Hearing: (H.A.S.C. No. 113-91)
Hearing: (H.A.S.C. No. 113-91)
HEARING
ON
WASHINGTON
2014
(II)
CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
HEARING:
Tuesday, March 25, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Army ..........................................
APPENDIX:
Tuesday, March 25, 2014 ........................................................................................
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WITNESSES
McHugh, Hon. John M., Secretary of the Army ....................................................
Odierno, GEN Raymond T., USA, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army ...............................
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APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
McHugh, Hon. John M., joint with GEN Raymond T. Odierno ....................
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:
Mr. Enyart ........................................................................................................
Mr. Wilson .........................................................................................................
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:
Mr. Barber .........................................................................................................
Ms. Bordallo ......................................................................................................
Mr. Brooks .........................................................................................................
Mr. Conaway .....................................................................................................
Mr. Cook ............................................................................................................
Mr. Gibson .........................................................................................................
Dr. Heck ............................................................................................................
Mr. Langevin .....................................................................................................
Mr. LoBiondo ....................................................................................................
Mr. Loebsack .....................................................................................................
Mr. Maffei .........................................................................................................
Mr. McKeon .......................................................................................................
Mr. Nugent ........................................................................................................
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FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 25, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Howard P. Buck McKeon
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. BUCK MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
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bility operations, involve minimal casualties, and assume significant troop contributions from our partner countries. Therefore, the
Department does not have the size of the Army for long-duration
land wars. I worry that the Department is justifying its deep cuts
to the Army based on this set of unrealistic assumptions.
We can look to every major land conflict we have been involved
in to know that we are usually wrong. And we have seen how deep
cuts to our defense capabilities, especially the Army, can result in
dire consequences. I fear that we as a nation are heading down
that path that General Abrams was referring to. Wishful thinking
is not a strategy to pin our force structure decisions upon.
I hope these sobering remarks remind us to not lose sight of our
shared values and the vital importance of reversing the dangerous
budget trajectory. I look forward to your testimony here today.
Mr. Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
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of that was for defense to show the areas where we would like to
be able to spend more money. They put offsets in to cover the cost
of that; offsets which I realize Congress probably will not accept,
but the challenge remains.
Here is the amount of money more we would like to spend. If we
on this committee want to spend it, find the offsets. Find the offsets, make it work, and spend that extra money. If you dont, we
have to live with the numbers that we have, and there are very few
Members of this Congress who would say that those numbers are
ideal or even workable, but it is what you have to live with.
And that is what gets you to the decisions that you have made
in this budget. And I believe that the decisions are sound. They are
certainly controversial. When you look at what is going on with the
Guard and Reserve, that is controversial. Bringing the size of the
force down to 440,000 or 450,000 is controversial. Many of the
changes that you have made in terms of your air support, in terms
of the helicopters, are going to be controversial, but they fit within
the budget and they make sense within that budget.
And as I have said many times in this hearing, I would urge everybody here, if you dont like those cuts, offer alternatives; offer
alternatives or give them more money. The giving them more
money part does not seem likely for a variety of different reasons
which I wont get into this morning, but if we are stuck with that
cap number, it is not enough for this committee to rail against the
cuts that have been proposed in this budget. We have to offer alternatives. It is literally a zero-sum game. And I think the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense have looked long and
hard at that, and come up with reasonable choices to make that
work.
Now, the final thing I will say about this is what I really believe
makes those choices reasonable, is as the chairman alludes to, the
worst the thing that we can do is ask the men and women serving
in our Army to perform a task that we do not equip and train them
to do. That is what a hollow force is. No matter the size of the
force, if they are not equipped and trained, they are not ready, and
it is a dereliction of our duty to prepare them. So, set the size but
make sure they are trained and equipped to perform the task that
we ask them to do.
If we do not accept some of the reasonable cuts that are put in
place here, if we insist on higher numbers in all of these places,
that gives us the very real possibility of having that hollow force.
The force will be bigger, the Guard and Reserve will be bigger.
There will be certain pet programs that are important to people
that wont be cut, but where will that money be made up? That
money will be made up in readiness. That money will be made up
in less maintenance, less equipment, and less training. So we will
have a larger force that is not prepared to fight, and that is the
worst dereliction of duty that we can have.
So I would urge us to, you know, live with the budget we have
got and make sure that the men and women serving in the Army
have the training and equipment that they need to perform whatever task it is that we decide that they are going to do.
I do not for a moment think that we absolutely have to just totally accept the budget that you are giving us. I am sure there are
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places where other savings can be found. It is the duty of this committee to take a look at that and try to find those, and I hope that
we will, but the committee is not doing its duty if we just say dont
cut this and dont offer an alternative.
So, I think this hearing this morning is incredibly important as
we sift through those tough choices and try to figure out, are they
the correct ones, and if not, in this zero-sum game that we are living in, what are the correct cuts that need to be made?
So again, I thank both Secretary McHugh and General Odierno,
in general, for your fantastic service, but in particular, for the extraordinarily difficult set of circumstances that you have had to
wrestle with in putting together this budget.
I look forward to the testimony and the questions. I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY
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Trust me, this is not what we wanted. It is not what your Army,
I think, deserves. But it is what we have had to do to preserve
Americas land power in such an austere fiscal environment, as
constructed by the dictates approved in law.
Nevertheless, in spite of turbulent funding and tremendous
change, this past year has been one of great transition, transformation, and triumph for your Army; not just here at home, but
around the globe as well. The resiliency, agility, and determination
of our warriors has been nothing short of amazing. From intense
combat to counterterrorism in retrograde to humanitarian relief,
disaster assistance, and regional engagement, your soldiers and civilians from every component, Active, National Guard, and Reserve, have seen unprecedented success, saved countless lives, promoted freedom and democracy in some 150 nations around the
world.
In Afghanistan, the Army continued to fight insurgents and terrorists as we transitioned into a training and support role, helping
to set conditions for elections in April and an appropriate withdrawal in December.
Simultaneously, we continued one of the largest retrograde operations in our Nations historyreturning or removing or demilitarizing some 580,000 pieces of equipment in just the past 12
months alone. We plan to retrograde over $10.2 billion of the
Armys $15.5 billion in equipment currently there.
As we continue to fight in one theater, we also expanded our regional alignments, conducting dozens of engagements with partners
around the world, from the rebalance to the Pacific to exercises in
Africa, South America, and Europe, our soldiers demonstrated their
global responsiveness, reassured our allies, and deterred would-be
aggressors.
In the Pacific, the Army remained a cornerstone of support with
some 80,000 Active and Reserve soldiers available to conduct operations. We have assigned 1st Corps to PACOM [United States Pacific Command] to provide a rapidly deployable joint headquarters,
maintained a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] battery in Guam to provide theater missile defense, and conducted 28
large-scale exercises with 13 different countries.
Elsewhere, we conducted over 70 engagements with partners in
Africa, participated in multilateral exercises with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], and deployed teams from the Georgia
Army National Guard to serve several Central and South American
countries.
We supported stability in the Middle East, with over 4,300 soldiers participating in Operation Spartan Shield, as well as 2,200
taking part in 7 exercises, including the deployment of key elements of the 1st Armored Division to Jordan.
Simultaneously, as our forces perform vital missions around the
world, the Army began a major transformation to reorganize our
brigade combat teams, accelerate end strength reductions, and cut
our headquarters staff. All designed to protect critical readiness
and seek more balance under these budget times.
In June, we announced the elimination of 12 brigade combat
teams so that we could reorganize and strengthen those that remain. In September, we announced a 2-year acceleration of our
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drawdown to reach 490,000 Active, 350,000 Guard, and 202,000
Army Reserve soldiers by the end of 2015, with the vast majority
of those cuts being taken from the Active forces.
In the summer, we conducted a comprehensive review in coordination with DOD and directed the reduction of headquarters personnel by up to 25 percent across the force. As we continue to retrograde, restructure, and reduce, we also continue our transition to
decisive action training, replacing our recent focus on counterinsurgency. Unfortunately, due to severe cuts in fiscal year 2013, we
were forced to cancel seven combat training center rotations and
significantly reduce home station training.
Although we ensured deploying units were fully trained, sequestration cuts directly impacted the training, readiness, and leader
development of more than two divisions worth of soldiers.
Moreover, in fiscal year 2014, even under the temporary relief
provided by the BBA [Balanced Budget Act], the Army will not be
able to train a sufficient number of brigades and meet unforeseen
strategic requirements, and currently can provide only a limited
number of BCTs [brigade combat teams] trained for decisive action.
Although readiness levels will increase through this year and in
2015, the looming sequestration return in fiscal year 2016 will
quickly erode these gains.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not mention the extraordinary
burden our civilian employees have faced over the past year with
pay freezes and furloughs. Although our fiscal 2014 appropriation
bought some much needed relief, I fear we have yet to see the true
impacts of these cuts on their morale and on their retention.
Looking back, it has been a tumultuous year, but it is still clear
now more than ever we must have predictable long-term funding
that supports deliberate planning and responsible actions, and for
that, we need your help, we need your leadership.
Our fiscal year 2015 budget request reflects the challenging fiscal
times in which we live by making the hard strategic choices now.
It contains difficult decisions to further reduce end strength, realign our aviation assets, prioritize near-term readiness, and protect soldier and family programs.
We do much of this by taking calculated risk in modernization
and facilities programs. There is no question, this budget is lean,
it could be described as stark and it is critical to meet the needs
of our Nation and its soldiers.
In this request, we will begin further reductions to our end
strength, reaching 450,000 Active, 335,000 Guard, 195,000 Reserve
soldiers by the end of fiscal 2017. It is important to know, we are
also adjusting our force mix in favor of the Reserve Component.
This is the maximum end strength we can afford to protect readiness and the minimum we need to execute the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.
Nevertheless, this is clearly not without risk. Members, we must
restructure our aviation portfolio. We recognize this is controversial, but in our view, there is simply no choice. The money is gone,
and we must balance these vital assets in a way that maximizes
our readiness and minimizes costs across all components. This initiative will generate savings by reducing our total number of plat-
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forms andfrom seven to four. We will divest the older, less capable Kiowa and TH67 trainers in favor of Apaches and Lakotas.
In support, the Guard will transfer their low-density, high-demand Apache attack helicopters to the Active Army, and in return
will receive 100 of our most modern Black Hawks, which are ideal
for their dual combat and State support role. We will transfer all
Active Army Lakota to training mission at Fort Rutger, and buy an
additional 100 for that fleet. And at current funding levels, the
Guard will be able to retain all of its Lakotas.
This is the right thing to do.
It allows us to better sustain and modernize more capable fleet
across all components and significantly reduce its sustainment
costs. Once again, as in end strength, the vast majority of cuts
from aviation, a total of 86 percent, come from the Active Army.
Overall, the Guards fleet was declined by just 8 percent, while the
Active force declines by some 23 percent.
At its core, our Army is its people. We are committed to protecting effective soldier, civilian, and family programs, and where
appropriate, adding resources, and in fact, we increased funding by
nearly 46 percent across a myriad of programs associated with
Ready and Resilient Campaign.
From a preservation and prevention of all of our soldier concerns,
ending sexual assault and sexual harassment, to suicide prevention, to transition assistance and comprehensive soldier and family
fitness, we are determined to meet the needs of our warriors, employees, and their families.
We have a sacred covenant with all who serve and all who support them, and will do everything within our power not to break
that.
To protect readiness and support our force structure reductions
we take prudent risk in our research, development and acquisition
of facilities accounts. We have been forced to make significant
changes to key programs. For example, we will conclude the
Ground Combat Vehicle program after the technology development
phase as the program is no longer affordable under budget constraints, and instead, we will focus on modernizing and sustaining
legacy systems such as Bradley and Stryker through incremental
upgrades.
Regarding our facilities, our budget is just 49 percent of our fiscal year 2014 MILCON [military construction] appropriation. We
are deferring some 20 percent of projects across all components
with again, the majority of those delays coming in the Active Army.
Let me take a moment to mention BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment]. And I know it is not popular. As a member, I had a
base in my district close due to BRAC. It is hard. I know that. But
it was necessary then, and it is even more necessary now. But it
is simply, we cant afford to pay for the maintenance and upkeep
of unused or unnecessary facilities. It wastes money we just dont
have.
So that is some of the issues that we have before us, my former
colleagues. I want to close by again stating how much all of us appreciate all you have done, the relief provided under the Balanced
Budget Act for 2014, and 2015, but if sequestrationas is the
lawreturns in 2016 our gains will erode and another round of in-
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discriminate cuts will gut our force to the point that we will be unable to meet the strategic guidance.
As I opened with, we deeplyperhaps more so than in any other
recent timeneed your leadership and need your help. This is the
time for protection and predictability, not politics. I have been associated with this committee for the better part of 20 years. It has
continuously without interruption been an honor, as it always is,
to be with you.
And I would be remiss, Mr. Chairman, as a classmate, if I failed
to mention in thisat least for the United States Armyyour final
posture hearing, how much I have enjoyed your wise guidance,
your leadership, and some 21 years of friendship, and I wish you
all the best, my friend.
Thank you, and I yield back.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and General
Odierno can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND T. ODIERNO, USA, CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. ARMY
General ODIERNO. Thank you Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, other distinguished members of the committee.
I want to start out where the Secretary left off. I want to thank
you, Chairman, for all that you have done. For all your 22 years
here serving and what you have done for the Army and our soldiers. You have been a steadfast leader here in this committee and
we appreciate everything that you have done for us. And we continue towe know we will continue to work with you for several
more months and we look forward to that.
Although resources continue to decline, the reality is that the demand for Army forces continues to increase. More than 70,000 U.S.
Army soldiers are deployed today on contingency operations, and
about 85,000 soldiers are forward stationed in nearly 150 countries,
including nearly 20,000 on the Korean peninsula.
As we can consider the future roles and missions of our Army,
it is imperative that we consider the world as it exists, not as one
we wish it to be. The recent headlines aloneRussias annexation
of Crimea, the intractable Syrian civil war, missile launches by
North Korea, just to name a few, remind us of the complexity and
uncertainty inherent in the international security environment. It
demands that we make prudent decisions about the future capability and capacity that we need within our Army.
As part of the joint force, the Army deters potential adversaries
by being capable of appropriate and rapid response anywhere in
the world, and across the entire range of military operations from
humanitarian assistance and stability operations to general war.
Last year, I testified that we can implement a 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance at moderate risk with an end strength of 490,000
in the Active Army; 350,000 in the National Guard; and 202,000
in the U.S. Army Reserve. I stand by that assessment.
We will achieve those end strength targets by the end of fiscal
2015; however, the law of the land is sequestration. Therefore, in
order to attain the proper balance between end strength, readiness,
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and modernization by the end of sequestration we will have to dramatically slash end strength again beginning in fiscal 2016. This
is in no way by choice. We will be required to further reduce the
Active Army end strength to 420,000; reduce the National Guard
to 315,000; the U.S. Army Reserve to 185,000.
The size of our Army at this level of funding will not allow us
to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance, and in my opinion, puts
in doubt our ability to execute even one prolonged, multi-phase
major contingency operation.
I also have deep concerns that, if the Army goes to the end
strength levels required by sequestration, we will not have the appropriate capacity to meet operational commitments and simultaneously train to sustain appropriate readiness levels across the
total Army.
The Presidents budget submission supports end strength levels
at 440,000 to 450,000 in the Active Army; 335,000 in the Army National Guard; and 195,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve. I believe this
should be the absolute floor for end strength reductions. At this
level, we can meet the Defense Strategic Guidance but as we continue to lose end strength, our flexibility deteriorates.
My experience tells me that our assumptions on the duration of
conflict and requirement about length and size, especially if phase
four operations, are optimistic, and if these assumptions are wrong
our risk grows significantly.
For the next 3 to 4 years, we are reducing end strength as quickly as possible while still meeting our operational commitments. As
we continue to draw down and restructure into a smaller force, the
Army will continue to have degraded readiness and extensive modernization program shortfalls. This will cause us to implement a
tiered readiness as a bridging strategy.
Also, our research, development, acquisition funding, which has
declined 39 percent since the fiscal year 2012 budget planning
cycle, will continue to suffer. At the end of fiscal year 2019, under
sequestration, we will stabilize our end strength and force structure. The Army will begin to establish the appropriate balance between end strength, readiness, and modernization, albeit for a
much smaller army.
From fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2023, we begin achieving our
readiness goals and reinvesting in modernization programs to upgrade our aging fleets. Under the Presidents budget, this will happen 3 to 5 years earlier, in fiscal year 2018, at larger total force
levels.
In order to meet the reductions imposed by sequestration and
achieve the right balance, we have worked for the past 2 years on
a total force policy that ensures the proper balance for the Active,
Guard, and Reserve components.
In developing our plan, we looked to the Secretary of Defenses
guidance that we not retain structure at the expense of readiness.
Additionally, the Secretary of the Army and I directed that cuts
should come disproportionately from the Active force before reducing the Guard and Reserve.
Our total force policy was informed by the lessons learned during
the last 13 years of war. We considered operational commitments,
future requirements, costs, and necessary readiness levels. The re-
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sult is a plan that recognizes the unique attributes, responsibilities,
and complementary nature of these three components, while ensuring our Guard and Reserves are maintained as an operational, and
not a strategic, reserve.
Budget cuts, to include full sequestration, result in a reduction
of 150,000 soldiers, 687 aircraft, and up to 46 percent of the brigade combat teams reduction from the Active Army. The National
Guard would be reduced by 43,000 soldiers, 111 aircraft, and up to
22 percent of its brigade combat teams. And the U.S. Army Reserve
would reduce by 20,000 soldiers.
The end strength cuts to the Active Army represent 70 percent
of the total end strength reductions, compared with 20 percent
from the National Guard and 10 percent from the U.S. Army Reserve. This results in that the Guard and Reserves will now comprise 54 percent of the total Army end strength, while the Active
Component will comprise 46 percent. The Army will be the only
service in which the Reserve Component outnumbers the Active
Component.
Under sequestration, we cannot afford our current aviation structure. The budget does not allow us to sustain modernization programs, keep current structure levels, and provide trained and
ready aviation crews in units across all three components. Therefore, we have developed an innovative concept to restructure our
aviation fleet that will properly address all three of these issues.
Overall, we believe this plan will generate a total savings of
$12.7 billion over the POM [program objective memorandum]. Of
the 798 total aircraft reduced under this plan, 687 of these aircraft
comes out of the Active Component, or 86 percent, and 111 aircraft,
or 14 percent, from the National Guard. As with end strength, we
are disproportionately taking cuts from the Active Component over
the Guard and Reserves.
Also under this plan, the National Guard will gain 111 U860s.
Additionally, the National Guard will maintain their current fleet
of 212 LUH72s. The Army National Guard will transfer low-density, high-demand AH64 Apache helicopters to the Active Army,
where they will be teamed with unmanned systems for armed reconnaissance role, as well as their traditional TAC [theater aviation command] role.
This plan allows us to eliminate obsolete airframes, while improving the modernization of our remaining fleet. It will also ensure that we are restructured to sustain an adequate level of pilot
proficiency across the entire force. This will result in an Active-Reserve Component aviation force mix with better and more capable
formations, which are able to respond to contingencies at home and
abroad.
Let me be very clear. Whether it be end strength, modernization
reductions, restructuring of the Army, these are not necessarily
cuts we want to take. However, these are cuts we must take based
on sequestration. I believe our recommendation delivers the best
total Army for the budget allocated.
The Secretary and I understand that the American people expect
our Army to consistently demonstrate a commitment to our core
values and promote ethical leadership. We are aggressively and
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comprehensively tackling this issue across the board individually,
organizationally, and through systematic reviews.
We have initiated 360-degree assessments on all officers, especially commanders. We have implemented a new officer evaluation
report which strengthens accountability. For our general officers,
we conduct periodic surveys, organize 18 annual senior leader seminars, and developed a specific ethics focus as part of our Army
senior leader development program.
We continue to make progress on combating sexual assault and
harassment, particularly on reporting and investigating these incidents. It remains our top priority. Over the past year, the Army
has established more stringent screening criteria and background
checks for those serving in positions of trust, expanded the special
victim capability program, and implemented new procedures to enhance pre-trial investigations. Our prosecution and conviction rates
continue to increase. But we know that much work remains. We
appreciate the continued focus by Members of Congress on this
issue. We take it very, very seriously.
We would also appreciate help from members of this committee
with two issues that directly impact our ability to maintain the
right balance for our Army. First, the Base Realignment and Closure process is a proven, fair, cost-effective means to address excess
installation capacity in our United States Armed Forces. With a reduction of over 200,000 men and women from our Army, we must
reduce excess infrastructure. We need BRAC to do this. If not, we
will have to pay for the sustainment of unnecessary infrastructure
throughout our Army.
Second, we are also extremely grateful for the high-quality care
and compensation our Nation has provided to our soldiers. We have
endorsed proposals that we believe continues to recognize the incredible service of our soldiers, while helping us to better balance
future investments in readiness, modernization, and compensation.
We all must keep in mind that it is not a matter of if but when
we will deploy our ground forces to defend this great nation of ours.
We have done it every decade since World War II.
It is incumbent on all of us to ensure we have the capacity and
capabilities to ensure our soldiers are highly trained, equipped, and
organized. If we do not, they will bear the heavy burden of our miscalculations.
I am incredibly proud to wear this uniform representing the Active Component, the National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve.
They have all sacrificed incredibly over the last 12 or 13 years and
will continue to incredibly sacrifice into the future. It is incumbent
on us to make sure we provide them the tools necessary for them
to be successful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the entire committee for allowing me to testify here today. I look forward to your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Odierno and Secretary
McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 55.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, both of you, for your
statements. As I said in my opening statement, any suggestion that
this budget supports an Active Duty Army of 450,000 soldiers is a
smoke screen because it suggests that, it assumes that sequestra-
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tion gets resolved. The fact of the matter is that the Army, as you
have laid out, is heading down a path of 420,000 Active Duty soldiers or less.
General Odierno, my question is twofold. First, based on this
budget and an Active Duty end strength of 450,000 directed by the
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], do you still believe that
the Army will assume fairly high risk in meeting the Defense Strategic Guidance? And second, if it is a fairly high risk at the 450,000
level, what level of risk do you assume at the 420,000 level?
General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, as I just stated, at the 440,000
to 450,000 level, I believe it is significant risks to meet the Defense
Strategic Guidance, but we can meet it. And I think that is based
on the assumptions that we made. And I think the assumptions are
optimistic. I believe that the assumptions of length of warfare; the
assumptions on the contribution of our allies; the assumptions on
the casualties and others are somewhat optimistic. And I believe
that increases the risk, based on my experience and what we have
experienced in the past that I think the risk is significant. Although I do believe we can meet the Defense Strategic Guidance.
At 420,000, and it is not just the Active. It is the reduction in
the National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve as well under sequestration that will make it very difficult. As we reduce capacity,
we lose flexibility. And therefore, when we lose the flexibility that
means our assumptions must be accurate.
And over the years, my experience tells us our assumptions are
not always very accurate. And so I am very concerned that at
420,000 we cannot meet the strategicDefense Strategic Guidance.
I doubt whether we could even execute one prolonged, multi-phase
operation that is extended over a period of time.
And so I have great, great concern. And what will happen is this
again falls on the shoulders of our soldiers when this happens, and
that is my concern.
And as we continue to move forward, the risk increases because
as our dependence on OCO is reduced, it also puts additional pressure on the base budget. And there will be some things that are
currently in our OCO budget that have to be translated over. The
base budget will continue to increase the risk as we have to execute full sequestration.
The CHAIRMAN. When Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey
came when we started this process, I think the press picked up on
the idea that we were taking the troops down tothe Army down
to 440,000. And the comment was made, That is the lowest level
since the start of World War II. I went back, and I think the Army
at the start of World War II was around 280,000. A year later,
after the start with the draft and everybody responding to Pearl
Harbor and the things that happened, the Army went up over 1
million overnight.
Well, we know, and I just finished reading a book about the
Northern Africa campaign and how many lives were lost and how
they were justwe were sending men in just like fodder. They had
inadequate training, inadequate equipment, inadequate leadership.
And that is something that none of us wants to ever see again. But
shortly after that, Korea hit. We did the same thing.
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And I think all of us here on this committee understand what we
have been talking about and how these cuts are so drastic. But I
was at an event last week and there was another Member of Congress there. And I was talking about some of these cuts. He is not
on this committee. And afterwards, he came up to me and said he
did not realize that we had cut that much.
And I think that isyou know, when we come to Congress, we
get involved in the committees we get assigned to and we dont get
as involved in other committees and know what is happening in
those committees, and still, we are here, and we vote on these
issues.
And we are closer than people I know in my district dont have
an understanding of how severe these cuts are. And when you are
talking about these risks, how severe they are. And yet they see
the news, they see Putin going into Crimea, the Russians talking
about you know, on the commentators are wondering, are they
going to go further, are they going to go into Ukraine? A few years
ago, they went into Georgia. They are still there. And what can we
do about it?
You know, basically, we are hunkering down. I think realistically, putting ourselves in a very serious, precarious position, moving forward.
And I know we passed the budget, and then you have to deal
with it as best you can. And if we dont face up to sequestration
and what that means, there are probably people that think that
with the budget that we passed in December, we have fixed sequestration. We didnt fix it. We put it off for a couple of years, and we
got $20 billion back this year instead of $50 billion.
But it is something that we really need to face up to, and I appreciate your candidness, I appreciate the efforts that you are making to do the best you can with what you have. But as Members
of Congress, we are going to have to face up to the real realities
that are facing us over the next 8 years, so.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly agree that we need to make sure we have a military
that is ready to perform the tasks we ask them to do. I would question, you know, even if we had a million-man Army, perfectly
trained, whether or not too many people on this committee would
consider it wise for us to use that Army to go toyou know, fight
a war with Russia over Crimea.
The issues there are very, very complicated, and simply sending
in the military is not always the solution to our diplomatic problems. But I will completely agree that we need to have that military ready to perform whatever tasks it is we think they should
perform.
I want to ask about base closing, first of all. Do you have an estimate at this point, as you draw down, what excess basing, what
percentage of excess basing capacity you have at this point?
Secretary MCHUGH. Yes. We have done a cursory analysis. We
were under a moratorium for a period of time, according to the
NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] that prevented us analyzing, but the figures we show right now is in the continental
United States, approximately 15 to 20 percent in excess.
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Mr. SMITH. And let me just comment, and I remember the debate, we had a vote in committee on that amendment, which I
urged us to strip that out of the NDAA. I sincerely hope this committee doesnt do anything like that again, where we tell you to not
even think about planning for what are obvious contingencies.
Whatever concerns we have about base closing, I mean, the budget
reality we have means we need to give you guys flexibility and not
box you in like that. So I hope we can avoid that this year.
Now, there was an estimate given by Under Secretary Hale over
in the Senate that it would cost about $6 billion to implement the
BRAC and then, you know, would be a $2 billion per year savings.
A couple questions about that.
First of all, how long would that take? How long would that first
$6 billion be going out before we started realizing the savings.
And then second, can you, you know, let the committee know
how different this BRAC would be from 2005? Because 2005 was
really more about realignment than it was about reducing the size
of the structure, so frankly, anybody who says, Oh gosh, 2005
wound up costing more money, therefore, we shouldnt do BRAC.
I mean, that is, you know to call it apples and oranges is an underestimation.
But could you elaborate on those two points?
Secretary MCHUGH. If I could start, and start with your second
point. There are really two types of BRAC embedded in 2005. As
you noted, Mr. Smith, the actual primary one for the Army was one
of moving and consolidating forces, bringing rationality to our command structure, that was not exactly directed primarily at the
budget. It did, over time, produce some savings, both through efficiencies and rational alignments, but it was really intended for us
to optimize our structure and make sure we were located in the
right places.
There was, of course, the second part to eliminate excess capacity. That started a payback more immediately. The $6 billion figure
that Secretary Hale used of course, is a Department-wide figure.
The Armys figure is somewhat less.
We would certainly target a net payback of at least a billion dollars a year. We generally say a 5-year payback. That really depends on particularly environmental considerations that sometimes
can stretch out a lot, quite a while. But we would hope for a relatively quick payback. Certainly more quickly than occurred in
2005.
Mr. SMITH. Okay. General.
General ODIERNO. If I just addin the BRAC in 2005, we did
some significant reorganization under that BRAC, which makes
that a bit different than this one.
For example, the combination of the armor and the infantry
school in Fort Benning, and others like that, all the logistics out
to Fort Lee.
So those were major reorganization that was supported by BRAC
that made it a little bit more expensive, but now is generating savings for us. The next BRAC wouldnt be quite that drastic. It would
really be targeted at just eliminating the excess infrastructure that
we have and so I think you would find it to be not as expensive
as it was in 2005 and probably a bit better return. Although, we
15
are now starting to get big returns on the investments we made in
2005 with the consolidation.
Mr. SMITH. Absolutely. And the final question is: the bulk of the
savings that you find in the Army budget in order to meet the cuts
that we have described, whether it is just, you know, what fiscal
year 2014 and 2015 give you or what sequestration gives you, are
in people and aircraft, basically. I mean that is likeI will throw
a figure, that is like 95 percent of your savings. Is that accurate?
A little bit less than that? Is that
General ODIERNO. I would say it is a bit less than that, but it
is the preponderance of our savings. I would say up to 70 to 75 percent of the total savings is on personnel reductions and aircraft reductions, because that is our most expensive operational component
to buy and sustain over time.
Mr. SMITH. And if you were to be restricted in how you could do
that, and I guess the biggest area of complaint is how this impacts
the Guard, both in terms of their aircraft and in terms of their personnel, where else would you find the savings?
Lets say that we came along and said, Gosh, no, you cant do
that. And just picking a figure, it is $1 billion. You know, I think
the total aircraft savings over 5 years is $12 billion for the movements you are making. I dont know off the top of my head what
the personnel savings are, but they are significant, I am sure. Lets
just say this committee said Nope, you cant do that, and it was
a billion dollars. Where would you find a billion dollars?
[Laughter.]
Mr. SMITH. Feel free to just go ahead and check in the pockets
of your coat.
Secretary MCHUGH. I was just about to look under the table
here. The reality is there are very few places we can go, and they
are the very places that we would most prefer not to go. That is
further end strength, further modernization program implications,
and decreased readiness, which is already severely constrained. I
would note just taking the aircraft, you have noted correctly, it is
about $13 billion costs across the program, but just the cancellation
of the cockpit sensor upgrade program for the Kiowa, which has already been done, would cost us $1.5 billion. So, that money, as I
mentioned in my opening comments, as is all the money associated
with these compo realignments, is gone.
And they are the same few accounts remaining that we have already hit hard since the beginning in 2013.
Mr. SMITH. General.
General ODIERNO. If I could, the cost avoidance on the aviation
restructure is almost $12 billion. That is cost avoidance, and then
that saves sustainment costs of $1.1 billion per year.
Mr. SMITH. Okay.
General ODIERNO. So it is quite significant. One billion dollars is,
you know, three Army BCTs. So, if you have to reduce significant
more Army BCTs, it is equivalent to two THAAD batteries. It is
equivalent to 2,000 or 1,500 JLTVs [Joint Light Tactical Vehicles],
$1 billion. So, it would havewe would have to significantly reduce
in many other areas if we are not able to execute this strategy.
Mr. SMITH. In a nutshell, it is training, equipment, and readiness. So basically, you know, you would have a less ready, less
16
equipped, less trained force, which would lead to precisely the
vulnerabilities that the chairman talked about, that we had prior
to World War II and prior to the Korean War.
General ODIERNO. That is correct.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I yield back.
General ODIERNO. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Forbes.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, General, I want to echo what the chairman said.
We are both in all very pleased and fortunate to have both of you
in the positions that you are in. We thank you for coming here and
sharing your wisdom with us. We learn a great deal from you. We
also learn a great deal from the members on this committee and
listening to them.
And earlier, the ranking member said something that we have
heard a lot. He said that the President, Congress, came up with a
budget, and that basically, you built a strategy around the budget.
My question for you today: Is that an accurate statement?
Secretary MCHUGH. I wouldntI would never question a Member of Congress, particularly a member of the Armed Services Committee
Mr. SMITH. If I may a point a personal privilege here, I believe
what I said was that you built a strategy that reflected both the
needs and the likely budget. I did not say
Mr. FORBES. I am using my time, and obviously the ranking
member has the time he wants to speak.
Mr. SMITH. Yes, and you have the time not to misquote me.
Mr. FORBES. And well, we can look at the transcript, but I think
it said very clearlyso it would be fair to say that you did not
build your strategy around the budget?
Secretary MCHUGH. I think it is fair to say that this was a strategy first development and program, yes.
Mr. FORBES. So, the strategy was the first priority, not the budget.
Secretary MCHUGH. Correct.
Mr. FORBES. Then why did, in the Presidents budget, Chairman
Dempsey testified before this committee based on the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance and the budget that had come over based on
that, that if you cut one dime out of that, if we reduce that at all,
we could not meet that strategic guidance?
Where did you reach this number that came over? Because it is
not the current law, it is not what was in the current law, and it
is not the dollars that were stated that needed to go to the 2012
strategic guidance. Where did you reach this in-between dollar figure, how did you come up with that?
Secretary MCHUGH. Uh, Chief?
General ODIERNO. So, you outlined a 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance that is the strategy we are developing. I cant speak for
Chairman Dempsey, but I will speak for us.
And on this budget that the President has submitted, I believe
that is the floor, mentioned earlier, I think that is the floor of what
we need in order for us to execute this strategy.
Once we go below that, we can no longer execute the strategy.
We are going to have to develop, either change the currentamend
17
the current strategy or develop a new strategy, especially as we go
down to sequestration.
But under the Presidents budget, I believe we can execute Defense Strategic Guidance with highwith a bit more risk than we
could originally.
Mr. FORBES. But, General, it would be fair to say that number
is less than what we were saying we needed to meet that strategic
guidance last year
General ODIERNO. As I said earlier, when I first testified in front
of you, I told you for the Army an end strength was 490,350, and
that would allow us to do it at moderate risk.
We are now below that, and so I think we can still execute it,
but the risk is increasing.
Mr. FORBES. The other question I have for you, General, last
year, the Army QDR office sponsored a report that the RAND Corporation conducted, entitled, Evolving [Employing] Land-Based
Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific, and it concluded that
land-based anti-ship missiles are readily available on the worlds
arms markets, inexpensive, and able to provide significant additional capabilities to U.S. forces. . . . These capabilities would also
significantly complicate the PLAs [Peoples Liberation Armys] C2,
intelligence, and targeting requirements and would raise the risks
and cost of a conflict for China.
Having such capabilities in an inventory would further U.S. efforts to provide security cooperation assistance to partner nations,
could help deter conflict, and could contribute to victory in a future
conflict by increasing flexibility and expanding the set of tools
available to U.S. commanders to implement plans.
My question is, do you agree with that conclusion? And do you
see any role for the Army to be able to use these type missiles in
the future?
General ODIERNO. I believe the report is worth us taking a hard
look at it. And that we have tothere is a role, I think, for us, in
our ballistic missile capability to potentially do this.
Now, the problem we have now is our ballistic missile capability
is overstretched now, as it conducts missions around the world. But
for us, it is important for us to study this, take a look at it, and
determine, as we move to the future, that this isis this a potential strategy we want to invest in?
Mr. FORBES. And final thing is, has anyone at the Pentagon developedbecause, obviously, the devil is always in the detailsthe
BRAC criteria yet that would be utilized if we had a BRAC?
General ODIERNO. I am not aware of it. We have done very little
on BRAC because
Mr. FORBES. Wouldnt it be fair to say that if we dont even know
what the criteria would be, it would be almost impossible to determine what, if any, savings we would have?
General ODIERNO. Well, I think the issue is we have not been
able to do that. What we do know we have is we have excess capacity and excess infrastructure, so.
Mr. FORBES. Okay.
General ODIERNO. And that is problematic.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
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And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, gentlemen, it is nice to see you both again.
We have worked together on many issues, as you know,
John, we miss you over here in the Congress. But I know you are
doing a great job over there.
Secretary MCHUGH. I wish I were back on the committee right
at this moment.
[Laughter.]
Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, right.
So, my issue today goes to the morale and the issues that are affecting our troops, because in particular in the Army, as you know,
the real resources are our men and women who serve every day,
who serve in the Reserves, who serve at the National Guards level.
And so, I am a little concerned about the climate, the culture climate and what is going on within the Army. And you know, we
have worked on a lot of these issues together for a long time, General and Mr. Secretary, but when I see things like the situation
with the unnamed brigadier general who is retiring with his current rank, despite his various acts of sexual misconduct, and I am
worried about what that is doing from the pressure from the outside to the military structure, and I worry about what happens
with the military structure, of a, you know, son, who is committed
to the U.S. Army. And I worry about due process, from both directions, on sexual misconduct, for example.
And I am also worried, because I cant think of anything sadder
when I look at our military forces than this whole issue of mental
illness and the suicide rate that we are seeing.
So I guess I wanted to ask you about what you are seeing, what
you are doing, that would give us some confidence that we are
going to be able to address what could be low morale, because of
some of these cuts going on, what could happen because ofyou
know, what is going on because of these outside pressures and decidedly important, and what we are doing about our young men
and women and this high suicide rate that we see going on within
our military?
Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I think you have painted with a very
accurate brush with respect to the various and myriad challenges
we face. And it takes on many forms, but clearly the impact on morale, the fact that we are going to continue to ask Americas sons
and daughters to come and serve, to ask Americas parents to send
those sons and daughters. And we have got to ensure that we retain the competence and the trust of both those who are serving
today and who continue to serve. And as we look at the expanse
of issues, from suicide to alcohol and drug abuse, et cetera, et
cetera, we are trying to do everything we can to put into place the
kinds of rules and regulations that will maintain good order and
discipline, but, equally important, to provide the level and type of
care that is necessary.
We recently established a Ready and Resilient Campaign that is
an umbrella structure for all of our initiatives focused on mental
health, focused on alcohol abuse and those kinds of challenges,
19
some 62 programs, and trying to ensure that we are coordinating
those in the most effective way, that we are messaging to soldiers
in the right way.
And we are trying to get on, as they say in the military, the left
side of the bank, before the problems actually manifest themselves.
Because the longer they go unaddressed, the harder they become
to be cured.
Just yesterday, the Secretary of Defense held a half-day session
with all the service chiefs and secretaries, all the combatant commanders, all the top officials from the Office of Secretary of Defense on ethics, on the responsibility of senior leaders.
We had several national experts come in and talk to us about
their experiences, what they believe needs to be done.
We need to send the right messages, particularly to junior soldiers, who do look at us and watch how we treat senior leaders who
are brought before the authorities for various charges and such.
So we are working as hard as we can. This is one area, as I mentioned in my opening comments, particularly with respect to family
care, that we are going to do everything we can to keep our commitment. And in some areas, we have actually increased funding
in spite of the pretty dramatic decreases that many other Army
programs have incurred.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
General ODIERNO. Mr. Chairman, could I just make a quick comment on that, if you dont mind?
The CHAIRMAN. Okay.
General ODIERNO. Your question is a really important one. I am
spending a majoritymy Sergeant Major of the Army and I are
spending a majority of our time on this very specific issue that you
are talking about.
And it is about education, it is about discussion, it is about understanding accountability, it is about enforcing standards, it is
about developing an environment that allows our soldiers to continue to grow.
And there is a lot of angst for a number of reasons, whether it
be jobs going away, whether it be, you know, 13 years of combat
or 12 years of combat operations.
You know, we are spending a lot of time. We are having lots of
meetings with our commanders, our general officer commanders,
our battalion and brigade commanders. The sergeant major is
meeting with the senior noncommissioned officers. We are traveling
around the Army.
And then, there are specific things we are doing. We have increased behavioral health capabilities. We are increasing our outreach to the Guard and Reserve with behavioral health.
We are working this very hard. It is something that we cant stop
on, and it is something we have to stay focused on. You are absolutely right.
And it is important for us. And we are focused on this issue.
I do appreciate you asking that question. We have to work together on this.
Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
20
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Secretary McHugh, General Odierno, thank you for your
service. My appreciation of your competence is firsthand. I have
four sons who have served under your leadership in Iraq and Egypt
and Afghanistan.
Last year, my wife and I, Roxanne, were reassured by your capabilities as our son, Hunter Wilson, served for a year in Afghanistan, South Carolina National Guard.
I am very concerned about the shifting of spending from national
defense to other programs at a time of dangerous worldwide
threats. As verified by the American Enterprise Institute, Al Qaeda
is expanding safe havens across North Africa, the Middle East, and
Central Asia, to attack American families from safe havens.
Additionally, sadly, Russia is violating international law by annexing sovereign territory of the Republic of Georgia and Ukraine.
We should remember that the despots who have seized the great
country of Iran are promoting, clearly, their goals, signs in English
that state Death to America. Death to Israel.
And just 3 weeks ago, there was a ship which had originated in
Iran with long-range rockets from Syria, which were being sent to
Hamas terrorists in Gaza for, obviously, an extraordinary attack on
Israel.
With this in mind, your leadership is more important than ever.
General Odierno, the congressional defense committees directed
the Army to explore accelerating the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle, AMPV, in each of the last two defense authorizations bill.
Now that the Ground Combat Vehicle, GCV, has been terminated
officially, can the Army brief the defense committees on its plan to
accelerate the AMPV program? And further, is AMPV now considered your number one combat vehicle program?
Secretary MCHUGH. If I could respond, Mr. Wilson
Mr. WILSON. Yes.
Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. And then the chief can certainly
add. The AMPV is amongst our five strategic requirements. We are
very focused on that. As you may be aware at the moment, we have
an agency protest, which means that one of the competitive bidders
has filed a protest with us that we did not conduct an open competition and that in essence we kind of wrote the requirements in
a way that would favor a particular manufacturer.
We need to work through that before we can resume, but AMPV
to replace the M1 and M113s are absolutely vital to us. And we
intend to, like the Stryker, like the Bradley and other platforms,
continue to fund those and support them.
General ODIERNO. I would just add is that it is an incredibly important vehicle to us. We are long overdue in replacing the 113. It
is critical to our strategy moving forward. And so it isthat is why
we funded it the way we have in the budget because of the importance of that vehicle to the future of the Army.
Mr. WILSON. And thank both of you for answering that question,
because I know you want the best for our troops. And you have reassured me.
21
General, do you have concerns about the proposed TRICARE
changes? Specifically, are you concerned how the changes impose
costs on Active Duty soldiers and their families?
General ODIERNO. So, I support the TRICARE change. I think it
is important that we go to one system. I think that that will save
us money and still provide the capability and resources to our soldiers to do this.
I believe under the plan, it requires some personal behavior
modification by our soldiers, but it still allows them to get the best
medical care at the lowest costs. Compensation as a whole, Congressman, is a very difficult issue because obviously you and us, I
want to do what is best for our soldiers and our families.
I worry that with budget reductions, we have to just reduce the
rate of growth. Not reduce the support, but reduce the rate of
growth. And we are trying to come up with the best ways to do
this. I believe with the TRICARE proposal, we still provide our soldiers with the best medical care possible within reasonable costs.
I worry a bit about the potential costs on our lower-ranking soldiers. And that is what we are trying to focus on, to reduce that
to as small as possible. And we will continue to take a look at that
as we move forward.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.
And Mr. Secretary, this is very quick, but I have been on the
board of the American Lung Association. I am not pro-tobacco. But
at AAFES [Army and Air Force Exchange Service], this generates
an extraordinary amount of sales, which helps MWR [Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Programs] and provides employment for dependents and spouses. What is the policy going to be on tobacco
sales?
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, could you please answer that one
for the record? The gentlemans time is expired.
Secretary MCHUGH. Be happy to, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on
page 93.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thanks to both of you gentlemen for your longstanding commitment to our Nations Army and our Nations Armed Forces.
Mr. Secretary, I couldnt help but think when you said if you are
on the committee right now. Maybe you would like to be on the
committee right now, what question you would ask yourself.
Secretary MCHUGH. It would be easy, whatever it was.
[Laughter.]
Mr. MCINTYRE. But thank you for that longstanding commitment
and friendship.
On page 5 of your testimony, gentlemen, you say, and I quote:
For the next 3 years as we continue to draw down and restructure
into a smaller force, the Army will continue to have degraded readiness and extensive modernization program reductions. And in the
next paragraph, you say that under sequestration-level spending
caps, quote: the size of our Army at this level of funding will not
allow us to execute the Defense Strategic Guidance and will put in
22
doubt our ability to execute even one prolonged multi-phase major
contingency operation.
In the time that I have, would either one of you, or both if you
would like, explain what this statement of the record means with
regard to readiness and with regard to sustainability? Because I
think they may be seen a little bit differently. In fact, specifically,
what level of unit readiness does the administrations budget request assume? If funded at the budget request level, how long will
it be until we regain sufficient full-spectrum readiness and also the
ability to sustain a major operation?
General ODIERNO. Thank you, Congressman.
First, with the statement on the 3 years, the bottom line is it is
about the balance. And in order to achieve balance, you have got
to get down to the right end strength levels. So it is goingunder
the Presidents budget, it will take us 3 years to get to the end
strength levels in order for us to get the end strength right so we
could then start to reinvest in readiness and modernization. And
that is when it will come together.
Under the Presidents budget, we do that earlier. We are able to
accomplish that balance around fiscal year 2018, which then allows
us then to start to increase readiness. Readiness is not one time.
It is something you have to sustain over the long term.
And then that allows us to meet the Defense Strategic Guidance,
as we have said, at significant risk, but we will be able to meet the
Defense Strategic Guidance. Under sequestration, in 2016, the cuts
are so severe that it will specifically go after readiness and it will
take us longer to recover. And when we do finally recover, it will
be in the fiscal year 2020 to 2023 range.
But the problem becomes we are now a smaller Army. So the
issue becomes with a smaller Army, although it is ready and capable, is it big enough to do a prolonged, long-term strategy. And that
is the concern.
Mr. MCINTYRE. So do you have an idea of how long it would take
to reach that level? Or does that just remain an open-ended question?
General ODIERNO. The level of readiness?
Mr. MCINTYRE. No, to be able to sustain an operation.
General ODIERNO. Well, again, under the Presidents budget, by
2018, I believe, we begin to sustain readiness. Under sequestration,
it will take someabout fiscal year 2023 before we reach that
sustainment level and then we arebut we are much smaller as
well.
Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Just a question on that. You said under the
Presidents budget. Is that the $115 billion over and above?
General ODIERNO. That is. That is.
The CHAIRMAN. That is kind of just a wish list.
General ODIERNO. That represents the $115 billion.
The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. I want to
thank both of you for your leadership on the issue of sexual as-
23
sault. And I want to appreciate the statement that is on page 18
in your joint written comments, Our goal is to reduce and ultimately eliminate this crime from our ranks. It is, I think, a huge
step forward on the cultural issue that the language of it being a
crime is the issue that is emphasized.
It takes us obviously to work on legislative and regulatory issues,
but it also is a cultural issue. And I appreciate your leadership on
that.
Mr. Secretary, you have in your joint comments also an issue of
suicide prevention. I have reviewed previously DOD reports on the
issues of the stress factors affecting suicide, one of which is custody. Unbelievably, throughout our country, family law courts are
taking children away from service members based upon either their
past deployment or the threat of deployment.
I have a bill which has been included in the NDAA for several
years that would eliminate deployment as a basis for removal, sole
basis of removal. It was endorsed by both Panetta and Gates. You
actually voted for it as a Member of Congress in fiscal year 2008,
2009, and 2010 for the NDAA.
Secretary MCHUGH. Thank God.
Mr. TURNER. Our chairman has set it as a goal for fiscal year
2015 to make certain this is the law. We have stalled in the Senate
largely because of recent weak support from DOD. I would like the
opportunity to sit down and meet with you to discuss this issue and
to hopefully gain your advocacy for that.
And then my question to both of you concerns sequestration. In
your joint statement on page 3, you have a statement I think crystallizes the issue of sequestration. It says that the Army continues
to face an uncertain fiscal environment in the years ahead.
I would like if you would both talk for a moment about the issue
of the fiscal cliff that you are facing. You know, Congress looked
at it as a, we, handed you a 2-year deal, with the budget being certain for 2014 and 2015. But the fact that you have to cut a glidepath through 2015 because sequestration appears to return at
2016, means that you dont have the certainty even for 2015. That
is one of the things we are going to struggle with is trying to put
money back, but that, of course, places you even in a more difficult
position of that fiscal cliff as approaches to 2016, without congressional reassurance that that sequestration-level spending cap in
fiscal 2016 will not be what you are handed.
In looking, General Odierno, in your continued efforts to highlight the fact that it would not allow us to do even one prolonged
multi-phase major contingency operation if we go to the sequestration numbers, I would like for you both to talk for a moment about
this uncertainty, that even for 2015it is not just 2016even for
2015, sequestration is putting you in a very untenable position.
And of course, is risking I think our national defense.
Secretary MCHUGH. Great question, Mr. Turner. And I dont
want to sound ungrateful about the bipartisan budget agreement
because it was important relief. And it has allowed us to begin to
buy back readiness, to increase our CTC [combat training center]
rotations, 19 planned for 2015, et cetera, or for 2014, I should say,
et cetera, et cetera, so, much-needed help.
24
But as you noted, sequestration is still the law of the land. And
absent a definitive act over that term of time by this Congress, it
continues to be something we have to program toward. The reason
we are talking about 420,000 is because sequestration will take us
to 420,000. We continue to program for that, although the Presidents proposal, if adopted, would allow us to sustain the 440,000
to 450,000 for the Active Component we have talked about.
One of the biggest impacts that really extends outside the Army,
but obviously affects us, is upon our industrial partnersthe folks
who look at not just the Army, but all the services as a customer,
who need predictability both to do hirings and ensure they have got
the right processes in place, got the right plants operating in the
right ways.
We cant tell them what we are going to be in a position to buy.
That makes them less cost-efficient. It causes them to hire fewer
rather than more people. I mean, it, at some point, has a pretty
significant drain on the economy, all because of uncertainty, not because of actual economic conditions at the moment.
The other thing it does for us in that same avenue, is it has
caused us to pay more for things. If we cant enter into longer-term
contracts with certainty, it causes us to have to enter into short interim contracts that generally, on a piece-by-piece basis, cost us far
more.
So, it effects virtually everything we are doing, including, by the
way, our ability to recruit and retain soldiers because they are uncertain of what their future would be if they sign on that dotted
line.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemans time has expired. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.
Excuse me, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And good to see you both. Thank you so much for your extraordinary leadership. Really appreciate it.
A few of the questions that I wanted to ask you have been asked,
but I might ask them in just a slightly different way.
Mr. Secretary, you have been on the other side of the table, and
you know in BRAC as you have mentioned, and certainly General
Odierno as well, how difficult these decisions are. But, they are important. And what more can you share with us as we move forward
and perhaps face that, the question that was faced last year of trying to, you know, rule that out?
And I think part of it is the specifics. I think that people do need
to know what that means in terms of readiness quite specifically
as you look over this landscape, really, of additional capacity at
bases, particularly operations. What more, you know, is there
something that is quite convincing you would like to say about
that, and again, particularly from your perspective, Mr. Secretary?
Secretary MCHUGH. I recognize how hard it was. I was a member
for three BRAC rounds, and I dont particularly recall enjoying any
one of them. But, having said that, it is necessary for us to maintain a balance both in terms of the investments we are required to
make in support of unnecessary infrastructure. That is going to
continue to increase as we draw down our end strength.
Obviously, fewer people mean fewer need for facilities, for buildings, et cetera, et cetera. And to maintain an unused building is
25
just the equivalent of throwing money away. The Department talks
about a $6 billion investment for say, a 2017 BRAC, but they would
hope over time, after 7 years, it would produce some $3 billion in
annual savings. For the Army, $3 billion in annual savings is a lot
of money.
And our challenge is, as we come down, if we are not allowed to
realign our facilities, you start to hollow out.
Mrs. DAVIS. Yes.
Secretary MCHUGH. Because you start to have fewer and fewer
people where the resources are taken away from their more immediate needs and placed into facility sustainment that just continues
us down that downward spiral of hollowness and just not doing
what we need to do to support.
Mrs. DAVIS. I have got another question or two, so I appreciate
that. I really wanted to hear from you because you have been here,
and it makes a difference.
On the question, we haveI know that my colleagues have
talked a little bit about the sexual assault. I mean one question on
that is how do you fence off outside influences? No matter how you
move forward. Because we saw the complexity of that in the latest
cases that certainly have made headlines.
So, that is one question, but the other one, if you could speak to
toxic leadership. General, I think you mentioned, maybe as we
draw down a little bit, that is going to make a difference. How do
I mean, how do you really, at the bottom, deal with that issue?
General ODIERNO. So we have done several things, and first, it
is something we want to eliminate. And I will start with the toxic
leadership. So we are doing several things. One is, we are doing
360 evaluations. We have done a pilot for battalion and brigade
commanders. We are going to probably put that for everyone starting this fall. We are going to move that to noncommissioned officers as well.
First of all, now people are recognizing that we are going to take
a look at this, and that people are going to see that. And you have
to change behavior. It is also about, we repeatedly have now put
this inside all of our training programs, whether it be noncommissioned officer and officers. So, it takes time, but what they are
going to see is that we dont tolerate it. We are alsowe will not
we will hold people accountable.
If you have a toxic leadership environment, you will be held accountable for that environment, and there are several different
definitions of what toxic leadership can be, but we are working on
all of those.
I am meeting regularly with commanders regarding both this
and the sexual assault, sexual harassment. We are having a lot of
conversations about this. This is aboutthis is about us. This is
about us. Our leadership in uniform. Taking control of this and
working the issues in order to solve this problem and create an environment for everyone to excel.
So, we have to just do that. Us. And we have to kind of not worry
about what other people are saying. It is upit is incumbent on
us to take this responsibility on and do it, and that is the discussion we are having. It is very important that we continue to do
this. This is not just something that is passing. This is something
26
that is going to be inherent in what we do as we move forward,
and that is the discussion we have to continue to have with our
leaders, and they will come around.
I am confident that our more senior leaders have. It is now getting it down to the junior level and making sure that they understand that we are serious about this.
Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And if I may just very, very briefly mention, thank you for the female body armor. ThatI think we came
back from a trip to Afghanistan and pushed for that, and thank
you very much.
Mr. KLINE [presiding]. Gentleladys time has expired, and by serendipity, as I take the gavel, it is also my turn to ask questions.
Mr. Secretary, you spent an awful lot of time dealing with issues
surrounding Arlington National Cemetery. Probably something you
didnt expect when you walked from here to there. And you and I
have had some conversations and exchanges of letters because Arlington National Cemetery isnt the final resting place just for soldiers, but other service members as well.
And for some time now, the advisory committee on Arlington National Cemetery has not had any Marine Corps representation,
anybody affiliated with the Marine Corps, and so, I have asked you
to look into that, and can you tell me, are we going to see that anytime soon?
Secretary MCHUGH. I appreciate your attention to this. And it is
important. Iand oftentimes, folks think of Arlington and do think
of soldiers, but as you rightly noted, this is the final resting place
of all men and women who wore the uniform of this Nation.
We are very interested in ensuring that all the services are represented effectively and fairly. We, as you know sir, had a tragic
death of the former lady, a terrific lady who had Marine roots in
her background, and we are in the process of making a replacement. I have made a recommendation. The final determination always in these matters rests with the Secretary of Defense. I am
sure he as well as I are somewhat frustrated. This is FACA [Federal Advisory Committee Act] committee. It has all kinds of procedural requirements. We are at the end of that, and hopefully we
will be able to share a name with you in the very near future.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you.
I appreciate your attention to this, and I know it is frustrating,
and you for us. When you were sitting here, you would never have
tolerated a year, year and a half sort of delay, but I do take you
at your word, and more than that, I know you very well, you are
doing your best to push this through and it just needs to be resolved.
Switching subjects, I want to, since we have both of you here,
very quickly, talk about readiness and where we are. I think, Mr.
Secretary, I think it was you, maybe General Odierno, but I think
you said that with the so-called Ryan-Murray budget and the adjustment, you were able to start buying back readiness. And clearly
that is what we would like to see.
I mentioned to you very briefly that I happen to know that at
least one of the Army infantry divisions is at a very, very, very low
combat readiness state. And when I talked to the command in gen-
27
eral, that division, he told me that he expected it would stay that
way for another year and a half or perhaps more.
And so, I understand that you are having to make trade-offs. The
chief is, and you areand when you look at different units and
their readiness. But my question is, is it your intention to keep
that division or any such division just to keep it down and in a sort
of C4, C5 level as you try to build up the others, or, are you
going to try to rotate that through?
Secretary MCHUGH. First off, thank you so much for the question.
We are slowly increasing our readiness, but it is slow. I think I
said last year, two brigades were ready. We are at higher than that
now. We are probably closer to five or six. You will continue to see
an increase in that readiness as we invest the dollars we got in
2014 in combat center rotations.
So, it will increase. The problem is, readiness is temporary. It is
good for about 6 months to a year or so ifwith the funding in
2014, 2015, but if it falls again in 2016, we will go back into this
readiness problem again, and we are going to have to sustain a
tiered readiness profile which says we will only have certain units
that will be ready.
We will rotate them through the Army Force Generation process,
so it will change between units as we move forward, but that is
really the crux of our problem with sequestration, because at 2016
we are going to have another readiness dive, if it is not changed.
We have no choice because we cant take out the end strength fast
enough in order to balance it.
Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that answer.
What I would hate to see is the sort of division equivalent of a
hangar queen where you just keep them down there, you know,
month after month and year after year. I understand that readiness is temporary, but the nature of this business sometimes is
temporary. When you are called, you are called now. And so, if you
are at C2 now, that is where you want to be. Not at C4 or C
5. I appreciate very much your answer.
In a no doubt futile effort to set an example for my colleagues,
I will yield back, and recognize Ms. Bordallo.
Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary McHugh, and General Odierno, thank you for your testimony and for your service to our great Nation.
Mr. Secretary and General, I want to applaud the efforts of the
Army working with the Air Force, TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command], and MDA [Missile Defense Agency] in deploying
the THAAD battery to Guam last year, which, Mr. Secretary, you
mentioned in your testimony. The deployment was relatively quick
and remains successful.
Although Guam had other missile defense assets providing protection, the THAAD is an added defense against North Korea aggression and their threats. And the people of Guam are very supportive of THAAD remaining on the island. But we acknowledge it
may have to redeploy if other contingencies arise.
So that said, can you comment on efforts to keep the THAAD on
Guam and in the coming years?
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I understand we are looking at a change of the command soon,
but what efforts are underway to keep THAAD on Guam for the
future? And also, to what extent are you considering utilizing the
Guard to support and sustain THAAD on Guam?
Secretary MCHUGH. I will start, and then turn it over to the
chief.
First of all, I had the, as I think you know, Ms. Bordallo, I had
the chance to visit Guam, visit those troops a number of months
ago. They were fresh on the ground, were excited by the mission.
And I have to say the Air Force thankfully was taking very, very
good care of our soldiers.
During that visit, and I am sorry I didnt get a chance to meet
with you. You were busy doing the job of representing the great island here in Washington. But I did meet with the Governor. And
your statement that the people of Guam are very supportive was
certainly reflected in his enthusiasm.
As I am sure you are aware, that stationing was led by the
PACOM commander, Admiral Sam Locklear. He has theater responsibility. We certainly stand ready to provide the mission as he
sees fit. This is a very high-demand, low-density asset. And as you
noted, we will have to make adjustments should contingencies
arise. But for the moment, I think we are doing quite well.
Chief.
Ms. BORDALLO. General, before you start, I just want you to
know, Mr. Secretary, that I have taken a couple of CODELs [congressional delegations] that have visited Guam out to look over the
THAAD operation.
General.
General ODIERNO. We are working with the joint staff towe are
at least working to see what it would take to sustain the THAAD
battery there for the long term. And we are working with the Air
Force. So we are takingand we are looking at it from an Army
perspectivewhat would it mean if we had to sustain that there
for the long term in terms of rotational capabilities, type of
THAAD? So we are clearly looking at that and preparing, if that
decision is made that we want to leave it there.
The deployment has gone very well. We are very pleased with
the support we have gotten there. I know the PACOM commander
supports it staying there in Guam. So we are preparing and looking at the options that would allow us to keep it there.
Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.
And also, I said, what extent are you considering utilizing the
Guard to support and sustain THAAD?
General ODIERNO. So, what we will do is, we will stillthis will
be part of our strategy. One of the thingsone of the options we
are looking at, and I will just throw this out there, is that not buy
more equipment, but increase number of crews and capabilities, so
you rotate the crews on the equipment.
So as we work our way through that, we will look at all the components to see how we can solve that problem. But that is one of
the solutions we have, because we believe in the future this could
be a problem not only if we sustain in Guam, but if we do other
deployments around the world. That is one of the options that we
are taking a look at.
29
Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.
I have another question and I have very little time left. The
question is for either of you. I read about the Armys Pacific Pathways strategy in the Washington Post. My staff has had subsequent briefings on the matter and we appreciate that the Army is
trying to articulate its strategy for the Pacific.
However, I am concerned that the strategy does not adequately
account for the potential of the Army supporting additional missile
defense capabilities in the Pacific. It also does not mention or adequately address the capabilities provided by the National Guard
State Partnership Program.
So I am concerned this strategy isnt really taking a holistic look
at the Armys future in the Pacific. Can you comment on this strategy, its way forward, and some of the items that I discussed?
General ODIERNO. Thank you. We are committed to supporting
the Asia-Pacific region with our 80,000 Active and Reserve troops
that are there in the region supporting that. Actually, we have
funded a 27 percent increase in the State Partnership Program in
support of PACOM in the budget. So we are looking to expand that
program.
It is a key program to supporting us. In fact, we are bringing
States in to increase our relationship with the countries within the
Asia-Pacific region. That is a centerpiece of this strategy.
The other centerpiece is that it isthe Guard and Reserve have
unique capabilities that allow us to continue to engage on several
different lines, and that is part of the Pacific Pathways strategy.
So I feel confident that as we move forward with this, it has to be
a multi-component solution. It cannot just be one component. We
need the whole Army involved in solving this problem.
Mr. KLINE. The gentleladys time has expired.
Ms. BORDALLO. My time is up. Thank you.
Mr. KLINE. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank both of you for being here. And I also want to thank
both of you for making separate but recent trips to the Anniston
Army Depot in my district. It was an honor to have each of you
there. That installation does an outstanding job of supporting our
warfighter. And because of its exceptional work in that role, they
are in pretty good shape; and also the mission they play for the
military, they are in pretty good shape. But I know the rest of the
organic industrial base is not in as good a condition.
The question I have for you is: Does the Army plan to move any
work from the Anniston facilityAnniston to facilities with less
workload in order to prop them up?
Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. Rogers, thank you for your comments.
I enjoyed very much my trip there. It was good to get a chance to
chat with you.
As I am sure you understand, we are continuously assessing
workload distribution across the entire Army organic industrial
base, both the depots as well as the arsenals. We have not made
any particular decisions in that regard, but I have to be frank, particularly as we come back out of theater, and once we are through
reset, which we, I should add, would require funding for 3 years
30
post-conflict to make sure we are resetting all of the returned
equipment.
The workloads are going to have to be reexamined and rebalanced. But, you know, if that occurs, we will certainly do everything necessary to keep you informed. Right now, we are in the
analysis phase and we are not prepared to make any announcements in that regard.
Mr. ROGERS. Well, we arethe Alabama delegation, we are paying a lot of attention. And, you know, it is a very cost-efficient facility. And that is one of the reasons they are in good shape. And we
hope that money is a big factor in your decision, and efficiencies,
when you decide what to move where. Because we think you get
a good deal and the taxpayer gets a good deal at Anniston.
My next question has to do with the AMPV. I am hearing that
there have been some concerns raised about the current RFP [request for proposal] that was issued by the Army. In the near future, I would like to meet with both of you to talk about some of
the concerns I have about that. But for this hearing, I am not really focused on the RFP. I am focused on the future depot work
maintenance work for the AMPV.
My primary concern is where the vehicles will be built and maintained throughout their life cycle. I believe strongly it should be the
Anniston Army Depot and here are some reasons why. The AMPV
is intended to replace the M113. Since 1995, the Anniston Army
Depot has been the home of life-cycle maintenance for the M113
family of vehicles.
Secondly, it certainly appears that the AMPV will be a track vehicle. The Anniston Army Depot is the center of industrial and
technical excellence for track vehicles. That means the track vehicle work is part of Annistons core workload.
And then finally, the model for public-private partnerships for
the production and life-cycle maintenance of the Armys land fleets
has been the Stryker, which is performed in Anniston. And as you
know, the Stryker has performed well in recent conflicts. Therefore,
Anniston has been the best capitalized facility to do the same work
for the AMPV.
Given these facts, do you expect the production and life-cycle
maintenance for the AMPV vehicleAMPV fleet at Anniston? Or
are you looking to share the work with other facilities within the
enterprise?
Either one of you.
Secretary MCHUGH. I would prefer to have the acquisition
ACSAM [Assistant Chief of Staff, Acquisition Management] come to
speak to you directly. The biggest part of that reason, as I mentioned earlier, this isthe bid is in an agency protest. That, as you
know, severely constrains what we are advised to say publicly
about it. You noted I think very accurately the advantages and the
competitive success that Anniston has demonstrated. If and when
we get to that point, which I hope it is if not when, we will certainly make the most cost-effective decision we can.
Mr. ROGERS. Thank you both very much.
I yield back.
Mr. KLINE. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Courtney, you are recognized.
31
Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank, again, both witnesses. It is great to see our
former colleague here, and also General Odierno. Those stripes on
your right sleeve are, in my opinion, very powerful evidence of, you
know, the fact that every word you present is backed with an outstanding, almost unprecedented level of service in the Middle East.
And a number of us had a chance to visit you over the years there
and your commitment to our Nation, again, is just unquestioned.
Mr. Secretary, you talked in your opening remarks about the sacred covenant that we must have with the people who have served
in the Army. And I know both of you believe in that unquestionably. I wanted to share with you a story about an Army National
Guard wounded warrior from my district who in 2007 was in a rollover. He is 100 percent medically disabled from a TBI [traumatic
brain injury] injury that he suffered as a result of it. So he was
medically retired. He is still within, obviously, the DOD sort of benefit structure. And his TRICARE coverage, which was TRICARE
ECHO [Extended Care Health Option] at the time of the injury, because TRICARE Standard once he went into a retired status.
If you fast-forward a couple of years ahead, he is a young guy.
He and his wife had a baby about a year ago. Unfortunately, she
was born with a pretty severe disability. It is a condition called
short colon, which requires nutrition to be done through feeding
tubes. They cant feed normally. And the doctors prescribed about
40 hours of home health services for the care of this child at home.
She has to be fed and changed every 2 hours.
TRICARE Standard does notthe structure of TRICARE Standard, as I found out, is really patterned after Medicare. So that families with young children and pediatric issues, particularly sort of
intensive specialized care, it is a square peg in a round hole. And
we have been for the last 4 months trying to work with Health Net
to try and just figure out some help in the home. We arewe think
we were able to sort of scrape a plan together for 16 hours of care,
but again, if you think of the sleep deprivation, if nothing else, that
this family experiences with that kind of intensive care, it is not
helping the wounded warrior in terms of his issues.
And frankly, it just sort of begs the question about, you know,
how we really take care of these families. Again, TRICARE ECHO,
it would not have been an issue at all in terms of getting the full
complement of prescribed care that, you know, the childs doctors
have prescribed.
So again, I am not asking you to, you know, answer on the spot
here, but, you know, when we talk about restructuring TRICARE,
and again, this is a challenge we have got to talk about, as the
General said. But frankly, there are gaps, you know, for particularly young medically retired in TRICARE that I would like to
work with both of you to try and fix.
I mean, this guy, you know, he did what he was asked to do. He
is going to carry this wound for the rest of his life, and his family
should not be sort of trapped in this sort of gap in coverage. And
again, I am not asking you toyou know, explicitly, but I just want
to make you aware of the fact that, you know, there are these sort
of special case problems that I think these conflicts are going to
continue to sort of manifest.
32
Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you, Joe. You know, first of all I
deeply appreciate the focus and the devotion that you have brought
to this individual soldier. And I know it transcends just a single
individual, and you have really, I think, struck upon one of the
challengesas you have saidwill be with us for many years.
The good new of Afghanistan-Iraq is people are surviving the
battlefield and wounds that in all likelihood they would have never
survived before.
As many of you have seenthe chief and I certainly have seen
in many visits to Walter Reedthe challenges many of those
wounds of survivors are facing incredibly challenging circumstances physically. I think it is fair to say back in 1996 and in
1997 when TRICARE was fully stood up that no one really considered this aspect of it.
And, as happens in the private insurance industry as well, sometimes you find your needs misaligned with your policy coverages.
And we want to certainly do everything we can do to support the
activity through the TRICARE Management Activity center and
others to try to close those gaps where they exist.
So if there is anything we can do to join in your effort, we certainly stand ready to do that.
Mr. COURTNEY. Well thank you, Mr. Secretary and help that actually is poised to try to work this through to come up with solutions for families like the
Secretary MCHUGH. Right.
But, we have to make sure we are not placing obstacles in front
of them from having that happen.
Mr. COURTNEY. Right, thank you
Mr. KLINE. The gentlemans time has expired.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning. And Chief, I
want to identify with what Joe said about your long service and the
absence from your family all those years, thank you very much.
Seems like a topic that you probably should not talk about, but
based on all the struggles and the stuff that you guys have been
putting forward, I have got to ask you about audit readiness. Hagel
had it in his opening remarksin his written remarks. I did a
quick look at your prepared remarks, and I didnt see it there.
Accountants and auditors are sensitive little fellows and folks,
and theywhen they dont see the chief and the Secretary talking
favorably about them, or just love them or hate them, just dont ignore them.
So I would like to get, from both of you, the top-down commitment, I thinkI know is there, but I just need to have it there
the record, but also specifically talk about as we make this move
to the GFEBs [General Fund Enterprise Business Systems], which
looks like it is moving well and is essential to getting to the
auditability part, ongoing there is a tendency to cling to legacy systems, because they are the comfortable pair of shoes that you liked
in the field and you know work. And there is some evidence that
you are not making the full move away from legacy systems and
thatwhile that may help temporarily, it is not going to be the
long-term solution.
33
And so, can you talk about the process and just give us a general
update on where the Army is with respect to meeting thePanettas original commitment, and now the commitment to get audit
ready by next year.
Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I would suggest the reason it wasnt
mentioned, we are just simply confident that it is going to happen.
We didnt want to
[Laughter.]
Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I appreciate that. I appreciate that.
Secretary MCHUGH. At least that is my story for the moment.
As you know, sir, this is something that is not just important;
it is stated in law that we have to be auditable by 2017. We are,
we believe, fully on track to meet that. Our ERPs [enterprise resource planning] have been going very well. You mentioned GFEBs,
we have had a series of rollouts of those. We are taking them in
segmented fashion so that we can ensure we are managing it in the
right way, and to this point in my discussions with recently retired
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and
Comptroller were having very, very good success.
We are mindful of what you said about the retention of past
practices and legacy systems. Perhaps the biggest challenge is to
wean people off things and processes in which they have dealt with
for years. Even when say GFEBs is available, they try to do workarounds and stay with what is familiar. And that is why in part
we have been segmenting the rollouts so we can keep an eye on
that and make sure that folks are going the right way.
The chief and I have ordered an analysis and an optimization
study throughout FMMC [Fort Myer Military Community] to make
sure that we are aligning ourselves in cost-efficient and effective
ways. I had a brief discussion yesterday with Bob Hale, the DOD
Comptroller, about auditability and we are going to continue to
work toward it. And for the moment I think all systems are go. Although, until we are there, we are not going to assume anything.
General ODIERNO. If I could just add, we are taking this very seriously. And I apologize if that didnt come forward, but, you know,
I speak to every installation commander before they take over and
I provide them a letter of instruction.
Part of that letter is a piece on audit readiness, and the importance for them to support the efforts that are going on, that the
Secretary has really pushed us towards meeting these goals. We
are doing mock audits on a regular basis so we understand where
we still have some issues. That is helping us to identify where we
can improve. We have awareness down really to the lowest levels
that this is really important, and by 2017 we have to be audit
ready.
So I am comfortable that we have identified the problem. I am
comfortable that we are focusing on it. We still have to make sure
that we are addressing any of the gaps that we might find as we
move forward, but I am confident that we are heading in the right
direction.
Mr. CONAWAY. You talk most about the challenge that you are
having from a budget standpoint and the many places dollars can
go. Are you able to sustain the necessary resources to do this work
as well?
34
General ODIERNO. The budget completely reflects thisthe capabilities we need to meet audit readiness by 2017.
Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you both. Music to my ears, and I know
the folks who are working really hard at this. It is tough stuff. It
is not particularly glamorous, and you dont get a lot of medals for
it, but it is important for the countrys health.
Thank you, very much, for your service, and appreciate your
comments this morning.
Yield back.
Mr. KLINE. Thank the gentleman.
Ms. Tsongas, you are recognized
Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you.
General Odierno, Secretary McHugh it is great to have you appearing before us today. And General Odierno, I do want to thank
you for your visit to Massachusetts and to Natick Soldier Systems;
it was so much appreciated. So thank you for that.
But I would like to take this opportunity to talk to you both
about the decision in the case of General Jeffrey Sinclair.
As the record shows, General Sinclair pled guilty to the following: Maltreatment of a subordinate, soliciting illicit pictures
from junior female officers, possessing pornography, as well as misuse of a credit card and using derogatory language. He was sentenced to pay a fine of $24,100, but did not receive any jail time
or a reduction in rank.
I would like to quote now from a New York Times article that
discusses the culture of Sinclairs unit when he was a colonel. The
quote is not pretty, and I take no satisfaction from reading it.
Quote: The atmosphere in his unit was such that, at a farewell
party when he left a brigade command 4 years ago, soldiers in his
unit put on a skit in which one, dressed in a wig and clothes, in
an apparent portrayal of the captain the general was sleeping with,
acted out a scene in which She asked another soldier seated in a
chair and portraying the then Colonel Sinclair whether he wanted
oral sex.
From this story, and from the charges that General Sinclair has
admitted to, there can be no doubt that General Sinclair abused
and debased his authority in a reprehensible way, using it to perpetuate a toxic military culture which accepted even criminal behavior as the norm.
And yet, according to the Times, it was after this incident that
he was promoted to brigadier general. And this is just what we
know. I dont want to imagine what we dont know.
These series of incidents and its recent shocking outcome, again,
in which the general did not receive a reduction in rank, and was
not sentenced to any time in jail, raises the very serious question
of whether the UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] can be
fairly called an instrument of justice and whether an organization
where rank and the pecking order created by rank can ever rise
above the dictates of deference that rank demands in order to
meaningfully change.
I grew up in a family of an Air Force colonel, and I recall in the
mornings when my father wanted us to get up and do whatever,
he always said orders from headquarters, and we responded and
did whatever the task of the day was.
35
But to put aside that, this decision and these incidents has undercut the progress that has been made by Congress, the military
and I appreciate sincere and genuine efforts that the Army has
made and many dedicated advocatesoften themselves victims of
military sexual traumato create accountability and change a culture that too often perpetuates a predatory climate.
It fuels a belief within the services and in the civilian world
I cant tell you how many of my constituents commented on the
outcome in this casethat high-ranking officers receive and will receive special treatment, whereas enlisted members would be most
harshly treated.
I know that you both agree that general officers should be held
to a higher standard, and there must be serious accountability
when they fail to meet these standards.
But is that currently possible?
I have my doubts.
I appreciate that you areand I appreciate the question of Congresswoman Davis about toxic leadership and that you are trying
to get a handle on it and create metrics. I hope that that includes
a way in which you link toxic culture to the ways in which leaders
fuel a culture within their unit that promote sexual harassment
and sexual assaultall the various forms of military sexual trauma that we have become altogether too familiar with.
This is really a comment as much as anything. I appreciate the
extraordinary challenges you have. I am just not sure that you
have the tools to really make change. The UCMJ is rooted in an
organization that is deferred and defined by rank. It is implemented by those who are ingrained in that culture. And I have to
say, this decision was so troubling on so many fronts.
Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you
Mr. KLINE. Thank the gentlelady.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. FLEMING. Mr. Chairman, I think she had a little bit more
time left.
Mr. KLINE. Thank the gentlelady.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. FLEMING. Mr. Chairman, I think she had a little bit more
time left.
Mr. KLINE. Oh she did. I am sorry. Okay. Yes.
Dr. FLEMING. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, first of all
for your service to our country. Both of you in different capacities,
and also for being here today.
And I listened very carefully to your discussion about the
ratcheting down of numbers of soldiers and BCTs. And I want to
revisit that a little bit, and so I apologize if there is any redundancy.
In my understanding, we are going from 570,000 to 490,000 soldiers; from 45 BCTs to 33 BCTs as a part of the Army 2020 process. And importantly, the remaining BCTs will be reorganized
through the addition of a third maneuver battalion and additional
engineering capabilities.
With the Presidents fiscal year 2015 budget submission, we now
realize the Army will go even deeper in these cuts. We have al-
36
ready talked about going somewhere between 440,000 to 450,000.
And should sequestration stay in place, it looks like in fiscal year
2016 as low as 420,000.
And I think I heard someone actually make the comment that
that is really exactly where we are headed at the rate we are going
at the present time.
Well, I understand a supplemental programmatic environmental
assessment [PEA] is already underway to look at these levels, so
here is where I want to drill down. General, can you tell me when
each of the remaining BCTs will be reconfigured with a third maneuver battalion?
General ODIERNO. Excuse me. In the Active Component, we will
complete the reconfigurance by the end of fiscal year 2015, and we
will complete, except for two brigades which will not convert because of room where they are at. So, all but two will convert by
the end of 2015. In the National Guard, we are still working with
the National Guard Bureau to define the timeline as they also convert to the new organization, and we are working our way through
that.
Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Thank you, General. Do you again, General,
do you believe you are adequately managing risk by implementing
such large reductions to both Army 2020 while simultaneously implementing the supplemental PEA process to yet again look at
more cuts?
General ODIERNO. Well, if I could just make one correction, we
are moving from 45 to 32 brigades, not 33.
Dr. FLEMING. Okay.
General ODIERNO. And as I stated, that number of brigades in
the Active Component allows us to meet the Defense Strategic
Guidance. But with these additional cuts, depending on how far we
go down, if we have to go down all the way to 420,000, we will no
longer be able to. And it will significantly reduce more of the
amount of brigade combat teams, up to eight more, coming out of
the Active Component.
Dr. FLEMING. And based on some comments you said earlier, it
sounds like to me if we go down to 420,000, we are really talking
about a high-risk category?
General ODIERNO. We would not be able to execute the Defense
Strategic Guidance, which putsI consider high risk.
Dr. FLEMING. Do you see any value in fully executing Army 2020,
meeting that commitment to the communities who host your soldiers before you go to the next step with this supplemental PEA?
General ODIERNO. That is what we are in the process of doing,
sir. We want to implement this first. We will then, the Secretary
and I will then conduct additional assessments on potential future
reductions and where that might occur.
But we have to continue tosince we know sequestration is the
law, we have to continue our process, and that is why we have to
do the program of our minimal assessment and get that out there.
Dr. FLEMING. And then finally, could you please comment on the
potential benefits and cost savings of having a BCT permanently
stationed at our national combat training centers?
General ODIERNO. We currently have one at JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center]. And we have found that to be very helpful
37
to have them there, so they have availability to many readiness
and training capabilities that arent normally there. It is a bit more
difficult out at the National Training Center to have one stationed
right there.
So, that is one of the factors we take into consideration as we
will make our assessment as we move forward, sir.
Dr. FLEMING. Right. JRTC is in my district, and as you know, we
are vastly upgrading, enlarging, and because of previous program
spending, are really upgrading that and enlarging that base. So,
obviously, we see some real benefits, I think, to the Army in doing
that.
And I apologize, Secretary McHugh, I didnt ask you any questions yet, but in 30 seconds, do you have anything to add?
Secretary MCHUGH. You cannot ask me a question any time you
want.
[Laughter.]
Secretary MCHUGH. No, I think the chief has captured it very
well. It all comes back to what both the ranking member and the
chairman said in their opening remarks. We are not particularly
anxious to take this Army down to 420,000. We are not at all sanguine about how it would look in the rationality of the process, but
it is the law of the land. Unless it changes, that is where we have
to go.
Dr. FLEMING. Yes. Okay, thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. KLINE. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Tsongas laid out an expose of the Sinclair problem. I understand, a few moments ago, you talked about a half-day
session that the Secretary of Defense had with the ranking members or the rank.
My question to you isso, as Secretary of the Army and top general in the Army, what are the two of you going to do about the
Sinclair situation?
Secretary MCHUGH. I will start. As the final decisionmaker in
matters of this kind, I am really constrained in what I can say. Unlike in the civilian sector, when a jury comes in, and the case is
closed, this case is not closed. They are under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, a continuing process of certification of the
record providing both the victim as well as the general an opportunity to respond to the content of that record.
The accused can make pleas for clemency, et cetera, et cetera. So
we have a ways to go.
What I can say is that as in the civilian sector, we do not have
control over, nor do we try to influence, the sentencing of the judge.
The Army was faced with the prospect of prosecuting this particular individual, and it did that, and it also prosecuted in a way
that obtained a conviction. Those are the things we do control. And
I think it is worthy to note that in the Army, the prosecution rate
for rape is 64 percent, where in the private sector, it is 14 percent,
14 to 20 percent.
So, we do take the steps necessary to hold soldiers accountable,
but we cannot, and nor would the civilian sector, be able to make
the determinations of a sentencing judge.
38
Mr. GARAMENDI. So the general gets off the hook?
Secretary MCHUGH. As I said
Mr. GARAMENDI. Retires with full benefits?
Secretary MCHUGH. As I said, sir, the process is still ongoing. I
have to make the finalI have to make the final certifications as
to his rank and conditions of retirement, and that has not yet
reached my desk.
Mr. GARAMENDI. General, your comments?
General ODIERNO. I have no additional comments than what the
Secretary said. Bottom line is, the military justice system, like the
civilian justice system, has an independent judiciary. In this case,
he had the sole discretion of the sentence and the accused and the
military judge made a decision. We now will abide by that decision
and work through the process, as it was described by the Secretary
of the Army, and we cant comment any further on it because it is
still an ongoing case.
Mr. GARAMENDI. When it is completed, I would expect you will
be back here to explain what your decisions are?
Secretary MCHUGH. Any decision I make would be a matter of
public record, of course.
Mr. GARAMENDI. I yield back.
Mr. KLINE. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate the panelists being here today. Thank you very
much for your leadership. I appreciate the sacrifices not only of you
both and your families, but all those that you command and lead.
I would like to follow up on earlier dialog with Ms. Sanchez and
our panelists about the status of the force, morale, cohesion, professional development. In particular, a focus on professional military
education. The vision for the Army changes since 2010, when I left
it, and particularly if there are aspects of your vision that you
would need changes in law.
General ODIERNO. Right now, I dont think there is any need to
have any changes in law. But let me walk through.
We understand now that what we havepart of what we have
learned over the last 10 to 12 years, and as I look to the future,
that the complexity of the environment we are going to have to operate in is increasing.
And so we have toone of the great advantages that we have in
our Army is our leaders, and we have got to continue to develop
them, both noncommissioned officers and officers, in order to meet
those increasing challenges.
So we are completely revamping how we do training, from the
United States Military Academy to ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps] all the way up through general officer training that we
are doing. We are changing what we do at Command and General
Staff College. We are changing what we do at the Army War College. We have NCO 2020 that is looking at the development of our
noncommissioned officers, and how we continue to train them to
understand the complex environment and make decisions.
I believe in the future, decisionmaking is going to be decentralized, and so we have to prepare our young leaders in order to understand this environment and the responsibility of making decen-
39
tralized decisions, especially with the fast movement of information.
So, we are totally focused on doing this. It is also about managing talent, and that is one of the most important pieces, and that
we want officers that are very well-rounded. We want officers that
can be successful tactically, but also understand the broader array
of responsibilities that you have as you increase in rank, and the
responsibilities of running a major organization, of understanding
the different aspects of operating in a joint multinational environment, operating and understanding budgets, but also being operationally and tactically proficient.
Those are the kind of capabilities we need. So, in order to do
that, we need to ensure that our young leaders are getting trained
to do this, and that we manage them in such a way that they are
getting jobs that develop them to do and operate across a wide
array of responsibilities.
So, it is a combination of training and education, it is a combination of talent management, and utilizing the incredible talent that
I believe we have in all the components of the Army.
Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Secretary, any further comments on that?
Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I think the chief summed it up very,
very well.
Obviously, as we go forward, the more uncertainty in the environment, we would like to have our leaders more and more comfortable with uncertainty. And that takes the kind of training processes and the kind of approach that, as the chief said, that it, particularly to this credit, we have worked very, very hard and we
view that as the key to the future.
Mr. GIBSON. And as the forces develop leadership, retained and
developed, do you envision any potential need to change the personnel policies in terms of rightsizing the force and developing the
force?
General ODIERNO. So, I think one of the things we are doing, as
we were growing the force in the 2000s, our promotion rates were
really high, because we lacked the numbers.
So as we shape the force as we go forward, first we are going to
see promotion rates come down to what I consider to be historic
levels, which I think is positive because it is going to generate competition. Competition. There is nothing better than creating great
leaders is through competition. And I think we are going to see
that as we move forward. And I think that is important.
But, again, it is also making sure that we continue to have processes, both in not only the institutional training piece, but in the
operational training, that we provide opportunities for our leaders,
operationally, to think through complex problems likethat is why
the regionally aligned force concept is so important. It is going to
connect them to regions they have not been in before, such as the
Asia-Pacific, such as Africa, such as working with our NATO allies,
such as in other areas, that will allow them to understand the culture, the idiosyncrasy, social, economic aspects of what we are
going to face in the future.
And that is going to be a key component of this. So it is not only
the institutional, but it is the organizational and operational education that is going to be important.
40
Mr. GIBSON. Well, it looks like I am about out of time, so I yield
back.
Mr. KLINE. Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Barber.
Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for being with us
today.
Before I ask my questions, I just want to comment on an experience I had last week. I had the good fortune, under the leadership
of Mr. Wittman, to go to Afghanistan, where I visited with many
of our soldiers, who, I have to say, are performing incredibly well,
very professionally, under what I would consider very trying circumstances.
So I think we all would agree that the statements that have been
made by the President of Afghanistan have been outrageous and
inappropriate.
And I wanted to find out for my own, for myself, how this is affecting morale amongst our troops. And, needless to say, morale is
very high. They are professionals. They are dedicated to their mission. They are carrying out, as I say, the mission in the midst of
very trying and a very fragile situation, with the elections coming
up just a week or so away.
I wanted to, Mr. Secretary, ask you about a particular issue that
I joined with Senators Flake and McCain. We sent a letter to you
a couple of weeks ago in regard to rumors that the Army Test Evaluation Command, or ATEC, was looking at consolidating test capabilities across the Nation.
Last year in March, March 2013, you responded to a similar letter, saying that these consolidations were not being considered. But
we still hear the rumors. And, of course, rumors create uncertainty,
and we would like to put them to rest.
As you know, Fort Huachuca in my district is home to the Electronic Proving Ground, the EPG. It has capabilities and assets that
simply cant be matched anywhere in the country. It is a critical
issue for our national security, I believe, that we respondwe get
your response to this question.
And, Mr. Secretary, we look forward to your response, and hope
that it will be similar to the one you gave about a year ago.
Do you have any sense of when we might be able to hear back
from you, sir?
Secretary MCHUGH. That letter is staffed and being worked, as
we speak, but we will try to expedite that to get it to you as quickly
as we possibly can.
As I mentioned in my letter last year, the capabilities at
Huachuca and White Sands offer advantages that are hard to replicate. I can only guess that the source of the rumor probably has
something to do with the Army-wide effort we are doing in looking
at our administrative structure.
We expect that there may be some changes across all Army processes in that regard, so we make sure we are aligned efficiently.
But that is a separate issue from testing, per se.
But I dont want to write the letter before it is written. So let
me make sure we are getting you the most up-to-date, accurate information, and we will do that as quickly as we can.
41
Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I appreciate that. And I
think, as we spoke before the hearing, with the general as well, I
think you know what a unique facility, installation, garrison we
have at Fort Huachuca in terms of the capability it has to test
without interference from flyovers or other electronic signals.
And I do hope that both of you will be able to come out and visit
us in the very near future.
Secretary MCHUGH. I am trying. As you and I talked this morning
Mr. BARBER. I know you are.
Secretary MCHUGH. I have had three trips canceled, for a variety
of reasons. I am beginning to think I am a jinx. But I am still committed to going out there.
Mr. BARBER. Look forward to having you. I know the community
would be very excited to meet with you as well.
Let me gomove quickly, then, since I have got very little time
left, to a question for General Odierno.
I want to thank you, first of all, General, for your incredible service to our country. And it is really unparalleled.
General, I agree with Secretary Hagel that cyber warfare should
be one of DODs top priorities. And certainly, we have welcomed
that. It is the capability we need, certainly, going into future warfare.
And, as I mentioned earlier, Fort Huachuca has the Electronic
Proving Ground. It is the Armys premiere C5ISR [command, control, communications, computers, combat systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and developmental tester, with the
most pristine electronic range, due to its geographic location. Quiet
electromagnetic spectrum and no overflights by the aircraft.
Because of this, it produces, really, the best world test results it
can have. Any reduction, I believe, in the personnel at Fort
Huachuca would put these missions at risk.
As the Army looks at downsizing force structure, General, what
is the Armys plan to avoid the loss of Active Duty military and civilians, like those that are found at Fort Huachuca, who have institutional knowledge to support programs such as cyber warfare?
If you could comment, please.
General ODIERNO. Well, first, we are increasingduring this
budget downsizing, we are increasing our investment, so that is
how important it is to us. And so, those people and that expertise
is critical to us as we move forward and as we continue to expand
the Armys role in cyber.
And I understand the range that is out there and the importance
of that range as we move forward. It is critical for our evaluation
and continued testing.
So, in my opinion, we are expanding our capability in cyber. We
still have some decisions to make, but I think the capability that
is in Fort Huachuca is one that is very important to us as we move
forward.
Mr. BARBER. Well, thank you both. I am out of time.
Mr. Secretary, General, look forward to seeing you in Arizona.
I yield back.
Mr. GIBSON [presiding]. The gentlemans time has expired.
Thanks, Mr. Barber.
42
Mr. Enyart.
Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Gibson.
General Odierno, all the way over here on your right, I have
moved positions, like Mr. Courtney, I recognize thewhat those
stripes on your sleeve mean.
And I know that over the past dozen years, many in our Active
Component have been on a 1-and-1 cycle, 1 year overseas, 1 year
back to try and reestablish family foundations, and then it is right
back into the fight again.
And I realize also, as do you, that if it were not for the contribution of the National Guard or the Reserve forces, our Army would
have been bent far beyond the ability to sustain that long-term
fight.
So it greatly concerns me when I heard you talk earlier, and I
think it was at least twice that you mentioned the Armys problems
in maintaining a prolonged fight if these cuts go through.
So that leads me into my question, having set the preface. According to OSD CAPE [Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation], and the recent Reserve Forces
Policy Board study, the National Guard is significantly more costeffective over its life cycle, at approximately one-third of the cost
when not mobilized and approximately 80 percent to 95 percent of
the cost when mobilized.
So I am not sure that I understand why we are proposing to cut
the National Guard instead of relying on it more, using a term that
you use so frequently, rebalancing, since it offers opportunities to
save money while sustaining defense capacity and capability.
So I would like you, and I will take this answer, since my time
is very limited, I will take this answer in writing after the hearing,
but I would like you to discuss for me why the Army is not choosing to keep tens of thousands of soldiers more in our total Army,
housed in the National Guard and the Reserves, while remaining
well inside the current cost constraints.
[The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. ENYART. Now, for an answer that I would like to have on the
record, the proposal to transfer the AH64s, the Apache helicopters, out of the Guard over to the Active Component, are any
of those Guard helicopters going to be mothballed or shrink
wrapped or placed on an inactive status?
Secretary MCHUGH. The short answer is no.
I can get you a detailed answer on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on
page 93.]
Mr. ENYART. Thank you.
Now, the reasoning that I have heard propounded here and in
other places for this justification for transferring the Apaches, is
that it is going to save money but we are not mothballing any, so
I am not quite sure how that saves money.
But the other reasoning I have heard is that the Governors can
get more use out of Black Hawks, that they, the Governors, dont
have any real use for Apaches.
So my question is, has the mission of the National Guard
changed? If you use that logic, what you are saying is the Guard
is only going to be used for domestic purposes or disaster response.
43
Has there been some shift in policy that Congress has not been
made aware of, that would eliminate the Guards role in deploying
overseas and in fighting foreign threats as well as guarding against
domestic disaster?
General ODIERNO. Thank you, sir.
First, what we are eliminating is almost 600 OH58 aircraft.
Mr. ENYART. Sir, I am not talking about the OH58s. I am aware
of
General ODIERNO [continuing]. You are asking me
Mr. ENYART. I am asking you aboutspecifically about Apaches.
General ODIERNO. And I will get to that. But you asked me why
we are not mothballing Apaches. It is because we are eliminating
OH58 Deltas. Significant number. Almostover 600 of those out
of the force. That is why we are doing this.
Now
Mr. ENYART. General, I dont want to cut you off. I have only got
a minute left. So you can answer that in writing to me, please.
General ODIERNO. Okay.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 93.]
Mr. ENYART. Thank you.
Now, the motto of the Army that I went through for many, many
years, was that you train as you fight. And I know when I went
to Bill Ingrams retirement ceremony, as the director of the Army
National Guard, when he gave his retirement speech, he talked
abut the first unit that got activated out of North Carolina in 2003
for Iraq was the AH64s.
Now, what concerns me is you are eliminating the Armys reserve force of AH64s at zero dollars in savings in terms of that
program. So I think that is not a particularly wise move and you
are taking away from the Guards ability to train because they are
not going to be able to train as they fight.
I have one more comment for you, General. And that is when I
was a young officer, there was a well-known motto: Different
spanks for different ranks. Now, when I got to be a two-star, I
vowed to eliminate that motto in the force that I commanded. And
I worked very diligently to do that. In light of the Sinclair episode,
I commend that thought to you, to eliminate different spanks for
different ranks.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. GIBSON. Thank you, Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Gallego.
Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, in looking at some of the issues with respect to the sequester
and the budget, I note that the supplemental programmatic environmental assessment [PEA] for Fort Bliss, which is located in El
Paso, indicates a possible cumulative military and civilian employee loss of 16,000 folks. And the supplemental PEA for Joint
Base San Antonio indicates a potential loss of 5,900 military and
civilian employees there.
San Antonio and El Paso being the ends of the congressional district that I representas you know, it is nearly a quarter of Texas
in that districtI know that a lot of that or all of that relates to
the necessarythe tough decisions with respect to the sequester.
44
But what happens to me as I go home and talk to folks is that
the perception is you all have such a big budget, why cant you find
the money and save the money and do thisand go on about the
business of the Army? Why is the sequester such a big deal?
Can youif you were talking to folks in El Paso or San Antonio
for me, what would youhow would you explain this to them? Because nobody feels the impact of the sequester. I mean, that is just
another Washington story and it, you know, it doesnt ever really
hit home.
How would you make it hit home?
General ODIERNO. Well, first of all, thank you for the question.
What I would tell everybody is that with all the budget cuts we
have had over the last 11 years, it results in a 34 percent reduction
in the Armys budget top line, which is $400 billion over about 11
years.
So that is a significant amount of money. And so in order to do
that, we have to get in balance readiness, modernization, and end
strength. So in order to meet our responsibilities to Congress, it is
important that we develop a program that allows us to do that.
Unfortunately, that means we have to reduce the size of the
Army, because the one thing we dont ever want to do is send people into harms way that arent trained or have the most modern
equipment. So we have got to balance that.
And that is the cost, is that we are reducing our spending on defense. That means we have a smaller Army. That means it will be
one that can do less. But in order to make itcontinue it to be capable, we have to reduce it. And that is why these reductions have
to take place.
Now, we can have an argument over whether it is too small or
not, but the bottom line is with the dollars that we have been allocated, we have no other choice. That is the only thing that we can
do, and that is what I would say to that.
Mr. GALLEGO. Is the sequester, then, not impacting readiness in
the sense that if you are going to just field a smaller Army, your
smaller Army will be ready. But I would argue that sequester impacts the training, for example. It impactsit has a real impact on
the safety of our men and women in uniform.
General ODIERNO. It does in the interim. So in other words, for
5 or 6 years as you are buildingit all has to do with as you are
taking end strength out, you then dont have enough readiness. But
once you get that end strength out, we will be able to sustain a
readiness level that is appropriate. And that is the end state.
And so at the end state, you have a smaller Army that is ready.
But in the meantime, it creates great uncertainty and unreadiness
because we have to be very careful on how we take soldiers out of
the Army. We want to make sure we can still meet our current
operational commitments. We want to make sure we take care of
our soldiers as we take them out. And we are taking out nearly
20,000 a year now out of the Army.
And for us to get down to sequestration levels, we would have
to continue that for another 5 years.
Mr. GALLEGO. I would invite youI know that you have been,
and I know that you have been semi-frequentlyand Mr. Secretary, you as well, to visit both Fort Bliss and Joint Base San An-
45
tonio. I think they are significantly important in national defense.
Each obviously has a very different mission, the San Antonio mission with the medical corps and the medical training corps across
the services.
But I would like the opportunity to host you all and have you all
talk to some of the folks directly about the importance of their mission and some of the challenges that you all face in the day-to-day
decisionmaking with respect to thesemaking these numbers
work.
General ODIERNO. I am actually coming down in April to San Antonio, so I would be happy to set something up.
Mr. GALLEGO. Great. Thank you.
Mr. GIBSON. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service. I was with General Welsh
this past weekend at Moody Air Force Base where the A10 flies
out of. And I have a tremendous amount of respect for General
Welsh. I know that he, like you, is having to make a tremendous
amount of tough decisions.
With regard to the A10, my primary concern with the recommendation is that we are pulling down that weapons system
over the course of 24 months, when it will be 7 to 8 years before
the F35 is coming off the assembly line in adequate numbers to
replace some of the other planes that are going to be pulled down.
I recognize the F35 is not the primary to take the role of replacing the A10 for close air support, but we cant have one plane in
two places at the same time. So we are going to be pulling down
a lot of planes over the course of the next 24 months.
With regard to the close air support mission, that is obviously
going to be taken over by other weapons systems. And my question
gets back to with the retirement of the A10, the costs of flying the
Apaches, what additional costs do you expect to incur out of the
Armys budget in handling that close air support mission with
Apaches instead of the A10s? And what additional challenges,
whether it be in altitude or range or other areas, do you anticipate
A10 versus Apache?
General ODIERNO. Well, first, I thinkfirst, I want to tell you
the A10soldiers appreciate the A10 and the incredible support
it has given to us. It is considered to be an incredible, good close
air support capability. What I would say, though, is the replacement really in the interim is the F16. The F16 is going to be
what gives us close air support. We have been using the F16 for
close air support in Afghanistan. They have done about 60 percent
of the missions in Afghanistan on close air support.
I think what we have to do with the Air Force, though, is work
through the tactics, techniques, and procedures on how we continue
to move forward with the F16 providing close air support.
The Apache provides some support to our ground troops. It provides us close, tactical, integrated air support, but it does not replace the responsibility and the need for close air support from the
Air Force. And so, we are going to have to depend on the F16
until the F35 comes on board for close air support.
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Again, as I said, they have been providing that with that in Afghanistan in some cases. We need to work with them to develop
the proper tactics, techniques, and procedures so we can move forward. And General Welsh and I have talked about this.
Mr. SCOTT. As I said, I have a tremendous amount of respect for
both of you, and I know he was an A10 pilot, and I know that if
we werent in the budget situation that we are in, we wouldnt be
talking about retiring it over the course of 24 months. It would
probably be closer to a 7-year or an 8-year drawdown as they went
in for major depot maintenance.
I appreciate your service and look forward to making sure that
we maintain that close air support mission as I know you and General Welsh will work on as well.
Secretary McHugh, thank you for being here. Sorry I had to step
out for a little while, but thank you for your service.
With that, I yield the remainder of my time.
Mr. GIBSON. Gentleman yields back.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And to both Secretary and General, you have led this country
during some extraordinary times and we value all of your sacrifices
on our behalf.
Secretary McHugh, I must challenge your earlier statement. To
say that there are 5,000 soldiers who will file complaints for sexual
assault or rape a year and only 500 of them go to court-martial,
that means that only 10 percent of those that file complaints actually go to court-martial. What happens to the 90 percent that dont?
So, the record is good in terms of once they get the court-martial
that you are successful, but that doesnt address the fact that so
many of these cases go unaddressed. But that is not really what
I want to spend time talking about this morning.
General Sinclair pled guilty. He pled guilty to engaging in an inappropriate relationship with his accuser. He pled guilty for engaging in an inappropriate relationship with another female Army captain. He pled guilty to engaging in an inappropriate relationship
with a female Army major. He pled guilty to possessing and displaying pornographic images and videos on his computer in Afghanistan.
He pled guilty to using his government-issued travel card for personal purposes for a trip to Tuscon, Arizona, to see his accuser, and
he pled guilty to using that same travel card for another trip to see
her in Fort Hood, Texas.
He pled guilty to engaging in sexually explicit communications
with a second female captain. He pled guilty to engaging in sexually explicit communications with a female major by requesting and
receiving nude photos and a sexually explicit video of her.
He pled guilty to trying to start an inappropriate relationship
with an Army lieutenant.
This is a sexual predator. And for a sexual predator to gain the
rank that he has gained, go through a court-martial process, and
be given a slap on the wrist suggests to everyone who has been
watching this case that it does not work. The system does not
work.
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This is an issue of undue command influence. That is the problem. It is a problem when undue command influence does not move
forward in terms of investigations and prosecutions, and it is a
problem when undue command influence goes forward in a case
that has got problems.
Now, it is true that the defendant and the prosecution had come
to an agreement, a pre-trial agreement in which the defendant
agreed to a demotion and jail time. And it was the convening authority that refused to accept that plea.
Now, my understanding is that you have the authority to demote
General Sinclair. Is that not the case?
Secretary MCHUGH. Under the processes for the military, when
a soldier goes for retirement, the Secretary of the Department has
the authority to order a grade determination board, and that grade
determination board makes recommendations as to the grade at retirement for that officer. That is correct.
Ms. SPEIER. So, lets be clear that this general pled guilty to any
number of egregious conduct. That a lower-ranking individual
would have been kicked out of the military. He has pled guilty to
those, and you do have the authority to demote him by virtue of
being the Secretary of the Army.
Secretary MCHUGH. As I said, under the military procedures, at
retirement, the service secretary of any of the military departments
can order a grade determination board to make recommendations
on grade at retirement.
Ms. SPEIER. Are you going to order that grade determination
board?
Secretary MCHUGH. As I stated earlier, Congresswoman, as the
decision authority in those matters, I am
Ms. SPEIER. You are not at liberty to tell us?
Secretary MCHUGH [continuing]. I am not at liberty to make
comment on what I may or may not do, particularly given that the
case is still technically open under the UCMJ. Unlike in most civilian courts, there is a preparation of the trial record. The victim in
this case will be allowed to make comment on those kinds of
things. The accused can make clemency pleadings, et cetera, et
cetera. So, I regret, but I am highly constrained from what I can
say.
Ms. SPEIER. All right.
Secretary MCHUGH. I can say, though, as I did earlier, as I know
you appreciate, and we all appreciate your devotion and focus on
this very important issue. The Army only had control over whether
or not this officer was prosecuted. He was. Those guilty pleas that
you have mentioned came about because the Army did prosecute.
We in the military, like in the civilian sector, have an independent
judiciary, and the independent judges make determinations of sentencing.
This officer was convicted.
Ms. SPEIER. The judges though, it is important to point out,
thank you Secretary, are JAG [Judge Advocate General] officers
that play the role of a judge for a particular case, so they are still
subject to the chain of command in subsequent cases.
I yield back.
Mr. GIBSON. Gentlewoman yields back.
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Mr. Carson.
Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, for your
service to our country.
General, let me first start by saying I have a deep affection and
admiration toward you for two reasons. One is substantive, the
other is superficial. On the substantive part, I spent some time
with you in the region a couple of years ago, and I found you to
be very forthright, very knowledgeable, and greatly respected by
your team and by our men and women in uniform.
On the superficial side, I think you carry yourself quite well for
a fellow tall guy and a guy who has a similar haircut. So thank
you.
Secretary McHugh, I recently received word about an Army proposal to pull some of its financial management services in-house,
and away from the Defense Finance and Accounting Services
[DFAS]. And as you may know or if you dont know, in Indianapolis, Indiana, which is my district, DFAS headquarters is located
there. And obviously this is a deeplyseriouslyserious concern
for that matter, for me and my constituents that might have been
impacted by these changes.
But, before getting to my question, I just want to say sir, and you
can relate as a former member, that I am disappointed that the
Army didnt reach out to me with the details of the proposal, and
I had to receive the information third party. So I know you understand my concerns, because you have been on this side, as well.
But, I would like to know from you, when I learned in March
that an Army pilot project was set to begin in April there really
wasnt much time to properly make an inquiry and determine how
exactly this will impact my district and DFAS as a whole. I dont
knowyou have probably seen the letter from the entire delegation
of Indiana with several questions about this proposal, its impact on
our State and how it might impact cost effectiveness and
auditability of the Army.
So I hope I can get your commitment to provide some answers
before the general pilot program begins.
So here are my questions, sir. Can you tell me if the Army is currently proceeding with a plan to realign some of its financial management and accounting services whether through the proposal I
am referencing or for some other proposal?
And, what are your goals, sir, in this process and how will efficacy and feasibility of a proposal be judged beyond the pilot stage
as we know it today?
Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you, Congressman.
First of all, as I know you understand, the United States Army
does not control DFAS. That is under the Department of Defense,
principally the Comptrollerat the moment Secretary Bob Hale. I
in fact had a conversation with him about this matter, a very brief
one, yesterday. And obviously as the administrative head of DFAS,
he is tracking very closely what, if any, impact the Armys current
initiatives may have on DFAS.
And I want to underscore the word if any. Our intent is not to
have an effect one way or another on DFAS, but rather to optimize
our financial management and financial structure internally.
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The project that you are, I believe, referencing is a two-based
pilot program that by and large focuses on internal management
and internal Army financial structures. And we dont expect it
would have much of any impact on DFAS, whether it be in your
district, or whether it be not far from my district used to be in New
York, in Rome, New York, for example, but we wont know what
the outcomes may be until we do this one- or two-base targeted
program.
I think everybody has to be realistic though, that DFAS relies
upon its customers and its customers are the Army, the Navy, the
Marine Corps, the Air Force, Coast Guard. As the number of customers get smaller, you are going to have fewer transactions if no
one does anything else.
It is just realistic.
So I mean, the face of DFAS, I would thinkand it is not my
call, would have to make some adjustments to accommodate the
drawdown in the budget as well.
It is justit seems to me logical.
But, having said that, the last point I would make, much of what
we are doing is in pursuit of what Congress has legally said we
must do, and that is, to become auditable. We have launchedyou
may have heard our conversation earlier with Mr. Conaway
launched GFEBs and other ERPs to make sure that we are
auditable. Part of that, too, will yield inefficiencies and economies
that may at some point have a transactionalan effect on the
transactions with DFAS, but we have to make those validations.
And I know we are working the response to you and your delegations letters, so thatyou know, our intent is not to surprise anyone, but again, this is basically an Army-focused exercise, but it
does have the Comptroller General and the Departments attention.
Mr. CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. GIBSON. Gentleman yields back.
This concludes questions from members. Offer the Army leadership any final comments.
Secretary MCHUGH. It is good to see a fellow New Yorker
General ODIERNO. Thank you very much, sir. We appreciate it.
Secretary MCHUGH. Thank you, sir.
Mr. GIBSON. Well, we thank the panelists for their long distinguished careers, for their service, and for their testimony here
today.
And may God bless the United States Army.
The hearing is completed.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
MARCH 25, 2014
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them for training and deployment. These AH64 battalions will deploy with an intermediate maintenance slice to support AH64 maintenance and armament. This
model has proven effective in the past, and in fact, we have a National Guard aviation brigade deployed to Kuwait today with an active duty attack battalion attached.
The Black Hawk utility helicopters the Army National Guard would gain by this
transfer play an critically important role in domestic operations, providing governors
with capability that Apaches lack. Black Hawks have been, and will continue to be,
a key combat multiplier for our commanders overseas as well. Indeed, the real world
missions that our National Guard Black Hawk crews conduct here in the homeland
provide them with experience that makes these crews an especially valued asset
when they deploy overseas. [See page 43.]
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ational Contract Support Planning and Execution Course (JOPEC), and COR
and Commanders Emergency Response Program Web Based Training.
Implemented the web-based COR Tracking (CORT) Tool, which provides contracting personnel and requiring activities with the means to track and manage
COR assignments across multiple contracts across DOD.
Developed new OCS initiatives for both acquisition and non-acquisition personnel including:
Army Operational Contract Support Board (AOCSB)
Command Post ExerciseFunctional (CPXF), Exercise in a Box.
Department of the Army Military Contracting Board of Directors (BoDs) and
Senior Leader Forum (SLF).
99
the training base and then to Command Aviation Companies, Air Ambulance Companies, and Assault Helicopter Battalions.
The Army also began a UH60A to UH60L recapitalization effort in July 2007
to address sustainment and readiness issues with the legacy UH60A fleet. The program upgrades provide 10 additional years of service life to a select number of UH
60As and will end in FY18 when the UH60L Digital program begins. The UH60A
to UH60L effort was primarily focused on increasing readiness in the Army National Guard, which operates the largest population of legacy UH60A aircraft.
When this program ends, approximately 412 UH60As will have been recapitalized
to UH60Ls, 320 of which will have been fielded to the Army National Guard.
Mr. SMITH. I understand that conversion of the 81st Armored Brigade Combat
Team into a Stryker Brigade Combat Team has been considered by the Army. Can
you please provide an update on the potential conversion of this brigade and when
we can anticipate receiving any updates and/or announcements on the 81st ABCT
designation as a Stryker brigade?
General ODIERNO. As the Army continues to reorganize itself due to budget cuts,
we will continue to assess the force mix of our Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), including the 81st Armored Brigade Combat Team. However, we are unable to make
any definitive decision on type and mix until we come to an agreement on the overall structure of the National Guard.
Mr. SMITH. I would like more detail on the impact to the Army National Guards
structure and composition that will result from reductions down to 335,000 (as proposed in the Presidents Budget) and 315,000 (as is projected under full sequestration). What specific units might the Army National Guard lose? What would the
process be for determining what units to keep and where they should be stationed?
General ODIERNO. The Army is structured as a Total Force and builds capability
across all three ComponentsActive, Guard and Reserveto meet national security
objectives. The Army is currently analyzing the impact of reduced end-strength on
the Active, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve, within the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. Part of that process includes the Army National Guard identifying which capabilities they recommend be retained or divested by mission, type,
capacity, and location. This proven process will identify options for senior leader decisions to balance Total Army capabilities within directed end-strength.
At 315,000, the Army National Guard (ARNG) would have a total of 22 Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs) with three maneuver battalions in each BCT. As a part of
the restructure at 335,000, the ARNG would consist of 24 BCTs with 3 maneuver
battalions in each BCT. This will allow the ARNG to maintain all maneuver battalions except for one.
Identification of specific unit and location detail for all components will not be
available until the completion of the TAA process which is anticipated for fall 2014
at the earliest.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON
Mr. WILSON. The AH64 ApacheIt is the Armys multi-role attack helicopter of
choice and will remain so through 2040, in addition to being a high demand asset
in Afghanistan. To meet this need, the Army plans to remanufacture all 634 Apache
D models to the E model configuration to further enhance and increase its capability. I understand the intent of the Army is to execute a multi-year procurement
contract in fiscal year 2017. What efficiencies and cost savings could we expect by
using a multi-year contract to acquire upgraded Apaches?
Secretary MCHUGH. The Army is currently pursuing multi-year procurement authority for the AH64E program and is working to satisfy the necessary statutory
requirements by the start of FY 2017. Multi-year contracts typically provide for
unit-price cost savings associated with larger procurement quantities, and increased
efficiency through the elimination of repeat labor and consolidated contracting. They
also provide industry with a predictable production workload over the contract term.
The Apache Program Office is currently preparing the Business Case Analysis to estimate the cost savings of a multi-year Apache procurement.
Mr. WILSON. The Department of Defense uses both annual contracts and multiyear contracts when acquiring goods and services. Under annual contracts, DOD
uses one or more contracts for each years worth of procurement of a given kind of
item. Under multi-year contracts, DOD uses a single contract for 2 to 5 years worth
of procurement. The multi-year contract: 1) results in supplier price breaks for larger quantity purchases, 2) eliminates repeat labor and bureaucracy by buying only
once, and 3) provides the stability of a set number of years worth of production.
In fiscal year 2013, when a 5-year multi-year contract was signed for the CH47
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Chinook helicopter, the savings were $810 millionor over 19 percentwhen compared to five single-year contracts. What is the Armys approach toward the use of
multi-year contracts? Can we expect to see additional ones, such one for the Apache
Helicopter in fiscal year 2017, in the future?
Secretary MCHUGH. When appropriate, the Army seeks to employ multi-year contracts to achieve cost savings. Army Aviation currently utilizes two multi-year contracts, one for the UH60 Black Hawk and one for the CH47F Chinook. Combined,
these contracts will result in over $1 billion in savings. The Army is currently pursuing multi-year procurement authority for the AH64E Apache program and is
working to satisfy the necessary statutory requirements by the start of FY 2017.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. LANGEVIN. I noted the release in February of FM338, which used the term
Cyber Electromagnetic Activities to address the blurring of the boundaries between
traditional cyber threats, traditional electronic warfare threats, and spectrum management operations. While the attention being given to this regime in doctrine is
certainly notable and a positive step, these fields are so dynamic that coordination
of effort across DOD, particularly given current fiscal constraints, is of paramount
importance. Are you comfortable with the current state of coordination within the
Army and between the DOD and other services, not just operationally but also in
terms of investments in systems and R&D? What do you think have been your particular successes and challenges?
General ODIERNO. Yes, I am comfortable with the current state of coordination
within the Army, and between the services and the Department of Defense (DOD).
Within the Army, the stand-up of the Cyber Center of Excellence consolidates Army
cyberspace operations, electronic warfare (EW), and spectrum management operations (SMO) for capability development, integration, and training, and it ensures
coordination between the relevant Army force modernization proponents. Operationally, Cyber Electromagnetic Activities (CEMA) elements are being created within
Army tactical units to integrate, coordinate, and synchronize organic and higher
echelon cyberspace operations, EW and SMO in support of those units missions.
The Army is studying what capability investments are needed to plan and execute
CEMA operations. Our Research and Development (R&D) community is conducting
research in dual use cyber and EW capabilities and maintains close liaison with
the R&D organizations of the other services and DOD to allow mutual leveraging
of research in these areas. Army CEMA is nested with the DOD Joint Concept for
Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO), which includes EW and SMO,
and the Army participates in three of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Communities of Interest (COIs) for Electronic Warfare/Electronic Protection, Cyber and the
Strategic Command JEMSO Concept of Operations development with the other
Services. The Army is collaborating with the DOD Chief Information Officer in support of the DOD Spectrum Strategy that assists in addressing a unity of effort for
EW and SMO.
Successes: The Cyber Center of Excellence recently achieved provisional status.
This single organization is responsible for cyber, EW, and SMO doctrine, training,
and capability development integration. Army Functional Area 29 EW Officers receive training in cyberspace operations and SMO, in addition to EW, to enable them
to lead the CEMA Elements in Army tactical units and further integration of Military Occupational Specialty 25E Spectrum Managers at battalion and brigade level.
Requirements are in the Armys validation process for development of Army dual
capable systems for planning and delivering cyber and EW effects.
Challenge: Maintaining momentum in Cyberspace, EW, and SMO development in
a fiscally constrained environment.
Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the current status of ARFORCYBER? What more do you
see that needs to be done to improve the Armys ability to protect its networks, as
well as being able to conduct full spectrum operations?
General ODIERNO. U.S. Army Cyber (ARCYBER) Command is assigned as an
Army Force Component Headquarters to U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM). It operates under the operational control of U.S. CYBERCOM with a Title 10 Service administrative control responsibility to Headquarters, Department of the Army for the
manning, training, and equipping of its force. ARCYBER has the authorities, manpower, and capabilities to accomplish its current missions.
ARCYBER and its subordinate commands, in partnership with CIOG6, are deliberately investing in critical cyberspace capabilities to ensure they stay ahead of the
growing cyber threat. To better defend all Army networks, ARCYBER is aggressively: 1) building Cyber Mission Force (CMF) teams of highly trained Soldiers and
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civilians; 2) acquiring and fielding the latest technology to equip these teams; and
3) ensuring access to critical indications and warning intelligence to further compliment our defensive capabilities. To ensure the command can conduct full spectrum operations, ARCYBER has established a Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber to
command and control CMF teams along with establishing links for these teams to
timely intelligencea decisive advantage this nation possesses within cyberspace
that will ensure operational success in this domain.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Can you provide for us an update on the Armys fielding of Cyber
Mission Teams to USCYBERCOM, and are you comfortable with the pace of training those teams?
General ODIERNO. The Army is on schedule to build 41 Cyber Mission Force
(CMF) teams per guidance from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A growing
number of these teams are already providing both the Army and US Cyber Command with operational capabilities. Additionally, the Army continues to build two
cyber brigades (the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade and a Cyber Protection Brigade) under the operational control of Army Cyber Command, Joint Forces HeadquartersCyber, and an Army operational headquarters (ARCYBER/2nd Army) to
support national, Joint, and Army cyber operations. 24 of the 41 Cyber Mission
Force teams will reach Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by the end of calendar
year (CY) 14. Beginning in Fiscal Year (FY) 15, the Army will be on pace for remaining teams to reach IOC by the end their designated FY build: 36 teams at IOC
by the end of FY15, and the full 41 teams at IOC by the end of FY16.
We are comfortable with the pace of training our CMF teams. Over the past 18
months, we have learned a lot and worked closely with the USCYBERCOM and the
Army to improve the processes that underpin the successful development of these
teams. We continue to work with USCYBERCOM to obtain the training courses and
seats that our CMF teams require so that they can meet projected initial operating
capability dates. We also continue to actively engage the Armys Human Resources
Command to ensure that personnel with the right grades of rank and Military Occupational Specialties to fill team critical positions are arriving to newly forming CMF
teams in a timely manner.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I have been concerned for some time about the vulnerability of our
domestic and overseas military bases to cyberattacks on the utilities, such as power
and water, on which our infrastructure depends. Can you provide us with an update
as to how the Army is working with relevant stakeholders to advance the state of
their network defenses? Are there additional authorities or incentives that you need
in order to be able to advance the ball in this regard?
General ODIERNO. It is critical that the utilities upon which our installations depend are secure from Cyber Attack. Army Cyber Command supports efforts to improve the cyber security of industrial control systems (ICS) the Service owns or upon
which it depends. The program follows four lines of effort focusing on: 1) identifying
the various systems throughout the Army; 2) integrating ICS cyber security into existing critical infrastructure risk management programs; 3) gap analysis of capabilities and capacity; and 4) collaborating with the ICS community of interest. The
Army has already started integrating ICS cyber security concerns into several of its
assessment programs and will expand the program in the coming fiscal year.
Based on our preliminary analysis, we do not believe there are any shortfalls in
our authorities.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO
Mr. LOBIONDO. What efficiencies and cost savings could we expect by using a
multi-year contract to acquire upgraded Apaches?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army is currently pursuing multiyear procurement authority for the AH64E program and is working to satisfy the
necessary statutory requirements by the start of FY 2017. Multi-year contracts typically provide for unit-price cost savings associated with larger procurement quantities, and increased efficiency through the elimination of repeat labor and consolidated contracting. They also provide industry with a predictable production workload over the contract term. The Apache Program Office is currently preparing the
Business Case Analysis to estimate the cost savings of multi-year Apache procurement.
Mr. LOBIONDO. What is the Armys approach toward the use of multi-year contracts? Can we expect to see additional ones, such one for the Apache Helicopter
in fiscal year 2017, in the future?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. When appropriate, the Army seeks to
employ multi-year contracts to achieve cost savings. Army Aviation currently uti-
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lizes two multi-year contracts, for the UH60 Black Hawk and the CH47F Chinook. Combined, these contracts will result in over $1 billion in savings. The Army
is currently pursuing multi-year procurement authority for the AH64E Apache program and is working to satisfy the necessary statutory requirements by the start
of FY 2017.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. BORDALLO. I am pleased to hear that you are committed to maintaining the
Reserve Components as an operational force. I believe the Reserve Components
must remain operational so we dont lose the experience gained over the last 13
years of combat, and to me, that means the Reserve Components can deploy in place
of or follow-on to Active units either during conflicts or in steady-state rotations to
places like the Sinai. Is the Army Guard going to be a continued part of the Armys
Force Generation cycle? Also, think tanks did a joint budget drill last year and there
were a variety of results. One such group suggested the Army look at Army Guard
rotations on the Korean Peninsula. Has that been considered?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army will continue to build Army
National Guard and Army Reserve forces through Army Force Generation. For example, we are planning to send one Army National Guard Brigade Combat Team
(BCT) to Combat Training Centers in FY 14 and two in FY 15. These events represent a significant investment in preserving Reserve Component readiness and ensuring an integrated and ready Total Force. Pursuant to the Army Total Force Policy, the Army will continue to consider using Reserve Component units for steady
state rotations, as it has in the past; however, the Army has not planned to employ
Army National Guard BCTs for rotations to Korea because the BCTs cannot reach
the desired level of training proficiency within their allotted training days.
In general, if the Army National Guard maintains too much force structure, its
readiness funding must be reduced. Therefore, it is essential that the Army National Guard reduce force structure as outlined in the Armys budget submission in
order to preserve its capability as an operational force.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. LOEBSACK. General Odierno, can you go into detail on other Army aviation
force structure considerations that would have resulted in a mix of combat aviation
brigades (CABs) and General Support Aviation Battalions (GSAB) in the Active
Component and Reserve Component? And why those considerations were ultimately
not chosen? If this restructuring is budget driven, does it not make sense to retain
some attack aviation capability in the Reserve Component because its less costly
than keeping the most expensive platform, the AH64, in the most expensive component to maintain and operate?
General ODIERNO. The Armys Attack/Reconnaissance battalions are considered
low density and high demand assets that must be fully trained and ready on short
notice to deploy for world-wide contingencies and crisis response in the wake of
major reductions to the Total Army end-strength and force structure. The divestment of OH58D Kiowa Warriors and the elimination of three entire Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) from the Active Component (AC) will take Army Aviation
down from 37 to 20 shooting battalions. This necessitates transferring all Apache
helicopters to the AC in order to meet the demands of our Combatant Commanders.
The Army simply does not have the luxury of retaining Apache helicopters in the
Reserve Component (RC) as it is considerably more expensive to maintain a sufficient, available inventory of Apaches in the RC than it is to do so in the AC.
When considering the most effective use of limited resources, National Guard Formations should be optimized with dual use equipment and formations that are capable of supporting States and Governors as well as Combatant Commanders when
mobilized. We must develop complimentary and mutually supporting capabilities.
The Army supports a multi-component solution for operationalizing ARNG Aviation
Brigades in non-permissive environments. Under the Aviation Restructure Initiative
(ARI), each ARNG Aviation Brigade will have an AC AH64 battalion aligned with
them for training and deployment. These AH64 battalions will deploy with an intermediate maintenance slice to support AH64 maintenance and armament. This
model has proven effective in the past, and in fact, we have a National Guard aviation brigade deployed to Kuwait today with an active duty attack battalion attached.
The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) was necessary due to severe budget restraints. ARI is designed to achieve a leaner, more efficient and capable force that
balances operational capability and capacity across the Total Army. The low-density,
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high-demand AH64 Apaches transferring out of the Army National Guard (ARNG)
will be repurposed to replace Active Component (AC) OH58D Kiowa Warriors that
are being divested. The transfer will enable the teaming of Apaches with unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) for armed reconnaissance, filling a critical capability need
for an Armed Aerial Scout created by the elimination of the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter program. In addition, consolidation of Apache airframes in the AC will
enable the Army to better meet the operational demands of our Combatant Commanders due to the increased operational availability as a result of the reduced
dwell times required in the AC. The ARNG will receive additional UH60 Black
Hawk helicopters to optimize the ability to perform its mission in the homeland and
deploy in support of combat operations.
Necessary savings are generated by divesting three entire fleets of Army aircraftthe OH58A/C Kiowas; the TH67 training helicopters; and the OH58D
Kiowa Warriorsan overall reduction of 798 aircraft. The net effect of the reduction
is a 23 percent decrease in aircraft in the AC with only an 8 percent reduction in
the ARNG. In addition to procurement and modernization cost savings, the Army
would also avoid the significant operations and sustainment costs of these aging aircraft fleets. ARI avoids approximately 12 billion dollars in imminent costs. If the
Army were to not execute ARI, we would be forced to retain many of our oldest and
least capable aircraft while divesting several hundred modernized airframes. Upgrades to the Kiowa Warrior would cost over 10 billion dollars. Replacing the legacy
TH67 training helicopter would cost another 1.5 billion dollars. In addition, lower
procurement rates of modernized aircraft would cost the Army approximately 15 billion dollars. These costs would be unbearable for the Army under the current budget
constraints and would risk creating a hollow force, with less overall capability and
less investment in modernization.
The Army National Guard was involved in the development and staffing of the
aviation restructure plan during the entire process. The ARNG was directly involved
as early as February, 2013 and had planners present during the development of specific details of ARI.
Under the ARI plan, the regular Army, Army National Guard, and United States
Army Reserve all retain combat aviation units. UH60 Black Hawks and CH47
Chinooks, which are in all service components, accounted for the majority of hours
flown in a combat environment during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
It is not possible to produce AH64s at a rate sufficient to replace the OH58,
resulting in a multi-year capability gap. In addition to this, the purchase of sufficient AH64s would cost over 4 billion dollars in addition to an additional annual
operations cost of more than 340 million dollars.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. CONAWAY. Secretary McHugh and General Odierno, you both are requesting
authorization for DOD to conduct a Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) in upcoming years to eliminate existing facilities and infrastructure because it will be a
fiscal burden to the U.S. Army based on a smaller army that is projected to reduce
from 45 Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) to 32 BCTs. You also testified that this
smaller army comes with increased risk to national security and reduces the ability
to conduct successful major ground operations. Should the U.S. enter another war
that requires major ground operations supported by a larger U.S. Army, or support
operations in more than one theater, how will the U.S. Army successfully support
the reversibility of the facilities and infrastructure that is required to support a
larger army? Would the U.S. Army then have to purchase new facilities and build
new infrastructure to support a larger U.S. Army? In your cost-benefit analysis, will
it be more expensive to purchase and build new facilities and infrastructure to support that effort than to maintain the existing facilities and infrastructure? Lastly,
is there a current plan for reversibility of facilities and infrastructure if a BRAC
is successfully conducted by the U.S. Army?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Armys ability to rapidly and effectively respond to future requirements is an important consideration of the BRAC
process, and the Army would incorporate this concept of surge capacity into the application of the Military Value Selection Criteria. Military Value Selection Criterion
#3, as proposed by DOD for a future BRAC round, states that the Secretary of Defense, in making recommendations for the closure or realignment of military installations inside the United States, will consider The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, surge, and future total force requirements at both existing and
potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
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One of the ways the Army can preserve its surge capacity is to retain maneuver
lands, impact areas, and training ranges sufficient to support a larger force structure. These are among the Armys most precious real estate assets because they are
historically extremely hard to replicate or acquire. Certain types of very specialized
structures (like testing ranges and unique production facilities) can also fall into
this category.
By contrast, excess administrative office space and other facilities on the cantonment area of Army installations degrade rapidly when not occupied. Retaining excess capacity indefinitely, even when buildings are placed in mothball status, will
slow but not prevent facility degradation. Multiple years of empty and unoccupied
facilities retained by the Army will transform an asset that could be repurposed to
host another mission realigned from another installation or disposed to benefit the
local community, into a liability requiring demolition.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER
Mr. BARBER. A Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Assessment (PEA)
was recently published that proposed a reduction of 2,700 personnel from Fort
Huachuca. This reduction would impact the special mission sets that call for low
density military occupational specialties (MOS) and civilian experts who manage
one of Secretary Hagels top priorities: cyber warfare and C5ISR systems. As the
Army looks at downsizing force structure, what is the Armys plan to avoid reducing
the low density MOSs and civilian experts that enable the unique mission sets at
Fort Huachuca?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army is in the process of reducing
its Active Component end-strength to 490,000 by FY15, in compliance with current
law, budget caps and the current national defense strategy. With further budget
cuts, the Armys Active Component end-strength could be forced to decline to at
least 450,000, and we are posturing to go as low as 420,000 if BCA spending levels
are maintained for Fiscal Year 2016 and beyond. The Supplemental Programmatic
Environmental Assessment (PEA) is in support of that planning.
The overall numbers assessed in the Supplemental PEA do not reflect actual or
projected losses; rather, they are designed to ensure an assessment of the possible
environmental and socio-economic impacts for the entire range of potential reductions at each installation.
Mr. BARBER. If the Army were to relocate its developmental tester for C5ISR from
the environmentally unique location at the Electronic Proving Grounds (EPG) to a
lab in another base, how would this impact future research and development of
C5ISR assets?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Given the nature of C4ISR testing, the
Army cannot relocate developmental testing to a purely lab-based environment. Effective developmental testing requires open air or field testing under operationally
realistic conditions. The Army is not changing its developmental test protocols, so
the balanced use of lab-based and open air or field testing will continue.
Mr. BARBER. How will Fort Huachucas testing, training, intelligence and signal
units play a role in the emerging and evolving cyber warfare mission?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Signal units, strategically stationed
under the command and control of the Network Enterprise Technology Command
(NETCOM), play a critical role in the emerging and evolving cyber warfare mission
of cyberspace operations. These signal units conduct network operations and defense
measures within all Army networks and, as directed, within Department of Defense
(DOD) information networks.
NETCOM, headquartered at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, is assigned to the Armys
newly established Second Army, and performs Army missions and functions relating
to the cyber operations lines of effort: Defensive Cyberspace Operations and DOD
Information Network Operations.
The functions that these signal units perform are focused on Army network modernization efforts, the day-to-day operations of the network, provisioning of information technology systems and services from the global enterprise to the regional and
local levels, and the protection of these same systems and services. The Commander
of Second Army is also dual-hatted as the Commander of the Armys component
command to USCYBERCOM, U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER). By aligning
the Armys global signal units capability under the same Commander who also commands ARCYBER, the Army is enhancing and enabling the cyber warfare mission
by synchronizing Army network modernization efforts and day-to-day operations
and security efforts with cyber warfare missions. The future network architecture
will be inherently more defensible in nature and will be better postured to support
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cyber warfare missions and be operated and defended as a cyber warfare operational
warfighting platform. When cyber warfare missions are conducted on the network,
they will be conducted in a manner that is synchronized with and informed by the
requirement for the network to maintain levels of service and capability to all Army
entities that use the Army network.
Intelligence training units will continue to integrate topics related to cyberspace
operations into instruction for all military intelligence Soldiers as appropriate. As
the organizations understanding of cyberspace operations expands, the training and
doctrine elements that support military intelligence will continue to refine and update the skills required and subsequent training paths for all source and single discipline intelligence Soldiers.
Mr. BARBER. What is ATECs current intent concerning future realignment of
ATECs assets and functions?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. At this time, the Army Test and Evaluation Command does not have a plan to realign or consolidate assets or functions
across the command. If studies and analysis identify a need to realign assets and
functions within ATEC, the command will use the appropriate channels within the
Department of the Army and the Department of Defense to properly inform all relevant stakeholders.
Mr. BARBER. Please explain the rationale for the Armys Aviation Restructure Initiative and how involved was the National Guard in this process? Does it not make
sense to continue to have combat aviation units in the Army Reserve?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Armys Attack/Reconnaissance
battalions are considered low density and high demand assets that must be fully
trained and ready on short notice to deploy for world-wide contingencies and crisis
response in the wake of major reductions to the Total Army end-strength and force
structure. The divestment of OH58D Kiowa Warriors and the elimination of three
entire Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) from the Active Component (AC) will take
Army Aviation down from 37 to 20 shooting battalions. This necessitates transferring all Apache helicopters to the AC in order to meet the demands of our Combatant Commanders. The Army simply does not have the luxury of retaining Apache
helicopters in the Reserve Component (RC) as it is considerably more expensive to
maintain a sufficient, available inventory of Apaches in the RC than it is to do so
in the AC.
When considering the most effective use of limited resources, National Guard Formations should be optimized with dual use equipment and formations that are capable of supporting States and Governors as well as Combatant Commanders when
mobilized. We must develop complimentary and mutually supporting capabilities.
The Army supports a multi-component solution for operationalizing ARNG Aviation
Brigades in non-permissive environments. Under the Aviation Restructure Initiative
(ARI), each ARNG Aviation Brigade will have an AC AH64 battalion aligned with
them for training and deployment. These AH64 battalions will deploy with an intermediate maintenance slice to support AH64 maintenance and armament. This
model has proven effective in the past, and in fact, we have a National Guard aviation brigade deployed to Kuwait today with an active duty attack battalion attached.
The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) was necessary due to severe budget restraints. ARI is designed to achieve a leaner, more efficient and capable force that
balances operational capability and capacity across the Total Army. The low-density,
high-demand AH64 Apaches transferring out of the Army National Guard (ARNG)
will be repurposed to replace Active Component (AC) OH58D Kiowa Warriors that
are being divested. The transfer will enable the teaming of Apaches with unmanned
aircraft systems (UAS) for armed reconnaissance, filling a critical capability need
for an Armed Aerial Scout created by the elimination of the Armed Reconnaissance
Helicopter program. In addition, consolidation of Apache airframes in the AC will
enable the Army to better meet the operational demands of our Combatant Commanders due to the increased operational availability as a result of the reduced
dwell times required in the AC. The ARNG will receive additional UH60 Black
Hawk helicopters to optimize the ability to perform its mission in the homeland and
deploy in support of combat operations.
Necessary savings are generated by divesting three entire fleets of Army aircraftthe OH58A/C Kiowas; the TH67 training helicopters; and the OH58D
Kiowa Warriorsan overall reduction of 798 aircraft. The net effect of the reduction
is a 23 percent decrease in aircraft in the AC with only an 8 percent reduction in
the ARNG. In addition to procurement and modernization cost savings, the Army
would also avoid the significant operations and sustainment costs of these aging aircraft fleets. ARI avoids approximately 12 billion dollars in imminent costs. If the
Army did not execute ARI, we would be forced to retain many of our oldest and least
capable aircraft while divesting several hundred modernized airframes. Upgrades to
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the Kiowa Warrior would cost over 10 billion dollars. Replacing the legacy TH67
training helicopter would cost another 1.5 billion dollars. In addition, lower procurement rates of modernized aircraft would cost the Army approximately 15 billion dollars. These costs would be unbearable for the Army under the current budget constraints and would risk creating a hollow force, with less overall capability and less
investment in modernization.
The Army National Guard was involved in the development and staffing of the
aviation restructure plan during the entire process. The ARNG was directly involved
as early as February, 2013 and had planners present during the development of specific details of ARI.
Under the ARI plan, the regular Army, Army National Guard, and United States
Army Reserve all retain combat aviation units. UH60 Black Hawks and CH47
Chinooks, which are in all service components, accounted for the majority of hours
flown in a combat environment during Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation
Iraqi Freedom.
It is not possible to produce AH64s at a rate sufficient to replace the OH58,
resulting in a multi-year capability gap. In addition to this, the purchase of sufficient AH64s would cost over 4 billion dollars in addition to an additional annual
operations cost of more than 340 million dollars.
Mr. BARBER. How will the Army avoid broad cuts to Tables of Organization for
the purposes of bringing numbers down so that special missions that are currently
valued by DOD are not hollowed-out?
Secretary MCHUGH. To meet the potential for a continued reduction of Active and
Reserve Component structure, the Army is thoroughly evaluating all capabilities, including those of low density forces, in order to structure a smaller force to meet National Security objectives and priorities within current budget constraints. That
process determines the relative value of each capability in the context of all the missions the Army may be called upon to perform and recommends a minimum
resourcing level, including in which component the capability should reside. Guidance throughout this process is to avoid the hollowing of organizations and the
Army as a whole.
Mr. BARBER. The Army said that the Supplemental PEA was one of many components that will be used when making force structure decisions. What other metrics
will the Army use in their scope of analysis before making the final decision on reducing force structure?
Secretary MCHUGH. In addition to the environmental and socio-economic impacts
assessed in the Supplemental PEA, Army realignment and stationing decisions are
based on strategic and operational factors, including national strategic priorities,
costs, operational requirements, and an assessment of installation capabilities. The
Army uses the Military Value Analysis (MVA) model to support capability assessments at installations hosting Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The MVA model is
a decision analysis tool designed to score installations on operationally important attributes related to training, power projection, geographic distribution, and Soldier
and Family well-being.
The Army remains a Soldier-centric force and we intend to preserve a high quality
of life for Soldiers and Families, while sustaining relationships with surrounding
communities. Assessments of installation capabilities, national strategic priorities,
costs, and operational requirements are combined with public feedback, ensuring
the Army weighs all considerations to make fully informed decisions.
Mr. BARBER. How does the Army specifically assess the socio-economic and environmental impacts at the local and installation levels during a Programmatic Environmental Assessment and what is the best way for local stakeholders to address
their concerns about potential impacts to the Army?
Secretary MCHUGH. In addition to the environmental and socio-economic impacts
assessed in the Supplemental PEA, Army realignment and stationing decisions are
based on strategic and operational factors, including national strategic priorities,
costs, operational requirements, and an assessment of installation capabilities. The
Army uses the Military Value Analysis (MVA) model to support capability assessments at installations hosting Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). The MVA model is
a decision analysis tool designed to score installations on operationally important attributes related to training, power projection, geographic distribution, and Soldier
and Family well-being.
The Army remains a Soldier-centric force and we intend to preserve a high quality
of life for Soldiers and Families, while sustaining relationships with surrounding
communities. Assessments of installation capabilities, national strategic priorities,
costs, and operational requirements are combined with public feedback, ensuring
the Army weighs all considerations to make fully informed decisions.
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Mr. BARBER. Is the Army considering expanding additional MOSs and career progression in a computer network exploitation or cyber defense field that will meet
the priorities set in the Presidents Budget?
Secretary MCHUGH. Yes, the Army is establishing a new Cyber Career Management Field (CMF) 17 to provide comprehensive career progression for our highlyskilled cyberspace Soldiers. Currently, the Army is conducting an analysis to identify the appropriate force mixture of Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) and
Functional Areas (FA) that will comprise the 17-Series CMF.
Mr. BARBER. Given the likelihood of the reduction of force structure lessening the
demand for Privatized Army Lodging, is the Army planning to proportionally reduce
that commitment in order to lessen the costs incurred on the Armys budget and
lessen the impact to local economies? If so, then please explain how.
Secretary MCHUGH. Regardless of whether the Army reduces or increases its
Privatized Army Lodging (PAL) requirement, the Army will not incur costs for the
construction, renovation, operation, and sustainment of its privatized lodging facilities. All PAL-associated costs are incurred by the private PAL partner and not by
the Army.
The PAL development plan agreed to by the Army, the private PAL partner, and
the lender has been revised to reflect a lower room count in anticipation of a smaller
Army force structure and reduced travel budgets. Across the PAL portfolio, the
privatized end-state room count will be 1,260 rooms fewer, which represents reductions at 28 of the 39 locations across the portfolio.
Mr. BARBER. The Army in particular has faced cuts in force structure (depth) and
deferred much needed modernization (capability). How would this dual degradation
in depth and capability impact the ability to respond to a major contingency? Is todays Army sufficient to meet OPLAN and CONPLAN requirements?
General ODIERNO. The Total Army Force of 490,000 in the active Army, 350,000
in the Army National Guard, and 202,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve that will exist
at the end of FY15 can meet the most demanding defense strategic guidance requirements at moderate risk.
The Bipartisan Budget Act supports the Presidents Budget submission of a Total
Army Force of 440,000 to 450,000 in the active Army, 335,000 in the Army National
Guard, and 195,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve through the end of FY17. At this end
strength, the Army could, with significant risk, meet requirements in the defense
strategic guidance if the optimistic assumptions regarding the duration and size of
future conflicts, allied contributions, and need to conduct post-conflict stability operations are correct. If these assumptions are wrong, risk will grow significantly. In
either case, as the Army continues to lose end strength, it will face a corollary deterioration in flexibility and ability to react to strategic surprise.
If implemented, the Budget Control Act (BCA) spending caps could result in a
Total Army Force of 420,000 in the active Army, 315,000 in the Army National
Guard, and 185,000 in the U.S. Army Reserve by the end of FY19. At this end
strength, the Army would not have the appropriate depth and capacity to successfully conduct all components of a prolonged, multi-phase major contingency operation as articulated in the defense strategic guidance under terms acceptable to the
United States. As a result, the very real probability exists that U.S. forces would
be unable to sustain conflict long enough to mobilize, train, and deploy additional
formations.
With regard to capabilities, the Army is still recovering from cuts to training and
modernization resources due to the lingering effects of sequestration. Current Army
readiness levels are not acceptable and, if the Army goes to the end strength levels
required by sequestration, the Army may not have the appropriate capacity to meet
operational commitments and simultaneously train to sustain appropriate readiness
levels across the Total Army Force.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Secretary McHugh, as the former Ranking Member of the
House Armed Services Committee and prior to that of the HASC Subcommittee on
Military Personnel, I know you understand the key oversight role of the committee
and the importance of following its policy directives. In House Report 113102 accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, the committee identified concern regarding soldier and civilian personnel exposure to environmental hazards, including burn pits, dust and sand, hazardous materials and
waste. The committee directed the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to
the congressional defense committees by February 15, 2014, evaluating the potential
utility of fabric-based solutions to address soldier exposure to inhalation of sand,
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dust, smoke, and pollutants. Subsequently, the Program Executive Office Soldier
identified (in a letter from Gen. Ostrowski to me on June 17, 2013) the proper entity
to evaluate fabric-based solutions as the U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering Center (NSRDEC) in Natick, Massachusetts, which makes
sense, as NSRDEC has technical and scientific expertise in the areas of environmental protection, protective clothing, multi-functional textiles, materials, and fibers. Now here it is near the end of March 2014, and the House Defense bill passed
in June 2013over 9 months ago. Yet the Army has not tested or evaluated any
potential fabric-based solutions to dust, sand, smoke and small particulates exposure, and no report has been issued as directed by the House Report. This disregards congressional intent. Can you explain why congressional intent was disregarded, and what steps you are taking to remedy this situation?
Secretary MCHUGH. The Army has been evaluating textiles since last year and
anticipates concluding the evaluation shortly. I would be happy to have you and or
other Committee Members briefed on the results of our evaluation.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MAFFEI
Mr. MAFFEI. Congress has asked for the Armys plans to leverage our investment
in the MEADS program. Under the Armys 30-year Lower Tier modernization plan,
it shows technical assessment of MEADS into the 4th quarter of calendar year 2015.
What is the status of the plan and strategy to evaluate MEADS end-items as the
Army has asserted?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army is currently executing a 3phased plan to evaluate opportunities to harvest MEADS technology. Phase I will
conduct a detailed assessment of MEADS technological maturity and help discern
whether technologies developed under the MEADS program are sufficiently mature
for harvesting against current requirements. This effort is currently being finalized
and will be completed in June 2014. Phase II is also currently underway and will
incorporate a DOD-wide assessment involving the Air Force, Navy, and Missile Defense Agency to determine opportunities to harvest MEADS technologies. Phase III
will focus on harvesting and/or transferring technologies to specific Army programs
or other Services for further development/integration activities. While we anticipate
that some harvested technology transfers could begin as early as FY15, most technology under assessment is not anticipated to be sufficiently mature for harvesting
until after FY15.
Mr. MAFFEI. DOT&E issued a report this year and last citing continued deficiencies in Patriot Ground System reliability and that the overall system does not
meet threshold requirements for reliability as a result. What is the threshold value
for Patriot reliability? What is the current reliability value mean time (in hours) between failures? As the Army is planning to invest in excess of $1 billion in radar
digital processor upgrades, what is the expected improvement in MBTF as a result
of this investment?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The current threshold value for Fire
Unit Mean Time Between Critical Mission Failure (MTBCMF) is 21 hours, as stated
in the January 2013 Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) approved PAC
3 Increment 2 Capability Production Document (CPD). MTBCMF is a measure of
average time between critical mission failures that place the system out of service
and into a state of repair. Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) is a measure of
the average time between failures that does not entail placing the system out of
service. The latest demonstrated MTBCMF from operational testing was 16.4 hours.
Achievement of MTBCMF is driven by reliability of the Radar Equipment, which
has 759 replaceable modules/parts. The incorporation of the Radar Digital Processor
(RDP) upgrade will reduce the quantity of replaceable modules/parts from 759 to 56,
which is expected to increase hardware reliability for the Radar Equipment from
132 hours MTBF to 182 hours MTBF. Based on this improved performance, the projected Fire Unit MTBCMF valueafter incorporation of the RDPwould be 21
hours, which would satisfy the threshold system reliability requirement.
The Army has budgeted $21.0 million in FY15 for 5 RDP kits, which will improve
reliability and provide the Patriot with additional capability, such as improved target identification.
Mr. MAFFEI. What is the status of Operational Testing on the Patriot Radar Digital Processor upgrades? When will it complete operational testing?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Developmental tests for the Patriot
Radar Digital Processor (RDP) upgrade are scheduled to begin in 1QFY15, with
operational testing currently scheduled to begin 3QFY15 and end in 1QFY16. However, some early contractor developmental testing of the RDP upgrades has begun
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at White Sands Missile Range to demonstrate performance improvements and increased reliability.
Mr. MAFFEI. The Army has stated a need for an expensive Patriot antenna upgrade to AESA technology. What requirements gap is driving the need for an AESA
radar upgrade and what other options have been studied that could meet the requirement for less cost?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Patriot ground system was initially fielded in 1984, with the latest major configuration upgrade to the Patriot
radar in 2000. Threat evolution and advancements of the future will continue to
challenge current radar technology. There are four critical capability gaps driving
the need to modernize our current radar. The first is the need to improve survivability. Based on current and emerging threats, Patriot is required to intercept advanced maneuvering threats; to operate effectively in an advanced electronic attack
environment; and to defend against both mass and complex integrated attacks. The
second gap is the need to sense, engage, and destroy evolving threats at the ranges
and altitudes required for the defended area. The third is the capability to accurately classify, discriminate, and identify manned and unmanned aerial objects in
order to prevent fratricide. The fourth critical gap is the need to improve reliability,
availability and maintainability to ensure sustained defense of critical assets.
In June 2013, the U.S. Army completed a review that showed operations and support savings, performance improvements, and reliability enhancements could be
achieved by upgrading the Patriot radar with AESA technology. The U.S. Army is
now preparing to support an OSD Cost Assessment & Program Evaluation led Analysis of Alternatives to investigate modernization alternatives available to improve
the capability of the Patriot radar. Alternatives to be examined could include: upgrading current Patriot radar with the AESA technology insertion; a new start with
pure AESA technology; harvesting Medium Extended Air Defense System radar capabilities; and procurement of other existing DOD radars.
Mr. MAFFEI. In the Armys Advance Planning for Industry briefings from March
2014, the Army states the need for 360-degree Sensing and InterceptSurveillance
coverage and Fire Control, Combat and Positive Identification, and links to sensors
and shooters. Given this capability for sensing and intercept was developed in
MEADS, why isnt the Army exploiting MEADS capability with IAMD/IBCS?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Army continues to evaluate opportunities to leverage technology from previous and ongoing investments. The MEADS
Multifunction Fire Control Radar (MFCR) and Low Frequency Sensor (LFS) require
significant additional Research Development Test and Evaluation investment to
complete development and operational testing to U.S. standards. The LFS has the
potential to offer increased capability and performance; however, the system would
also introduce increased operational and support costs. The Army is currently evaluating opportunities to harvest MEADS technology based on the ongoing assessment
of technological maturity.
Mr. MAFFEI. We understand that the MEADS Radars, in coordination with the
PM, IAMD Program office, were successfully integrated and demonstrated on the
IBCS last November. Have those results been published or disseminated? Wouldnt
this be relevant to a decision on harvesting MEADS radars for IAMD, given the approximately $2.4 billion the U.S. invested in MEADS?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Project Office granted approval to Northrop Grumman to use Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS) software in a joint
Industry Initiative between Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin, but did not
participate in the demonstration. The demonstration was limited in its scope and
showed that data transmission occurred between the Low Frequency Sensor (LFS)
and the Multifunction Fire Control Radar (MFCR) to the IBCS software. Initial
draft results were provided to the IAMD Project Office and are being considered as
part of the Armys assessment on MEADS technology harvesting.
Mr. MAFFEI. How much has been spent to date by the PEO organizations (LTPO/
and PM IAMD) on integrating Patriot on the network? When is this capability expected to be completed and what is the projected cost?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Integrated Air and Missile Defense Project Office has expended approximately $185 million to date in Research
Development Test and Evaluation (RDTE) funds with an expected additional $55
million in RDTE funding to support testing efforts in FY15 to FY17. Completion of
the development is expected in FY16 with First Unit Equipped in FY17, and Initial
Operating Capability in FY18.
Mr. MAFFEI. We understand the Army needs additional funding to get the Patriot
system to a Mode 4 capability in Identification Friend and Foe (IFF). How much
has been spent to date? How much time and funding is needed to finish develop-
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ment and implement on the existing radar? MEADS is already IFF Mode 5; when
will Patriot reach IFF Mode 5? We understand the development of the fratricide
fixes in Patriot were initiated almost immediately following OIF. Why has it taken
over 10 years to implement these fixes?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The Patriot system has incorporated
Mode 4 IFF capability since the early 1980s. The Army has expended $43.6 million
to correct Mode 4 IFF issues identified in OIF. The Army demonstrated initial Patriot Mode 5 capability in 2009 through Post-Deployment Build (PDB) software upgrades and demonstrated this capability in Joint level tests and exercises. Further
Patriot Mode 5 capability will be fielded with the Radar Digital Processor (RDP) upgrade and PDB8 program. The RDP is in production, and the PDB8 software is
scheduled for fielding in FY16. The Army currently plans on testing to demonstrate
full Mode 5 capabilities in a Joint air environment beginning in 1Q FY15 with Initial Operational Capability in 3QFY16. However, MEADS has not demonstrated a
production-ready, tested sensor with Mode 5 capability, and thus does not present
a ready alternative to Patriot modernization.
Based on lessons learned from OIF, the Army developed a priority list of hardware and software enhancements to correct fratricide-related deficiencies. Two
major software changes were required, in addition to materiel solutions. The materiel solutions were developed, tested, produced and fielded serially, with fielding of
the modifications applied to the Patriot units over time. The development, testing,
and materiel release approvals for most of the enhancements were completed on
schedule in FY07. Two lower-priority enhancements were fielded in FY11.
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that each facility is fully operational. These locations will be fully operational on
May 5, 2014.
With a change in contractors, SDDC is addressing several issues to ensure a
smooth transition. SDDC sent out advisories on April 15 and April 24, 2014 that
provided information for all Department of Defense Service members, civilian employees, Service Headquarters, and Transportation Offices regarding the implementation of the new global privately-owned vehicle Contract III. The advisory addressed issues such as the establishment of new Vehicle Processing Centers under
the new contract, implementation details, and transition planning for POV customers.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. HECK
Dr. HECK. Why can the Army not field transport telemedicine within the next 12
months, especially since the technology has moved beyond TRL7 (Technology Readiness Level) and commercial companies are fielding capability now?
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. The commercial environment for telemedicine is different from the military environment. The military environment requires significant integration and interconnectivity into the military operational and
communications systems in a deployed setting, as well as Food and Drug Administration validation that the integrated system meets the general controls for transmitting medical data. Military requirements must be fulfilled in the following areas:
cyber security (information assurance), logistics, and communication requirements
(current radios do not have adequate capabilities to meet data transmission requirements). Also, for development and acquisition of a military system there must be
an integrated requirements document approved by all the various military components that are affected.
Based upon the results of demonstrations of military utility, there are still major
efforts ongoing for use in the military environment. These efforts include testing
and validating air worthiness (the ability for a system to operate correctly in an airborne craft without interference to the system or to the aircraft); the need to transmit the information across multi-classification domains (e.g., classified radio networks to the Electronic Health Record on the unclassified network); protection of patient data as required by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act;
and the validation of the types and modes of clinical data that will be by needed
and used by our clinicians.
Dr. HECK. What is the timeline for the integration of RC Cyber Forces into
ARCYBERCOM?
General ODIERNO. ARCYBER is closely collaborating with Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the United
States Army Reserve (USAR) to develop a Total Army RC cyber integration strategy
that supports Joint and Army cyber requirements. This RC Cyber Protection Team
integration concept rests on four guiding principles: (1) Joint training and certification of RC cyber forces is the desired end state; (2) RC cyber forces will be developed in phases beginning in FY 14 and allocated against current Joint and Army
priorities; (3) RC cyber forces will focus on foundational training and certification
requirements that do not require Joint-level training facilities subject to availability
of resources, priority of effort for facilities, training, infrastructure should shift to
RC upon completion of Cyber Mission Force build in FY 17); and (4) RC forces will
train and certify to meet immediate un-resourced Army cyber requirements.
Dr. HECK. What mission is ARCYBER going to assign to the RC Cyber Force?
General ODIERNO. ARCYBER, in coordination with United States Cyber Command, ARNG and USAR, has identified the following mission requirements that
could be discharged by members of the reserve components in the near term: defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), cyber command readiness inspections, vulnerability assessments, cyber opposing force support for training, critical infrastructure
assessments, theater security cooperation activities, Federal Emergency Management Agency support, augmentation to active component cyberspace organizations,
support to Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber, and intelligence support to cyberspace
operations.
The desired end state for the main effort is 21 Reserve Component (RC) Cyber
Protection Teams (one full-time Title 10 ARNG CPT; 10 Title 32 ARNG Teams; and
10 Troop Program Unit USAR CPTs) trained and certified to the joint standard. As
part of a Total Force solution, Joint training and certification will provide the Army
the needed flexibility to align RC cyber teams to meet both Joint and Army cyberspace priorities.
Dr. HECK. What are the Army Cyber Private Public Partnership initiatives (P3i)?
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General ODIERNO. A key Army cyber public private partnership initiative is the
Army Cyber Institute (ACI) located at West Point, New York. The ACI is a Secretary of the Army and Chief of Staff of the Army priority initiative that performs
four major functions: outreach, advising, research, and education, in that order of
priority. The ACI performs and enables outreach to bridge gaps and prompt information exchange across Army, military, academic, industrial and governmental
cyber communities. They work closely with Army Cyber Command and U.S. Cyber
Command/NSA to ensure their efforts are synchronized and limited resources are
employed to maximum effect.
At the executive and action officer levels, the Army CIO consistently participates
in a variety of engagements with private and public sector partners to shape Army
modernization efforts and enhance cyber security capabilities. It is imperative that
networks are kept current and up-to-date with the rapid changes in technology.
Currently the CIO/G6 has been engaged in a comprehensive effort with entities and
organizations across the Army to assess current capabilities, on-going modernization
efforts, and future IT and cyber security requirements.
Dr. HECK. What are the Army Reserves Cyber P3i activities?
General ODIERNO. The United States Army Reserve (USAR) is seeking private
and public partners in the cyber domain to enhance individual and unit readiness
through extended partnerships creating operational experiences, developing leaders,
and advancing cyber skills through alternate resourcing opportunities and P3i networks. To date, the program has over six partners with two statements of intent
at the university provost/dean level. The participating universities include: the University of Texas at San Antonio, the University of Washington (Seattle, Tacoma,
Bothell), the University of Massachusetts/Fitchburg, the Naval Post Graduate
School, the University of Denver, and the University of California-Davis. The USAR
has additional universities working to link into the USAR cyber program. The program is designed to tie University Cyber Security programs directly to Cyber Security/Information Assurance positions key skills and attributes (KSA). The intent is
to catalyze the Soldier development for novice, apprentice and master levels of cyber
security using the university degree and certificate programs. Various Army National Guard (ARNG) organizations have also signed cyber partnerships with educational institutions to include the Georgia ARNG, the Mississippi ARNG, the
Michigan ARNG, the American Samoa ARNG, and the ARNG Professional Educational Center to name a few. These partnerships assist the ARNG and universities alike by increasing the training, educational, and recruitment throughout.
Dr. HECK. What is ARCYBERs Training Readiness Authority plan?
General ODIERNO. Like other Army units, Army Cyber conducts training and
readiness reporting to meet the requirements established by regulation and law. For
the Cyber Mission Force teams, the developing USCYBERCOM Training and Readiness (T&R) Manual will serve as the guideline for Cyber Mission Force (CMF) readiness. Currently, the T&R manual has draft core Mission Essential Tasks (METs)
that were derived from DOD Universal Joint Task List (UJTL); when finalized,
these METs will provide a common set of tasks against which like teams can train
and assess readiness. When approved, Army Cyber Command will use the
USCYBERCOM T&R Manual as our fundamental tool to build and maintain CMF
team readiness.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. BROOKS. I would like to compliment the Army on the successful execution of
the ITEP program (Improved Turbine Engine Program) to date. It incorporates competition, best business practices, acquisition reform measures and helps maintain a
cutting edge technological and industrial base. Unlike many of the recent unsuccessful aviation programs, this one has valid, unchanging requirements and is executing
and testing very successfully. It benefits from strong Congressional support and
Army/Industry partnering. This is critical because the ITEP investment benefits
both the current Black Hawk and Apache fleet, and reduces risk for the next generation Future Vertical Lift helicopter. I encourage the Army to sufficiently fund
ITEP to maintain program momentum and a 1218 month Technology Maturity/
Risk Reduction phase. I appreciate your continued support of this priority program
and we all look forward to the increased capability and tremendous fuel and cost
savings ITEP provides.
Secretary MCHUGH and General ODIERNO. Improved Turbine Engine Program
(ITEP) remains an important component of the Army Aviation modernization strategy. This engine upgrade program will allow the Armys current fleet of Black Hawk
and Apache helicopters to perform their full range of missions in high/hot environ-
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ments like Iraq and Afghanistan, while simultaneously achieving much needed reductions in fuel consumption and flying hour costs. While the Army faces significant
fiscal pressures in the current budget environment, we plan to continue funding
ITEP at previously planned levels through the Technology Maturity/Risk Reduction
phase of the program. The Army requested $79.9M for ITEP in FY14 and received
full funding. The Army is requesting $39.3M for this effort in FY15.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT
Mr. NUGENT. Concerning the Department of the Armys proposed cuts to the
Army National Guardthe Adjutants General presented an alternative solution
that paid the Army National Guard portion of the BCA bill while sustaining higher
capability and force structure for the National Guard, and therefore for the Army.
(1) Why was this proposal rejected? (2) Given the lack of agreement on the best way
to right-size the Army, what opposition do you have to establishing an independent commission to make recommendations on appropriate force structure for all
three components? (3) Will you support taking the next 912 months to conduct a
comprehensive study of the proper AC/RC force mix and how the structure should
be best tailored to fulfill mission requirements that are consistent with available resources?
Secretary MCHUGH. The Army strongly opposes an independent force structure
commission on the grounds that it is unnecessary and untimely. Our restructure initiative is based on a comprehensive Total Force study. It was an open process and
we received input from many parties, including the National Guard Bureau. We are
confident we have reached the right conclusions. Further, a commission would essentially freeze our end strength in place, which will prevent us from beginning to
implement necessary changes and force the Army to make severe cuts to readiness
and modernization programs, neither of which has adequate funding right now. Additionally, an independent review of the Armys plans has already been conducted
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation.
Make no mistake, the recommendations we have proposed have been forced on us
by the Budget Control Acts spending caps. We would prefer not to make these
changes, but unless something is done to adjust the BCA caps beginning in fiscal
year 2016, these changes will become unavoidable.
Regarding the $1.7B NGB Proposal, it was considered independently by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense and was rejected by both, because
it does not meet the Defense Strategic Guidance without additional investment; it
decreases fulfillment of Combatant Command contingency plans and steady-state
operational requirements; it reduces the readiness of the Army National Guard; and
it increases costs in comparison to the Department of the Army plan. Due to the
Budget Control Act (BCA), Army Aviations total obligation authority for aircraft
modernization and acquisition has been reduced by $3B per year through FY19, and
training and sustainment dollars are reduced by 40 percent from FY12 levels. These
reductions make the previously approved (pre-BCA) Aviation Force Structure and
Aircraft Modernization plans untenable, requiring a new approach.
Prior to the BCA, Army Aviations modernization and force structure plan was to
continue to grow the Active component to 13 Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB); continue to modernize the AH64 Apache, UH60 Blackhawk, and CH47 Chinook helicopter fleets; upgrade the OH58D Kiowa Warrior (at a cost of $10B); and conduct
a costly service life extension program (SLEP) or even more costly replacement of
the aging TH67 training fleet. The Army National Guard and Army Reserves
would continue to receive modernized UH60, AH64 and CH47 aircraft and retain
all of their structure.
To continue with the original aircraft modernization plan under BCA constraints
(upgrade OH58D Kiowa Warrior, continue to modernize the AH64, UH60 and
CH47 fleets, and SLEP TH67) would require the deactivation of 5 Active and Reserve aviation brigades and the divestment of their associated aircraft (464 aircraft). This would have been a significant loss of structure and numbers of modernized AH64, UH60 and CH47 aircraft, just to retain the costly legacy OH58D
and TH67 aircraft. For that reason, I directed a fundamental reassessment of Aviation structure in the Active, National Guard and Reserve forces. My guidance was
to determine the best force structure and modernization balance to retain the most
capabilities and capacity in highest demand by our Combatant Commanders and recurring civil and homeland defense requirements.
The new approach, known as the Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI), uses the
Budget Control Act level force and does not add cost to the Armys budget. ARI calls
for reducing and reconfiguring the number of Active aviation brigades from 13 to
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10, which enables the retention of one aviation brigade per Active component division. The Reserve component will retain 12 Aviation Brigades but will be restructured to a common organizational structure for 10 Brigades optimized for assault,
lift, and MEDEVAC missionsmost in demand for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions.
To execute ARI, we will divest 338 OH58D Kiowa Warriors and use the previously designated OH58D cockpit upgrade dollars to reinvest in the training base
and other modernization efforts. We will transfer all of the AH64s from the National Guard to the Active component and use the AH64, teamed with unmanned
systems, in armed reconnaissance squadrons to replace the loss of the Kiowa Warrior Squadrons in the Active component. We will transfer 159 X UH60s from the
Active component to convert 4 of 10 Reserve component AH64 Battalions to UH
60 (2 USAR and 2 ARNG). The National Guard will gain 111 UH60s and the
USAR will gain 48 UH60s over current structure. We will divest the legacy TH
67 and OH58A/C training fleet and replace them with UH72A Lakota helicopters
taken from the Active component and 100 newly procured Lakotas. In a compromise
with the National Guard, the Office of the Secretary of Defense directed the Army
to procure the 100 new Lakotas to address concerns raised by the Guard during the
planning process for ARI. The National Guard will retain all of their 212 UH72As
specially equipped for the southwest border mission and other requirements in permissive, non-combat environments. This will give us a modernized, next generation
glass cockpit, dual engine training helicopter. These aircraft will train all new Army
aviators, regardless of component.
Eliminating three of seven entire fleets of legacy aircraft (OH58D Kiowa Warrior,
TH67, OH58A/C), remissioning Apache helicopters to the armed reconnaissance role
in addition to their traditional attack role, dual-purposing our UH72A Lakota helicopters for both the homeland defense role and initial pilot training, and growing
our lift helicopter fleets in the Army National Guard will allow us to retain the
maximum force structure and modernized aircraft across the Total Army to meet
the demand for Aviation across the Combatant Commands and States.
Although the resulting rotary-wing force will be smaller by 798 aircraft to preBCA levels and cuts fall disproportionately on the Active component (23 percent)
versus the National Guard (8 percent), divesting the OH58 and TH67 fleets and
moving the AH64s from the RC to the AC allows us to preserve two additional
Combat Aviation Brigades and improve the quality of Aviation Training while retaining a fully modernized aviation force across the Total Army.
The NGB proposal, actually increases costs. While the NGB proposal appears neutral with respect to the ARNG budget, it does not account for the significant increase that would occur to the $3.25B per year that the Department of the Army
already funds from the Regular Army budget to support the Army Guard. Specifically, the NGB proposal does not account for increases of $300M annually for additional end strength and structure related costs such as basic combat training, specialized skill training, contractor maintenance support, payroll processing and officer accessions. Nor does it account for a $350M annual increase in aviation operations and sustainment type costs and the $4B one-time cost that would result from
not executing the Aviation Restructure Initiative as planned.
The NGB proposal decreases readiness by reducing Operations and Maintenance
funding that is used to resource Soldier, unit and facilities readiness. The proposal
funds only 50-to-80 percent of required duty MOS, functional and professional development training, resulting in significant numbers of Guardsmen assigned to units
untrained in their military duties and leadership responsibilities. The proposal reduces unit readiness, with only two Guard BCTs funded above individual-crewsquad level of readiness. The proposals reductions to readiness would lengthen postmobilization training that ARNG units require to respond to Combatant Command
operational and contingency requirements, decreasing the Army Guards viability as
an operational reserve. The proposal also decreases MILCON funding by $100M per
year and decreases facilities sustainment funding, negatively impacting Army
Guard infrastructure.
The NGB proposal does not accurately capture the cost of turbulence. The Department of the Army estimated and budgeted turbulence costs at $310M over five
years, or approximately $62M per year. The NGB estimated turbulence costs at
$1B, but this estimate included $275M in costs to implement the Aviation Restructure Initiative that are already accounted for in the Regular Army budget; $360M
in facilities upgrades for unit conversions that have not been substantiated; and
$55M in additional recruiting costs that the Department of the Army believes is excessive and unnecessary given the reduction of the force.
The NGB proposal also does not accurately depict the impact of turbulence. OSD
and Army leadership have testified to their desire to maintain ARNG end strength
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at 335K as part of a 450K/335K/195K force, which would significantly reduce turbulence if full BCA/sequester cuts can be avoided. NGB turbulence projections of the
Department of the Army plan are overstated in that they represent a highly-unlikely absolute-worst-case that every possible position associated with potential
structure adjustments is impacted. Even if the worst case were realized, the average
annual turbulence that would result during the five-year period of implementation
would be less than the approximately 15 percent annual turnover the Army Guard
experiences due to normal attrition.
Finally, the NGB proposal increases strategic and operational risk by reducing required unit readiness and operational responsiveness in order to preserve less-ready
force structure. The proposal reduces the Total Armys ability to meet Combatant
Commander contingency plans and steady-state operational requirements, extending
the length of operations at increased risk to mission accomplishment and likelihood
of additional casualties. Because the NGB proposal costs more and does not meet
BCA-driven funding reductions, it would require additional reductions of $650M per
year to other accounts, further degrading readiness and equipment modernization.
The NGB proposal decreases readiness, increases risk, costs more, and violates the
defense strategic guidance.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOK
Mr. COOK. After cancelling 7 brigade level trainings at the Combat Training Centers in 2013, your statement indicates that the Bipartisan Budget Agreement permits 19 BCT trainings in FY15. Do you anticipate funding all 19 trainings in FY15?
And what do you estimate the impact would be for training in FY16 if sequestration
persists?
General ODIERNO. Yes, if the Army receives funding levels supported by the Bipartisan Budget Agreement then 18 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will conduct full
rotations at maneuver Combat Training Centers (CTCs) in FY15, with another BCT
joining a Combat Aviation Brigade and Special Operations forces in an aviation exercise. If sequestration persists in FY16, we will be required to significantly reduce
home station training in order to fund CTC rotations, which will impact our overall
readiness posture.
The reduction in home station training may preclude the full training progression
of some BCTs prior to execution of a CTC rotation. Without the benefit of sufficient
home station training, BCTs could begin the CTC rotation at a lower level of training readiness. As a result, CTC rotations may not produce the maximum BCT capability, in terms of training readiness.