinction
introduced by Melnitschansky at the Frankfurt Congress of categorising people as either friend
or foe when it came to evaluating the prominente Persnlichkeiten (prominent personalities)
in the LAI. A category made up of political and cultural personalities outside the communist
movement, but one which had been a vital source for the LAI in establishing itself as a non-party
organisation, while at the same time disguising its communist ties. Smerals work assessing the
prominente Persnlichkeiten also illustrates how a believer and advocate of the new line
perceived the LAIs collaborations with radical left-wing activists, socialists, nationalists and
intellectuals. Nonetheless, Smeral was not unique in being a communist content to define non896

RGASPI 495/3/120, 72-75, Erklrung des Gen. Mnzenberg, Moscow, Political Secretariat, 25/9-1929.

353

communist actors in derogatory terms. For example, Heimo told Mnzenberg to get new
reserves, while Bittelman in the DR LAI concluded that it was necessary to free the League of
these elements by severing its ties to representatives of reformist nationalist movements in the
colonies (Gupta, Nehru, Hatta and others). Hence, a systematic campaign against Maxton and
Fimmen would only be a natural reaction to expose their treachery, Bittelman stated. Smeral
described the non-communists in vivid terms, referring to Baldwins ties to an anti-communist
front, or that after the Communist Party of Mexico had expelled Rivera, a logical reaction was
therefore to relieve him of his position on the LAI Executive. On 2 January 1930, Smeral
completed his first evaluation of the LAI Executive, and passed on his results to Piatnitsky and the
Eastern Secretariat:
Table 8.1: Composition of the LAI Executive Committee, January 1930
Name

Nationality

Status

Dr. Thengdi

India

Huang Ping

China

Jawaharlal Nehru

India

Shapurji Saklatvala

India

Mohammad Hatta

Indonesia

Fuad Chimali

Syria

J. W. Ford

Negro

Diego Rivera

Mexico

Augusto Sandino

Nicaragua

Melnitschansky

The Soviet Union

Georgi Dimitrov

The Balkans

A. Herclet

France

Willi Mnzenberg

Germany

Reginald Bridgeman

Great Britain

James Maxton

Great Britain

Harry Pollitt

Great Britain

Edo Fimmen

Holland

Source: RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat and
Piatnitsky, Moscow, 2/1-1930
Members of the LAI Executive marked with a + were soon to be, or were already on the other
side of the barricade, Smeral concluded, whereas the ones without any mark remained as
trustworthy members. In the latter case, however, a majority were either loyal communists or
imprisoned colonial figureheads (Thengdi). This ideological evaluation of the LAI Executive also
defines the crisis within the LAI, as this purification process went against the ECCI Secretariats

354

directives to the International Secretariat in December 1929, which had urged the LAI to begin
acting as a broad non-party organisation not obliged to copy the Comintern.897
The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress was a phase characterised by its contradictions, which
were essentially caused by the militancy of the class against class principle. It was therefore only
a question of how long the non-communist members in the LAI Executive would endure. The
focus here was now on how Maxton, Fimmen, Hatta and Nehru would respond to the International
Secretariats criticism while, in the background, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters
were expecting the International Secretariat to both shun and defame these collaborators. This
purification process lasted for several years after 1929; however, in a majority of cases, the
prominente Persnlichkeiten chose to resign voluntarily from the LAI. For the LAI, the purging
of its non-communist members called into question the very essence of a sympathising
organisation which, as in this case, existed solely to aid the Cominterns colonial ambitions, but
which also relied on the consent and the support of political and intellectual actors outside the
communist movement in order to justify its existence. The other side of the coin was the
defamatory

rhetoric

used

by

the

International

Secretariat

towards the

prominente

Persnlichkeiten, a form of behaviour which tipped the scale in favour of the non-communist
members leaving the LAI. Maxton proved to be the exception to the above.
James Maxton: Maxton was the political sacrifice the Eastern Secretariat expected the
International Secretariat to make after the Frankfurt Congress. According to the DR LAI, Maxton
had had the opportunity to express his sincerest of sympathy for the anti-imperialist struggle of
the colonial peoples at the congress. Nonetheless, Bittelman concluded that Maxtons
performance had been a serious error which had caused a gross distortion and infringement of
the CI line.898 For Maxton, any chance of averting the storm around his persona was now out
of his hands. Mnzenberg tried to reduce the criticism against Maxton, initially stating that the
opinions raised at the Frankfurt Congress had been enough. However, if the Comintern
commanded the LAI to break with Maxton, the International Secretariat would endorse the
decision. Maxton was a valuable political source in England for both Mnzenberg and the LAI. On
10 September, Mnzenberg told Maxton in a letter about his concern that our organisation has
completely failed in its duty to get involved in the Wailing Wall riots in Palestine. In August
897

For a discussion on sympathising organisations and the use of prominent individuals, see Introduction, and Stern
2007, pp.43-45; RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky,
Moscow, 2/1-1930; RGASPI 495/18/740, 95-96, (Vertraulich) An das Exekutivkomitee der Antiimperialistischen Liga,
the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, December, 1929. This letter was not, however,
aimed to be read by the LAI Executive (see above), it was addressed to the kom.Fraktion at the International
Secretariat.
898
RGASPI 495/20/722, 100-105, Draft Resolution on Results of the II World Congress of the LAI and its Direct
Immediate Tasks, passed by the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/8-1929.

355

1929, the riots in Jerusalem had culminated in a violent dispute between the Jewish and Arab
populations on the question of who had access rights to the last remnants of Herods temple.
Additionally, the Honorary President of the LAI, Albert Einstein, referred to this episode as being
the reason to resign from his position in the LAI due to its anti-Semitic propaganda in its release of
a resolution against the Jewish population in Palestine. Hence, while the non-party character of
the LAI was beginning to crumble, Mnzenberg perceived Maxton as being one of the LAIs few
remaining links capable of organising strong parliamentary and extra-parliamentary actions
against the MacDonald Government in order to draw attention to the Wailing Wall riots.899
Maxtons performance at the Frankfurt Congress was not the only factor contributing to this
political confrontation. According to William Knoxs biography of Maxton, Maxton simply
refused to do what Mnzenberg, Chatto and the British LAI Section expected of him, i.e. to
publish the transcript of his speech at the Frankfurt Congress in the New Leader. Maxton
apparently feared that such an act would increase the conflict between the ILP and the MacDonald
government. A more rational explanation was also that Maxton had reach the end of the road in his
relations with the LAI, frustrated and tired of being bullied, harassed and pestered as to the times
and methods by which he should express himself. As noted in Gordon Browns biography of
Maxton, after the Frankfurt Congress Maxton travelled to Largs in Scotland for a vacation. Once
there, and beginning to hear rumours of his impending expulsion from the LAI, Maxton concluded
that he was more interested at the moment in the solution of a mystery story than half a dozen
expulsions from the LAI.900 Nevertheless, the attacks against Maxton continued in the most
sectarian terms, but this time under the direction of the British LAI Section rather than the
International Secretariat. John Saville wrote that the sections central aim was to relieve Maxton of
his duties as Chairman of the LAI an initiative the International Secretariat had not, as yet,
sanctioned. Thus, the British LAI Section had decided to act independently and, on 17 September,
at a meeting in London, the section decided to expel Maxton from the LAI. Bridgeman explained
the reason for this decision:

899

RGASPI 542/1/30, 82-84, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 12/8-1929;
RGASPI 542/1/33, 18-21, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Maxton, London, 10/9-1929 (the draft, German version,
was finished on 30 August, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/33, 11-14). For the Wailing Wall riots, see Fieldhouse 2006, p.161.
On 6 September, Albert Einstein informed the International Secretariat of his immediate resignation as Honorary
President of the LAI, stating that the resolution against the Jewish population in Palestine makes it impossible for me
to be connected in any way to the League. This quote was later included in Smerals report on the Arab countries to
Magyar, a document filed in the Piatnitsky dossiers, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 6-19, Bericht des Sekretariats der
Liga gegen Imperialismus ber die arabische Arbeit in der Periode von August bis Dezember1929, Berlin, 10/11930. A copy of this report is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 6-19; IISG LAI Collection 3392.1/86, Resolution ber
die arabischen Lnder, Frankfurt am Main, 20-31/7-1929.
900
William Knox, James Maxton, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987, pp.87-88; Gordon Brown, Maxton,
Mainstream Publishing, Edinburgh, 1986, p.201.

356

[] there was no doubt whatever that he [Maxton] apparently displayed no interest whatever
in events of tremendous importance in colonial countries leading to the despatch of troops
and warships to Palestine, with much bloodshed, thus creating the impression that he was
looking for an opportunity to resign from the League.901
The decision was a rash one. Most importantly, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters
had not authorised the section to expel Maxton. Thus, in the beginning of 1930, the leader of the
WEB in Berlin, Helmut/Dimitrov, instructed the International Secretariat to reprimand the British
LAI Section for having committed an act that went against the principles and activities of the
League.902 What did this act of insubordination consist of? Primarily, it was a question of control.
On 21 February 1930, the Colonial Commission of the CPGB wanted the International Secretariat
to realise that Maxtons unsanctioned expulsion would be used by the LSI in their propaganda to
describe how the communists treated their political associates. Thus, the Maxton affair had
damaged the League as a whole.903 Secondly, the unsanctioned expulsion of Maxton turned into
an ideological question. For the International Secretariat, the negative effects had to be deflected
by finding some kind of resolution. According to an article, James Maxton und die Liga gegen
Imperialismus, published in Pressedienst on 30 May 1930, the International Secretariat declared
that the British LAI Section had interfered with the jurisdiction of the LAI Executive.904 The crux
of the matter is that at the time this article was published, i.e. on 30 May 1930, the LAI had no
Executive.
Edo Fimmen: Bittelman stated in the DR LAI that Fimmen had intentionally concealed his
support for social democracy. Nevertheless, in contrast to how the Maxton case had played itself
out within the British LAI Section, the Comintern and the International Secretariat proceeded with
caution in examining the LAIs relation with Fimmen after the Frankfurt Congress. On 2 January
1930, Smeral concluded that Fimmen had begun to ignore the International Secretariat after the
congress, and was apparently acting against us. Somehow, Smeral had managed to read a letter
from Fimmen to Nehru in which he had stated that the communist dominance in the League
901

Saville concluded that Maxtons expulsion was a bizarre event understandable only in terms of the sectarian
excesses that followed the application of the general political line of the 6th Congress of the CI [Comintern], Reginald
Bridgeman to F. Gardner, 21/9-1929, in Bellamy & Saville (eds.) 1984, p.31.
902
RGASPI 499/1/17, 54-55, Bericht des Sekretariats durch Mnzenberg, Smeral and Chatto, WEB, Helmut/Dimitrov,
Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 13/1-1930. The International Secretariat sent the letter to the British LAI Section on 3
April; see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 88-91, Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the British LAI Section,
London, 3/4-1930.
903
RGASPI 542/1/44, 59, Letter from the COLONIAL DEPARTMENT [CPGB], London, to the International
Secretariat, Berlin, 21/2-1930
904
RGASPI 542/1/46a, 78-81, Pressedienst, James Maxton und die Liga gegen Imperialismus, Internationales
Sekretariat, Berlin, 15/5-1930. In connection with the re-launching of the LAI Executive in Berlin in 1931 (see next
chapter), the Political Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat formulated the details for Maxtons formal expulsion.
The focal point for the LAI was to expose these so-called agents of imperialism (Hatta, Fimmen and Nehru), see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Protocol: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-1931.

357

deserves no comment.905 Furthermore, Magyar had visited Amsterdam in either November or

December 1929, where he had held a private consultation with Fimmen to discuss why the latter
had expressed discontent towards the development of the LAI. At the meeting, Magyar declared to
Fimmen that there was no turning back for the LAI and, despite Fimmen still remaining as vicedeputy of the LAI, the time has passed [for] us [communists] to associate openly with the leftwing of the Amsterdam International. Fimmen considered that the militancy of the new
course was sending the LAI off in the wrong direction. From Magyars perspective, this merely
confirmed that Fimmen was a corrupt Amsterdam bureaucrat [] good for nothing.906 Whether
Fimmens meeting with Magyar provoked a desire to sever his ties with the LAI, remains
unknown. However, on 19 February 1930, Fimmen contacted Chatto, demanding to retrieve every
document (letters and circular information) mentioning his name, which the LAI bureau had on
file in Berlin. If Chatto did not fulfil this request, Fimmen intended to resign with immediate
effect.907 Nevertheless, Fimmen waited until 27 October 1930 to send his letter of resignation from
the LAI Executive to the International Secretariat. The primary reason for Fimmens resignation
was that the LAIs original objective to become an international leader and spokesperson for the
anti-imperialist movement had turned into a failure of grandiose proportions. The political
results after the Frankfurt Congress were nil, Fimmen stated and, worst of all, the LAI was an
illusion about to fade away.908 Smeral did not know how to react after reading Fimmens
letter, and decided to send the document on to the Eastern Secretariat for further consideration. In
Moscow, the Political Commission reviewed Fimmens letter, instructing the Eastern Secretariat to
compose a short draft of a resolution, while urging the International Secretariat to act vigorously
by publishing articles and pamphlets in order to ridicule Fimmen. The Eastern Secretariat
completed its resolution on 22 November, after which the ECCI Secretariat duly endorsed the
document and passed it on to the Political Commission for a final review. Heimo, on the other
hand, instructed the International Secretariat to publish this resolution in Pressedienst. What were
the primary arguments against Fimmen in this resolution? Apparently, Fimmen had sabotaged
every decision of the League since the Frankfurt Congress. By not acting as a real supporter of
the struggle against imperialism, Fimmen was actively supporting counter-revolutionary Zionism,
this agent of British Imperialism. These arguments were also included in the article, Gesunde
905

For the original document, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to the Eastern
Secretariat/Piatnitsky, Moscow, 2/1-1930. For a copy of this report, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 5-11.
906
RGASPI 542/1/44, 56, Letter from Edwin/Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to the Eastern Secretariat, 6/2-1930.
Edwin/Magyar deliberately did not reveal to Fimmen the purpose of his visit in Amsterdam ich sagte ihm auch
nicht wo ich arbeite und was ich mache.
907
RGASPI 542/1/44, 57, Letter from Fimmen, Amsterdam, to Chatto, Berlin, 19/2-1930. Whether Chatto ever sent
these documents to Fimmen remains unknown.
908
RGASPI 542/1/44, 76, Letter from Fimmen, Amsterdam, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 27/10-1930; A
copy of this letter is filed in the ECCI Secretariats dossier, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/863, 26.

358

Erscheinungen in der Liga gegen Imperialismus (Healthy Action in the League against
Imperialism), which was published in Inprecorr on 28 November.909 On 3 December, the Political
Commission considered the matter to be closed, instructing the International Secretariat to send
Fimmen a formal letter of expulsion from the LAI.910
Mohammad Hatta: The chaos at the Frankfurt Congress had a lasting impression on Hatta. In
Hattas retrospective account, published in the Indonesian nationalist newspaper Indonesia
Merdeka in the autumn of 1929, he wondered whether the international platform for all antiimperialists of any political inclination would collapse under the weight placed on its shoulders
after the purification process which the communist hardcore elements within the LAI had
instigated. If the motive was to purify the LAI, Hatta feared that a new League will arise from its
ruins and only the suppressed nations of coloured race could be its supporters, without any
support from the former stronghold: the anti-imperialist movement in the imperialist countries.
This article had an immense repercussion on Hattas political life, which, as noted by Mavis
Rose, made him a target for Comintern attack. However, there was more to this than the
publication of one article. After the Frankfurt Congress, Hatta had insisted that the PI sever its ties
to the Dutch LAI Section, so once Smeral became aware of his article and the above
recommendation, Hatta became a persona non grata. From a broader perspective, Hatta had been
the International Secretariats link to Indonesian activists in both the Netherlands and across
Europe. Once Smeral and Hatta resolved to terminate this relationship, irrespective of each others
motive, the LAI lost its Indonesian connection. For the Dutch LAI Section, the situation worsened
and was one of despondency. Smeral observed how the section barely managed to exist after the
Frankfurt Congress.911
Jawaharlal Nehru: Nehru left the LAI Executive on his own initiative. Nehrus case also
illustrates the level of isolation the LAI was experiencing in India. Furthermore, the narrative
discloses Chattos radicalisation from being an Indian revolutionary to being a loyal advocate of
communism. Barooah has thoroughly analysed the relationship between Chatto and Nehru;
909

RGASPI 495/4/67, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.99 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 11/111930; Inprecorr, Proletarische Massenorganisationen. Gesunde Erscheinungen in der Liga gegen Imperialismus,
[illegible number and page], 28/11-1930, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 23-23a.
910
RGASPI 495/18/863, 23, Short note from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to the ECCI Political Commission,
Moscow, 22/11-1930; RGASPI 542/1/44, 82, Letter from Heimo/ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to the International
Secretariat, Berlin, 22/10-1930; for the final discussion by the Political Commission on Fimmen, see fol. 495/4/72, 13, Protokoll Nr.104 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, Moscow, 3/12-1930. Present at the
meeting were Manuilsky, Piatnitsky, Weinstone, Sokolik, Heimo, Zirul, Safarov, Kutschumov, Magyar, Lozovsky,
Walecki, Angaretis and Furubottn. For the resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/72, 10-12, Resolutionsentwurf des
Sekretariats der Antiimperialistischen Liga (Moscow), 6/12-1930. A copy of this resolution is filed in fol. RGASPI
542/1/44, 81-82.
911
Hatta [1929] 1972, pp.200-204; Mavis Rose, Indonesia Free. A Political Biography of Mohammad Hatta, Equinox
Publishing, Singapore, 2010 (first published 1987), p.92; RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to
Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky, Moscow, 2/1-1930.

359

however, the fact that this relationship also illustrates the difficulties the LAI were experiencing in
establishing its activity in India is also worth further consideration. The Frankfurt Congress had
not enhanced the possibilities for the LAI to establish itself in India. As a solution to this dilemma,
Chatto needed advice from Bittelman on how to proceed, only to receive the answer that he was
suspicious of the political contacts the LAI had in India. Bittelman argued that it was inadvisable
to continue the relations with national reformists (the INC), urging Chatto to establish contacts
with revolutionary trade unions and peasant organisations. If this was done, the LAI would
remain safely in our hands.912 Yet, after Bittelman had resigned from his assignment as liaison
for the LAI in Moscow, all discussion of India abruptly ended. In October 1929, Chatto contacted
Freyer [?] at the Eastern Secretariat, asking what steps have been taken?. However, Freyers
reply to Chatto only confirmed the effectiveness of the hierarchy of relations at play at the
International Secretariat, i.e. Mnzenberg had already received advice on the question, therefore
Chatto only had to ask him what to do.913 Chatto concluded in December that a majority of the
LAIs former contacts in India, e.g. with the communist movement in Bombay, had disappeared.914
At the beginning of 1930, Nehru represented one of its few remaining links to India.
Nehru had not witnessed the controversy and political commotion at the Frankfurt Congress.
However, Nehru managed to establish an understanding of the event from other sources, e.g. from
Gupta, Fimmen and Baldwin, who had referred to the LAIs metamorphosis. Realising that the
Frankfurt Congress had been a serious episode, not only in relation to the drastic change in the
LAIs political platform, Nehru contacted Chatto to explain that, if the LAI continued along the
line of the communists, this would lead to the collapse of the League. Chatto had nevertheless
begun to radicalise his attitude towards Nehru. In his response to Nehru, Chatto complained about
Gandhis omnipotent influence over the INC, and blamed Nehru, as INC Chairman, for this tragic
collapse particularly as he had endorsed the Delhi Manifesto in October 1929. This manifesto
was, above all, a result of Gandhis ambition to get the INC to initiate a political collaboration with
both the Liberals and other moderate political forces in India, and to achieve a political amnesty
for political prisoners. The Delhi Manifesto did not question when or whether India would
achieve dominion status; it was rather a political demonstration which focused on working out the
912

Bittelman wanted Chatto to explain in detail on his plan for India: [] we wish to know through whom you are
planning to send the finances, and who, in your opinion, will receive the money in India and who is going to initiate
the organisation of the organising committee. Certainly it will not do at all to send the money to Nehru or similar
elements and have them undertake the organisation of the League section in India, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/33, 10,
Letter from Bittelman, Moscow, to Chatto, Berlin, 27/8-1929.
913
RGASPI 542/1/33, 38, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Fryer/Freier, Moscow, 16/10-1929. This letter arrived in
Moscow on 18 October (stamped); RGASPI 542/1/33, 37, Short note from Fryer/Freier, Moscow, to Chatto, Berlin,
11/11-1929.
914
RGASPI 542/1/44, 24-37, Bericht ber die indische Arbeit des Internationalen Sekretariats der Liga gegen
Imperialismus. Periode von August bis Dezember 1929, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 9/1-1930.

360

details for a possible constitution based on India receiving dominion status. The manifesto had
been largely a reaction to a political field study of India in 1929 and its ensuing evaluation by a
British government official, Lord Irwin, who advocated the opinion that dominion status was a
realistic goal to achieve for the Indian independence movement. However, Nehru did not consider
this to be enough and, at the INC session in Lahore in December 1929, he referred to the manifesto
as being the reason for having adopted the far more radical Purna Swaraj Resolution, a document
which demanded complete independence for India. This act in itself also made Nehru renounce
his support of the LAIs radical policy and of its connections with the communist movement
before the INC members in Lahore. Benjamin Zachariahs study of Nehru concludes that Nehru
realised that it was dangerous to be bound by the communists methods, referring particularly to
the episode of the KMT putsch in April 1927, which had proven to be so disastrous for those
involved.915
Chatto continued to criticise Nehru. In the end, Nehru reacted by severing both his relation
with Chatto and the INCs collaboration with the LAI. On January 30 1930, Nehru sent two letters,
the first a personal letter to Chatto, and the second to the International Secretariat declaring his
resignation from the LAI Executive. Nehru explained in his letter to Chatto the reason why he had
decided to leave the LAI:
My dear Chatto, [] I am afraid you are often very much mislead by some of your
correspondents in India. I can well understand a difference in outlook. If this difference is
fundamental then co-operation is difficult. [] In any event it does not help matters much by
calling people with whom you may happen to disagree a little traitors and the like.916
In his letter of resignation to the International Secretariat, Nehru introduced himself as the INCs
representative. According to Nehru, many things that your secretariat had done appeared to us
[INC] strange, especially the hostility shown towards Gupta in Frankfurt and the attitude to our
Congress. Nehru questioned even why he had bothered to support the LAI, a belief that in turn
had made the INC question Nehrus position. Thus, the International Secretariats common
practice of magnifying such criticisms does not make it any easier for us to continue our
association with you or to contribute to your funds, thus, the sooner we separate the better,

915

Roger Baldwin lost his interest in the LAI in 1931. In a letter to Nehru, Baldwin explained that he had just been
expelled because of his support for the INC, see Roger Baldwin to Nehru, 29/4-1931, in Nehru 1958, pp.96-97; V.
Chattophadyaya to Nehru, Berlin, 4/12-1929, in Nehru 1958, pp.79-81; Barooah 2004, pp.262-265; Benjamin
Zachariah, Nehru, Routledge, Oxon, 2004, pp.64-66.
916
Nehru argued that Chatto would change his mind if you came in personal contact with some of our most
aggressive young men who pose as workers leaders you might change your opinion of them. Some of them
undoubtedly are fine young men but some also are entirely untrustworthy, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 50, Letter from
Nehru, Allahabad, to Chatto, Berlin, 30/1-1930. Nehrus letter is also included in Gopal 1975, p.139, and Barooah
(2004, p.266).

361

Nehru concluded.917 The International Secretariat reacted to Nehrus resignation with silence.
However, Chatto experienced the situation as humiliating, asking the ECCI to allow him to reply
to Nehru, a point of view supported by the ZK KPD, who told Piatnitsky that Nehrus behaviour
was an intolerable act which deserved some kind of response.918 However, the Political
Commission advised everyone involved to remain silent and to await further instructions, while
informing the International Secretariat to act cautiously in its future contacts with Nehru. Chatto
ignored these instructions, however. Barooah writes that Chatto sent a letter to Nehru, asking him
to show tolerance towards mistakes simply because these happen to be pointed out by
Communists. At this point, however, the split between the two of them had deepened to such a
degree that they could no longer see eye to eye. The Nehru case had revealed Chattos fateful
ideological conversion from being a nationalist revolutionary to having communism as his only
ally.919

The aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress merely confirmed the complete dependence of the
International Secretariat on the Comintern apparatus in Moscow. On 6 and 19 December 1929, the
International Secretariat held two meetings in order to assess the situation, reaching the conclusion
that activity had either slowed down or had reached a complete standstill at all levels, e.g. its

917

According to Nehru, the separation was a logical step for both parties: [I]f you feel that there is a vital difference
between your viewpoint and that of the Congress then it obvious that we cannot work on a common platform [] That
would be a straightforward course and that would give both parties full freedom of action. But it is an impossible
position for us to be associated with you and to be continually attacked by you, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 51-54,
Official letter from Nehru, Allahabad, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 30/1-1930.
918
RGASPI 542/1/44, 55, Decision of the International Secretariat, author: Chatto, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 2/21930. The Colonial Commission of the CPGB did not appreciate the suggestion to expel Nehru at once, and referred to
the mistakes committed by the British LAI Section in connection with Maxtons expulsion. This differed from the
opinion of the ZK KPD, which urged Piatnitsky to get the ECCI to sanction the direct expulsion of the traitorous
Nehru, RGASPI 542/1/44, 59, Letter from the COLONIAL DEPARTMENT [CPGB], London, to the International
Secretariat, Berlin, 21/2-1930. For the ZK KPD, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 22, Vertraulich, ZK KPD, to Piatnitsky,
Moscow, 6/2-1930.
919
Barooah 2004, p.266. In Frankfurt, Chatto described to Bjarne Braatoy that the Indian movement came in first
place, and communism was the second option, see IISG LSI Archives 3050/60-61, Letter from Braatoy, Berlin, to
Adler, Zurich, 6/8-1929. Why did the Political Commission restrain Chatto? According to the Political Commission,
Kuusinen should send directives to the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion (Mnzenberg and Smeral), and tell
them to do nothing at all. Thus, if Nehru received no response from the International Secretariat, time would be the
LAIs ally. However, if the International Secretariat sent a formal reply to Nehru, it should contain no criticism; it
would need to be focused on Nehrus defection from the LAI Executive. In India, Nehru was preoccupied with other
issues, e.g. Gandhis salt manufacturing campaign, and the civil disobedience movement, the latter resulting, on 14
April 1930, in Nehrus arrest and a prison sentence of six months. On 7 October 1930, Smeral discussed Nehrus arrest
with Mnzenberg and Chatto, only to conclude that he was tired of waiting for a decision from someone at Comintern
headquarters on what to do with the Nehru question. Making an effort to solve the stalemate, Smeral wrote a draft
resolution on Nehru and sent it to the Political Commission. However, the Political Commission dismissed this
resolution, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/19, 1-4, Protokoll Nr.47 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des
Politsekretariats des EKKI, 23/3-1930; RGASPI 495/4/19, 86, Confidential letter from [Kuusinen], Moscow, to
Mnzenberg and Smeral, Berlin, 28/3-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 108, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Mnzenberg &
Chatto, Berlin, 7/10-1930. For Smerals draft, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 109-111; Gopal 1975, pp.141-143.

362

connections with India and the Meerut trial campaign920 as well as the Negro question,921 while
internal chaos had begun to consume several of the sections (the Dutch and British sections).
Unable to pay the debts (13,021 Marks) accumulated in connection with the Frankfurt Congress,
Mnzenberg, Chatto and Smeral had no answer to the question of how to proceed. To confirm the
crisis, Hans Jger, the secretary of the German LAI Section in Berlin, told Mnzenberg that, due to
the lack of finance, that section would cease activity on 1 January, 1930. Jger needed a monthly
sum of 50 Marks to finance its work.922 The crisis had arrived.
*
The Crisis
My initial impression of the general situation, as noted by Smeral on 2 January 1930, was that
the crisis dealt essentially with the very existence of the LAI. Previous interpretations of the LAI
have ignored the structural effects the Frankfurt Congress had on the International Secretariat,
leading to the beginning of a dynamic period. Despite Haikals discerning and ground-breaking
narrative on the LAI, he only conceded that, by the beginning of 1930, the organisation had lost
almost every non-communist member, and that this was merely a reflection of Comintern policy
in the Third Period. Another interpretation has been given in Matthew Worleys evaluation of
the British LAI Section, which describes a section which had voluntarily retreated into isolation
due to the expulsion of former left-wing supporters, although this did not prevent the British LAI
Section from continuing to function.923 This is a perspective which offers a deeper understanding
of the dynamics of the crisis. The primary aim here is to evaluate and analyse how this crisis

920

The Comintern wanted to develop the Meerut campaign at the end of 1929. CPGB member, Tom Bell, suggested to
the political advisor for the campaign, J. T. Murphy, that every step of the campaign had to be co-ordinated along the
lines of the Tenth ECCI Plenum, i.e. to prepare political questions and speeches from the prisoners, expose
imperialist rule in India under the MacDonald Government and connect the trial with the theme of class
suppression of all labour organisations in India. Hence, the declarations of international solidarity of the colonial
masses with workers in the metropolitan countries would pave way for the support of the Soviet Union as the
Workers fatherland, and in defence of the Comintern, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/4, 10, Letter from Tom Bell, London,
to Political Commission, Moscow, 1/11-1929. Bells letter was forwarded by Piatnitsky to the Political Commission,
see fol. RGASPI 495/4/4, 12, Short note from the ECCI Bureau, Moscow, to the Political Commission, Moscow, 2/111929.
921
The Negro question was primarily taken care of by either the ECCI Negro Bureau or the Profintern Negro Bureau
in Moscow.
922
RGASPI 542/1/39, 49-54, Protokoll der Sekretariatssitzung, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/12-1929;
RGASPI 542/1/39, 55-58, 55-58, Protokoll der Sekretariatssitzung , Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/121929.
923
Haikal 1995, p.151; Worley 2002, p.228. By 1930, the international communist movement was targetted by the
uncertain development of the class against class policy, according to Worley (ed., 2004, p.11). Janet Patricia Little
offers in her biography of French philosopher and petitioner against colonialism, Simone Weil, another approach to
this complex scenario. According to Little, at the beginning of the 1930s Weil experienced the left-wing movement as
being somewhat split along ideological lines, in which the LAI had lost its impetus due to internal dissent and a
conflict between the communists and reformists, see Simone Weil & Janet Patricia Little (ed.), Simone Weil on
Colonialism: an Ethic of the Other, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 2003, p.11.

363

affected the LAI. The general objective here is to discern how the decision-makers (individuals
and departments) at Comintern headquarters negotiated in order to come up with an idea that
would resolve the crisis.
Smerals 2 January report was a vivid testimony to the LAI. In the report, Smeral
recommended that Piatnitsky reflect over the need to get the Eastern Secretariat, the WEB and the
communist parties in Europe to systematically assist the LAI.924 In fact, this was a conclusion
which had originally been introduced by Bittelman in his DR LAI. However, while Bittelman had
discussed the option of re-organisation as a solution to the inherent problems of the LAI, at the
beginning of 1930, the question centred around finding motives to sustain and keep the LAI alive.
At this point in time, the WEB emerged as one of the solutions to assist Smeral and the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters in gathering intelligence on the International Secretariat.925
Adding to its emerging paranoia, the International Secretariat suspected some of the noncommunist members in the LAI Executive of plotting a coup to seize power over the antiimperialist movement.
Smeral observed how the national sections barely existed in the most important countries:
England,926 France, USA, Germany and the Netherlands. This was further borne out by the facts
that the sections had not organised any conferences after the Frankfurt Congress, the members
refused to pay any fees, while the International Secretariat had no money with which to support the
sections. Nonetheless, Smeral believed that these problems should not prevent the sections from
taking their own independent initiatives, e.g. raising money or establishing campaigns. However,
Michail/Piatnitsky should have no high illusions.927 On the other hand, Hans Jger offered a
more realistic picture of the troublesome situation in Germany: the German LAI Section was on its
knees due to the constant shortage of money and having at its disposal useless political material.928
However, this was an internal crisis; therefore neither the International Secretariat nor the German
924

RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Freunde [Michail/Piatnitsky], Moscow, 2/1-1930.
RGASPI 495/4/4, 55a, Information from the Bureau of the [ECCI] Secretariat, Moscow, to members of the Political
Secretariat, Moscow, 2/11-1929. Helmut/Dimitrov was the formal leader of the WEB, supported by other European
communists, e.g. Remmele, Barb, Ferguson and Tischler.
926
Bridgeman wondered whether Arnot could ask the International Secretariat to send some money to the British LAI
Section. Working together with A. Glyn Evans, the organiser in London (according to Bridgeman), the section was
suffering from a constant shortage of funds, a fact that made it impossible to find new contacts, maintain old ones and
organise propaganda campaigns, RGASPI 542/1/46, 6, Letter from Bridgeman and A. Glyn Evans (organiser),
London, to Arnot, Moscow (Hotel Lux), 19/1-1930.
927
Smeral had noted that the International Secretariat only had 16 Marks left in its cash box at the office, however, its
debts amounted to over 10,000 Marks, see fol. RGASPI 495/19/312, 1-4, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Freunde
[Michail/Piatnitsky], Moscow, 2/1-1930.
928
According to Hans Jger, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf had a monthly circulation of 4,000 copies in Germany, yet
this was not enough to sustain activity. A minimum of 100 Marks per month would keep the section alive, supported
by an additional 250 Marks to cover the travel costs for instructors and referents to visit the local branches. In the
beginning of 1930, the German LAI Section had branches in Berlin (250 members), Frankfurt (550), Chemnitz (100),
Cologne (85), Remscheid (56), Hamburg (125), Dresden (40), Hagen (36), Essen (49) and Munich (32), RGASPI
542/1/46, 13, Report on the German LAI Section, Hans Jger, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 1930.
925

364

LAI Section publicly announced the deteriorating state of affairs. Instead, the International
Secretariat announced that it was planning to organise public meetings and a series of seminars in
Berlin, together with the German LAI Section, in February and March.929 From the Schutzpolizeis
perspective in Berlin, however, these public announcements by the LAI were one explanation for
the sudden increase of Russian emissaries in the city.930
The International Secretariat believed that the non-communist members in the LAI Executive
were aiming to use the crisis to lay their hands on the anti-imperialist movement. Smeral
referred to this so-called initiative as the Independence from Moscow group (Unabhngigkeit
von Moskau) which was striving to cleanse the anti-imperialist movement of any communist
involvement. Additionally, the International Secretariat informed the Eastern Secretariat that
repeated incidents (without referring to any particular episode) by the prominente
Persnlichkeiten after the Frankfurt Congress pointed towards a suspected takeover of the issue
by the anti-imperialist movement. The International Secretariat then had to summon the LAI
Executive to discuss organisational questions, as well as the status of the LAI in the Arab region,
the recent development of the Negro question in Haiti as well as the current state of affairs in both
South and East Africa.931 The crux of the matter was that, at this point in time, there existed no
functional Executive of the LAI, according to Helmut/Dimitrov. Helmut/Dimitrov also told the
ECCI that the International Secretariat had to revise the LAIs ideological programme in order to
react against the antagonism from the non-communist members. Solving the crisis was,
nevertheless, the central issue, Helmut/Dimitrov stated. Thus, rather than holding a meeting with a
now defunct LAI Executive, the ECCI should support the idea of organising a Colonial

929

The Berlin branch of the German LAI Section intended to hold a course on Imperialism in Different Colonial
Countries at IAH headquarters in February-March, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 2, Welt am Abend, no.37,
13/2-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 7, Die Rote Fahne, No.65, 16/3-1930.
930
At an LAI meeting in Berlin on 28 January, Mnzenberg, Sandalino Junco from Mexico and Cavarello from Spain
all gave speeches. The Schutzpolizei concluded that it had been a communist meeting, suspecting the event of
functioning as a cover for the KPD, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 3-5, Der Polizeiprsident. Abteilung IA an
den Herrn Preuischen Minister des Innern, z.Hd.des Herrn Ministerialrats Schnner, hier, Berlin, 10/2-1930;
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1001/6751, 125, Short note from Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Eingeborenenkunde, Berlin, to Herrn
Geheimrat Eltester, Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 28/1-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1001/6751, 128/130, Cover and
backpage, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf. Organ der Liga gegen Imperialismus (Deutsche Sektion), Nr.1, III.Jahrgang,
Berlin, 1/2-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1001/6751, 31, Short note from Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Eingeborenenkunde,
Berlin, to Herrn Geheimrat Eltester, Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 12/3-1930.
931
RGASPI 542/1/44, 20-23, Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow,
11/1-1930. The first political question Smeral devoted attention to at the International Secretariat was the Arab
question. According to one of the first confidential reports from Smeral to Piatnitsky (completed in January), the
Arab work of the LAI had to establish connections with every anti-imperialist organisation and force in the
region. One personal contact was of particular value to the LAI Smeral stated: the Arab nationalist Hamdi el Husseini,
who lived in Jerusalem and frequently sent reports to the International Secretariat. Additionally, the International
Secretariat intended to establish a Klub der arabischen nationalen Erweckung in Berlin, and to publish a nationalist
paper in the Arabic language, RGASPI 495/19/312, 5-19, Bericht des Sekretariats [author: Smeral] des Liga gegen
Imperialismus ber die arabische Arbeit in der Periode von August bis Dezember 1929, Berlin, to the Eastern
Secretariat [?], Moscow, 10/1-1930. A copy of this report is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, 6-19.

365

Conference with delegates from the European communist parties.932 In another letter to the ECCI,
the secretary of the WEB in Berlin, Alarich (pseudonym used by the German communist
Richard Gyptner), declared that the primary intention with such a conference would not be to
examine the colonial work in the parties, but rather it would be to establish guidelines for the
future work of the International Secretariat.933
The Political Commission discussed Helmut/Dimitrovs proposal on 13 February, concluding
that the idea would be an inappropriate step, especially as there existed no adequate
documentation on the characteristics of the LAI crisis at Comintern headquarters. Furthermore,
considering the total disarray of the colonial work in the parties, the decision-makers in Moscow
found it almost impossible to even have a theoretical discussion of the issue. This resulted in the
Political Commission calling for an investigation of the crisis, with Mif being instructed to gather
intelligence on both the LAI and on the colonial work in the parties and, in connection with the
Enlarged ECCI Presidium in Moscow (8 28 February 1930), to hold minor conferences with
delegates from the parties.934
*
The Fear, and Going to Moscow: The Crisis Confirmed
We hope, despite the present political and material crisis in the League, to turn the League
into an active and useful organisation []. We have to win time.
Max [Petrovsky] to Mnzenberg and
Smeral, 15/1-1930
Max/Petrovsky assured Mnzenberg and Smeral that the ECCI Secretariat knew about the crisis,
the major question nevertheless being the need to understand the reasons and dynamics which had
caused the crisis. As part of the solution, the International Secretariat and the WEB had to send
reports to the Eastern Secretariat outlining the nature of the crisis.935 At this point in time, the
932

RGASPI 499/1/17, 54-55, Report from the WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 13/1-1930. Excerpts from the
report, including the passim on the LAI is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/37, 2, Auszug aus dem Protokoll des WEB,
Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 13/1-1930.
933
Alarich/Gyptner enclosed a number of documents in his letter to the ECCI, including one on the LAI Executive;
reports on India and the Arab countries; and Chattos personal letter in response to Nehrus defection. According to
Alarich/Gyptner, if the communist parties in Europe chose to support the LAI, this would solve a majority of the
organisations problems as well as those at the International Secretariat, RGASPI 542/1/37, 3, Protocol Betr. LAI,
author: Alarich [R. Gyptner]/WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 14/1-1930.
934
RGASPI 495/4/14, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.42 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des EKKI, 13/2-1930. Present at
the meeting were among others Piatnitsky, Heckert, Heimo, Kuusinen, Kirsanova, Manuilsky, Wassiljew, Lozovsky,
Tschang-Piao, Kornblum, Mif, Rossi and Angaretis.
935
RGASPI 495/18/863, 12-15, Letter from ECCI Secretariat [author: Max/Petrovsky], Moscow, to Smeral and
Mnzenberg, Berlin, 15/1-1930. Max/Petrovskys name is not included in a copy of the letter, see fol. 495/4/11, 58-60,
Confidential letter to Smeral and Mnzenberg from the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow, author Max [Petrovsky],

366

institutional or individual actors at Comintern headquarters had no idea of how to solve the crisis,
a conundrum that spurred some in Moscow to react with a fear of losing control over the antiimperialist movement in Europe. This also strengthened the opinion that the LAI was facing an
uncertain future; hence, the Comintern had to commence a structural and ideological reorganisation of the LAI. The central question revolved around whether to either disband or to save
the LAI. If the decision-makers chose the latter option, Berlin would be the ideal place for the
International Secretariat, and what position would the LAI then have within the international
communist movement? This crisis set in motion a critical discussion of the LAIs ideological
development since the Brussels Congress in 1927; however, the Comintern apparatus underlying
motive was to confirm its administrative grip on the International Secretariat.
For Petrovsky, the Cominterns objective was clear, telling Mnzenberg and Smeral to adapt
the International Secretariat to the conditions determined by the crisis, and to try to win time in
order to neutralise the present struggle. Hence, it was a question of getting through the ordeal
and winning time, Petrovsky concluded. However, what did this present struggle consist of?
By dividing the struggle into both objective and subjective explanations, the former concerned
the successful repression in the colonies by the imperialist nations, resulting in weak
communist parties, as well as the poor liaison between Europe and the colonies, and the lack of
money, while the latter explanation focused on the reasons why it seemed impossible to carry out
any constructive work, caused essentially by the passive national LAI sections and the
indifferent behaviour of the communist parties (the PCF, the CPGB and the KPD). Due to all
this, the LAI had failed to establish connections with workers and peasants in the imperialist and
colonial countries, while at the same time, the prominente Persnlichkeiten in the LAI were
plotting to form a new league, Petrovsky stated. Despite Petrovskys verdict on the noncommunist members on the LAI Executive, he warned of the risk of transforming the LAI into a
pure, communist organisation.936
Petrovskys evaluation was the first one on the LAI crisis to reach Comintern headquarters.
Perceived as a prognosis, the Political Commission examined Petrovskys opinions and resolved to
instruct the Eastern Secretariat to introduce a draft for a plan on how to re-organise the LAI, a

stamped date: 21/1-1930. A third copy is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/37, 8-11, Letter from ECCI Secretariat [?],
Moscow, to Smeral and Mnzenberg, Berlin, 15/1-1930. However, this version does not mention the author of the
letter.
936
Petrovsky explained that it was useless to transform the LAI into a genuine cover organisation for the Comintern. A
more constructive approach was to re-activate the national sections, convince the communist parties that the LAI was
an important factor in the communist movement, as well as improve the administrative and financial structure, see fol.
RGASPI 495/18/863, 12-15, Letter from ECCI Secretariat [author: Max/Petrovsky], Moscow, to Smeral and
Mnzenberg, Berlin, 15/1-1930.

367

process which also had to include the PCF and CPGB.937 This called for the imminent summoning
of Mnzenberg and Smeral to Moscow, for the sole reason that the Political Commission wanted
to hear their versions of the crisis. Upon receiving Piatnitskys order to travel to Moscow, Smeral
reacted with unease. Smeral explained to Piatnitsky that he was preoccupied with doing work for
the ECCI in Europe, thus, a more constructive solution would be to hold a discussion of the LAI
with representatives of the Profintern and the WEB in Berlin, while sending Mnzenberg to
Moscow.938 Piatnitsky turned down Smerals request. At the same time, Piatnitsky instructed
Mikhail Trilliser (1883 1940; also known by his Comintern persona Moskvin) to act as an
intermediary between the secretaries at Comintern headquarters in order to co-ordinate the meeting
with Mnzenberg and Smeral. Furthermore, Moskvin/Trilliser was to examine the LAI question,
beginning with Petrovskys prognosis, before presenting a conclusion on why it was necessary to
re-organise the LAI. Moskvins/Trillisers involvement indicates that the question of the LAI was a
crucial issue, particularly as Moskvin/Trillier was the head of the Soviet state security services
Foreign Department in Moscow, perceived as being one of the founders of Soviet intelligence.939
However, despite the vast number of empirical sources on the LAI in the Comintern Archive, this
is one of only a few explicit observations linking the LAI to the Soviet intelligence apparatus.
Moskvin/Trilliser pursued this assignment with vigilance. As noted in a short memorandum,
addressed to the Eastern Secretariat, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Piatnitsky, Gusev and Molotov on 26
February 1930, Moskvin/Trilliser believed that the Eastern Secretariat could not solve the issue of
re-organising the LAI on its own. In fact, the issue required the involvement of the highest
authoritative level in the Comintern. Moskvin/Trilliser nevertheless admitted that the scheduled
meeting between Mnzenberg, Smeral and the Political Commission represented an opportunity to
present the Eastern Secretariats plan on how to re-organize the LAI.940 The Eastern Secretariat
had completed the draft of a plan, Projekt des Briefes vom Sekretariat des EKKI an das ZK der
KP Frankreichs in der Frage der Umorganisierung und Belebung der Arbeit der LAI (the reorganisation project) which, despite the signature of the ECCI Secretariat, aimed to function as
consultative material in support of the decision-making process. The central issue in the reorganisation project was how to re-organise the LAI and its activities, and why it was necessary

937

RGASPI 495/4/11, 5-8, Protokoll Nr.37 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI,
23/1-1930.
938
Smeral explained to Piatnitsky that he was overburdened with work. In January, Smeral had given twelve speeches
on the Five Year Plan system in the Soviet Union in Berlin, and he felt that he had no reason to travel to Moscow.
Smeral stated that the issue was of a completely different nature for Mnzenberg, who needed to receive instructions
from the Political Commission on a coming conference of the Friends of Soviet Union, RGASPI 495/19/312, 23-24,
Letter from Smeral [handwritten], Berlin, to Michail/Piatnitsky, Moscow, 7/2-1930.
939
Rosenfeldt vol. II, 2009, p.215, 367-368.
940
RGASPI 542/1/39, 64, Moskvin, Moscow, to unknown recipient, Moscow, 26/2-1930.

368

to do so. Furthermore, the document discloses how the Eastern Secretariat perceived a
sympathising organisation such as the LAI during the third period,
If the League is to carry out its task in the present period it must base its support on workers
and peasants organisations. This is the central organisational task of the League.941
Prior to Mnzenberg and Smerals arrival in Moscow, the Enlarged ECCI Presidium was
convened. At one of its sessions, Manuilsky addressed the status of the national revolutionary
movement in the colonies, introducing the rhetorical question: who was to lead the peasant
classes, the bourgeoisie or the proletariat? The answer was obvious for Manuilsky, who declared
that it was the task of the communist party to lead the proletariat in the colonies. The crux of the
matter was that there hardly existed any operative or functional parties in the colonial and semicolonial countries, e.g. the recent events in India pointed in that direction. Kuusinen admitted
rather self-critically that he feared the masses [in India] more than British Imperialism. The
reason he gave for this was that there existed no effective strategy to prevent the Indian
bourgeoisie from sustaining its control over the workers and peasants movements. Due to
Kuusinens failure to contribute to constructing such a strategy, he concluded that the recent period
of Comintern activity in India had been nothing more than a sham struggle.942 In comparison to
the previous plenums in 1928-29, and the Sixth International Comintern congress in 1928, the
Enlarged ECCI Plenum in February 1930 served the purpose of both declaring the communists
ideological conviction and highlighting the Cominterns vigilance in realising its advocated policy
of class against class.
On 1 March, Mnzenberg and Smeral had their meeting with the Political Commission.
According to the protocol of this meeting, Smeral delivered a report on the current situation in the
LAI [not filed in the dossier], and took part in the ensuing discussion on the re-organisation
project, an issue which apparently did not involve Mnzenberg. The meeting ended with the
Political Commission endorsing a strategy on how to proceed, instructing Smeral to edit the
confidential decisions, bearing in mind the exchange of opinions (Meinungsaustausches) at
941

RGASPI 542/1/39, 65-76, Projekt des Briefes vom Sekretariat des EKKI an das ZK der KP Frankreichs in der
Frage der Umorganisierung und Belebung der Arbeit der LAI, author: Eastern Secretariat, Moscow 16/2-1930;
RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat to the ZK der KP Frankreichs, 23/3-1930; RGASPI
495/4/35, 40-52, Letter from the International Secretariat [ ECCI Secretariat], Moscow/Berlin, to the CC CPGB,
London, [3/6-1930].
942
The Enlarged Presidium discussed the preparations for the Fifth International Profintern Congress (scheduled to
convene in Moscow, August 1930); the situation in the communist parties in Great Britain, Germany, Italy and the
Soviet Union; and the struggle on how to achieve communist hegemony within the national revolutionary movement.
Manuilskys discussion on proletarian hegemony implied that the communist parties in Europe were strong enough
to cut the cords with the bourgeois class society, thus, the communist movement was liberated from pettybourgeois ideology and, therefore, could pursue an independent class policy; see Degras vol.III 1965, pp. 98-99.
According to McDermott and Agnew, ,Manuilsky introduced the resolution by pure coincidence in connection with
Stalins infamous article, Dizzy with Success, a text which called for a momentary pause in the collectivisation
process in the Soviet countryside, see McDermott & Agnew 1996, p.96.

369

the session which had contributed to the altering of the original plan of the re-organisation
project.943 According to the Political Commission, however, it would be inadvisable to dissolve
the LAI for the simple reason that it would cause a political risk:
The League must not be transformed into a genuine communist organisation; it must retain
and develop its broad basis as a non-party mass organisation. The liquidation of the League
is therefore politically dangerous, as the left-wing social reformists and national reformists
would inevitably take over the business of the Anti-Imperialist League.944
Nevertheless, the Political Commission expected the LAI to ruthlessly expose left-wing social
reformists (Maxton and Fimmen) and national reformists (the INC, the PI and the NAACP),
while at the same time expressing its concerns about turning the organisation into a genuine
communist organisation (eine rein kommunistische Organisation verwandeln). It was a mass of
contradictions, calling for provisional solutions. Firstly, the International Secretariat should get
comrades in Europe to travel to India and Indonesia to carry out missions, but only once the
Political Commission had approved each candidate. This meant that Smeral had to find candidates
by visiting the LAI sections in France, England and the Netherlands and, during his visit, explain
the purpose and aim of the re-organisation plan. Secondly, the International Secretariat had to
continue the work of supporting the establishment of LAI sections in the colonial and semicolonial countries.945
The Eastern Secretariat stated in the re-organisation project that it was obvious why it was
necessary to re-organise the LAI, first and foremost to get the organisation accustomed to the
policy of class against class. Nonetheless, it was not an easy task to re-activate the LAI after
the Frankfurt Congress, the Eastern Secretariat conceded. This involved primarily scrutinizing the
nature of the LAI network, which unfortunately had already been proven to have very few
remaining contacts. According to the Eastern Secretariat, the re-organisation project was focused
essentially on why the LAI existed, i.e. to fulfil the role as Comintern intermediary in colonial and
semi-colonial countries, and to either develop or support communist activism in regions that were

943

RGASPI 495/4/15, 1-5, Protokoll Nr.43 der Sitzung der politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI,
1/3-1930. Present at the meeting were Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Heckert, Manuilsky, Heimo, Smeral, Mnzenberg,
Jewreinov, Hopner, Mif, Chitarow, Wassiljew, Schubin, Gussew, Koplenig, Tschernin, Jefremova and Walecki.
According to this protocol, Mnzenberg was not involved in the discussion on the LAI, focusing rather on the Friends
of Soviet Union and Mezhrabpom-Film.
944
RGASPI 495/4/15, 15-17, (Vertraulich) Beschluss der Polkommission, Moscow, 1/3-1930. For a copy of this
decision, see fol. 495/20/722, 67-69.
945
The Political Secretariat instructed the WEB to distribute this letter to the European communist parties, see fol.
RGASPI 495/4/15, 15-17, (Vertraulich) Beschluss der Polkommission, Moscow, 1/3-1930. A copy of this decision is
filed in fol. 495/20/722, 67-69; RGASPI 495/3/154, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.78 der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI,
6/3-1930. For the WEB, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 90, Report from the WEB, author: Helmut/Dimitrov [?], Berlin, to
the ECCI, Moscow, 15/3-1930. The Political Secretariat sent the resolution to the WEB in Berlin, which passed on the
document for reconsideration to the International Secretariat.

370

generally sealed off to the international communist movement. However, as a result of the
Frankfurt Congress, this latter objective was facing a critical moment. The Eastern Secretariat
believed that the LAI and its organisational work was an imperative source of inspiration for the
international communist movement:
We think it is unnecessary to emphasise that a non-party organisation such as the LAI, is an
important organisation in the Third Period of Post-war capitalism. Due to its non-party
character, not limited like other international communist organisations in this period of
increased antagonism and with the growing liberation struggle in the colonial and semicolonial countries, it represents more significance than other international non-party
organisations such as the IAH, the IRH, the Friends of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Fascist
League.946
The Eastern Secretariats argument presented a concrete reason for why it was essential to keep the
LAI alive. However, aside from the Eastern Secretariat explicitly declaring its support in
sustaining the LAI, this quote was omitted in the final version of the re-organisation project,
according to the letters sent to the PCF and the CPGB.947 The question is why, and for what
reason? Firstly, the Eastern Secretariat had declared that the LAI was suffering from having been
established during the second period of post-war capitalism, which had provided socialists,
social democrats and intellectuals with a chance to influence and dominate the organisation. At the
same time, the communist parties had chosen to ignore the fact that the LAI was not only
influencing these groups in a communist direction but also represented one of the few existing
channels between the Comintern and the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The Eastern
Secretariat argued, above all, that the LAI was the leading agent to distribute Bolshevik
propaganda around the world. In comparison to other mass and sympathising organisations of the
Comintern, e.g. the IAH, the IRH, the Friends of the Soviet Union and the Anti-Fascist League, the
LAI was not overtly identified as a communist organisation, the Eastern Secretariat argued. It was
therefore crucial to retain the notion that the LAI was not a genuine Communist International
organisation in order for the organisation to continue its work in public spaces, something that
other Comintern organisations were not able to do.948 Whether this was the argument which caused

946

RGASPI 542/1/39, 65-76, Projekt des Briefes vom Sekretariat des EKKI an das ZK der KP Frankreichs in der
Frage der Umorganisierung und Belebung der Arbeit der LAI, author: Eastern Secretariat, Moscow 16/2-1930.
947
The letter to the Central Committee of the PCF was sent on March 23, while the letter to the Central Committee of
the CPGB on June 3, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/16, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.44 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des
Politsekretariats des EKKI, 8/3-1930; RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to ZK der KP
Frankreichs, Paris, 23/3-1930; RGASPI 495/4/35, 1-4, Protokoll Nr.63 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des
Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 3/6-1930; RGASPI 495/4/35, 40-52, Letter from the International Secretariat [ ECCI Secretariat],
Moscow/Berlin, to the CC CPGB, London, [3/6-1930].
948
Fredrik Petersson, The League against Imperialism: The Most Valuable Organizational Tool for Bolshevik

371

the exchange of opinions at the meeting with the Political Commission remains unknown.
However, one must not forget the fact that the Eastern Secretariats opinion concerning the LAIs
relevance within the international communist movement had been deliberately deleted.
The LAIs spiritual awakening and organisational revival depended on establishing some kind
of curative measures, the most urgent being that the communist parties had to stop ignoring their
colonial work. The ECCI Secretariat received intelligence on the French LAI Section from both its
secretary Herclet and from the functionary at the PCF secretariat in Paris, Gabrielle Cormon (real
name: Henriette Tartavel). The disheartening information indicated that no intellectuals wanted to
remain in the anti-imperialist movement in France, while the LAI had ceased to exist from an
organisational point of view and was merely a figment of the imagination printed on paper.949
The British LAI Section was no better off, having the Political Secretariat question why the
Central Committee of the CPGB had chosen to support the Friends of the Soviet Union rather than
the LAI.950 The ECCI and the Political Secretariat considered the activities of the LAI sections in
Great Britain and France as crucial because these countries were the strongest imperialist
powers, and they would, therefore, be able to link the anti-imperialist movement in Europe with
the ones existing in the French and British colonies. The ECCI Secretariat realised, however, that
the PCF and CPGB had to focus on different issues in its support for the LAI sections. In France,
the PCF could help the section to increase its membership ratio by instructing the IAH, the IRH,
the Friends of the Soviet Union and the LDRN to become collective members and, secondly, by
establishing connections in the trade unions and among seamen from the black African
colonies.951 In Great Britain, the section had to apply a from-below perspective, i.e. focus on
colonial associations active in the universities, e.g. the Indian Students Association and the West
African Students Union had branches in Oxford, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Manchester, Belfast and
Glasgow. The CPGB could therefore contribute by assisting the section to organise curricular
courses on imperialism and Marxism. The courses had to be held under the strictest of precautions,
Propaganda in the Imperialist and Colonial World during the Interwar Era? Synopsis of a doctoral thesis, in The
International Newsletter of Communist Studies, Bernhard H. Bayerlein (ed.), Vol.XIII (2007), No.20, University of
Mannheim, Mannheim, pp.105-110.
949
RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to ZK der KP Frankreichs, Paris, 23/3-1930.
For Henriette Tartavel (1904 - ?), first a syndicalist then a communist, see Rachel Mazuy, Croire plutt que voir?
Voyages en Russie sovitique, 1919-1939, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2002, p.341 (see footnote 41).
950
The letter from the International Secretariat (authored in secrecy by the ECCI Secretariat) to the Central Committee
of the CPGB stated the following: We are of the opinion that the problems to which we are earnestly calling the
attention of the Party leadership in this letter can be solved in a satisfactory manner only if the Polit Bureau of the
Party devotes sufficient attention to them and if our fraction in the Executive of the League succeeds with the help of
the Party in bringing about a definite advance in its organisational and political work, RGASPI 495/4/35, 40-52,
Letter from the International Secretariat [ECCI Secretariat], Moscow/Berlin, to the CC CPGB, London, [3/6-1930].
951
The ECCI Secretariat realised, however, that it was impossible to establish an open, legal League organisation in
the French colonies, above all in East Africa. The LAI should therefore use covert strategies to distribute its
propaganda, and to find contacts in clubs, associations for national liberation, or only as committees, see fol.
RGASPI 495/4/16, 81-90, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to ZK der KP Frankreichs, Paris, 23/3-1930.

372

the ECCI Secretariat argued, and the section could only engage itself with the colonial associations
once the Party has checked up on them. Essentially an idea relying on a hierarchical agreement
between the party and section, having the section co-ordinate the connections with the British
colonies, but only under the direct supervision of the Central Committee of the CPGB. The
question of West Africa proved, nevertheless, to be an exception to the above. According to the
ECCI Secretariat, the first step there was to evaluate whether it even was worth the effort to
organise the West African organisations into a section of the League (Gold Coast, Sierra Leone,
Gambia and Nigeria; workers and peasants organisations). If the idea seemed too complicated to
realise, the British LAI Section had to, at least, establish contacts through sailors who could be
used to distribute propaganda on the LAI in West Africa.952 These propositions from the ECCI
Secretariat also indicated that the International Secretariat should perfect its role as the hub for the
anti-imperialist movement in Europe. However, in order to execute its original aim as a Comintern
intermediary, the International Secretariat in Berlin needed to be more closely supervised by the
WEB and the KPD.
*
A Languishing Movement, Part I
Smeral left Moscow in March. Upon his return to Berlin, Smeral discovered that the International
Secretariat was languishing. William Patterson, acting as the plenipotentiary of the Profintern
Negro Bureau, also made a similar comment after visiting the International Secretariat in April,
describing it as a place of apathy and passivity.953 An even more detailed description of the
International Secretariat was given by the American communist, Margaret Dean (real name:
Margaret Cowl), in a letter to Piatnitsky. After having completed a secret mission in England in the
beginning of 1930 to prepare the 5th World Congress of the Profintern, Dean made a short
stopover in Berlin before travelling to Moscow. Dean went to the International Secretariat where
she met Chatto, who informed her of the steady decline of the LAI on all levels, telling her to pass
on this information to Piatnitsky:

952

RGASPI 495/4/35, 40-52, Letter from the International Secretariat [ ECCI Secretariat], Moscow/Berlin, to the CC
CPGB, London, [3/6-1930].
953
Smeral instructed Magyar to pass on this letter to Kuusinen after he had read it, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 37,
(Confidential) Handwritten letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 27/3-1930; RGASPI 534/4/330, 1-4,
(original) letter of WW[ilson]/Patterson to Negro Bureau/Profintern, London 18 April, 1930; RGASPI 534/4/330, 20
letter from Padmore (G.P.) to Dear Comrades, 15/4-1930. First, Pattersons reference to the apathy in Berlin
concerned, above all, the indifference at the International Secretariat to assist with the preparatory work for the
ITUCNW conference in Hamburg. Hence, Patterson wondered whether this attitude extended to the colonial question
in general. The ITUCNW conference convened in Hamburg on 7 July, with Chatto appearing as an LAI delegate, see
fol. RGASPI 534/4/330, 13fp+bp handwritten letter from WW [Patterson], London, to the Negro Bureau Profintern,
Moscow, 24/5-1930, see Weiss (2011) and Adi (2008).

373

They want something to be done about the League becoming a more functioning body.
Comrade Chatto said that workers in colonial countries must be placed in the League. More
attention to colonial work. [] What is needed is some organisational changes. Smeral who
is receiving USD 150.00 a month in wages, really has no important work to do in the office.
In his stead some workers on colonial work could be taken in. Chatto said Smeral himself
says he has no work to do in the office.954
This languishing state of affairs brought to the attention of the institutional and individual actors at
Comintern headquarters the need to re-organise the LAI. However, the process depended on
getting the PCF and the CPGB to respond to the re-organisation project, leaving the
International Secretariat on its own to face the consequences of the crisis.
Mnzenberg knew that the question of the communist parties indifference towards supporting
the LAI had been an issue addressed by the Political Commission. Attempting to re-approach the
ZK KPD, Mnzenberg declared that a majority of the difficulties linked to the activities of the LAI
in Germany were due to the lack of administrative support from the party apparatus. Thus, to
improve the almost non-existent relations between the LAI and the KPD, something that in turn
would bolster the LAI in Germany, Mnzenberg wondered whether the ZK KPD could instruct
every member to begin showing an interest in colonial questions, as well as get other communist
organisations to become collective members. Mnzenberg stated that the ZK KPD could no longer
continue to ignore the LAI, especially as the organisation had managed to infiltrate and influence
different colonial communities in Berlin. For Paul Scholze, a secretary of the German LAI Section,
the gravity of the situation had a more serious implication, informing the Eastern Secretariat that
the section had reached its lowest point in Germany, where the local branches resembled clubs
rather than large, active sections.955
Despite the crisis, Chatto still attempted to co-ordinate the anti-colonial activists in the LAI
network in both Berlin and beyond. Yet, Chattos long-standing antagonism towards Roy reached a
critical point in 1930, consuming most of his energy. After Roys official expulsion from the
Comintern due to his alleged support of the German social democratic Brandler organisation, a
decision endorsed by the ECCI Presidium on 11 November 1929, Roy became a persona non
954

RGASPI 495/19/312, 32fp/bp, Letter from Margaret Dean [Margaret Cowl, Margaret Undjus, Krumbein],
Moscow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 6/6-1930. Dean had been a student at the ILS, conscripted during her studies to carry
out clandestine missions in the service of the Profintern in between her studies. Deans surname was Undjus, not
Cowl, as suggested in Herbert Romerstein and Eric Breindels analysis of Soviet espionage. Dean was also married to
Charles Krumbein, a person involved in the Cominterns clandestine service in Great Britain. Krumbein was
arrested in England in 1930, where he served six months in prison for using a false passport, see Klerh, Haynes and
Firsov (eds.) 1995, pp.42-43; Herbert Romerstein & Eric Breindel, The Venona Secrets: Exposing Soviet Espionage
and Americas Traitors, Regnery Publishing, Washington, 2000, p.526.
955
RGASPI 542/1/39, 102-103, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ZK KPD, Berlin, 20/3-1930; For Paul Scholz,
see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 7, Protokoll der Sekretariatsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, to the Eastern
Secretariat, Moscow, 25/5-1930.

374

grata. From the autumn of 1929 up until November 1930, Roy was living in Berlin under the
pseudonyms Roberto or Villa Garcia, completing his book Revolution and Counter-Revolution
in China, before returning to India in December 1930.956 Chatto regarded Roys presence in Berlin
as uncomfortable, telling Mnzenberg that Roy used every opportunity to fraternise with Indian
anti-colonial activists. Apparently, Chatto suspected that either Roy was interfering intentionally in
his activities, by convincing LAI members to leave the organisation, or that he was simply stealing
candidates supportive of the organisation. Because of this, Chatto urged Mnzenberg to help him
to curb Roys actions. One way to do so was to send a warning about Roys activities to the ZK
KPD and the ECCI. Hence, Chatto suggested using the communist press to expose the Roys
adventures in Berlin, and by so doing, this would hopefully disrupt his connections with Indian
activists, as well as reveal his intimate collaboration with the Brandlerianer. The root of Chattos
dismay was that Roy had evidently managed to establish some kind of contact with Indian
associations in Berlin. For example, the Indian Association (Verein der Inder) frequently referred
to Roy, particularly as one of its members, Saikh, was also living in Roys apartment. Furthermore,
Chatto suspected that Roy had infiltrated the Indian Students Central Association in London. In
addition, the secretary of this association, Sunder P. Kabadi, was a supporter of Roy, the latter
having convinced the former to move to Berlin, Chatto stated. For Saklatvala, this was all
particularly embarrassing, as it was he who had first introduced Kabadi to the British LAI Section,
Chatto concluded. This paranoia continued as Chatto accused Clemens Dutt of having been in
contact with comrade Rhadouri, apparently known to be closely connected to Roy. Thus, Dutt
had to end this relationship, and if he refused to do so, Chatto told Mnzenberg to contact the
ECCI and the Central Committee of the CPGB for the sole reason of warning Dutt. In Berlin, Roy
had organised a number of fairly successful political evenings, which included the provision of
free beer. Chatto actually feared that if the Roy people continued to obstruct the activities of
the LAI, it would be necessary for the Comintern to organise a campaign in the Indian press to
expose Roy before he has stirred up too much confusion.957
The paranoia regarding Roy, and the ensuing confusion caused by the crisis, ultimately
destroyed Chatto. Smeral observed how Chattos health was deteriorating rapidly, due to liver
problems. In March, Chatto was admitted to a hospital in Berlin to receive urgent medical care.
956

RGASPI 495/213/18, 26, Auszug dem Protokoll Nr.21 der Sitzung des Prsidiums des EKKI, Moscow, 23/11-1929.
Present at the meeting were Kuusinen, Chitarow, Lozovsky, Rust, Manuilsky, Purman, Piatnitsky, Bell, Katayama,
Garlandi, Ulbricht, Strakhov, Kolarev, Meriko Ledo, Reimann, Musso, Bela Kun and Stalin. Piatnitsky signed the
decision; Samaren Roy, M. N. Roy. A Political Biography, Orient Longman Limited, Hyderabad, 1997, p.85. Samaren
Roy writes that Roy lived in Mnzenbergs flat, however, this is an unlikely proposition, particularly as the Comintern
had categorised Roy as a persona non grata.
957
RGASPI 495/19/312, Letter [Abschrift] from Chatto, Berlin, to Mnzenberg, [?], 24/3-1930. Saikh attended the
Frankfurt Congress as the accredited delegate of the Verein der Indier Zentraleuropas, and Allindische
Jugendkongress, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 23.

375

While this was happening, Mnzenberg himself received a diagnosis of being overworked,
while at the International Secretariat Otto Schudel notified Smeral of his resignation and of his
plan to travel to Basel to work for the IAH. Nevertheless, Smeral promised the Eastern Secretariat
that the International Secretariat would try its best to continue its activity.958 What kind of activity
did Smeral have in mind? The Meerut Conspiracy Trial campaign had nearly ceased to exist in
Germany, thus the International Secretariat wanted, in collaboration with the ZK KPD, to revive
the campaign, rather than merely act as its financial supporter. For example, Smeral had provided
Pollitt with an unknown amount of money to rescue the Meerut campaign within the British LAI
Section. A second question was the Negro Labour Congress [ITUCNW] in July, for which
Chatto had written a European Declaration in the name of the LAI to be delivered at the
congress. Finally, the International Secretariat had sent instructions to the Central Committee of
the CPUSA on how to revive its LAI section.959 For the International Secretariat, however, this
only uncovered its existing flaws, with the constant lack of money limiting the LAIs scope and
opportunity to develop its activity. The ECCI Secretariat finally conceded that the International
Secretariat could not do any more than was possible due to the crisis, informing the WEB that the
LAI question would remain unresolved until further notice.960
The Meerut campaign was the exception to the above. Mnzenberg seemed convinced that the
campaign would get support from the ZK KPD, particularly as the LAI had infiltrated the Indian
community in Berlin. The German LAI Section planned to organise proletarian solidarity
demonstrations in Berlin, with a focus on the Meerut prisoners, with Mnzenberg telling the ZK
KPD that these events would summon large crowds available for the KPD to infiltrate.961 After
the May Day struggle against imperialism demonstration in Berlin, Mnzenberg persisted with
his negotiations with the ZK KPD and the WEB on the Meerut campaign. Yet, the central question
958

RGASPI 542/1/39, 37, (Confidential) Handwritten letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 27/3-1930.
Mnzenberg informed Piatnitsky of his visit to the doctor. As Mnzenberg had been advised to take a leave of absence
from all kinds of activity from April to June, he was not involved in the International Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI
495/19/312, 26, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Lieber Genosse [Piatnitsky], Moscow, 27/3-1930. For Schudels
resignation, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 85-87, Projekt zum Protokoll der Sekretariatssitzung der LAI, Berlin, to the
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/4-1930.
959
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 11-12, Der koloniale Freiheitskampf, III. Jahrgang, Nr.2, Berlin, Mrz 1930;
RGASPI 542/1/39, 85-87, Projekt zum Protokoll der Sekretariatssitzung der LAI, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat,
Moscow, 3/4-1930. The ECCI Secretariat informed the International Secretariat (kom.Fraktion) that Sandino had
told the Central Committee of the CPUSA that he was a staunch supporter of the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 495/18/863,
18, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to the kom.Fraktion/LAI, Berlin, 1/4-1930.
960
RGASPI 542/1/39, 77-84, (Handwritten) Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 5/4-1930.
Piatnitsky expected Smeral to write a detailed budget for the monthly expenses of the International Secretariat.
According to Smeral, then, the International Secretariat needed 6,325 Marks, per month, to cover all expenses, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/39, 134, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to unknown receiver [Piatnitsky], [Moscow], 2/5-1930; RGASPI
542/1/39, 146-149, Beilage II [Budget] Berlin, author: Smeral, to [Piatnitsky], Moscow, May, 1930. For the WEB, see
fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 105, Auszug aus dem Protokoll des WEB vom 11/4-1930. For a copy of the excerpt, see fol.
RGASPI 495/155/74, 94; RGASPI 495/18/863, 16, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat to the WEB, (stamped date +
copy), 25/3-1930.
961
RGASPI 542/1/39, 102-103, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ZK KPD, Berlin, 20/3-1930.

376

for Mnzenberg was to get the Political Secretariat to withdraw its decision temporarily
prohibiting the International Secretariat from engaging itself in the Meerut campaign. To meet
Mnzenberg midway, Helmut/Dimitrov contacted the Political Secretariat to convince them to lift
the ban.962
The chance to devote its attention to the Meerut campaign was enough to persuade the
International Secretariat to introduce the idea of sending an LAI delegation from Europe to India.
According to an official request sent by the International Secretariat to the Secretary of State for
India in London, the composition of the delegation was presented and the purpose of the journey
to India laid out:
Sir, at a special meeting of the Secretariat of the LAI to consider the situation that has arisen
in India, it was resolved to send a delegation of the League to that country to report on the
position there, and the following gentlemen were appointed to be members of the delegation:
Reginald Bridgeman, London, J.R., London, Edo Fimmen, Amsterdam, Prof. Zdenek
Nejedly, Prague, Henri Barbusse, Paris, Willi Mnzenberg, M.d.R., Berlin, Georgij Dimitrov,
Sofia. It is intended that the delegation should proceed to India not later that June 1st next
and we should therefore be much obliged if you would be good enough to instruct the British
Council in Berlin to grant the necessary visas to the above mentioned gentlemen whose
passports will be duly submitted to the Consulate for this purpose by the Secretariat of the
League.963
The British India Office in London refused to approve the necessary visas. Yet, this refusal in itself
functioned as a pretext for launching anti-imperialist propaganda in Germany. For example, Die
Rote Fahne stated that the MacDonald governments decision to refuse a delegation of the LAI to
visit India illustrated the suppression of the Indian liberation struggle.964
The responses from the PCF and the CPGB on the re-organisation project turned into a farce.
In April, Smeral wanted to visit the PCF Secretariat in Paris to see whether the party had initiated
any discussion.965 However, he chose to remain in Berlin. In May, the International Secretariat

962

RGASPI 542/1/39, 151, An das Sekretariat des ZK der KPD, Internationale Sekretariat, LAI, Berlin, May, 1930;
RGASPI 542/1/39, 150, Letter from the League Fraction, Berlin, to WEB, Berlin, 2/5-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA
R/1501/20200, 9, Kampftag gegen Imperialismus, in Welt am Abend, No.91, 29/4-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA
R/1501/20200, 10, Untersttzt die indische Revolution!, in Die Rote Fahne, 6/5-1930; RGASPI 499/1/17, 116,
Auszug aus dem Protokoll des WEB [Helmut/Dimitrov], Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 7/5-1930.
963
RGASPI 542/1/39, 155, Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Secretary of State for India,
Whitehall, London, 10/5-1930. British authorities argued that this application verified the communist connotations of
the LAI, where a statement such as the Meerut campaign was no better form of propaganda [to] to arouse British
workers to the facts of the situation in India spoke for itself, see TNA PRO KV2/773, Letter from unknown author,
London, to Norton, London, 16/7-1930.
964
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 15, Die Rote Fahne, No.128, 4/6-1930.
965
RGASPI 542/1/39, 99, Letter from unknown author, Berlin, to CC PCF, Paris, 4/4-1930; RGASPI 542/1/39, 106107, Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/4-1930.

377

informed the WEB that Smeral could leave for Paris at any given moment to pressure the PCF. The
WEB decided to assume control over the question, and sent the re-organisation project letter for
a third time to Cormon at the PCF. Cormon was acting temporarily as the leader of colonial work
in Paris after Doriots arrest and imprisonment. As it turned out, Cormon never replied to this
letter, either to the International Secretariat or to the WEB. The situation reached such a critical
point that Smeral had no other option than to contact Magyar on 4 June. According to Smeral, the
PCFs indifference, not even bothering to acknowledge receipt of the letter, was nothing short of
shameful, a behaviour which made it very difficult to re-organise the LAI. With Doriot now out
of prison, he was able to meet Smeral in Berlin in June, and tried to explain that any letters from
the LAI or the WEB were no longer to be found at the PCF Secretariat in Paris. Despite Smeral
informing him of the repeated attempts to send the re-organisation project, Doriot stated that he
knew nothing about the plan.966 Whether or not Doriot had deliberately concealed any knowledge
of both the letters and the plan is unknown and, despite Cormon having discussed every question
on the colonial work with Magyar in Moscow, the Political Commission nevertheless decided to
give Doriot four months in which to compile an extensive report on the French LAI Section and
the anti-imperialist movement in France.967
The Central Committee of the CPGB realised it would be easier to respond during the Fifth
International Profintern Congress in Moscow.968 In May, the WEB sent a draft of the reorganisation project to Arnot in London, who told Smeral that it would be very useful in giving
an impetus to the work. The International Secretariat sent the final version to the Central
Committee of the CPGB in June.969 While waiting to proceed with the re-organisation of the LAI,
Mnzenberg and Smeral decided to gather intelligence on the colonial work being done by other
European communist parties, with a focus on their relations to the LAI. This depended on having
the opportunity to first identify and then locate the sources of information. Thus, the most
966

RGASPI 542/1/39, 150, Letter from the League Fraction/International Secretariat, Berlin, to the WEB, Berlin, 2/51930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 7-8, Protokoll der Sekretariatssitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, to the Eastern
Secretariat, Moscow, 25/5-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 1, Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Freunde [Magyar], Moscow,
4/6-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 16-19, (Streng vertraulich) Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Liebe Freunde (Magyar),
Moscow, 5/7-1930. At a meeting in Berlin, Smeral gave Doriot information on liaison techniques and reliable
addresses in Paris.
967
RGASPI 542/1/37, 76, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Smeral and Mnzenberg, Berlin, 18/6-1927
[sic: 1930]. The indifference of the PCF continued. On 3 September, 1930, however, the Political Commission reacted
against the PCF, demanding that Doriot give an explanation, and instructing the ICC to carry out an investigation to
rectify the breach of discipline in the party, RGASPI 495/4/49, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.79 der Sitzung der Politischen
Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 3/9-1930.
968
RGASPI 542/1/39, 104-105, Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to Pollitt, London, 10/4-1930;
RGASPI 542/1/39, 95-96, Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 10/41930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 16-19, (Streng vertraulich) Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Liebe Freunde (Magyar),
Moscow, 5/7-1930.
969
RGASPI 542/1/39, 106-107, Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow,
22/4-1930; RGASPI 542/1/39, 156, Letter from Arnot, London, to Smeral, Berlin, 10/5-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 20,
Telegram, R. P. Arnot, London, to the Political Secretariat, Moscow, 21/6-1930.

378

constructive solution, according to the International Secretariat in a request to the Eastern

Secretariat, was to send Smeral as an LAI delegate to the Fifth International Profintern Congress in
Moscow (15 30 August, 1930). In Moscow, Smeral could both approach and hold informal
negotiations with a selection of delegates on the re-organisation of the LAI. 970 On 23 June, Magyar
presented this idea to the Political Commission, which decided that it would be convenient to
invite Smeral to the congress in order to give him a chance to meet specific delegations and to
discuss the LAI.971
*
The Trial
The League question is not a question about the so-called representation, it is a question for
the Comrades there [Moscow] to make use of existing possibilities to develop the League.
Mnzenberg to Smeral, 22/8-1930
The League was established during the second period as a united front, with the intention
of playing a progressive role between the national bourgeoisie in the colonies and the
international revolutionary labour movement. [] The misfortune of the League was that it
started during, and is connected to, the second period, when this period was coming to an
end.
Smeral to the Political Commission,
Moscow, 13/9-1930
Smeral left Berlin in July. Before arriving in Moscow in August, Smeral visited Prague to hold a
couple of meetings with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz)
to supervise and organise the Friends of the Soviet Union section and to give a public speech on
the Five-Year-Plan system in the Soviet Union. For the Profintern, the Fifth International Congress
in Moscow in August 1931 confirmed its definitive and official break with the reformist trade
union movement, focusing instead on increasing its independence as a revolutionary trade union
opposition. Edward Hallet Carr wrote in his study of the Comintern that Smeral unexpectedly
spoke as a delegate of the LAI at the congress, where he declared that the organisation was no
longer a fighting alliance between the national bourgeoisie of colonial countries and the masses of
970

RGASPI 542/1/37, 76, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Smeral and Mnzenberg, Berlin, 18/6-1927
[sic: 1930]. A copy of this letter is filed in fol. RGASPI 495/18/863, 21, Letter from the ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to
Smeral and Mnzenberg, Berlin, 18/6-1930; RGASPI 495/4/38, 1-5, Protokoll Nr.67 der Sitzung der Politischen
Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 17/6-1930.
971
RGASPI 495/4/39, 1-4, Protokoll Nr.68 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 23/61930; RGASPI 542/1/37, 81, Short note from Mif, Moscow, to Smeral and Mnzenberg, Berlin, 27/6-1930.

379

the international proletariat, but a united revolutionary mass organisation.972 While Carr
interpreted Smerals appearance as an unexpected performance, Smerals presence at the congress
was crucial as he was gathering intelligence on the LAI from the delegates; information Smeral
needed to accumulate in order to, primarily, study how the communist movement perceived the
LAI, and secondly, to write and present a report to the Political Commission detailing both why it
was essential to re-organise the LAI and how it would be possible to accomplish such an
undertaking. This was the LAIs trial. Smerals role in this drama resembled the role of a defence
lawyer. For Smeral, this required the holding of closed meetings and the organising of a smaller
conference with some of the delegates. After these sessions, Smeral summarised (in most cases)
his observations in reports, documents which functioned as the primary sources in completing his
analysis of the LAI.973 The general aim of Smerals visit was to get the decision-makers at
Comintern headquarters, the Political Commission in particular, to formulate some kind of opinion
on the LAI. Thus, the reference to a trial likened Smerals challenge to a defence of the LAI,
introducing a constructive solution to the question at stake and, finally, convincing the Political
Commission of the LAIs potential utilisation in the context of the international communist
movement. What did this process unveil? How did the decision-makers react to Smerals analysis,
and what was the result of the trial?
Smerals activity in Moscow cannot be compared to how Arnot evaluated the colonial work in
1929. Nonetheless, one cannot refute that Smeral had similar ambitions. By this I mean that by
inviting delegates known to have an opinion on colonial work, Smeral succeeded where earlier
efforts had failed in organising a colonial conference. According to an invitation to some of the
delegates at the Profintern congress, Smeral expressed the desire to hold a joint discussion on an
issue which focused on what kind of relations the communist parties had to the LAI, to colonial
work in general, and whether there existed any understanding on the colonial question. On this
occasion, Smeral wanted to hear suggestions on necessary measures for the strengthening or
eventual establishment of the non-party mass organisation [LAI] in their home countries. This
invitation was a document signed by both the International Secretariat [Smeral] and the Profintern
Colonial Department, and was endorsed by the Profintern Presidium on 14 August. This invitation
972

For Smerals activities prior to the Profintern Congress, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 16-19, (Streng vertraulich)
Report from Smeral, Berlin, to Liebe Freunde (Magyar), Moscow, 5/7-1930. E. H. Carr, Twilight of the Comintern,
Pantheon Books, New York, 1982, p.385. Carrs reference to Smerals unexpected appearance, taken from Protokoll
des V Kongresses der Roten Gewerkschaftsinternationale (1930). Smerals manuscript is filed in fol. RGASPI
534/1/143. 538 delegates from 60 countries attended the congress, which ended with a pompous celebration outside
the Trade Union building in Moscow, see Tosstorff 2004, pp.670-671; Ny Dag, RFI-kongressens avslutning, 2/91930, 1, 8 (in English: The Completion of the RILU Congress).
973
The documents in fond 542/1/42 consist of reports or transcripts of Smerals meetings with delegates from the
CPGB, the CP Austria, the CPUSA, the CP Bulgaria, the CP Hungary, the CP Greece, the CP Indonesia (Darsono), the
CP Canada, Latin America, Arab region, Rumania and Czechoslovakia.

380

also disclosed how the LAI, Profintern and the Comintern had categorised the anti-imperialist
movement on a global scale, a movement that had an active representation in eight operative parts
(a h):
a. England, Ireland, France, Germany
b. USA and Canada
c. small European states with legal possibilities (Belgium, Denmark, Holland,
Sweden, Norway, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain and
Greece)
d. small European states with openly Fascist regimes (the Balkans, the Baltic
states, Poland, Hungary, Italy)
e. Latin America
f. India, China, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Australia
g. Arab region (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and South Africa [!])
h. the Negro situation.974
*
The Colonial Conference at the Hotel Lux
Smeral had to co-ordinate the investigation on different hierarchical levels within the Comintern
structure. Once the Political Commission had approved Smerals appearance at the Profintern
congress in Moscow as the LAI representative, the Eastern Secretariat assumed responsibility over
the project and worked out the details together with Smeral. This involved a discussion with
Lozovsky, and with the leader of the Profintern Eastern Department (Ostabteilung), Lev N. Geller
(known pseudonym: Leo Heller; 1887 ?). Their primary aim was to reach an agreement on who
to invite from the non-colonial delegations to meet Smeral, and secondly, the investigation
should not cause any disturbances at the congress. The final step for the Eastern Secretariat was
to notify a range of actors at Comintern headquarters, e.g. Molotov, Manuilsky, Kuusinen,
Piatnitsky, Mif, Saffarov, Wassiljew, Magyar, Lozovsky, Heller and delegates from the communist
parties, of Smerals intention to gather intelligence on the LAI during the congress in Moscow.975
Smeral used the Hotel Lux (Zimmer Nr.12) as the base for his investigation. In the privacy
of his own room, Smeral met and interviewed representatives, later summarizing his observations
and impressions in written statements. Smeral realised that it was not sufficient to only have
private and separate sessions, a conference was also needed. By inviting delegates from Italy,
Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Portugal, Greece and
Spain to attend a colonial conference at the Hotel Lux, at 1 pm in Room 37 on 1 September,
974

RGASPI 542/1/42, 2-4, An alle Delegationen des Profinternkongresses, signed: Die Koloniale Abteilung der
Profintern & Internationales Sekretariat der Liga gegen Imperialismus [Smeral], Moscow, 14/8-1930.
975
RGASPI 542/1/42, 1, Letter from Smeral, Moscow, to the Profintern Presidium, Moscow, 17/8-1930; RGASPI
542/1/42, 5, Information from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, [August 1930]. Lev N. Geller became a victim of the
purges during the Great Terror; see Tosstorff, 2004, p.731.

381

Smeral hoped that this would be enough to achieve a thorough understanding of the issues at
stake.976 The Einladung (Invitation) explained that the colonial conference was scheduled to
last about one hour and would focus on assessing and determining tangible [and] practical
propositions on the LAI. At the conference, the delegates were also asked to hand over reports to
Smeral, along with the promise to either increase or establish contacts with the International
Secretariat in Berlin.977
What did these meetings and reports reveal to Smeral, and what was the attitude towards the
LAI among the delegates? Smeral heard that the delegates general understanding of the LAI was
that it was a failure, with some of the delegates also taking the opportunity to criticize themselves
for the incapacity of the communist parties to carry out any colonial work. Smeral gathered
information (based on his personal meetings) from the CPGB (Pollitt, William Rust), the CPUSA
(Earl Browder), the Communist Party of Indonesia (Darsono), on Latin America (Charles Gamba,
and Gibarti), the Middle East (Mustafa Saadi from Palestine), Austria (Karl Toman, Goriktschoner
[?]) and on Hungary from an unknown delegate. These reports indicate how the causality of
internal factors (the strategy of the Comintern, structural disruptions and a lack of organisational
coherency) as well as external factors (ideological confusion, mistrust and repression) explained
why the LAI had not become an international mass organisation.
Pollitt and Rust were critical towards the utopian and unrealistic ideas the Eastern
Secretariat had introduced in its re-organisation project. Taking into account the experiences and
results of the colonial work in Great Britain, the CPGB considered it to be a difficult duty to
formulate a coherent plan of action for the British LAI Section, despite the fact that the matter was
under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Commission of the CPGB. According to Pollitt and Rust,
Bridgeman was the sore point, despite him having a very influential position within the section.
The CPGB preferred to see reliable, communist functionaries such as Arnot, Rathbone and Percy
Glading leading the section. Nevertheless, the most important figure for the LAI in Great Britain
was Clemens Dutt, and his relation to his brother Rajani Palme Dutt, the specialist on the Indian
question. Pollitt and Rust concluded that despite the reliability of the above candidates, this was
not enough to solve the frustration within the section. For example, the frequent complaints from
976

Any protocol from this so-called colonial conference has not been found.
The top strata in the Comintern apparatus received the Einladung. Some of the documents, e.g. the undated
reports from the Rumanian, Greek and Hungarian delegations came from the colonial conference. Furthermore,
Smeral was unable to bring proper working material from Berlin, thus, Smeral told the Political Commission that
the investigation in Moscow depended on getting access to as much empirical material as possible in Moscow in order
to analyse the LAI properly. The Political Commission granted Smeral an additional ten days to complete his report,
see fol. RGASPI 542/1/42, 6, Einladung, Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, undated [August 1930]; RGASPI 495/4/49, 12, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.79 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 3/9-1930. Present at the
meeting were Manuilsky, Heckert, Sokolik, Wassiljew, Zirul, Gerisch, Smeral, Lozovsky, Francon, Monmousseau,
Ferrat, Stepanov, Magyar and Bela Kun.
977

382

colonial comrades on the direction and political work in the section caused confusion, yet the
CPGB chose to ignore these comrades.978
The USA LAI Section was in a terrible situation, Browder stated, resulting primarily from
Lovestones fractional struggle in 1929. Hence, this episode had produced a permanent,
ideological imprint, creating a political space for fascist agents within the anti-imperialist
movement. According to Browder, Baldwins prominence and his eager support of Lovestone had
paralysed the section. In fact, Browder argued that the USA LAI Section had been liquidated
after the Frankfurt Congress, leaving in its wake only a very weak central organisation.
Browders criticism conveyed the idea that the issue involved more than just the present LAI
crisis. Thus, this meeting offered Browder a chance to declare that in the CPUSA it was ein
Kampf zwischen uns und den Rechten (a struggle between us and the Right) on the colonial
question. The central question was to ensure that the CPUSA did not deviate from the struggle of
the Leftist against the Rightist, with Browder promising to continue to push the party strongly
to the Left. A suitable example of this was the Indian liberation movement in the USA, a
movement, according to Browder, overcrowded with Gandhist followers whom Lovestone and
Baldwin controlled. However, the CPUSA had been unable to respond due to the perilous state of
its organisational structure, Browder concluded, conceding that in order to develop a strong
communist movement in the USA, a new set of organisational conditions was required. In
comparison to Europe, Browder expressed his envy of the fact that the European parties had access
to an institutional actor such as the WEB. If the CPUSA had a similar actor at its disposal, it would
improve the unstable and complex administrative and ideological work on the Latin American
continent.979
The report on Latin America corroborated the LAI crisis on the American continents (North,
Central and South America). After Smeral had met Charles Gamba at the congress, and prior to
leaving Berlin in July, having consulted Gibarti, Smerals report outlined the fragile outlook for the
LAI in Latin America. Firstly, the IRH (referred to as the International Labour Defense [ILD] in
the USA and Latin America) had taken over the activities of the LAI in Mexico. Secondly, Julio A.
Mellas murder in 1929 was the event which had most destroyed the LAIs tentative attempts to
establish itself, particularly in Mexico. Thus, Gamba and Gibarti believed that in order to resurrect
the activities of the LAI in Latin America, an organisational and ideological re-constitution of the

978

RGASPI 542/1/42, 12-14, Besprechung mit den Vertretern der englischen Partei, Pollitt and Rust, ber die LigaFragen, Smeral, report completed in Moscow, 18/8-1930. Smeral met Pollitt and Rust on 11 August in X [Moscow].
979
RGASPI 542/1/42, 42-47, Besprechung ber Liga-Arbeit in den Vereinigten Staaten, Earl Browder to Smeral,
Moscow, [August 1930]. Bill [William F.] Dunne told Smeral to contact Ford if he wanted any information on the
Anti-Imperialist work in the Revolutionary trade unions in the USA, see RGASPI 542/1/37, 99, Short note from Bill
Dunne, Moscow, to Smeral, Moscow, 29/8-1930.

383

LAI was required, solely for the reason of attracting the anti-imperialist movement in the Americas
(North and Latin America), although this would also call for a decentralisation of the decisionmaking process. This referred explicitly to finding a solution to its structural constraints,
particularly the fact that both the USA LAI Section and the Latin American anti-imperialist
movement had New York as their operative centre. One of the major reasons for having located the
centre in New York was that not one instructor lasted longer than a month [in the] small
[Latin American] countries, hence, it had seemed to be impossible to establish a functional centre
in any of the Latin American countries. This had been a poor solution, Gibarti argued, explaining
that New York was neither a practical location nor an ideological answer to the demands of the
movement in Latin America. More importantly, the ordinary Latin American worker neither
understood nor grasped the fundamental implications of the directives issuing from New York. The
central question was, therefore, how to resuscitate the Latin American work. In comparison to
Browders appraisal of the WEB, Gamba and Gibarti wanted to involve the International
Secretariat more closely in their work assisting the activities of the LAI in Latin America.980
The reports on the Arab countries and Indonesia showed that the activity of the LAI defined
itself by external factors. According to Mustafa Saadi from Palestine, the LAI had barely
survived after being subjected to a vigorous surveillance by colonial authorities. In order to
circumvent this surveillance and thereby solve the dilemma, Saadi hoped that the re-organisation
would enable the LAI to pose as another type of anti-imperialist organisation in the Middle East.
This involved above all else establishing independent associations in countries under the control
of the imperialist nations, able to exploit the differences that existed in the bilateral relations
of the French, British and Italian mandate powers. Thus, this shift in focus would increase the
possibility of getting leftist nationalists, intellectuals and semi-proletarians to join the movement
which, in turn, could convert these elements to the service of the communists.981
The anti-imperialist movement in Indonesia was defined by the repression of the Dutch
colonial mandate. According to Raden Darsono, the intensification of the persecution had
culminated in the adoption of a law in 1930 prohibiting any connection with international
organisations, a decree which had forced the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) to retreat into
submission and become very weak, with restricted contact to the peasants and workers
movements. Furthermore, the isolation of the communist movement more or less confirmed itself
with the establishment of a united front against communism in 1930 which joined together

980

RGASPI 542/1/42, 32-34, Report on the League work in Latin America [Gamba & Gibarti], Smeral, Moscow,
21/8-1930. For Charles Gamba, see Philip Deery, Malaya, 1948: Britains Asian Cold War?, in Journal of Cold War
Studies, Vol.9, No.1, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp.29-54.
981
RGASPI 542/1/42, 39, Besprechung mit Saadi (Arabischer Genosse aus Palstina), Smeral, Moscow, 20/8-1930.

384

imperialists, nationalists and social democrats and included rhetoric portraying the LAI as an
instrument of Moscow. For Darsono, the central issue was that there existed no direct
communication links from Indonesia to the International Secretariat in Berlin. Darsono told
Smeral to consider the idea of organising roundabout communications by instructing
trustworthy Indonesians in Europe, preferably students or members of the PI, to act as couriers
from Europe to Indonesia. However, if Smeral or the Comintern did not approve, Darsono
suggested using the IRHs network, a functional channel through which to send illegal propaganda
to Indonesia via the services of colonial sailors who, on a regular basis, docked in Antwerp,
Amsterdam and Hamburg. However, after his meeting with Darsono, Smeral questioned whether
Darsono could be trusted, stating in a conclusive remark that Darsono is not a man of mass
work. Why was Smeral suspicious towards Darsono? According to Smeral, Darsono was a
journalist, something that made him act in an undisciplined manner by fraternising with the
middle leaves of the Indonesian nationalist movement, rather than with the communists.982
Karl Toman and Goriktschoner told Smeral that one can do anything in Austria, while in
Hungary, the LAI had to connect the anti-imperialist movement with the work of cultural
organisations controlled by the communists. Apparently, the anti-imperialist movement in Austria
and Hungary shared the stigma of having neither a solid structure nor any reliable contacts, while
the low level of academia on the colonial question within the communist movement required
education on the theoretical implications of anti-imperialism. Toman and Goriktschoner
nevertheless admitted that the Balkan nationalist revolutionary movement in Vienna was a vibrant
element, which also had reliable connections to Berlin. For the LAI, this was a movement that
deserved more attention as it would offer a passage into the Balkan countries. If the International
Secretariat wanted to establish contact with Balkan nationalist revolutionaries and associations,
e.g. the editor of the communist-biased journal Balkanfrderation Dimitrije Vlachoff, or the leader
of the Albanian Committee for the Liberation of Kosovo Fan Noli, who had also attended the
Frankfurt Congress and was known to travel on regular basis between Vienna and Berlin, they had
to let the Communist Party of Austria know about it. Smeral also received information on a third
candidate, the Serb nationalist Mustafa Golubitsch, a member of the Black Hand (Schwarze
Hand), the organisation which had, as highlighted by Toman and Goriktschoner, arranged the
Sarajevo assassination in 1914.983 Aside from this reference to Golubitsch, Vlachoff and Fan
Noli were, however, not new faces to the LAI.

982

RGASPI 542/1/42, 22-25, Besprechung mit Darsono, Indonesia, report completed by Smeral, Moscow, 20/8-1930.
RGASPI 542/1/42, 10-11, Besprechung ber Liga-Arbeit in sterreich (Toman and Goriktschoner), Smeral, August
1930. Karl Toman (1887 1945) was a leading person in the Austrian communist movement, in charge of relations
between the trade unions and the CP of Austria, see Lazitch 1986, p.473. The identity of Goriktschoner is unknown.
983

385

In 1928, the Berlin Chief of Police began to investigate the original source of the Balkan
communist propaganda being disseminated from Vienna, suspecting that Berlin was the original
place of distribution. Despite the fact that Vienna was functioning as the centre and rallying point
for Balkan nationalist activism during the inter-war years, it was not the only hub linking together
the activities of the Balkan revolutionary movement. The Balkanfrderation was using Berlin as
its centre of activity, from where Vlachoff and Fan Noli were organising their operations, an
arrangement which came to fruition during Fan Nolis visit to Moscow in 1928, at least according
to the suspicions of the Berlin Chief of Police.984 The establishment of the association Bund Freier
Balkan in 1929 was the result of an increasing presence of Balkan nationalist revolutionaries in
Berlin. The Bund Freier Balkan engaged a string of well-known left-wing characters: Erwin
Piscator, Ledebour, the Danish author Karin Michaelis, Barbusse, Sinclair, bishop Montgomery
Brown, the author Maxim Gorki and Mnzenberg. However, the Berlin Chief of Police could not
verify whether the LAI, the Balkanfrderation and the Bund Freier Balkan had established any
connection, deciding to leave the question open for further investigation.985 In fact, the first and
tentative step to establish relations between the LAI and the Balkanfrderation was initiated on 15
April 1930, when Vlachoff wondered whether Chatto could write an article on India for inclusion
in the newspaper Balkanfrderation. In conclusion, the contact between the International
Secretariat and the Balkanfrderation had been an arrangement co-ordinated by Helmut/Dimitrov
of the WEB.986
While summarising his observations from the meetings, Smeral realised that the LAI and its
International Secretariat was caught in a deadlock. And, on an even more serious note, Smeral
recognised that not a single delegate had approved of the LAIs political guiding principle: to focus
the LAI on workers and peasants associations, parties and movements in colonial and semicolonial countries. On the contrary, the reports disclosed that the LAI had to strengthen its ties to
For the Hungarian report, see RGASPI 542/1/42, 19-20, Report on the League work in Hungary, completed 4/9-1930,
author: Smeral.
984
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20697, 429, Notiz [Polizeiprsident], Berlin, 1928. According to the Berlin Chief of
Police in a report on Fan Noli, dated 28 March 1928, Nolis birthplace was Ibrik Tepe in Albania, 1 January 1882, see
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20697, 431-433, Abteilung IA, Kriminal-Kommissar, Polizeiprsident, Berlin, 28/3-1928.
For Fan Nolis participation at the Frankfurt Congress, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 25. Michael Schmidt-Neke,
Entstehung und Ausbau der Knigsdiktatur in Albanien (1912-1939): Regierungsbildungen, Herrschaftsweise und
Machteliten in einem jungen Balkanstaat, Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag, Mnchen, 1987, p.189.
985
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20697, 446, Auszug aus Nr.123 der Zeitschrift La Federation Balkanique vom 1/111929, Berlin; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20697, 467-471, Der Polizeiprsident, Abteilung I. Betrifft: Bund Freier
Balkan and Die Balkanfrderation, Goehrke, Berlin, to the Minister of the Interior, Berlin, 21/4-1932.
986
RGASPI 539/2/432, 15-17, Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale
Unabhngigkeit, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 8051/82/8, 718-724, Handwritten notes, Willi Budich,
Berlin, 1-2/6-1931. For Dimitrov and the Balkanfrderation, see Hans-Joachim Bernhard, Georgi Dimitroff, UraniaVerlag, Leipzig, 1982, p.145. Nissan Orens somewhat dated, yet still discerning analysis of the attempts of the
communists to establish activity in the Balkans during the inter-war years, provides a good insight into the issue,
Nissan Oren, Popular Front in the Balkans: 2. Bulgaria, in Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.5, No.69, Sage
Publications, London, 1970, pp.69-82. Vlachoff was elected as a member of the LAI Executive in June 1931.

386

revolutionary trade unions, establish functional sections or support existing ones in order to make
them capable of responding to a repressive societal milieu (Indonesia and the Middle East), while
some delegates already considered the LAI to be disbanded and had used Smeral merely as a
vehicle to air their discontent and political conviction.
*
The Hearing
Mnzenberg followed Smerals progress from a distance in Berlin. Showing a great interest in how
Smeral had managed to collect a number of different opinions on the LAI, Mnzenberg was
nevertheless amazed and surprised upon hearing of the criticisms levelled against the LAI.
Mnzenberg wrote to Smeral, urging him to contact Kuusinen and Magyar for the sole reason of
preventing any negative comments further up in the hierarchy before introducing the report to the
Political Commission. Most importantly, Smeral had to get them to ensure that the Comintern
intended to continue to support the LAI financially.987 On 13 September, Smeral was scheduled to
give his report, an analysis aimed to influence the Political Secretariats final decision on the future
ideological and organisational direction of the LAI. Smerals report, Bericht des Gen. Smeral
ber die Lage der Liga gegen Imperialismus (Report of Com. Smeral on the Situation in the
League against Imperialism), was both an account and an interpretation of how one of the
involved actors in the LAI was experiencing not only the crisis, but also the organisation in
general. For Smeral, the question at stake, aside from presenting his individual opinion, was to
delineate a strategy which the Comintern could take into account when re-organising the LAI,
rather than merely suggesting its dissolution as the only answer. Moreover, Smeral hoped that his
report would highlight the difficulties encountered by the contradictory historical tendencies
within the Comintern, especially its policy changes and how these had affected a sympathising
communist organisation like the LAI.
Smeral introduced his analysis by describing how he had felt isolated at the International
Secretariat after arriving in Berlin in November 1929. However, the Political Commission had to
understand, above all, that the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress, and the LAIs ensuing crisis,
had strengthened relations between the individuals at the International Secretariat:
I must first of all say that for such an important meeting for the League, the other two
secretaries of the League, Comrades Mnzenberg and Chatto, should have been invited. []
we as secretaries and as a group, a collective, since I started in Berlin, I did not understand

987

RGASPI 542/1/37, 98, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Smeral, Moscow, 22/8-1930.

387

that the League question is seen in this scope, and I have never discussed the question with
them [Mnzenberg, Chatto] on this level.988
The collective leadership at the International Secretariat is what had kept the LAI together,
Smeral argued, wondering how the League question and its scope could differ so much in
Berlin in comparison to the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters. From Smerals point of
view, the LAI and its scope was focused on its instrumental role within the international
communist movement during the third period. Unfortunately though for the LAI, the
inauguration of the organisation had coincided with the peak of the second period [the united
front], upon which Smeral conceded that it was not logical and wrong to apply the policy [the
third period] of today to the former. This was the essential dilemma that the LAI had to confront.
The scope also explained the misfortunes which had befallen the LAI since 1928, especially the
chaos of the Frankfurt Congress, Smeral argued. The latter had been an event, organised with the
ambition to demonstrate a united front against colonialism and imperialism, where the organisers
(the International Secretariat) seemed to have missed the fact that the second period already was
over. Caught in the void between the second and third periods, the very idea of turning the
organisation into a progressive political actor had been thrown into question, Smeral argued.
Indicative of the above was the conclusion that the Comintern no longer endorsed the idea of
getting the LAI to connect the national bourgeoisie elements in the colonies with the
prominente Persnlichkeiten in Europe, especially the left-wing movement in Europe (socialists,
social democrats, pacifists and trade unions). However, Smeral believed that the Comintern would
have recognised the LAI as a success if more work during the second term had been carried
out.989 This statement merely confirmed Smerals perception of the contradictory nature of the
relations between the LAI and the Comintern since the LAIs inception in 1927.
Which solutions did Smeral recommend in order to re-organise and keep the LAI alive? In
Moscow, Smeral had re-assessed the Eastern Secretariats re-organisation project, focusing on
the deleted passage which had been included in the draft version. According to Smeral, the
question the Comintern needed to ask itself was whether the LAI was the only sympathising
organisation within the Cominterns network of auxiliary organisations capable of both distributing
Bolshevik propaganda on a global scale and establishing contacts in the colonial and semi-colonial
countries. If the LAI was given the chance to develop its organisation and activities, it had every

988

Smeral finished his report on 8 September, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/52, 12-42, Bericht des Gen. Smeral ber die
Lage der Liga gegen den Imperialismus. Fr die Sitzung der Politkommission, Moscow, 13/9-1930. Two different
versions of Smerals report have been found in the Comintern Archive dossiers: RGASPI 495/3/176, 4-17
[stenographic report], and fol. RGASPI 542/1/37, 100-133.
989
RGASPI 495/4/52, 12-42, Bericht des Gen. Smeral ber die Lage der Liga gegen den Imperialismus. Fr die
Sitzung der Politkommission, Moscow, 13/9-1930.

388

chance of becoming a serious organisation [] to fulfil the important task of establishing and
supporting a safe channel for the communist movement to the colonies. This required that the
decision-makers ignore the ideological guiding principle included in the re-organisation project:
to transform the LAI into a connective point for the colonial workers and peasants movements.
Hence, in order to get the LAI to assist in the struggle [to achieve] world revolution, the answer
was to be found in a more pragmatic approach, Smeral concluded. The question was how. Smeral
had taken notice of the LAI and its political discourse, suggesting a focus on the liberation
struggle in the colonial and dependent countries, the revolutionary class struggle of the
proletariat and the defence of the building of socialism in the USSR. Yet, while this appeared to
be merely a repetition of class against class, what Smeral strove to achieve was to get the LAI
functional again. Thus, Smeral told the Political Commission that this would require dividing the
LAI into two halves, with one covert and one overt side. This organisational restructuring would
also enable the Comintern to more closely define its control over the LAI and its International
Secretariat and, therefore, save the organisation from dissolving. The re-organisation of the LAI
had to abide by the following principle, Smeral stated:
In almost all the colonies and dependent countries, the social structure of the population []
represents a very important part of the active revolutionary movement. [] In this situation,
the work, the means and the apparatus of the Comintern have to be more devoted than
before. [] Certain reasons (increased and improved connections, political reasons) suggest
that this work has to be done outside the USSR. This work should be done by the LAI, in
part, as a relief [organisation; authors remark and italics], partly as a cover [authors italics]
of the Comintern. [] Although the LAI would retain full independence on the outside, in
fact they would be less independent than before. As an auxiliary organ, acting as a cover, it
would be connected with the Comintern much more than until now.990
The principle implied the definitive submission of the LAI and its International Secretariat to the
Comintern, however, the crux of the matter was that, in 1930, the LAI had very few and fragile
connections in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Smeral was aware of this dilemma, urging
the Comintern to understand the necessity of contributing with active support. Particularly as the
aftermath of the Frankfurt congress had more or less obliterated the LAIs network to the colonies,
an event which had burnt these bridges observed Smeral. This had prevented the LAI from
introducing itself as a political actor opposing imperialism. According to Smeral, the option of
posing as a relief organisation could solve the problem, but only if the Comintern decided to make
the organisation operative again, but how? Firstly, the International Secretariat had to be certain
990

RGASPI 495/4/52, 12-42, Bericht des Gen. Smeral ber die Lage der Liga gegen den Imperialismus. Fr die
Sitzung der Politkommission, Moscow, 13/9-1930.

389

that the monthly endorsement from the Comintern would arrive, and secondly, that instructors
from Moscow visited the Berlin bureau to give political directives and assist in the practical work.
Smeral stated that if the decision-makers chose to endorse this vision, the LAI would do its utmost
to fulfil its aim of laying a foundation for the communist movement in the colonial world.991 The
question was under what kind of pretext.
The International Secretariat was a central factor in both explaining and solving the crisis. As
the Frankfurt Congress had left the International Secretariat severed from its connections to anticolonial activists in Europe, and in order to reconstruct the LAIs network, the working conditions
at the bureau in Berlin had to be improved. According to Smeral, in the summer of 1930, the
International Secretariat was suffering from a lack of personnel, money and people with the
necessary linguistic skills (aside from Chatto). After his investigations in Moscow in August,
Smeral had become convinced that the matter of solving the organisational and ideological
confusion within the LAI lay entirely in the hands of the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters. Thus, this would realise the ambition of re-organising and transforming the LAI into
two entities: to pose as a relief organisation, yet exist under the pretext of functioning as a cover
for the Comintern for the sole purpose of finding reliable candidates who would be able to spread
anti-imperialist and Bolshevik propaganda around the world. Having completed his report, the
decision was now in the hands of the Political Secretariat, as noted by Smeral in a letter to
Mnzenberg after the session. Approached by the secretaries [unknown] of Magyar and
Moskvin/Trilliser, Smeral was told that the Political Secretariats ambition was to solve the
question of the LAI in a constructive way.992
*
Verdict and Repentance
The members of the Political Secretariat assessed Smerals performance and report before handing
down their verdict. This was the culmination of a process which had emerged both at the 1929
Frankfurt Congress and, especially, in its aftermath. The Political Secretariats verdict aimed to
present both an answer and a solution to the crisis. This depended, however, on whether the
Political Secretariat was willing to consent to the idea of transforming the LAI into a relief
organisation on the one hand, while at the same time functioning as a cover for the Comintern. On
16 September, the Political Secretariat members (Magyar, Lozovsky, Manuilsky, Ford, Kuusinen
and Chitarow) endorsed Smerals report and his recommendations to link the LAI more closely to
991

RGASPI 495/4/52, 12-42, Bericht des Gen. Smeral ber die Lage der Liga gegen den Imperialismus. Fr die
Sitzung der Politkommission, Moscow, 13/9-1930.
992
RGASPI 542/1/37, 134, Letter from Smeral, Moscow, to Mnzenberg and Chatto, Berlin, 15/9-1930.

390

the Comintern as a cover organisation and re-introduce the LAI as an organisation, this time
under the guise of relief activities. The Political Secretariat nonetheless observed that the present
challenge was to prepare and circulate a credible political programme outside the communist
movement, containing the message that the LAI was indeed an independent non-party
organisation. According to the Political Secretariat, Manuilsky had to compose the LAIs revised
anti-imperialist agenda. The agenda Manuilsky had in mind was a political manifesto structured
around the Bolshevik conception of building socialism. Manuilsky argued that the LAI should
support the message of absolute national independence for the colonies, the dismissal of armed
forces, the expropriation of large estates and their equal distribution among the peasants, the
disbanding of imperialist-owned enterprises and total independence as well as the right to
assembly for workers and peasants organisations in the colonies. The Political Secretariat also
contributed with a more practical solution, concluding that the International Secretariat would
receive regular transactions of money and instructors from Moscow to Berlin to guide the
transformational process. This depended on resolving a few organisational questions. In relation to
the LAI and the youth question, the Political Secretariat sanctioned the KIM to both nominate a
youth secretary at the International Secretariat, and finance the individual in Berlin. Moreover, in
order to present its revised political agenda, the International Secretariat had to re-launch the LAIs
theoretical organ The Anti-Imperialist Review in the imperialist metropolises London, Paris and
New York. The most urgent issues to solve were the agreement of a monthly budget and to ensure
that the LAI started collecting missing membership fees, particularly from the Russian
AUCCSLU, money which the International Secretariat could use to finance the travel
arrangements for its instructors in Europe. There was, however, a level of scepticism and concern
expressed by the Political Secretariat, wondering whether the LAI would ever succeed in turning
itself into an international mass organisation. The most fundamental problem the LAI had to
confront was the hostility from former prominent LAI Executive members (Maxton, Fimmen,
Nehru and Hatta). This would most likely contribute to making it difficult to realise the leap to
becoming a mass organisation; however, the Political Secretariat conceded that the LAI had every
chance of establishing itself in Latin America, China, India and in some Negro areas in Africa.993
993

RGASPI 495/4/52, 7-9, Nach Anhren des Referates des Genossen Smeral, Political Secretariat, Moscow, 16/91930. The process to nominate a LAI youth secretary turned into a protracted process in Moscow. First, the KIM
Executive Committee notified the Small Commission on December 14, 1929, that the candidate, Tenner, would begin
his studies at the ILS, and had no intention of going to Berlin. A second candidate, Boretzky, who had received his
nomination on May 1930, suddenly passed away [for reasons unknown] in Moscow prior to his departure, RGASPI
495/4/7, 21, Short note from EC KIM, Moscow, to the Small Commission, Moscow, 14/12-1929; RGASPI
495/18/863, 20, (Confidential) Letter from ECCI Secretariat, Moscow, to Smeral and Mnzenberg, Berlin [stamped
date] 8/6-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 26-37, Brief Nr. 1, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat,
Moscow, 18/10-1930. The International Secretariat should use The Anti-Imperialist Review to distribute Manuilskys
theory, which, through propaganda could be popularised in the left-wing movement before the LAI Executive

391

At first glance, the protocol from the Political Secretariats meeting on 16 September seems to
indicate that it had just been a routine meeting at Comintern headquarters to discuss Smerals
report. However, reaching a verdict on the LAI was not easy. The customary procedure at meetings
at Comintern headquarters was to make no records and no stenographic reports of the speeches.
Instead, a short summary was compiled and added to the protocol. According to the summary in
the protocol of the meeting on 16 September, the Political Secretariat authorised the following
regarding the LAI:
The EAST L.S. [Lndersekretariat] is authorised to formulate, together with Comrade
Smeral, the basic guidelines for strengthening the activities of the LAI in a few short points,
so that these policies can serve as a basis for a concrete plan of [action for] the League. The
EAST L.S. is to hand over these guidelines to the Political Commission for review.994
Thus, according to this summary, a solution had been found to the problem. Smeral had also
attended this 16 September meeting and compiled a summary (Diskussion im Polsekretariat), a
document which illustrates just how much the members of the Political Secretariat had deliberated
before giving their final verdict on the LAI. Why did Smeral write this summary? According to
Smeral, the sole reason was to be able to tell Piatnitsky (unable to attend the meeting) what the
Political Secretariat had discussed.995 What does this Diskussion im Polsekretariat disclose?
Firstly, Smerals 13 September report had initiated an internal debate on how to solve the crisis
within the LAI. Secondly, the Political Secretariat conceded that the International Secretariat in
Berlin had not caused the crisis, far from it; the crisis was the result of internal factors originating
in Moscow in 1929 during the preparatory work for the Frankfurt Congress. This was an
observation which corresponded with Manuilskys conclusion at a Political Secretariat session in
August 1930: there are always excesses in the communist movement when sharp changes are
made.996 Smerals summary is, therefore, a crucial eyewitness account of a peculiar episode,
detailing how Magyar, Lozovsky, Manuilsky, Ford, Kuusinen and Chitarow in fact resorted to
using self-criticism as a way of explaining the anni confusionis of the LAI. In comparison to the
protocol, Smerals summary show how several of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters
felt it was a complicated course of action to adapt the LAI to the policy of class against class.
This observation contradicts the general understanding of the Comintern as a rigid institution
adopted this new political direction, see fol. RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of the
Executive Committee of the LAI, June 1931, Berlin, Moscow, 26/5-1931; The Colonies and Oppressed Nations in the
Struggle for Freedom, in The Anti-Imperialist Review, Vol.1, September-October, 1931, No.1, International
Secretariat, Berlin, pp.3-6.
994
RGASPI 495/3/176, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.92 der Sitzung des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 16/9-1930. For Smeral as
author of Protokoll Nr. 92, see fol. RGASPI 495/155/90, 80.
995
RGASPI 542/1/40, Briefe No.2, Fraktion der Liga, Berlin, to Freunde [Magyar], Moscow, 3/11-1930.
996
Taken from Worley 2004, p.11 (for Manuilskys quote, extracted from the files of the CPGB [Communist
Archive], see p.17, footnote 34).

392

merely adhering to strict doctrinal behaviour for the sole purpose of fulfilling its aim of
establishing organisational coherency and control. For the LAI and its crisis, this 16 September
Political Secretariat meeting was an opportunity for its members to reflect, regret and repent,
without losing face.
Magyar did not appreciate how the LAI had progressed in 1930. Appearing as the sternest
critic at the meeting, Magyar stated that it was a duty to tell the others that he had lost interest in
and patience with the LAI. He was willing to give the LAI one more chance to become a real
mass organisation but, should it fail once more, the organisation would have to be liquidated.
Magyars statement opened up the discussion, and with everyone expected to give their opinion on
the crisis, responses were received from Lozovsky, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Chitarow and Ford. In
Lozovskys opinion, it was inadvisable to liquidate the LAI, especially as the crisis had been a
result of internal disputes. The firm belief amongst the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters, that the Frankfurt Congress had to be turned into a forum for discussing the
revolutionary trade union movement, had been a serious mistake, Lozovsky argued. This serious
mistake in relation to the trade union question had, in fact, destroyed any opportunity of using the
LAI as a legal weapon to connect with colonial countries, especially to send instructors from
Europe to India, Africa and the USA. Lozovsky believed that responsibility for solving the crisis
lay fairly and squarely in the hands of the Comintern. According to Manuilsky, liquidation was not
a creative solution to the problem, as it would only force the Comintern to establish a section of
the Eastern Secretariat in one of the colonial metropolises in Western Europe. This section would
nevertheless fairly soon attract attention from leading antagonists such as the LSI and the national
security services, Manuilsky stated. Kuusinen condemned Magyars sceptical attitude as not being
particularly constructive. Kuusinen stated that if liquidation was the only option, the Cominterns
and Profinterns detour of establishing a new organ for the anti-imperialist movement would
consume time, energy and money. This continued as Chitarow admitted that the primary reason for
letting the LAI continue its activity was that it represented one of the few auxiliary organisations
which, in a legal way, could operate in a public setting. Thus, for the Comintern, the LAI offered
a chance to influence social and political actors who would otherwise remain completely out of the
reach of the communist movement.997
The central question was whether the members of the Political Secretariat could accept the fact
that the Comintern had not properly supported the LAI since its inception in 1927. According to
Lozovsky, the International Secretariat had received minimal assistance at every level
997

RGASPI 542/1/40, 128-130, (Beilage XIV) Diskussion im Polsekretariat, Moscow, 16/9-1930. Ford and Chitarow
did not deliver any lengthy statements in comparison to the others taking part at the meeting. Instead, they both
supported the opinions expressed by Manuilsky, Lozovsky and Kuusinen.

393

(administrative and financial); therefore, it was an illogical proposition to blame the LAI for the
crisis, concluding, we all have a share in the guilt. Manuilsky did not agree, however, and
despite the crisis being an established fact, there existed no clear solution to the LAI question.
Kuusinen told everyone present at the meeting that they had to understand that the demands placed
on the shoulders of the LAI and its International Secretariat had been too much to cope with.
Appearing as the moderating force at the session, Kuusinen stated that the crisis was a result of the
indifference amongst the communist parties and the revolutionary trade unions to support the LAI,
which had resulted in the LAI retreating into a state of isolation. Kuusinen admitted quite frankly
that the crisis had also emanated from the endorsed attitude by the Comintern:
We thought they [the LAI] could be established as a mass organisation with large reformist
trade unions, and we have criticised them for the fact that the work was not achieved quickly
enough. Maybe that was possible 5 years ago. Since then, this has been impossible. In this
matter, one cannot blame the lack of energy.998
These reflections and this level of self-criticism were an indication of the Political Secretariats
position on the LAI question and the crisis: that this was an issue entirely in the hands of the
Comintern to solve. Kuusinens conclusive remark was the Political Secretariats verdict on
Smerals analysis, which proposed the necessary transformation of the LAI:
I tend to think thus that the League should not in fact formally be a joint body of the
Comintern and Profintern for mass revolutionary agitation in the field of the anti-imperialist
struggle. [] We will not publicly say that it is our institution. We must consciously [use it]
as a united front instrument [to connect with] the petite bourgeoisie and workers elements
not yet ripe but considered necessary for communism.999
This verdict by the Political Secretariat provided both an answer and solution to the crisis. Most
importantly, the verdict also authorised the LAI to retreat from the Cominterns endorsed new
line policy, and to return to its original purpose i.e. functioning as a united front. Thus, by
returning to the role of acting as an intermediary for the Comintern, Kuusinen and the Political
Secretariat wished that the LAI would still be able to secure elements not yet ripe for
communism. Was this even a plausible proposition as the anni confusionis was coming to its end?

998
999

RGASPI 542/1/40, 128-130, (Beilage XIV) Diskussion im Polsekretariat, Moscow, 16/9-1930.

RGASPI 542/1/40, 128-130, (Beilage XIV) Diskussion im Polsekretariat, Moscow, 16/9-1930.

394

Chapter 8. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

The LAI is an international organisation of the Comintern. [] The work of the League is
similar to the work of the Comintern, whose actions usually run parallel with the League.
Der Reichsminister des Innern.
I A.2065/20.8, Berlin 20/8-1930
The situation has worsened since the aid [money] granted to us by our other friends
[Comintern] does not come regularly [] we are sitting here in an office and looking at each
other, unable to do anything. [] We have not paid the rent, [] The anti-imperialist work
of the International Secretariat can and should be extended, but the means to do so,
especially if the union dues [AUCCSLU] are not paid, have to be found outside the current
budget. Smeral left Moscow with the impression that all major colleagues (Manuilsky,
Kuusinen, Lozovsky, Wassiljew, Chitarow and the Eastern Secretariat) were in agreement.
The International Secretariat, Berlin, to
the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 2/11931
The LAI crisis in 1930 led to the re-birth of the organisation.1000 With the Political Secretariats
consent and its realisation that class against class was of no use to the LAI, the organisation
returned to its united front strategy as a result of the crisis. The anni confusionis had shattered the
LAIs anti-imperialist agenda and structure, while the irresolute decisions from and the behaviour
at Comintern headquarters had forced the organisation to make a detour from its original aim of
acting as an intermediary between the anti-colonial movement and the international communist
movement. Granted the right to return to its united front strategy, the LAI was able to take a big
step forward. However, the LAI was in such a perilous state after the ordeals and repercussions of
the Frankfurt Congress, that by 1930, the organisation had been pushed two steps backwards.1001
As Smeral had emphasised in his report to the Political Commission, it was of the utmost
importance to strengthen the ties between the International Secretariat and the Comintern, only
then could the LAI resume its activity. Despite the acts of self-criticism from several of the
members at the Political Secretariat in September, the outcome of Smerals investigation was the
1000

The term rebirth refers to spiritual rebirth and resurrection from the dead; see Davies 1996, p.471.
The allusion to one step forward, two steps back is taken from Lenin; however, its contextual framework is not
related to Lenins critique of the Russian Social Democratic Party and its crisis in 1904. A situation which had
emerged at the second party congress, in connection with the dispute between the majority (Bolsheviks) and the
minority (Mensheviks), see V. I. Lenin, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back (The Crisis in Our Party), taken from
Lenin, Collected Works Volume 7, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1964, pp.203-425. Lenins statement was published
in May 1904.
1001

395

transformation of the LAI into a relief organisation, whereas Kuusinens verdict had confirmed
that the LAI was nothing more than a cover for the activities of the Comintern. Thus, the
International Secretariat was facing an enormous challenge, involving adjustments to both internal
and external factors. With the return to its united front strategy, this in turn attracted attention from
the German national security services (the MdI and the Auswrtige Amt), institutional actors which
decided to increase their vigilance in order to confirm the LAIs communist ties and composition.
Moreover, despite the Political Secretariats verdict, the anni confusionis had had a lasting effect
on the International Secretariat. The crisis had left the International Secretariat with the
momentous task of re-constructing the LAI in a German socio-political milieu in a highly volatile
state, characterised by violent confrontations between the extreme Left (the communists) and the
extreme Right (the NSDAP) on the streets in Berlin.1002
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the International Secretariat adjusted and adapted
itself to meet the demands and outcome of the crisis. While class against class had been the
ideological principle during the anni confusionis (1929-30), a policy which had contributed
immensely to destroying the LAI, by 1930 the organisation was an isolated and fragile structure.
The following narrative covers the chronological period from October 1930 to December 1931.
This period covers the re-birth of the LAI, although events and episodes occurring after the anni
confusionis would continue to marginalise the LAI. Thus, this chapter has defined a number of
thematic questions on which the International Secretariat focused in order to re-activate antiimperialist activism.

This was the nadir of Mnzenbergs involvement in the LAI, as he was now focusing on other
matters, particularly the commencement of preparations for the tenth anniversary of the IAH in
1931.1003 The International Secretariat kom.Fraktion (Mnzenberg, Smeral, Chatto and the
Turkish communist and Comintern emissary Bekar Ferdi, see further below) concluded in October
1930 that Mnzenberg had to at least visit the International Secretariat two or three times per
month.1004 Another serious question was the increased pressure on the LAI due to the collaboration
between the British and German national security services. Towards the end of 1929, the British
Metropolitan Police (Special Branch) in London had asked the German ambassador, van
Scherpenberg, to assist the British Passport Control Officer in Berlin. The British Special
1002

For the German context, see Hoppe (2007); Striefler (1993); Schlgel (1998).
The IAH celebrated its tenth anniversary at the eighth international IAH congress in Berlin on 9 15 October,
1931, see Willi Mnzenberg, Solidaritt. Zehn Jahre Internationale Arbeiterhilfe, 1921-1931, Neuer Deutscher Verlag,
Berlin, 1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 9/I 6/7/24-29, 8. Weltkongress der Internationalen Arbeiter-Hilfe in Berlin, 915/10-1932.
1004
RGASPI 542/1/40, 26-37, (Vertraulich) Brief Nr. 1, Liga gegen Imperialismus kom.Fraktion, Berlin, to the
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/10-1930.
1003

396

Branchs primary motive was to strengthen the existing police liaison in order to gain access to
intelligence on the visits of British communists to the KPD, the WEB and other Communist or
semi-Communist centres in Berlin, mentioning, for example, that the activities of Mnzenberg,
Chatto and the LAI were of particular interest. Van Scherpenberg passed on this proposal to the
German Minister of the Interior (MdI), Albert Grzesinski, in Berlin, who instructed the officials at
the department to increase their surveillance of the German communist movement both in Berlin
and across the country.1005 In 1930, the MdI accelerated its pace in accumulating intelligence on
the variety and character of the radical political scene in Germany. With reference to the
communist movement in Berlin, the MdI particularly wanted to confirm the whereabouts of the
increased number of foreign communists in the city. The MdIs focus was also in line with the
expressed requests of other governmental agencies in Berlin: to unmask the city as the Bolshevik
headquarters in Western Europe. In this context, the LAI was referred to, as noted in an article in
the Dutch newspaper Politik Economisch Weekblad (Die deutsche Gefahr, published on 9 July
1930) as a vital actor co-ordinating the operations of the international communist movement in
Berlin. Brckner, an official at the MdI, read the article and notified the Auswrtige Amt of the
urgency in strengthening the surveillance of dubious organisations and associations in order to
maintain public order in the Weimar capital.1006 One way of doing this was to limit the amount
of public space available for political activism. On 13 August 1930, the Berlin District School
Board, along with a school deputation, authorised a ban prohibiting extremist political
organisations from using the schools premises to hold meetings or other kinds of activities. This
ban included the LAI, the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Association of Proletarian Writers, the

1005

TNA KV4/110, 1a, Letter from Liddell, Metropolitan Police, Special Branch, London, to Valentine Vivian,
London, 21/2-1930; TNA KV4/110, 6a, Letter from Liddell, Metropolitan Police, Special Branch, London, to
Valentine Vivian, London, 7/3-1930; TNA KV4/110, 15a, Letter from Liddell, Metropolitan Police, Special Branch,
London, to Valentine Vivian, London, 28/10-1930.
1006
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 138-139, bersetzung des Artikels aus Politik Economisch Weekblad (Die
deutsche Gefahr), Nr.41 vom 9.7.30 (Seite 352); SAPMO-BA ZPA R1001/6751, 141, Letter from
Brckner/Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, to Auswrtige Amt, Berlin, 15/8-1930. The RMdI concluded, after
having reviewed the MdI report on the communist connections of the LAI, that the LAI was an international
organisation (auxiliary arm of the Comintern), which supported and broadcast a similar political message as the
KPD. For example, the MdI pointed to the ties of the LAI with the Profintern, and to the fact that Mnzenberg acted as
its official representative in Germany, as confirmation of the organisation's communist connections. The MdI
recommended the continued monitoring of the following aspects of the LAI: its attempts to carry out political
education among the widest circles about the nature of colonial policy and its effect on suppressed and oppressed
peoples; the organisation of protest campaigns against violent colonial imperialism; the nature of its solidarity
actions and practical assistance to affected peoples; the content of the intellectual organ [The Anti-Imperialist
Review]; its contacts with anti-colonial activists struggling for their freedom in the colonies and the exploited
classes of other countries; and to start a register of periodical events which had an international character and
included the physical participation of colonial peoples alongside international progressive organisations, see
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 19, Der Reichsminister des Innern. IA.2065/20.8, Berlin 20/8-1930.

397

IAH, the KIM and the IRH. It was also a decision which indicated a political leaning towards
organisations linked to the Nazi movement.1007
The German authorities hostile attitude towards the communist movement contributed to
turning the streets of Berlin into a political scene during the autumn and winter of 1930. This
nevertheless suited the LAIs return to its united front strategy. The International Secretariat,
together with the German LAI Section and the Chinese Student Association (Klub Chinesischer
Studenten), organised a public celebration at the Piscator-Bhne in honour of the memory of SunYat-sen, and held a demonstration in support of Sowjetkanton-Sowjetchina! at which both
Mnzenberg and Karl August Wittfogel delivered speeches. This was part of a larger Chinese
campaign in Berlin, which reached its climax on 16 December at a public rally in defence of the
Soviet Union and Soviet China. According to the real organiser of the campaign, the WEB, the
main purpose of the demonstration had been to publish and distribute propaganda against the
global conspiracy to organise an intervention against the USSR. The WEB chose to use the LAI
as the most suitable cover behind which to organise public meetings and to act as the formal leader
of the campaign. For the WEB, this campaign was an opportunity to assess whether the LAI could
distribute propaganda against the war threat against the Soviet Union and in the defence of the
Soviet Union, and whether it would create any positive reaction. The campaign also provided the
LAI with a chance to distribute League-signed leaflets and to invite if possible, noncommunist speakers to declare their support for the LAI. Additionally, the campaign celebrated
the joining of political forces between the IRH and the LAI, who declared their joint aim to assist
each other as relief organisations.1008
*

1007

According to a decree adopted on 25 June 1930, the MdI did not allow any official of the police force in Berlin to
be a member of the KPD or the NSDAP, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 20, IAN 2165g/19.8.30, Berlin, 25/8-1930.
According to His-Huey Liangs study of the Berlin security police (Schutzpolizei; Schupo), the police gravitated
dangerously towards an attitude of passive neutrality towards the NSDAP during its challenge for power in the
Weimar Republic in 1927-30, see His-Huey Liang, The Berlin Police and the Weimar Republic, in the Journal of
Contemporary History, Sage Publications, London, 1969:4, pp.169-170.
1008
The meeting at Piscator Bhne began at 11.30 am, at the same time as the demonstration at the Wallner-Theater,
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 26, Die Rote Fahne, No.288, 10/12-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 27, Die
Rote Fahne, No.290, 12/12-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 32, Die Welt am Abend, No.294, 17/12-1930;
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 30, Short note, re. MOPR, December 1930. For the WEB and China, see fol.
RGASPI 499/1/17, 238-239, Projekt des Protokolls ber die Sitzung des Sekretariates der Liga gemeinsam mit dem
Vertreter WW, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 20/11-1930; Steiner 2005, p.711.

398

The Return to a United Front

The LAI is a broad, non-party organisation which aims to unite every fighting force against
imperialism. The claim that the LAI is a Communist organisation, or a tool of party politics,
is a deliberate falsehood which the imperialists spread in order to monitor the followers of
the League.
Inprecorr, Gesunde Erscheinungen in
der Liga gegen Imperialismus, 28/111930
Correcting the errors of the past was easier said than done. The International Secretariat knew that
the Comintern had given its consent to letting the LAI return to using the united front strategy as a
means of strengthening the organisation. However, once Smeral had arrived from Moscow, the
challenge was to re-introduce the conception of the LAI as a broad, non-party organisation.
Smeral fairly quickly admitted that this would increase the pressure on the LAI, particularly as the
Comintern also expected the organisation to pose as a relief organisation, while really acting as a
cover for the Comintern. The International Secretariat nonetheless promised the ECCI that the
time has come to act as the uncompromising, revolutionary non-party organisation Manuilsky had
once envisioned.1009 This all depended, however, on the tripartite interactionism between the
International Secretariat, the Eastern Secretariat and the WEBs meticulous supervision in Berlin.
Improving relations between the International Secretariat and Comintern headquarters was
primarily a question of assessing the capacity of administrative functions and the inclusion of
individuals. In a similar way to Smerals appointment as LAI secretary after the Frankfurt
Congress, the Political Commission instructed Bekar Ferdi to leave Moscow and travel to Berlin.
Once in Berlin, Ferdi was to use the International Secretariat as the base for his operations in
Europe. However, Ferdis connection to the LAI differed in one important aspect from Smerals,
with Ferdi focusing entirely on covert missions as an LAI emissary in order to visit the LAI
sections in Europe. What united the two of them was their relationship to the WEB. Magyar
recommended that the Political Commission authorise the decision to send Ferdi to Berlin as a
way of seeing through the transformation of the LAI. Before Ferdi departed from Moscow,
Magyar held a private session with Piatnitsky and Kuusinen, at which the three men decided that
Ferdi should visit and analyse the European LAI sections, deliver directives and send regular
reports to the Eastern Secretariat on how the LAI and the anti-imperialist movement were

1009

RGASPI 542/1/44, 95-96, (Confidential) Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow,
October 1930.

399

progressing.1010 As noted in Brief Nr. 1 [an insignia indicating the beginning of a new phase for
the International Secretariat], Ferdi arrived in Berlin in October 1930.
These regular reports from the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion to the Eastern
Secretariat were a crucial element in improving relations. Nevertheless, the kom.Fraktion argued
that, despite the new confidence being invested in the LAI, the organisations few connections to
the colonies was a big embarrassment. While Ferdis arrival had been a constructive solution by
providing useful assistance on the general political line as well as his linguistic skills in the
French language, the International Secretariat was by no means willing (or able) to pay Ferdis
salary of 600 Marks per month. This was a confirmation of the incongruous relations between the
International Secretariat and the Comintern, characterised by a continued lack of understanding of
the actual situation in Berlin. Yet, the focal point of interest in the aftermath of the anni confusionis
was to see whether the LAI could introduce a credible anti-imperialist agenda, which was expected
to create a reaction across broad political layers. Thus, it was crucial for the International
Secretariat to re-launch the LAI journal, The Anti-Imperialist Review, in order to circulate and use
it as a means to outline the new agenda. This depended not only on knowing that the Comintern
would give its systematic support but also on receiving support from the communist solar
system, i.e. the Profintern, KIM, Krestintern, the national communist parties and the
revolutionary trade unions. In this Brief Nr.1, the International Secretariat made a sketch of the
potential geographical spread of the LAI, a concept which relied on the Eastern Secretariats
endorsement:
It is necessary to send a man working for the League to Africa (Negro areas) and one to the
Arab region. As for India, you [the Eastern Secretariat] need to quickly identify the line for
the local League work, since the last meeting with you it has not been clear what is to be
done (opinion of Comrade Kuusinen). Perhaps it is necessary to have a man there too. The
Chinese work can only be done by the party [CP China] and you.1011
The principal consequence of the anni confusionis was the complete submission of the
International Secretariat to the Comintern apparatus. Hence, in order to realise its return to the
1010

RGASPI 495/4/48, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.78 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 28/91930. Present at the meeting were Heckert, Manuilsky, Piatnitsky, Zirul, Wassiljew, Gerisch, Magyar, Scholdack and
Lenzner. For Kuusinen and Piatnitsky, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/3, 40-41, Protokoll Nr.12 der Sitzung der Politischen
Kommission des Politsekretariats des EKKI, 21/10-1929. Ferdis covert missions in Europe from November 1928 till
September 1932 are not mentioned in the Chronology, filed in Ferdis personal file in the Comintern Archive. One
of Ferdis principal activities was to find communists of Turkish origin, evaluate the candidates and send them to
Moscow for further education at the KUTV, see fol. RGASPI 495/266/38, 1, Chronology, Bekar Ferdi, Moscow,
undated; RGASPI 495/4/14, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.42 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des EKKI, 13/2-1930.
1011
The Brief Nr. 1 was made out in three copies: the Eastern Secretariat, Mnzenbergs own copy and the last one
destroyed. After the letter had arrived in Moscow, additional copies of the report were printed and distributed to the
Political Commission, Meissner [?], Kitaigorodsky (KIM), and Lozovsky, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 26-37, Brief Nr.
1, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/10-1930.

400

strategy of the united front, the International Secretariat had to begin by re-constructing its
network in Berlin and beyond.
Symptomatic of the above, the International Secretariat held a number of closed conferences
with several Negro friends in Berlin in October (see further below). However, the reintroduction of the LAI depended primarily on accumulating intelligence and finding new and
reliable connections as well as on deciding a tactic which countered imperialist policy, e.g. the procolonial propaganda in Germany.1012 In his role as leader of the WEB, Helmut/Dimitrov informed
Smeral that soon a plan from the ECCI, containing political and administrative directives from
the Political Secretariat, will be given by the WEB to the International Secretariat.1013 The crisis
had deepened the structural dependency of the International Secretariat on the Comintern at every
level. For example, Smeral requested permission from Piatnitsky [Michail] to travel to Austria
and Czechoslovakia, where he intended to act as a representative of the Friends of the Soviet
Union and to deliver a series of lectures on the Moscow process against the wrecking of Soviet
industry carried out by the subversive Industrial Party. However, this idea had been introduced
by Mnzenberg.1014 Piatnitsky had endorsed the idea but, once on location in Austria, Smerals
mission quickly collapsed. In Vienna on 7 December, after Smeral had finished giving his lecture,
the Austrian police arrested him and charged Smeral with advocating communist subversive
ideas. Escorted to the Czechoslovakian border, Smeral was deported with immediate effect.1015
The anti-colonial community in Berlin experienced an increased pressure from the national
security services in November-December 1930. Colonial residents, known to be attending public
LAI meetings, were either being targeted by the RKO or arrested on the spot by the
Schutzpolizei. These actions made it difficult for the International Secretariat to convince colonial
activists to publicly support the LAI:

1012

The kom.Fraktion at the International Secretariat informed the Eastern Secretariat that the pro-colonial
propaganda in Germany had a stronghold in the Hansa cities (Bremen and Hamburg). Hence, the LAI had to use
these ports and the ships coming into these ports to distribute its anti-imperialist propaganda. With roughly 50 ships
arriving into Hamburg harbour each day, the potential was enormous, the kom.Fraktion stated, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/40, 56-61, Beilege Nr-2 Briefe Nr.1, Deutsche Kolonialpropaganda, International Sekretariat, Berlin, to the
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, October, 1930. The appendix arrived in Moscow on 22 October.
1013
RGASPI 542/1/37, 267, Auszug aus dem Prot. d. WEB, Nr.157, Berlin, to Ost-Lndersekretariat, Moscow, 26/111930. This extract is also filed in fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 261. For Neptun/Fergusons note to Magyar, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/37, 277, Auszug aus dem Prot. des WEB Nr.154, to, Magyar, Moscow, 20/11-1930. A copy of this note is filed
in fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 237. The WEB reported on the following travel routes for its members in November:
Neptun/Ferguson (England and Ireland), Magnus/Gyptner (Sweden, Norway and Denmark), while Helmut/Dimitrov
planned to meet the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Austria in Vienna, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/17, 262,
Feststellung der Ttigkeit in der nchsten Woche, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 27/11-1930.
1014
RGASPI 495/19/312, 46fp/bp, (Original, handwritten) Letter from Smeral, Berlin, to Michail/Piatnitsky,
Moscow, 3/12-1930. For the trial against the Industrial Party, see Acton & Stableford 2005, pp.343-344.
1015
RGASPI 542/1/40, 133-137, Brief No.3, LAI, International Secretariat, Berlin, to, the Eastern Secretariat,
Moscow, 22/12-1930; RGASPI 542/1/40, 139, Abschrift. Bundes-Polizeidirektion Wien, 7/12-1930.

401

Although they were released again, most colonial residents fear that their residence permit
may be revoked and that they could be deported. This creates great difficulties for us, in
particular when it comes to deciding upon speakers for public meetings.1016
The International Secretariat had to consider the possibility that the anti-colonial movement in
Berlin was losing its influence on the political scene. Thus, the expectation initially introduced by
Magyar, to aim a programmatic declaration at every member and organisation affiliated to the
LAI to continue to give their support, had to be fulfilled. However, without a strong League
secretariat, despite the inclusion of Ferdi, this was an impossible proposition. In Moscow, Magyar
had decided to retract his former critical attitude of the LAI, instead urging the Political
Commission to understand that the KIM had to send a secretary to lead the youth question in
Berlin. This also involved getting a Negro secretary to lead the African question at the
International Secretariat, and two steno-typists to assist with the daily administrative routines.
Magyar believed that in order to get the LAI to demonstrate its revised agenda, LAI emissaries had
to travel to Africa and to the Middle East, while a Continental Committee should to be
established in Montevideo.1017 The Political Commission approved Magyars proposal, even
though it depended on all current obstacles impeding the realisation of this vision being first
cleared away. Hence, the Eastern Secretariat had to present a budget for every cost and, if it was
not capable of doing this, it would have to postpone the plan ad infinitum.1018
The uncertainty surrounding the LAIs new political direction and transformed character
reached a peak while Ferdi was visiting the LAI sections in Paris, Amsterdam, and Brussels in
December 1930. Apparently, the relationship between the International Secretariat and the sections
was in an amorphous state after the crisis. Ferdi had hoped to meet and hold creative sessions with
representatives of the communist parties and the sections; however, once on location, Ferdi
observed how the French section had barely managed to resurrect itself, the Dutch LAI Section
existed only on paper, while in Belgium the the Leagues address was no longer functional.
Stunned by the fact that both the Communist Party of Belgium and the mass organisations were
weak, Ferdi was annoyed by the fact that Rajani Palme Dutt had not even bothered to respond to
his request to meet him in Brussels before he (Ferdi) was due to return to Berlin.1019

1016

The police had arrested Chinese and Japanese activists (no names mentioned), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 133137, Brief No.3, LAI, International Secretariat, Berlin, to, the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/12-1930.
1017
RGASPI 495/4/75, 12-13, Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to the Political Commission, Moscow, 7/12-1930. A copy
of Magyars letter (unsigned), which purportedly refers to the International Secretariat as being the author, is filed in
fol. RGASPI 542/1/44, RGASPI 542/1/44, 97-98, (Confidential) Letter from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to
the ECCI, Moscow, 7/12-1930. Codovilla and Condreras were to nominate the liaison in Montevideo.
1018
RGASPI 495/4/75, 1-6, Protokoll Nr.107 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 23/121930.
1019
Ferdis letter arrived in Berlin on 16 December and was forwarded to Moscow in January (arrived 16 January,

402

At the beginning of 1931, the WEB expressed its intention to reinforce the work of
Bolshevizing the West European communist movement. According to the Arbeitsplan of the
WEB, one crucial aspect was to increase the supervision of the international auxiliary [cover]
organisations for the sole purpose of re-activating the international struggle in defence of the
Soviet Union [and] against the war threat in organisations such as the Krestintern, Sportintern, the
Friends of the Soviet Union and the LAI.1020
*
No Light in Sight
Resurrecting the LAIs activities to its former glories proved to be a complicated undertaking for
the International Secretariat. Despite the WEBs aim to re-activate the international auxiliary
organisations, this did not involve solving practical issues. On 9 January 1931, the
kom.Fraktion informed the Eastern Secretariat that they had no money to pay the monthly rent
for the office or to buy stamps to send out circulars on the anti-imperialist struggle on India. As
the Cominterns monthly allocation had not arrived in time, the kom.Fraction concluded that the
only thing left to do was to sit around at the office and look at each other. The kom.Fraktion
wondered whether our major colleagues (Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Lozovsky, Chitarow and the
Eastern Secretariat) had already forgotten the promise they had given to Smeral in September to
secure money from the Profintern and the KIM, and for the sum to be made available to the
International Secretariat in Berlin.1021 Due to its financial difficulties, as declared in the
Pressedienst, the International Secretariat informed the members of the League that at the
current moment, the LAI had a very, fragile organisational structure, calling out to every cadre
who knows about the colonial question to begin acting in an altruistic fashion, above all to
engage in voluntary work without expecting to receive any money for their services (organising
public meetings and political rallies).1022 Aside from the altruistic tone of the statement, it was also
a plea confirming one of the lowest points in the history of the LAI, caused primarily by the
consequences of the crisis.
1931). The kom.Fraktion reported on Ferdis mission to Paris, Amsterdam and Belgium in Brief No.3, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/40, 138, Letter from Ferdi, Paris, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 11/12-1930; RGASPI
542/1/40, 133-137, Brief No.3, LAI, International Secretariat, Berlin, to, the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 22/12-1930.
For Ferdis report, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 1-9, Bericht des Genossen Ferdi ber seine Reise, International
Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 5/1-1931. For the report on the French LAI Section, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/48, 10-21. For Ferdis opinion on how the Belgian LAI Section should be re-organised, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/49, 2-3, Einige Vorschlge zur Organisierung der antiimperialistischen Arbeit in Belgien, Ferdi, Berlin,
to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 5/1-1931
1020
RGASPI 499/1/34, 5-6, (Vertraulich) Arbeitsplan, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 2/1/1931.
1021
RGASPI 542/1/51, 1-2, Letter from Smeral, Chatto, Ferdi, Mnzenberg (kom.Fraction), Berlin, to the Eastern
Secretariat, Moscow, 9/1-1931.
1022
RGASPI 542/1/46a, 34, Pressedienst Nr. 1 der Deutschen Sektion der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, 1931.

403

The only issue resolved at Comintern headquarters was the nomination of an LAI youth
secretary. In Moscow, the Executive of the KIM appointed Comrade Miller (see further below),
an individual who mastered the necessary languages and could be used safely for League
operations. The reaction from the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion to Miller was twofold: firstly, relieved to finally have a youth secretary, the kom.Fraktion nonetheless questioned
why the International Secretariat had to pay Millers monthly salary, particularly as Chitarow
had promised Smeral that the KIM would pay for the LAIs youth secretary. The suggestion that
the LAI would have to pay for his salary was an ill-conceived and frivolous proposition, the
kom.Fraktion concluded.1023
Who was Miller and did this person ever arrive in Berlin? Miller was the pseudonym of
the half-Danish, half-Japanese Hans Peter Thgersen. In February 1931, Thgersen had just
arrived a few days ago en route from Moscow to Berlin. According to Thgersens
correspondence to the KIM secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat after assuming his position at
the International Secretariat, he identified himself by his communist party name York. On 9
March 1931, MI5 observed that York/Thgersen was acting as the representative of the Youth
Section of the LAI, was in charge of the Negro question in the USA and also administered
organisational and financial issues at the International Secretariat.1024 York/Thgersen was
nonetheless not one of those prominent in the League in comparison to the core (Mnzenberg,
Smeral and Ferdi), and very few traces reveal any detailed information about his activities in
Berlin. Yet, York/Thgersen was, upon his arrival in Berlin, already familiar with the activities of
the LAI. In 1927-28, York/Thgersen had pursued studies at the International Lenin School in
Moscow. Under the personal tutelage of Borodin, Lozovsky and Roy, in June 1928
York/Thgersen was sent on his first international mission as a messenger on Far Eastern
questions an assignment he carried out at the International Secretariat in Berlin.1025

1023

RGASPI 542/1/51, 1-2, Letter from Smeral, Chatto, Ferdi, Mnzenberg (kom.Fraction), Berlin, to the Eastern
Secretariat, Moscow, 9/1-1931.
1024
Firstly, any reference or mention of Miller in the correspondence between the LAI/International Secretariat and
the Comintern does not occur after his nomination. Secondly, this does not imply that it is impossible to discern
Millers identity. Rather, it shows how the Comintern put into practice its system of pseudonyms. In February,
York/Thgersen was in charge of the youth question at the International Secretariat. On 20 March, at an antiimperialist youth conference in Berlin, he publicly introduced himself as the leader of the LAI youth section, TNA
PRO KV2 1056, (Secret) Report on Hans P. Thgersen from L. M. [?], Berlin, to D.A.C.S.B., London, 9/3-1931; TNA
PRO KV2/1056, Thoegersen, Hans Peter, 1/6-1933. For York/Thgersens arrival in Berlin, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39,
26c, Report from York/Thgersen, Berlin, to unknown, February 1931 [stamped: 9/2-1931].
1025
TNA PRO KV2/1056, Biography, Hans Peter Thgersen, August 1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 36, Die
junge Garde, No.26, 20/3-1931. York/Thgersen informed Chatto of his special education at the ILS, which had a
file that contained my first and fuller biography together with recommendations from Comrades Borodin, Lozovsky,
Vilde and Fortunatoff These were written and deposited with them during Winter 1927, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/56,
2, Letter from Hans [York/Thgersen], Berlin to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932.

404

Upon arrival in Berlin, York/Thgersens primary aim was to begin organising the LAI youth
section. Approaching the student community in Berlin, especially the contacts in the KOSTUFRA
network, York/Thgersen prepared and organised conferences and public meetings, a collaboration
which peaked at the LAI Executive meeting in Berlin (30 May - 2 June 1931) with the convening
of the Berlin Anti-Imperialist Youth Conference at the Pharussle at 142 Mllerstrae. The
speakers at this conference were the secretary of the British LAI youth section T. Green, the Indian
S. Tagore, the German LDRN section representative Joseph Bil from Cameroon, the Indonesian
Raden Mas Soewardi Suryaningrat (better known as Ki Hajar Dewantara) and Mnzenberg.1026
York/Thgersens assignment at the International Secretariat also served another purpose,
which, not unlike those of Ferdi and Smeral, concerned sending confidential reports to the Eastern
Secretariat on the state of affairs at the International Secretariat, an activity kept secret from the
other members. In one of York/Thgersens first reports, he concluded that since the crisis of the
Frankfurt Congress, the method of work generally is not a very energetic one. Thus, this partly
explained why the International Secretariat apparently had so much difficulty in establishing
connections to the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and partly corroborated Ferdis conclusion
that one could even question whether the LAI had any existing and functional sections in the
imperialist countries at all. York/Thgersen focused essentially first on understanding the
dynamics at the International Secretariat, and then began scrutinising the inner functions of the
bureau in Berlin. On 14 February 1931, he concluded that the LAI was on the verge of
disintegrating:
Many of the organisations and groups [inserted by hand: in the colonies] have simply
stopped communicating with us. The contact that has been maintained with the organisations
and sections affiliated to the LAI has been essentially thru [sic] circular letters. [] As far as
a plan of work is concerned for the LAI, there is none, neither is there a division of work
amongst the secretaries. [] Some work, of course, is being developed, as for example in
England and Australia; but looking through all our correspondence of the last several months
with these countries, we can see that the Secretariat has not been a constructive and
stimulating force for these developments.1027
In addition to York/Thgersens negative prognosis, the International Secretariat depended
exclusively on Chatto who, in contrast to the lack of interest Mnzenberg was showing in the LAI

1026

SAPMO-BA ZPA R134/70/269, 411-413, Reichskonferenz des RFS (28.2-3.3.1931); SAPMO-BA ZPA
R/1501/20200, 48, Die Rote Fahne, No.208, 24/5-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 50, Die Rote Fahne,
No.209, 27/5-1931; RGASPI 542/1/51, 77, Antiimperialistische Jgendkndgebng, Jugendkomite d. Liga gegen
Imperialismus. Deutsche Sektion, 30/5-1931.
1027
RGASPI 542/1/39, 26a, Letter from York [Thgersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 14/21930 [1931].

405

by only taking part in certain important meetings to discuss financial matters, alone represented
the dynamism of the organisation:
The shipping of material for which great possibilities exist has been organised on a personal
basis (through Chatto). As a matter of fact practically the entire organisational [inserted in
handwriting] work that is being done [is being carried out] by Chatto, who also has all the
contacts thru [sic] which we ship material and is the only one who knows what the various
addresses which we have in the office mean.1028
At the start of 1931, the LAI was a mere shadow of its former self. York/Thgersen observed how
Smeral and Ferdi occupied themselves with writing long letters to M [Piatnitsky], or were away
on missions in Europe. Because of this, and if Chatto was sick or unable to carry out any activity
at the bureau, the International Secretariat was completely abandoned. This poor conduct made
York/Thgersen concede that the International Secretariat was in a precarious situation, telling the
Eastern Secretariat to initiate a commission in Moscow in order to systematise the work in
Berlin. For the International Secretariat, this proposal had a two-edged implication: firstly, it
implied the beginning of the end for Chatto (see further below), and secondly, the systematisation
of the work suggested a strengthening of ties to other communist organisations. Thus, rather than
depending on Chattos expertise, York/Thgersen preferred to see the shipping of material into
the colonies going through the channel of the recently established International of Seamen and
Harbour Workers (ISH), an auxiliary organisation within the Profintern network, established in
1930.1029 York/Thgersen also emphasised the need to rectify the financial wastage at the
International Secretariat, especially as three quarters of the budget was being spent on wages. A
decisive step, if the Eastern Secretariat approved the idea, would be to send an authoritative
comrade from Moscow to Berlin to re-organise the LAI apparatus and, while on location, assist in
developing the LAIs propaganda campaigns, York/Thgersen concluded. This involved, for
example, the strengthening of the International Secretariats work to organise the international
anti-imperialist campaign [] in connection with the Imperialist Exhibition in Paris in 1931.1030
*
1028

RGASPI 542/1/39, 26a, Letter from York [Thgersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 14/21930 [1931]. Illustrative of the above, Ford instructed Padmore to distribute the organ of the ITUCNW, The Negro
Worker, through the channels used by the LAI, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/668, 41, Letter from Ford, Berlin, to Padmore,
Negro Bureau RILU, Moscow, 7/2-1931.
1029
The ISH aimed to appear as a sovereign, self-governing organisation. According to the biased memoir of Jan
Valtin, Dimitrov instructed him to begin working at the ISH Secretariat in Hamburg in August 1931, see Jan Valtin
(Richard Julius Herman Krebs), Out of the Night, Alliance Book Corporation, New York, 1941, p.272. For a more
balanced account and analysis of the ISH, see Weiss (2011).
1030
York/Thgersen concluded, [T]his will require the mobilisation of the Comintern and the various parties, see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 26a, Letter from York [Thgersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, 14/21930 [1931].

406

The Anti-Imperialist Exhibition in Paris

The International Colonial Exhibition in Paris was a bizarre event, characterised by its
nationalism. According to Klaus Schles study, this exhibition was a peculiar and totally
contradictory event which exposed Frances colonial arrogance. The French government had
issued invitations to former and current imperialist powers to participate in the exhibition.
However, France did not convince either the British Empire, Germany or Spain to even bother
attending, although Italy, Portugal, Belgium and the Netherlands did eagerly participate. The
exhibition opened in May 1931 and was visited by 40 million people during the event. The
ambiance of the whole affair, and its initial ambition of projecting the civilising mission of France
in the colonies as something positive, acting for the well-being of humanity, was nevertheless
contradicted by a common understanding in the international press that the Paris exhibition was an
abnormal event. This exhibition offered an opportunity for the LAI to organise an antiimperialist campaign, with the German communist Alfred Kurella directing the activities of the
PCF in organising an anti-imperialist exhibition in Paris.1031 This is not the whole picture and,
despite the fact that Kurella played a role in preparing the so-called anti-imperialist exhibition as a
response to the International Colonial Exhibition, other actors played a more decisive role,
particularly the International Secretariat and the PCF, undertakings which were supervised by the
Comintern in Moscow.
As soon as news of the International Colonial Exhibition began to circulate in Europe in
1930, the International Secretariat suggested to the Eastern Secretariat to consider the idea of
creating a protest campaign against the exhibition. On 11 November 1930, Wassiljew presented
this idea and convinced the Political Commission to endorse the idea of allowing the International
Secretariat, together with the PCF, to instigate a campaign to exploit the Colonial Exhibition. To
co-ordinate the work between the LAI and the PCF, Ferdi was to function as the liaison.1032 While
this merely confirmed a bureaucratic procedure, the challenge was to raise awareness of the antiimperialist campaign and its focus against the exhibition in Paris. For example, Ferdi visited the
PCF Secretariat in December to introduce and co-ordinate this work, while on 23 January 1932,
Mnzenberg and Chatto published an appeal to all anti-imperialist organisations, individuals,
newspaper Editors, Publishers and Photographers. This appeal highlighted the need for assistance
1031

Klaus Schle, Paris. Die kulturelle Konstruktion der franzsischen Metropole: Alltag, mentaler Raum und
sozialkulturelles Feld in der Stadt und der Vorstadt, Leske + Budrich Verlag, Opladen, 2003, pp.157-159; Hans-Jrgen
Lsebrink, Historical Culture in a (Post-)Colonial Context. The Genesis of National Identification Figures in
Francophone Western Africa, in Identities: Time, Difference and Boundaries, Heidrun Friese (ed.), Berghahn Books,
Oxford, 2002, pp.206-208. France had a tradition of organising colonial exhibitions; similar events had been convened
in Marseille 1907 and in 1922.
1032
RGASPI 495/4/67, 1-3, Protokoll Nr.99 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 11/111930. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Heckert, Manuilsky, Wassiljew, Magyar and Bittelman.

407

in either organising or supporting the LAIs public demonstrations against the economic and
political power of imperialist states. According to Mnzenberg and Chatto, these demonstrations
aimed to fulfil a two-fold purpose: on the one hand, to introduce the opinion that the LAI was the
only international organisation in support of the struggle of the oppressed masses of the colonial
countries and, on the other hand, to use the demonstrations as an opportunity to announce the
need to organise an Anti-Imperialist Exhibition in Paris. This appeal therefore required the
vanguard of the anti-imperialist movement to send anti-colonial propaganda (photographs,
statistical material, published and unpublished reports) to the International Secretariat, material the
LAI intended to use against the International Colonial Exhibition and which could be expected
to constitute the basis for the anti-imperialist exhibition in Paris.1033
This appeal was enthusiastically received. Albert Moreau, an AAAIL member in New York,
told Chatto, his colonial friends [] welcomed the idea, while the secretary of the South African
Trades and Labour Council, Andrews, promised to support the anti-imperialist exhibition by
providing Chatto with useful anti-colonial propaganda. Andrews also told Chatto, child
marriages are not customary with South African natives, describing how the living conditions in
the country were a result of malnutrition owing to poverty, insanitary surroundings, ignorance and
vice. Chatto thanked Andrews for the good material on South Africa, which could be used in
different campaigns.1034
While propaganda proved easy enough for the International Secretariat to solve, the central
question was how to co-ordinate the preparatory work. Ferdi informed the WEB in March of his
intention to travel to Paris not later than on 25 March, and that he would remain in the city for
one month to complete the preparations for the exhibition with the French LAI Section and the
PCF secretariat. According to Ferdi, the primary aim of the anti-imperialist exhibition was to turn
it into a big campaign against British imperialism. Thus, in connection with the opening of the
International Colonial Exhibition in May, the LAI aimed to celebrate the Anti-Imperialist
Week in the colonial metropolises around the world. To co-ordinate the propaganda for the
1033

IISG LAI Collection, 3392.1, p.140, Circular letter, International Secretariat, signed by Mnzenberg and
Chattophadyaya, Berlin, 23/1-1931. Mnzenberg and Chatto introduced the idea of turning the anti-imperialist
exhibition into a permanent International Anti-Imperialist Museum in Berlin. A copy of the circular (German
version) is filed in fol. RGASPI 542/1/49, 15-18. York/Thgersen requested that all anti-imperialist youth
organisations, individuals, editors and publishers of youth literature and photographers send documents on the antiimperialist youth issue in February, to be included in the exhibition, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/51, 8-10. For a copy of
York/Thgersens circular letter, see IISG LAI Collection, 3392.1, p.140.
1034
RGASPI 542/1/48, 48, Letter from Albert Moreau/AAAIL, New York, to Chatto, Berlin, 18/2-1931; IISG LAI
Collection, 3392.1, p.140, Letter from Andrews, Johannesburg, to the Joint Secretaries/LAI, Berlin, 7/3-1931; Letter
from Andrews, Johannesburg, to Chatto, Berlin, 25/3-1931; Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Andrews, Johannesburg,
14/4-1931; Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Andrews, Johannesburg, 15/4-1931. The pamphlet [title unknown], which
Andrews referred to, had been issued by the Joint Council of European and Natives in Johannesburg. Grateful for
having received the material, Chatto promised Andrews to use it in the campaigns of the LAI, e.g. in connection with
the international conference on African children in Geneva, 22-25 June 1931, organised by the League of Nations.

408

week, the International Secretariat had sent out instructions to the A-I-Z and the editors of the
Inprecorr to publish articles, while Ferdi aimed to conclude his negotiations with the Central
Committee of the PCF. During these negotiations, the WEB kept its eye on the PCF, particularly to
see whether the party and its secretariat were carrying out the ECCIs instructions to give the
International Secretariat and the French LAI Section their full assistance in completing the
preparatory work.1035
The original aim of the anti-imperialist exhibition gradually became one of disappointment for
the LAI. Quite suddenly, Ferdi had to abort his mission as liaison, as he was required to travel to
Moscow instead of to Paris in April. When the imperialist exhibition opened in Paris, the
International Secretariat could only stand by and watch how the the lack of any assistance from
the Central Committee of the PCF to support the fragile French LAI Section contributed to turning
the anti-imperialist exhibition into a complete mess. Unable to open the exhibition as planned in
May, the International Secretariat described the PCFs conduct as an immense mass deception
against the anti-imperialist movement.1036 Despite the organisational disaster caused by the PCF,
the French LAI Section opened the anti-imperialist exhibition in Paris in August. This was not,
however, thanks to any assistance from the PCF, but rather the Soviet consulate in Paris had given
the LAI an exhibition stand in the Soviet pavilion, from where the section could present
statistical material, photographs and documents to illustrate the horrors of exploitative and
suppressive colonialism.1037
The organisational adventure of the anti-imperialist exhibition was also an expression and
consequence of the return to the LAIs united front strategy. For the International Secretariat,
however, this episode confirmed that the return to former glories was going to be more complex
than expected. In an attempt to realise its objective of functioning as a cover for the Comintern, the
International Secretariat adjusted its organisational apparatus to perfect itself as the hub of the antiimperialist movement.
*

1035

RGASPI 542/1/47, 15, Gemeinsame Besprechung mit dem Sekretariat der Liga, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI,
received by Inza [?], Moscow, 11/3-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 55-57, Brief Nr.12, Internationale
Sekretariat/Fraktion, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/3-1931.
1036
RGASPI 542/1/46a, 35-36, Zur Pariser Kolonial-Austellung (Pressedienst, Nr.2); RGASPI 542/1/53, 24-29, Ein
ungeheurerer Massenbetrug Die Kolonial-Ausstellung in Paris, [unknown], to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow,
[undated].
1037
Die Anti-Imperialistische Kolonialausstellung in Informationsdienst der Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr
nationale Unabhngigkeit, No.2, Berlin, 2/9-1931, p.14. For the Anti-Imperialist Exhibition, see further in Stephen
Feins forthcoming doctoral thesis on the subject.

409

Hub of the Anti-Imperialist Movement

The anni confusionis had left the LAI unable to orchestrate any massive propaganda campaigns.
Despite the turbulence of the Frankfurt Congress and its aftermath, leading to the purification of
the prominente Persnlichkeiten on the LAI Executive, as well as the undesired exposure of the
LAI as a front organisation of the Comintern, in 1930 the International Secretariat still nourished
the ambition of establishing contacts with representatives of the anti-colonial movement. For
Chatto, the crisis had represented an opportunity to transform the LAI from the ardent antiimperialist voice it had once set out to be, into an organisation preferring to establish reliable
connections with anti-colonial activists. This essentially involved the idea of perfecting the LAI as
the hub of the anti-imperialist movement in Berlin and beyond. An undertaking which meant that
Chatto was expected to evaluate the ideological leanings and reliability of the candidates
(desirable elements) and, after consulting with the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow, sending the
candidates in a new direction. Colonial students in European cities, or colonial seamen arriving in
the vital European ports (Hamburg, Rotterdam, Marseille and Liverpool), were considered by the
LAI to be valuable targets to aid in the distribution of anti-imperialist propaganda, to carry out
anti-imperialist activity in the colonies or to undergo political education in Moscow. The ISH
persistently targeted colonial seamen, with both Weiss and Adis studies proving that neither the
African anti-colonial hub in Europe nor the transatlantic links of the anti-imperialist activists
(represented by the ISH) to the USA, tracing back to Africa, ever corresponded with the aims and
activities espoused by the International Secretariat. My aim here is therefore two-fold: firstly, to
disclose the efforts of both Chatto and the International Secretariat in realising the idea of turning
the LAI into the hub; and secondly, to explain why this endeavour became more or less a failure,
an aspect which involves a discussion of Chattos fate within the international communist
movement. The core at the International Secretariat carefully monitored Chattos activity, e.g.
Smeral provided Piatnitsky [Michail] and Magyar with information on how Chattos work was
progressing. The LAI and its ambition to become the hub also involves solving a few of the
mysteries in its lost history, particularly in relation to shedding some light on several of the
actors who have previously been kept in the dark, while others continue to exist as illusions.
This crisis made the International Secretariat act cautiously in its contacts with the anticolonial movement, elements which the kom.Fraktion viewed as political material rather than
as individuals or organisations. This was a definition introduced by the kom.Fraktion in its
Letter No.2 to the Eastern Secretariat on 3 November 1930, after having arranged and held five
informal conferences in Berlin (13-14 and 18 October) with Negro friends: the Gambian E. F.

410

Small, Frank Macaulay from Nigeria, Joseph Bil and Garan Kouyat. The kom.Fraktion
observed that the political material needed a patient and serious treatment:
They will show you [enclosed reports to the Eastern Secretariat] the political level, the
psychology and to a certain extent the character of these two friends. [] Our general
impression is that both of them can be used, at least we shall try to establish connections
with the students through them and subsequently with other elements in the country. But we
must wait and see how far they will be active at home and what resistance they will have to
overcome.1038
To evaluate the character of these friends was a difficult process. The kom.Fraktion urged
Piatnitsky to understand that it was not easy to get deeply into their soul in the course of a hurried
conversation.1039 The African question continued to haunt the LAI, which, in comparison to India,
China and the Latin American continent, remained a blank page. It did not matter that the LAI had
a connection with the Profintern section, the ITUCNW, the International Secretariat wanted to
establish independent LAI sections on the African continent, especially in West Africa. Bil
(Morris) was the key for Mnzenberg in this respect, and was perceived to be the most suitable
candidate to stimulate and lead anti-imperialist activity in West Africa. Nonetheless, this required
sending Bil to Moscow to undergo a proper ideological education at the KUTV, a decision
dependent upon the benevolence of the ZK KPD. Mnzenberg explained to the ZK KPD that one
merely had to review Bils understanding of the anti-imperialist movement and the colonial
ambitions of the Comintern and, above all, his longevity as secretary of the German LAI Section
and in the German LDRN section, as well as being a member of the PCF, to understand that he
was the best candidate. However, Mnzenberg did not manage to convince Smeral that Bil was a
sincere and devoted anti-imperialist, with Smeral telling Flieg that he opposed the idea of sending
Bil to Moscow to study at the KUTV.1040 The Bil question was not an isolated episode, it was
1038

On 13 October, Smeral went to Kiel to meet Small, Macaulay, Bil and Kouyat, and escorted the company to
Berlin, where they held five closed meetings with members of the International Secretariat (Smeral, Chatto, Leitner,
Hussun and Cantor). Mnzenberg attended the final meeting on 18 October. The sessions focused, for example, on
whether the LAI could establish sections in Nigeria and Gambia, see fol. RGASPI 495/155/90, 78-81, (Confidential)
Letter No.2, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/11-1931; RGASPI 542/1/40,69-72,
Briefe No.2, Fraktion der Liga, to Liebe Freunde [Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky], Moscow, 3/11-1930; RGASPI
542/1/40, 77-89, Protokoll der Sitzung des Internationalen Sekretariats mit den Negerfreunden, Berlin, 14/10-1930;
RGASPI 542/1/40, 102-103, Die letzte Sitzung mit den Negerfreunden beim Genossen Mnzenberg, Berlin, 18/101930. For an analysis of these meetings, see Weiss (2011).
1039
RGASPI 542/1/40, 68, Telegram from Fraktion der LAI, Berlin, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 6/11-1930. The
accumulated material from the meetings with the Negerfreunden (protocols, and miscellaneous documents) was sent
to Piatnitsky on 11 November.
1040
The idea of sending Bil to the KUTV in Moscow became a long, drawn-out affair, due to a personal conflict with
another fellow African in Berlin, Wilhelm Munumi, as well as the ZK KPDs hesitancy towards sanctioning the
proposal. Additionally, Smerals remark that Bil longed to return to Cameroon and his family contributed to the
situation, above all the statement that Bils abilities are limited and he could be of little use, see SAPMO-BA ZPA I
2/5/33, 121, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to the ZK KPD Secretariat, Berlin, 28/10-1930; SAPMO-BA ZPA I

411

characteristic of the relations between the International Secretariat and the African anti-colonial
movement in Berlin. For both Kouyat and the German LDRN section, the incapacity of the
International Secretariat to support the LDRN with administrative assistance and money was
nothing more than a bluff, contradicting an agreement entered into in 1929. On 30 September
1930, Kouyat informed the Profintern secretariat in Moscow that the International Secretariats
crisis was also having a perpetual effect on the LDRNs work in Germany. As a solution to its
inherently weak relationship to the LAI, Kouyat wanted instead to connect the LDRN network to
the IRH and the KPD, a move which would entail a definitive separation from the International
Secretariat. The International Secretariat had no intention of letting Kouyats criticism pass by
without any response, informing the Eastern Secretariat that they did not understand why Kouyat
seemed displeased and disappointed.1041
Two reasons explain why the International Secretariat found it difficult to confirm a fixed
trajectory for the LAI in Africa: the first was the repression and monitoring of colonial authorities
which contributed immensely to limiting the spread of anti-imperialist propaganda; and the second
involved the internal difficulties which contributed to destroying the LAIs possibilities to develop
the African question, particularly as it seemed problematic to even reach a decision on how to
proceed. For the International Secretariat, the primary aim of the October conferences with its
Negro friends was to observe, learn and to capitalise on the observations of these meetings,
which, in turn, would result in an African strategy for the LAI. As noted in the draft, Der antiimperialistische Kampf des westafrikanische Volkes (The anti-imperialist struggle of the West
African Peoples), this document presented the International Secretariats plans and strategies in an
attempt to attract the attention of the peasants in West Africa. This document was sent to the
Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky on 6 November, 1930. However, in its most modest form, this
draft was merely a re-appraisal of how to build socialism in Africa, a narrative taken from the
process of collectivization in the Soviet Union:
The objective of the LAI in each colony is not only to reveal to the masses the true nature
and the terrible results of the entire system, imperialist plunder and oppression [] but to
determine the political and economic objectives of the oppressed masses and to take all
necessary steps for the organisational leadership of the struggle [] The League supports all

2/5/33, 122, Letter from W. Munumi re. Joseph Bil, Berlin, to the KPD, Berlin, 22/11-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 166,
Short note re. Bil, International Secretariat, Berlin, to unknown receiver, Moscow, 2/11-1931; RGASPI 495/155/90,
78-81, (Confidential) Letter No.2, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/11-1931. See
further in Weiss (2011) and Adi (2008) on Bil.
1041
RGASPI 495/155/87, 404-408, Kurzer Ttigkeitsbericht der Liga zur Verteidigung der Negerrasse, Deutsche
Section, Kouyat, Berlin, to the Profintern Secretariat, Moscow, 30/9-1930; RGASPI 495/155/90, 78-81,
(Confidential) Letter No.2, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 3/11-1931; Weiss
(2011); Aitken (2008).

412

sections of the peasants who are interested in the struggle against imperialism, [and] supports
and encourages the movement for the formation of farmer co-operatives and associations as
organs of the struggle against imperialism.1042
Justifying the societal transformation of the Soviet Union was not, however, an approach that
worked in the interest of the LAI in this context. In February 1931, Magyar visited the
International Secretariat and examined the draft before returning to Moscow to attend a meeting
with the Political Commission in March. During this session of the Political Commission, Magyar
concluded that the idea of establishing LAI sections in West Africa was hardly realisable. The only
option for the International Secretariat was to instruct the British LAI Section to co-operate with
the NMM on the African question, particularly by distributing anti-imperialist leaflets to West
African seamen touching at British ports.1043
Hence, the road to establishing the LAI as a political actor in Africa itself came to a dead end
in 1931. Another field of activity was to establish contacts with anti-colonial activists from Africa
who were living in Germany and England. However, this undertaking turned into an operation
burdened by quarrels. On 16 January 1931, Chatto explained in a letter to Macaulay in London,
that the International Secretariat would not send money to you when you demand it, and
wondered why he did not focus on finding colonial students who were members of the Negro
Welfare Association in London. Apparently, this was an arrangement which had been agreed upon
during the October conferences in Berlin, when Chatto had instructed Macaulay to evaluate
candidates of interest and their fitness for study, and to inform Chatto of their occupation, their
age, their social status (i.e. whether they were a worker, student etc.). Macaulay seemed to have
taken it for granted that the International Secretariat would, consequently, send money to London
on a regular basis. Chatto consequently accused Macaulay of negligence, and questioned why he
had promised the students in London that they could travel to Berlin to undergo political education
without consulting the International Secretariat.1044 The LAI never turned into an influential actor
either developing or supervising anti-imperialist activism in Africa; instead, the African question
remained in the hands of the Profintern and the ITUCNW, supervised by the networks of Ford and
Padmore in both Europe and the USA.
1042

RGASPI 542/1/40, 90-93, (Draft) Resolution: Der anti-imperialistische Kampf des westafrikanische Volkes,
International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat and Piatnitsky, November, 1930. The draft arrived in
Moscow on 10 November 1930.
1043
RGASPI 542/1/47, 10-11, Proposals relative to the activity of the Anti-imperialist League in West Africa [L.
Magyar], Berlin,15/2-1931; RGASPI 495/4/94, 42, Information re. LAI from Magyar, Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to
the Political Commission, Moscow, 6/3-1931.
1044
Chatto believed Macaulay could do some work in your country [Nigeria] otherwise we should not have entered
into any connections with you, TNA PRO KV2/1056, (Intercepted) Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Macaulay, London,
16/1-1931. Chatto was a leading actor in selecting and assessing the students. According to Ford, Chatto was well
informed on this arrangement, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/669, 93-101, Report to the European Secretariat of the RILU
on Activities of the ITUCNW at Hamburg, author: Ford [arrived in Moscow 21/2-1931].

413

Perhimpunan Indonesia was a vital actor for the LAI. In connection with Ferdis visit to the
Netherlands in December 1930, Ferdi met Abdul Manaff and wondered whether it would be
possible to strengthen contacts between the LAI and the PI, as well as whether he could find
young people (students and workers) suitable to undergo political education in Berlin. After
returning to Berlin, Ferdi informed Magyar that Manaff seemed to be a reliable person who
belonged to the radical side of the PI. The reason why Ferdi described Manaff in such
confidential terms was that a fraction inside the PI had staged a successful coup against the
leader H [?] and appointed the Indian communist Abdul Madjid (pseudonyms: Aziz, Hafiz) as
the new leader of the PI in the Netherlands. This was also the result of the fraction having acted
upon Ferdis instructions. With this internal putsch in the PI, Manaff nevertheless conceded that it
had not improved contacts between Europe and the revolutionary movement in Indonesia; on the
contrary, the opportunities to work for the PKI were extremely limited after the party had been
declared illegal in 1930. The LAI and its International Secretariat therefore represented one of the
few existing connections for the PI to use.1045 In order to establish some kind of collaboration,
Manaff went to Berlin in January 1931 and had a meeting with Chatto and Ferdi at the
International Secretariat. Despite Chatto and Ferdi concluding that Manaff was an honest
character, the chance of re-introducing the LAI in the Netherlands had become a far-fetched
illusion. The primary reasons for this were that the PI had become a shadow of its former self,
having only 80 active members, and that both the repression by the Dutch security services and the
established antagonism from the socialist movement within the country made any activity there
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, Manaff was still a source of information for the International
Secretariat on the progress of the Indonesian nationalist movement in Europe. For example,
Manaff told the International Secretariat that Sukarno was living in Paris, an individual the LAI
had to approach, especially as he showed a leaning towards communism after having studied
Marxism and was known to fraternise in communist circles in Paris.1046
In Moscow, the Eastern Secretariat made efforts to realise the LAIs aims in the Far East. Since
Magyar was the proclaimed expert on the Chinese question at Comintern headquarters, in
November 1930 the Eastern Secretariat introduced the idea of establishing a Far Eastern subsection of the LAI, the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Anti-Imperialist League (FESAIL). The
FESAIL was to function as an independent actor, without any explicit connections either to the Far
Eastern Profintern branch or to the ECCI department (the Far Eastern Bureau). The FESAILs
1045

Abdul Manaff was also familiar with the activities at the International Secretariat in Berlin, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/49, 1, Letter from Abdul Manaff, Amsterdam [?], to Lieber Freund/Eastern Secretariat/Magyar, Moscow [?],
3/1-1931.
1046
RGASPI 542/1/49, 29-38, Report (Ferdi and Chatto) Vertreter der neuen Leitung der indonesischen Organisation
Peripoenan [sic], Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 19/1-1931.

414

primary aim was to co-ordinate the operations of the LAI in the Far East and, above all, to assist
the International Secretariat in either maintaining or establishing contacts with the anti-imperialist
movements in China, Korea, Indochina, Formosa, Malacca, Siam, Java, Indonesia and Japan.
From the outset, the FESAIL was to assume a two-faced Janus character in order to avoid the
prohibitive measures of the colonial powers in the Far East. Meaning, while publicly introducing
the FESAIL as a relief organisation based on the fundamental principles of international
solidarity, in reality the FESAIL would have to adhere to the duties imposed on it as a cover
organisation for the Comintern in order to ensure a safe passage to the Far Eastern countries.
Despite its grand ambitions, the result of this FESAIL initiative would be nothing more than a
theoretical sketch, leaving no visible or practical imprint whatsoever.1047
While the FESAIL initiative petered out on its own in Moscow, the International Secretariat
had a few reliable contacts to the Far Eastern national revolutionary movement. In Japan, the
leader of the Japanese LAI Section in Tokyo, J. Kunigattis, provided Chatto with intelligence on
the movement. For example, in November 1930, Kunigattis provided information that the
Japanese communist journal, Central Review, condoned the views of deviationist anti-imperialist
policies in an article authored under the pseudonym Tseuno Yonekawa. Kunigattis had contacted
Chatto to receive advice on strategy and tactics in order to respond to this article.1048 In Berlin,
the contacts of the International Secretariat to the Far Eastern community were limited but
functional. Teido Kunizaki (A. Kon; Kohn), a Japanese communist in Berlin and a member of
the KPD, began to work at the International Secretariat in 1930, in charge of the Far Eastern antiimperialist propaganda. By translating documents from German into Japanese, Kunizaki was a
valuable and accurate worker at the International Secretariat, according to Ferdi. Kunizakis
knowledge of the political leanings of the Far Eastern national revolutionary movement and the
current political situation in the Far East, contributed immensely to setting up the LAIs
propaganda campaigns against the military conflict between China and Japan in 1931 (the
Manchurian crisis and the Ruegg case in China; see further next chapter). Kunizaki, the architect
behind the propaganda against Japanese imperialism, also organised the distribution of material
to the LAI sections and co-ordinated several demonstrations of colonial students in Berlin. On
27 November 1931, for example, Kunizaki organised a public demonstration against Der
1047

The Eastern Secretariat argued that the primary reason for establishing the FESAIL was as a response to the
initiative taken by the CPCh and the Chinese KIM section to form the Eastern Anti-Imperialist League. Thus, the
FESAIL was to function as an authorised [LAI] section, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/37, 248-250, Plan of Work of the
Far Eastern Secretariat of the Anti-Imperialist League, the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, November 1930. For the FEB
and the ECCI, see Alexander M. Grigoriev, The Far Eastern Bureau of the ECCI in China, 1929-1931, in Leutner,
Felber, Titarenko & Grigoriev (eds.) 2002, pp.156-165, and for the Profintern FEB, see Fowler 2007, p.64.
1048
This letter included an enclosed article by Tseuno Yonekawa, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/39, 182-192, Tsuneo
Yonekawa, Die Probleme der Entfaltung der antiimperialistischen Front, Central Review, November 1930; RGASPI
542/1/39, 163, Letter from J. Kunigattis [?], Tokyo [?], to Chattophadyaya, Berlin, 14/11-1930.

415

Einbruch der japanischen Imperialisten in die Mandschurei in the name of the LAI. 1049 Kunizaki,
driven by a belief that his contribution to the anti-imperialist movement in Berlin and beyond
would result in a change, lived quite a similar life to the ones experienced by Chatto and Hansin
Liau in Berlin. While the city was initially perceived as a haven, it was also a situation defined by
sparse living conditions and a continual harassment from the authorities in Berlin. As Kunizaki
was not one of the prominent actors at the International Secretariat, he left few imprints in the LAI
annals.
*
Curricular Activity as Conscription to Communism
As far as the work in Berlin is concerned, the few Comrades and sympathisers we have here
in the Indian colony have to participate more actively in the work. [] KOSTUFRA wanted
to take steps to organise a course with the attendance of mostly foreign students. Despite
several meetings, nothing has come of it.
Chatto to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 24/3-1930

In 1930, the central question for Chatto was to focus the efforts of the International Secretariat on
establishing connections with anti-colonial activists. This required, above all, scrutinising the
political material in a methodical evaluation before determining who was eligible to receive
political education. This curricular activity was the essence of Chattos idea of utilising the
International Secretariat and the Indian Bureau under the pretext of organising discussions on
Marxism and the colonial question, with the true purpose of these courses being a conscription to
communism. The anni confusionis had increasingly altered Chattos egocentric network, with a
majority of his former contacts either being out of reach or having voluntarily disassociated
themselves (Hatta and Nehru) from the LAI, leaving in their wake a re-defined network. However,
the Indian Bureau and Nambiar were still crucial in sustaining Chattos activities, while the

1049

Kunizakis first contact with the LAI was at the Frankfurt Congress in 1929, which he attended as the delegate of
the Japanische revolutionre Gruppe in Deutschland. Additionally, Kunizakis contact with the Communist Party of
Japan was a result of his contact with Katayama. Kunizaki worked at the International Secretariat until August 1932.
On 3 September, 1932, Kunizaki left Germany after Prussian authorities refused to renew his residence permit and
travelled to Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 495/205/4516, 1, (Biography) Teido Kunizaki (A. Kon), Kommission, Moscow,
25/7-1936; RGASPI 495/205/4516, 15-16, Betr. Teido Kunizaki, ZK KPD, Berlin, January, 1933; Fowler 2007, p.89.
For the Manchurian crisis, see Steiner 2005, pp.637-638. For the demonstration on 27 November 1931, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/48, 169, Short note from kom.Fraktion Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/11-1931,
and SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 71, Die Rote Fahne, No.207, 27/11-1931 and, finally, Kunizakis deportation is
mentioned in RGASPI 534/8/222, 27, Fragebogen: Teido Kunizaki, 9/6-1932.

416

LAIs contact with Bridgeman in London was also still intact. These two factors were essential to
the idea of getting the LAIs curricular activity off the ground in 1930.1050
The anni confusionis had also provided Chatto with organisational space in which to introduce
the idea of curricular activity as a strategy to finding desirable elements. Chatto realised,
however, that previous attempts to organise such activity had received neither any attention nor
any support from the ZK KPD in Germany, informing Mnzenberg that the KPD had to
understand that this work is useful, particularly given the weakness of our colonial parties.1051
For this reason, Chatto believed that curricular activity would aid the dysfunctional anti-imperialist
movement in the colonies. Hence, by carefully selecting candidates and providing them with a
political education in Berlin, and in some cases with further study in Moscow, Chatto claimed that
this would preserve the continuance of anti-imperialist propaganda in colonial areas suffering from
repression, lack of communication or a disorganised communist party. The colonial metropolises
in Europe were the key for Chatto, intersections containing a majority of the candidates ripe for
influence and for receiving a political education under the tutelage of the International Secretariat.
In due course, Chatto wanted to either transfer these tutored individuals to colonial and semicolonial countries or send them to Moscow for further political education.
The case of the Indian communist and Chattos friend, Pandurang S. Khankhoji, illustrates this
strategy clearly. On 31 January 1931, the leading member of the Communist Party of Mexico,
Manuel Diaz Ramirez, explained in a letter to Chatto that our work is almost illegal, and our
apparatus is very weak. Thus, it was a difficult task to co-ordinate the activities of foreign anticolonial activists in Mexico. Ramirez noted that the Indian emigrant and party member
Khankhoji, who was working as an agronomist in Mexico, wanted to return to India. Chatto
wanted Khankhoji to come to Berlin for consultation before going home. Since Khankhoji was
an expert on the agrarian question, as Chatto notified the Eastern Secretariat, perhaps he could
be useful for the Party if he returns [to India] after a consultation here and in Moscow.1052
Whether Khankhoji ever went to Berlin and visited Chatto remains unknown. However, on 24
1050

Bridgeman asked Chatto whether he had heard a rumor initiated by one of Gandhis friends in London, Reginald
Reynolds, referring to the execution of some Indian in Moscow not long ago said to have been followers of M. N.
Roy. This had aroused interest within the Indian community in London, wondering whether this was true, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/48, 46, Letter from Bridgeman, London, to Chatto, Berlin, 4/2-1931.
1051
RGASPI 495/19/312, 29-31, Letter from Chatto, Berlin, to Mnzenberg, [?], 24/3-1930.
1052
Ramirez described the inefficiency of the Mexican LAI Section to Chatto: [] this side of our work is not in very
good shape; not only on account of the situation but also because it has been neglected by our friends in spite of the
fact that there is a good field for it among the masses and that they would like to do it; it is only a matter of the proper
elements to take charge of it and these elements are very scare here. The too many tasks our Party has and so very little
cadres to do the work impede a great deal the League work, as we do not have anymore and do not want them either
some petty bourgeois intellectual (students) elements which were before engaged in this work, there are only very
restricted exceptions, see fol. RGASPI 542/1//48, 43, Letter from Ramirez in Mexico to Chatto, 30/1-1931. For P. S.
Khankhojis relation to Chatto, see RGASPI 495/213/186, 223 and Kaye 1971, p.169 (document June No.54
[deposit]).

417

September 1931, Ferdi wrote to the Eastern Secretariat, informing them that Khankhoji intended to
travel to Kabul in October to replace Rattan Singh as the representative of the Hindustan Ghadr
Party. Additionally, the WEB told the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion that Khankhoji was
a trustworthy comrade, who had been of good service to the Mexican party. It is therefore
likely that Khankhoji met Chatto in Berlin at some point in 1931, before arriving in Moscow in
September.1053
Chatto completed his report, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, on 5 November 1930,
a document which presented the essence of the curricular activity the International Secretariat and
the Indian Bureau planned to organise. This report, which illustrates how Chatto described a
small group under our influence in Berlin, is also an account located and filed in different places
and archival collections. 1054 For Chatto, these courses were a crucial project, while others looked
upon this line of activity with suspicion, particularly how Chatto was dealing with the candidates
who seemed inclined towards communism in Germany and England. M [Michail/Piatnitsky]
expected Smeral to act vigilantly in his examination of how Chattos relations with the colonial
students were progressing:
Please indicate how the case is with the Indian students in England who joined a course in
the principles of communism. [] Have you managed to organise any communist education
of the young Indian nationalists, about whom Chatto wrote? We have no commitments
towards the participants in these courses. [] If any materials are needed, please write. Best
regards, M.1055
Piatnitsky decided to contact Smeral after having read Chattos report in November. Yet, already in
August 1929, after the Frankfurt Congress, Chatto had been pondering the idea of developing
curricular activity. Hence, it is logical to assume that Piatnitsky wanted to know how the contacts
1053

The discussion of Khankhojis eventual visit to Moscow depended wholly on the information from the WEB,
which implied that the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion knew that Rattan Singh was to act as a protector if he
went to Moscow, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow,
24/9-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 94-95, Letter from WEB, Berlin, an die kom.Fraktion des Sekretariats der
Antiimperialistischen Liga, Berlin, 16/10-1931.
1054
The original report was sent to Moscow on 5 November (whether it was addressed to Piatnitsky remains
unknown), arrived on 6 November and was later filed in the dossiers of the Piatnitsky secretariat. A copy was filed in
the LAI fond, while a third version of the document (a transcript) was retrieved by the Berlin Schutzpolizei during a
police raid of the International Secretariat on 21 December, 1931 (see further next chapter). A fourth copy has been
located in P. C. Joshis archive, deposited at the Jawaharlal Nehru University (section: Archives on Contemporary
History), see IISG P. C. Joshis Archives, Catalogue, volume 7 (Jawaharlal Nehru University, Archives on
Contemporary History), p.96, LAI: IML: ZPA: BERLIN: KURSE FR KOLONIALE STUDENTEN IN BERLIN,
Course for Colonial Students in Berlin: Report by Chatto & Nambiar (Photocopy in German bound); For the
Comintern Archive, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, and the original RGASPI 495/19/312, 38-42. Examination of
these two versions discloses no alterations between the original and the copy. For the extracted copy, SAPMO-BA
ZPA R1501/20200, 111-115, Abschrift IAN 2165 m/9.3. Aus dem Material, das bei der Liga gegen Imperialismus und
koloniale Unterdrckung, Berlin, Friedrichstr.24, gefunden wurde. The extracted version does not, however, mention
the date of completion (5 November 1930).
1055
RGAPI 495/19/312, 37, (Vertraulich) Letter from M. [Piatnitsky], Moscow, to Smeral, Berlin, 14/10-1930.

418

with anti-colonial activists in Berlin were developing over time. Apparently, several Oxford
students of Indian origin had attended the Frankfurt Congress, before travelling to Berlin where
they had met Chatto at the International Secretariat, who had observed their inclination towards the
Communist Party. To capitalise on the moment, Chatto wanted the Indian Bureau to organise
a four-week holiday course [in the summer of 1930] on Marxism with special reference to the
colonial revolution in Berlin. However, the snags and hitches in pulling this off proved to be too
difficult to overcome. Expecting to hold the course in August 1930, and for it to be given in
English, Chatto engaged Wittfogel and Josef Lenz, the leader of the KPD Agitpropabteilung in
Berlin, as teachers because of their English linguistic skills. However, Chatto also needed tutors
proficient in English. Chatto asked Mens [?], a youth comrade from America who was living in
Berlin, to contact the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow, and see whether they could send a couple of
teachers from Moscow to Berlin to give a few lectures. While still attempting to piece this all
together, the students from Oxford arrived in Berlin in July. However, as Chatto was waiting for a
decision from the ZK KPD on when the course could begin, and as Mens had failed to secure any
teachers from Moscow, Chatto was unable to tell the Oxford students what was happening and the
students simply left Berlin and went off in different directions for the holidays after having
heard nothing from Chatto.1056 For Chatto, the Indian student colony in Berlin was a decimated
clique due to the recent political disputes, a group dominated by the Roy agents, Tagore, ex-C. P.
members such as Gupta, and British spies. Consequently, Chatto stated that the Indian Bureau
needed to expand its activities at the universities in Great Britain and put the word out that
academic courses on the colonial question were being arranged in Berlin.1057
In the latter half of 1930, Chatto and Nambiar were planning to arrange three separate courses
in Berlin. In October, Wittfogel had already held the first course on the agrarian question in the
colonies, while the second course, Agrar Politik, began on 11 November and followed a similar
theme, with Wittfogel in charge of the seminars at the Deutsche Hochschule fr Politik. The
final course, the Tuesday evening course of 16 lectures on imperialism, was scheduled to be held
in December under the tutorship of Hermann Duncker from the MASCH (Marxistische
Arbeiterschulung; Marxist Workers Education) in Berlin. Chatto stated that the courses being
organised by the Indian Bureau fulfilled a two-fold objective: firstly, to influence Indian
1056

RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930. The
Indian students that wanted to attend a course, and had visited the Frankfurt congress in 1929 were Mazumdar, the
Jussuf sisters, Sinha, and the delegates of the Indian Student Association in Glasgow (N. N. Bose, J. J. Saha, and A.
Roy), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/92, 23. For Josef Lenz, see Hoppe 2007, p.21, 213, and, Worley 2002, p.10. Lenz was an
ardent defender of the class against class policy in the KPD, for example, Lenz stated that the Bolshevik delegation
in the KPD, despite its small size, had the greatest of influence in party questions.
1057
The curricular activity was also a strategy that served the purpose to avoid the ban, issued by the Berlin board of
school, which prohibited political parties or organisations to hold political meetings in the school premises.

419

students and to get Indian newcomers from England to speak the German language, an
undertaking supported by the German comrades of the KOSTUFRA who were also helping to
find suitable communist students at German universities (Berlin, Munich, Leipzig and Frankfurt
am Main); and secondly, these courses confirmed that the Indian Bureau was an extremely
useful centre for recruiting students.1058
This curricular activity attracted not only the attention of Indian students and activists but also
that of individuals from Africa and the Arab region (Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Persia). How
did Chatto evaluate the political material and what were his general impressions? His primary
aim was to assess whether the candidates could be of any use to the LAI. Chatto concluded that six
students had participated in the preliminary course, five from India plus the Palestinian
Alaeddin, a member of the national revolutionary group under the leadership of Hamdi el Husseini
in Palestine. In relation to the Indian students, Chatto observed how they were all of different
political persuasions. For example, Ghosh was studying in London and, once back in India,
expected to open a publishing house in Calcutta. This was of particular relevance to the LAI,
Chatto argued, especially as Ghosh was planning to publish important revolutionary books.
However, due to the fact that Ghoshs father was a titled Government servant, he had to conceal
his sympathies to the LAI. Chatto nonetheless conceded that he did not expect much from him,
but was rather providing Ghosh with a chance to acquaintance himself with our literature, and
perhaps, in the future, he could be of service to the LAI in India. The second student was
Sengupta, an electrical engineer by profession and a member of a terrorist-inclined group.
According to Chatto, he was a sincere and serious person who could be of good service to the
anti-imperialist movement in India. Khosla, the third student, who was from Lahore and allegedly
a member of the Indian terrorist movement, made a good impression on Chatto. However,
Chatto also questioned several of the students. Yagnik, a member of the Bombay Congress
Committee, had acquired a clear working knowledge of communist theory from the course,
although Chatto became suspicious of both his ties to the Indian bourgeois press and of his real
intentions for having taken the course, particularly as Yagnik wrote articles for the sole purpose of
earning money. Chatto nonetheless observed that Yagnik spoke Gujrati, so he could be of use to
translate certain [LAI] pamphlets. Sinha was a student with a few illusions who had attended
the Frankfurt Congress in 1929. According to Chatto, these illusions were expected to disappear
during the course of discussions, especially as he had a very good and intimate knowledge of
the condition of the peasantry and the peasant movement in India.1059

1058
1059

RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930.
RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930.

420

The course on Agrar Politik based itself on Wittfogels expertise of the China question, and
was attended by students from the Arab region, Africa and India. M. J. S. Naidu, Chattos nephew,
aside from working on-and-off at both the International Secretariat and the Indian Bureau, was
one of the students on the course. Naidu was not, however, given any special treatment, described
by Chatto as a sympathiser but one who is very confused and needs education. Other students
represented a more valuable source for Chatto, e.g. the journalist and devoted Pan-Islamist, Hajj
Muhammad Jalabi, the most active and intelligent of the Arabs in Berlin. Chatto considered it
worthwhile to make use of Jalabis expertise in order to complete his own ideas of both Islam
and the Arab nationalist movement. The Egyptian Ibrahim Youssef could also be of great service to
the LAI. Working as a journalist in Berlin, Chatto observed that Youssef had published a number
of articles in the name of the LAI in the Middle Eastern national revolutionary press. Chatto
concluded, however, that several of the course participants were either unreliable or vague about
their intentions. For example, the student of history at the [Humboldt] university, Abdur Rauf
Malik, was a sincere fellow with Gandhist illusions, while Abdul Alim, a nationalist of the
Gandhi school, had only begun to acquaint himself with communist literature under our
influence. Chatto wanted to win Alim over, but only if he acted seriously and reliably. The
course also offered a chance for Chatto to establish closer relations with the Iraqi liberation
movement. In this regard, the London-based Iraqi diplomat Muzahim Beg Ali Pachachi, who was
also the leader of the Iraqi Nationalist Party, had informed Chatto that a group of students from
Iraq were planning to visit Berlin and would remain there for a longer period. This visit, Chatto
explained to the Eastern Secretariat (and Piatnitsky), was an opportunity to first establish contact
and then to maintain influence among them. However, it was essential to prevent the Iraqi
students from listening to Jalabis Pan-Islamic visions, Chatto stated. In the end, however, the aims
of this curricular activity were essentially covert. Firstly, the International Secretariat and the
Indian Bureau hoped that the courses would set up a viable channel to the anti-imperialist
movement, with the LAI expecting to assume the role as the administrative hub, and with Chattos
evaluation of the students (the political material) receiving a final verdict of either acceptance or
refusal. Secondly, after Chattos evaluation of the political material, if the student was deemed to
be a trustworthy candidate, the person would be invited to a closed meeting at the International
Secretariat with Chatto and other Oriental comrades (Ferdi and Nambiar). If the individual
managed to convince one of the Oriental comrades (Ferdi), the candidate was approved to
undergo further political education in Moscow at one of the Cominterns educational facilities
(KUTV).1060
1060

RGASPI 542/1/40, 119-123, Courses for Colonial Students in Berlin, author: Chatto, Berlin, 5/11-1930.

421

The complexity, impact and ramifications of this curricular activity organised by Chatto and
Nambiar are, initially, hard to understand, particularly in relation to the fundamental aims of the
courses. For Chatto, the courses constituted more than just an educational opportunity, they
functioned essentially as an opportunity to see whether any of the students could be of service to
the communist and anti-imperialist movement. Secondly, while the courses conveyed the
impression of providing a broad understanding of the colonial question, in fact the courses were a
political strategy endorsed by the ZK KPD and the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters.
Their principal motive was to get the International Secretariat and the Indian Bureau to find
recruits for communism. These courses also introduced an opportunity for the LAI to set up
different channels to colonial and semi-colonial countries; either by convincing the students to act
as couriers or to carry out missions in their home countries (distributing anti-imperialist
propaganda, delivering directives or money). As a historical narrative, however, these covert
results remain a hazy blur and are, therefore, very difficult to analyse. In conclusion, the range of
colonial courses proves that the International Secretariat existed in a relatively limited political
space in Berlin, and the courses also contributed to increasing Chattos workload. They likewise
strengthened Chattos position at the International Secretariat after the crisis, which, in turn,
created a skewed distribution of responsibility, power and knowledge of the extent of the LAI
network, again in Chattos favour.
By February 1931, York/Thgersen was arguing that the International Secretariat was in a
critical condition due to its mismanagement, caused primarily by its incapacity to delegate work.
This was a criticism levelled against the extent of Chattos influence. Since Chatto both controlled
and supervised the LAIs valuable contacts at the International Secretariat, York/Thgersen called
for a change in the hierarchical structure, arguing that it was not logical to let Chatto act as
International Secretary and, at the same time, lead its administrative work. As a kind of cureall, York/Thgersen told the Eastern Secretariat that the International Secretariat only needed two
secretaries (York/Thgersen and Chatto), while Mnzenberg, in charge of finances and playing a
crucial role within the German communist movement, had to be drawn into the work more
closely. Initially, there was no sign of any reaction to York/Thgersens criticism at Comintern
headquarters. Yet, at some level, it is possible that it contributed in some way to what was about to
happen to Chatto in 1931. The question is why. According to York/Thgersen, the International
Secretariat was still suffering from the crisis, evidenced by its rigid and hierarchical structure.
Thus, the Eastern Secretariat had to consider establishing an investigative commission in Moscow
to discuss the situation, focusing on Chattos dominance and his ability to carry out all the duties
demanded of him in Berlin. This recommendation principally questioned Chattos position at the
422

International Secretariat, above all his knowledge of every contact within the LAI network, a
source of information York/Thgersen and Ferdi wanted to get their hands on. The question at
hand for the Eastern Secretariat was to decide whether Chatto and Smeral, either or both, should
return to Moscow, and to get an authoritative comrade to assist the International Secretariat
with its political work.1061 Was there any immediate reaction to York/Thgersens proposal?
In April 1931, the Political Commission discussed the accusations against Comrade
Shattopadhyaya [sic], yet these discussions were not necessarily a reaction to York/Thgersens
criticisms. According to the strictly confidential protocol, the Political Commission decided to
transfer the question to the International Control Commission (the internal supervisory organ of
the Comintern in Moscow; the ICC), without making any further reference to the nature of the
accusation.1062 The ensuing investigation nevertheless required the summoning of Chatto to
Moscow to face the indictment. In June, Magyar visited Berlin in connection with the
reconstitution of the LAI Executive, and instructed Chatto to travel to Moscow. On 23 June 1931,
Magyar (A. B.) informed Kuusinen in a report that Chatto was ready to leave Berlin after
having received the order from the ECCI.1063 However, Chatto remained in Berlin in July and
August. During this period, Chatto carried out technical matters under Magyars instruction after
having been prohibited from getting involved in the daily routine work at the International
Secretariat, and having been deprived of his authoritative position as International Secretary. For
example, Chatto was instructed to translate manuscripts from German into English aimed for
publication in the re-launched LAI organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review. Chatto was also no longer
a member of the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion which, in August, received a firm
request from Magyar that Chatto was expected in Moscow. The primary reason why Chatto had
not yet left Berlin was explained in a telegram from Chatto to a Clarence Miller [?] at the Hotel
Lux in Moscow. According to Chatto, he had been bedridden [for] ten days due to severe
kidney trouble. Once he had recuperated, Chatto expected to leave Berlin and arrive Friday or
Saturday in Moscow.1064
1061

York/Thgersen observed that Ferdi was in agreement with the essence of these proposals, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/39, 26a, Letter from York [Thgersen], Berlin, to unknown [Eastern Secretariat ?], Moscow, 14/2-1930
[1931].
1062
RGASPI 495/4/101, 2, (Streng vertraulich! Fr SONDERMAPPE!) Protokoll Nr.134 der Sitzung der Politischen
Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 20/4-1931. On 23 May, the Political Commission endorsed the new International
Secretariat in Berlin: Ferdi, York/Thgersen, Mnzenberg, Smeral and a colonial representative. Thus, this marked the
end of Chattos position as International Secretary, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/109, 6-7, (Streng vertraulich! Fr
Sondermappe!) Protokoll Nr.142 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931. Present at the
meeting were Piatnitsky, Knorin, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Heimo, Arnot, Magyar and Miff. The ICCs main objective
was to observe communist discipline amongst the members sections and individuals of the Comintern, see further
in Huber 1995, pp.28-37.
1063
RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, Letter from A. B. [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI
459/213/186, 7-8, Biographical notes: Chatto, ICC, Moscow, 4/9-1936.
1064
RGASPI 542/1/48, 136, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to Kommfraktion des Sekretariats

423

Is it possible to determine the actual accusation against Chatto? Firstly, however, we need to
re-assess Barooahs interpretation of why Chatto chose to leave Berlin, an erroneous conclusion
which contradicts the empirical sources (the protocols of both the Political Commission and the
ICC and Chattos personal file in the Comintern Archive). According to Barooah, Chatto had no
other option than to escape from Berlin in August 1931, after the International Secretariat had
been transferred to Paris [!]. Prohibited to enter France, and due to the Schutzpolizeis increased
surveillance of Chatto, his only option left was Moscow, after having received personal advice
from Dimitrov, Barooah concludes. Certainly, Dimitrov and the Soviet ambassador in Berlin
assisted in organising Chattos journey to Moscow; however, Barooahs conclusion as to why
Chatto left Berlin is based on misconceptions.1065 Most importantly, the decision had never been in
Chattos hands, mainly because the case against him was based on political dishonesty and,
therefore, this matter had been authorised at various hierarchical levels at Comintern headquarters.
The central issue was that someone in the Comintern, for unknown reasons, was questioning
Chattos involvement in the Indian Committee, an association in Germany which had supported
the Indian national liberation movement during the Great War and which the German government
provided with money in order to create and stimulate anti-British propaganda in India. Chatto
arrived in Moscow in August or September 1931 and began to write down a history of his life as a
national revolutionary in his so-called Autobiography. In this document, Chatto performed an
act of self-criticism by apologising for my failures, and referred to his ideological conversion to
communism. On 15 October, Chatto handed over his Autobiography to the ICC, in which he
declared:
My work in the League against Imperialism is known, as well as my failures. Even in this
respect I should like to add that I scrupulously carried out at each stage the policy laid down
by the Fraction, and I believe that my colleagues will bear me out when I claim that the
greater part of the work of building up the connections of the League was done by me.
During the last two years I was not allowed the scope that I had previously had, because
comrades [Smeral; Ferdi] were appointed to take charge who had not the least idea of such
work, and whose policy was bound to lead to the stagnation of the League. I regret that I
have been removed from the League Secretariat without having had a chance of explaining
the real position there or of organising the work in the way in which I could have done so.
[] In the course of my political activities during the last 25 years there is one period which
LAI, July, 1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 186, Telegram, sender: Chatto, to Clarence Miller [?], Hotel Lux, Moscow,
August, 1931. Ferdi explained that the reason why Chatto not yet had left Berlin was not due to reluctance, but rather,
he feels sick, he hopes to depart in the next few days. See fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 147, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to
the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1931.
1065
Barooah 2004, pp.283-285.

424

has been the subject of suspicion and criticism and, as the true facts regarding my life and
development are not generally known, this suspicion has naturally caused a number of
comrades to withhold from me the confidence to which I am entitled. That period was
deuring [sic] the years 1914-1918, when I, along with all Indians living abroad, co-operated
with the Kaisers government. In order to understand the nature of that co-operation it is
necessary to go through the documents, as far as they have been preserved, [] But I feel
that as I was not then a Communist or even a Social Democrat [during the Great War] as my
relations with the Government were not individual but collective, and as I liquidated those
connections at the earliest possible moment, these facts should be regarded as extenuating
circumstances. [] I ask the I.K.K. therefore to examine by statement and the documents of
the Indian Committee, and to pass final judgement on my war activities, in order to free me
from the suspicion and mistrust that some comrades, wrongly and unfortunately, entertain
against me.1066
This charge against Chatto had a lasting effect on his life as a political refugee in the Soviet Union.
During the purge of the Comintern apparatus at the time of the Great Terror in the Soviet Union in
1937, Chatto was sentenced to death on 2 September by the Military Collegium of the Supreme
Court of the USSR. Charged with having been a German spy on Soviet soil, Chatto was executed
by firing squad in Moscow once the verdict had been handed down.1067
The case against Chatto symbolises a decisive turning point in the history of the LAI. Despite
the attempts of York/Thgersen and Ferdi to gain access to every contact that had been cultivated
and administered by Chatto, once Chatto had left Berlin, the LAI and the International Secretariat

1066

RGASPI 495/213/186, 215-228, Autobiography by Chatto, Moscow, to the ICC, Moscow, 15/10-1931.
Barooah plays down Chattos anxiety at being accused of political dishonesty, instead, he refers to the biased
memoir of Chattos widow, Lidiya Karunovskaya, written in 1970, a narrative which implies that Chatto was far more
concerned about his alleged involvement in the murder of the British diplomat Curzon Wyllie in London in 1909.
Chattos own explanation, according to his Autobiography tells, however, a completely different story: [I]n 1909 I
openly advocated [this] political assassination and defended Dhingra, who shot Sir Curzon Wyllie in London in July of
that year, I was elected a member of the Maharashtra secret society, the Abhinava Bharat, and was appointed one of
the three representatives in Europe for the purpose of (a) organising the Indians abroad for the movement, (b)
obtaining contacts with European anarchists to get training in explosives and (c) supplying the organisations in
Bombay and Bengal with revolvers etc., see RGASPI 495/213/186, 215-228, Autobiography by Chatto, Moscow, to
the ICC, Moscow, 15/10-1931; Barooah 2004, p.320-321. Chatto was rehabilitated during the thaw of 1956 in the
Soviet Union after Karunovskayas plea to clear his name. The Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR
concluded on 28 April, 1956, that the verdict against Chatto was lifted, and the case against him was withdrawn
because of the lack of evidence of a crime. On 22 March, 1958, Karunovskaya received a death certificate indicating
that Chatto had died on 6 April, 1943. Similar erroneous information on Chattos demise is found in Subodh Roys
essay, included in Cecil Kayes documentary collection, which states that Chatto passed away in January 1941, Kaye
1971, p.337. Documents on Chattos rehabilitation are located in the P. C. Joshi Archive, deposited at the Jawaharlal
Nehru University/Archives on Contemporary History [not consulted by the author], see IISG in Amsterdam P. C.
Joshis Archives, Catalogue, volume 7, section V. Chattophadyaya His Activities (In Part). Sobhanalal Guptas
analysis of Indian communism includes a fair though short account of Chattos years in the Soviet Union, see Gupta
2006, pp.271-272, 274, 306.
1067

425

lost one of its vital components, one which had been essential in maintaining the links within its
anti-imperialist network.
*
Revival (or Decline?)
To some degree the International Secretariat managed to revive the LAI as a cover organisation for
the Comintern. From a political perspective, however, the organisation was not credible,
particularly as the LAI had no Executive and no General Council, a consequence of the
purification process in 1930. In the beginning of 1931, this dilemma troubled the International
Secretariat, especially as it contributed to the LAI being depicted as a dysfunctional body. The
International Secretariat told Magyar that it is possible and necessary to hold an LAI Executive
meeting in order to renew the legal continuity of the LAI, a session that would have to decide
upon anti-imperialist propaganda, organisational and tactical issues.1068
It was a question of revival or decline for the International Secretariat. To revise the political
agenda and, above all, to revive the LAI on an organisational basis, the International Secretariat
expected a reconstituted Executive to resurrect its activities. The preparations for the LAI
Executive in 1931 also confirmed the Cominterns governance vis--vis the International
Secretariat. Correspondence, protocols and drafts of resolutions reveal that the Eastern Secretariat
and other actors at Comintern headquarters controlled every stage of this LAI Executive meeting,
in which the WEB acted as both the receiver and executor of its instructions. For the International
Secretariat, the resurrection of the LAI Executive confirmed its status as a bystander.
To propose new members to the LAI Executive was a complex task. Magyar stated that it was
essential to avoid introducing an Executive which more or less continued the understanding of the
LAI being a communist organisation. In February, however, as Magyar and the International
Secretariat were looking into this issue, the list of proposed candidates confirmed its communist
bias: Bridgeman, Pollitt, Saklatvala, Clemens Dutt, Herclet, the French communist Mireille
Gaillard (later employed at the Inprecorr bureau in Berlin in 1932), Ford, Helmut/Dimitrov,
Witcheff, Huang Ping, Arthur Abolin as the AUCCSLU delegate,1069 Magyar of the Eastern
Secretariat, IRH delegate Louis de Visser, a representative from the PI (Manaff or Abdul
Madjid), Mnzenberg, Chatto, Smeral and Ferdi. When it came to the former prominente

1068

RGASPI 542/1/48, 26-28, Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat [delivered in
person by Magyar], Moscow, 12/2-1931.
1069
Serafima Gopner, a communist from Ukraine (1880 1966) and member of the ECCI Secretariat, was instructed
on 23 May by the Political Commission to contact Arthur Abolin in Moscow and to instruct him to act as the delegate
of the AUCCSLU at the LAI Executive, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/109, 6-7, (Streng vertraulich! Fr Sondermappe!)
Protokoll Nr.142 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931.

426

Persnlichkeiten, Magyar instructed the International Secretariat to send an invitation to Nehru

since he officially remained a member of the LAI Executive. However, Magyar conceded, he
would not come. If so, the International Secretariat should establish an international campaign
against the betrayal of Nehru, Fimmen, Maxton and Hatta as a means of reviving the League
as well as utilising the differences between the imperialists. It all boiled down to a question of
money in the initial stages, however. In March, as Magyar travelled back to Moscow, the
financial burden at the International Secretariat was the central issue to be sorted out in order to
guarantee that the delegates would be able to attend the LAI Executive. According to Magyar, the
Political Commission needed to endorse the sum of 2,200 Marks in order to cover their travelling
expenses.1070
*
Deliberations at the Centre
On 8 March, Magyar introduced the idea of resurrecting the Executive of the LAI at a session with
the Political Commission. However, Magyar concluded that under no circumstance was the LAI
Executive meeting to convene at the same time as the Eleventh ECCI Plenum (scheduled for 26
March 11 April in Moscow). The Political Commission observed that this session would offer a
chance for the International Secretariat to realise the need to establish a new focus for the LAI,
especially the question of the national revolutionary movement in Europe, represented by
organisations and associations in the Balkans, Ukraine and in Alsace-Lorraine. This proposition
clashed with Magyars vision of the LAI Executive. Magyar had expected the meeting to function
as a forum to discuss the development of the liberation movement in the colonies after the
Frankfurt Congress, a report on the International Secretariat and to elect both a new LAI Executive
and General Council.1071 The primary reason why the Political Commission wanted the LAI to
take on the European national minority movement was an initiative inspired by the apprehensive
political situation in Eastern Europe in the beginning of the 1930s. Eastern Europe was paralysed
by chronic instability which, after the adoption of the Locarno Treaty in 1925, had only increased,
resulting in the Eastern Polish borderlands, for example, being a scene of sporadic violent
1070

Magyar confirmed the sum of 2,200 Marks in his report to the Political Commission on 8 March. The expected
cost for the delegates were: Bridgeman (300), Pollitt (270), Saklatvala (270), Clemens Dutt (270), Herclet (180),
Gaillard (180), Ford (100), Witcheff (if released from prison in time, 400), de Visser (180), the delegate of the PI
(180), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 26-28, Report from the International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat
[delivered in person by Magyar], Moscow, 12/2-1931.
1071
RGASPI 542/1/47, 12-14, [Russian original] (Secret) Report from Magyar, Moscow, to the Political Commission,
Moscow, 6/3-1931 (delivered on 8 March 1931). For a copy of this report (German version), see fol. RGASPI
495/4/94, 42. For the meeting of the Political Commission, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/94, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.126 der
Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 8/3-1931. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky,
Kuusinen, Pieck, Knorin, Magyar and Kun. This meeting re-introduced the discussion of the LAI and of the national
minority movement in Europe, a topic introduced by Bela Kun in September, 1929 (see Anni Confusionis).

427

outbursts, while the growth of nationalism in the Balkan countries had reached new unparalleled
heights. With the rise of nationalism as a political stimulus, as well as the criticism of the League
of Nations failure to implement the theory of national self-determination in practice, the national
minority movement was gaining in both strength and size.1072 Yet, when the International
Secretariat heard of the idea to focus the LAI on establishing contacts with the minority
movement, the Eastern Secretariat received a less than confident response:
We are not prepared to handle this question of national minorities in Europe seriously and in
detail. We need help to develop a good resolution, and this may call for a recommendation,
perhaps from Bridgeman.1073
The question of the national minority movement in Europe as a topic had, however, already been
examined by the International Secretariat in January 1931. Smeral had investigated whether the
LAI would be able to establish sections in Eastern Europe. For example, together with the Polish
communist and member of the ECCI Presidium, Julian Lenski, Smeral had assessed the prospects
of setting up a section in Poland and, if successful, repeating the operation in Bulgaria. Smeral
and Lenski stated that the structural shape of the section had to be a small committee which, at a
later date, could be transformed into a section. However, due to the extensive repression against
the communist movement in both Poland and Bulgaria, Smeral and Lenski concluded that it would
be futile to attempt to realise this proposal.1074 The idea of getting the LAI to pay attention to the
national minority movement did not, however, disappear. While the International Secretariat
kom.Fraktion observed the question as being politically important, it also noted that for the
Political Commission to even suggest that the LAI should introduce a serious, objective and
exhaustive resolution was an illogical proposition. This was an issue entirely under the
jurisdiction of the Comintern, and it needed to be decided upon before the LAI Executive
meeting. 1075
Magyars primary challenge was to set up an LAI Executive which would be able to convince
the European left-wing movement that the LAI was a non-party organisation. After reviewing the
list of invited guests, Magyar concluded that very few independents [non-communist delegates]
had been included. Realising that two of the focal points at the meeting of the LAI Executive
would be the expelling of several of the non-communist members on the Executive and the protest
1072

Steiner 2005, pp.627-630.

RGASPI 542/1/44, 101-103, International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, March/April
1931.
1074
RGASPI 542/1/49, 4-5, Letter from Smeral/Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow,
16/1-1931; RGASPI 542/1/49, 9-10, Letter from Smeral/International Secretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern
Secretariat/Magyar, Moscow, 16/1-1931.
1075
RGASPI 542/1/48, 55-57, Brief Nr.12, Internationale Sekretariat/Fraktion, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/3-1931;
RGASPI 542/1/48, 51, Zirkularbrief Nr. 10, Fraktion der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat,
Moscow, 14/3-1931.
1073

428

against the Imperialist system, Magyar understood that this session would confirm the
understanding of the LAI as a forum for only Communists and as a cover for the activities of the
Comintern.1076 For this reason, Magyar challenged the Political Commission to solve the question
of the programme and the tactics of the LAI during the Eleventh ECCI Plenum, and to summon
both Mnzenberg and Ferdi to Moscow.1077
The kom.Fraktion explained to Magyar that the LAI could no longer invite neutral
persons. Compared to its first year of activity in Berlin, 1927, by 1931 the socio-political
situation in Germany had completely changed. Attempting to grasp why the LAI had become a
reclusive organisation, the kom.Fraktion admitted that the purging of the LAI after the Frankfurt
Congress had made it hard to find here and in the immediate vicinity anyone willing to be
associated with the LAI.1078 Berlin, once the haven for the anti-colonial movement was, at the
beginning of the 1930s, turning into a hostile scene for political activism. The LAI and its
International Secretariat found itself caught in the middle, having to confront the political battles
between both the Nazi and communist movements, while continually adapting itself to combat the
daily repression of the Schutzpolizei.
On 13 April, Mnzenberg and Ferdi attended the Political Commission session in Moscow.
The strictly confidential discussion made it very clear that everyone had to understand the need
for thorough preparations prior to the meeting of the LAI Executive, and for it to convene at the
end of May. The Political Commission stated that this would provide Magyar and the Eastern
Secretariat with enough time to complete the resolutions and agenda, assigning Kuusinen to
examine the drafts, leaving the question of Nehrus expulsion in the hands of Mnzenberg and
Ferdi.1079
The preparatory work for the resurrection of the LAI Executive was positive proof of how the
International Secretariat was obediently following the dictates of the Comintern. After completing
the material for the session in Moscow, Magyar sent the documents, e.g. the agenda and the
definite date (30 May 2 June), to the International Secretariat. According to the agenda, the LAI
1076

RGASPI 495/4/94, 42, An die Politkommission ber die Anti-imp.Liga, Magyar, Moscow, to the Political
Commission, Moscow, 6/3-1931.
1077
The Eleventh ECCI Plenum focused primarily on two topics: reports on the communist parties and the crisis of
capitalism (Manuilsky together with Thlmann, Lenski and Cemodanov as co-reporters), and the war threat and the
fear of a military intervention in the Soviet Union, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/94, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.126 der Sitzung der
Politischen Kommission des Politsekretariats EKKI, 8/3-1931; Kahan 1990, p.28.
1078
RGASPI 542/1/48, 55-57, Brief Nr.12, Internationale Sekretariat/Fraktion, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/3-1931.
1079
RGASPI 495/4/99, 1-4, Protokoll Nr.131 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI am 13/41931. Present at the meeting were: Pieck, Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Knorin, Heimo, Dimitrov, Kun,
Mnzenberg, Magyar, Safarov and Ferdi; RGASPI 495/4/99, 5, (Streng vertraulich. Fr Sondermappe) Protokoll
Nr.131 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI am 13/4-1931. After the meeting, Piatnitsky
summoned Mnzenberg, Ferdi and Magyar to a closed session in his office. Any record of this discussion remains
unknown. However, prior to the session, Piatnitsky wondered whether the sum of 2,200 Marks would be enough to
cover the costs, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/99, 8.

429

Executive meeting would focus on discussing a report by the International Secretariat, the
development of national LAI sections, the nature of the anti-imperialist youth movement and the
question of unifying the anti-imperialist struggle with the European national minority
movement. Magyar estimated that forty-one delegates had received an invitation and
recommended that the International Secretariat invite Maxton, Hatta, Fimmen and Nehru, despite
there being little hope of them attending the session in Berlin. Magyar instructed the
International Secretariat to notify every delegate that they were expected to deliver a report at the
meeting although, in order to avoid any unwanted debate, each delegate had to send a draft of
his/her report to the International Secretariat a few days before the meeting.1080 To complete the
preparations, Magyar accelerated the completion of all questions at the end of May, e.g. the
resolutions on the political and national minority questions.1081 On 23 May, the Political
Commission urged the Eastern Secretariat to present its resolutions on both the Session of the
Executive Committee of the Anti-Imperialist League and the national liberation movement of
the oppressed European peoples. For Kuusinen, the LAIs revised political agenda was a source
of inspiration in defining the Cominterns policy on the national question. Kuusinen believed that
the LAI was capable of influencing and manoeuvring the European national minority movement(s)
and, on 6 June, at the ECCI Presidium session in Moscow, Kuusinen presented his ideas on the
question of National Oppression in Europe, stating that he believed the LAI could play a pivotal
role:
The Anti-Imperialist League on behalf of the national revolutionary organisations of the
whole world energetically protests against the existing revolting oppression of millions of
the masses of oppressed nationalities, primarily in Poland, Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, CzechoSlovakia, Greece, Italy, but also in Spain, France (Alsace-Lorraine), Great Britain (Ireland)
[] There could not be a crueller satire on the freedom of peoples which was promised in
the Versailles Treaty than the practice which is adopted by the Versailles system of
imperialism. The Anti-Imperialist League resolves to carry on a struggle against the whole of
this system of imperialist plunder and mass destruction, against all forms of national
oppression and inequality of rights, for the purpose of winning complete freedom for the
oppressed peoples.1082
1080

RGASPI 542/1/48, 95-96, Antrag zur Sitzung des Sekretariates ber die Exekutive der Liga gegen Imperialismus
[Eastern Secretariat], Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 4/5-1931 [arrived in Berlin 6/5-1931].
1081
RGASPI 542/1/48, 99, Brief Nr.12, Fraktion im Ligasekretariat, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat/Magyar,
Moscow, 12/5-1931.
1082
RGASPI 495/4/109, 1-5, Protokoll Nr.142 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931.
Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Knorin, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Heimo, Arnot, Magyar and Miff; For
Kuusinens speech, see fol. RGASPI 495/2/180, 129-132, (Confidential) Material on the Report of Comrade Kuusinen
at the Session of the Presidium of the ECCI, Moscow, 6/6-1931.

430

This idea nonetheless merely confirmed Kuusinens appraisal of the example of the Soviet
Union and its role in saving the movement from national oppression on the basis of the Soviet
system. In fact, the idea paraphrased the resolution, Zur nationalen Befreiungsbewegung der
unterdrckten Vlker Europas which the LAI Executive had endorsed in Berlin on 2 June (a
resolution had been completed on 27 May and the political resolution on 26 May).1083 Magyar had
adhered strictly to the policy of class against class during the process of completing the
resolution which, in turn, had exposed the LAIs communist ties. As noted in the political
resolution, for example, the LAI should show no tolerance towards its former alliances, especially
the former non-communist members of the LAI Executive. This also implied an increase in the
struggle against its principal enemies: the LSI and the Amsterdam International:
All the bloodhounds are unleashed by the imperialists against revolutionary anti-imperialist
liberation movements. [] The leaders of the II [LSI] and Amsterdam International are in
the forefront of the fight against the oppressed peoples. MacDonalds Labour Government
fights against the Indian liberation movement [] A most despicable role is played by the
so-called left Social Democrats, Messrs. Maxton and Fimmen [] Mr. Fimmen deserted the
Anti-Imperialist League. Likewise, Mr. Maxton shamelessly supported the manoeuvres of
British Imperialism [] The so-called left socialists, the Jabaralal Neru [sic] and Bose, have
played a particularly despicable role. [] Neru, who, has become the agent of British
imperialism.1084
The rhetoric of class against class was used to confirm that the LAI and the anti-imperialist
movement had reached a new and higher stage:
The intensification of all antagonisms and the seriousness of the situation makes it the
imperative duty of the Anti-Imperialist League to increase its struggle and strengthen its
organisation.1085
Was the resurrection of the LAI Executive in Berlin the step which confirmed a new and higher
stage for the activities of the LAI?
*
1083

RGASPI 495/3/201, 1-2, Protokoll Nr.109 der Sitzung des Politsekretariats EKKI, Moscow, 28/5-1931. Present at
the meeting were Piatnitsky, Weinstone, Manuilsky, Arnot, Gutmann, Bratkowski, Kuusinen, Lozovsky, Knorin,
Codovilla and Worowsky. For the resolutions see fol. RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of
the Executive Committee of the LAI, June 1931, Berlin, Moscow, 26/5-1931; RGASPI 495/3/201, 412-415,
(Vertraulich) Zur nationalen Befreiungsbewegung der unterdrckten Vlker Europas, Moscow, 27/5-1931. Another
resolution, presented and adopted during the LAI Executive meeting, was the Resolution ber den Terror in den
Kolonien und Halbkolonien, see fol. RGASPI 539/2/432, 13.
1084
RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of the Executive Committee of the LAI, June 1931,
Berlin, Moscow, 26/5-1931.
1085
RGASPI 495/3/201, 395-404, Draft resolution for the Session of the Executive Committee of the LAI, June 1931,
Berlin, Moscow, 26/5-1931.

431

Resurrection and the Road to Sectarianism: The LAI Executive Meeting, Berlin, 31 May
2 June 1931
I would like to collectively draw your attention to the following. The preparation of the
meeting was very poor. Even the necessary measures to ensure the participation of the major
imperialist countries were not taken. [] the reports and discussion left little concrete for the
future work of the League.
Helmut/Dimitrov to the ECCI, 8/6-1931

On Sunday 31 May, at 3 pm, at an unknown location in Berlin, Mnzenberg opened the meeting of
the LAI Executive. Mnzenbergs nearly three-hour long speech was an outline of the history of
the LAI which concluded that the mistakes committed by the organisation was a dilemma
explained essentially by the betrayal of opportunists such as Maxton, Nehru, Fimmen and
Hatta.1086 Forty-six delegates attended this LAI Executive meeting. Fourteen of these delegates
represented both the imperialist world and the mass organisations (the AUCCSLU, the IAH, the
IRH, the Profintern and the International Secretariat), and there were fourteen representatives from
the colonies, e.g. Bridgeman, Percy Glading, van Mnster, Dimitrov, Vlachoff and Popov from
Macedonia. I, Valnitsky from Poland and the Ukrainian nationalist Petruschewitsch, the KPD
representative Lenz, the IAH functionary Paul Scholze, Wittfogel, Hans Jger, Ford, Kouyat, the
IAH delegate Otto Katz, Kunizaki, Saklatvala, Tagore, Abdul Madjid of the PI, Willi Budich of the
IRH, Ferdi, Chatto, Smeral and York/Thgersen were all present. The International Secretariat had
also invited journalists from the German and foreign communist press, e.g. Inprecorr, TASS, Die
Rote Fahne, Berlin am Morgen and Welt am Abend. Nonetheless, Ferdi made note of the fact after
the meeting that not a single, colonial delegate had arrived directly from the colonies, a
troublesome fact which exposed the incapacity of the International Secretariat to secure money to
cover travel expenses.1087 Some of the articles published after the meeting, e.g. Die KolonialUnterdrckten tagen in Welt am Abend (which included a picture of Ford, Mnzenberg and
Kouyat standing side-by-side, a picture actually taken at the Frankfurt Congress in 1929)
described how the new Executive of the LAI celebrated the resurrected body of the LAI. Inprecorr
published an article authored by the Arab communist and member of the Wafd, Mahmud Husni al1086

The article, James Maxton und die Liga gegen Imperialismus, published in Pressedienst, 15 May, defined the
official attitude of the LAI and its new Executive on Maxton: Under these circumstances there is no doubt that
Maxton has violated his solemn promises [], his systematic silence has supported the pro-imperialist actions of the
Independent Labour Party, and he has not strengthened the campaign against the imperialist terror of the MacDonald
government in the British colonies, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Protocol: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin,
31/5-2/6-1931, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/46a, 78-81, Pressedienst der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nr.9, Internationales
Sekretariat, Berlin, 15/5-1931.
1087
RGASPI 542/1/49, 281-287, Bericht des Bureaus der Fraktion der Exekutivsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus,
author: Ferdi, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1931.

432

Arabi (signed C. Husny), which declared that the LAI had entered a new period of
development by leaving behind its inhibitions and looseness in activity almost like a historic
relic. The LAI was now characterised by its systematic revolutionary mass activism due to its
revised and distinct political line.1088
The LAI Executive meeting was expected to signal a new beginning for the LAI. By the end of
it, however, the organisation had been exposed as one which had reached the end of its road as a
political actor. For Mnzenberg, the session proved, nonetheless, that our theories and ideology
are so good that they are alive and at work, yet this was nothing more than shallow talk. The
reconstitution of the LAI Executive in 1931 and this meeting in Berlin (the last one ever to take
place) was the fork in the road announcing the onset of sectarianism. The LAIs sectarian
behaviour strengthened its narrow-minded and open obedience towards communism as well as
towards the Cominterns class against class policy, as it likewise contributed to distancing the
LAI from the political scene both in Berlin and beyond.
Helmut/Dimitrov concluded after the session had ended that the preparatory work done at the
International Secretariat for this LAI Executive meeting had been very poor. This was based on
the fact that very few delegates of the European communist parties from the major imperialist
countries had bothered to attend, while its report on the European question and the national
minority movement remained a blank page due to the absence of representatives from AlsaceLorraine, Flanders, Catalonia and the Basque province. According to Helmut/Dimitrov, this
epitomised the inherent and very weakness of the League, where the neglect of work in this
area in the European communist parties (the PCF and its attitude is directly scandalous) was
destroying any attempt to revive the LAI. If this continued, Helmut/Dimitrov argued, it would be
difficult for the LAI to influence and give new impetus to the national revolutionary movement in
Europe. Ferdi believed that despite the organisational shortcomings, the session had proven the
possibility of organising the LAI along a more systematic line; an argument also raised by
Mnzenberg and Heckert in their report to the Secretariat of the IRH in Moscow, which had
concluded that the LAI Executive meeting was the end of disharmony, caused by compromises
or open alliances with unreliable persons and groups (the ILP, Maxton, Nehru, Gupta, Hatta
and Fimmen). Impressions of the meeting continued as Magyar observed that the session had
exposed no particular differences, while the personal intervention of the WEB, particularly that
1088

Die Kolonial-Unterdrckten tagen!, Welt am Abend, Berlin, 4/6-1931; Gegen koloniale Unterdrckung. Tagung
der Exekutive der Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, Inprecorr, No.55, 9/6-1931; Vor
einer neuen Entwicklungsperiode der Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, von C. Husny,
Inprecorr, No.60, 23/6-1931. For the articles above, see also SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 55-58a. For Mahmud
Husni al-Arabi, see Joel Beinin & Zachary Lockman, Workers on the Nile. Nationalism, Communism, Islam and the
Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954, The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo, 1998, p.194. Husni al-Arabi left
Egypt for Europe in the summer of 1930, as local authorities were harassing him due to his political activism.

433

of its leader Helmut/Dimitrov, on the question of oppressed peoples had saved the event from
ending in disarray. 1089 However, are the arguments introduced above a fair account of the event?
According to the verbatim record of the LAI Executive meeting,1090 several of the actors had
commented on the uncertainty within the LAI and the sections. This verbatim record also indicates
that Mnzenberg, Ferdi, Smeral and Ford were in control of the session, whereas others present
e.g. Bridgeman, Jger, Scholze, Kouyat and Chatto stated that both the LAI and the antiimperialist movement were in a precarious position.
While Mnzenberg had introduced the historical dimension of the LAI, Smeral outlined the
new political agenda of the LAI: the revolutionary national minority movement in Europe.
Apologising for the extensive resolution, Smeral nonetheless focused essentially on attacking
the LSI and the Amsterdam International, rather than on explaining the principal aim of getting the
LAI to approach the national minority movement. Later, Smerals report was edited and published
as an article, Der Kampf um eine vernnftige Organisation der Welt, in the July issue of Der
Rote Aufbau. In this article, Smeral claimed that twenty-one European countries persistently
oppressed national minorities as a result of the Versailles Peace Treaty, nations which received
eager support from the imperialist policy of the League of Nations. Smerals performance in
Berlin and his ensuing article were nothing more than a salute to the Soviet Union and its national
organisation, declaring that it was the only country in the world in which all nationalities are
equal. This was merely a repetition of the Cominterns policy on the national question, which
would again be re-stated by Kuusinen at the ECCI Presidium session in Moscow on 6 June.1091
Fords report on the Negro question ended with the conclusion that the LAI had to recognise
that the blacks are an important factor in the struggle against imperialism. While this was
nothing more than a rhetorical act, Kouyats disheartening report made Ford react. Kouyat stated
that the French LAI Section was a complete mess, while the structural setting in Berlin prevented
1089

Helmut/Dimitrov reported to the ECCI that the representative of the PCF, Gadyar, had arrived on 4 June, just in
time to attend the final meeting of the fraction bureau. The fraction bureau was an instrument used to control the
LAI Executive meeting and consisted of Helmut/Dimitrov (WEB), Lenz (KPD), Magyar (Eastern Secretariat), Ferdi
and Mnzenberg, see fol. RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to ECCI,
Moscow, 8/6-1931 and Ferdis report, RGASPI 542/1/49, 281-287, Bericht des Bureaus der Fraktion der
Exekutivsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus, author: Ferdi, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1931; RGASPI
539/2/432, 7, Bericht ber die Sitzung des Exekutiv-Komitees der anti-imperialistischen Liga, Mnzenberg &
Heckert, Berlin, to the IRH Secretariat, Moscow, June 1931 [arrived in Moscow 23/6-1931]; RGASPI 542/1/48, 110115, (Confidential) Report from A. B. [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931.
1090
Put on record by the secretary [unknown] at the unknown location for the meeting in Berlin.
1091
RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931. Smeral concluded in
Der Rote Aufbau that the following twenty-one European countries acted as oppressive hosts against national
minorities (marked out on a map): Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Iceland, Estonia, Germany, France, Greece, Great
Britain, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Rumania, Sweden, Spain, South Slovenia, Czechoslovakia
and Hungary. According to Smeral, the LSI and the Amsterdam International represented the tools of the MacDonald
government, see Bohumr Smeral, Der Kampf um eine vernnftige Organisation der Welt, in Der Rote Aufbau,
Berlin, 15. Juli 1931, IV. Jahrg. Heft 11, pp.504-509.

434

the German LDRN from carrying out any kind of activity. The LDRNs predicament troubled
Ford, urging Kouyat to work more energetically, although Ford conceded that it was difficult to
achieve any results as Kouyat was completely alone in Berlin.1092
Paul Scholze, the IAH delegate, tried to explain the IAHs current relations with the LAI, while
admitting that the IAHs organisational weakness in the colonies was entirely due to its lack of
contacts. Apparently, Scholze intentionally avoided mentioning the historic tie between the IAH
and the LAI; yet the IAH had supported the LAI financially from the beginning. However, this had
not helped to strengthen the network of the IAH outside Europe. Scholze admitted that the IAH
was experiencing the present moment as difficult as, like the LAI, the IAH had lost several
collaborations to different organisations. Later in 1931, however, an appraisal of the relations
between the LAI and the IAH appeared in the IAHs book Solidaritt. Zehn Jahre Internationale
Arbeiterhilfe, which had allegedly been written by Mnzenberg and the Czechoslovakian
communist, Otto Katz. Furthermore, Solidaritt had been released in connection with the Tenth
Anniversary of the IAH in 1931, and presented a picture which differed in many respects from
Scholzes report. For example, the IAHs support had (rightfully) secured the establishment of the
LAI in 1927, with Mnzenberg stating that it had been an initiative which illustrated the IAHs
moral stimulus as both a defender and a protector of proletarian solidarity, e.g. by organising
solidarity campaigns in support of the Chinese and Indian national revolutionary struggles.1093
Mnzenbergs depiction contrasted with Scholzes evaluation of the IAH and its relation to the
LAI. Thus, while Mnzenberg argued that the IAH had given the LAI its moral support from the
beginning, he neglected to mention that the LAI was also the result of the IAHs administrative
and financial support.
Bridgeman kept his report on the British LAI Section short, concluding that Maxtons
treachery had inflicted great difficulties to overcome for the section. This particularly
concerned the official ban, sanctioned by the Labour Party, prohibiting any member of the social
democratic movement in Great Britain from joining the LAI. After the LAI Executive meeting,
Bridgeman returned to London and to the despondency of the section. In August, Bridgeman
accused the International Secretariat of overlooking the fact that we have no staff and very little
money, and questioned how the International Secretariat even had the nerve to urge the section to
1092

RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931. Ford was only able
to attend the meeting for a short while, and left in all haste, according to the keeper of the minutes, concluding that he
seemed stressed about something during his much reduced speech, see further in Weiss (2011).
1093
RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; Mnzenberg 1931,
pp.331-334. The LAI organised public demonstrations in Berlin, Hamburg, Remscheid, Cannstatt bei Stuttgart,
Leipzig, Erfurt, Worms and Vienna. 50,000 people attended the meeting in Hamburg, where the leader of the KPD,
Thlmann, delivered a speech, joined by Bil on the rostrum, A-I-Z, Jahrgang. X, No. 26, Neuer Deutscher Verlag,
Berlin, p.522.

435

distribute both its special issue of the A-I-Z, Leben und Kampf der Schwarzen Rasse (published
in the summer of 1931) and The Anti-Imperialist Review at the expense of the section. Apparently,
the International Secretariat demanded that the British LAI Section buy 800 copies of The AntiImperialist Review, thus Bridgeman wondered whether the LAI centre in Berlin realised that the
situation in London had reached a critical level:
Do not overestimate our ability to assist you. We will do all we can, but as I have already
said we have not got any staff or any resources, and can only therefore do one thing at a
time. I regret this weak state of affairs, but the suggestions which you have made with regard
to the distribution of the Review indicate that you have got an entirely incorrect idea as to
our position.1094
The Secretary of the German LAI Section, Hans Jger, described a section in a confused and weak
state concluding that, in comparison to former organisational standards, the LAI barely existed
in the country. Jger argued that the failure of the section was a result of the political situation in
Germany, where the double battle against the reformists and then against the fascists, as well
as the surveillance by the security services, was consuming a lot of energy. Yet, this struggle was
also suffering from the constant lack of resources (no money for posters or events), leaving the
section reduced to a passive behaviour, capable only of organising small anti-imperialist
demonstrations in Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Essen and Remscheid.
Jger concluded that both the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress and the purification process
had caused immense damage to the section, especially with the loss of intellectuals, pacifists,
socialists and other non-party activists, and yet, the section wanted to make everything work and
would not fall short compared to the other sections.1095
At this LAI Executive meeting, Chatto introduced himself as the LAI representative on the
Indian question. Since this was Chattos final performance on behalf of the LAI (which he did not
disclose at the meeting), his report was an act of self-criticism on the errors of past times,
especially on the failure to establish a vigorous anti-imperialist movement in India. Chatto stated
1094

RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; RGASPI 542/1/52,
26, Letter from Bridgeman, London, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 26/8-1931. For the special issue on the
Black race, see A-I-Z, Sondernummer: Leben und Kampf der Schwarzen Rasse, Jahrgang X., Nr. 26, Berlin,
Neuer Deutscher Verlag (1931). Heinrich Stahr concluded that the Sondernummer was one of the few existing
examples highlighting the situation of the Black race in the USA (Stahr, 2004, pp.394-398). The Sondernummer
included an article by Ford (Die schwarze Rasse stsst zr Roten Front) as well as other articles which gave an
account of the slaves of the white master (Sklaven der weissen Herren) and the cheapest hands of the world, in
which the latter phrase referred to the systematic use of child labour in Africa. This special issue was a joint effort by
Mnzenberg and Padmore, based on the writings of Scott Nearing in Black America. Padmore had provided an IAH
functionary in Moscow (who had only one arm) with Nearings book, who in turn passed it on to Mnzenberg, who
used the book as inspiration to design the Sondernummer. On 3 March, 1932, Padmore asked Gross to tell
Mnzenberg that he wanted his book back, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/753, 155, Letter from Padmore, Hamburg, to
Gross, Berlin, 3/3-1932.
1095
RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931.

436

that much had been done since the Frankfurt Congress, however the LAIs reaction to the
Nehrus betrayal had been a disappointment. For Chatto, the LAIs hesitancy in responding with
conviction and the reluctance to foment a strong, political campaign against Nehru had damaged
the organisation. Chatto regretted having trusted Nehru, a person who had capitulated to Gandhi
over and over again, urging the delegates at the meeting to understand that his (Chattos) sole
objective had been to establish the LAI in India, an aim which depended on establishing personal
connections from Europe to India. Chattos final statement was a musing over the above, as well
as a reflection on the work to continue developing the LAIs activities in Berlin and England:
More Indian companions have to participate in the work of the League, and to create closer
work with the British section. Berlin is always referred to as a section of Moscow. Now this
is not true. Berlin offers a direct and undisturbed connection with the colonies. 2 million
Indians live outside India as labourers. The English ports are a very busy traffic of Indians.
This has to be approached in some way, also the large numbers of West Indian students [in
England].1096
This would be Chattos epitaph and legacy at the International Secretariat. Nevertheless, during
this LAI Executive meeting, Mnzenberg avoided mentioning in his report on organisational
questions the fact that Chatto was about to leave Berlin, stating only that important personal
changes are to be made after some employees resign. According to the verbatim record,
Mnzenberg concluded that the change in personnel was part of a re-structuring of the LAI in
1931, referring to the LAI as in essence, [...] a committee built upon no organisational
foundation unable to execute substantial work. How did Mnzenberg define work in this
context? Mnzenberg argued that the LAI was a leading actor in a number of international
propaganda campaigns (the Meerut trial and the well-known Sacco and Vanzetti case in the USA),
and was a pivotal actor in protesting against the imperialist agents: the LSI and the Amsterdam
International. While this meeting of the LAI Executive in Berlin aimed to revive the LAI as a
non-party organisation, Mnzenberg stated that the organisation did not depend on either the
consent or the participation of the leaders of social democracy. Thus, the meeting in Berlin
symbolised the re-birth of valuable political and ideological ideas, Mnzenberg stated:
The LAI is reflected in its organisational [] strength, its actual influence is not reflected.
We actually have more, [] stronger influence than we realise. [] Our theories and
ideologies are so good that they live and work, even without organisations to distribute and
process them, they exist. The most important result of our conference is the alliance between

1096

RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931.

437

the LAI and the organisations of national minorities and, through this alliance, the League
shall become a world organisation.1097
To give substance to the vision of developing the LAI into a world organisation, the delegates
approved the following seventeen members to constitute the LAI Executive:

Table 9.1: The LAI Executive Committee, June 1931

Member

Country, or, Region

Mnzenberg (general secretary)

Germany

Robert Dunn

USA

Abdul Madjid

Indonesia [India]

Hamdi el Husseini

Middle East

Chandra Chatterjee

India

[?] Petruschewitsch

West Ukraine; part of Poland

Alex Gossip

England

[?] Pavlov

Hungary [imprisoned in Sofia]

Reginald Bridgeman

England

Harry Pollitt

England (NMM)

Shapurji Saklatvala

India

A. Herclet

France

Augustino Sandino

Latin America

Georgi Dimitrov/Helmut

Balkan

John Ford

Negroes; USA

G. Melnitschansky

The Soviet Union

Huan Ping

China1098

A new set of members to the LAI General Council was also appointed at the Berlin meeting:
Anastasov from Macedonia, the Indian Gopal Basak (one of the accused in the Meerut trial), the
Albanian Boschi Lano, Jim Larkin Jr. from Ireland, A. Mesta from the Thracian region, the South
African A. Nzula and Padmore.1099 As one of its first acts, the LAI Executive endorsed a revised

1097

Mnzenberg wanted to increase LAI activity on all levels, e.g. the representatives of national minority
organisations should be guaranteed a seat on the LAI Executive; organise a congress on the European national
minority question; strengthen the youth work; re-launch The Anti-Imperialist Review; and develop mass work in
Germany and England, see fol. RGASPI 539/2/432, 7, Bericht ber die Sitzung des Exekutiv-Komitees der antiimperialistischen Liga, Mnzenberg & Heckert, Berlin, to the IRH Secretariat, Moscow, June 1931 [arrived in
Moscow 23/6-1931]; RGASPI 542/1/49, 123-209, Verbatim record: LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931.
1098
SAPMO BA-ZPA R 8051/82/8, 718-724, Handwritten notes, Willi Budich, Berlin, 1-2/6-1931.
1099
Only Lano attended this LAI Executive meeting. The official report (an edited version of the unofficial protocol
and Mnzenberg and Heckerts report), had deleted the names of well-known communists who had participated at the
meeting, e.g. Ford, Dimitrov, Melnitschansky, Pollitt and Mnzenberg, only to include the names of Robert Dunn,
Abdul Madjid, Hamdi el Husseini, Chatterjee, Petruschewitsch, Vlachoff, Saadi from Arabia and Rattan Singh of the
Ghadr Party, see fol. RGASPI 539/2/432, 15-17, Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr
nationale Unabhngigkeit, Berlin, 31/5-2/6-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R 8051/82/8, 718-724, Handwritten notes, Willi

438

political programme for the LAI, an agenda which Manuilsky had presented during a discussion of
the end of the crisis in September 1930 (see previous chapter). The LAI Executive also instructed
the International Secretariat to improve its work in order to turn the LAI into a world
organisation. This request focused, above all, on strengthening its propaganda and the enormous
importance of the liberation struggle of oppressed nations as well as the unification of every
revolutionary workers, peasant and national revolutionary organisations in the colonial countries
as a measure to protect communications running from Europe to both the Middle East and the
Negro liberation movements in Africa and Latin America.1100 The resurrection of the LAI
Executive in Berlin exposed the fact that the LAI was a cover organisation in the service of the
Comintern (a communist front organisation). In conclusion, this LAI Executive meeting also
exposed the International Secretariat as a centre about to implode due to its shattered structure and
sectarian tendencies. Thus, the resurrection of the LAI Executive marked the arrival of
sectarianism.
*
A Stagnant Movement
Ferdi argued that the resurrection of the LAI Executive had put an end to the illegal character of
the LAI. The challenge now though was how the International Secretariat should realise the revival
of the LAI as a non-political actor. Firstly, the International Secretariat intended to distribute
information on the LAI Executive meeting to the sections and, secondly, the working masses
had to be convinced to support the new line. However, the brief moment of euphoria at the
International Secretariat vanished rather quickly, replaced by a feeling of apprehension and
stagnation. Magyar remained in Berlin after the LAI Executive meeting only to remark that if the
LAI did not resume its activity, the organisation would miss the opportunity to do so. In
Helmut/Dimitrovs opinion, the issue was of a more pragmatic nature, informing the ECCI that the
International Secretariat had to first become operational before being able to capitalise on the

Budich, Berlin, 1-2/6-1931; SCA, CL Collection, volume 131, Sitzung des Exekutivkomitees der Liga gegen
Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, Berlin [June 1931].
1100
According to an article, A Decisive Stage in the Development of the League against Imperialism, authored by
Ferdi (signed F, translated from French to English by Chatto), and published in The Anti-Imperialist Review in
September 1931, the LAI had a new, political direction: The LAI came into being at a time when the domination of
the national bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist movements of national liberation had attained its zenith. [] the last
session of the Executive Committee accomplished a task which had been left too long in suspense. It finally liquidated
the abnormal situation which resulted from the formal presence in its midst of elements not in accord with its essential
principles. [] gave the League a definitely revolutionary political line and that it imposed the obligation on all its
members of fighting effectively for the complete independence of the colonies, the semi-colonies and the countries
containing oppressed national minorities, insincere elements continued to remain within its ranks [Nehru, Maxton,
Fimmen, Hatta], F [Ferdi], A Decisive Stage in the Development of the League against Imperialism, in The AntiImperialist Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, September-October, 1931, pp.15-24.

439

big opportunity to establish a partisan fighting alliance of the liberation movements of the
colonial and semi-colonial countries, the nationally oppressed in Europe and the revolutionary
proletariat and peasantry in the imperialist countries.1101 Nonetheless, the International Secretariat
was also suffering from the pressure of having to undergo a re-organisation on the individual level.
While the LAI Executive meeting celebrated the idea of resuming a higher level of activity, in
reality the International Secretariat was embarking upon its most sombre period, defined by a
sectarianism which raged across the international communist movement during 1931.
Despite Mnzenbergs lively performance at the LAI Executive meeting, in fact the gulf
between him and the LAI was, at this point in time, enormous. For Helmut/Dimitrov, this friction
caused enormous irritation, telling the ECCI to order Mnzenberg to cease acting indifferently and
to contribute more actively to the work of the LAI, despite the fact that he has many other works
which consumed Mnzenbergs energy and attention, especially the preparations for the Tenth
Anniversary of the IAH (scheduled to convene in Berlin on 9-15/10-1931).1102 With Chatto having
lost his authoritative position at the International Secretariat, and without Mnzenbergs patronage,
no other individual seemed capable of assuming responsibility at the International Secretariat.
According to both Helmut/Dimitrov and Magyar, the capacity of the other remaining members was
at its best limited. Ferdi was a good comrade but a poor organiser who had no political
initiative whatsoever, while York/Thgersen was an active and agile person, yet unable to fill
the gap left by Chatto. The stagnant atmosphere only increased when Smeral declared that he
wanted to resign from the International Secretariat (see further below). Thus, the Eastern
Secretariat instructed Ferdi to take care of the curricular activity for a short period so that the
International Secretariat did not completely lose control. On 18 August, Ferdi concluded that the
summer course for eight Indian students in Berlin had given the impression that they have
benefitted from it.1103 However, the first step of the individual re-organisation at the International
Secretariat was introduced on 16 July, when Magyar informed the Political Commission in

1101

Ferdi informed the Eastern Secretariat that the resolutions had been published in a pamphlet (German and English
versions) in June, and preparations for a French and Arabic edition were on the way, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/49,
281-287, Bericht des Bureaus der Fraktion der Exekutivsitzung der Liga gegen Imperialismus, author: Ferdi, to the
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1931, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 128; RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, (Confidential)
Report from A. B. [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI 499/1/33, 44,
(Confidential) Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931.
1102
RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931;
RGASPI 495/30/715, 7-10, Resolution zum Bericht des Genossen Muenzenberg ueber die Arbeit der IAH in der
Beratung der Agitprop des EKKI, 17/6-1931.
1103
RGASPI 542/1/48, 128; RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, (Confidential) Report from A. B. [Magyar], Berlin, to
Kuusinen/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from
Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 147, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1931.

440

Moscow of the new International Secretariat: CPGB member Clemens Dutt, Ferdi,
York/Thgersen and the Polish communist Joseph Berger (Bob, Boris).1104
Clemens Dutt assumed Chattos position as International Political Secretary at the
International Secretariat and became responsible for its curricular activity. In August 1931, Dutt
arrived in Berlin and held a course on the Basis of the Action Program for the Communist Party
of India. The process to confirm Dutt as Chattos replacement turned into a vitriolic procedure,
characterised by its defamation. Magyar had in fact nominated Robin Page Arnot as the most
desired candidate to take over Chattos position at the International Secretariat. However, Arnot
had other obligations which prevented him from assuming the position. Clemens Dutt was the
second preferred candidate who, according to Magyar, was a person without any initiative,
incapable of carrying out either organisational or political work. Yet, Magyar acknowledged that
Dutt was a man of words because of his professional background as a publicist and journalist.
With no other suitable candidate to be found (J. T. Murphy was briefly mentioned as a third
candidate), Magyar accepted the fact and sent an instruction to Dutt to resign as editor at the
publishing house Markus Lawrence (Ltd.) in London and to travel to Berlin in August. In August,
the Political Commission notified the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion that Dutt was the
colonial member at the Secretariat.1105
In July 1931, Smeral declared his intention of not wanting to continue as a secretary of the
LAI. Unwilling to carry out the assignments demanded of him, Magyar and Helmut/Dimitrov
realised that the Smeral question required an urgent solution. Why did Smeral want to leave the
LAI and Berlin? Apparently, already prior to the LAI Executive meeting, the Political Commission
had discussed that Smeral wanted another candidate to replace him in Berlin.1106 However, in
1104

RGASPI 495/4/122, 25, (Secret) Short note [in Russian] regarding the LAI, 16/7-1931. Joseph Berger, born in
Cracow in 1904, emigrated to Palestine in 1920, and founder of the Communist Party of Palestine. In the latter half of
the 1920s, Berger underwent political education in Moscow (ILS or KUTV), later to assume a position as an emissary
of the Comintern (known pseudonym: Barzilai). Berger arrived in Berlin on 1 October, 1931, Lazitch 1986, p.23;
RGASPI 542/1/48, 155, Short note from Berger, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 6/10-1931.
1105
The Political Commission instructed the Central Committee of the CPGB to find another Comrade as a
replacement for Dutt at the publishing house. According to Ferdi, the nomination of Dutt had apparently caused
disorder within the CPGB leadership. Yet, the Political Commission remained unconvinced as to whether Ferdis
statement was accurate, telling him that it did not matter if Dutt, or J. T. Murphy were poor organisers, Dutt was only
half an Indian, but he could speak and write in German, something Murphy was unable to do. In fact, the Political
Commission suspected that some English Comrades just want to get rid of Murphy, RGASPI 495/4/124, 1-2,
Protokoll Nr.161 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 27/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 136,
(Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to kom.Fraktion [Mnzenberg, Ferdi, York] des Sekretariats
LAI, July, 1931. For Murphy discussion, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 142-143, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern
Secretariat, Moscow, to the LAI Secretariat, Berlin, 31/7-1931; RGASPI 495/154/783, 15, Letter from Pol.Comm.,
Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 12/8-1931.
1106
RGASPI 542/1/48, 110-115, (Confidential) Report from A. B. [Magyar], Berlin, to Kuusinen/Eastern
Secretariat, Moscow, 23/6-1931; RGASPI 499/1/33, 44, (Confidential) Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to
ECCI, Moscow, 8/6-1931; RGASPI 495/4/109, 6-7, (Streng vertraulich! Fr Sondermappe!) Protokoll Nr.142 der
Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. EKKI, 23/5-1931; RGASPI 495/4/119, 7-8, (Streng vertraulich! Fr
Sondermappe!) Protokoll Nr.152 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 3/7-1931.

441

comparison to the case against Chatto, the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters showed a
lenient attitude towards Smeral. If Smeral left the LAI, the main challenge for the Comintern
would be to find a new assignment for him within the hierarchy. Smeral expressed an irrevocable
desire to resign and, prior to departing for his vacation in July, Smeral told the kom.Fraktion that
he did not know whether he would return to the International Secretariat.1107 Smeral had grown
tired of being in Berlin and hoped to find a new direction within the international communist
movement. While spending the summer holidays with his family in Czechoslovakia, Smeral
assisted the CPCz in Prague during the municipal electoral campaign. In early October Smeral
expected that Ferdi would have some information on his fate, before even considering whether
he would return to Berlin. Thus, on 13 October, the Political Commission decided to transfer the
Smeral question to the party in Prague. In the meantime, the WEB notified the kom.Fraktion
that the Smeral question would soon be determined.1108 Rumour had it that the Political
Commission had sent Smeral an instruction on 23 October to return to Moscow for a meeting with
the General Council of the Profintern, although, in the end, this meeting never took place. In fact,
Smeral left Berlin sometime in November or December 1931 and travelled to Czechoslovakia
instead of returning to Moscow. In Prague, Smeral delivered a couple of lectures in the beginning
of 1932 on the progression of socialist construction in the Soviet Union. On 15 April 1932, the
Political Commission discussed a request from Mnzenberg, proposing that Smeral assume the
leadership of the Czechoslovakian IAH section.1109 In conclusion, Smerals departure from the
International Secretariat also witnessed the end of the old guard at the LAI bureau in Berlin. In
the second half of 1931, the International Secretariat had a new set of devotees.
*

1107

Magyar explained that due to the fact that almost all employees are on leave on summer holidays, the work at
Comintern headquarters had came to a halt, and nothing could be done until the Political Secretariat had evaluated this
question. This left Smeral with no other option than to remain in Berlin, RGASPI 542/1/48, 128, Letter from Ferdi,
Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 8/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 136, Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to
Kommfraktion des Sekretariats LAI, July, 1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 140-141, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar,
Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 31/7-1931.
1108
RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 24/9-1931. A copy of
this report was sent to the Political Secretariat, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 160-163; RGASPI 495/4/145, 1-3,
Protokoll Nr. 187 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr am 13/10-1931. Berger wondered whether the
Eastern Secretariat could speed up its work on reaching a decision on Smeral, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 155, Short
note from Berger, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 6/10-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 94-95, Letter from WEB, Berlin,
an die Kommfraktion des Sekretariats der Antiimperialistischen Liga, Berlin, 16/10-1931.
1109
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1507/279, 86, (Abschrift, Berlin den 19. August 1932) Betrifft: Durchsuchung der Rume der
Liga gegen den Imperialismus, Bezug: Berichte vom 31/12-1931, Der Polizeiprsident, Berlin; RGASPI
495/272/3640, 1-2, Certificate: Anketa Bohumr Smeral, Moscow, [undated]; RGASPI 495/4/183, 1-5, Protokoll Nr.
236 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr am 15/4-1932. However, the Political Commission decided
to transfer the question entirely to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In 1934, Smeral
left Berlin and travelled with Vasil Kolarov to Outer Mongolia as Comintern emissaries to assist with the work of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of Mongolia, see Lazitch 1986, p.434.

442

Why We Appear
The International Secretariat attempted to act as the LAIs spokesperson after the LAI Executive
meeting in Berlin. In order to do so, the LAI organ, The Anti-Imperialist Review, was re-launched
in September 1931. As noted in the introductory note, the International Secretariat stated that the
reason why we appear was to function as the focal point of the international anti-imperialist
movement. Hence, the moment had arrived to extend and intensify its activities to a
corresponding degree and, with the release of The Anti-Imperialist Review, each member of the
LAI had a theoretical manual on how to develop and strengthen the anti-imperialist movement.
The International Secretariat believed that this Review represented a communicative channel for
the LAI. Above all, the journal was a weapon to rally the forces in the propaganda against the
Versailles peace treaty in support of the colonial struggle, and to advocate a re-constitution of
Europes borders on the principle of national self-determination.1110
The publication of The Anti-Imperialist Review was one of the few undertakings the
International Secretariat succeeded in realising after the LAI Executive meeting in 1931.
According to Ferdi, the review had been edited perfectly.1111 The curricular activity
continued to represent a central source from which the International Secretariat could find
political material in Europe, however, the primary question was either to develop or support a
number of propaganda campaigns in 1931. For example, in the second half of 1931, the
International Secretariat devoted itself to developing a campaign in connection with the
Manchurian crisis. In September, the WEB released a statement declaring in defence of the Soviet
Union and the Chinese revolution and against the Japanese offensive. This statement set out the
initiation of a support campaign under the supervision of the LAI in Berlin. However, the WEB
was in total control of this campaign, with Ferdi performing his role as liaison, and Kunizaki
acting as an advisor.1112 Another question was the Scottsboro case in the USA, a campaign which
quickly assumed the character of a global protest movement. The case centred on a legal action
involving nine young Afro-American males, who had been arrested on 25 March 1931, charged
with having raped two white young females. For the communist movement in the USA, the
Scottsboro case was one of the major propagandist exercises during the 1930s, registering the
services and support of the CPUSA and the IRH [better known as the International Labour
Defence in the USA; ILD]. In Europe, the LAI was part of the communist machinery supporting

1110

International Secretariat, Why we Appear, in The Anti-Imperialist Review, Vol. 1 September-October 1931, No.
1, Berlin, pp.3-8.
1111
RGASPI 542/1/48, 128, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 8/7-1931.
1112
RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 24/9-1931. For the joint protest,
see Degras, Appeal by the West European Bureau of the ECCI and the European Secretariat of the RILU on the
Japanese Invasion of Manchuria, vol. III, 1965, pp.176-179. Taken from Inprecorr, xi, 93, p.2080, 29/9-1931.

443

the IRH campaign, e.g. by distributing material to the left-wing press and publishing articles. For
example, on 4 July 1931, Inprecorr published an article by the International LAI Youth secretariat
[York/Thgersen], Erkmpft Leben und Freiheit der acht [sic] jungen Neger, declaring its
solidarity in support of the defendants.1113 The question at this point in time was, however, whether
the International Secretariat was on the verge of collapsing due to its sectarian tendencies.
Moreover, the Chief of Police suspected that the International Secretariat represented a vital hub
for the international communist movement, especially channelling intelligence back and forth to
Moscow, an activity supported by a global network of communist agents.1114
Ferdi emphasised that the International Secretariat had to carry out some kind of regular
activity after the LAI Executive meeting in Berlin. Yet, with Chatto about to leave, and Smeral
refusing to work at the bureau in Berlin, the International Secretariat lacked personnel.
Nonetheless, on 8 July, Ferdi informed Magyar that a Hungarian communist, Leitner, had arrived
in Berlin in June. According to Ferdi, Leitner was a good revolutionary very capable in the
colonial question and the Negro question, and had proficient linguistic skills in English, German
and French. In fact, Ferdi concluded that Leitner seemed overqualified to work at the International
Secretariat, wondering whether the Eastern Secretariat could ask Piatnitsky if there was a position
for Leitner in the OMS in Moscow (let him come to you and give him a job that matches his
skills). While Magyar concluded that Leitner could become a leader of the ECCI translation
services apparatus in Moscow, Ferdi, on the other hand, had to send additional documents on
Leitner before the Comintern could authorise him to travel to Moscow.1115
On the question of the oppressed national minorities in Europe, Ferdi told the Eastern
Secretariat that work was progressing. This particularly concerned the distribution of
information (circular letters) to national minority organisations in Europe.1116 Mnzenbergs
1113

Walter T. Howard (ed.), Black Communists Speak on Scottsboro. A Documentary History, Temple University
Press, Philadelphia, 2007, pp.1-21; Miller, Pennybacker and Rosenhaft (2001). Prominent and important Party
leaders of color (William Patterson, Harry Haywood, Ford, Cyril Briggs, B. D. Amis, Padmore, and Eugene Gordon)
were involved in this protest campaign; SAPMO-BA ZPA R1501/20200, 62, Erkmpft Leben und Freiheit der acht
jungen Neger, Inprecorr, No.71, 4/7-1931.
1114
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 68, Der Polizeiprsident, Abteilung IA., Berlin, an Herrn R. R. von Lengriesser,
12/8-1931.
1115
Leitner escaped from Hungary in 1931, leaving his wife behind who, in turn, ended up in a prison in Budapest.
Known to the others within the Hungarian mafia in the Comintern, for example, Gyula Alpri and Magyar, Leitner
was an entrusted Comrade, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 128, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat,
Moscow, 8/7-1931. For Magyars reply, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 142-143, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern
Secretariat [Magyar], Moscow, to the LAI Secretariat, Berlin, 31/7-1931. Leitner was not, however, assigned as a
translator. Instead, he remained in Berlin throughout 1931 and became seriously ill in December. An arrangement was
made to send him to Moscow in the care of MOPR [IRH], once he was strong enough to undertake the voyage,
RGASPI 542/1/56, 2, Letter from Hans [York/Thgersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932.
1116
In the summer of 1931, the International Secretariat published petitions and public manifestos against both the
counter-revolutionary terror in China and the arming of the Zionists of Palestine by British imperialism, RGASPI
542/1/48, 137-138, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 25/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 147,
Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 18/8-1931.

444

opinion and expectations of the new line were of a more modest character, telling Magyar: I await
with great interest the decisions signalled by you in the matter of the league. This is urgently
needed since the International Secretariat currently is not very productive.1117 As part of the
solution in resolving the difficulties at the International Secretariat, caused most likely by Chattos
sudden fall from grace and the arrival of Clemens Dutt in Berlin, the Eastern Secretariat promised
the kom.Fraktion to appoint a permanent liaison for the LAI at Comintern headquarters.1118
Working conditions at the International Secretariat did not improve, however, especially after the
ECCI appointed Ferdi as its emissary to the Communist Party of Turkey. This assignment required
Ferdi to travel frequently to Turkey to hold meetings and to organise the partys ideological and
organisational work. Other members of the International Secretariat were becoming anxious and
started to question whether it would ever be possible to get the work up and running again.1119
The major problem for the International Secretariat and the new line was its lack of reliable
contacts to the national minority movement. It did not help that the propaganda emanating from
the International Secretariat highlighted this problem, e.g. Informationsdienst (an LAI publication)
included articles on the political situation in Eastern Europe, the struggle of the Belorussian
peasant; the Ukrainian minority and its relation to the Polish state; the Basque nationalist
movement; and the Flemish independence movement in Belgium. The results of this propaganda,
and whether this undertaking increased the number of International Secretariat contacts, are
complex questions to evaluate. The visit by the representative of the Irish Republican Party,
Peader Ordonell [sic], to the International Secretariat, which focused on how to re-organise the
Irish LAI Section in September 1931, is perhaps illustrative of the assumption that the propaganda
did indeed have some kind of effect. After returning to Ireland, Peader ODonell organised a
public LAI meeting in Dublin in December 1931 against the extension of the Bill to protect
public security, an event attended by a thousand strong crowd of workers.1120
The WEB monitored whether or not the International Secretariat was managing to put the new
line into practice, however, it fairly quickly lost patience with how the work was progressing.

1117

RGASPI 542/1/48, 139, Short note from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 25/7-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48,
136, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Berlin/Moscow, to Kommfraktion des Sekretariats LAI, July, 1931.
1118
RGASPI 542/1/48, 140-141, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 31/7-1931;
RGASPI 542/1/48, 142-143, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern Secretariat [Magyar], Moscow, to International
Secretariat LAI, Berlin, 31/7-1931. Curiously, Magyar thanked Mnzenberg for having sent a pair of shoes to him in
Moscow, expressing that you have made a man completely happy.
1119
This decision did not mean that Ferdi was about to resign from the International Secretariat, far from it, it merely
added depth to his mission as a Comintern agent in Europe, above all to strengthen the national minority question, see
fol. RGASPI 495/154/783, 12-14, Information re. Ferdi (streng vertraulich), Moscow, 3/8-1931.
1120
RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 24/9-1931;
Informationsdienst der Liga gegen Imperialismus und fr nationale Unabhngigkeit, Internationales Sekretariat, No.2,
Berlin, 2/9-1931, pp.12-13; RA SE/RA/420640.02, Del 6, EK der IRH Agitprop, Information ber Irland, December,
1931.

445

Helmut/Dimitrov told the International Secretariat kom.Fraktion to let the WEB use the LAIs
European network in order to get the work heading in a new direction. In November, the WEB
additionally provided the kom.Fraktion with a sanctioned version of a resolution on
oppressed nationalities in Europe, along with the instruction to circulate this resolution to all
LAI sections and to all organisations associated with the LAI. The perceived success of these
WEB interventions was confirmed in a report by Helmut/Dimitrov to the ECCI: I enjoy how the
work on the oppressed nations and national minorities in Europe is progressing in the League.1121
The WEBs active intervention to correct the work of the International Secretariat on the national
minority question confirmed the LAIs inability to adjust itself to the new line and to find new
contacts. The issue of the national minority movements reduced the LAI to being nothing more
than a distributor of propaganda, focusing on letter-writing campaigns, publishing articles and
despatching resolutions. For example, on 8 December 1931, the LAI Executive published a protest
in Inprecorr against the oppression and persecution of national minorities in Poland.1122 This
strategy continued in 1932, with articles being published in the Informationsbulletin on the
oppressed national minorities in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, the Balkan region, Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia, reports which included criticism of the League of Nations and its treatment of the
national minority question in Europe.1123
In 1931-32, the International Secretariat also organised public demonstrations, special
seminars and introduced the idea of organising an international conference of oppressed nations
and national minorities. While the former activities were supported by the MASCH in Berlin,
which provided a location for the LAI to give a lecture on the heroic Balkan struggle on 19
August, 1932,1124 the idea of an international conference was a test of faith involving a whole host
of actors. An unknown representative of the IRH, who was either living in or was on a mission to
Berlin, informed Hertha the pseudonym for the Russian Elena Stasova, one of the leaders at
1121

RGASPI 542/1/48, 169, Short note from kom.Fraktion Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/111931; RGASPI 542/1/48, 176, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 7/11-1931.
1122
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 72, Inprecorr, Protest der Liga gegen Imperialismus, No.49, 8/12-1931. The
political situation in the eastern Polish borderlands, particularly the tense relations between the Polish and Ukrainian
populaces, characterised by the nationalist struggle of the Ukrainian liberation movement, came to a head with the
Polish drive for power and its revanchist ambitions. During the first years of the 1930s, this situation deteriorated even
further. With the formation of the OUN (Orhanizatsiia Ukrainskykh Natsionalistiv; Organisation of Ukrainian
Nationalists) in 1929, the Polish state was now facing a violent opponent. In addition, the national minority question
in Poland was a source of discontent that troubled not just Poland, but also its relations with neighbouring nations and
the League of Nations, see further in Tadeusz Piotrowski, Polands Holocaust. Ethnic Strife, Collaboration with
Occupying Forces and Genocide in the Second Republic, 1918-1947, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, 1998,
pp.177-178, and Steiner (2005).
1123
The LAI accused the League of Nations of merely seeking reconciliation and national reformism rather than
promoting national self-determination, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 126-129, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Nummer 11, Mrz 1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 136-139, Informationsbulletin der Liga
gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 13, Mai 1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 145a, Gegen nationale und koloniale
Unterdrckung. Zum Achten Kongress der nationalen Minderheiten in Wien, Inprecorr, No.25, 28/6-1932.
1124
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 159, Die Welt am Abend, No.192, 17/8-1932.

446

IRH headquarters in Moscow that Willi Budich and Heckert had met the kom.Fraktion in
October. The primary aim of the session had been to convince the LAI to do joint work with the
IRH and, that if they did so, this would be of great help for our movement [the IRH] in the
colonies and semi-colonies. Apparently, these negotiations succeeded to some degree. In May
1932, the IRH organ, the MOPR, announced in an article, Die IRH und die antiimperialistische
Liga, the unification of the IRH and the LAI in the struggle against imperialist war and the war
threat against the Soviet Union and in defence of the Soviet Union. A fundamental prerequisite
for this collaboration was, nevertheless, a mutual consensus on how best to arrange the
international conference. Firstly, the interactionism between the LAI and the IRH focused
essentially on an interchange of services in order to cultivate political activism on a global scale.
For the LAI, this meant helping the IRH to establish sections or committees in South Africa, India,
and Indonesia, with the IRH network in Latin America being at the service of the LAI. Secondly,
to celebrate this joint work, Ferdi, Berger and Mnzenberg discussed with Budich and Heckert
in Berlin in October 1931 the plan to organise an international conference of oppressed nations
and national minorities. However, this meeting generated no definite answers1125 and remained
unresolved until January 1933. During the visit of Falkner [?], a Comintern emissary, the
members of the International Secretariat raised the question of the conference. Once Falkner had
returned to Moscow, he/she informed the ECCI Secretariat of the International Secretariats
request to prepare and hold a conference of oppressed nations and national minorities, but only
on the condition that the Comintern granted the budget of 2,000 Marks.1126 On 27 January 1933,
Kuusinen assessed the idea of this conference and convinced the Political Commission to endorse
the decision to let the LAI arrange a conference of European national minorities in 3-4
months.1127 However, with the Nazi regimes ascendancy to power in Germany on 30 January
1933, the idea of and momentum for this conference evaporated.
*
The Decline of Curricular Activity
When Clemens Dutt arrived in Berlin in August 1932, curricular activity at the International
Secretariat entered its final phase. Internal constraints, caused by the structural changes to the
1125

RGASPI 539/2/425/1, Letter from unknown author, Berlin, to Hertha [E. Stasova], Moscow, 1/11-1931. Other
people attending these meetings at the International Secretariat were Padmore, Bil and Luis Carlos Prestes from
Brazil (a Communist agitator according to the notes of the MdI), see fol. RGASPI 534/3/668, 120-121, Report from
Padmore, Hamburg, to Otto Huiswood, Moscow, 16/11-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 161, IAN 2165 p/7.9.
Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, 20/9-1932.
1126
RGASPI 542/1/58, 1, Letter from Falkner, Moscow, to Anna/Aina [?], Moscow, 11/1-1933.
1127
RGASPI 495/4/228, 5-6, (Streng vertraulich) PROTOKOLL (B) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des
Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/1-1933.

447

International Secretariat apparatus, as well as the consequences of the global recession, increased
both the radicalism and the political extremism of the Weimar Republic and contributed to putting
the LAIs nerve centre in a political gridlock. The social and economic situation was undermining
the International Secretariat; however, the Eastern Secretariat did not consider this to be sufficient
grounds on which to grant a rapid influx of money to sustain its curricular activity. Magyar told
Mnzenberg that despite the crisis the best and most correct method to raise money was to
organise proletarian solidarity collections in Paris and Berlin.1128
Its curricular activity represented an opportunity for the International Secretariat to find
devoted anti-colonial activists in Europe. As Chatto had been forced to leave Berlin, the
responsibility for evaluating the political material fell on Ferdis shoulders, a process which
involved developing a technique to circumvent the surveillance of the French and German national
security services. This left Dutt in charge of the courses, which were essentially focused on the
Indian student community in Berlin, while Ferdi travelled to Paris to assess the anti-colonial
movement and, in some cases, invite desirable elements to attend the courses in Berlin.
However, the combination of a constant lack of money and the vigilance of the Sret in Paris,
made it difficult to get the candidates to leave Paris and to cross the French-German border. This
created a breach in the work to fulfil the original aim of the courses: to provide the educational
units in Moscow (the ILS and the KUTV) with students. Despite Ferdis French hiccup, Dutt
continued to hold the courses for colonial students in Berlin, attended primarily by individuals
who were either living in Germany, or had arrived from England. The KOSTUFRA helped Dutt to
entice young people at German universities to take the LAIs colonial courses in Berlin. In
addition, the International Secretariat instructed the KOSTUFRA to send information, if they
found any promising candidates, to the leader of the local branch of the LAI, intelligence later
passed on to Ferdi. This facilitated Ferdis work of assessing the candidates, particularly in
determining whether the person(s) were reliable enough to take the course. If a candidate gained
Ferdis trust, he/she could travel to Moscow and enrol for political education at either the KUTV
or the ILS. The case of the Indian student Narain is illustrative of this process. In Clemens Dutts
opinion, Narain was a reliable and ardent person, suitable for political education at KUTV. Yet,
Ferdi questioned Narains intentions and wanted to do a new inquiry about him after having
discovered several inconsistencies in his statements, telling the Eastern Secretariat the following
about Narain:

1128

RGASPI 542/1/48, 144, (Confidential) Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 1/8-1931.

448

In general, this young man seems to have a healthy mentality, which indicates a small
glimmer of adventure if he receives a good education, he is probably capable of a being a
good, but mediocre, revolutionary fighter.1129
In the end, Piatnitsky approved Dutts proposal to send Narain to Moscow; however, whether he
ever arrived in Moscow remains unknown. Ferdis continual efforts to find students in Paris came
to nothing as he came back empty-handed to Berlin.1130 Why did Ferdis attempt to find
candidates in Paris fail? The kom.Fraktion stated that the central problem was the
misunderstanding between the International Secretariat and the Central Committee of the PCF in
Paris, with the latter refusing to respond to any communications or to provide any support. The
Eastern Secretariat was able to draw its own conclusion since we have not in the last three months
received a single reply to our numerous letters and suggestions to the PCF, the International
Secretariat explained.1131
The second half of 1931 confirmed the dependency of the International Secretariat on the
Eastern Secretariat at all levels, with the curricular activity being no exception. The courses had
also veered away from the original vision once outlined by Chatto: to provide a fundamental
understanding of the Marxist-Leninist perception of the colonial question and imperialism, and to
find recruits for communism. Under Dutt and Ferdis leadership, these courses primarily
functioned as a channel for finding revolutionary fighters. Yet, at same moment, the
International Secretariat was not alone in wanting to find students inclined towards anticolonialism. In Hamburg, Padmore and Kouyat were working together to send African students to
Moscow for political education at the KUTV, an operation they co-ordinated through both the
International Secretariat and the Eastern Secretariat.1132

1129

RGASPI 542/1/48, 148-150, (Confidential) Report from Ferdi, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 24/91931. The Political Secretariat received a copy of this report, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/48, 160-163.
1130
On 2 December, the kom.Fraktion Liga, in a letter to the Eastern Secretariat, questioned whether a decision on
Narain and other candidates would arrive in Berlin. The decision did not come immediately, however. On 12
December, an unknown source in Moscow (Piatnitsky ?) sent information to the International Secretariat, stating that
we dont object to N. [Narain] coming to us if our Friend Fr. [Ferdi] agrees to it, while on 13 January, 1932,
Piatnitsky authorised the decision to send Narain. Whether he ever travelled to Moscow remains unknown, see fol.
RGASPI 542/1/48, 177, Short note from kom.Fraktion Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 11/11-1931;
RGASPI 542/1/48, 181, Short note from kom.Fraktion-Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, 2/12-1931; RGASPI
542/1/48, 187, Note from unknown source, Berlin or Moscow, to the LAI, Berlin, 31/12-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 21,
Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 13/1-1932.
1131
RGASPI 542/1/48, 154, Letter from Komfraktion Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 4/11-1931;
RGASPI 542/1/48, 169, Letter from Komfraktion Liga, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 6/11-1931.
1132
Kouyat organised a journey to Moscow and the KUTV for two African students [unknown] in November 1931.
As a confirmation of the arrangements, Berger and Ferdi received a note from the Eastern Secretariat that two Negro
people would soon arrive in Moscow. This line of work pressured Padmore, who complained about the ordeals of
getting the proper support from the KPD. The organisational procedure Padmore had to confront in his contacts with
the KPD was a structure defined by a rigorous bureaucracy administered by the secretary of the ZK KPD in Berlin, the
Lithuanian Max Ziese, whose attitude according to Padmore was simply objectionable, see fol. RGASPI
534/3/668, 120-121, Report from Padmore, Hamburg, to Otto Huiswood, Moscow, 16/11-1931; RGASPI 542/1/48,

449

Sectarianism determined the character of the International Secretariat after the resurrection of the
LAI Executive at the meeting in Berlin in May-June 1931. Fear and paranoia led to exclusion
becoming a common practice, with both believers and anti-colonial activists being described as
either trustworthy or untrustworthy. However, in reality, sectarianism was consuming the
International Secretariat, with its case against Chatto and its suspicious behavior vis--vis the
political material, both symptoms of the worsening situation. For Chatto, it was not enough to
have been an active member and believer in the anti-imperialist vision since 1926. No longer
belonging to the inner core a structure now reserved for Mnzenberg, Smeral and Ferdi and
having to face the charge of having committed political dishonesty, Chatto was reduced to a
shadow of his former self at the International Secretariat. For the International Secretariat in
December 1931, it was no longer a question of why we appear, but rather the actors in Berlin
were suddenly confronted with the question of whether we appear at all.
*

183, Short note from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Berger and Ferdi, Berlin, December 1931. For relations
between Padmore and Ziese, see further in Weiss (2011).

450

Chapter 9. Nadir

At about 11 am the door-bell rang.

York/Thgersen, Berlin,
Moscow, 21/1-1932

to

Chatto,

The non-party League is in fact a communist organisation [which] administers an

extensive network of men of confidence [Vertrauensmnnernetz] scattered over the whole
Earth.
Superintendent Sattler, Berlin, 24/12-19

For us [the Eastern Secretariat] it was an incredibly painful surprise that the police were able
to find in the League office documents not intended to fall into the hands of the police. You
[Ferdi] write that the raid was a disaster. Concerning the current conditions in Germany,
you should have been prepared that not one, but several house searches are being carried out.
[] We recommend Comrades quite categorically to immediately destroy our letters and
telegrams after reading.
The Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi,
Berlin, 19/1-1932
The Schutzpolizei and the political police (IA) raided and ransacked the International Secretariat at
24 Friedrichstrae on 21 December, 1931. Leaving the heart of the LAI shattered and exposed, the
incalculable consequences of this raid marked the beginning of the LAIs nadir, defined in terms of
illegality, external pressure, frailty, decline and depression. For the International Secretariat, whilst
the former problems of the LAI had primarily been a question of combating internal clashes, this
raid marked the beginning of the lowest point thus far in the history of the LAI. Once the
consequences of the raid had become apparent, no further political space would be made available
for the LAI in either Berlin or beyond. York/Thgersen contacted Chatto in Moscow (who was
then awaiting the ICCs verdict), to describe the raid in detail. After ringing the bell to the bureau
of the International Secretariat, 22 bulls from the Schutzpolizei and the political police (IA)
stormed in, remained there for eight hours (11 am to 7 pm) and confiscated all correspondence,
printed matter, Cardex, accounting books, etc.. York concluded that the police had messed up the
place, collected every scrap of paper or written matter which looked suspicious. Every person
visiting the bureau, members and individuals (sixteen in total) were arrested and hauled off to the
IA for interrogation: Ferdi, Clemens Dutt, Berger (Bob), the Polish communist Valnitsky,
451

Kunizaki, York/Thgersen, Ella Windmller, and Frieda Schiff, Petigura, Vigdor, a Bulgarian
Comrade and Odette. At IA headquarters, the police officers subjected everyone to a body
search before being cross-examined, and released each person after having first signed a written
statement. Berger was the only one not released, charged with possessing a false passport.
Transferred to the Moabit prison in Berlin, Berger received a minor sentence and spent a couple of
months in prison and, when he was released, he had to leave Germany. To provide Berger with
legal service, Mnzenberg assigned a lawyer, Dr. Apfel, at the expense of the International
Secretariat. It was a decision not appreciated by several of the International Secretariat members.
According to York/Thgersen, this lawyer was a money-grabber who cost a pretty penny!,
while concluding that the humiliation and disorder caused by the raid had shaken the International
Secretariat to its very core:
The raid has naturally retarded us to a great extent in carrying on our work. In fact, we
only received our correspondence-files, Cardex, etc., the other day. Many documents (62 in
number, according to the IA statement) are still with the CID authorities. Clemens, Valnitsky,
Ella, Odette, Frieda and I are regularly in the Office while Ferdi avoids coming now-a-days
(of course, we have arranged to meet him from time to time). All in all, the Office is rather
dead just now. [] This state of affairs cannot continue any longer. It is very harmful, to
say the least. Why! We havent as yet been able even to organise an open protest meeting!1133
Before the raid, the International Secretariat had been suffering from an inherent weakness;
however, the consequences of the raid hinted at the possible closure of the International Secretariat
in Berlin or, in the words of York/Thgersen: the Office is rather dead just now. What were the
initial effects of this raid, and how did this episode affect the International Secretariat?

The raid resulted in unwanted and unexpected exposure for the LAI in Germany. A dilemma not
helped by the more deeply divisive political milieu in Berlin, characterised by actual violent battles
between the communist and Nazi movements. According to Eric D. Weitz, 1932 was the year the
Weimar Republic was governed by a presidential dictatorship which held two Reichstag
elections, two presidential elections and had three consecutive Reich chancellors. In Berlin, the
streets were dominated by a continual presence of police authority, a major factor interpreted as
conservative and rather supportive of the Rightist political movement. Furthermore, as Sace Elder
observes in a study of the police in Weimar Berlin after 1930, the police became increasingly
engaged in policing subversive political groups. Exercising its influence over many aspects of
everyday life in Berlin, the probationary techniques of the policy authority surveillance and
1133

RGASPI 542/1/56, 2, Letter from Hans [York/Thgersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932. Articles in the
German communist press also mentioned the figure of sixteen arrested individuals.

452

infiltration cracked down on radical and subversive political movements. This strategy
succeeded in reaching all the way into the inner sanctums of both the LAI and the anti-imperialist
movement. Nevertheless, the raid had had different effects on those involved. According to
York/Thgersen, despite Bergers confinement to prison, he was lively and active while
Clemens Dutt acted medium and was in a bad state of health and frame of mind and Ferdi was
as usual phlegmatic.1134 Meanwhile, the MdI analysed the evidence collected from the raid (the
confiscated documents), material which confirmed their suspicion that the LAI was both by its
nature and its structure a cover organisation for the Comintern, used to foment and support the
activities of both the international communist movement and the KPD. Moreover, the raid on the
International Secretariat was a practical expression of the attempt by German authorities to
suppress the left-wing movement in Germany. On 23 December, the Hamburg police stormed the
bureau of the International Seamans Club (Internationalen Seemansclub), a cover and location for
activities linked to both the ITUCNW and the Profintern. The police literally tore the club apart
and confiscated propaganda material, brochures, magazines and documents. For Padmore, this
episode was a humiliating experience, telling York/Thgersen that since the affair we have been
completely isolated from each other []. For heavens sake, break the silence, for you are the only
friend with whom we have any connection.1135
The MdI and the Auswrtige Amt initially focused their attention on classifying and identifying
the documents confiscated from the International Secretariat and, secondly, on analysing and
verifying whether the LAI was a communist organisation sponsored by and part of an international
network. Nonetheless, the independent act of the Schutzpolizei to raid the International Secretariat
had provided the MdI and the Auswrtige Amt with sufficient evidence on the LAI. The question
is, however, why did the raid take place when it did? According to the Berlin Chief of Police, the
Schutzpolizei decided to act swiftly in order to confirm their inkling that the bureau of the LAI
was a haven for foreigners and foreign Communist refugees in the possession of not orderly
passports, and that the International Secretariat stored derogatory publications against the Weimar
Republic.1136
1134

Weitz 2007, pp.122-123; Sace Elder, Murder, Denunciation and Criminal Policing in Weimar Berlin, in Journal
of Contemporary History, Vol 41 (3), Sage Publications, London, 2006, p.404, 406; RGASPI 542/1/56, 2, Letter from
Hans [York/Thgersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932.
1135
See Weiss (2011); Aitken (2008). See also the dated and biased article by Rger 5/1967, pp.782-797. For
Padmores letter, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/754, 25, Letter from Padmore, Hamburg, to Hans T. [York/Thgersen],
Berlin, 7/1-1932. Padmore ended the letter by sending best New Year wishes to Elly [Ella Windmller] and yourself.
1136
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 76, Der Polizeiprsident, Abteilung I [Abschrift], Berlin, an den Herrn Minister
des Innern, Berlin, 31/12-1932. The MdI received Sattlers report on 12 January, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 75,
Schnner, Berlin, an den Herrn Reichsminister des Innern, Berlin, 12/1-1932. The MdI Intelligence Department
informed the Prussian Minister of the MdI of the raid on 24 December, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 74,
Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an den Herrn Preuischen MdI, Berlin, 24/121931.

453

The MdI completed a brief analysis of the LAI in January: a report distributed from Berlin to
the provinces (Landesregierungen), while intelligence on the raid reached, for example, MI5 in
London who kept minutiae on the raid of the LAI bureau.1137 The raid provided the German
security services with access to and an in-depth understanding of the communist movement in the
Weimar Republic, above all of the organisational structure and network of Red Berlin, which
confirmed that the city functioned as a Comintern village. The documents at the International
Secretariat had also disclosed a number of ties the LAI had to other subversive actors within the
communist movement, but they also finally ended the illusion of the LAI being a non-party
organisation. For example, correspondence between the International Secretariat and the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of Belgium included directives and plans for future activities,
while cash receipts from the ZK KPD cashier [Max Ziese] proved the regular flow of money back
and forth between the LAI and the KPD.1138 Several documents also proved the close contacts
between the International Secretariat and the WEB. The raid provided the Berlin Chief of Police
with intelligence suggesting the presence of an actor called the WEB in Berlin, and its close links
to the Comintern. Before the raid, the WEB had been perceived as a shadowy actor and just one of
many actors on the communist subversive scene, however, the raid led the authorities to an
understanding suggesting that the WEB was the institutional actor manoeuvring and controlling
the West European communist movement. Consequently, if Berlin was the operative centre for the
international communist movement outside the Soviet Union, this threatened the very foundation
of German society, the Berlin Chief of Police concluded.1139 According to the Assistant Police

1137

Information on the LAI went to every regional agency in Germany. According to the document
Nachrichtenstellen der Landesregierung (Information Agencies of the National Provinces), 18 districts and
provinces received in-depth intelligence on the LAI: 1. Preuische Minister des Innern [crossed over in the document];
2. Bayerisches Ministerium des Innern, Mnchen; 3. Polizeidirektion Mnchen; 4. Polizeidirektion Nrnberg-Frth in
Nrnberg; 5. Schs. Ministerium des Innern Dresden-N, Knigs Ufer 2; 6. Wrttembergisches Ministerium des Innern;
7. Polizeiprsidium Stuttgart; 8. Badisches Landespolizeiamt in Karlsruhe; 9. Thringisches Ministerium des Innern,
Weimar; 10. Hessisches Polizeiamt Darmstadt; 11. Mecklenburg-Schwerinsches Ministerium des Innern, Schwerin;
12. Kriminalabteilung der Staatspolizei Neustrelitz; 13. Polizeiprsidium Braunschweig; 14. Oldenburgisches
Staatsministerium Oldenburg; 15. Anhaltisches Staatsministerium Dessau; 16. Polizeidirektion, (Z. St.), Polizeihaus,
Zimmer 450, Bremen; 17. Polizeibehrde, Hamburg; 18. Polizeiamt Lbeck, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200,
162, Nachrichtenstellen der Landesregierungen (In Doppelumschalg zu versenden), [compiled by:] Der Preuische
Minister des Innern, 18/1-1932. Additionally, the raid had raised an interest in the LAI among foreign intelligence
services, for example, MI5, which now gained access to information on individuals who worked at the International
Secretariat. Intelligence added to the existing files on Gibarti and York/Thgersen, TNA PRO KV 2 1056 Information
on H. P. THOGERSEN, taken from the Raid of the LAI Office in Berlin and given by German authorities [undated
1932]. For Gibarti, see TNA PRO KV 2 1401, Relating to Gibarti, Louis Otto. REPORT ON DOCUMENTS SEIZED
IN RAID ON LAI OFFICES IN BERLIN.
1138
The Assistant Police Commissioner, Sattler, argued that evidence such as the articles in The Anti-Imperialist
Review, and the finding of a Rotafix machine, which the International Secretariat used in order to print and distribute
self-made pamphlets, were enough to confirm the subversive character of the LAI, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200,
77-80, Bericht, Hilfskriminalkommissar Sattler, Berlin, 24/12-1931.
1139
The Berlin Chief of Police suspected that the WEB was running a courier service between Russia and the West
European Communist parties and organisations and was an actor that controlled every organisation affiliated to the
Comintern in Germany. The documents from the raid provided an opportunity to initiate an analysis of the

454

Commissioner Sattler, the LAI wields authority over an extensive network of men of confidence
scattered over the whole Earth,1140 while on 14 March 1932, the MdI concluded that:
[] there can be no doubt that the LAI in Berlin is a central point for international
communist propaganda work, in particular for the anti-war work. [] it appears that the
League, which claims to be a non-party organisation, in reality constitutes a communist
organisation, which operates in almost all countries of the world in sections, a kind of work
that simultaneously strives to influence the oppressed towards communism. The League
maintains an extensive, scattered network of agents all over the world, who report [back on]
all transactions of a political nature to the General [International] Secretariat in Berlin.1141
*
Public Reactions
The German communist press covered the raid extensively. As a social institution in Germany and
Berlin, the press had a decisive role in magnifying incidents or episodes of a political character.1142
For Mnzenberg, therefore, the raid offered an opportunity to instruct both the IAHs media
apparatus and his own Neuer Deutscher Verlag to set up a support campaign and to protest against
the German authorities treatment of the LAI and its International Secretariat. The first reaction to
the police action appeared on 22 December 1931, in both Mnzenbergs Welt am Abend and in
the KPD newspaper Die Rote Fahne, with the latter accusing the police of doing the dirty work of
foreign governments. The reason why the press portrayed the police as being puppets in the
service of foreign policy interests was a response to the protests linked to the nature of the LAI and
its Manchurian campaign. According to Welt am Abend, the Japanese government experienced the
LAI and its colonial exploitation as an eyesore. Thus, by shifting the focus from the raid to
discussing Japan and its foreign policy, the German communist press hoped to use the opportunity
to create propaganda against Japanese imperialism. This was in fact an initiative feverishly
sponsored by the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow. In the aftermath of the raid, the Eastern
Secretariat instructed the International Secretariat to develop the question of whether Japanese
communist conspiracy and its network in Germany. According to a letter from the International Secretariat to the
WEB, the contact between the LAI and the ZK KPD was evident: To the ZK KPD, 6.10.31. The enclosed [letter] was
handed over to the WEB. Since it is addressed to the German party, we pass it on to you after we have taken notice of
it [the content]. We leave it to you to make use of it in a way you feel it right to do. With greetings. International
Secretariat. However, the Berlin Chief of Police was not able to decipher some of the individuals linked directly to
the WEB, e.g. the identity behind the pseudonym Helmut remained a mystery. At this moment, Dimitrov was in
Moscow, and he returned to Germany in June 1932, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 120-122, Der
Polizeiprsident/ Goehrke, Der Preuischer Minister des Innern, an den Herrn Reichsminister des Innern, Berlin, 18/31932. For Dimitrovs whereabouts, see Zeittafel, in Bernhard, 1982, p.194.
1140
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 77-80, Bericht, Hilfskriminalkommissar Sattler, Berlin, 24/12-1931.
1141
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 116, Herrn Oberregierungsrat Erbe, Berlin, 14/3-1932.
1142
Elder 2006, p.409.

455

provocation had played a role, a strategy set in motion after having read Kunizakis report to the
Eastern Secretariat.1143
Articles on the ransacking of the International Secretariat poured out of the mouths of the
Mnzenbergian press apparatus. On 23 December, Welt am Abend published an article by
Mnzenberg, in which he introduced himself and Chatto (!) as the general secretaries of the LAI.
In this article, Mnzenberg criticised the social democratic newspaper, Vorwrts, for having used
the raid as a pretext to denounce the LAI, and repudiated its claim that the LAI was illegal and
secret. Mnzenberg argued that the public character of the LAI had commenced in 1927, while
the LAI in 1931 was a broad, legal world organisation, represented by German citizens at the
International Secretariat. Mnzenberg protested against the claim made in Vorwrts that the
confiscation of forged passports found in the hands of the foreigners Bulgarians, Poles and
Czechs at the International Secretariat, sufficiently proved the fact that the LAI was a genuine
communist front organisation. Vorwrts had highlighted the fact that one person [Berger] had
intentionally concealed his identity by signing the interrogation statement with a false name,
describing this as a shameful and deceitful act.1144 The LAIs support campaign gained pace in
January 1932, as Mnzenbergs old guard of prominent intellectuals declared their support for
the LAI. Theodor Lessing expressed sympathy towards the higher purpose of the Anti-Imperialist
League in Welt am Abend, while Ledebour referred to the freedom of assembly and the rights of
the LAI to react and respond to the use of coercive policies by the authorities. In the end, however,
the campaign slowly fizzled out. On 18 January 1932, Welt am Abend published its final
pronouncement, Fr die Antiimperialistische Liga, signed by Lessing, Otto Corbach,
Goldschmidt, the secretary of the German IAH section Georg Dnninghaus, Lehmann-Russbldt,
Armin T. Wegner, the representative of the Internationalen Frauenliga fr Frieden und Freiheit
Magda Hoppstock-Hut, Wittfogel, Ledebour and Mnzenberg.1145
1143

SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 83, Polizei gegen Antiimperialistischen Liga, Die Welt am Abend, No.298,
22/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 73, Polizeiaktion gegen die Liga gegen den Imperialismus, Die Rote
Fahne, No.215, 22/12-1931; RGASPI 542/1/54, 21, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International
Secretariat, Berlin, 13/1-1932.
1144
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 86, Die Aktion gegen die Antiimperialistische Liga, Die Welt am Abend,
No.299, 23/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 84, Polizeiaktion gegen Mnzenberg-Liga, Vorwrts,
No.599, 23/12-1931. The Eastern Secretariat was concerned about Berger, asking the International Secretariat whether
he was going to remain in prison and, if so, what had happened in connection with the raid, and whether everything
was being done to get him out of prison, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 21. For other articles on the raid, see Die Rote
Fahne, and Inprecorr, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 82, Heraus mit den verhafteten Anti-imperialisten, Die Rote
Fahne, No.236, 23/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 85, Inprecorr, Polizeiaktion gegen die Liga gegen
Imperialismus, No.51, 23/12-1931; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 87, Die Polizeiaktion gegen die
Antiimperialistische Liga, Die Rote Fahne, No.237, 24/12-1931.
1145
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 88, Fr die antiimperialistische Liga, von Professor Dr. Theodor Lessing
(Hannover), Die Welt am Abend, No.6, 8/1-1932; SAPMO-ZPA BA R/1501/20200, 89, Freiheit der
Antiimperialistische Liga. Ein Appell von Georg Ledebour, Die Welt am Abend, No.9, 12/1-1932; SAPMO-ZPA BA
R/1501/20200, 91, Fr die Antiimperialistische Liga. Protesterklrung, Die Welt am Abend, No.14, 18/1-1932.

456

*
A Languishing Movement, Part II
The chain of events after the raid confirmed the nadir of the International Secretariat in Berlin. The
episode not only brought unwanted attention to the activities of the International Secretariat but,
most importantly, it also damaged the structural relations between both the LAI and the Comintern
and those between the LAI and other actors within the communist movement. While Comintern
headquarters had a detached understanding of the actual consequences, the International
Secretariat in Berlin, haphazardly thrown into a languishing state, was reduced to existing in a
clandestine setting. In comparison to the languishing state of affairs during the anni confusionis of
1930, this was a far worse situation, particularly as it appeared as though the International
Secretariat had reached a dead-end. Still on its knees after the effects of the raid, the LAI also
found itself overtaken by other operations run by the Comintern apparatus, especially the Anti-War
Congress in Amsterdam on 27-29 August 1932, which inspired the establishment of the anti-war
movement (the Amsterdam/Pleyel movement). For Mnzenberg, the anti-war question was the reinvention of the machine in terms of utilising his skills as instigator and organiser of sympathising
organisations and committees. The anti-war campaign also witnessed the return of Gibarti as
Mnzenbergs intermediary to both assist with and prepare the anti-war congress.

The Eastern Secretariat could not initially understand the effects and damage the raid had inflicted
on the International Secretariat. In one of the first communications from the Eastern Secretariat
after the raid on 11 January 1932, the letter included no reference whatsoever to what had
happened in Berlin. On the contrary, the Eastern Secretariat demanded that the International
Secretariat contribute with $800 to financing a journey for Sukarno from Indonesia to Europe. The
reason why Sukarno wanted to visit Europe was to leave Indonesia after his release from prison in
Java on 31 December 1931, expecting to use the LAI as a way out.1146 The detached understanding
at Comintern headquarters continued when the Political Commission ordered the International
Secretariat to include an article written by Georgi Safarov, Nationale Revolutionen in den
Kolonien, in its next issue of The Anti-Imperialist Review.1147 The central question at this stage,

1146

It was estimated that Sukarnos journey from Java to Europe would cost $2,000. However, Sukarno did not leave
Java in 1932, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 18a, An die Liga, Note from Boris (?)/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the
International Secretariat, Berlin, 11/1-1932; Mrzek 1994, pp.87-89.
1147
RGASPI 542/1/54, 24, (Confidential) Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 28/1-1932;
RGASPI 495/4/161, 1-7, Protokoll (A) Nr.206 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, Moscow,
31/1-1932. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Knorin, Pieck, Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Wassiljew, Gerisch,
Codovilla, Miff and Magyar.

457

however, was whether the International Secretariat would ever be capable of publishing this
journal again?
Another question was troubling the Comintern, however: the fact that the Schutzpolizei and the
IA had got their hands on Ferdis documents, material which exposed the covert and highly secret
organisational modus operandi of the LAI, as well as the identities of several Comintern agents.
The Political Commission also feared that these documents would curtail Ferdis work as both an
ECCI plenipotentiary and as liaison for the Communist Party of Turkey. Therefore, and despite the
fact that Ferdi managed to avoid imprisonment, the Political Commission transferred the
conspiracy against Ferdi to the ICC for further investigation. The major aim for doing so was to
assess whether the damage, caused initially by Ferdi by letting sensitive documents fall into the
wrong hands, constituted a serious breach in discipline.1148 The Eastern Secretariat did not approve
of Ferdis mistake and accused him of acting irresponsibly because he had not destroyed sensitive
documents after reading them. This careless act had affected other individuals. The German
communist and Comintern agent, Grete Wilde (party name: Erna Mertens; 19041943/44?),
explained in a letter to the OMS in Moscow in January 1932, that Ferdis arrest was a very
uncomfortable incident as it put her mission in Turkey at risk, especially as the seized documents
included some very important addresses in Turkey.1149
Ferdi had not followed the protocol every Comintern emissary, plenipotentiary, instructor or
agent on a mission outside the Soviet Union had to adhere to. On 19 January 1932, the Eastern
Secretariat reminded him that, we recommend Comrades quite categorically to immediately
destroy our letters and telegrams after reading. Aside from its criticism of Ferdis negligent
behaviour, the Eastern Secretariat wondered when the International Secretariat could resume
activity despite the chaos caused by the raid. The central question was if and when the
International Secretariat could begin developing an independent field of activity, according to
the Eastern Secretariat. The latter request did concern political activity, it was a remark made

1148

RGASPI 495/4/163, 1-3, Protokoll (A) Nr.208 der Sitzung der Politischen Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 9/11932. Present at the meeting were Piatnitsky, Kuusinen, Manuilsky, Pieck, Knorin, Gerisch, Wassiljew, Thorez, Kun,
Angaretis, Codovilla, Miff, Williams and Safarov.
1149
RGASPI 495/266/38, 160, (Streng vertraulich), Auszug aus dem Brief aus Konstantinopel von Grete Wilde, OMS,
Moscow, January, 1932 [arrived in Moscow 19/1-1932]. The accusation against Ferdi was a serious one, the Eastern
Secretariat stated. On 19 January, the Eastern Secretariat asked in a letter to Ferdi whether Wilde/Mertens
interpretation was correct, and whether a series of letters and addresses had been found during the raid. If so, this
could result in the arrest of people in Turkey. In order to position himself, Ferdi explained to the secretary of the
ICC, the Lithuanian communist Zigmas Angaretis (real name: Aleksa; 1882 1940) that the German authorities had
not made any statement to the Turkish embassy, and that the seized documents were entirely legal matters:
correspondence and information to sections, general opinions, manifestos and press material and not, as Wilde had
stated, ciphered letters. Additionally, Ferdi claimed to have contacted the OMS apparatus in Berlin, as well as sent a
warning to the Turkish comrades in Constantinople on 23 December, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 23, Letter from the
Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 19/1-1932; RGASPI 495/266/38, 168, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to
Angaretis, ICC, Moscow, 3/3-1932 [arrived in Moscow 7/3-1932].

458

against both the inability of the International Secretariat to take its own initiatives and its
dependency on consulting the Eastern Secretariat on every question. However, the Eastern
Secretariat did admit that the situation in Berlin was serious. Ferdi should therefore make every
effort to take the step to go temporarily into illegality and for a brief period, shut down all
communications with Moscow after having sent a detailed report on the house search.1150 This
period of illegality ended in March 1932. After abandoning the bureau at 24 Friedrichstrae, the
International Secretariat re-located itself in an office at 13 Hedemannstrae.1151
Both prior to and after the raid, Mnzenberg had, apart from his press campaign, disassociated
himself from the International Secretariat. In February 1932, Mnzenberg used the occasion of the
fifth anniversary of the LAI to re-introduce the LAI and to raise awareness of the anti-imperialist
movement in Germany. In a number of articles, Mnzenberg outlined the history of the LAI in
relation to the recent series of events, all written using the Cominterns endorsed policy. As noted
in the articles (Fnf Jahre Antiimperialistische Liga in Welt am Abend, Fnf Jahre antiimperialistischer Kampf in Der Rote Aufbau and Fnf Jahre Liga in Pressedienst), Mnzenberg
concluded that the LAI aimed to continue with its gaze from the left. This referred explicitly to
condemning the behaviour of former reformist members (Lansbury, Maxton and Nehru), which
had contributed to bringing the LAI down and had prevented the organisation from earning the
trust of workers and peasants in the colonies.1152 Mnzenberg wanted to re-define the reasons
why the LAI had found it so difficult to generate activity. Thus, the answer was not to be found in
the repression by governmental agencies in Germany, but in the contempt displayed by the LAIs
adversaries. The celebration of the LAIs fifth anniversary passed by unnoticed, particularly as the
International Secretariat had momentarily gone underground and consequently lost all contact with
the anti-colonial community in Berlin. Apparently, anti-colonial activists began to experience
Berlin as a location curtailed by the coercion of the Schutzpolizei and, at the same time, the LAI as
an organisation was perceived with distrust within the German communist movement.1153

1150

RGASPI 542/1/54, 21, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin, 13/11932; RGASPI 542/1/54, 23, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 19/1-1932. For an
introduction to the conspiratorial environment and the destruction of sensitive documents, see Rosenfeldt vol.2,
2009, p.179.
1151
SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der Polizeiprsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern,
Berlin, 19/8-1932; RGASPI 542/1/54, 23, Letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Ferdi, Berlin, 19/1-1932. In
March 1932, the International Secretariat announced in the Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus
(No.11) its new office at 13 Hedemannstrae, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 126-129. The SA (Sturmabteilung)
had an office (Gaubro) at Hedemannstrae, address unknown, Striefler 1993, p.365.
1152
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 94, Blick von links. Fnf Jahre Antiimperialistische Liga, Die Welt am Abend,
No.39, 16/2-1932; Willi Mnzenberg, Fnf Jahre anti-imperialistischer Kampf, in Der Rote Aufbau, Berlin, 1. Mai
1932, V. Jahrg. Heft 9, pp.387-390; RGASPI 542/1/46a, 37-39, Fnf Jahre Liga, Pressedienst, Nr. 3 (Der deutschen
Sektion der Liga), Berlin.
1153
For example, the Chief of Police had examined the document Kurse fr koloniale Studenten in Berlin, SAPMOBA ZPA R/1501/20200, 105-106, Der Polizeiprsident, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern, Berlin, 24/2-1932;

459

In the beginning of 1932, local police authorities in Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen increased
their pressure against foreign elements in Germany, particularly against those suspected of
carrying out subversive, political activism.1154 The case of the Indian journalist, Ayi Ganpat
Tendulkar, further illustrates how the International Secretariat had to answer to the paranoia
developing within the KPD. In April 1932, the Schutzpolizei decided to monitor the activities of
Tendulkar in Berlin more closely, particularly his contacts with the International Secretariat, which
led to the internal question of Tendulkar within the German communist movement exposing
paranoia as an accepted frame of mind not only within the KOSTUFRA, but also within both the
International Secretariat kom.Fraktion and the ZK KPD. The International Secretariat knew that
Tendulkar had, with the support of English money, established the pro-Hindustan committee,
Sobhan. By using the boarding-house at 41 Ansbacherstrae as the base for this committee,
Tendulkar was primarily aiming to assist Asians who were either visiting or living in Berlin. The
International Secretariat wanted to approach Tendulkar and the Sobhan committee, however the
KOSTUFRA considered this to be a bad idea due to Tendulkars connections with other suspicious
German communists. For example, the medical student and member of the KOSTUFRA, Katja
Klapper (Katja, 18/12-1906?), had a reputation within KPD circles for her eager and
enthusiastic participation at organised party events. However, in April 1932, a rumour started to
circulate which implied that Klapper could not be trusted. Since Klapper frequently visited the
boarding house of the Sobhan committee, the KOSTUFRA told the International Secretariat not to
trust the prattling Klapper. The reason for this was as follows. According to the KOSTUFRA,
Klapper had applied for a visa at the Soviet consulate in Berlin in January 1932, stating that she
wanted to travel to Moscow to pursue her medical studies to become a nurse. The KOSTUFRA
stated, however, that this did not correspond with intelligence from several Chinese communists in
Berlin, suggesting that Klapper was an agent in the service of the Chinese embassy who had
infiltrated the Asian student community. Consequently, the International Secretariat had to
understand that under no circumstances should they give their support to Klapper to realise her
objective of pursuing studies in Moscow. After having examined the KOSTUFRA documents, the
International Secretariat passed on this material to the ZK KPD for further consideration.1155
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 111-115, Aus dem Material, das bei der Liga gegen den Imperialismus und koloniale
Unterdrckung, Berlin Friedrichstr.24, gefunden wurde).
1154
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 125, Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Hntzschel,
Berlin, an die Polizeibehrde Hamburg und die Polizeidirektion Bremen, 6/4-1932.
1155
SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 1 I 2/5/14, 282, Betr. Inder [Maschinenschrift, Durchschlag], ZK KPD, Berlin, 19/4-1932.
Tendulkar returned to India (year unknown) as an avid nationalist and convinced anti-communist. In 1964, the
Bombay Provincial Congress Committee published a pamphlet authored by Tendulkar, Nation Betrayed? A Case
Against Communists: their Own Evidence, an analysis of the conduct of the Communist Party of India in times of war,
Overstreet & Windmiller, 1959, p.580. For Klepper, see SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 1 I 2/5/14, 283, Sekretariat an die
Reichsfraktionsleitung der Kommunisten in der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Berlin, an ZK KPD, Berlin, 22/4-1932;

460

The raid also brought the International Secretariats curricular activity to a sudden halt. This
left the International Secretariat with the only option of functioning as a channel for propaganda
campaigns in 1932, all of which were essentially centred on the question of the war threat and in
defence of the Soviet Union. One exception to this was the LAIs solidarity campaign in support of
Hilaire Noulens and his wife (real names: Yakov Rudnik and Tatyana Moiseenko, better known as
the Ruegg case). On 15 June 1931, Chinese authorities arrested the Noulens in Shanghai charging
them with having carried out clandestine activities in the service of the Soviet foreign apartment.
This involved, for example, utilising covert methods to maintain a hub for the communist
movement in the Far East by linking together the activities of the Profintern Shanghai Bureau
(TOSS; branch of the Pan-Pacific Trade Union Secretariat), the ECCI Far Eastern Bureau (FEB)
and the LAI. These arrests inspired Mnzenberg to get the IAH apparatus to set up proletarian
solidarity campaigns across Western Europe declaring their support for the Ruegg couple, an
initiative which depended on using the IAH and the LAI networks.1156 While the International
Secretariat published articles in Informationsbulletin, Welt am Abend urged the KMT in the name
of millions of workers and thousands of intellectuals to release the Ruegg couple.1157 In
connection with the Ruegg campaign, and perhaps inspired by a long-held interest in China,
Mnzenberg suddenly wanted to travel to Shanghai in the company of Barbusse, an idea which
nevertheless required the consent of the Political Commission in Moscow. Whether Mnzenberg
expected to use the Ruegg campaign as a cover for IAH activities in China remains unknown.
Moreover, as Mnzenberg explained to the Political Commission, the journey would serve the
purpose of raising money and organising demonstrations of solidarity in support of the Chinese
workers. Bela Kun notified Mnzenberg that the Political Commission had turned down the idea,
telling him that the IAH could carry out that kind of work in Germany by organising a day of
solidarity in Berlin and that the occasion could be used to raise money.1158

and, SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 1 I 2/5/14, 284, Betr. Anfrage Katharina Klapper (genannt Katja), KOSTUFRA, Berlin, an
ZK KPD, Berlin, April 1932.
1156
Frederick S. Litten writes in his research note The Noulens Affair (1994), that the campaign was orchestrated
by Mnzenberg in August 1931 using, for example, the Inprecorr as a channel to distribute articles and propaganda. A
representative of the IRH [unknown] was critical though towards Mnzenberg, wondering whether the campaign
would turn into a personal operation under Mnzenbergs leadership, rather than in support of the work of the
committee, Zentrales Verteidigungskomitee zur Rettung Rueggs, Frederick S. Litten, The Noulens Affair,
(Research Note) in The China Quarterly, No. 138 (Jun. 1994), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp.492-512.
For an in-depth presentation of the PPTUS office in Shanghai and the FEB, see Fowler 2007, p.64, 86. This criticism
from the unknown IRH representative is mentioned in RGASPI 539/2/425, 1, Original letter (typed) from unknown
IRH representative, Berlin, to Hertha [Elena Stasova], Moscow, 1/11-1931; Gross 1967, p.235.
1157
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 154-158, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 18, Juli
1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 146, Die Welt am Abend, No.159, 9/7-1932.
1158
RGASPI 495/4/182, 8-9 Protokoll (B) Nr. 234, 9/4-1932; RGASPI 495/4/186, 5 Protokoll (B) 27/4-1932. Moscow
started an operation in May 1932 to save the Ruegg couple from the death sentence. However, in connection with
the release of the Ruegg couple on 27 August, 1937, rumors began to circulate about the drama behind the scenes.
According to Litten, the most fragrant rumour was that Richard Sorge, the Soviet master spy in the Far East, had been

461

The British LAI Section highlighted the Ruegg case at its Second Annual Conference at
Friars Hall in London on 21-22 May, 1932. According to its official report, the section had
convinced James Maxton to raise the question in a debate in the House of Commons. Whether the
section was also the source behind Maxtons initiative to highlight the Ruegg case during a
parliamentary debate in London on 23 February is, however, unknown. In fact, Anthony Eden [not
Sir John Simon as mentioned in the Second Annual Conference report], the British Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, blocked Maxtons attempt to confront the British government on the
question regarding the treatment by the Chinese authorities of Mr. and Mrs. Ruegg. Eden told
Maxton that the Ruegg case was not a question for the British to solve; it was entirely a matter
under the jurisdiction of the extra-Settlement authorities in Shanghai.1159 The pice de rsistance
for the British LAI Section were the Meerut campaign and the support for the Chinese liberation
struggle, propaganda campaigns which frequently found their way out onto the streets of London
in 1932. The section arranged, for example, together with the British ILD section [the British IRH
section] an anti-war monster demonstration at Trafalgar Square on 20 February with the slogan:
Hands off China, withdrawal of troops and warships, a free Soviet China!, while a second event
in March commemorated the Third Anniversary of the Imprisonment of the Meerut Prisoners.
Bridgeman was at the centre organising and distributing press material on the campaigns to the
left-wing and bourgeois press in Great Britain, documents which called for the organisation of
demonstrations, meetings and processions in support of the Indian independence movement
using the slogan: Down with imperialism!1160
Somehow, the International Secretariat adapted itself to the complex reality caused by the raid.
As the Manchurian campaign ran its course in Germany, Welt am Abend announced that the
General Secretary of the LAI Mnzenberg planned to deliver a speech on the predatory war of
the Japanese imperialist in connection with the celebration of the Fifth Anniversary of the LAI
at a public rally at Pharusslen in Berlin on 16 February.1161 Apparently, the LAI and the antiJapanese campaign constituted only part of a larger scheme that was about to emerge in 1932. For
Mnzenberg, the rally at Pharusslen aimed to re-introduce the LAIs anti-Japanese propaganda
by connecting the Manchurian crisis with the war threat against the Soviet Union. If the strategy
in Shanghai in 1932, provided with $20,000 from the Comintern with which to guarantee the release of the couple.
This was nevertheless only hearsay, Litten states (1994, pp.497-498).
1159
RGASPI 495/100/875, 7-28, Report of 2nd Annual Conference of LAIs British Section, held 21st-22nd May 1932,
Friars Hall London. For Maxtons question and Edens reply in the House of Commons, see:
< http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/search/ruegg?decade=1930s >.
1160
RGASPI 495/100/875, 1-3, Hon. Sec. R. Bridgeman, Press material concerning the 3rd Anniversary of the
Imprisonment of the Meerut Prisoners, published by the British LAI Section, London, 20/3-1932; RGASPI
495/100/875, 7-28. For the demonstrations, see fol. RGASPI 495/100/875, War on China! Monster Demonstration,
Trafalgar Square, London, 14/2-1932; RGASPI 495/100/875, London Workers! Your Help is Needed! Meerut
Sunday-March 20, Trafalgar Square, London, 20/3-1932.
1161
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 92, Die Welt am Abend, No.38, 15/2-1932.

462

worked out as planned, Mnzenberg pondered the idea of arranging an international congress
against the war sometime in 1932. The campaign called for a strengthening of the structural
foundations of the LAI in order to amplify its anti-war propaganda. On 20 February, Mnzenberg
sent a letter to Fritz Brupbacher in Zurich, requesting him to give his opinion on Japanese
imperialism, and asking him whether he would sign a petition in the name of the LAI in support
of Mme Sun Yat-sens protest against the threat of a Japanese invasion of Shanghai.1162 The antiwar theme was an idea further outlined in a letter from the kom.Fraktion Liga to the Central
Committee of the CPUSA on 25 February, describing the anti-war campaign as a potential field of
activity in which to develop the LAI despite the organisational weakness of most of our sections:
The International Secretariat of the LAI is conducting a wide campaign against the war in
the Far East. It has called upon its national sections to develop extensive activity in this
connection and it has provided them with detailed instructions on the tasks which they must
undertake.1163
The political situation in the Far East was a discourse that would be the opportunity to draw the
masses into the movement, yet, ultimately, it would again be a question of turning theory into
practice for the International Secretariat. For example, the Central Committee of the CPUSA had
to stir up fervour on the anti-war question within the anti-imperialist movement, while at the same
time exercising a close control over the work of those comrades who are charged with dealing
with the activity of the League section.1164
The idea of connecting the Manchurian campaign with the anti-war propaganda also brought
Gibarti back to Berlin. After having performed his role as liaison for both the IAH and
Mnzenberg in the USA since 1929, by 1932 Europe was Gibartis operative field as an agent of
the Comintern. MI5 noted in its summary of traces that Gibarti had been in Paris in February
and travelled to Berlin in April to begin some kind of activity in a committee.1165 What kind of
committee was MI5 referring to, and what were its functions and aims? Mnzenberg sent a
strictly confidential proposal on 30 March from Berlin to the Political Commission with the idea
of arranging an international congress of struggle against war in Geneva. As a crucial part of his
plan, Mnzenberg wanted to assemble a preparatory committee to lead the work up until the
formal opening of the international anti-war congress. Scheduled for 28 July, Mnzenberg
1162

IISG 4249.10/189, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to F. Brupbacher, Zrich, 20/2-1932.

RGASPI 542/1/56, 3-4, Letter from the Komfraktion Liga, Berlin, to the CPUSA, New York, 25/2-1932.
1164
Perhaps this instruction was a reference to Earl Browders criticism of the incapacity and unreliability of the USA
LAI Section in 1930 (see Anni Confusionis), see fol. RGASPI 542/1/56, 3-4, Letter from the Komfraktion Liga,
Berlin, to the CPUSA, New York, 25/2-1932.
1165
Gibarti arrived in Berlin in February and was contacted by Padmore in Hamburg, who wondered whether the IAH
could circulate some of its propaganda to Negro workers, see TNA PRO KV2/1401, Summary of MI5 traces up to
January 1933 Gibarti, Louis; and RGASPI 534/3/754, 105, Letter from Padmore, Hamburg, to L. Gibarti/Central
Committee I.W.R [IAH], Berlin, 14/2-1932.
1163

463

argued that the congress aimed to pay homage to the day of the Sarajevo murders in 1914.
Gibartis role in the committee, according to Mnzenberg, was to assume a leading position and to
act as Mnzenbergs right-hand-man in directing the preparatory work. In fact, the idea was a
blueprint of Gibartis functions during the preparations for the Brussels Congress in 1926-27.1166
Thus, in the context of the anti-war movement, the LAI was the forerunner in uniting the question
of the Manchurian campaign with the anti-war question, an idea which later evolved into the
Amsterdam-Pleyel movement.
What role did the International Secretariat play in all of this? The International Secretariat
played a central role, above all in evaluating whether the anti-war issue was managing to attract
any attention and whether the idea could be sustained for more than a month in Germany.
Mnzenberg had prepared his idea thoroughly before contacting the Political Commission on 30
March. On 3 March, the International Secretariat, together with the IAH Berlin-Brandenburg
district, had organised an international demonstration against the threat of world war at the
Sportpalats in Berlin. The invited speakers nevertheless revealed the rally to be overtly
communist: the PCF member Marcel Cachin, the pacifist and member of the CPGB and IAH
Isabel Brown, Nakanome Otsuka from Japan, Chuang Tang from China, the KPD delegate Albert
Kuntz and Mnzenberg. Moreover, the entrance ticket (eintrittspreis 40 Pfennig) declared that it
was a demonstration against the predatory Japanese war, in defence of the Soviet Union, against
the Hindenburg-Hitler-Front and in support of the red workers candidate Thlmann!.1167 This
demonstration at the Sportpalats was an operation co-ordinated by the International Secretariat,
along with the active assistance of the national LAI sections. According to Ferdi in a report to the
Eastern Secretariat, the sections had received the instruction to organise demonstrations of
protests against Japanese imperialism [and] in defence of the Soviet Union on the very same day
as the Sportpalats rally. From a broader perspective, the massive rally of the LAI and IAH on
3 March also reflected the increasingly heated political scene in Weimar Berlin. The demonstration
was such a success that it attracted widespread attention across Germany and encouraged the
International Secretariat to organise similar events in Berlin, Cologne, Hamburg and Upper

1166

RGASPI 543/1/17, 2-3, (Streng vertraulich) Vorschlag zur Organisierung eines internationalen Kampfkongress
gegen den Krieg, Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Political Commission, Moscow, 30/3-1932. According to E. H Carr, the
WEB organized on instructions from the Political Commission a conference for European communist party
representatives (Thlmann, Pieck, Thorez, Monmousseau, Pollitt, and Lenski) in Berlin on 30-31 March, solely for the
reason to plan a campaign against imperialist war (1982, p.387). If so, and perhaps the meeting was the inspiration
Mnzenberg needed to compile a proposal on the anti-war question.
1167
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 100, Weltkrieg droht!, Die Rote Fahne, No.45, 1/3-1932. For the ticket of
entrance, see fol. RGASPI 543/1/17, 320b, Eintrittskarte zur Internationalen Kundgebung gegen den Krieg,
Sportpalast, Berlin, 3/3-1932.

464

Silesia.1168 The International Secretariat was, however, unable to carry the weight of the entire
anti-war campaign on its own shoulders. Due to the political pressures caused by the daily political
struggle in Germany, as well as the prohibitive measures of the German authorities, the LAI
wanted to establish a closer co-operation with the IAH in order to develop this campaign. The first
step was to send out invitations to the various demonstrations or conferences. Clemens Dutt told
Padmore in Hamburg of the absolute necessity of coming to Berlin and participating in an
International Conference against Imperialist War on 20 March.1169 However, things took a turn
for the worse with regard to this conference. As the political extremism and literal violence on the
streets in Berlin reached new heights in 1932, due to the clashes between the military branch of the
KPD (Roter Frontkmpfer Bund, RFB) and the brown-shirted vanguard of the NSDAP
(Sturmabteilung, SA), in March the MdI adopted its Emergency Decree (Notverordnung). This
decree was intended to bring an end to the political chaos, above all to curtail the political
campaigns of both the communists and the Nazis. This strict governmental policy contributed
therefore to bringing the propaganda work at the International Secretariat to a sudden end.
However, the German communist movement believed that the Emergency Decree was only an
unforeseen obstacle to overcome on the road to achieving political victory in Germany, as noted by
the historian, Christian Striefler. The practical implications of the decree were, however, somewhat
more difficult. For the International Secretariat, the only option left was to postpone the
conference ad infinitum which, according to a short notice in Welt am Abend on 17 March, meant
that new invitations are going to be sent to every organisation.1170
The primary goal now for Mnzenberg was to organise the international anti-war congress in
Geneva. As the anti-war issue had proven to be a successful undertaking for both the LAI and the
International Secretariat, especially as the issue indicated that it was perhaps still possible to revive
the LAI after the raid, the cancellation of the International Conference against Imperialist War in
Berlin was a huge disappointment with broader implications. While the LAI had assumed the
symbolic role as instigator and defender of the anti-war campaign in Germany at the beginning of
1932, once Mnzenberg started mooting the idea of holding the anti-war congress in Geneva, the
International Secretariat found itself obsolete. The initial enthusiasm for both the anti-war issue
and the International Secretariats grand plans were initiatives more or less brought to a premature

1168

RGASPI 542/1/54, 31-34, Die internationale Kampagne der Liga gegen Imperialismus, author: Ferdi, Berlin, to
the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, [stamped:] 16/3-1932.
1169
RGASPI 534/3/754, 169, Letter from the LAI (Clemens Dutt), Berlin, to Padmore, Hamburg, 15/3-1932.
1170
Striefler 1993, p.365. For the cancellation and postponement, see fol. RGASPI 534/3/754, 175, Letter from
Clemens Dutt, Berlin, to Padmore, Hamburg, 21/3-1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 119, Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Die Welt am Abend, No.65, 17/3-1932.

465

end with the publication on 15 March of Clemens Dutts article, Die imperialistischen
Kriegstreiber und der antiimperialistische Kampf, in Der Rote Aufbau.1171
By April, the International Secretariat no longer had any direct involvement in either the
further planning of the anti-war campaign or the international anti-war congress. Alone at the
bureau as the other people have fallen ill, Ferdi told Kuusinen that the LAI was still
experiencing the paralysing indifference of the European communist parties. Ferdi contacted
Magyar in an attempt to explain the precarious situation in Berlin, telling him that every member
at the International Secretariat felt that the situation was extremely depressing. Ferdi conceded that
hardly any money seemed to exist to fund anti-imperialist activity, although he suspected the ZK
KPD of intentionally not providing the LAI with the money set aside for its activities. To correct
Ferdis suspicions about the money issue, Freier at the Eastern Secretariat explained that the
International Secretariat had received its full share for January and February.1172
In March, Joseph Berger was released from Moabit prison. However, Berger did not intend to
leave Berlin, even after realising that the crisis amongst the staff at the International Secretariat
had reached a critical level. York/Thgersen wanted to return to the ILS in Moscow to resume his
studies. In November 1931, York/Thgersen had sent an application to the Eastern Secretariat,
although the dramatic series of events in December had disrupted everything. As the ILS had
avoided giving York/Thgersen a definite answer, Berger tried to help by asking an unknown
contact in Moscow when York/Thgersen would get a decision on his departure.1173 Did
York/Thgersen leave Berlin in 1932 and what was the outcome of his application to the ILS? The
following observations only confirm York/Thgersens obscure fate. In May 1932, MI5 received
intelligence on York/Thgersen suggesting that he intended to leave Berlin shortly for Moscow en
route to the Far East on a mission for the Comintern. However, in August, MI5 observed that
York/Thgersen had not yet left Berlin for Moscow. The reason why MI5 was monitoring the
whereabouts of York/Thgersen in 1932 was to confirm whether the following rumour was
correct: in League circles rumours that it had been proposed in Moscow to establish a new
Asiatic section of the League with headquarters probably in China, to carry on the necessary work
in China, Korea, Indo-China and, possibly, India; and it had been hinted that Hans THOGERSEN

1171

Clemens Dutt, Die imperialistischen Kriegstreiber und der antiimperialistische Kampf, in Der Rote Aufbau,
Berlin, 15. Mrz 1932, V. Jahrg. Heft 6, pp.249-255. Labour Monthly translated Dutts article and published it in its
April issue, see Clemens Dutt, The Imperialist War-Makers and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle, in Labour Monthly,
Volume 14, April 1932, Number 4, pp.208-216.
1172
RGASPI 542/1/54, 36, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, [stamped:] 14/3-1932. For the money issue
and personnel issues, see brief note from Freier to Ferdi, fol. RGASPI 542/1/54, 37, Letter from FR [Freier], Moscow,
to F [Ferdi], Berlin, 15/3-1932.
1173
RGASPI 542/1/54, 38a, Note from B[Berger], Berlin, to unknown recipient, Moscow, 23/3-1932; RGASPI
542/1/56, 2, Letter from Hans [York/Thgersen], Berlin, to Chatto, Moscow, 21/1-1932.

466

might be sent to China to take charge.1174 In retrospect, however, with the social disorder in China
and with the setbacks of the Comintern caused by the Ruegg affair, an Asiatic section of the LAI
was an illogical proposal in 1932.
The primary reason why York/Thgersen hoped to leave Germany was the German authorities
increasingly rigid control of foreigners residence permits. This bureaucratic procedure had had a
negative impact on the individuals at the International Secretariat. While the Berlin police
authority (I.A. section) denied having renewed Kunizakis residence permit, Clemens Dutt
received an expulsion order in April,1175 forcing the latter to go underground in Berlin.
Consequently, York/Thgersen most likely also received notification from the authorities of his
imminent expulsion from Germany. Hence, it is possible that the I.A.s decision not to renew
existing permits was a sanctioned strategy, related to the MdIs on-going investigation of the LAI
and its International Secretariat. For Dutt, therefore, the only option left (aside from leaving Berlin
and Germany) was to adopt a clandestine lifestyle, hiding in safe houses and living with the
constant threat of immediate deportation. The last trace of York/Thgersen in Berlin was as editor
of the October issue of the Informationsbulletin.1176
*
Predicting the End, and Its Solution
The internal decline at the International Secretariat was an established fact in relation to its
individual setbacks. As the communist parties in Europe continued to act indifferently towards the
LAI, and while the political situation in Weimar Germany was worsening by the day, there was no
turning back. Valnitsky at the International Secretariat observed how the unwillingness of the ZK
KPD to provide any administrative support had contributed to isolating the LAI within the
European communist movement:
[] the political hegemony of the Communist Party [in Europe] is now in every country so
huge and great that any initiative [] from the International Secretariat of the LAI, which is

1174

MI5 knew that York/Thgersen was on very intimate terms with Ella Windmller, the steno-typist at the
International Secretariat who, in turn, was married to another functionary at the office, Benno Windmller.
Furthermore, MI5 had a fair description of the interior at 13 Hedemannstrae, an office that consisted of three or four
rooms on the first floor, one of which is usually occupied by York/Thgersen, TNA PRO KV2/1056, Biography of
Hans Peter Thogersen; TNA PRO KV2/1056, EXTRACT, International Secretariat of the LAI, 8/8-1932. Any trace of
York/Thgersens personal file in the Comintern Archive remains missing. However, if one exists, it most likely
contains information on whether or not his application to the ILS was eventually approved.
1175
RGASPI 542/1/54, 72-73, Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Boris [Berger], Berlin, 27/4-1932.
1176
SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus - Sondernummer,
Herausgegeben vom Internationalen Sekretariat, Nr. 20a, September 1932; Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Herausgegeben vom Internationalen Sekretariat, Nr. 22, Oktober 1932.

467

only carried out on our own [initiative], in the future and without the active support from the
parties, will have no success.1177
Valnitskys criticism of the omnipotent position of the communist parties and their relations
towards the sympathising organisations highlighted one of the fundamental problems within the
international communist movement during the inter-war years. For the LAI, the turning point came
when the parties refused to adhere to or even to acknowledge the directives emanating from
Comintern headquarters to support the organisation. In 1932, the responses to such commands
were nil. The LAIs isolation in Berlin forced the Eastern Secretariat to begin reassessing the
future of the International Secretariat in April-May. The central issue for the Eastern Secretariat
was the decentralisation of the International Secretariat apparatus in Berlin, and then the relocation
of the centre of the LAI to another European city. With Kunizaki, Dutt and (probably)
York/Thgersen having had their residence permits revoked and most likely about to be expelled
from Germany, this would leave only Ferdi at the International Secretariat. Magyar was
determined to find a solution and used Berger, who had managed to avoid the attention of the
Schutzpolizei, as his liaison in Berlin. In April, Magyar notified Berger that the most logical step
was to decentralise the central apparatus of the League in Berlin. At the same time as the
organisational structure was being dismantled, the LAIs political agenda was also being
substantially modified. Ferdi notified the Genossen at the WEB in Berlin that the International
Secretariat was incapable of keeping up the momentum on the issue of the European national
minority movement. In Moscow, Magyar concluded that it was just a matter of time before the
entire LAI apparatus in Berlin collapsed. Yet, for as long as the authorities allowed the activities of
the International Secretariat, the centre had to remain in Berlin, Magyar argued. If relocation of
the centre was the only option left, however, Magyar wanted to split the International Secretariat
into two parts. In Berlin, the LAI would have an illegal secretariat with Mnzenberg as general
secretary, working together with a German Comrade, while a legal secretariat in London would
be governed by Clemens Dutt.1178 Magyar, Safarov and Mif re-assessed this issue on 27 May and
convinced the Political Commission to endorse the idea of transferring the International Secretariat
to Paris if the situation in Berlin worsened to such a degree that it was impossible to carry out any
organisational or political work. The Political Commission added that the decision was irrevocable
for the staff at the International Secretariat, who under no circumstances would be able to demand
a renegotiation. Magyar added that this decision depended on the consent of the Colonial
Commissions of both the PCF and of the CPGB to support the LAI. This solution indicated the
1177

RGASPI 542/1/54, 54-55, Report by Valnitzki, Berlin, to the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 14/4-1932.
RGASPI 499/1/37, 19-20, Letter from Ferdi, Berlin, to Genossen/WEB, Berlin, 15/4-1932; RGASPI 542/1/54,
72-73, Letter from Magyar, Moscow, to Boris [Berger], Berlin, 27/4-1932.
1178

468

definitive partition of the International Secretariat, just as it also confirmed the artificial existence
of the centre in Berlin if the LAI was formally declared an illegal organisation in Germany. The
Political Commission recommended reducing the LAI apparatus to a minimum, keeping one
responsible comrade [York/Thgersen] to continue the work of the Informationsbulletin in
Berlin.1179 Freier at the Eastern Secretariat informed Ferdi and Berger in a letter dated 2 June that
the Political Secretariat had authorised Magyars plan, expecting the International Secretariat to
give their attitude to the decision. According to Freier, Ferdi and Berger had to understand that
the decision was a response to the low level of efficiency and capacity at the secretariat. Thus,
the decentralisation of the International Secretariat would be put into effect at the proper
moment if the LAI was banned in Germany.1180
The discussion of the LAI at Comintern headquarters was part of a broader context: the
prediction of the possible collapse of the German communist movement in 1932. If this happened,
the movement would have to resort to clandestine activity. Discussions of a similar nature were
also taking place outside Moscow. On 20 July, Dimitrov met the PCF representative, Jacques
Duclos, and the leader of the KPD, Thlmann, at the WEBs rendezvous (the Bayerhof
restaurant) in Berlin, to assess the extremely serious situation in Germany. For Mnzenberg,
who, according to Gross, had become an anxious and nervous man, the results of the Reichstag
Elections on 31 July, was a crucial moment for the German communist movement.1181 The KPD
was caught in the middle. Obliged to follow the Cominterns strategy, which urged the KPD to
continue its antagonism against the SPD in order to establish a power balance in relation to the
NSDAP, the party seemed incapable of acting independently and, therefore, suffered the
consequences. According to Hermann Weber, this was an indication of the conversion
(Wandlung) within the KPD where its uncompromising attitude towards the Weimar Republic
and social democracy brought the party precariously close, from time to time, to the extreme
right.1182 In the summer of 1932, the political scene in Berlin was about to self-destruct, whereas in
Amsterdam, the Anti-War Congress emerged as a refreshing contrast to the radicalism and
extremism on display in the Weimar Republic.

1179

RGASPI 495/4/191, 8, Protokoll (B) Nr.244 der Sitzung der Polit. Kommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 27/5-1932.
RGASPI 542/1/54, 80, Letter from Freier/Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to the International Secretariat, Berlin,
[stamped:] 2/6-1932.
1181
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 227-229, Betrifft: Westeuropisches Bro der kommunistischen Internationale
(WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die Nachrichtenstellen der Lnder,
14/2-1933; Dontscho Daskalow, Georgi Dimitroff als Theoretiker und Schpfer der Einheitsfront und der Macht der
Volksdemokratie, in Georgi Dimitroff, Bernhard (ed.), Urania Verlag, Leipzig, 1982, p.62; Gross 1967, p.242. In the
July 31 elections, the NSDAP polled in at 37,3 %, the KPD 14,3 %, and SPD 21,6 %, see Hoppe 2007, p.315; Degras
vol.III, 1965, p.217.
1182
Hoppe 2007, p.303; Weber 1969, pp.241-242.
1180

469

*
Prologue to the End
The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress, held on 27-29 August, was Mnzenbergs major
organisational achievement in 1932. For the LAI, however, the congress confirmed the
organisation as a political bystander within the anti-war movement. During the congress, the
Schutzpolizei supposedly ransacked the International Secretariat at Hedemannstrae. However, the
relative lack of documents usually linked to such a raid, makes it difficult to verify whether the
Schutzpolizei ever carried out the raid. According to Barooah, this episode also witnessed the
definitive closing down of the LAI building in Berlin. A scrutiny of Barooahs rather ambiguous
conclusion shows that it is based on a single account, Betrifft: Durchsuchung der Rume der
Liga gegen den Imperialismus,1183 a report signed by the Berlin Chief of Police and despatched
to the MdI on 19 August. Any additional reports on the raid have gone missing, if they indeed ever
existed. In Barooahs defence, however, the Berlin Chief of Police appears to have gained access
to new intelligence on the LAI in August, information which disclosed the international
connections of the International Secretariat. While the December raid in 1931 had exposed the LAI
as a cover organisation for the Comintern, even if a second raid did take place in August 1932, it
did not lead to the definitive closing down of the International Secretariat, as Barooah suggests.
The August report is, nonetheless, very detailed in that it describes the functions and activities of
various actors connected to the LAI, e.g. Mnzenberg, Smeral, Chatto, Gibarti and Ferdi.
Furthermore, the report analyses the constitution of the LAI Executive and the General Council as
well as the contacts between the International Secretariat and both the national LAI sections and
other communist mass and sympathising organisations (Krestintern, the International of
Proletarian Freethinkers, the IAH, the IRH and KOSTUFRA). According to the Berlin Chief of
Police:
[] the material provided with proper evidence that the League is a communist organisation.
The suspicion that it is in connection with illegal organisations, has come true. [] The
League is anxious not to abandon its Communist character [] The League has tried to
capture many people and organisations for its own purposes [] The material also verifies
that the League is a department of the Comintern.1184
1183

Barooah 2005, p.283, 309.

The Berlin Chief of Police sent this report to the MdI, recommending it as being wise to limit the political space of
the LAI in Germany, thus, circular information had to be issued to Auswrtige Amt, the Ministry of Defence and the
German police districts. This circular information, which the RMdI compiled and distributed in September, announced
its conclusion on the LAI: [] the League is a communist organisation which operates with the Comintern, the
Communist Party [KPD] and its auxiliary and subsidiary organisations, [and maintains] the closest relations with
illegal communist organisations [] even in the realm of illegal work (Intelligence, military intelligence service),
SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der Polizeiprsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern,
1184

470

Hence, on the question of the second raid, the only reference was the seized card index in
August by the Schutzpolizei. The Berlin Chief of Police stated that with this card index, the
German police finally had the information needed to expose the international extent of the LAI
network. According to this report, the LAI was a communist organisation in control of an
extensive network linking together individuals and organisations around the world and supervising
particular men of confidence.1185 Within the network, the LAI sections functioned as a means
of transmission for the International Secretariat in Europe, USA, Latin America, India, Japan,
China and Africa, obliged to provide the men of confidence with material support. This
arrangement also had a reverse function, where the sections were to channel intelligence to the
International Secretariat, information which was then passed on to Comintern headquarters in
Moscow. In August, the Berlin Chief of Police had to face the fact that, aside from the LAI being
an actor in the possession of an international network, Berlin was the nerve centre for the
international communist movement. In relation to the above, the Schutzpolizei received the
instruction to continue monitoring the contacts between the International Secretariat and IAH
headquarters; however, the Chief of Police noted: the International Secretariat [] seems
recently not satisfied with the direction of the work.1186
The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress was an event which confronted the political scene in
Europe, while at the same time briefly strengthening the German communist movement against the
terror of the National Socialists against communists and socialists.1187 The anti-war congress
was, however, never meant to be a response to the Nazi movement in Germany; its primary aim
was to discuss the international crisis caused by the effects of the global recession, a socio-political
mixture which could lead to the coming of a new world war. At first scheduled to convene in
Geneva on 28 July 1932, the congress location was moved to Amsterdam after the Swiss
Berlin, 19/8-1932; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1507/279, 78, (Circular information) Nachrichtensammelstelle im
Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, 20/9-1932. A copy of this circular is filed in SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200,
161.
1185
The men of confidence were required to send reports every 14 days on how their missions were progressing,
enclose newspaper clippings and photographs, and write an account of the socio-political situation. The Berlin Chief
of Police used these reports to confirm the assumption that the LAI agents were carrying out their missions either
legally or by using illegal methods. For example, if police authorities in a country had a very strict attitude, the
agent should use sympathising travellers as a method for its courier service, preferably seamen. For the LAI, noted
the Chief of Police, the establishment of a safe route from Europe to India was an essential goal. According to a seized
document, Fragebogen, the LAI recommended that their agents enter India via trade routes (sea and land), and the
railway, see SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der Polizeiprsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des
Innern, Berlin, 19/8-1932.
1186
The Berlin Chief of Police highlighted the close and intimate collaboration that existed between the LAI and the
IAH. For example, the organisations assisted each other in establishing themselves around the world, a strategy that
depended on mutual understanding. If the LAI assisted the IAH to establish sections in the colonies as well as
provided the IAH apparatus with contacts to the European national minority movement (intelligence, addresses,
contacts and translation of documents into local languages), the IAH had to let the LAI use its propaganda apparatus
and assist the LAI with organising campaigns and public meetings, SAPMO-BA ZPA 1507/279, 79-93, Der
Polizeiprsident, Abteilung I, Berlin, an den Herrn Minister des Innern, Berlin, 19/8-1932.
1187
Gross 1967, p.242; Striefler 1993, pp.355-372; Hoppe 2007, p.296.

471

government refused to give the organisers (Komitee zur Einberufung des internationalen
Kongresses gegen den Krieg) permission to hold it. Dimitrov had also advised a change of
location.1188
Dimitrov and the WEB assumed a leading role in preparing the congress. For Mnzenberg, this
shift in authority was a disappointment, especially since he had convinced the Political
Commission to give him the mandate to organise a congress on a broad basis, involving
proletarian mass organisations and leading public figures (writers, scientists, artists). In May,
however, the WEB notified the ZK KPD that they had taken control of the preparations.1189
Nevertheless, Gibarti remained a key figure for Mnzenberg and, before being expelled from
Germany in July on the explicit orders of the MdI,1190 was the true architect of the Komitee zur
Einberufung des internationalen Kongresses gegen den Krieg. The committee consisted of the
members Maxim Gorki, Barbusse, Albert Einstein, Mme Sun-Yat Sen, Upton Sinclair, Theodor
Dreiser, Romain Rolland, Helene Stcker, Sen Katayama, Marcel Cachin, Saklatvala, Thlmann,
Mnzenberg, Clara Zetkin, Pollitt and Stasova.1191 Gibartis primary focus was to assess the
political character and reliability of the members in the committee, describing Romain Rolland, for
example, as an uncertain person:
The biggest difficulty with Romain Rolland, despite him having a very strong sympathy for
the Communist Party, is that he believes that you can invite all parties to a conference. He
is totally politically nave and has only vague ideas about tactics and strategy, which should
be followed in the preparation of the Congress.1192
Albert Einsteins participation in the committee was a result of Barbusses efforts to convince him
to come. In a letter from Einstein to Barbusse, his belief in the idealism and utopianism of the antiwar issue appears: I see that you have a great goal in mind, [] in that endeavour I would like to
participate as best as I can. Furthermore, as rightfully observed by Carr, both Barbusse and

1188

Carr 1982, p.390; Daskalow 1982, p.62.

RGASPI 543/1/17, 4-6, Betrifft Internationalen Kampfkongress gegen den Krieg, Political Commission, Moscow,
April 1932; RGASPI 543/1/17, 21-22, (Vertraulich) Instructions from the WEB, Berlin, to ZK KPD, Berlin, 14/51932. The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress in 1932 is a topic that needs additional research and evaluation, above all its
links to the second congress, the Pleyel Congress in Paris in July 1933, and that the Amsterdam/Pleyel movement was
one of the first public reactions against Hitler and the Nazi regime in 1933. One of the few available studies is E. H.
Carr (1982) and David James Fisher, Romain Rolland and the Politics of Intellectual Engagement, Transaction
Publishers, Rutgers, (2003).
1190
TNA PRO KV2/1401, Summary of MI5 traces up to January 1932 Gibarti, Louis. Intercepted letter from
Mnzenberg to the British IAH Section, London, 26/7-1932.
1191
RGASPI 543/1/17, 14, Komitee zur Einberufung des internationalen Kongresses gegen den Krieg auf den 28.
30. Juli 1932 nach Genf, undated, year: 1932.
1192
RGASPI 543/1/17, 133-135, (Streng vertraulich) Auszug aus einem Berichte Gibartis ber die letzten Entwicklung
im Internationalen Initiativkomitee, Berlin, June 1932. See Stern (2007) on how the communists perceived (and used)
intellectuals for their own purposes.
1189

472

Rolland symbolised a source of inspiration in the context of the anti-war congress,1193 although
neither of them were ever the actual organisers of the congress.
The Amsterdam Anti-War Congress was a major achievement for the international communist
movement. Attending the congress were 2,165 delegates from 27 countries, represented by 1,865
workers, 290 social democrats and 830 communists. Dimitrov acted in the background as the
leader of the communist fraction which comprised Heckert, Hans Kippenberger, Mnzenberg,
Gottwald, Pollitt and Marty. This communist fraction had two objectives to fulfil in Amsterdam:
on the one hand, the pursuit of a unified Marxist line in the fight against the war threat and, on
the other, to establish a permanent anti-war movement. This was a vision that turned into reality
and, in the aftermath of the congress, Helmut/Dimitrov kept feeding the ECCI with reports on how
the work with the anti-war mass movement was progressing.1194 The Amsterdam Congress was
the beginning of the anti-war movement in Europe, although the movement did not manage to gain
any momentum until the Salle Pleyel Congress in Paris on 4-6 June, 1933. In Paris, the congress
aptly re-labelled itself as a peace movement under the title, Committee against Fascist Terror,
which essentially was a response to the deeds being committed by the Nazi regime in Germany in
1933. According to Rundschau (the successor to the Inprecorr), the congress at the Salle Pleyel
was attended by more than 3,000 delegates, representing three million workers. In addition, the
congress witnessed the inauguration of the Amsterdam/Pleyel movement. 1195
At what level did the LAI contribute to the Amsterdam Congress and did the event serve any
other purpose? Aside from the symbolic declaration of brotherly greetings from the LAI to the
congress in its support of the struggle to achieve national liberation from the Imperialist
yoke,1196 the congress functioned as a cover for the International Secretariat to hold a closed
conference (Interne Konferenz der Vertreter der Ligasektionen) for its members. The meeting
had been an operation carefully planned by the WEB before the congress. According to the draft
1193

RGASPI 543/1/17, 11, (Abschrift) Letter from A. Einstein, Berlin, Henri Barbusse, Aumont par Senlis (Oise),
26/4-1932; Carr 1982, p.387.
1194
For number of participants, see Carr 1982, p.390, and the biased Anti-Comintern publication, Adolf Ehrt (Hg.),
Der Weltbolschewismus. Ein internationales Gemeinschaftswerk ber die bolschewistische Whlarbeit und die
Umsturzversuche der Komintern in allen Lndern, Anti-Komintern, Berlin, (1936). Ehrts book contains several
pictures from the congress. The article Der Amsterdamer Kongress. Eine gewaltige Kundgebung gegen den
Imperialistischen Kriege, published in (Sondernummer) Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus
(Nummer 20a, September 1932) provides a summary of the congress. On the composition and the aims of the
communist fraction, see fol. RGASPI 543/1/17, 280-281, Vorschlge an die Politkommission, Moscow, WEB,
Berlin, August 1932; , Daskalow 1982, p.62; Hans-Joachim Bernhard, Georgi Dimitroff ein treuer Freund der
deutschen Arbeiterbewegung und Mitgestalter ihres revolutinren Kampfes, in Georgi Dimitroff, Bernhard (ed.),
Urania-Verlag, Leipzig, 1982, p.156; Zeittafel, Bernhard (ed.), 1982, p.194. For official documents (printed
speeches, congress material, pamphlets, newspaper articles), see IISG World Congress Against the Imperialist War
Collection 3390.2, consulted by the author in 2010.
1195
Carr 1982, p.392-393; Gross 1967, p.270.
1196
SCA CL Collection, volume 131, Manifest des Internationalen Sekretariats der Liga gegen Imperialismus auf
dem Weltkongress gegen den Imperialistischen Krieg, (Sondernummer) Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Nr. 20a, September 1932.

473

on how to proceed, (Der Antikriegskongress und die Antiimperialistische Liga. Plan Entwurf),
the Interne Konferenz of the LAI was to address two particular questions. Firstly, the anti-war
congress was the occasion for the LAI to alter its political agenda, above all to unify the antiimperialist movement and the anti-war movement into one. While it may seem as though this was
a question motivated by an ideological impetus, this was, in fact, never the case. The WEBs
primary aim was to make use of the LAIs transcontinental network to spread the word about the
anti-war congress and, thereby, facilitate the process of establishing where possible [] anti-war
committees in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Secondly, the Interne Konferenz could
be a forum for the International Secretariat to play down the difficult situation in Berlin. The
representatives of the International Secretariat should under no circumstance indicate the decline
in activity in Berlin, the WEB stated, but rather explain that their primary focus for the moment
was the publication of literature in the languages of the colonial peoples and oppressed
nationalities.1197
In Amsterdam, the Interne Konferenz reassessed the status in the national sections in the
USA, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain and Palestine. The major conclusion drawn from this session
was to increase anti-imperialist activity, while continuing to perceive the International Secretariat
as the centre for the LAI. Bridgeman attended the meeting and declared that the surveillance and
coercion of the colonial element in London by the British police made it extremely difficult to
maintain any kind of activity in England. This observation only verified, however, the fragile
organisational structure of the LAI on an international scale. Moreover, the Amsterdam session
was a definite dividing line in the history of the LAI, especially as this was the last time the
organisation ever held a conference. Despite the decision to improve general operations by
unifying the movement with the anti-war question, the Interne Konferenz confirmed that the
LAI was caught in an ideological and organisational deadlock.1198 In an attempt to reinvigorate its
revised political agenda in October, the International Secretariat despatched a circular letter to
every section and affiliated organisation stating that the LAI campaigns (the Meerut conspiracy
trial,1199 the Scottsboro trial and Ruegg case) were of a peripheral interest. The LAI and the antiimperialist movement aimed instead to give its fullest support to the Amsterdam anti-war
campaign, a statement that also obliged every section to give its moral support in defence of the

1197

RGASPI 543/1/17, 296-297, Der Antikriegskongress und die Antiimperialistische Liga, WEB, Berlin, July 1932.
SCA CL Collection volume 131, Interne Konferenz der Vertreter der Ligasektionen, (Sondernummer)
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nr. 20a, September 1932.
1199
The German IRH Section administered the Meerut conspiracy trial campaign in Germany. On 11 November, the
section declared that the LAI and the Profintern aimed to unify their forces to strengthen the campaign, see
SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/320, 3-5, 3-5, Rettet die Gefangenen von Meerut! Mitteilung Nr. B/137., Berlin, 2/11-1932.
1198

474

Soviet Union against the imperialist war threat.1200 The Amsterdam anti-war campaign usurped
the International Secretariats role. Reduced to functioning merely as a supplier and distributor of
anti-war propaganda, and ignoring their existing anti-imperialist campaigns, Ferdi and Clemens
Dutt asked Dimitrov at a meeting in Berlin on 30 January 1933, why it seemed as though the antiwar question had unconsciously sidelined the LAI. Irritated about hearing the complaint,
Dimitrov told Ferdi and Clemens Dutt to remove this false attitude and to rather focus on getting
the International Secretariat and the main League sections up and running again.1201
Between 1 September 1932 and 30 January 1933, a decisive period in the history of Weimar
Germany, the struggle of the German communist movement came to an end. On 1 September
1932, the Schutzpolizei stormed and ransacked IAH headquarters in Berlin, seizing every
document on the Amsterdam Anti-War Congress. On this occasion, Mnzenberg was in Moscow
attending the Twelfth ECCI Plenum (27 August 15 September 1932). At this plenum, the
delegates evaluated reports on both the international situation and the tasks of the sections, the Far
Eastern conflict and the continued struggle against imperialist war and the anti-Soviet
intervention. The ECCI Plenum concluded that, in the event of a new world war, Germany
would become one of the main centres of the most heated and most intense world imperialist
conflicts. This statement did not, however refer to the on-going struggle for power between the
KPD and NSDAP, but rather the ECCI Plenum meant that the colonial ambitions of the Weimar
Republic was a symptom of the current war threat against the Soviet Union. This was a conclusion
illustrating the somewhat detached understanding at Comintern headquarters of the political
struggle in Germany. It was decided at this ECCI Plenum that it was an obligation for the national
communist parties to apply with the greatest persistence and energy the Cominterns decisions on
the question of the struggle against imperialist war and intervention.1202
In an attempt to put the Cominterns dictates into practice, on 12 December the International
Secretariat and the German IRH Section organised a public demonstration in Berlin against
imperialist war and intervention and to celebrate an international day of struggle against
colonialism to remember the Canton Commune in 1927.1203 This demonstration aimed to show
an increase of public communist activity in Berlin, particularly to counteract the campaigns of the
1200

RGASPI 542/1/55, Rundschreiben an alle Sektionen und angeschlossenen Organisationen der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, 27/10-1932.
1201
RGASPI 542/1/59, 29, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow [?], 6/2-1933.
1202
For the raid on IAH headquarters and Mnzenberg, see Gross 1967, p.243. For the Twelfth ECCI Plenum, see
Degras vol.III, 1965, p.208, 223-224.
1203
RGASPI 542/1/55, Rundschreiben an alle Sektionen und angeschlossenen Organisationen der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, Internationale Sekretariat, Berlin, 27/10-1932. Informationsbulletin (No.25, November) published
information on the day of struggle against Colonialism, an account the MdI used as reference material to monitor
the activities of the LAI, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/320, 87-90, Reichskommissar Report Betrifft: RHD
Winterhilfskampagne Internationaler Kampftag am 12. Dezember d.Js., Berlin, 19/11-1932.

475

Nazi movement. The German IRH Section stated in a report that public agitation was a source of
inspiration to continue political activity in Germany:
Due to the deepening of class divisions, the intensification of terror on a national and
international scale, the number of national and international campaigns in recent months []
has greatly increased.1204
At the beginning of 1933, the German communist movement was clinging to life by its fingernails.
For the International Secretariat, this was a moment defined by political forces beyond their
control.
*

1204

SAPMO-BA ZPA R 1507/321, 137-141, Bericht ber die Kampagnen von Anfang Juli bis Ende Oktober 1932.

476

Chapter 10. Collapse and Ruin

[] the League has shown once again that good opportunities for mass work are present;
however, there is a great lack of understanding of how to exploit these opportunities in the
direct leadership [International Secretariat]. [] A terrible political impotence at the very
moment when the imperialists and their agents develop almost everywhere very active
business. [] There is also the matter of the International Secretariat that has to be
considered. Even without the current worsening situation in Germany, it seems to me that
Paris is the temporary place for such an international body. [] we must change as soon as
possible the current unacceptable situation in the League.
Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar,
Berlin, 6/2-1933

On 30 January 1933, Hitler became the Reich Chancellor of Germany after the Reichstag election,
a victorious undertaking by the NSDAP. On the night of 27 February, the Reichstag Fire in Berlin
bore witness to the symbolic end of the Weimar Republic. As the flames ravaged the building, the
disaster of the moment presaged a nation on the verge of entering a period of unchartered political
territory. In the ruins of the burnt-out Reichstag, the Berlin police found and arrested the confused
Dutch communist Marius van der Lubbe. Accused of having started the fire, Lubbe received the
death sentence; however, the political discourse surrounding the fire is of a peculiar nature. For
Hitler and the NSDAP, the primary aim was to confirm whether the fire had been a conspiracy
organised by the communists. With the arrest of Dimitrov and his Bulgarian companions, Vassil
Tanev and Blagoi Popov, at the Bayerhof in Berlin on 9 March, the NSDAP found both the
pretext and the actors with which to corroborate the above. The German police discovered that
Dimitrov had a false passport, made out in the name of Rudolf Hediger, thus, while this was the
cause for his arrest, the entire process culminated in the monumental Leipzig trial in 1933.
Dimitrov was acquitted after making a grandiose concluding speech at the trial in December, an
act celebrated by the international communist movement and contributing to establishing the myth
of Dimitrov as the figurehead in the struggle against fascism.1205

1205

Georgi Dimitroff, Skriftlig inlaga till polisens rannsakningsmyndigheter, in Dokument, brev och anteckningar
frn Leipzigprocessen, Fram frlag, Stockholm, 1936, p.13; Markus Wien, Georgi Dimitrov: Three Manifestations of
His Cult, in The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships. Stalin and the Eastern Bloc, Apor, Behrends, Jones and
Rees (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004, pp.194-208; Marin Pundeff, Dimitrov at Leipzig: Was There a
Deal?, in Slavic Review, Vol.45, No.3 (autumn, 1986), The American Association for the Advancement of Slavic
Studies, pp.545-549. For a biased interpretation, see Jakob Rosner, Zum Kampf Georgi Dimitroffs in Leipzig gegen

477

The NSDAPs ascendancy to power confirmed the end of activity for the LAI and its
International Secretariat in Berlin. The historiography covering the final few dramatic months of
the Weimar Republic in 1933, e.g. the debated views of conservative historian Ernst Nolte, has
primarily interpreted the NSDAPs coming to power in terms of intrigue and crime. However, this
supposition does not provide a fair account from a broader contextual perspective. Nolte argues, as
noted in his book Der europische Brgerkrieg 1917-1945, that the NSDAPs huge social and
political impact in 1933, particularly Hitlers nomination as Reich chancellor on 30 January, was
an epochal event explaining why the Weimar Republic ended.1206 Eric D. Weitz gives a more
concise interpretation of the political impact of the first few months of 1933, referring to it as the
beginning of the Anni terribli for the KPD, as the establishment of the Nazi regime resulted in
the immediate and massive repression of German communism. The KPD had, however, not just
stood by and watched the NSDAP and Hitler come to power on 30 January. On 25 January, the
KPD had, together with several other communist organisations, arranged a public demonstration in
Berlin, drawing 130,000 participants. In January, however, the WEB was still channelling the
detached understanding of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, sending out the
instruction to the most important parties in Europe to avoid establishing collaboration with the
social democratic movement even if the Nazi regime banned the KPD in Germany.1207 The sociopolitical reality in Germany was, however, by then somewhat different, with the systematic use of
violence by the militant forces of the NSDAP (the SA and the SS), assisted by the gullible
Schutzpolizei, against the German communist movement, ending in personal suffering and
haphazardly plunging the movement into illegality. On the night of 27 February, nearly four
thousand KPD members in Prussia ended up in prison, and were later transferred to concentration
camps.1208 Meanwhile, Comintern headquarters in Moscow observed how the KPD, one of its
most important sections, was facing extinction. In February and March, the socio-political chaos in
Germany resulted in the emigration of German communists and other nationalities to the Soviet

den Faschismus, in Beitrge zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung, Leipzig, 2/1962, pp.358-370. For a
concise biography of Blagoi Popov, see Chase 2002, p.490.
1206
Ernst Nolte, Der europische Brgerkrieg 1917-1945. Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus, Herbig, Mnchen,
1997, p.56. For an assessment of the historiographical debate which erupted after the release of Der europische
Brgerkrieg, see, for example, Daniel Schnpflug, Histoires croises: Francois Furet, Ernst Nolte and a Comparative
History of Totalitarian Movements, in European History Quarterly, April 2007, vol.37, no.2, Sage Publications,
London, pp.265-290. For a concise description of the post-war development of German historiography, see David E.
Barclay & Eric D. Weitz, Introduction, in Between Reform and Revolution, Barclay & Weitz (eds.), 1998, pp.13-18.
1207
RGASPI 499/1/38, 2, Information from the WEB, Berlin, an die wichtigste Parteien, 19/1-1933. The ECCI
appealed to the workers of all countries to protest against the establishment of the openly Fascist dictatorship in
Germany, a statement released in the communist press in April 1933. Taken from Labour Monthly, Vol.15, April
1933, No.4, London, pp.267-269.
1208
Weitz 1997, p.280. Towards the end of 1933, the Nazi regime had imprisoned between sixty and one hundred
thousand communists, according to the historian Horst Duhnkes calculation in Die KPD von 1933 bis 1945, Cologne,
1972, p.104; Epstein 2003, p.45; Bernhard 1982, p.63; McMeekin 2003, p.258.

478

Union. As the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters acted more or less indifferently both
prior to and after the NSDAP had come to power, this is a period in the history of international
communism which has caused substantial scholarly debate, above all whether Stalins lenient
policy towards the NSDAP and Hitler contributed to paving the way for the Nazi movement. This
was the perspective presented in historian Robert C. Tuckers study on Stalinism, however, it
merely corroborates a prejudiced understanding of Soviet foreign policy as having been dogmatic
during the inter-war years, McDermott and Agnew argue. A more nuanced understanding of the
KPD and its physical destruction in February 1933 is to see it instead not just as the end of the
party; this epochal event also dealt the Comintern itself a fatal blow. However, the Comintern did
not react immediately to the literal decimation of the German communist movement. This critical
turning point, created by the autocratic rise to power of the German national socialist movement in
1933 and its support for the fascist movement in Europe, was the incentive for the communist
movement to initiate a move towards the Popular Front doctrine against fascism, a doctrine the
Comintern endorsed at the Seventh (and final) International Comintern Congress in Moscow in
1935.1209
The year 1933 was the ruination of the German communist movement. The NSDAPs impact
on the societal and political milieu in Germany also had a lasting imprint on the communist
movements organisational structure and its network(s), as the Nazi regime succeeded to radically
re-shape German society. But how did it do this? By going a long way towards destroying the
solidarities built on the ideological and practical experiences of class, the Nazi movement won
over the loyalty of the German working class as it shifted attention towards the bonds of nation
and race.1210 Nazi repression against subversive communist organisations had increased during
1932, while in January and February 1933 its coercive policies reached their climax. For the
colonial groups in Germany, e.g. the Indian community, this was the end for both students and
political migrs, with a majority ending up in German prisons before deportation, as in the cases
of A. C. N. Nambiar and M. J. S. Naidu.1211 Red Berlin/the Comintern village became just a

1209

Robert C. Tucker (ed.), Stalinism. Essays in Historical Interpretation, W. W. Norton & Company Inc., New York,
1977; Vatlin 2009, p.192; Hoppe (2007); McDermott & Agnew 1996, pp.116-119; Heinrich August Winkler,
Choosing the Lesser Evil: The German Social Democrats and the Fall of the Weimar Republic, in Journal of
Contemporary History, Vol.25, Sage Publications, London, 1990, pp.205-227; Jonathan Haslam, The Comintern and
the Origins of the Popular Front 1934-1935, in The Historical Journal, Vol.22, No.3 (Sep., 1979), Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, pp.673-691.
1210
This meant the structural destruction and ruin of the left-wing movement in Germany (communist, socialist and
social democratic movements). For example, the NSDAP sanctioned the prohibition of both the social democratic
newspaper, Vorwrts, and the communist Die Rote Fahne, while at the same time hindering KPD activities in Berlin.
On 7 February, the ZK KPD held its last meeting in Berlin and, on 23 February, the headquarters of the KPD (KarlLiebknecht-Haus) was ransacked, searched and closed by the police, see Hoppe 2007, p.323; Weitz 1997, p.281.
1211
Israel 1994, p.275. Weiss study (2011) includes a brief description of how George Padmore escaped from
Germany to England in January 1933.

479

memory as the suppression of both subversive and dissident political and social movements gained
strength on all levels after 30 January. On 2 February, with the appointment of Hermann Gring as
Reichsminister of the MdI, the ministry issued a decree prohibiting the KPD and other communist
organisations from holding public demonstrations both in Berlin and across Germany. However,
this was only the beginning of things to come. On 4 February, the NSDAP endorsed the emergency
decree, Schutze des deutschen Volkes! (Protect the German People!) which, according to
Angriff, the Nazi party newspaper, demanded that the German authorities stop the blood plague
being organised by the Foreign legions of Moscow (KPD). For the Nazi regime, this decree also
functioned as an incentive to gain total political and administrative control, as well as provided
governmental agencies with the impetus to control the press and to end the freedom of
assembly.1212 All these measures contributed to physically abolishing the political space(s) for
German communism in Berlin. In February, the KPD headquarters in Berlin, Karl-LiebknechtHaus, was ransacked. The well-known bureau of Willi Mnzenberg [IAH headquarters] at 48
Wilhelmstrae was also closed down.1213 The International Secretariat also fell victim to this
enhanced suppression, yet, unlike the KPD and the IAH, the centre of the LAI managed to
remain in operation until the end, i.e. until the Reichstag Fire on 27 February.
The aim of this chapter is to focus on why the International Secretariat realised that it not was
possible to stay in Berlin, choosing instead to transfer its bureau to Paris. Is it possible to give an
account of the International Secretariats final moments? Was there any wish to continue LAI
activity in Germany? Despite everything that was happening in Berlin, and prior to its move to
Paris, the International Secretariat still managed to prepare and carry out some level of antiimperialist activism in a milieu defined by activism, anger, hope and despair.
*
Continuation of Campaigns
The International Secretariat did not become complacent in January 1933. The decline of the LAI
throughout 1932 had, however, reduced it to a shadow of its former self, capable only of
prolonging activity through propaganda campaigns. This propaganda focused essentially on
supporting the conclusive work of the British LAI Section in connection with the end of the
Meerut trial, and to initiating a letter-writing campaign to protest against the arrest in China of

1212

Striefler 1993, p.376-378. The NSDAP endorsed this decree as a response to the murder of the SA leader, Zauritz,
in Berlin on 30 January. The German communist, Maikowski, was arrested and charged with the crime, and became a
symbol for the struggling communist movement.
1213
SAPMO-BA ZPA R1501/20200, 227-229, Betreff: Westeuropisches Bro der kommunistischen Internationale
(WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die Nachrichtenstellen der Lnder,
Berlin, 14/2-1933; Rosenfeldt, vol.2, 2009, p.285.

480

Huang Ping, the Chinese trade unionist and LAI Executive member. These two campaigns indicate
that, despite the increased pressure on the LAI in Germany, particularly its repression by both the
Schutzpolizei and the MdI, the International Secretariat still had a functional transcontinental
network.
In the beginning of 1933, the communist movement in Europe realised that Germany would
soon face a socio-political change. As early as in October 1932, Helmut/Dimitrov informed
Wilhem Knorin (1890 1939) in Moscow of the WEBs initiative to establish a
Revisionskommission fr die Massenorganisationen. The primary aim of this commission was to
evaluate the complex political situation of the mass and sympathising organisations in Europe. In
this context, Helmut/Dimitrov concluded that Germany was of particular interest since the
movement there was experiencing the aggravating circumstances as troublesome. The WEB
planned to use the symbolic authority of this Revisionskommission to send instructors across
Europe to examine the auxiliary bodies of the Comintern: the IRH, the Friends of the Soviet
Union, Sportintern, Krestintern, the LAI and the IAH. In December, the WEB intended to carry
out a thorough inspection of the German communist movement.1214 Is it possible to outline the
results of this Revisionskommission, or did the initiative fizzle out? From a chronological
perspective, another episode may help to explain what happened: the Essener Konferenz. The
WEB organised this extremely illegal conference on 30 December 1932, for representatives of
the European communist parties (the KPD, the PCF, the CPCz, the Communist Party of Belgium,
the Communist Party of Austria and the Communist Party of Poland, while the Communist Party
of Italy and the CPGB were unable to participate). According to the German communist, Walter
Gollmick (1900 1945), for conspiratorial reasons the conference took place either in
Remscheid or outside the small town of Sauerland in Germany. Whether the question of the
communist mass and sympathising organisations in Europe was a topic addressed at the
conference remains unknown. At the conference, the WEB focused apparently on one issue only,
the enforcement of Comintern directives on the parties, urging the need to establish and conduct a
strong campaign against the Versailles Treaty to take the wind out of the sails of the NSDAP. If
successful, this would establish a fighting alliance between the German-French working
class.1215 Yet, prior to the Essener Konferenz, Helmut/Dimitrov had suggested a different
1214

RGASPI 499/1/37a, 11, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Freunde/Knorin, Moscow, 3/10-1932; RGASPI
499/1/37a, 13, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Freunde/Knorin, Moscow, 3/10-1932; RGASPI 499/1/37a,
14, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Freunde/Knorin, Moscow, 19/10-1932.
1215
This reference to conspiratorial reasons was a statement given by Gollmick during an interrogation by the SS in
Hamburg on 23 July, 1943, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/58/3833a, 58-60, II A I-158/43. Walter Gollmick, Westeuropisches
Bro (Web), Hamburg, 23/6-1943. Dimitrov informed the ECCI in the autumn of 1932 of the fractional failures of
the ultra left-wing within the KPD which were causing disorder and hindering the ZK KPD from carrying out
Leninist work. According to the report on Gollmicks interrogation, the small city of Sauerland was the location for

481

solution in order to unify the socialist and communist movements in Germany against the NSDAP.
In a letter to the Political Commission in October, Helmut/Dimitrov urged the Commission to
understand the fact that organised public demonstrations in Germany had the potential to
counteract the Nazi movement. However, this would require creating an alliance, referring
explicitly to the united front strategy. For Helmut/Dimitrov, it was important to unify the
communist, socialist, social democrat and Christian movements into a front, controlled by the
communists, under the slogan: Come with us! Fight with us against fascism Create a Red
Front under the Leadership of the Com. Party [KPD].1216 The Political Commission ignored
Helmut/Dimitrovs proposal and, even if the Revisionskommission ever carried out any of its
intended work, its results were insignificant. The primary aim of the Essener Konferenz was to
enforce the policy of the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters on the European communist
parties. Obviously, this aim flew in the face of the harsh political reality the communist movement
in Europe had to struggle against at the end of 1932. Thus, in the beginning of 1933, this was a
movement characterised by internal inconsistencies. The Comintern seemed to act with
indifference to the KPD crisis, particularly when the world party commanded its German section
to continue to be suspicious of the German labour movement, even if they declared their support
for the communists. The Comintern also criticised the KPD leadership for having failed to take
advantage of the opportunity to realise revolution in Germany in December 1932. According to
Hermann Webers illustrative appraisal of this dilemma, these were the burdensome
consequences of Stalinization.1217
In the beginning of 1933, reduced to being a pawn in the internal contradictions both between
the Comintern and the KPD and in the political game in general in Germany, as well as being
crippled by its own organisational weakness, the International Secretariat focused completely on
propaganda campaigns. With the arrest of Huang Ping on the orders of the Tientsin Committee of
the KMT in Peiping, China, on 4 January 1933, the International Secretariat assisted with the
efforts of both the IAH and other actors in the global labour movement to establish a massive
protest campaign.1218 According to Welt am Abend on 6 January, the International Secretariat of the

this conference, while Bernhard (1982, p.156, 194) writes that it was convened in Remscheid. Carr (1982, p.393)
suggested that it took place somewhere in the Ruhr area of Germany. The Gestapo arrested Gollmick in Copenhagen
in 1941 and transferred him to Hamburg, where the SS pressured him to give information on the German communist
movement. As the Nazi regime was beginning to crumble towards the end of World War II, Gollmick committed
suicide on 15 February, 1945, see Weber & Herbst 2004, pp.257-258.
1216
RGASPI 499/1/37a, 20-25, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to the Political Commission, Moscow, October
1932.
1217
Hoppe 2007, pp.320-321; Weber 2008, p.26.
1218
RGASPI 542/1/59, 2, (Confidential) Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to General Ma, Li-Du, Sun Bin-Wen,
Nanking, 21/1-1933; for Huang Ping, see Daniel Y. K. Kwan, Marxist Intellectuals and the Chinese Labour
Movement. A Study of Deng Zhongxia (1894-1933), University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1997, p.94; for Pings

482

LAI had acted swiftly to establish an international rescue campaign,1219 a campaign utilising the
transcontinental networks of both the LAI and the IAH. On 10 January, an unknown correspondent
in New York and IAH liaison in the USA, sent information to Mnzenberg that the Huang Ping
campaign had unified the USA LAI Section, the IAH, the IRH, the TUUL and friends [CPUSA]
behind Mnzenbergs plan of action. What did this plan entail? Firstly, that the networks of the
IRH [ILD] and the IAH should administer the Huang Ping campaign in the USA. Secondly, that by
sending a delegation to visit a number of governmental agencies in Washington, Huang Pings
solidarity rescue campaign would receive public exposure, particularly the demand to support
the immediate release of Ping. This unknown liaison promised Mnzenberg that the final aim
was to organise a series of public demonstrations in New York, Boston, Chicago and San
Francisco in the near future. Apparently, this liaison had travelled to Washington to discuss the
Huang Ping case with several Chinese scholars, and had met Theodor Dreiser (who was also
connected to the anti-war campaign), who had published a couple of articles on the campaign in
the American labour press. The hardest thing for the liaison though was to raise the money for
the telegram to Mnzenberg, especially as each word cost 88 cents, thus, the liaison had had to
work for an entire day to get the money needed.1220
On 25 January, Mnzenberg contacted Magyar assuring him that he would do everything
possible to intensify the Huang Ping campaign, e.g. the International Secretariat had established a
connection in Washington, Borah, who could exert pressure on the USA government. The
question is, however, who was Borah? One plausible candidate was the Republican Senator
William E. Borah, the Chairman of the Senate of Foreign Relations Committee. As noted in
Benjamin R. Beedes study of US foreign policy in the years 1898-1934, Borah was strongly
against the USAs imperialist policy.1221 Towards the end of January, however, a rumour
suggested that the KMT had executed Ping. If so, and in order to respond to the atrocious act,
the Political Commission instructed the Eastern Secretariat to write a statement and send it to the

attendance at the Frankfurt Congress in July 1929, elected as LAI General Council member, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/92, 28, 33.
1219
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 215, Welt am Abend, No.5, 6/1-1933.
1220
RGASPI 542/1/59, 5, Letter from unknown writer [name deleted with scissors], New York, to Mnzenberg in
Berlin, 10/1-1933. According to Epsteins study, communists were willing, indeed eager, to sacrifice their time,
energy, work and relationships for the communist cause, Epstein 2003, p.42. The unknown representative was not
Gibarti. On 11 January, MI5 intercepted a telegram sent to Gibarti in Berlin, a document which mentioned that the
movement [had] started. Whether this related to the Ping campaign was not disclosed, see TNA PRO KV2/1401,
Positions, which are known to have been held by Dobos as Louis Gibarti in united front organisations, Summary of
M.I.5 traces up to January 1933.
1221
RGASPI 542/1/59, 7, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Magyar/ECCI, Moscow, 25/1-1933; Benjamin R. Beede,
The War of 1898 and U.S. Interventions, 1898-1934, Taylor & Francis, London, 1994, p.444, 504. Borahs stance
against the imperialist policy of the USA was in connection to the idea of building a canal in Nicaragua in 1932.

483

International Secretariat in case his murder is confirmed.1222 In the meantime, Mnzenberg

asked whether Maxton would consider getting the ILP to support the Ping campaign. Maxton
stated that he remembered Ping as a person who had a fine working-class outlook and he
promised Mnzenberg that the ILP eagerly supported the imminent release of Ping.1223 It was
nevertheless through Bridgeman that Mnzenberg heard of the safety of Ping, as Bridgeman had
received the information from the Chinese charg DAffaries in London.1224 The KMT released
Ping on 24 January, although whether this decision was a reaction to the pressure caused by the
LAIs rescue campaign is unknown. Nonetheless, the global protest campaign had drawn
unwanted attention to the KMT and the Nanking government. According to Fowler, the Huang
Ping campaign had unified the anti-colonial movement as the activists began to experience some
success in mobilising a broad constituency among Chinese, Filipinos, Japanese, American
workers and the so-called liberal elements.1225 Spreading information in Europe about Pings
release from prison seems to have been a slow process, however. Barbusse tried to co-ordinate a
campaign with the Swiss communist Jean Vincent (who had also been involved in the Ruegg
campaign) to pressure the Chinese delegation at the League of Nations in Geneva. To put an end to
the unceasing flow of protest telegrams, the ambassador of the delegation, Yen, sent a note to
Vincent on 1 February, stating that Ping was a free man after having made a confession to the
authorities and becoming a state witness. Barbusse informed Mnzenberg about what had
happened, yet, still perhaps not willing to trust Ambassador Yens statement, Mnzenberg
questioned whether Huang Ping was alive and is he free in an article in Inprecorr on 12
February. Ping was alive and managed to escape from the KMT. After the Second World War, Ping
re-surfaced as a member of the CPCh.1226

1222

RGASPI 495/4/228, 1-4, Protokoll (A) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/11933. Present at the meeting were Manuilsky, Heckert, Knorin, Gusev, Lozovsky, Gerisch, Eisenberger, Kolarov and
Magyar.
1223
RGASPI 542/1/59, 11, Letter from Maxton, London [he used a sheet of paper with the insignia House of
Commons], to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 24/1-1933. Mnzenberg passed on Maxtons letter to Magyar on 27 January; see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/59, 10, Letter from Mnzenberg, Berlin, to Magyar, Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, 27/1-1933.
1224
The British LAI Section organised a demonstration outside the Chinese embassy in London on 28 January, an
event Mnzenberg informed Magyar about, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/59, 14, Letter from Bridgeman, London, to
Mnzenberg, Berlin, 24/1-1933; RGASPI 542/1/59, 27, Letter from Mnzenberg, location unknown, to Magyar,
Moscow, 5/2-1933.
1225
Fowler 2007, p.168.
1226
RGASPI 542/1/59, 26, Letter from the Chinese Delegation, League of Nations, Geneva, to Jean Vincent, Geneva,
1/2-1933. The secretary of the Chinese delegation kindly asked Vincent to inform Barbusse and your other friends of
Pings release, and to stop sending petitions. Mnzenberg sent a copy of Vincents letter to Magyar on 5 February, see
fol. RGASPI 542/1/59, 26. For Jean Vincent, see Huber 1995, p.456. Other sources on the nature of the Ping campaign
are, for example, SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 230, Willi Mnzenberg, Lebt Huanping und ist er frei?,
Inprecorr, No.21, 14/2-1933. For the further development of the Huang Ping campaign and its aftermath in relation to
Bridgeman and Mnzenberg, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/58, 27, (Handwritten) Letter from Bridgeman, London, to
Mnzenberg, Berlin, 29/5-1933; RGASPI 542/1/58, 25, (Excerpt) Letter from Mnzenberg, Paris, to the ECCI
Secretariat, Moscow, 31/5-1933.

484

The end of the Meerut trial in January was the LAIs second propaganda campaign. For the
International Secretariat, the process essentially involved providing assistance to the British LAI
Section and to Bridgeman. On 16 January, the accused received the incredibly harsh verdict
from the Judge, R. L. Yorke, condemning them either to transportation for life or to imprisonment
for between four to twelve years.1227 One of the accused, Philip Spratt, stated some time afterwards
that the portrayal of the trial within the international communist movement had been a contrast
with the facts and the entire episode had been a pretext for the Comintern to distribute
propaganda.1228 However, while Spratt had his reasons for questioning the results of the Meerut
campaign, he also ignored the involvement and belief invested in the campaign by some of the
actors, especially Bridgeman.
Since the beginning of the Meerut campaign in 1929, Bridgeman kept feeding Mnzenberg
and the International Secretariat with information on how the work was progressing. In January
1933, despite the official declaration of the verdicts, this was not the end of Bridgemans
commitment to supporting the Meerut prisoners. Bridgeman told Mnzenberg of his idea to
establish a Special Meerut Release Committee in order to protest against the verdicts of the trial.
By adopting the theme of proletarian solidarity to raise awareness, the committee should act in
the vein of a typical trade union and focus its activities on collecting money to give the prisoners
moral support, Bridgeman stated. The political stimulus for the committee was to continue
utilising the international network which had been built up as a result of the Meerut campaign,
according to Bridgeman, and, if this did not happen, it would be a huge mistake on behalf of the
British LAI Section to lose contact with these numerous persons and organisations.1229
Bridgeman had authored a letter of invitation to join the committee which he sent to Mnzenberg
for further reconsideration. Bridgemans primary aim was to approach as many people as
possible:
For some time past, the LAI has set itself to carry on the agitation among the British workers
for the release of the Meerut prisoners, and has undertaken the task of raising money for the
Defence Fund. So far approximately 750 has been sent to the accused since March 1929.

1227

Bellamy & Saville (eds.), The Meerut Trial, 1929-1933, Volume VII, 1984, p.89.
Spratt wrote that the proceedings, which were in any case largely formal, became such a bore that not one of the
accused, so far as I remember, tried to follow them. We read, talked or slept in the dock, or when allowed spent the
day in the garden of the house which was used as the court, while describing the lighter moments in jail filled with
playing various games, exercise, composing light verse and singing songs. At the end of the process, and after
receiving a sentence of twelve years imprisonment (reduced to two years), Spratt became depressed, see Spratt 1955,
pp.49, 52, 57-58.
1229
Bridgeman told Mnzenberg that he was in telegraphic contact with the prisoners in India, see fol. RGASPI
542/1/59, 12, Letter from R. Bridgeman, London, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 14/1-1933; RGASPI 542/1/59, 14, Letter
from Bridgeman, London, to Mnzenberg, Berlin, 24/1-1933.
1228

485

This sum sinks into insignificance when we compare it with the 124,000 spent by the
Government.1230
Proletarian solidarity was the moral incentive for the Special Meerut Release Committee.
Moreover, the committee strove to highlight fundamental questions of elementary social and
political rights for the Indian working class, e.g. the right to organise themselves in trade unions
and in political organisations.1231 While Bridgeman conceptualised the idea of the committee, the
only thing Mnzenberg could contribute with at this stage, however, was to pass on the
information from London to the Eastern Secretariat in Moscow.1232 The Special Meerut Release
Committee managed to maintain the political drive of the Meerut conspiracy trial campaign. Over
a period of six months, the committee collected 1,000 and established an active collaboration
with the National Council of Labour in London, which resulted in the publication of a pamphlet
demanding that the British government change the prison terms for the defendants. On 24 July
1933, the High Court in Allahabad reduced the sentences in favour of the imprisoned
individuals.1233
*

1230

RGASPI 542/1/59, 15, Letter of invitation from the British LAI Section, author Bridgeman, January 1933. The
CPGB member active in the LAI section in London, Percy Glading, fronted the committee.
1231
RGASPI 542/1/59, 15, Letter of invitation from the British LAI Section, author Bridgeman, January 1933. The
committee had planned to hold its first meeting in London on 26 January, at 8 pm, at the London District Office of the
Amalgamate Engineering Union, at 39 Doughty Street.
1232
The Political Commission endorsed the idea of the Eastern Secretariat organising a specific Meerut day, under
the direction of the LAI in Europe. However, due to the unforeseen series of events in Germany, particularly the
Reichstag Fire, this plan was suddenly cancelled. The only reaction from the LAI was a written protest, published in
the February issue of the Informationsbulletin (printed in Paris in March), see fol. RGASPI 495/4/228, 1-4, Protokoll
(A) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/1-1933. For the article, see SAPMO-BA ZPA
R/1501-20200, 220-225, Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 2, Februar 1933.
1233
Bellamy & Saville (eds.), The Meerut Trial, 1929-1933, Volume VII, 1984, p.89.

486

Organisation No More
On the day Hitler took over the government in Berlin, there was a meeting of the Enlarged
[International] Secretariat, [] The extremely important decisions taken at this meeting
concerned the political and organisational work of the International Secretariat [] due to
the changes made in the bureau because the situation in Germany had made it objectively
impossible [to continue].
Allo Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris,
1/4-1933
A terrible political impotence is present now.
Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar,
Moscow, 6/2-1933
If there is one particular moment in the decline of the LAI day, month and year 30 January
1933 is its decisive turning point. In the history of the Weimar Republic, this date refers to Hitlers
appointment as Reich Chancellor, while for the International Secretariat, this date refers to the last
meeting ever to take place at its bureau at 13 Hedemannstrae. After this meeting, everyone knew
that the game was up. The irrevocable decision to transfer the International Secretariat from Berlin
to Paris had made this perfectly clear to everyone. The dismantling of the International Secretariat
was an operation determined by how to put into practice the directives given from one person to
another in February and March. With the literal dispersal of the International Secretariat out of
Berlin, this process marks the definitive disintegration of the anti-imperialist movement in
Germany during the inter-war years. Additionally, it also reveals the different reactions amongst
the actors.1234
While the appointment of Hitler as Reich Chancellor on 30 January is a chronological fixture
in the history of Germany during the inter-war years, the socio-political consequences of the
Reichstag Fire on 27 February witnessed the painful end of the Weimar Republic.1235 Moreover,
with the arrest of Dimitrov in Berlin on 9 March, this was a signal for the communists remaining

1234

Based on to two accounts, one a report from the German communist Allo Bayer Bericht ber Lage und Ttigkeit
des Intern.Sekretariats der Liga ab 30.Januar 1933 and the other Helmut/Dimitrovs report to Magyar on 6 February,
documenting the dramatic and planned end of the International Secretariat in Berlin.
1235
The scholarly debate on causality, intent, and the question of guilt as to who had started the fire is still raging. The
principal question is whether it was an act committed by a disillusioned individual, or whether it was a conspiracy
organised by the NSDAP and Hitler, or the KPD. Criminological investigations, scholarly interpretations, and general
discussions have yielded the same conclusion, that the fire was not a put-up job organised by the NSDAP. See further
in Fritz Tobias groundbreaking analysis Der Reichstagsbrand: Legende und Wirklichkeit, Grote, Rastatt/Baden, 1962,
p.28; Martin Moll, Zur Historikerkontroverse um den Reichstagsbrand, in Jahrbuch fr Forschungen zur Geschichte
der Arbeiterbewegung, Verlag NDZ, Berlin, 2003/I, Januar, pp.177-183; Erwin Eckert & Emil Fuchs, Blick in den
Abgrund. Das Ende der Weimarer Republik im Spiegel zeitgenssischer Berichte und Interpretationen, PahlRugenstein, Bonn (2002).

487

in the city to escape and leave Germany. In the period from 30 January to 27 February, the German
security services focused their attention on gathering intelligence on the German communist
movement. The raids on the headquarters of both the KPD and the IAH in February provided the
MdI with a rich cache of documents on the organisational network of the German communist
movement. It was logical for the International Secretariat to blame the Reichstag Fire for its
liquidation and transfer to Paris. Yet, this overstates the consequences of the Reichstag Fire and
conceals the fact that the NSDAPs electoral victory on 30 January simply enabled the
International Secretariat to implement earlier than planned the Political Secretariats decision in
June 1932 (see previous chapter) to remove the nerve centre of the LAI from Berlin to Paris.

The Eastern Secretariat partly contributed to supporting the International Secretariat in its efforts
to mobilise the campaign for Huang Ping and to influence the Meerut verdicts in January. Also in
January, Berger returned from Berlin to Moscow to assist Magyar in setting up a plan on how to
re-organise the International Secretariat. On 27 January, Piatnitsky summoned Magyar and Berger
to a closed session in his office to listen to the plan. They agreed that it was crucial to keep
Mnzenberg as the General Secretary of the LAI, above all for him to function as the liaison
between the kom.Fraktion Liga and the ECCI in Moscow. This was primarily because Clemens
Dutt and Ferdi would be leaving Berlin at any moment and returning to Moscow. The Comintern
had already made plans for Clemens Dutt. Michael E. Kreps (1895 1937), the leader of the
publishing department at Comintern headquarters, had proposed that the Political Commission
invite Clemens Dutt to Moscow and, if he accepted, he would be given a position in the publishing
department. Ferdis future was less clear. He only knew that he had to leave Berlin for Moscow at
a given signal. Magyar and Berger focused essentially on the International Secretariats technical
apparatus, telling Piatnitsky that 1-2 Comrades had to remain in charge in Berlin for as long as
possible. The first candidate was Allo Bayer, who would replace York/Thgersen as the editor of
the Informationsbulletin, while the second candidate was Wittfogel, designated to act as the editor
of The Anti-Imperialist Review. Bayer and Wittfogel would also take care of the daily routine work
at the bureau. To confirm the re-organisation of the International Secretariat, Magyar and Berger
expected to present this plan at an extended plenary session at the International Secretariat in
Berlin sometime over the next 14 days in February.1236 However, due to the series of events in

1236

Magyar and Berger presented the re-organisation plan at a closed session in Piatnitskys office (11 Uhr
Vormittage) at Comintern headquarters, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/228, 80, Tagesordnung, 27/1-1933. For Kreps
request, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/228, 1-4, Protokoll (A) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des
EKKI, 27/1-1933. Manuilsky authorised Clemens Dutts journey to Moscow. For a biography of Kreps, see Huber
1995, p.431; for this protocol, which includes the strictly confidential plan of reorganisation, see fol. RGASPI
495/4/228, 5-6, (Streng vertraulich) PROTOKOLL (B) Nr.291 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des

488

Berlin on 30 January, Magyar and Bergers original intention had to be drastically altered. Instead,
it was Helmut/Dimitrov who emerged as the messenger to enforce the Political Commissions
decision to re-organise and dismantle the International Secretariat.
On 14 February, Inprecorr published the article Gegen nationale und koloniale
Unterdrckung. Eine wichtige Sitzung des Erweiterten Internationalen Sekretariats der LAI,
which gives the impression that the International Secretariat had held a meeting on that very same
day in Berlin. This was a deliberate deception, however. Apparently, the so-called extended
plenary session (die erweiterte Sitzung) was carried out in all haste at 13 Hedemannstrae on 30
January, after Helmut/Dimitrov had summoned Clemens Dutt, Ferdi and Bayer for the last
meeting of the International Secretariat. At this meeting, Helmut/Dimitrov talked about how to
secure the International Secretariats future political and organisational activities as well as
criticised the centre for its inability to develop any sustainable work. While the Inprecorr article
depicted the LAI as an active and vigorous organisation, this article was based on the draft of a
resolution authored by the WEB (Entwurf einer politischen Resolution ber die Kriegslage im
Fernen Osten und die Aufgaben der anti-imperialistischen Organisationen) which supported the
anti-war campaign in its protests against Japanese imperialism in the Far East. According to this
article, the LAI was one of the few real, revolutionary organisations in Germany which, in
comparison to the treachery of social democracy and the reformist trade unions, strove to continue
the struggle against imperialism.1237 This depiction was nonetheless an erroneous recapitulation of
what had really happened at the last meeting of the International Secretariat on 30 January.
Helmut/Dimitrov stated in his report to Magyar that he had criticised the members of the
International Secretariat for their lack of understanding in how to exploit good opportunities to
create anti-imperialist mass work, a dilemma mainly prevalent in the leadership of the LAI.
The terrible political impotence at the International Secretariat and its inability to carry out
organisational work, explained why the promotion and support of the movement in the colonies
and in areas of national oppressed minorities in Europe had been a complete failure,
Helmut/Dimitrov argued. While briefly touching upon the raging political situation in Germany,
Helmut/Dimitrov concluded that the fate of the International Secretariat depended on realising
other factors:

EKKI, 27/1-1933; For Allo Bayer as editor of the Informationsbulletin, see SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501,20200, 220-225,
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus, Nummer 2, Februar 1933.
1237
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 231, Gegen nationale und koloniale Unterdrckung. Eine wichtige Sitzung des
Erweiterten Internationalen Sekretariats der LAI (Against National and Colonial Oppression. An Important Meeting
of the Enlarged International Secretariat of the LAI), in Inprecorr, No. 21, 14/2-1933 [published around the date
suggested by Magyar and Berger]; RGASPI 499/1/37, 27-36, Entwurf einer politischen Resolution ber die Kriegslage
im Fernen Osten und die Aufgaben der anti-imperialistischen Organisationen, WEB, Berlin, to the ECCI, Moscow,
[stamped date: 14/2-1933].

489

I have concluded that the current line, as it is, even with the best will cannot do that [develop
mass anti-imperialist work]. [] a workable International Secretariat, a living centre capable
of taking the initiative, suggestions, to help and control the implementation of directives in
the sections, establish new contacts, take the initiative for the establishment of new sections
(Belgium for example), make a political stand against current imperialist policy and colonial
oppression, organise a series of campaigns aimed against imperialist activity and provide the
sections with appropriate material, organise international anti-imperialist propaganda, to
promote and take advantage of the possibilities [in the political work], the current
[International] Secretariat is not suitable. An immediate change is absolutely necessary
according to me.1238
According to Helmut/Dimitrov, the International Secretariat was a defunct leader of the LAI,
unable either to carry out the obligations required of it, to subsist on its own strength or, most
importantly, to realise the Cominterns colonial work. Thus, the only logical solution at hand was
to temporarily relocate the International Secretariat to Paris. This would preserve the original
aim of the LAI acting as a Comintern intermediary to the colonies. Helmut/Dimitrov argued that
this was a crucial question for the ECCI to consider, especially as the LAI constituted one of the
few communist organisations which had established contacts with reformist unions, social
democratic parties, petite bourgeoisie circles and among intellectuals. However, Helmut/Dimitrov
left the matter of transferring the International Secretariat to Paris in the hands of Magyar,
concluding that it was still possible to create a vigorous anti-imperialist movement despite the
movement still being far away [] we must change the current unacceptable situation in the
League as soon as possible.1239
Helmut/Dimitrov did not, however, inform Magyar that several of the members had already
begun to dismantle and liquidate the International Secretariat after this meeting. In March, after
Bayer had escaped from Berlin and arrived in Paris, he completed a report on every stage in the
process, and passed it on to Magyar. According to Bayer, the operation had begun with a scattering
of personnel:
Immediately after the meeting, the secretaries Ferdi and Dutt were recalled [to Moscow]. A
short time later, the Hitler government made it impossible to conduct any useful work. Willi
M. [Mnzenberg] disappeared shortly thereafter.1240

1238

RGASPI 542/1/59, 29, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 6/2-1933.
RGASPI 542/1/59, 29, Letter from Helmut/Dimitrov, Berlin, to Magyar, Moscow, 6/2-1933.
1240
RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht ber Lage und Ttigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933,
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933. Bayer handed over the report in person to Magyar in Paris on 6
April. Enclosed with the report was a short note from Bayer, stating that the report was a valuable piece of
information, which described the precarious situation of the International Secretariat. Thus, Magyar had to dispatch
1239

490

Dutt and Ferdi arrived safely in Moscow.1241 Magyar had a meeting with Ferdi at Comintern
headquarters to receive additional information on the last meeting at the International Secretariat
[any report of this meeting remains missing]. After listening to Ferdis evaluation, and having
examined Helmut/Dimitrovs report, Magyar told Mnzenberg that the recent activities at the
International Secretariat had been weak and trivial in nature, while it seemed obvious that the
LAI sections were incapable of carrying out real work.1242
The question is nevertheless whether Mnzenberg even took the time to reflect upon Magyars
criticism. Concerned about the situation in Berlin, Mnzenberg virtually disappeared in Berlin
after the NSDAP came to power on 30 January. Gross wrote that Mnzenberg never went back to
his apartment, hiding anonymously in a room somewhere in the western part of Berlin.1243
*
Liquidation
The liquidation of the International Secretariat was an undertaking fraught with mistakes from the
start, characterised by a hesitancy that corresponded to the harsh realities imposed on the German
communist movement in February.1244 At the last meeting of the International Secretariat on 30
January, Helmut/Dimitrov had instructed Bayer to work alone at the bureau and to dismantle the
bureau. Nonetheless, Bayer had to wait for a few days for your [Magyar] instructions, a decision
which delayed the process of transferring sensitive documents at the International Secretariat to
Paris. Bayer concluded that Helmut/Dimitrovs advice had hampered the securing of a safe transfer
of every document, correspondence and archive to Paris, especially as the Schutzpolizei and the
SA raided and temporarily closed down the International Secretariat in the beginning of February.
the report as soon as possible to our friends [Comintern] in order to ensure that we as soon as possible get an answer
on the future of the International Secretariat in Paris, see fol. RGASPI 542/1/60, 38, Short note from A. Bayer, Paris,
to Magyar, Paris, 6/4-1933.
1241
RGASPI 495/198/1140, 29-30, Lebenslauf Clemens Palme Dutt, author: Clemens Palme Dutt, year: 1933. At the
end of 1933, Krebs contacted Mller at the OMS in Moscow to inform him of the strictly confidential decision of the
Comintern Cadre Department to send Clemens Dutt to London on a two-month mission [purpose unknown]. Mller
had to ensure that the visa is not granted on the passport, but on a separate sheet, see fol. RGASPI 495/198/1140, 26,
Streng vertraulich, Kreps, Moscow, to Mller, OMS, Moscow, 7/12-1933.
1242
RGASPI 542/1/58, 17, Confidential letter from the Eastern Secretariat, Moscow, to Mnzenberg, unknown
location, Germany, 17/2-1933. This letter did not contain any further information on Ferdi after his arrival in Moscow.
Nonetheless, Ferdi remained in Moscow where he worked at the Eastern Secretariat in 1933. On 3 January 1934, the
Political Commission discussed Ferdi and resolved, due to his networks in Turkey and the Balkans, to give him a
position in the ECCI Balkan Lnder Sekretariat and to appoint him a standing member in the Collegium of the
Eastern Secretariat, RGASPI 495/266/38, 108, Auszug aus dem Protokoll Nr.352 der Sitzung der Politkommission des
PS, des EKKI vom 3.1.1934, Moscow [signed: Knorin].
1243
On 22 February, Gross sent a letter to Fritz Brupbacher informing him of her intentions to visit Zrich on 27
February, and asking whether they could meet for a short meeting at the railway station, Gross 1967, p.244; IISG
4249.10/194, Letter from Gross, Berlin, to F. Brupbacher, Zrich, 22/2-1933.
1244
SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 227-229, Betreff: Westeuropische Bro des Kommunistischen Internationale
(WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die Nachrichtenstellen der Lnder,
14/2-1933.

491

The MdI had also prohibited the printing and publication of both the Informationsbulletin and The
Anti-Imperialist Review in Germany. Apparently, the vindictiveness of both the Schutzpolizei and
armed forces of the SA had destroyed every printed copy of the February issue of the
Informationsbulletin at the printing house. Realising that the situation in Berlin would not
improve, Bayer informed some of the LAI sections of the impending threat. On 13 February,
Bridgeman received a letter from the International Secretariat containing the directive to use the
address Walter Gabbeh, 14 Ahrweilerstr. Berlin if he wanted to correspond with the International
Secretariat and, at any cost, to avoid the old one. Despite Helmut/Dimitrovs bad advice, Bayer
managed to send most of the important correspondence as well as the addresses and other
materials to Paris.1245 Did Bayers consignment of documents ever arrive in Paris? Is it plausible
that the documents were captured at the German-French border? And if the documents did arrive
in Paris, who was the receiver and where did the material end up? These are all questions which,
sadly, remain unresolved. Nevertheless, a plausible scenario is that the consignment was
confiscated somewhere en route to Paris. According to a remark made by Mnzenberg to Franz
[?] on 3 March, the failure of getting the last consignment from Germany to France whether
this concerned the consignment of LAI documents was not disclosed was an unforgivable loss
which had caused enormous damage.1246
The eerie setting in Berlin in February was the road to silence for the German communist
movement, determined by the successful purging and shutting down of the movement by the state
security services. This process received the assistance of a network of gullible informants in the
service of the Schutzpolizei, with the raids against the headquarters of both the KPD and the IAH
confirming that the WEB had been the driving force behind the activity of the communists in
both Berlin and across Europe. Furthermore, the MdI observed that in connection with the closing
down of the IAH headquarters on 14 February that:
On the same occasion, the office of the German LAI Section, also located at 48
Wilhelmstrae, was no longer to be found there. This could not be determined until now.1247

1245

MI5 intercepted the letter to Bridgeman, a document which contained the following information: [T]here is
definite evidence that owing to the advent of the Hitler regime, this address is to be used as a cover for the
correspondence of the League against Imperialism, TNA KV5/135, Register No. O.F.6/10, Minute Sheet No., 13/21933; RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht ber Lage und Ttigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933,
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933.
1246
RGASPI 542/1/58, 21, Letter from Mnzenberg, unknown location [France], to Franz, 3/3-1933 [stamped: 8/41933]. Evaluation of the fonds in the Archives Nationales (Fontainebleau, Paris) and the Archives nationals du monde
du travail has not provided any further clue as to whether the documents ever arrived in Paris, see:
< http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/ >.
1247
Gross 1965, pp.244-245; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 227-229, Betreff: Westeuropische Bro des
Kommunistischen Internationale (WEB), Nachrichtensammelstelle im Reichsministerium des Innern, Berlin, an die
Nachrichtenstellen der Lnder, 14/2-1933. For an in-depth interpretation of the network of informants in Germany, see
Claire M. Hall, An Army of Spies? The Gestapo Spy Network 1933-45, in Journal of Contemporary History,

492

However, despite the raid of the International Secretariat at 13 Hedemannstrae in February, this
was not the definitive end of the bureau. Bayer, alone at the International Secretariat, experienced
the desolate and obscure atmosphere of the Weimar capital while being preoccupied with
liquidating the International Secretariat. On 9 March, Bayer had no other option than to escape in
all haste from Berlin.
*
Fire, Dismantling and Escape
At 21.14 pm on 27 February, an alarm sounded across Berlin, declaring that the Reichstag was on
fire. Due to the chaos caused by the fire, Hitler and the Nazi regime ordered the SA and the
Prussian police to arrest well-known communist leaders. Mnzenbergs name was on its most
wanted list, yet on 27 February, he was attending a KPD party meeting in Langenselbold in the
outskirts of Frankfurt am Main and managed to avoid arrest.1248 On 28 February, the national radio
in Germany broadcast the warrant for Mnzenbergs arrest, accusing him of having committed
high treason and, on 1 March, the Deutsches Kriminalpolizeiblatt published a picture of
Mnzenberg.1249
Meanwhile, Bayer was waiting for further instructions on how to proceed in Berlin, although
after hearing that Helmut had been arrested, this was the code to abandon the International
Secretariat and to escape from Berlin and Germany.1250 However, as logical as Bayers decision to
leave Berlin may appear, the liquidation of the International Secretariat was not dramatic. Far from

2009:44, Sage Publications, London, pp.247-265. Hall writes that the reliability of an informer was very important,
which forced the Gestapo to question whether intelligence from a source was accurate or not.
1248
Mnzenberg did not stay at a hotel during his visit, instead Mnzenbergs driver Emil was in charge of the
arrangements, Gross 1967, p.246; Wessel (1991).
1249
On March 5, the Nazi paper, Vlkischer Beobachter, released the article, Pestherd des kommunistischen
Untermenschentums, which included a photograph of the fleeing Mnzenberg (next to van der Lubbe), Gross 1967,
p.257. Tony Le Tissiers topographical study of Berlin contains the official Nazi regime press release after the
Reichstag Fire, a document which announced the German nations aim to protect the people and the State: The
burning of the Reichstag was intended to be the signal for a bloody uprising and civil war. Large-scale pillaging in
Berlin was planned for as early as four oclock in the morning on Tuesday. It has been determined that starting today
throughout Germany acts of terrorism were to begin against prominent individuals, against private property, against
the lives and safety of the peaceful population and general civil war was to be unleashed. [] Warrants have been
issued for the arrest of two leading Communist Reichstag deputies on grounds of urgent suspicion. The other deputies
and functionaries of the Communist Party are being taken into protective custody. Communist newspapers, magazines,
leaflets and posters are banned for four months throughout Prussia. For two weeks all newspapers, magazines, leaflets
and posters of the Social Democratic Party are banned, Tony Le Tissier, Berlin then and now, Battle of Britain Prints,
London, 1992, p.46, see also Alan Bullock, Hitler: a study in tyranny, Pelican Books, London, 1962 (first published in
1952), p.263, and for Mnzenberg, see Martin Schumacher (ed.), M.d.R. Die Reichstagsabgeordneten der Weimarer
Republik in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus Politische Verfolgung, Emigration und Ausbrgerung 1933-1945,
Dsseldorf, 1991, p.405.
1250
RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht ber Lage und Ttigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933,
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933. For a dramatic narrative of the consequences and immediate series
of events after the Reichstag Fire, see G. L. Ulmens biography of Wittfogel, which outlines in great detail Wittfogels
struggle to avoid arrest, his unfortunate incarceration and, finally, his deportation from Germany (1978, pp.157-169).

493

it, the dispersal of the centre had been a meticulously-planned process. From Berlin, Bayer
arranged for the destroyed February issue of the Informationsbulletin to be re-printed in Paris
which, in the name of the International Secretariat, included one of the first public protests against
the openly Fascist dictatorship in Germany [and the] new German Imperialism.1251 However,
the psychological pressure on Bayer in Berlin had been a trying and nerve-racking experience.
According to Mnzenberg, Bayer had been working alone at the bureau for almost four weeks, a
task which had almost driven him insane.1252 Nevertheless, Bayer had managed to carry out the
work of dismantling the International Secretariat, re-routing the LAI propaganda apparatus to
Paris, securing a liaison between Paris and Germany and eradicating all traces of individual
activity at the bureau.
Bayer left Berlin on 10 March, the day after Dimitrovs arrest. Before his departure, Bayer had
a last meeting with some German friends, who promised Bayer that they would continue LAI
activity and distribute anti-imperialist propaganda in Germany. However, Bayer realised after
arriving in Paris that this promise would most likely never become a reality. The symbolic end of
the International Secretariat was an act carried out by Bayer as he divided between the members at
the International Secretariat whatever amount of money was left at the bureau. Recording the
balance, noting that overdue debts had been not paid, Bayer burned all remaining books and
documents at the bureau.1253
*
Empty Place
The International Secretariat, once both the cradle and intersection of the anti-imperialist
movement in Berlin as well as the hub and junction of particular bundles of activity, was
dismantled and abandoned in March 1933. This last act was a result of external factors
characterised by the socio-political setting in Berlin, which effectively ended the idea of an antiimperialist movement in Germany during the inter-war years. On 16 March, the Berlin Chief of
Police concluded, after several officers of the Kreutzberg-Tempelhof police district had entered
and searched the International Secretariat at 13 Hedemansstrae, that the facilities of the League

1251

RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht ber Lage und Ttigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933,
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933; Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus
(Herausgegeben vom Internationalen Sekretariat, Paris, 57, rue Charlot), 2 Jahrgang, Nummer 3, Ende Februar.
1252
RGASPI 542/1/58, 21, Letter from Mnzenberg, France (unknown location) to Franz [?], unknown location
[Moscow?], 3/3-1933 [stamped: 8/4-1933].
1253
RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Bericht ber Lage und Ttigkeit des Intern. Sekretariats der Liga ab 30. Januar 1933,
author: A. Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933.

494

against Imperialism were empty.1254 The items confiscated from the bureau by the Polizeiamt
Kreutzberg-Tempelhof were typical of the kinds of material and furniture usually found in an
office. These objects were recorded in an inventory list (a document which signals the definitive
end of the International Secretariat in Berlin). In 1925, the IAH had been developing its anticolonial project under the guise of a philanthropic agenda which, in 1927, realised its objective of
establishing the LAI in Brussels; however, in 1933, the centre of the LAI reflected the abrupt
end of the colonial question in the histories of both the LAI and the Comintern in Berlin.
The bureau at 13 Hedemannstrae was located on the first floor in the building and consisted
of four separate rooms. The entrance hall and the first room had shelves, tables, a typewriter table,
a number of chairs and a litter bin, an electric hanging lamp, a newspaper holder, typing and
writing materials, and curtains. The second room, which faced the street and had a blind at the
window, contained document cabinets, chairs, a punch holder, electric lamps, transcript and
newspaper holders, a clothes hanger and curtains. The third room had an office desk and
typewriter tables (no typewriters were left, only the tables), a clothes hanger and a telephone, a
filing cabinet and a card index with four empty compartments, a window cabinet, a hanging
electrical lamp, empty baskets and curtains. The last room had a diplomats desk, typewriter tables,
chairs, electric lamps and a standard lamp, a document stand, a filing cabinet, a shelf and a clothes
hanger, empty litter bins, various writing materials, inkwells and net curtains. The Schutzpolizei
observed that a number of newspapers, books, empty folders and files were scattered in all of the
rooms.1255
One year later, on 9 March 1934, the Prussian Ministry of Finance made the entry that the
furniture and office material confiscated from the International Secretariat of the LAI had been
used to furnish the rooms at SS headquarters at 8 Prince Albrechtstrae1256 almost an inverted
poetic justice.

1254

Fowler 2007, p.5; Weitz 1997, p.6; SAPMO-BA ZPA R/1501/20200, 234, Polizeiprsident, Berlin, Aus
Lagebericht, 16/3-1933.
1255
Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preuischer Kulturbesitz (GStA_PK) Rep. 151, IA, Nr.8350, 99-100, Abschrift: Polizeiamt
Kreutzberg-Tempelhof SW 29, Berlin, 4/5-1933.
1256
GStA_PK Rep. 151, Nr.8350, 102, Der Preuische Finanzminister; Berlin, 9/3-1934.

495

496

Chapter 11. Postscript: The LAI in Exile Paris 1933 and London 1933-37 A New
Beginning and the End
In March 1933, the International Secretariat was just a memory, while for Mnzenberg and Gross,
this was the beginning of a new phase. After escaping from Germany and the crumbling Weimar
Republic by crossing the German-French border by car in the beginning of March, the two of them
arrived in Paris. In a letter from Gross to Paulete Brubacher in Zurich, Mnzenberg wrote, we are
still alive and quite safe and that Paris was like coming to a new world.1257 In March and April,
Paris was a hectic and confused scene with the arrival of German migr communists, with the
French capital emerging as a haven in which the German communist movement could resume its
activity. With the transference of the LAI and its International Secretariat to its exile in Paris, once
Bayer had arrived in Paris in March, he concluded that, in order to re-construct the structural basis
of the organisation from top to bottom, large sums of money would be required. Bayer wanted
Mnzenbergs opinion on the matter, only to receive the recommendation that a far more
constructive solution would be to locate the International Secretariat permanently in Brussels.
Perhaps Mnzenberg came up with this idea after understanding that the Paris friends (Central
Committee of the PCF) showed no interest in supporting the LAI.1258 Exile in Paris was the
definite turning point for the LAI, therefore, is it possible to distinguish any organisational
initiatives by the LAI in Paris; and what character did the discussion of the LAI assume at
Comintern headquarters concerning the future of the International Secretariat?
The interest amongst the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters to re-construct the
International Secretariat apparatus in Paris gradually ebbed away. Magyar went on a short trip to
Paris in March to observe the turmoil amid the German communist migr community, only to
return to Moscow at the end of the month. At a meeting of the Political Commission, Magyar
challenged the attending members to come up with a solution in order to revive the activities of the
International Secretariat in Paris. According to Magyar, the International Secretariat was at this
stage much reduced; a more constructive solution would, therefore, be to transfer the LAI
apparatus to London. If so, the Political Commission had to sanction Comrade Bridgeman to
assume the role as the official leader, and convince Mnzenberg to remain on as General
Secretary.1259 Magyar most likely met Mnzenberg in Paris, only to realise that he appeared to be
1257

Gross 1967, pp.246-250; IISG 4249.10/194, Letter from Gross, Berlin, to Fritz Brupbacher, Zrich, 22/2-1933;
IISG 4249.10/195, Letter from Gross, Paris, to Paulette Brupbacher, Zrich, 29/4-1933.
1258
RGASPI 542/1/60, 37, Letter sent by Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 29/3-1933 [stamped date: 23/6-1933];
RGASPI 542/1/60, 39-49, Report from Bayer, Paris, to Magyar, Paris, 1/4-1933.
1259
The Political Commission suggested, if it were possible, to transfer a majority of the colonial work carried out by
the International Secretariat in Berlin to the French IRH section, and to get the work re-started by using the contacts of

497

preoccupied with more urgent matters rather than dealing with the LAI. At this point in time,
Mnzenbergs primary focus was on the anti-fascist campaign, better known as the World
Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, a campaign which culminated in the convening of
the anti-war conference at the Salle Pleyel in Paris on 4-6 June, 1933. Furthermore, Mnzenberg
furnished propaganda against the Nazi regime by co-ordinating the publication of the renowned
The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror and the Burning of the Reichstag in 1933.1260 Magyars
recommendation to the Political Commission in April also contradicts Savilles otherwise
discerning analysis of the British LAI Section, in which he concludes that the International
Secretariat quite simply was handed over to Bridgeman at the end of 1933.1261 However, the
matter involved an in-depth discussion at Comintern headquarters, with a number of actors
(Mnzenberg, Magyar, Piatnitsky, Saklatvala and Pollitt) being engaged to examine whether
Bridgeman was the most suitable candidate to assume the leadership of the LAI.
Mnzenbergs lack of interest in the LAI determined whether it would be possible to reconstruct and develop the activities of the LAI in Paris. In June 1933, Mnzenberg travelled to
Moscow in the company of Gross and, once there, used the opportunity to declare his opinion on
the LAI. In a letter to Magyar, Mnzenberg explained that the trying social conditions in Paris
made it difficult for the LAI to develop any kind of activity. This letter is also the document of a
resigned persona remembering past glories, where Berlin had provided Mnzenberg with a
political and organisational scene in which to establish propaganda campaigns. For Mnzenberg,
the result of having being been forced to escape from Germany, while attempting to re-adapt
himself to the situation in Paris, a city offering only a fraction of the number of former
possibilities, it was no longer possible to carry out the work the Comintern demanded of him.
According to Mnzenberg, it was even impossible to find the suitable word to describe his loss
of engagement, or to present any kind of solution, especially as the Comintern did not send any
the Colonial Commission of the PCF as an intermediary to the colonies. Yet, the Political Commission realised that
this would be an insecure arrangement, considering that for the moment there existed extremely limited channels of
contact with the colonies, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/242, 6-7, Protokoll (B) Nr.308 der Sitzung der Politkommission des
Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 27/4-1933; RGASPI 495/4/242, 1-5, Protokoll (A) Nr.308 der Sitzung der Politkommission des
Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/4-1933; RGASPI 495/4/242, 175-183, Confidential resolution on the colonial work of the
French Section of the IRH, adopted by the Political Commission, 7/5-1933.
1260
The Salle-Pleyel Congress was attended by more than 3,000 delegates according to Rundschau, which described
the congress as a propagandist feat: [T]he international advance of Fascism announces an immediate transition to
imperialist war [] Fascism is an international danger for the workers of all countries. For the preparations for the
second congress, see fol. RGASPI 495/100/931, 1-2, Official letter from the European Workers Anti-Fascist
Congress, 28/3-1933; RGASPI 495/100/931, 4, Note from the German Relief Committee, 4/4-1933. See also Carr
1982, pp.392-393; Gross 1967, pp.270-272; McMeekin 2003, p.264. For Mnzenbergs work on the Brown Book,
SAPMO-BA ZPA RY 9/I 6/7, 18, Letter from Mnzenberg, Paris, to Knorin, Smoliansky, Kuusinen, Moscow, 13/51933; and, World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, The Brown Book of the Hitler Terror and the
Burning of the Reichstag, Gollancz, London, 1933.
1261
Saville referred to the Report of the International Secretariat for 1934, a document that mentions how difficult
Bridgeman was finding it to re-activate the LAI, Saville vol.VII 1984, p.45; RGASPI 542/1/61, 1-43, Report from
Bridgeman, London, to Saklatvala CPGB, 1934 [arrived in Moscow 10/3-1935].

498

notification, information and assistance on how to solve the question. Consequently, Mnzenberg
argued that the only solution for him was to resign from the LAI:
[] if we are finished and I was formally released from any connection with the L. [LAI],
[] The time is past when I could give newspapers a number of instructions to do this and
that.1262
On 15 June, Magyar notified the Political Commission of Mnzenbergs wish to resign from the
LAI, thus, it was essential to decide whether the International Secretariat should be transferred
from Paris to London. If the Political Commission endorsed this plan, Magyar argued that this
would require the central apparatus of the LAI in London being guaranteed a monthly allowance
of $220, and the sections of the LAI in France, England, Belgium and the Netherlands being
guaranteed $205 per month.1263 The decision-makers at Comintern headquarters were, however,
reluctant to let go of Mnzenberg as the General Secretary of the LAI. Mnzenberg could not cope
with the situation of not receiving a definite answer. On 20 August, Mnzenberg sent Piatnitsky a
short note, including his desire to sever his ties to the LAI:
Dear Comrade P. [Piatnitsky]. After my proposal to move the headquarters and secretariat of
the Anti-Imperialist League to London, I ask to be relieved from my former work in the
League and to no longer be cited as secretary of the League. With party greetings / W.
Mnzenberg1264
This short note was Mnzenbergs final act in the history of the LAI. The Political Commission
granted Mnzenbergs wish and, on 27 August 1933, terminated his position as General Secretary.
After this Political Commission session, Piatnitsky summoned Magyar and Bela Kun for a closed
discussion in his office at Comintern headquarters at 11am. In Piatnitskys office, the three of them
worked out the details of how to transfer the International Secretariat from Paris to London and to
appoint Bridgeman as the new leader of the LAI.1265
The history of the LAI at the end of 1933, and up until its formal end in 1937, is a question
that deserves a thorough re-assessment. This question involves, aside from its chronological
delineation (1933-37), an examination of the individual relationships after the transfer of the
International Secretariat to London, e.g. the complex relationship between Mnzenberg and
Bridgeman. Mnzenberg believed that Bridgeman was a capable and effective person to lead the
1262

RGASPI 542/1/59, 45, Letter from Mnzenberg, Moscow, to Magyar, Moscow, 8/6-1933. For the journey to
Moscow, see Gross 1967, p.272. This quote is also included in Haikal (1995, p.152).
1263
RGASPI 495/4/250, 15-16, Protokoll (B) Nr.318 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr.EKKI, 15/6-1933.
Magyar continued the LAI discussion at 11am in Piatnitskys office, see fol. RGASPI 495/4/250, 47, Running order of
topics, Piatnitskys office, Moscow, 15/6-1933.
1264
RGASPI 495/4/260, 72, Short note from Mnzenberg, Moscow, to Piatnitsky, Moscow, 20/8-1933.
1265
RGASPI 495/4/258, 1-4, Protokoll (A) Nr.331 der Sitzung der Politkommission des Pol.Sekr. des EKKI, 27/81933; RGASPI 495/4/258, 12, Tagesordnung, 27/8-1933.

499

LAIs public campaigns in England in 1933 (the Huang Ping campaign and to bring the Meerut
trial campaign to a conclusive and constructive end). Yet Mnzenberg also seems to have been a
bit skeptical towards Bridgeman. According to MI5, the CPGB member, Percy Glading, stated that
Mnzenberg had made great efforts to get rid of Bridgeman from the LAI because his
political inclination was not extreme enough and he has always refused to become a
Communist.1266
Despite the fact that Bridgeman assumed the role as the official leader of the LAI, in reality, in
fact, he was in the minority. The International Secretariat of the LAI in London was dominated by
communist members such as Pollitt, Saklatvala and Glading. However, Bridgeman considered the
LAIs connections with the communist movement to be secondary. According to J. Ayodele
Langleys interview with Bridgeman on 20 April 1967, he made it clear that he still believed that
the LAI was not a Communist front organisation. Bridgeman nevertheless found the task of
reconstructing the LAI, after having been appointed as its leader in October 1933, as
insurmountable. The only document sent to Bridgeman from Paris (or Moscow) was a list of
addresses which was not up to date and so of little value; therefore, the only option was to
reconstitute the work of the League from the beginning.1267
From November 1933 until the beginning of 1937, the LAI remained active in England, before
deciding to formally dissolve itself and replacing it with the Colonial Information Bureau (CIB), a
socialist association which publicly renounced the former communist ties of the anti-imperialist
movement. The CIB did not, however, disavow the historic impact of the LAI, and initiated a
nostalgic narrative of the LAI:
Since its foundation in 1927 the League against Imperialism has done consistent work in
connection with the different aspects of the colonial struggle; but it is essential that we
should advance from the position of a small group of people interested in the colonial
struggle, seriously restricted in their activities because of their association with a banned
organisation, and activate the working class organisations and peace societies,1268
The LAI existed from 1927 until 1937. The establishment of the LAI in Brussels had been
followed by a process which attempted to link together the anti-colonial movements in both Berlin
and beyond, which, in 1927-33, witnessed both the rise and fall of the anti-imperialist movement
1266

RGASPI 542/1/59, 45, Letter from Mnzenberg, Moscow, to Magyar, Moscow, 8/6-1933; TNA KV5/135, 50,
Personal M/12, League against Imperialism, 25/8-1933. The rest of the quote reads as follows: Willi Muntzenberg
[sic] has three times requested him to leave the Movement, but Bridgeman has refused. Bridgeman has rather a large
personal following in this country and, as he also has independent means, he is a very difficult person to get rid of.
1267
RGASPI 542/1/61, 1-43, Report from Bridgeman, London, to Saklatvala CPGB, 1934 [arriving in Moscow on 10
March 1935]; Langley 1973, p.310 (see footnote 70). Much of Langleys interpretation of the LAI was based on his
interview with Bridgeman in Middlesex, England, on 20 April, 1967.
1268
Saville vol.VII 1984, pp.45-46.

500

in Berlin. Its successor in London, 1933-37, offers the logical possibility of seeing these two
topics as separate historical accounts, particularly if one considers the differing socio-political
contexts in London and Berlin. However, what unifies the narratives of these two LAI
organisations is the organisational connection of both of them to the structure and network(s) of
the Comintern. The history of the LAI is one which remains firmly rooted within the context of
international communism, as it is also a history which explains itself as a source of inspiration for
the decolonisation process in the colonial and semi-colonial countries after World War II.
*

501

502

Conclusion
The history of the LAI is not ambiguous. Far from it, the history of the LAI is a narrative
characterised not only by tragedy, failure, self-deception, control, resignation and dejection, but
also by commitment, eagerness, anticipation, self-sacrifice and euphoria. The visionaries and
utopian dreamers who believed in the LAI, particularly the actors at the International Secretariat,
journeyed through the political and social landscape of the 1920s, characterised by its hope and
possibilities, with the first years of the 1930s forcing them to realise that everything had been a
dream. The euphoria of the Brussels Congress and the establishment of the LAI in 1927 fulfilled
the Cominterns objective of having an international anti-imperialist organisation at its disposal.
Despite the feeling of a spiritual bond and the expressions of collective joy in 1927, the
momentum of the Brussels Congress contrasts starkly with the collapse of the anti-imperialist
vision in 1933. Furthermore, the disintegration of a sympathising communist organisation belongs
to this discussion, with the argument that the Comintern was a grandiose failure due to its
dissolution in 1943, a theory inspired by the understanding that the world party never
accomplished what it set out to do at the beginning: to create a world of communism. However,
this raises a few questions. Is it logical to assume that either the physical discontinuity of the
Comintern in 1943, the liquidation of the International Secretariat in Berlin 1933 or the formal
dissolution of the LAI in 1937, signified the definitive end of what these movements represented?
The history of the LAI is a lost history which contains a variety of dynamic aspects. The above
analysis has striven to disclose perspectives which existed and took place both from below and
from above, located in hierarchical structure(s), thus, the history of the LAI is a story enacted both
in horizontal and vertical dimensions. By combining the impact of both internal and external
factors with the effects of decisive events, the drama of the LAI emerged in the heyday of the
inter-war years; decisive events which both contributed to and shaped, and ultimately confirmed
the end of the LAI.
On 30 August 1945, just thirteen days after Indonesia had finally won its independence (on 17
August 1945) from both the Dutch and Japanese imperialists, after more than 300 years of Dutch
colonial rule, with Sukarno and Hatta having been the main leaders of the Indonesian
independence movement and Sukarno being proclaimed the first President of the Republic of
Indonesia, Mohammad Hatta sent a personal message to my old comrades wherever they may
be. According to Hatta, the memories of his life in Europe and his many friends there had made
him reflect upon the leaders of movements and those champions of humanitarianism who had
rallied against colonialism and imperialism, concluding that the 1927 Brussels Congress had been
503

a conference of world importance.1269 In 1945, however, the leaders and champions of

humanitarianism connected to the LAI had either died in mysterious circumstances (Mnzenberg)
or had fallen victim to an ideology they had defended and believed in (communism). One cannot
summarise and conclude the history of the LAI without taking the above into account. As Karl
Schlgel rightfully observes in his study of the terror and dreams in Moscow in 1937, the normal
approach for an author in the epilogue is to recapitulate the main contentions which have emerged
during the analysis, before summarising and reaching a conclusion. When it comes to the tragedy
of the LAI, it is relevant to emphasise two aspects similar to the ones raised by Schlgel, aspects
explicitly linked to the historical connection of the state-sanctioned violence against the Russian
population during the Great Terror in 1937, and to the history of international communism.1270
Firstly, a majority of the visionaries and utopian dreamers involved in the LAI at some
ideological, organisational or individual level faced a brutal end during the Terror and purging of
Soviet society during the 1930s. These were individuals who had given the whole of their lives to
creating utopia and defending an ideology, only to finally witness the end of utopia. After 1933,
Moscow became the capital and symbolic haven for communist migrs, particularly for those
from Germany. A majority of the actors connected to the LAI did not live to see the end of the
Second World War in 1945 but, even worse, many did not even live to see the war begin in 1939,
while the fates of some of them are still not known today. Mnzenberg was found dead in France
in 1940; Chatto was executed in Moscow in 1937; Teido Kunizaki most likely disappeared into the
GULAG penal system sometime during the 1930s, probably after the ICC in Moscow had refused
to transfer his KPD membership to the CPSU (B) due to his bourgeois background; Hansin Liau
died in 1964, shortly after arriving back in China after having served a sentence in the GULAG
together with his wife; and Hans Thgersen (York; 1902 ?) vanished without trace in January
1933. In Moscow, a majority of the actors at Comintern headquarters, who at some level had had a
role in the LAI, suffered a tragic end and were executed during the Great Terror in 1937-38:
Heimo (1937); Magyar (1937); Petrovsky (1937); Melnitschansky (1937); Piatnitsky (1938); Mif
(1938); and Bukharin (1938).1271
Secondly, the ascendancy of the NSDAP as the leading power in Germany on 30 January 1933,
resulting in the chaotic and somewhat anticipated end of the Weimar Republic in February-March,
was also the end for the LAI and the International Secretariat in Berlin. This also announced in the
1269

A personal message to my old comrades wherever they may be, in Hatta 1972, p.504. For Indonesias
independence, see Merle Calvin Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1200, (Third Edition), Stanford
University Press, Stanford, 2001, pp.261-264.
1270
Karl Schlgel, Terror och drm Moskva r 1937 (original title: Terror und Traum Moskau 1937; 2008), Natur
& Kultur, Stockholm, 2011, p.654.
1271
See further in Chase (2002); Hermann Weber & Dietrich Staritz (Hrsg.), Kommunisten verfolgen Kommunisten,
Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1993; Arch Getty & Naumov (2010).

504

most violent terms the end of the German communist movement, and laid the foundation for a new
political and social milieu in Germany. However, the development of German society after 1933
was a period overshadowed by the inhumane and devastating consequences of the Second World
War. Consequently, the impact of the 1930s contributed to the end of the history of the LAI in both
a national and international context. In the post-war societies of the Cold War, the LAI, as both a
topic and a phenomena, was either consigned to the dustbin of history, exposed to the politics of
biography or had become an object of nostalgia. The understanding of the LAI was a topic
included in many discussions and assessments which attempted to make a distinction between
good and bad history, often within an ideological framework, while in Bandung in 1955, the LAI
emerged as a fond memory and nostalgic point of reference for the leaders of the decolonisation
movement. These factors shed some light on why the topic of the LAI, one of the first protesters
against the system of colonialism and imperialism in the twentieth century, has been perceived as
being ambiguous. The issue is, however, far more complex.
*
Success and Failure
The Brussels Congress and the establishment of the LAI in 1927 were unexpected successes for
the IAH, the LACO, for Mnzenberg and for the Comintern. The dynamic message of its antiimperialist agenda, as presented in Brussels, showed the Comintern the possibilities of producing a
political message which attracted attention to the colonial question from outside the international
communist movement. Once Mnzenberg, with Gibartis help, had managed to transfer the LAIs
inaugural congress to Brussels one of the hearts of imperialism in Europe Mnzenbergs
position as the leading organiser of communist propaganda and covert activities of the Comintern
in Europe was confirmed. To the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, the LAI suddenly
appeared as the solution to establishing a channel for communism to the colonial and semicolonial countries. In Brussels, disparate political camps socialists, social democrats, trade
unionists, nationalists, pacifists and radical elements all united around a common aim: the
struggle against colonialism and imperialism. However, the central issue for Mnzenberg and the
Comintern was that the establishment of the LAI signified the essence of the united front strategy
which, according to the vision outlined by Kuusinen in 1926, aimed to create a Solar System to
realise the building of a world of communism. For Mnzenberg, the Brussels Congress was the
opportunity to merge the LAI with already existing anti-colonial committees and campaigns
established by the IAH apparatus in Berlin which, through the active leadership of the

505

International Secretariat in Berlin, expected to turn the LAI into one of the most vociferous critics
of the policies of the League of Nations.
The LAI was a success for the simple reason that it provided some of the anti-colonial
activists, who later re-surfaced as leaders of liberation movements in their home countries, e.g.
Hatta, M. J. S. Naidu and Nehru, with a life-long experience and knowledge of organising. For
example, the necessary steps to work out and structure propaganda campaigns, schedule activities,
work out budgets and to organise public meetings.1272 The LAI was a success because it mobilised
the euphoria amongst the visionaries and utopian dreamers in the struggle against colonialism and
imperialism. For a brief moment, the LAI succeeded in living up to its vision of actually posing as
a non-party organisation, a crucial factor enabling actors holding different political points of view
to stand on the same political platform around a common cause. However, once the Comintern
resolved to correct the ideological agenda and organisational structure of the LAI after its
inception in 1927, this created a scenario which ultimately established a dividing line between its
communist and its non-communist members.
The impact of the LAI on the anti-colonial movement left a lasting imprint. Culminating in the
Bandung conference in 1955, the LAIs heritage was one of inspiration which, according to
Sukarno, was a result of sacrifices, which had ultimately ended in the understanding that [N]ow
we are free, sovereign and independent. We are again masters in our own house. We do not need to
go to other continents to confer.1273 Both the Bandung Conference and the Brussels Congress are
chronological fixtures in the historiography of decolonization, in which the LAI plays a key role in
the subaltern understanding of global history, a perspective which stands in stark contrast to the
perception of Empire as an idea and its global dominance. On the other hand, it is curious to point
out the conviction that the LAI engendered amongst some of the decision-makers at Comintern
headquarters. For example, the institutional liaison of the International Secretariat in Moscow, the
Eastern Secretariat, argued in 1930 that the LAI was by far the most important sympathising
communist organisation among the Cominterns auxiliary organisations. The reason why the
Eastern Secretariat considered the LAI to be a pivotal actor for the international communist
movement was its role as a distributor of Bolshevik propaganda in colonial and semi-colonial
countries, as well as the fact of it having established contact with individuals inclined towards
communism. From a broader perspective, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that the LAI led the
way in inspiring and maintaining anti-imperialist networks of a transcontinental character during
the inter-war years. Its success in doing this drew attention to the LAI from actors who, on the one
1272

See further on the legacy, experience, and organisation inside of mass organisations in Kasza 1995, pp.183-188.
Opening Speech by the President of the Republic of Indonesia, Sukarno, at the Asian African Conference
(Bandung, 17th 24th April, 1955).
1273

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hand, defended and believed in the LAI as a political actor, and those who, on the other hand,
condemned the activities of the LAI. Free to act on the basis of being a focus-centered
organisation, the LAI took measures to rally against the system of colonialism and imperialism.
However, this is also what contributed to the LAIs downfall. Once the Comintern, the LAIs
parent body and financial supporter, decided to take a more active part in the decision-making
process and, ultimately, subject every aspect of its activism to its own standards and rhetoric, the
outcome was an unwanted exposure which played into the hands of the LAIs main antagonists:
the LSI and the national security services.

In the end, the LAI was a failure. The primary explanation for this is that the LAI did not realise its
ambition of becoming an international anti-imperialist organisation. However, this simplified
generalisation deserves a more thorough and rational explanation. By seeking an answer in internal
and external factors, one can explain why the LAI headed off in a different direction than the one
originally intended. Crucial to the above was the establishment of a hierarchy of relations at the
International Secretariat, an internal factor which determined its relations to Comintern
headquarters in Moscow, with the latter following its own set of hierarchical structure(s) in order
to guide and supervise the activities of the LAI in Berlin. Control and the struggle for power were
dominant features throughout the history of the LAI. Fuelled by a desire to attain a prestigious
position among the central actors in the hierarchy, the core at the International Secretariat
conspicuously separated itself from the believers. What were the principal reasons for doing this?
The fundamental difference was ideology. Hence, the core represented a structural factor reserved
for individuals considered to be reliable and genuine communists, whereas the believers, in spite
of their desire to both contribute to and develop the political work of the International Secretariat,
had a different political or social background, e.g. as nationalists or socialists. This conclusion is
based on the characters, behaviours and fates of some of the individuals engaged at the
International Secretariat. The relationship between Mnzenberg and Chatto is illustrative of the
above. Whilst reaching a mutual understanding in the context of anti-imperialism, once Chatto had
received the order to leave Berlin in 1931 and was then instructed to resign from his post as
International Secretary of the LAI, Mnzenberg made no effort to change this decision. The
second case is Hansin Liaus experience of how the core separated itself from the believers, a
hierarchy of relations which ultimately led him to chastise himself as an oppressed colonial slave
of the LAI. It was rather the omnipotent core of individuals who were either deemed to be
trustworthy and reliable, e.g. Mnzenberg, or were authorised by the Comintern to travel from
Moscow to Berlin and be located at the International Secretariat, e.g. Smeral and Ferdi, which
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earned the respect and prestige the believers were seeking. A product of ideology, and established
for the sole purpose of acting as an intermediary between the Comintern and nationalist
movements in the colonies, the LAI faced the challenge of having to combat ideological
ambitions within its organisational structure. Communism was an ideology expecting to build
bridges to the colonial countries, which, according to the maxim introduced by Stalin in 1918,
was an aphorism used by the LAI as a pretext and a guiding principle for its activities. However,
the LAI failed in its endeavour to construct viable and functional bridges to the colonies.
Consequently, the question is why did the LAI and its International Secretariat take the route they
did?
The time-line of the LAI and the International Secretariat followed a course initially set in
motion and determined by internal constraints, which ultimately came to its end due to external
events. In 1925, the anti-colonial project was a product of the philanthropic agenda the IAH was
sponsoring, an initiative which gained momentum with the successful establishment of propaganda
campaigns such as Hands off China and the Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee. For
Mnzenberg, the outcome of the Hands off China campaign was the impetus used to convince the
decision-makers at Comintern headquarters of the necessity to keep supporting the activities of the
IAH as a proletarian solidarity mass organisation. With the success of the Hands off China
campaign, the rhetoric of anti-colonialism as espoused and supported by the IAH created a
reaction outside the communist movement, especially amongst anti-colonial activists in Berlin and
Europe. Making the most of this opportunity, Mnzenberg proposed to the Comintern the idea of
allowing the IAH organise an international congress against colonialism and imperialism.
However, the Indian communist Manabendra Nath Roy was the key who, after analysing the
achievements of the IAHs colonial work, and in connection with the establishment of the LACO
in February 1926, suggested to the Comintern that they should endorse the idea of creating a
permanent organisation to support the liberation movement in the colonies. Hence, the hitherto
general understanding of the LAI, that it was a product of Mnzenberg and the IAH, is an
erroneous assumption. In fact, the establishment of the LAI as an organisation was never a priority
for Mnzenberg. Mnzenbergs primary focus was to organise an international anti-imperialist
congress in Brussels, in 1927, and to turn this event into a grandiose demonstration of antiimperialist propaganda, as well as finding candidates suitable for communist influence. The
euphoric reaction to the Brussels Congress nevertheless caught Mnzenberg off guard, with
Mnzenberg conceding that it would be foolish to ignore the establishment of the LAI as an
organisation. Hence, neither Mnzenberg, the IAH nor the Comintern could disregard the
magnitude of this event. However, the ensuing work to co-ordinate the organisational structure of
508

the LAI after the Brussels Congress developed into a conflict between the International Secretariat
and the Comintern, which in turn added anxiety to a relationship which was already under
pressure. Efforts to find solutions to practical questions (personnel, money) were provisional from
the outset: e.g. the International Secretariat being located within the headquarters of the IAH in
Berlin; or the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters not swiftly solving the crucial question
of funding for the LAI; as well as intentionally delaying the despatch of directives to the
International Secretariat. Meanwhile, Mnzenbergs primary concern was to get Piatnitsky to
reimburse the IAH for the expenses spent on the congress. Thus, the LAI missed its opportunity to
take full advantage of the euphoria and momentum generated by the Brussels Congress for the sole
reason that the decision-makers in Moscow chose not to react to the extent, functionality and
intentions of the LAI until June 1927. By then, however, the interest in the ethos of the
organisation had begun to fade among the visionaries. At the same time, the LAIs antagonists (the
LSI, and the German, British and French security services) were increasing their efforts to
understand and verify their suspicion that the LAI was indeed a communist organisation. Due to
the above, in the period from February till June 1927, the LAI and the Comintern missed their
chance to establish a vigorous international anti-imperialist organisation, as they had hoped and
intended. In retrospect, and in order to avoid a deterministic understanding of the history of the
LAI, the organisation remained in existence despite experiencing a downward spiral after June
1927, a process which included suffering the humiliation of its transfer from Berlin to Paris in
March 1933, and finally its definitive dissolution in Great Britain under Bridgemans supervision
in 1937.
The International Secretariat was an institutional actor subjected to the dictates of the
Comintern. These constraints and obligations were, however, a prerequisite set in place to allow
the International Secretariat to exist, so therefore this was a logical arrangement based on a mutual
understanding. Yet, the process ran in one direction only. The Comintern issued either directives or
political instructions to the International Secretariat which were aimed at maintaining activity as
long as the LAI continued to fulfil and comply with the expectations of Moscow. A symptom of
the hierarchy of relations at play, the system depended on the co-operation and administrative
services of Mnzenberg and/or the Comintern emissaries (Smeral, Ferdi and Clemens Dutt). For
the Comintern, maintaining control was crucial and it was prepared to use every available means
to ensure that the International Secretariat carried out its decisions. This was a structural
relationship, which gained in strength over time, defined by the policy changes within the
Comintern. The shift from the united front strategy to the new line in 1928, and with the
confirmation of the correctness of class against class in 1929, signified a drastic turn to the left
509

within the communist movement. After 1928, the LAI was literally heading towards an uncertain
future, one characterised by alienation and internal chaos. It is nevertheless through the words
expressed by one the actors involved (Smeral) that one discovers the internal dilemma which the
LAI had to confront. In connection with the anni confusionis and the LAIs trial in 1930, Smeral
informed the top-strata of the Comintern apparatus in Moscow that the LAIs misfortune was the
fact that the organisation had come into existence while the united front strategy was still the
Cominterns endorsed policy. The radicalism and isolationism of the new line ignored the
instrumental use of the sympathising communist organisations as a cover for the operations of the
Comintern. For the LAI, the policy change from the united front strategy to the new line
hampered its every attempt to become an international organisation, producing instead a confused
and hostile relationship to the political, social and cultural groups, and individuals connected to the
LAI. In addition, how was the LAI going to behave in public, and present its political message?
Internal hostility and fear grew because of this policy shift in 1928: a doctrine advocated by the
Comintern and which the prominent leaders of the national communist parties fervently supported.
This in turn stimulated a frame of mind more aptly described as paranoia, with the communists
devoting a great deal of time, energy and attention to making a distinction between friend and
foe. At the Second International Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism in Frankfurt am
Main in July 1929, the hostility from the communist elements put the LAI to the test. While the
Brussels Congress in 1927 had been a scene of euphoria, the Frankfurt Congress was the exact
opposite, leaving the LAI gasping for air before the organisation began to devour itself from the
inside. As a result of all this, the aftermath of the Frankfurt Congress the anni confusionis not
only purged the LAI from an organisational and ideological perspective, but the prominente
Persnlichkeiten (Nehru, Maxton, Fimmen and Hatta) themselves became either victims or
resigned individuals during the purification process. A process which focused exclusively on
preserving the dictum once envisaged and endorsed by the Comintern in 1926: to preserve control
and for the LAI to remain in our hands, a frame of mind fervently advocated by Mnzenberg,
Katayama, Smeral and Magyar. It did not matter that the pragmatism of the communists
contributed to ending to the LAIs utopianism and, ultimately, bringing the organisation to its
knees. The reason for this was based on suspicion and distrust, a mentality the Bolsheviks
endorsed for the sole reason of getting the international communist movement to implement a
conspiratorial behaviour as a moral impetus for its activities.
After the 1927 Brussels Congress, the International Secretariat was unable to capitalise on the
euphoria of the event and, rather than linking together the anti-colonial movement, represented by
organisations, associations, committees and individuals, into a broad anti-imperialist movement,
510

the International Secretariat was dependent upon egocentric networks. The LAI was in fact never a
broad, unified organisation on an international basis. This becomes evident when one compares the
opinions of fear and suspicion expressed by the national security services to the internal
discussions at both the International Secretariat and within the Comintern on the geographical
ramifications of the LAI. The German security service took notice of the international network of
the men of confidence connected to the International Secretariat which was, in retrospect an
exaggeration. In reality, the LAI network was made up of a fairly limited number of individuals
sensitive to both internal and external pressures, and to coercion. The central issue is nevertheless
that the initial indecisiveness, as well as the subsequent policy shifts and sudden changes in
attitude among the decision-makers at Comintern headquarters, traumatised the International
Secretariat, and, in turn, also affected the organisational structure of the LAI. Due to the radicalism
of the new line in 1928, the adoption of the class-against-class policy in 1929 and the
consequences of the anni confusionis in 1930, once the decision-makers in Moscow had finally
admitted that mistakes had been made, it was too late to use the LAI as an intermediary to build
bridges to colonial and semi-colonial countries. By 1931, there was no road back to the united
front strategy.

The LAI was an expression of the communist vision. It was also an organisation representative of
the enthusiasm and anticipation of the inter-war years to create a better and more just world. The
international events preceding the inception of the LAI in 1927 also contributed to defining the
objectives of the organisation. The key event had been the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919
and its aftermath. After the end of the Great War in 1918, and in connection with the poor
treatment and ignorance of the colonial question among the leaders of the victorious powers during
the Peace Conference (despite disturbances in the colonies throughout 1919), the end result was
that the Wilsonian moment gradually evaporated. This contributed to radicalising the anticolonial movement which, in some instances found an ideological haven in the internationalism
expressed by the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Russia after its establishment in 1917, a relationship
which came to fruition after the symbolic formation of the Comintern in 1919. Expecting to act as
the leading spokesperson in support of the anti-colonial movement, the LAI was an institutional
actor both intertwined with and subjected to the endorsed ideology and administrative directives of
the Comintern. While these factors set the boundaries for the International Secretariat, the sociopolitical situation in Germany provided the political backdrop. After 1929, in connection with the
crash of the global economy and the ensuing recession, the Weimar Republic was a political scene
which, at the beginning of the 1930s, had turned into a political battlefield between forces of the
511

extreme Left (the Communists) and the extreme Right (the Nazis) on the streets in Berlin. For the
LAI and the International Secretariat, further subjected to the crisis of the anni confusionis and on
the brink of self-destruction, external factors gave them their final death blow. In 1930, German
authorities (the RKO, Auswrtige Amt, MdI and the Schutzpolizei in Berlin) descended upon the
International Secretariat and, as a result of the raid on 21 December 1931, exposed the communist
nature of the LAI. Furthermore, the security services in Germany were collaborating with other
national security services, particularly the British, to uncover the activities of the LAI. With the
NSDAP competing with the KPD for political power in Germany in 1932, some of the decisionmakers at Comintern headquarters conceded that the only available solution was to disband the
International Secretariat en masse and to re-locate its activities to Paris. In January and February
1933, after the Nazi regimes ascendancy to power in Germany, this period witnessed the
humiliating defeat of the KPD and symbolised the end of the German communist movement. Was
it even logical or, for that matter, possible for the LAI and its International Secretariat to remain in
Berlin during this period? By 1933, the LAI was a mere vision and shadow of its former self.
Thus, a more justified and fair understanding of the LAI at the beginning of the NSDAPs period
of omnipotent influence is to conclude that the LAIs aim to act as the hub for the anti-imperialist
movement had come to an end. However, the idea sponsored by the LAI the struggle against
colonialism and imperialism was a belief which persisted amongst the visionaries and utopian
dreamers, despite the contradictions and complications taking place at the centre, i.e. at the
International Secretariat in Berlin.
*
Towards an Understanding of the LAI
Is it possible to achieve an understanding of the LAI? This thesis and its analysis have aimed to
question, through the study of primary sources linked either directly or indirectly to the LAI, the
conclusions drawn by previous research and, above all, to discuss and reveal the dynamics and
activities of a sympathising communist organisation. What is the primary reason for evaluating the
LAI from such a methodological approach? This approach has assisted the analytical process in
reaching an understanding as to why the Comintern endorsed the decision to establish the LAI, and
how the Comintern supported the LAIs work. Furthermore, this approach confronts the relative
scarcity of previous research on the LAI. One of the fundamental results of this study is having
revealed how difficult the actors found it to create an anti-imperialist utopia, a conundrum which
also confirms the utopianism of communism, i.e. that the LAI was an expression of communism
and belonged to the complex ideological and administrative system of international communism,
512

represented by the Comintern. A two-fold dimension kept the LAI together: firstly, the LAI wanted
to create a public platform against the system of colonialism and imperialism and, secondly, it
belonged to a movement wanting to spread communism on a global scale. This required and
depended upon the active participation of convinced individuals, while at the same time, the entire
process was, however, an undertaking manoeuvred by the communists in the background. Stripped
of its communist ties, the LAI would have resembled a business enterprise or a religious clique,
restricted by its incapacity to act due to a weak financial structure, while confronting ambitions of
power within its hierarchy. The LAI was one of several sympathising communist organisations
connected to the Comintern's network, e.g. the Friends of the Soviet Union, the Anti-Fascist
League, the International of Revolutionary Writers, the International Trade Union Committee of
Negro Workers and the Amsterdam-Pleyel Anti-War movement. However, the LAI also provided a
political platform for several of these sympathising organisations, particularly the emergence of
both the anti-war movement in 1932 and the ITUCNW in 1929. While all of the above
organisations had their own distinctive features and political agendas, they nevertheless all shared
the same stigma of dissolution during the societal darkness of the 1930s. A comparative approach
may help to create an in-depth understanding of the dynamics and interactionism of the
sympathising communist organisations of the Comintern. Therefore, the following proposal is that
the organisational activity which took place in these organisations was an interactionist process,
e.g. the mandatory attendance of delegates from other sympathising organisations at congresses
and conferences organised by a communist organisation, the publication and distribution of
political material, the interchange of personnel, financial assistance and joint preparatory work to
organise public demonstrations. Furthermore, the sympathising organisation was an institution
within the communist movement where individuals could share inspiration and experiences, but it
was also an arena representing either an inclusive or exclusive institution for its members.
Critical assessments and analytical research of the many activities of the LAI may yet produce
fruitful and insightful knowledge of the international communist movement during the inter-war
years, e.g. by evaluating how the LAI presented itself in a public context. Through the publications
released by the International Secretariat and the public campaigns organised by LAI, a plausible
approach would be to adopt either a discursive or a comparative analysis. Points of departure
which may strengthen the assumption that the LAI could, in some way, be seen as a forerunner to
the letter-writing campaigns initiated by Amnesty International in the 1960s or the environmentawareness campaigns organised by Greenpeace. This postulation addresses in turn the question of
reaching a deeper and historical understanding of the behaviour and activities amongst the interest
groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which emerged in the post-war society after
513

the Second World War. Another question is the radical youth movement in both Germany and
beyond during the inter-war years, and how the LAI strove to portray itself as a source of
inspiration for youth. For example, the Second International Congress against Imperialism and
Colonialism in Frankfurt am Main acted as the host for a LAI youth conference on 20 July 1929,
which essentially discussed how to mobilise youth to rally in support of the anti-imperialist
movement. This episode in Frankfurt may contribute to better understanding the reception of the
LAI and its political message, but it also illustrates the youthful bliss of belonging to a movement
based on humanitarian ideals.
If we are seeking quantitative results by measuring in degrees of success, e.g. by the number of
registered members, geographical spread and long-lasting continuity, the answer is relatively
disheartening. It is rather through a qualitative perspective that it is possible to interpret and
understand the LAI. By analysing the dynamics and character of the institutional and individual
networks connected to the LAI, a history emerges depicting the spread of anti-imperialism both as
an idea and as a practice. This qualitative focus is, in its essence, a narrative of the interactionism
and relations that existed both within and between the LAI, the national sections, the International
Secretariat and the Comintern. In conclusion, this also explains why the LAI turned into an
illusion of utopia. Despite the initiative of the IAH, Mnzenberg and the Comintern to establish
the LAI, its very structure contributed to its downfall on the political arena and, consequently, the
LAI was never able to capitalise on the euphoria of the 1927 Brussels Congress. A majority of the
undertakings invested in the LAI by Comintern headquarters (administrative and political work)
concerned, above all, the question of formulating theoretical concepts for if and possibilities, rather
than choosing to understand the harsh realities taking place in Berlin or, for that matter, anywhere
else outside the Soviet Union. While some people have interpreted the LAI as being either
ambiguous or a mere mouthpiece for Soviet foreign policy, these erroneous assessments ignore the
fact that the LAI did function as a source of experience and inspiration for both anti-colonial
activists and the anti-colonial movement. It is almost as if the liquidation of the International
Secretariat in Berlin 1933, its conclusive end in London 1937 and the communist overtones of the
LAI, have defined the historical understanding of the LAI. As a consequence of this, the LAI as a
topic has been perceived as a lost history, remembered either in critical terms or as a nostalgic
memory.
*

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We must return to walk in the city, or to be more precise, in two cities. Brussels, the capital of the
Belgian kingdom, was, towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
century, a place of conferences, a tradition which is still maintained to this day, being the heart of
the European Union. According to a map of Brussels from the 1930s, squashed in between the
sheer size of the Palace of Justice and the Royal Palace, walking along the rue de la Regence, one
finds the medieval Palais dEgmont. The political intersection and bundles of activity which
occurred here on 10-14 February 1927, were specifically chosen to declare a symbolic
demonstration against colonialism and imperialism, which in turn aimed to fulfil the desires and
anticipations of the visionaries and utopian dreamers. The inauguration of the LAI at the 1927
Brussels Congress, in one of the hearts of imperialism, was designed to confront both the system
and the idea of Empire as a global determinant. The second city, Berlin (Red Berlin), was, in a
sense, the direct opposite of Brussels, as Germany was no longer an imperial power. However, for
the LAI, Berlin was the most logical place in which to concentrate its activities. The combination
of radicalism, liberalism, conservatism, socialism and communism, social and political expressions
on display for everyone to see, was a milieu that stimulated the growth of an anti-imperialist
movement supported by the LAI, as it would likewise contribute to its downfall. To walk around
Berlin during the years of the Weimar Republic, with the magnitude of movements colouring
everyday life must have been a remarkable scene. For the LAI and the International Secretariat,
however, theirs was a history enacted in a narrow geographical space, housed in crowded bureaux
in a few blocks of the pulsating heart of the city. The history of the LAI was a tragic one, leaving
many with a sense of unfulfilled hopes and dreams, particularly those of the collective joys of
belonging and euphoria, which ultimately exposed the true essence of the LAI: a mere vision.

515

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Appendix I: Chronology: 1925 1933

1925
Hands off China campaign, June
Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee, December
1926
Founding conference of the League against Colonial Oppression (LACO) in Berlin:
Rathauskeller conference, 10 February
Meeting of the LACO Executive, Berlin, 13 September
1927
First Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism in Brussels, 10-14 February
LAI Executive meeting, Amsterdam, 28-29 March
LAI Executive meeting, Cologne, 20-21 August
LAI General Council, Brussels, 9-11 December
1928
LAI Executive meeting, Brussels, 28-29 April
LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 18-19 August
1929
LAI Executive meeting, Cologne, 15-16 January
LAI Executive meeting, Amsterdam, 13-14 April
LAI Executive meeting, Frankfurt am Main, 20 July
Second Congress against Imperialism and Colonialism, Frankfurt am Main, 21-28 July
1930

1931
LAI Executive meeting, Berlin, 31 May 2 June
1932
Interne Konferenz of the LAI at the Amsterdam Anti-War Conference, August
1933
Last meeting of the International Secretariat, Berlin, 30 January
Reichstag Fire, 27 February
Re-located to Paris, March August
The International Secretariat transferred to London, September

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Appendix II: Dramatis personae

Adler, Friedrich (1879 1960). Born in Vienna; historian and journalist by trade, became active
in the Social Democratic Party of Austria in 1911. Involved in the anti-war and pacifist
movements during the Great War; secretary of the Two and a half International 1921-1923;
secretary of the LSI 1923-1939; member of the LACO Executive 1926.
Arnot, Robin Page (1890 1986; Jack Cade). CPGB member; secretary of the LDR in 1920;
left the LDR in 1928. Attended the Sixth Comintern Congress 1928, remained in Moscow as
CPGB representative and worked as Deputy Head at the Eastern Secretariat, elected as member of
the Ost-Lnder-Sekretariat II Sektion [India] in 1928. Leader of the work to organise the
Colonial Conference and examine the colonial work among the West European communist
parties in 1929. Prepared the second LAI congress and was Mnzenbergs liaison on LAI
questions. Travelled to the USA as ECCI plenipotentiary in May 1929, returned to England in
December 1929.
Bach, Federico (1897 1978; real name: Fritz Sulzbacher). Journalist by trade; engaged in the
KIM in Berlin in 1922; IAH functionary 1923-1925; LACO secretary in Berlin in 1926. Travelled
to Mexico on an LAI mission in 1927; delegate of the IRH Executive in Mexico in 1928. Bach
resigned from the KPD and broke with the German communist movement in 1929. Worked as a
professor at Mexico University, remained and died in Mexico.
Bayer, Allo (? ?). German communist, IAH functionary. Representative of the Central
Committee of the IAH in Paris October 1928 December 1930; worked at the International
Secretariat in Berlin and Paris January 1933 August 1933.
Berger, Joseph (1904 ?, Bob). Communist from Poland; co-founder of the Communist Party
of Palestine in 1920; went to Moscow in 1924. Assigned to work at the International Secretariat in
1931; arrested by the Schutzpolizei on 21 December, 1931. Remained in Berlin after being released
in 1932 and returned to Moscow in January 1933, given a position in the Eastern Secretariat.
Bil, Joseph Ekwe (1892 1959; Morris). Anti-colonial activist from Cameroon. Co-founder
of the Berlin LDRN section in September 1929; performed work for the International Secretariat,
considered by Mnzenberg as the leading expert on West Africa in Berlin. Attended the founding
conference of the ITUCNW in July 1930.
Bittelman, Alexander (1890 1982; Alex). Born in Russia and emigrated to the USA. Member
of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party of America in 1919. Visited Moscow in 1922;
involved in fractional disputes within the American party. Member of the CPUSA Politburo, but
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relieved of this position in May 1929, instructed to act as Mnzenbergs liaison, organise the
Colonial Conference and to supervise the preparations for the second LAI congress in Moscow.
Resigned as LAI liaison in September 1929; travelled to India on a mission. Moved to the USA
after the Second World War, arrested and sentenced to prison for five years during the McCarthy
era, released in 1957.
Bridgeman, Reginald Francis Orlando (1884 1968). Pursued a diplomatic career, promoted in
1920 as Counsellor of Embassy, appointed to the British Legation at Teheran. This experience
made Bridgeman turn towards socialism and anti-imperialism, and became acquainted with Soviet
diplomats. Dismissed in 1922 and, after a trip to India, Bridgeman returned to England in 1923.
One of the co-founders of the British LACO Section in 1926, Bridgeman attended the Brussels
Congress and was nominated as a deputy member on the LAI Executive. Perceived by
Mnzenberg as the key figure within the British LAI Section, Bridgeman remained in the section
and was in charge of, for example, the propaganda campaign in support of the defendants in the
Meerut Conspiracy Trial. Assumed the leadership of the LAI and the International Secretariat in
September 1933, and continued in this position until 1937, taking the decisions both to disband the
LAI and to establish the CIB.
Brockway, A. Fenner (1888 1988). Involved in the Fabian Society, prominent leader in the ILP.
Attended the 1927 Brussels Congress, elected as member of the LAI General Council. Assisted in
founding the provisional British LAI Section in 1927. Main opposing voice against Adler in
discussions of the LAI within the LSI; acted temporarily as LAI chairman after Lansbury had
resigned, left the LAI in 1927.
Bukharin, Nikolai (1888 1938). Well-known communist persona from Russia; one of Lenins
closest collaborators and theoretician in the history of Bolshevism and international communism.
During the years 1919-28 held a prominent position within the Comintern; replaced Grigori
Zinoviev as chairman in 1926; due to factional disputes and the struggle for power, ousted by
Stalin in 1928-29. Assisted Mnzenberg in promoting the idea of the Brussels Congress, e.g. coauthored the article Fr eine Kolonialkonferenz. Arrested in Moscow in 1937, was as one of the
defendants in the third show trial, executed in Moscow in 1938.
Chattophadyaya, Virendranath (1880 1937; Hussein, Chatto). Indian nationalist and leader
of the anti-British movement in Europe during the Great War. Lived in Stockholm 1917-21 but,
after having been denied an extension of his residence permit, re-located to Berlin. Given a
function at the LACO secretariat in 1926, Chatto assisted with the preparations for the Brussels
Congress. Appointed as LAI International Secretary in 1928, a position he held until June 1931.

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Due to allegations raised in Moscow by the Political Commission and the ICC, Chatto travelled to
Moscow in August/September 1931. Executed during the Great Terror in 1937.
Chiu-pai, Ch (1899 1935; Strakhov; Tsiu Wito). Born in China; travelled to Soviet
Russia in 1920 as a journalist. Instructor and interpreter for Chinese students at KUTV. Member of
the Central Committee of the CPCh in 1922. Lived in Moscow 1928-30; Chiu-pai attended the
Tenth ECCI Plenum and assisted with the preparations for the second LAI congress, which he also
attended. Held leading posts in the ECCI before returning to China in 1934. Arrested and executed
by KMT troops in 1935.
Codovilla, Vittorio (1894 1970; Victorio). Born in Italy, moved to Argentina in 1912.
Member of the Communist Party of Argentina in 1921. Held a position in the Eastern Secretariat
1926, assisted with the work to prepare the Brussels Congress. Visited the International Secretariat
in Berlin in October 1927. Performed sanctioned ECCI missions in Latin America during the
1930s, passed away in Moscow in 1970.
Cowl, Margaret (? ?; Margaret Dean). Communist from the USA, also known as Margaret
Undjus, and wife of veteran CPUSA leader Charles Krumbein. Given a position within the
Profintern, visited the International Secretariat in 1930 after having completed a Profintern mission
in England.
Dimitrov, Georgi (1882 1949; Helmut). Communist from Bulgaria; joined the Communist
Party of Bulgaria after its establishment after the Great War; accused and sentenced to death in his
absence for having performed terrorist acts in Sofia in 1923. Secretary of the Balkanfrderation in
1926; appointed as the leader of the WEB in Berlin 1929-33. Key figure co-ordinating the
activities of the International Secretariat from 1930 to 1933. Arrested in Berlin on 9 March 1933,
accused by the NSDAP of having organised the Reichstag Fire. Dimitrov was the leading figure in
the infamous Leipzig Trial. Acquitted of all charges, Dimitrov travelled to Moscow and, during the
Seventh Comintern Congress (July August 1935), was appointed as General Secretary of the
Comintern.
Dutt, Clemens Palme (1893 1974). Rajani Palme Dutts elder brother; researcher in Bristol
1919-1922; founding member of the CPGB. Secretary of the International Section of LRD in
London 1922-23; editor of the Russian Information and Review published by ARCOS, London,
1923-25; editor of the Masses of India, published in Paris, and engaged in the Indian Partys
work 1925-28. Attended the Sixth International Comintern Congress as Indian Party delegate with
a consultative voice. Worked for the Colonial Commission of the CPGB; publications editor of
Markus Lawrence Ltd, in 1930-31. International secretary at the International Secretariat August
1931 January 1933. Left Berlin and returned to Moscow in January/February 1933.
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Dutt, Rajani Palme (1896 1974). The well-known British communist and leading spokesperson
for the Indian communist movement. Joined the CPGB in 1920; founded the Labour Monthly in
1921. Acted as theoretical adviser in the Comintern on the colonial question and was involved in,
for example, the ICBu and the LAI. Lived in Brussels for most of his life.
Ferdi, Bekar (1890 ?; real name: Mechnet Schafik). Born in Macedonia, the leading
spokesperson for the Communist Party of Turkey in the 1920s. Attended the Sixth Comintern
Congress in 1928, elected as ECCI member. From 1928 to 1932 acted as a Comintern agent, e.g.
as secretary of the LAI at the International Secretariat 1930-33, and as plenipotentiary of the ECCI
in the Turkish Party 1931-33. Escaped together with Clemens Dutt from Berlin in
January/February 1933. Given a position at the Balkan Lnder-Sekretariat 1934, member of the
ICC in 1935 and, in 1946, worked at the Soviet news agency TASS.
Fimmen, Eduard Edo (1881 1942). Born in the Netherlands, engaged in the trade union
movement, Fimmen was a leader in the International Transport Workers Federation, also known
as the Amsterdam International. As one of Mnzenbergs friends, involved in the establishment of
the Auslandskomitee zur Organisierung der Arbeiterhilfe fr die Hungernden in Russland in
1921. Attended the 1927 Brussels congress, elected as vice deputy chairman; member of the LAI
Executive 1927-1930; and left the LAI voluntarily in 1930. Fimmen passed away in Cuernavaca,
Mexico in 1942.
Flieg, Leopold (1893 1939; Leo). Engaged in the German socialist youth movement in 1908;
active in the Spartacus group, and founding member of the KPD. Mnzenbergs friend and assisted
in establishing the KIM in 1919. Flieg was entrusted with the illegal apparatus of the KPD, was
the grey emissary in the relations with Piatnitsky and the OMS. Executed in Moscow in 1939,
rehabilitated posthumously in 1957.
Ford, James W. (1893 1957). Prominent figure in the Negro question and trade union activist;
member of the WPA in 1925; member of the Profintern Executive Bureau 1928; prepared the
ITUCNW and the Hamburg Congress in 1930. Attended the LAI Executive meeting in Cologne,
15-16 January 1929; the second LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main 21-27 July 1929, where he
was elected member of the LAI Executive as representative of the Negro race; attended the LAI
Executive meeting in Berlin 30/5-2/6-1931.
Gibarti, Louis (1895 1967; real name: Laszlo Dobos. Known pseudonyms: Otto,
Kaminski, Feliks Gasbarra, Karl Feller). Hungarian communist, journalist by trade.
Emigrated to Germany in 1921/22. LACO secretary and Mnzenbergs right-hand-man in
preparing the Brussels Congress. Resigned abruptly from his position in the LAI in 1928, but reappeared as LAI representative (International Secretariat) in the USA in 1929; involved in anti522

fascist and anti-war campaigns (Amsterdam Anti-War Congress, 1932), as well as the Spanish
Civil War. Attempted to gain a position at UNESCO after the Second World War.
Gillies, William (1884 1958). Secretary of the International Department of the Labour Party;
worked closely with the secretary of the LSI, Friedrich Adler, to monitor the European left-wing
movement. In 1933, published a critical analysis, The Communist Solar System, on communist
mass and front organisations.
Gomez, Manuel (1895 1989; real name: Charles Shipman; Frank Seaman, Jess
Ramrez). Born in the USA, frequently travelled to Mexico where, in 1919, he met Roy and
Mikhail Borodin. After attending the Second Comintern Congress in 1920 and returning to the
USA, assumed the name Manuel Gomez. Key figure in developing colonial work in the USA as
founding leader of the AAAIL in 1925. Attended the Brussels Congress and nominated as LAI
General Council member. Expelled from the CPUSA in 1929.
Gross, Babette (1898 1990; Ruplie Berta). Mnzenbergs companion and partner; editor at
Neuer Deutscher Verlag; carried out missions to England in the service of the International
Secretariat. Escaped together with Mnzenberg in 1933 to Paris. After the German invasion of
France in 1940, Gross fled to Portugal from where she departed on a ship to the USA and ended up
in Mexico. Returned to West Germany in 1949.
Gumede, Josiah Tshangana (1867 1947). Founder and chairman of the ANC 1927-30. Attended
the 1927 Brussels Congress and travelled through Germany and the Soviet Union together with
Jimmy La Guma the same year. Invited to the second LAI congress, but was prevented from
leaving South Africa due to a lack of finance. Expelled from the ANC in 1930 because of his ties
to and sympathy towards the Communist Party of South Africa.
Gyptner, Richard (1901 1972; Alarich, Magnus). German communist and KIM
representative in the ZK KPD in 1920. Travelled to Moscow in 1922 and was appointed KIM
secretary in the West European Secretariat in Berlin in 1923. From the end of 1928 to February
1933, Gyptner acted as WEB secretary and worked together with Georgi Dimitrov in Berlin. Via
Scandinavia and France, where he acted as IAH secretary 1933-35, Gyptner emigrated to Moscow,
acting as Dimitrovs personal secretary.
Hatta, Mohammad (1902 1980). Prominent and distinguished leader of the Indonesian
nationalist movement in the inter-war years. Hatta lived in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, and later,
Locarno, Switzerland, acting as leader of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, from which he resigned in
1929. Attended the 1927 Brussels Congress, nominated as member of the LAI Executive and acted
Chattos liaison. After attending the second LAI congress, Hatta expressed criticism and was

523

expelled from the LAI. Returning to Indonesia in 1932, Hatta established an active collaboration
with Achmed Sukarno.
Heimo, Mauno (1894 1937; Lindberg). Communist from Finland, emigrated to Soviet
Russia in 1920, holding an influential position within the Comintern apparatus as head of various
chancellery offices. Associated with Kuusinen, Heimo also acted as Mnzenbergs liaison during
preparations for the Brussels congress in 1927, and again in 1928. Executed in Moscow in 1937.
Johnstone, Jack W. (1880 1942; Jack, Jack Godfrey, Jack Courtland, John
Johnstone). Member of the WPA. Appointed as LAI emissary to India in 1928, where he was
arrested and deported. Given a position at the ECCI Caribbean Bureau in Moscow 1931.
Jger, Hans (1899 1975). Born in Berlin; a member of the KPD in 1920; carrying out
functionary services. Member of the Institute of Social Research at Frankfurt am Main and leader
of the Marx-Engels Verlages. Secretary of the LACO (Sd-deutsche Sektion) in 1926; secretary
and leader of the German LAI Section in Berlin 1927-32. Escaped from Germany to Prague and
emigrated to Moscow for a short period. Abandoned his KPD membership in 1935, expelled from
the Comintern on the recommendation of the ICC. Moved to London, where Jger lived for the
rest of his life.
Katayama, Sen (1859 1933; real name: Yasutaro Yabuki; Yavki, Kiyoda). Japanese
communist who spent most of his life outside Japan, e.g. in the USA and the Soviet Union.
Attended the Brussels Congress as the secret leader of the ECCI delegation; leader of the ECCI
delegation at the LAI General Council in Brussels 1927; member of the ECCI delegation at the
second LAI congress in 1929; participated at the Amsterdam Anti-War congress in 1932. Passed
away in Moscow in 1933.
Khankhoji, Pandurang S. (? ?; pseudonym: Aga Khan). National revolutionary and
communist from India; visited Moscow in 1921 in the company of Chatto; travelled to Mexico,
where he remained during the 1920s, and joined the Communist Party of Mexico. Visited Berlin in
1930, then Moscow, and ended up in Kabul as representative of the Hindustan communist
organisation, the Ghadr Party.
Kunizaki, Teido (1894 ?; pseudonyms: A. Kon, Kohn). Engaged in the Japanese workers
and peasants movements 1924-1926. Emigrated from Japan to Berlin as a student in 1926. Joined
the KPD in 1928; leader of the Marxist study group Japanische Sprachgruppe der KPD; carried
out work in the Wilmersdorf district party cell. Given a position at the International Secretariat
1930-1932; expelled from Germany in August 1932; arrived in Moscow in September 1932. Most
likely suppressed, fate unknown.

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Jalabi, Hajj Muhammad (? ?). Pan-Arab movement advocate of Persian origin and lived in
Berlin. Attended the inaugural meeting of the LACO at the Rathauskeller in Berlin on 10
February, 1926.
Kouyat, Garan Tiemoko (1892 1942). Communist of Malian origin, lived in France. PCF
member and leader of the LDRN in Paris. Attended the second LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main
in 1929, elected as member of the LAI General Council. Visited Moscow after the congress,
returned to Berlin and founded the Berlin LDRN section together with Joseph Bil (see above).
Attended the Fifth Profintern Congress as delegate of the ITUCNW. Expelled from the Profintern,
the ITUCNW and the PCF in 1933. Executed by the Nazis in France.
Kuusinen, Otto Wilgelmovich (known pseudonyms: Kuku, Alfons, Jansen; 1881
1964). Earned a PhD in History in 1905; entered the social democratic movement in 1905, acted as
leader 1911-1917; co-founder of the Communist Party of Finland in 1918 before escaping from
Finland. Participated at the foundation of the Comintern in March 1919, held various positions
within the Comintern apparatus 1919-1943. Responsible for the Solar System theory, acted as
Mnzenbergs liaison on LAI questions, and was the Head of the Eastern Secretariat.
Lansbury, George (1859 1940). Prominent leader within the British socialist movement;
member of the Social Democratic Federation, the ILP, and the Labour Party; pacifist, and editor
of the Daily Herald. Attended the Brussels Congress, elected as Chairman of the LAI; cashier of
the British LAI Section; resigned from his position in the LAI in June 1927.
Liau, Hansin (? 1964; Liao Khuansin, Liau Gunzin, Liao Gongxing, Liao Huanxing).
Chinese emigrant, nationalist, member of the KMT and member of the CPCh in 1922. His CPCh
membership was transferred to the KPD in 1923. Given a position by the Hungarian communist
Jen (Eugen) Varga in the economic institute, the Vargabro, in Berlin 1925-27. Attended the
Brussels Congress as delegate of the Central Executive Committee of the KMT, and given a seat
on the LAI Executive. Appointed in 1927 by Mnzenberg as the leader of the Chinese National
Agency in Berlin; functionary/secretary at the International Secretariat 1927-28. After a personal
dispute with Mnzenberg and Gibarti, Liau emigrated together with his wife, Dora LiauDombrowski, to Moscow in December 1928. Attended the second LAI congress in 1929, and had
his KPD membership transferred to the CPSU (B) in 1929. Accused and acquitted of political
dishonesty by the Chinese communist migr group in Berlin in 1929. Sentenced together with his
wife to the GULAG penal system; released in the first years of the 1960s, moved to China in 1964,
passed away the same year.
Magyar, Ludwig (1891 1937; real name, Lajos Milgorf). Communist of Hungarian origin;
member of the Communist Party of Hungary 1919, went to Moscow in 1922 after an exchange of
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political prisoners. Acted as Comintern official in China in the mid 1920s, and later given a
position within the ECCI apparatus. As Deputy Head in the Eastern Secretariat, Magyar coordinated a majority of the questions connected to the LAI (the Magyar Thesis) and visited
Berlin, Amsterdam and Paris to assess progress and to give instructions. In 1934, he was accused
and performed an act of self-criticism during the Magyar case. Executed in 1937.
Manuilsky, Dmitri Zajarovich (1883 1959; Felix, Numa, Mefodij, Thomas
Bezrabotny, Beruzzi, Ivanov, Samuely, Pellicano, Kirsch, Serednjak, Foma,
Robert, Paul, Stefan Dolicki, Petrov, Marmor, Mayor). Communist veteran
from Ukraine and member of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party; in exile in France
1907-1917 and expelled in 1919. One of the leading decision-makers at Comintern headquarters:
member of the Small Commission, the Political Commission, the ECCI Presidium, the ECCI
Secretariat, the Organisational Department. Provided Mnzenberg with guidelines on the anticolonial project in 1925-1926. Acted as leader of the WEB in Berlin 1928-29; formulated the new
agenda for the LAI in 1931.
Mattar, Achmed Hassan (? ?). Anti-colonial activist from the Sudan; arrived in Berlin 1925/26.
Attended the inaugral conference of the LACO in Berlin on 10 February, 1926. Journalist by trade,
with relations to the Rif region, Mattar was the IAH connection to the nationalist Klub der
Zaglulisten (Zaglulist Club) in Berlin. Mattar frequently travelled between Tangiers and Berlin.
Expelled from Germany in 1927 on the direct orders of the RKO.
Melnitschansky, Grigorij Natnovic (1886 1937). Communist from Ukraine; member of the
Russian Social Democratic Workers Party in 1902; emigrated in 1910 to the USA; worked as
journalist and published articles in the Russian socialist paper Novyj mir. Returned to Russia
together with Trotsky after the October Bolshevik coup in 1917. Involved in the Russian trade
union movement and given a position within the Profintern as a functionary. Melnitschansky
carried out international missions in 1928; attended the LAI Executive in Cologne 1929, and the
second LAI congress in Frankfurt am Main, appointed as LAI Executive member. Executed in
Moscow in 1937.
Misiano, Francesco (1884 1936). Communist from Italy; in charge of the IAHs film production
(Mezhrabpom-Film) at IAH headquarters in Moscow. Assisted Mnzenberg in co-ordinating the
Hands off China campaign in 1925. Attended the Tenth ECCI Plenum in Moscow in 1929. Died in
August 1936 due to illness.
Maxton, James (1885 1946). Born in Scotland; distinguished leader of the ILP; and opposed the
militancy of the Great War. Attended the LAI General Council in Brussels, December 1927, and
was later appointed as chairman of the LAI replacing Lansbury. Participated at every LAI
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Executive meeting up until the second LAI congress in 1929. After the Frankfurt am Main
Congress, ousted from his position as Chairman on the initiative of the British LAI Section,
remained in contact with Mnzenberg.
Mller, Kurt (? ?). German communist and functionary at IAH headquarters in Moscow.
Mnzenbergs liaison in developing the IAHs colonial work in 1925-26. Visited Beijing in 1925
to assess the work of the IAH. Fate unknown.
Mnzenberg, Willi (1889 1940; Herfurt, Albert Schneider, A. Sonnenburg,
Studzinsky, Berg). German communist who, at an early age, was involved in the socialist
and pacifist movements. Emigrated during the Great War to Switzerland, where he met Lenin and
other prominent characters in the Zimmerwald Left; after the war, one of the leading figures to
found the Communist Youth International (KIM) in 1919. In connection with the Third
International Comintern Congress in Moscow in 1921, Lenin instructed Mnzenberg to establish
the forerunner of the IAH, the Auslandskomitees zur Organisierung der Arbeiterhilfe fr die
Hungernden in Russland. Mnzenberg and the IAH were the entrepreneurial force behind a range
of committees, associations and sympathising communist organisations during the inter-war years,
which epitomised Kuusinens vision of the communist Solar System. As the architect of the anticolonial project and the LAI, Mnzenberg held the position as its secretary 1927-33. In August
1933, he was formally released from his obligations to the LAI. The LAIs exile in Paris added to
his isolation. His last visit to Moscow took place in 1936; and in 1938, the KPD revoked his
membership, while the Comintern categorised him as persona non grata. Confined to a
concentration camp in France after the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, and in
connection with the German invasion of France in 1940, Mnzenberg fled, only to be found dead
later the same year.
Naidu, M. Jayasurya S. (? ?). The son of the Nightingale of India, Sarojini Naidu, and
Chattos nephew. Lived in Berlin as a student and worked at the International Secretariat and the
Indian Bureau 1928-1933. Arrested and expelled from Germany in 1933.
Nambiar, A. C. N. (? ?). Nationalist activist, migr from India, and Chattos personal friend. In
1923, he left London and moved to Berlin, where Nambiar and Chatto organised the Indian anticolonial movement. Journalist by trade, Nambiar was a correspondent of the pro-nationalist
agency Free Press of India, and member of the All India Congress Committee (AICC). Attended
the inaugural Rathauskeller conference of the LACO in 1926; the Brussels Congress as delegate
of the Verband Indischer Journalisten in Europa; and, together with Chatto, formed the Indian
Bureau in 1929. Arrested and expelled from Germany in 1933. Appointed by Nehru after the
Second World War as Ambassador of India in West Germany.
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Nehru, Jawaharlal (1889 1964). Leader of the Indian national liberation movement in the interwar years, protg of Gandhi, Indias first Prime Minister in 1947. Visited Germany in 1926
together with his wife Kamala, and was involved in preparing the Brussels Congress. Attended the
Brussels Congress as accredited delegate of the INC; appointed as LAI Executive member (192730). Formed the Independence for India League in 1928, a radical outgrowth of the INC, shaped
on the agenda of the LAI. Supported Chatto and Nambiar in establishing the Indian Bureau in
1929, and left the LAI in 1930. Attended the Bandung Conference in 1955.
Padmore, George (1903 1959; real name: Malcolm Ivan Meredith Nurse; Hamilton).
Born in Trinidad; communist, and later, leader of the Pan-Africanist movement. Guided the work
in preparing the First International Congress of Negro Workers in Hamburg in July 1930, and head
of the ITUCNW. Assisted Mnzenberg in preparing the African question in A-I-Z in 1931. Studied
at the KUTV in 1932; deported from Germany in 1933. Expelled from the ITUCNW, the
Profintern and the Comintern in 1934.
Patterson, William Lorenzo (1891 1980; William Wilson). Communist from the USA;
studied at the KUTV 1927-31; member of the ECCI Negro Bureau. Attended the second LAI
congress as Negro trade union delegate.
Petrovsky, David Alexandrovich (1886 1937; real name: David Lipetz; A. J. Bennet,
Humbold, Max, Max Breguer, David Goldfarb, Isolde). Communist from Russia,
held various positions within the Comintern apparatus; head of Agitprop Department, ECCI
emissary to the CPGB. Assisted Mnzenberg in preparing the political material for the Brussels
Congress in Berlin in January-February 1927. Assessed the work of the British LAI Section in
London 1927-28. Demoted from his position after the decolonisation debate at the Sixth
Comintern Congress. Carried out covert missions in Europe in 1929 as WEB representative.
Married to British communist Rose Cohen. Executed in Moscow in 1937.
Piatnitsky, Osip (1882 1938; real name: Iosif Aranovich Tarshis; Freitag, Michail,
Sonntag). Given a position within the Comintern in 1921. Operative head for the Department
for International Communications (OMS) and the administrative key figure in co-ordinating the
activities of the Comintern. Evaluated and authorised, for example, the budget and personnel
questions of the LAI. Removed from the Comintern apparatus in 1935, arrested in Moscow 1937
and executed, after brutal interrogations and torture, in 1938.
Ping, Huang (? ?). Communist from China and KMT member; Ping travelled to Moscow in
1924 to study Russian; returned to Hong Kong in 1925 as CPCh delegate. Returned to Moscow
where he remained until 1927, engaged in the Chinese trade union movement. Attended the second
LAI congress in 1929, given a seat on the LAI Executive (1929-33). Arrested by the KMT in
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China in 1933 and the subject of an international campaign organised partly by the IAH, which
partly contributed to his release. Appeared in the CPCh after the Second World War.
Pollitt, Harry (1890 1960). British communist, joined the CPGB in 1920, attended the inaugural
conference of the Profintern in Moscow in 1921. Attended the Brussels Congress as delegate of the
National Minority Movement, given a position in the LAI General Council; attended the second
LAI congress, again as delegate of the NMM, given a seat on the LAI Executive (1929-31).
Assisted Smerals work in co-ordinating the re-organisation of the British LAI Section in 1930.
Roy, Manabendra Nath (1887 1954; real name: Narendranath Bjattacharya; Robert
Allen, Roberto Allen y Villagarca, Garca, Richards, C. A. Martin, Dr.
Mahmud, Manuel Mndez, Dr. Banerji, Roberts). Communist from India, attended the
Second Comintern Congress in 1920 as delegate of the Communist Party of Mexico. Involved in a
debate with Lenin on the colonial question at this congress. Appointed as leader of the ICBu in
Paris in 1924. Held various positions within the Comintern apparatus during the 1920s; guided
the preparatory work in Moscow for the Brussels Congress via different commissions, acting as
Mnzenbergs liaison. In 1929, accused of rightist deviations and expelled from the Comintern.
Lived in Berlin for a brief moment before returning to India where he was arrested.
Saklatvala, Shapurji (1874 1936). Communist from England of Indian origin; linked to the
IAHs activities and colonial work in 1925-26. Member of the LACO Executive Committee and
established, together with Bridgeman, the British LACO Section in December 1926. Unable to
attend the Brussels Congress due to his visit to India, Saklatvala was given a seat in the LAI
General Council. Attended several of the LAI Executive meetings; and at the second LAI congress
in Frankfurt am Main, participated as member of the LAI Executive. Key figure in co-ordinating
LAI work in India and the Meerut Conspiracy Trial campaign in England.
Schudel, Otto (1902 1979). Communist from Switzerland and IAH functionary given a post at
the International Secretariat after the 1927 Brussels Congress. Schudel resigned from the LAI in
1930, and left for Basel to work in the press organ Rundschau (successor of Inprecorr). Carried
out an LAI mission to Geneva in 1929 to convince delegates, who were attending the ILO
Congress, to attend the second LAI congress.
Senghor, Lamine (1889 1927). Born in the French colony of Senegal, Senghor (no relation to
poet Lopold Sdar Senghor), he was conscripted to French military service during the Great War.
In the war, Senghor contracted a serious health problem. As an ardent defender of the social rights
of the black race and as an anti-colonial activist, Senghor co-founded the La Comit de Dfense de
la Race Ngre (CDNR), and was also a member of the PCF. Attended the Brussels Congress in
1927, and given a seat on the LAI Executive. After factional disputes within the CDNR, Senghor
529

resigned and formed, together with Kouyat, the radical organisation LDRN. Due to sickness
(tuberculosis), Senghor passed away on 25 November, 1927.
Smeral, Bohuml (1880 1941). Communist from Czechoslovakia; involved at an early age in the
socialist movement; moved to the left during the Great War; and was the leader of the Communist
Party of Czechoslovakia after its foundation in 1921. Held various positions within the Comintern
apparatus, e.g. the Organisational Department and, in 1929, instructed to act as secretary of the
International Secretariat, as well as the WEB. In charge of the Arab question in the LAI, Smeral
also monitored the work of the International Secretariat and supervised its re-organisation in 1930.
Smeral left his position in 1931; remained in Czechoslovakia 1931-32; departed for Mongolia in
1934 and was nominated as member of the ICC in 1935. In 1941, Smeral passed away due to
sickness in Moscow.
Thgersen, Hans Peter (1902 ?; York, Miller; Hans Tiergen). Danish father and a
Japanese mother; no relation to Danish communist leader Thger Thgersen. Studied at the ILS in
1928 and worked at the International Secretariat in 1928 on Far Eastern questions. Returned to
Berlin as York in 1931, in charge of the LAI Youth Secretariat; disappeared in January 1933.
Trilliser, Mikhail (1883 1940; Moskvin). Communist from Russia; in charge of the red
terror in Siberia during the Civil War and involved with the Soviet state security services from
1921. Head of the Foreign Department from 1922 and founder of the Soviet intelligence apparatus.
Acted as intermediary between the secretaries at Comintern headquarters in 1930 during the
preparations to re-organise the LAI.
Windmller, Ella (? ?). German communist; steno-typist at the International Secretariat, 19271932; fate unknown.
Wittfogel, Karl August (1896 1988). Sinologist and German communist during the inter-war
years; involved and employed at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main. Requested
to assist with the work to complete the political resolution for the Brussels Congress, Wittfogel
attended the Brussels Congress off the record; involved at various stages in the work of the LAI in
Germany, e.g. attended the second LAI congress as leader of the LAI branch in Frankfurt am
Main. Appointed by Chatto to take care of the LAIs curricular activity in Berlin 1930-31; and in
charge of The Anti-Imperialist Review in 1932-33. Arrested by German authorities after attempting
to escape from the country in connection with the Reichstag Fire in 1933; confined to a
concentration camp from which he was released in 1934. From England, Wittfogel departed for the
USA. In 1939, the Central Committee of the CPUSA, via the direct orders of the Comintern Cadre
Department, revoked Wittfogels communist membership on the grounds that he was not worthy

530

of being a member of the Party. After the Second World War, Wittfogel became a committed and
fervent anti-communist.
*

531

532

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495/2
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495/3
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495/4
ECCI Small Commission / Malaja komissija Politsekretariata IKKI
495/6
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495/7
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495/18
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495/20
ECCI Organisational Bureau (Orgbureau) / Organizatsionnyi otdel (Orgotdel) IKKI
495/25
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495/30
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495/50
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otdela IKKI
533

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499/1
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515/1
534

Communist Party of France (PCF) / Kommunisticheskaia partija Frantsii (Correspondence, Henri

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517/1
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523/1
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528/1
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532/4
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534/1
534/2
543/4
534/6
534/8
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535/1
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538/2
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539/1
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542/1
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543/1
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552/2
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NY 4036
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NY 4041
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NY 4080
SgY 30/0331
535

Bestand: Albert Norden

NY 4217
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NY/4235
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Reichsministerium des Innern, Nov.1929 Febr.1933
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R 1507
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R 3003/ORA/1218/6
R 3003/ORA RG/Sammlung Rote Hilfe/5
R 3003/ORA RG/Sammlung Rote Hilfe/7
R 3003/ORA RG/Sammlung Rote Hilfe/14
Vereinig. f. freie Wirtschaft
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1715
536

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KV2/1919
Willi Mnzenberg
PRO KV2/772
PRO KV2/773
PRO KV2/774
Hans Thgersen
PRO KV2/1056
E. Offen
PRO KV2/1380
Otto Katz
PRO KV2/1382
Louis Gibarti
PRO KV2/1401
David Petrovsky / Bennett / Goldfarb
PRO KV2/1433
Policy on Liaison between Metropolitan Police Special Branch and German (Prussian) Ministry of
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PRO KV4/110
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PRO KV5/135
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Volume 131: Ligue contre lImperialisme, 1927 1932

537

Riksarkivet / National Archive, Sweden (RA)

Stockholmspolisens kriminalavdelning, rotel 6, med fregngare 1886-1946
SE/RA/420640.01
SE/RA/420640.02
F2 Kommunistiska handlingar, del 1-10
F3 Del 1; 3; 13; 18; 19
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
All American Anti-Imperialist League
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Mnzenberg, Willi, Fnf Jahre Internationale Arbeiterhilfe, Neuer Deutscher Verlag, Berlin,
1926
Mnzenberg, Willi, Mot kolonialt frtryck, in Norrskensflamman, 30/12-1927
Mnzenberg, Willi, From Demonstration to Organisation, in The Anti-Imperialist Review,
Berlin, Vol.1, No.1, July 1928
Mnzenberg, Willi, Unser Konzern I, in Der Rote Aufbau, II. Jahrg., Berlin, Juli 1929,
pp.97-107
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der Liga gegen Unterdrckung, Nr. 3, Berlin, 5/7-1926
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Contemporary Journals and Magazines
Anti-Imperialist Review
Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung (A-I-Z)
Der koloniale Freiheitskampf
Der rote Aufbau, Berlin (1922-1932)
Die Rote Fahne
Die Rote Gewerkschafts-Internationale
538

Frankfurter Zeitung
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen Imperialismus
International Press Correspondence/Inprecorr, Berlin/Vienna (1921-1933)
Labour Monthly
Mahnruf
Norrskensflamman
Pressedienst
Rotes Gewerkschafts-Bulletin
Rundschau
Welt am Abend
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< http://archive.workersliberty.org/wlmags/wl61/indonesi.htm > [Java and Sumatra rebellions,
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< http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/people/gumede_jt.html > [Sechaba, Gumede]
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Paris); Archives nationals du monde du travail]
*

539

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561

562

INDEX
Abolin, Arthur, 426
Abramovic, Rafail, 192
Adler, Friedrich, 30, 67, 95-96, 166-67, 17980, 190-94, 224, 304, 519
Action Committee against the Colonial
Politics of the Imperialists (Action
Committee; Aktionskomitee gegen die
imperialistische Kolonialpolitik), 84, 134,
148
African National Congress (ANC), 125, 275
Against the Cruelties in Syria Committee,
53, 79-80, 82-85, 91 93, 95, 112, 124, 147,
195, 211, 508, 517
Albanian Committee for the Liberation of
Kosovo, 385
Alpri, Gyula (Julius), 126, 171
All American Anti-Imperialist League
(AAAIL), 69, 99, 139, 147-48, 175-76,
218, 244, 301, 310, 408
All Chinese Labour Association, 238
All India Congress Committee (AICC), 241
All Indian Youth League, 309
Amsterdam Anti-War Congress (1932), 457,
463, 465-66, 469-71, 473, 475
Amsterdam International (International
Federation of Trade Unions), 37, 66, 74,
129, 190, 302-03, 358, 431, 434, 437
American Commission (1929), 270
American Negro Labour Congress (ANLC),
86, 99, 140, 306, 311, 324
Andrews, William H. (Bill), 204, 292, 309,
324, 330, 408
Anti-Fascist League, 49, 62, 371, 513
Anti-Imperialist Commission, 156, 16061, 164, 168, 177, 183, 189, 196, 200-02,
206-09
Anti-Imperialist Exhibition (Paris, 1931),
407-09
Anti-Imperialist Review, 21, 201, 229, 391,
400, 423, 436, 443, 457, 488, 492
Anti-War Amsterdam/Pleyel Movement
(1932-33), 49, 457, 464, 473, 498, 513
Arab Association, 310
Arab National Congress, 248, 286
Arab Student Association, 93
al-Arabi, Mahmud Husni (C. Husny), 433

Arbeiter Illustrierte Zeitung (A-I-Z), 29, 96,

135, 144, 177, 192, 205, 409, 436
ARCOS raid (1927), 167, 187
Arnot, Robin Page, 36, 38, 200, 231, 234, 236,
238, 247-48, 250-51, 253-64, 266-72, 27576, 280, 282-84, 288, 290, 292-302, 305,
312, 341, 378, 380, 382, 441, 519
Ashanti Freedom Society, 205
Assadoff, Ahmed, 93, 138, 146, 204
Assafi, Ahmed, 204
Association of Korean Students, 323
Association of Proletarian Writers, 397
Association Rpublicaine des Anciens
Combattants (ARAC), 64
AUCCSLU (Zentralrats der
Sowjetgewerkschaften), 88, 228, 391, 395,
426, 432
Auslandskomitees zur Organisierung der
Arbeiterhilfe fr die Hungernden in
Ruland, 74
Auswrtige Amt, 29, 62, 83, 94-95, 101-02,
125, 143, 157, 163, 216-17, 396-97, 453,
512
Awooner-Renner, Kweku Bankole, 205
Bach, Federico (Fritz Sulzbacher), 36, 92, 97,
118, 140, 175, 177-79, 286, 519
Baer, Hans, 92
Balabanov (Balabanoff), Angelica, 56, 301
Baldwin, Roger, 112, 146, 154, 175-76, 193,
204, 209, 222, 225, 292, 294, 312, 328, 354,
360, 383
Balkanfrderation, 325, 385-86
Bandung Conference, 1-2, 11, 15, 24, 505-06
Barb, Henri, 221, 266, 284
Barbusse, Henri, 82, 95, 112, 124, 135, 137,
146, 152, 157, 182-83, 203, 226, 292, 377,
386, 461, 472, 484
Basak, Gopal, 438
Bayer, Allo, 36, 487-94, 497, 519
Beckett, John, 155, 190, 211-13
Berger, Joseph (Bob, Boris), 441, 447,
451-53, 456, 466, 468-69, 473, 488-89, 519
Bergsma, Pieter, 181
Berliner Blutmai, 277-78
Besant, Annie, 242

563

Bey, Mohamed Hafiz Ramadan, 112, 146,

204
Bey, Wissa Wassef, 238
Bil, Joseph Ekwe (Morris), 405, 411, 519
Bittelman, Alexander (Alex), 36, 269-70,
272-73, 282-84, 289, 297-304, 306-07,
309, 311-13, 317-18, 321, 341, 344-48,
352, 354-55, 357, 360, 364, 519
Black Hand (Schwarze Hand), 385
Bloncourt, Max, 140
Bombay Central Labour Board, 174
Borodin, Michael, 65, 404
Braatoy, Bjarne, 321-22, 324, 332, 334, 337,
362
Bridgeman, Reginald Orlando, 22, 37, 102,
120-21, 138, 146, 154-55, 164-65, 171,
173, 182, 185-86, 204, 209, 211-14, 22223, 238, 240, 248, 250-52, 279-80, 293,
303, 310, 322, 337, 354, 356, 377, 382,
417, 426, 428, 432, 434-36, 438, 462, 474,
484-86, 492, 497-500, 509, 520
Brockway, A. Fenner, 22, 37, 141-42, 146,
155, 164-68, 189-93, 195, 209, 222, 227,
304, 520
Browder, Earl Russel, 128, 382-83
Brown, Isabel, 464
Brown, Montgomery, 95, 386
Brupbacher, Fritz, 30, 95-96, 463
Brussels Commission, 129, 153-54
Buber-Neumann, Margarete, 19-20, 122,
141, 149-50
Budden, Olive, 248, 288, 310, 322
Budich, Willi, 386, 432, 447
du Bois, William E. Burghardt, 22
Buisson, Fernand, 112
Bukharin, Nikolai, 54, 64, 97, 113-17, 120,
127, 130, 219-20, 224, 231-32, 270, 277,
315, 504, 520
Bund Freier Balkan, 386
Burns, Emile, 36, 213, 289, 299, 319, 32122, 333, 335, 344, 350
Cachin, Marcel, 464, 472
Campbell, J. R., 160
Casabona, Louis, 112
Central European Indian Association, 92,
309
Chamberlain, Austen, 112, 143, 167, 181

Chand, Dhuni, 182

Chatterjee, Chandra, 438
Chattophadyaya, Virendranath (Chatto), 2122, 24, 31, 35, 46, 92, 111, 119, 152-54,
158,59, 168, 172-75, 182, 185-86, 198, 200,
222-29, 237, 239-45, 248, 279, 285-91, 293,
301-04, 307, 310, 319, 322, 331, 343-44,
349-51, 356, 358-63, 373-76, 386-88, 390,
396-97, 405-08, 410, 413-26, 432, 434, 43637, 440-41, 444-45, 448-51, 456, 470, 504,
507, 520
Chedli, Mustapha, 209, 248, 286, 320
Chen Kuen, 146, 204
Chi, Chao-Ting, 210-11
Chinese Labour Association, 238, 291
Chinese National Agency, 169-72, 187, 196
Chinese Students Alliance of America, 311
Chiu-pai, Ch (Strakhov, Tsiu Wito), 254,
266, 295, 298, 312, 316, 318, 323, 326, 329,
521
Codevilla, Vittorio, 160, 178, 197-98, 200
Colonial Office (CO), 29, 82-83, 118, 121
Colonial Commission (CPGB), 212-14, 251,
253, 257, 310, 382, 468
Colonial Commission (LSI), 224
Colonial Commission (PCF), 62-63, 253, 25758, 468
Colraine, Daniel, 140, 146, 204
Commission for the Examination of the
Question of a Colonial Congress in
Brussels (CEQCCB), 28, 103-07
Commission on Colonial Conference, 260,
262-64, 266, 268-69, 272, 299-300
Commission on the LAI, 280-82, 284, 29091, 293-97, 300-01, 309-12, 335, 338, 347
Commission to Guide the Work of the
Colonial Congress (CGWCC), 107-09,
113-14, 116-19, 130-31
Communist Party of Belgium, 263, 324, 402,
454, 481
Communist Party of China (CPCh), 57, 65,
169-70, 209, 312, 484
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPCz),
379, 442, 481
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB),
59-60, 69, 85, 96, 121, 127, 165, 167-68,
184, 212-14, 219, 221, 226, 232, 234, 240,
255-57, 259, 266, 289, 310, 312, 325, 341,

564

367-68, 371-72, 374, 377-78, 383, 468,

481
Communist Party of Holland (CPH), 181-83,
226-27, 243, 266, 272, 312, 325
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), 58,
123, 180, 384, 414
Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
(Bolshevik), 14, 17, 38-39, 67, 77, 97, 199,
219, 277, 282-83, 504
Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA), 36,
38, 179, 255, 269-71, 276, 282, 294, 300,
376, 382-83, 443, 463, 483
Confdration Gnrale du Travail-Unitaire
(CGTU), 64, 325
Cook, Arthur James (A. J.), 124, 190, 238,
246-51, 291-92, 295, 305
Corbach, Otto, 456
Cormon, Gabrielle (Henriette Tartavel), 325,
372, 378
Cowl, Margarete, 373, 521
Crawfurd, Helene, 124, 141, 165
Cruter, Albert, 92
Danziger, Fritz, 81, 84, 94-95, 97, 111
Darsono, Raden, 180-181, 318, 382, 384-85
Davies, S. O., 124, 137, 146, 204, 248
Der koloniale Freiheitskampf, 101, 112, 221,
223, 364-65, 376
Der Rote Aufbau, 434, 459, 466
Delhi Manifesto (1929), 360
Dengel, Philipp, 114, 342
Destour Party, 204
Deutsche Gesellschaft fr
Eingeborenenkunde, 217, 365
Dimitrov, Georgi (Helmut), 37, 325, 337,
344, 354, 357, 365-66, 377, 386, 401, 424,
426, 432-34, 438-41, 446, 469, 472-73,
475, 477, 481-82, 487, 489-92, 494, 521
Dombrowski-Liau, Dora, 198
Doriot, Jacques, 37, 59, 128, 130, 258, 378
Draft Resolution on Results of the II World
Congress of the LAI and its direct tasks
(DR LAI), 340, 346-49, 351-55, 357, 364
Dreiser, Theodor, 472, 483
Duchne Mme, 146, 183, 209, 222, 237, 248
Dunne, William F., (Bill), 175, 383
Dnninghaus, Georg, 456
Dutt, Clemens, 35, 37, 46, 59-60, 375, 382,

426, 441, 445, 447-48, 451, 453, 465-68,

475, 488-89, 509, 521
Dutt, Rajani Palme, 60, 295, 299, 323, 326,
330, 382, 402, 521
Dutch-Indies Delegation (1927-28), 182-83,
186-87
Eastern Department, 38, 59, 69, 83, 85, 87-89
Eastern Secretariat, 28, 38, 97-98, 100, 10310, 113, 116-17, 128, 154, 159-60, 162, 165,
183, 203, 205, 207, 213, 217, 221, 231, 241,
244, 254-55, 257, 259-63, 272, 279-82, 285,
290-92, 296, 316, 321, 339, 341, 344, 34648, 351-52, 354-55, 358, 360, 364-72, 374,
376, 379, 381-82, 388, 393, 395, 399-400,
402-07, 410-12, 414, 417-19, 421-23, 426,
428-30, 440, 444-45, 448-49, 451, 455-59,
464, 466, 468-69, 483, 486, 488, 506
ECCI Secretariat, 27, 38, 64, 69, 76-78, 81,
103-13, 117,19, 122-23, 128-32, 142, 14951, 153-55, 157-58, 160, 163, 199, 208, 222,
225-26, 333, 341, 354, 358, 366, 368, 37273, 376, 447
Einstein, Albert, 92, 137, 146, 204, 356, 472
El Bakri, Mazhar Bey, 150
El Husseini, Djemal Effendi, 204
El Mansir, Abd, 238
ENGKOM, see Small Commission
Essener Konferenz (1932), 481-82
tolie Nord-Africaine, 146, 209, 258, 286,
301, 324
Ewert, Arthur, 261-62, 282, 284, 318
Falcon, Csar, 112
Fan Noli, 385-86
Far Eastern Secretariat of the AntiImperialist League (FESAIL), 414-15
Ferdi, Bekar, 35, 37, 46, 396, 399-400, 402,
404-09, 414-15, 418, 421, 423-26, 429, 43234, 439-45, 447-53, 458-59, 464, 466, 46870, 475, 488-91, 507, 509, 522
Ferguson, Aitken (Neptun), 37, 312-13, 325
Feuchtwanger, Leon, 330
Figatner, Yuriy Petrovich, 282, 284
Fimmen, Edo, 37, 74, 110-11, 130, 139, 146,
154, 158, 168, 179-80, 182, 187-90, 193,
203-04, 209, 215, 222-24, 226, 248, 250,
293, 303-04, 322, 337, 348, 354, 355, 357-

565

60, 370, 377, 391, 427, 430-32, 434, 510,

522
Fineberg, Iosif (Joseph), 129
Flieg, Leopold (Leo), 68-69, 105-06, 325,
411, 522
Fond fr Kolonialdelegationen, 298
Ford, James W., 245-46, 248-49, 273, 29495, 299-301, 305-06, 309, 313, 318, 32426, 330, 332-33, 337, 354, 372, 390, 39293, 413, 426, 432, 434-35, 438, 522
Fort-Witheman, Lovett, 86
Foster, William Z., 70, 175, 270
Fournier, Albert, 95, 112, 124, 146, 204
Freethinkers, 301
Friends of the Soviet Union, 49, 237, 244,
371-72, 379, 397, 401, 403, 481, 513
Fuchs, Eduard, 124, 126
Gaillard, Mireille, 426
Gamba, Charles, 382-84
Gandhi, Mahatma, 100, 119, 137, 173, 185,
331, 360, 383, 421, 437
Garland Fund, 177
Garvey, Marcus (Garveyism), 22-23, 232,
332
Geller, Lev N., 381
Grard, Georges, 146, 204
Geschke, Ottomar, 103, 160
Ghadr Party, 301, 309, 418
Gibarti, Louis (Laszlo Dobos), 30, 35, 46,
89, 91-93, 97-101, 104-06, 108, 111-12,
114-21, 124-25, 128, 132-33, 137, 140,
146, 148, 151, 154-59, 163, 167-68, 174,
182-86, 189-92, 195-99, 204, 209-10, 213,
218-19, 225, 229, 239, 382-84, 457, 46364, 470, 472, 505, 522
Gillies, William, 30, 190, 192-95, 523
Glading, Percy, 382, 432, 486, 500
Glaubauf, Hans (Gnther), 162, 221
Goldschmidt, Alfons, 99, 152, 168, 178, 183,
249, 301
Gomez, Manuel (Charles Shipman), 38, 69,
99, 132, 139, 146, 150, 175-77, 179, 204,
523
Gorki, Maxim, 386, 472
Gossip, Alex, 248, 287, 295, 438
Gross, Babette, 19-21, 30, 74, 91, 116, 119,
126, 129, 150, 238, 278, 320-21, 337, 469,

491, 497-98, 523

Gumede, Josiah Tshangana, 139-40, 150-51,
286, 309, 523
Gupta, Shivaprasad, 320, 323, 329-31, 333,
345, 352, 354, 360-61, 419, 433
Gusev, Sergei Ivanovich (Travin), 281, 283,
318, 368
Gssfeld, Kthe, 150
Gyptner, Richard (Alarich, Magnus), 37,
366, 523
Haitian Patriotic Union, 140, 311, 324
Hamid, Khwaja Abdul, 163
Hands off China, 53, 64-66, 68-70, 72, 74-77,
79-80, 84-85, 106, 112, 120, 134, 147-48,
162, 211, 338, 508
Harlem Tenants League, 311
Haschni, Jahia, 93
Hatta, Mohammad, 139, 146, 179-82, 204,
209, 222, 224, 226-27, 240, 242-43, 248,
286, 293, 309, 321-23, 337, 348, 353-55,
359, 391, 416, 427, 430, 432-33, 503, 506,
510, 523
Hayford, Casely, 86-87, 119
Haywood, Harry, 299-300, 444
Head Office (HO), 85, 175, 215, 226, 228
Heckert, Fritz, 37, 71, 199-200, 248-49, 278,
295, 312, 318, 325, 344, 433, 447, 473
Rudolf Hediger, see Dimitrov, Georgi
Heimo, Mauno, 38, 89, 117, 122-29, 132-33,
198, 221, 226-28, 254, 345, 352, 354, 358,
504, 524
Herrenhaus Congress (August 1925), 70-73,
75
Ho Chi Minh/Ngyuen Ai Quoc, 146, 205, 257
Holitscher, Arthur, 124-25, 217, 301
Hoppstock-Hut, Magda, 151, 456
Hug, Mahbubul, 99
Humbert-Droz, Jules, 160-61
el Husseini, Hamdi, 365, 420, 438
Hutchinson, Hugh Lester, 240
Independence for India League, 242, 275,
286
Independence from Moscow
(Unabhngigkeit von Moskau), 365
Independent Labour Party (ILP), 37, 112,
121, 141, 165-66, 190, 192-93, 195, 212-

566

13, 304, 320, 326, 328-29, 334-35, 356,

433, 484
India Union, 309
Indian Association, 309, 375
Indian Bureau (Berlin Indian Students
Information Bureau), 241-42, 289, 301-02,
416, 418-22
Indian Defence League, 223
Indian National Congress (INC), 100, 119,
127, 153, 173, 204, 241-44, 279, 286, 299,
301, 309, 320, 323, 329-32, 335-36, 36061, 370
Indian Trade Union Council, 302
Informationsbulletin der Liga gegen
Imperialismus, 31, 217-18, 446, 461, 467,
469, 488, 492, 494
Informationsdienst, 409, 445
Inprecorr (International Press
Correspondence), 29, 65, 113-14, 144,
170-71, 192-93, 278, 319, 321, 327, 336,
359, 409, 426, 432-33, 444, 446, 473, 484,
489
Institute of Marxism-Leninism, 16,26
Inter-Colonial Association, 140
Inter- Parliamentary Union, 238
International Colonial Bureau of the
Comintern (ICBu), 53, 59-60, 85
International Control Commission (ICC),
199, 423-24, 451, 458, 504
International Labour Defence (ILD), see
Internationale Rote Hilfe
International Labour Organisation (ILO), 76,
302-04
International Lenin School (ILS), 151, 218,
404, 448, 466
International of Seamen and Harbour
Workers (ISH), 406, 410
International Secretariat for Work Among
Women, 284
International Trade Union Committee of
Negro Workers of the RILU (ITUCNW),
305-06, 324, 332-33, 376, 411, 413, 453,
513
International Womens League for Peace and
Freedom, 146, 183, 301
Internationale der Kriegsopfer, 301
Internationale Rote Hilfe (IRH), 50, 71, 92,
162, 298, 323, 325, 371-72, 383, 385, 398,

412, 426, 432-33, 443-44, 446-47, 462, 470,

475-76, 481, 483
Irish Republican Party, 445
Islamia, 310
Islamic Academic Association, 93
Iyengar, Srinivasa, 240-42, 275
Jakoby, Siegfried, 104
Jalabi, Hajj Muhammad, 100, 421, 525
Japanische revolutionre Gruppe, 323, 416
Japanische Sprachgruppe der KPD, 524
Jhabwala, S. H., 137, 172-75, 204, 225, 240
Johnsen, Teddy, 92
Johnstone, Jack W., 70, 244-45, 287, 524
Jones, Mardy, 182-87, 245
Joshi, 76, 85, 99, 185, 302-04
Ju Fei, 258
Jger, Hans, 125, 322, 363-64, 432, 434, 436,
524
Kabadi, Sunder P., 375
Kadalie, Clements, 204
Kai-shek, Chiang, 96, 100, 170
Katayama, Sen, 36, 129, 142, 146, 148, 154,
162, 179, 201, 204-05, 207-08, 313, 323,
325, 472, 510, 524
Katholische Gewerkschaften, 158
Katz, Otto, 432, 435
Kenyatta, Johnstone (Jomo), 309, 329, 333
de Keermacker, Josef, 325
Khalifat Committee, 99-100
Khankhoji, Pandurang S., 417-18, 524
al Khattabi, Abd el-Krim, 59
Khitarov, Rafael Moiseevich, 283-84, 299
Kikuyu Central Association, 309, 324
Kilbom, Karl, 103, 234-35
KIM (Kommunisticheskii Internatsional
Molodezhi), 64, 66, 143, 190, 263, 284, 288,
313, 324, 326, 392, 399, 401, 403-05
Kippenberger, Hans, 473
Kitaigorodsky, Pyotr, 266, 284, 298, 311,
329, 400
Klapper, Katja, 460
Klub der Zaglulisten, 86
Knittel, Fritz, 325
Knorin, Wilhelm, 481, 491
Kollwitz, Kthe, 71
Kolonial Revue, 152, 160, 192, 198

567

Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD),

2-3, 6, 8, 14, 19, 27, 58, 63, 68-69, 71, 77,
92, 103, 110, 114, 121-22, 125-26, 131,
153-54, 157, 162, 167-69, 175, 193, 19899, 232, 239, 248, 277-79, 291, 295-96,
312, 323, 325, 341-42, 367, 373-74, 376,
397, 412, 415, 417, 419, 432, 453-55, 460,
464-66, 469, 475, 478-82, 488, 492-93,
504, 512
Korean Association, 142, 323
Kornblum, Isaak Romanovich, 64, 66, 69,
79, 89, 287, 291, 318
KOSTUFRA (Kommunistische Studenten
Fraktion), 325, 405, 416, 420, 448, 460,
470
Kouyat, Garan Tiemoko, 201, 309, 324,
333-34, 411-12, 432, 434-35, 449, 525
Kreps, Michael E., 287, 488, 491
Krestintern, 28, 50, 287, 299, 311, 400, 403,
470, 481
Kruyt, John William, 78, 92
Kunigattis, J., 415
Kunizaki, Teido, 36, 46, 323, 415-16, 432,
443, 452, 456, 467-68, 504, 524
Kuntz, Albert, 464
Kuomintang (KMT), 57, 65, 71, 92, 96, 100,
121, 141, 146, 167-71, 187, 189, 196, 206,
209-10, 218, 233, 293, 295, 328-29, 33132, 345, 361, 461, 482-84
Kurella, Alfred, 407
KUTV (Kommunisticheskii universitet
trudiashchikhsia Vostoka), 89, 200, 205,
261, 306, 411, 421, 448-49
Kuusinen, Otto W., 38, 48, 67, 70, 79, 87,
89, 97, 113, 116-17, 122, 126-27, 130, 193,
215, 220, 233-36, 238, 240, 243-48, 250,
253-58, 262, 264, 268-69, 273, 279-80,
282-83, 286, 289, 296-97, 299, 301-02,
314-17, 345-46, 350, 368-69, 381, 387,
390, 392-96, 399-400, 403, 423, 429-31,
434, 447, 466, 505, 525
La Guma, Jimmy, 125, 140, 150-51, 205,
245
Labour Party (British), 30, 37, 121, 165, 167,
182, 184, 189-90, 212, 223, 327, 330, 335,
435
Labour Research Department (LRD), 213,

259
Labour and Socialist International (LSI), 6, 14,
30, 67, 73, 96, 115, 129, 149, 164, 166-68,
180, 187-89, 190-96, 200, 202, 206-07, 209,
224-25, 229, 232, 237-38, 293-94, 300, 30405, 330, 357, 393, 431, 434, 437, 507, 509
de Lacerda, Mauricio, 216
LAI General Council (Brussels, December
1927), 30, 146, 178, 186, 195-97, 200, 202,
203-05, 207-09, 211, 215
LAI Political Commission, 283, 293, 301
Landy-Witkowski, Adam (Vitkovsky), 283,
314
Lano, Boschi, 438
Lansbury, George, 37, 110-12, 121, 124, 137,
140-41, 146, 150, 153-55, 164-65, 168, 18889, 208, 222, 327, 459, 525
Larkin Jr., Jim, 210, 438
League for Human Rights (Liga fr
Menschenrechte, LHR), 74-75, 80, 82, 89,
92, 101, 121-22, 124, 153, 211
League of Nations, 5, 76, 80, 151, 224, 428,
434, 446, 484, 506
Ledebour, Georg, 71-72, 80, 92, 95, 101, 139,
146, 152, 216, 237, 278, 329, 386, 456
Lefbre, Henri, 182-83
Lefela, Maphutseng, 291
Lehmann-Russbldt, Otto, 74, 82, 91-92, 121,
124, 239, 301, 456
Lehnhoff Wyld, Friedrich Karl, 133
Leibrand, Robert, 325
Leipzig Trial (1933), 477
Leitner [?], 411, 444
Lekhotla la Bafo, 291
Lenin (Ulyanov), Vladimir IIich, 2-3, 20, 48,
51, 54-57, 77, 208, 240
Lenski, Julian, 428-29, 464
Lenz, Josef, 419, 434
Lessing, Theodor, 112, 133, 146, 237, 301,
456
Liau, Hansin, 36, 46, 141-42, 146, 150, 152,
154, 169-72, 182, 196-200, 209-11, 218,
222, 224-25, 229, 323, 416, 504, 507, 525
Ligue de Dfense de la Race Ngre (League
for the Defence of the Negro Race,
LDRN), 201, 236, 253, 257, 309, 324, 334,
341, 372, 405, 411-12, 435
Lindhagen, Carl, 30-31, 156, 238, 240, 291,

568

319, 321, 329

Locarno Treaty (1925), 427
Lominadze, Vissarion Vissarionovich
(Besso), 142, 150, 160, 210
Lovestone, Jay, 160, 270-71, 314, 383
Lozovsky, Solomon Abramovich, 227-28,
283, 299-300, 316-17, 381, 390, 392-93,
395, 403-04
Lu Chung Lin, 143, 146, 204
van der Lubbe, Marius, 477, 493
Ludwig, Emil, 301
Luhani, G. A. K., 316-17
Macaulay, Frank, 411, 413
MacDonald, Ramsey, 327, 356, 377
MacManus, Arthur, 130
Madjid, Abdul (Aziz, Hafiz), 181, 414,
426, 432, 438
Magyar, Ludwig Ignatovich, 38, 262-67,
301, 312-13, 321, 341, 346, 358, 378-79,
381, 387, 390, 392-93, 399, 402, 410, 41314, 423, 426-31, 434, 439-41, 444-45, 448,
466, 468-69, 477, 483, 487-91, 497-99,
504, 510, 525
Malaka, Tan, 58, 123
Malik, Abdur Rauf, 421
Manaff, Abdul, 183, 222, 414, 426
Mann, Tom, 128
Manuilsky, Dmitri Zajarovich, 38, 58-59, 65,
77, 81-82, 88-89, 113-14, 116, 129, 255,
272-73, 278, 299, 301, 311, 315-17, 32021, 335, 344, 350, 368-69, 381, 390-95,
399, 403, 439, 526
Marteaux, Andr, 137, 146, 153, 182, 204,
209, 222, 248
Marxist-Leninist conception of imperialism,
43, 449
Marxistische Arbeiterschulung (MASCH),
419, 446
Mattar, Achmed Hassan, 86, 97-98, 150, 526
Maxton, James, 37, 112, 124, 139, 190, 195,
208, 211-14, 222-27, 237-38, 246-50, 280,
292, 304-05, 312, 320, 322, 326-29, 334-35,
337, 343, 345, 347-48, 351, 354-57, 370,
391, 427, 430-33, 435, 459, 462, 484, 510,
526
Meerut Conspiracy Trial, 175, 279-80, 316,
330, 363, 376-77, 437-38, 462, 474, 480,

485-86, 500
Mella, Julio A., 175, 177, 179, 204, 287, 383
Melnitschansky, Grigorij Natnovic, 228, 24849, 251-52, 282-83, 292-93, 295, 299-300,
311-12, 321, 325-26, 328-30, 334-35, 337,
353-54, 438, 504, 526
Meng-yu, Kou, 79, 86, 95, 99-100, 112, 146,
171
Messali, Hadj-Ahmed, 146, 204
Meyer, Ernst, 71
MI5, 29, 36, 102, 128, 167-68, 181, 234, 249,
404, 454, 463, 466, 500
Michaelis, Karin, 386
Mif, Pavel Aleksandrovich, 38, 254, 298, 301,
311, 317, 348, 366, 381, 468, 504
Miglioli, Guido, 146, 204
Miners Federation of Great Britain (MFGB),
184, 246, 250
Ministerium des Innern (MdI), 29, 122, 171,
396-97, 453-55, 465, 467, 470, 472, 480-81,
488, 492, 512
Minor, Robert, 111, 115
Misiano, Francesco, 63, 69, 77, 157, 526
Mohani, Hasrat, 98-99, 204
Moirova, Varvara Akimovna, 284, 299, 311
Molotov, Vyacheslav, 255, 283, 368, 381
Molotov-Gusev-Kuusinen Commission
(1929), 281-83
Monmousseau, Gaston, 295, 325
Moore, Richard B., 87, 140, 176, 204
Moreau, Albert, 408
Morin, Edgar, 116
Moss Lovett, Robert, 175
van Munster, Gijsbert Jasper, 30, 227
Mller, Kurt, 64-65, 69, 84-85, 87-89, 527
Mnzenberg, Willi, 1-4, 12, 16, 19-21, 24, 2931, 35, 37-38, 46, 53, 60-62, 66-77, 80, 8285, 87-89, 91-98, 100, 103-08, 110, 11218, 121-36, 139, 141-47, 149-50, 152-60,
163-65, 169-71, 174-80, 182-84, 189, 19294, 196-205, 208-11, 214-15, 218-29, 235,
237-40, 243-52, 254, 256, 268, 272, 275,
278-80, 282-83, 285-93, 295-98, 301-05,
307, 309-13, 321-22, 325-28, 336-39, 34446, 348-56, 360, 363, 366-69, 374-79, 38688, 390, 396-98, 401, 404-05, 407-08, 411,
416-17, 422, 426, 429, 432-35, 437-38,
440, 442, 444, 447-48, 450, 452, 455-57,

569

461-65, 468-70, 472-73, 475, 480, 483-86,

488, 490-94, 497-500, 504-05, 507-10,
514, 527
Naidu, M. Jayasurya S., 241, 421, 479, 506,
527
Naidu, Sarojini, 119, 241
Nambiar, A. C. N., 92, 240-42, 289, 302,
416, 419, 421-22, 479, 527
National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades
Association, 287
National Association for the Advancement of
Coloured People (NAACP), 112, 124-25,
177, 324, 370
National Minority Movement (NMM), 325,
413, 438
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche
Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP), 2, 8, 11, 14, 396,
465, 469, 475, 477-82, 488, 491, 504, 512
Nearing, Scott, 137, 175, 436
de Negri, Ramon, 112
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 8, 22, 112, 119, 128, 142,
146, 151, 153-54, 158, 165, 172-73, 182,
189, 204, 209, 222, 225-26, 239, 241-43,
275, 279, 286, 289, 293, 299, 302, 304,
316, 331, 337, 354-55, 357, 359-62, 391,
416, 427, 429-30, 432-33, 437, 459, 506,
510, 528
Nehru, Motilal, 119, 160, 204, 242
Neumann, Heinz, 68-69, 210
New Economic Policy (NEP), 219, 231, 277
Nn, Andreu, 234
ODonell, Peader, 445
OMS (Otdel mezhdunarodnoi sviazi), 35,
262, 267, 342, 444, 458, 491
Otsuka, Nakanome, 464
Padmore, George, 20-22, 406, 413, 436, 438,
447, 449-50, 453, 463, 465, 479, 528
Pan-Arab Committee, 309
Pan-Pacific Labour Conference (1927), 128
Paquet, Alfons, 95, 124, 133, 301
Pascha, Tassun, 100
Partei Communiste Francais (PCF), 37, 59-60,
62-64, 85, 114, 128, 130, 201, 219, 222, 226,
231, 253, 257-58, 312, 325, 341, 367-68,
371-72, 374, 377-78, 407-09, 411, 433, 449,

464, 468-69, 481, 497

Patterson, William (Wilson), 294-95, 300,
306, 312, 324-25, 332-33, 373, 528
Pepper, John (Joszef Pogany), 103, 270
Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI), 133, 139, 18081, 186, 227, 243, 286, 301, 309, 323, 359,
370, 385, 414, 426, 432
Peters, Lucie, 125, 322
Petrov, Fedor (Fedor Feodorovich
Raskolnikov), 107, 116, 118, 127, 134, 142,
154, 160
Petrovsky, David Alexandrovich (A. J.
Bennet, Isolde, Goldfarb), 30, 36, 12728, 130-31, 134, 160-61, 164-65, 168-71,
180, 183-84, 195-98, 203, 212-14, 218, 221,
228, 234, 252, 254, 269, 282-83, 285, 36668, 504, 528
Piatnitsky, Osip (Iosif), 28, 38-39, 69-70, 79,
108, 113, 116-18, 132-33, 159-60, 174, 18286, 203, 220-21, 241, 255, 271, 273, 282-84,
296-97, 301, 311-12, 343, 349, 354, 362,
364, 368, 373, 381, 392, 399, 401, 406, 41012, 418, 421, 444, 449, 488, 498-99, 504,
509, 528
Pickens, William, 112, 124-25, 175-76, 29192, 294-95, 324, 332-33, 343
Pieck, Wilhelm, 71, 200, 427, 429, 457-58,
464
Ping, Huang, 323, 331, 354, 426, 438, 481-84,
488, 500, 528
Ping-shan, Tan, 128
Piscator-Bhne (Erwin Piscator), 80, 217,
386, 398
Platten, Friedrich (Fritz), 77
Plisnier, Charles, 146, 204
Poale Zion, 323, 326
Political Commission, 27, 38, 343, 348-49,
351, 358-59, 362, 366-70, 372, 374, 37881, 387, 389, 392, 395, 399, 402, 407, 413,
423-24, 427-30, 440-42, 447, 457-58, 461,
463-64, 468-69, 472, 482-83, 488-89, 49799
Political Secretariat, 27, 38, 116, 127-28,
132-33, 159-61, 220-21, 247, 251-52, 254,
258-62, 270, 272, 275, 280-83, 285, 28991, 293, 295, 300, 311-12, 337, 341-42,
345-46, 348, 351, 372, 377, 387, 390-96,
401, 469, 488

570

Pollitt, Harry, 146, 165, 204, 211-13, 248-49,

251, 299, 311-12, 317-18, 325-30, 337,
354, 376, 382, 426, 438, 472-73, 498, 500,
529
Pour Reza, Mohammed, 93
Pressedienst, 31, 160, 217, 244, 286-88,
357-58, 403, 459
Profintern, 28, 37, 50, 64, 66- 67, 71, 128,
188, 227-29, 234, 246-50, 252, 254-55,
282-83, 287, 294, 298, 305-06, 312, 32425, 333, 351, 368, 373, 378-81, 393-94,
400, 403, 406, 411-14, 432, 442, 453, 461
Provisional Committee of the International
Congress against Colonial Oppression,
112
Prger, Eugene, 278-79
Radek, Karl, 57
Ramirez, Manuel Diaz, 284, 311, 417
Rathauskeller Conference (10 February,
1926), 84, 87, 91-94, 98-99, 241
Reichskommissar fr berwachung der
ffentlichen Ordnung (RKO), 29, 99,
101, 121-23, 157, 162-63, 168, 194, 225,
241, 249, 401, 512
Reichministerium des Innern (RMdI), 23738, 397, 470
Remmele, Hermann, 153, 161, 164, 178,
254, 364
von Reventlow, Graf, 71
Revisionskommission fr die Massenorganisationen, 481-82
Richards, E. A., 205
Rivera, Diego, 151, 178, 204, 209, 222, 248,
286, 292, 337, 354
Roland-Holst, Henriette, 146, 204
Rolland, Romain, 137, 226, 472-73
Rosenberg, Marcel, 128-29
Rosemond, Henry, 324, 332
Rothstein, Andrew, 118, 130, 212, 234, 238
Roy, Manabendra Nath, 1, 36, 56, 59-60, 76,
85, 87, 92, 103, 105, 107-10, 113-14, 116,
118, 128, 130, 172, 208, 221, 229, 234, 241,
317, 374-75, 383, 404, 419, 508, 529
Ruegg case, 415, 461-62, 467, 474, 484
Rust, William, 382
Ruthenberg, C. E., 70

Saadi, Mustafa, 382, 384, 438

Sabri, Mohammed, 238
Safarov, Georgi, 348, 359, 429, 457, 468
Saklatvala, Shapurji, 95-96, 102, 112, 114,
121, 146, 164, 182, 184-86, 209, 212-14,
222, 233, 237-38, 248, 293, 322, 325, 333,
337, 354, 375, 426, 432, 438, 472, 498, 500,
529
Sandino, Augustino, 287, 337, 354, 376, 438
Sarekat Islam, 123, 180, 186
Saul, Ben, 323
Senussi, 204
Schiff, Frieda, 452
Schiffer, Peter, 325
Schneller, Ernst, 68-69, 106-07, 109-10
Scholze, Paul, 78, 374, 432, 434-35
Schubin, Joel, 254, 266, 284, 298-99, 311, 318
Schudel, Otto, 36, 46, 150-51, 239, 303-04,
376, 529
Schutzpolizei, 28, 169, 288, 365, 401, 424,
429, 451, 453, 458-60, 468, 470-71, 475,
478, 481, 491-92, 495, 512
Scottsboro case and campaign, 23, 443, 474
Semard, Pierre, 160, 257
Semaun, A., 124, 129, 146, 204
Senghor, Lamine, 133, 140, 146, 150, 201-02,
204, 258, 529
Sierra Leone Railway Workers Union, 20405, 229
Simmel, Georg, 1, 41
Sinclair, Upton, 176, 386, 472
Singh, Rattan, 301, 309, 323, 331, 418, 438
Small Commission, 28, 39, 154, 156-57,
162, 169, 180-81, 183, 253-55, 259, 262,
281, 349-51
Smedley, Agnes, 22, 168, 288
Smeral, Bohumil, 36-37, 46, 160, 313, 34951, 353-54, 357-59, 363-70, 373-83, 38590, 392, 394-96, 399, 401, 403-06, 410-11,
418, 423-24, 426, 428, 432, 434, 440-42,
444, 450, 470, 507, 509-10, 529
Sociaal Demokratische Arbeiderspartij
(SDAP), 179-80
Socialist Bund, 81, 92
Solanke, Lapido, 309
Solar System theory, 48, 97, 162, 193-94,
400, 505
Soong Qingling (Mme Sun Yat-sen), 112, 146

571

205, 463
South African Trade Union Congress, 140,
204, 292, 309
Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland
(SPD), 72, 78, 149, 193, 277-79, 342, 469
Special Meerut Release Committee (1933),
485-86
Sportintern, 50, 287, 325, 403, 481
Spratt, Philip, 127, 174, 214, 240, 244, 279,
485
Stalin (Dzhugashvili), Iosif Vissarionovich,
9, 55, 96, 179, 219, 231, 233, 269-70, 27778, 283, 315, 479, 482, 508
Standing Commission, 28, 39, 271-72, 280,
282, 287, 311-13, 348, 351
Stasova, Elena (Hertha), 446, 472
Stcker, Helene, 95, 101, 124, 133, 146, 151,
204, 329, 472
Stcker, Walter, 130
Sue Ring Hei, 323
Sukarno, Achmed, 1-2, 205, 309, 414, 457,
503, 506
Sukur, Abdullah, 243
Sun Yat-sen, 57, 65
Sret (French), 60, 158, 201, 203, 257, 287,
448
Suryaningrat, Raden Mas Soewardi
(Ki Hajar Dewantara), 405
Swede, Oscar H., 30, 321
Syrian Rebels (Hauptquartier der syrischen
Aufstndischen), 150
Tagore, S., 405, 419, 440
Tang, Chuang, 464
Taraq, Mohammed Eminbawi, 100
Tendulkar, Ayi Ganpat, 460
Thengdi, Dr., 337, 354
Thompson, Joan, 213-14
Thurtle, Ernest, 121
Thlmann, Ernst, 277, 429, 435, 464, 469, 472
Thgersen, Hans (York, Miller), 36, 40406, 422-23, 432, 440-41, 444, 451-53, 46669, 488, 504, 530
Togliatti, Palmiro (Ercoli), 157-58
Toller, Ernst, 80-81, 125, 301
Toman, Karl, 382, 385
Trilliser, Mikhail (Moskvin), 365, 390, 530
Tschang Pah Chung, 71

Tschelebi, N., 93, 100

Ugarte, Manuel, 112, 146, 204
Ulbricht, Walter, 291, 300, 313, 341-42
Universal Negro Improvement Association
(UNIA), 140
Union Intercoloniale, 60
Usmani, Sikandar S., 234
Vandervelde, Emile, 115-17, 138, 192, 203
Vantadour, Jacques, 151
Varga, Jen (Eugen), 169
Vasconcelos, Jos, 112, 139, 146, 204
Vereinigung fr Deutsche Siedlung und
Wanderung, 102, 125, 217
Verri, Victorio, 146, 204
Versailles Peace Treaty (1919), 5, 7-8, 37, 54,
76, 80, 149, 155, 223, 430, 434, 443, 481,
511
Vincent, Jean, 484
Virtanen, Niilo, 178, 261-63, 268-69, 297
de Visser, Louis, 182, 187, 325, 426
Vlachoff, Dimitrije, 385-86, 432, 438
Wafd, 286, 433
Wailing Wall riots (1929), 355-56
Wall Street crash (1929), 342
van Walree, H., 183
Wassiljew, B. A, 103, 129, 233, 282, 284, 313,
318, 381, 395, 407, 457-58
Wegner, Armin T., 217, 456
Weil, Simone, 363
Weiss, Fritz, 81, 92, 131
Werkhoven, Cornelis, 179-80
West African Farmers Union (WAFU), 291
West African Students Association
(WASU), 86, 309
West European Bureau (WEB), 36-37, 40,
220-21, 261-62, 272, 278, 312, 321, 325,
341, 344, 349, 357, 364, 366, 368, 373, 376,
378, 383-84, 386, 397-99, 401, 403, 408-09,
418, 426, 434, 442-43, 445-46, 454, 468-69,
472-74, 478, 481-82, 489, 492
Wiatrek, Heinrich (Weber), 200
Wilde, Grete (Erna Mertens), 458
Wilkinson, Ellen, 121, 141, 155, 190, 238
Windmller, Ella, 36, 197-98, 452-53, 467,
530

572

Wittfogel, Karl August, 20, 36, 131, 152, 32122, 327, 398, 419, 421, 432, 456, 488, 493,
530
Wilson, Woodrow (Wilsonian moment), 5-6,
54, 149, 511
Wolfe, Bertram D., 221, 270, 283
Wood, Samuel R., 86-87
Workers Party of America (WPA), 36, 38, 70,
86, 111, 128, 140, 244, 246
Workers Welfare League of India, 222, 323
Zaghlul Party, 86
Zentralkomitee des Kommunistische Partei
Deutschland (ZK KPD), 28-29, 35, 38, 61,
63-64, 66, 68-69, 71, 79, 81-82, 89, 104-06,
109, 114, 130-31, 162, 198, 210, 244, 277,
325, 341-42, 362, 374-76, 411, 417, 419,
422, 454, 460, 466-67, 472
Zetkin, Clara, 77-78, 80, 126, 472
Zimmerwald movement, 55
Zinoviev, Grigori, 57, 69, 71-75, 96-97, 100,
104-05, 113
Yaglom, Ya. K., 228
Youssef, Ibrahim, 324, 331, 421

573

574

Fredrik Petersson

Willi Mnzenberg, the League against Imperialism,

and the Comintern, 1925 1933

lonialism in Brussels marked the establishment of the anti-imperialist organisation,

the League against Imperialism and for National Independence (LAI, 1927-37). The
complex preparations for the congress were though initiated already in 1925 by Willi
Mnzenberg, a German communist and General Secretary of the communist mass
organisation, Internationale Arbeiterhilfe (IAH, 1921-35), together with the Communist International (Comintern, 1919-43). Berlin was the centre for the LAI and its
International Secretariat (1927-33), a city serving the intentions of the communists
to nd colonial migr activists in the Weimar capital, acting as representatives for
the anti-colonial movement in Europe after the Great War. With the ascendancy to
power of the Nazi Party (NSDAP) on 30 January 1933, the LAI reached an abrupt, but
nonetheless, expected end in Berlin. This doctoral thesis examines the role, purpose
and functions of a sympathising communist organization (LAI): to act as an intermediary for the Comintern to the colonies. The analysis evaluates the structure and
activities of the LAI, and by doing so, establish a complex understanding on one of
the most inuential communist organisations during the interwar period, which, despite its short existence, assumed a nostalgic reference and historical bond for anticolonial movements during the transition from colonialism to post-colonialism after
the Second World War, e.g. the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955.

We Are Neither Visionaries Nor Utopian Dreamers.

On 10 February 1927, the First International Congress against Imperialism and Co-

Fredrik Petersson

Willi Mnzenberg, the League against Imperialism, and the Comintern, 1925 1933

We Are Neither Visionaries

Nor Utopian Dreamers.

Fredrik Peterssons study, based on archives in Moscow, Berlin, Amsterdam, London,

and Stockholm, uncovers why the Comintern established and supported the LAI
and its anti-imperialist agenda, disclosing a complicated undertaking, characterised
by conict and the internal struggle for power, involving structural constraints and
individual ambitions dened by communist ideology and strategy.

2013

bo Akademis frlag

Fredrik Petersson

We Are Neither Visionaries

Nor Utopian Dreamers.
Willi Mnzenberg, the League against Imperialism,
and the Comintern, 1925 1933
Doctoral Thesis, General History
Division for Arts, Education and Theology, History Department