ase Digest: VSD Realty vs.

Uniwide
G.R. No. 170677 : October 24, 2012
VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. UNIWIDE
SALES, INC. and DOLORES BAELLO TEJADA,Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner VSD Realty and Development Corporation (VSD) filed a Complaint for
annulment of title and recovery of possession of property against respondents
Uniwide Sales, Inc. (Uniwide) and Dolores Baello (Baello) with the RTC.
VSD alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Caloocan City,
wherein VSD purchased the said property from Felisa D. Bonifacio. VSD proved the
identity of the land it is claiming through the technical description contained in its
title, TCT No. T-285312; the derivative title of Felisa D. Bonifacio, TCT No. 265777;
the technical description included in the official records of the subject lot in the
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City; and the verification survey conducted by
Geodetic Engineer Evelyn Celzo of the DENR-NCR.
On the other hand, Baello countered that the subject property was bequeathed to
her through a will by her adoptive mother as approved by the probate court.
Therafter, she entered into a Contract of Lease with respondent Uniwide. As a
consequence of the lease agreement, Uniwide constructed in good faith a building
worth at least P200,000,000.00 on the said property.
The RTC ruled in favor of VSD. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not VSD is entitled to recovery of possession of the subject property?
II. Whether or not Uniwide, as a lessee, is entitled to recover the amount of
improvements introduced to the land?
HELD: The petition has merit.
CIVIL LAW: accion reivindicatoria; builder in good faith
Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to

recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it
must prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title
thereto. In regard to the first requisite, in an accion reinvindicatoria, the person who
claims that he has a better right to the property must first fix the identity of the land
he is claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof. Hutchison v.
Buscas held: "It bears stress that in an action to recover real property, the settled
rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title, not on the weakness of
the defendants title. This requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it is possible
that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the property in
dispute, and second, the burden of proof lies on the party who substantially asserts
the affirmative of an issue for he who relies upon the existence of a fact should be
called upon to prove that fact."
In this case, petitioner proved his title over the property in dispute as well as the
identity of the said property; hence, it is entitled to recover the possession of the
property from respondents.
SECOND ISSUE: Uniwide is not entitled to recover from VSD the cost of its
improvement on the land.
It is noted that when the contract of lease was executed, Uniwide was unaware that
the property leased by it was owned by another person other than Dolores Baello.
Nevertheless, Uniwide cannot avail of the rights of a builder in good faith under
Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which
provides for full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, as the said provisions apply only to a
possessor in good faith who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner
thereof. It does not apply where ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental
contract. Parilla v. Pilar held: "Articles 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Article 546
of the same Code, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where ones only
interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in
the power of the tenant to improve his landlord out of his property."
Petition is GRANTED.

Tan v. CA - Rescission of the contract of insurance

174 SCRA 403

Facts:

> Tan Lee Siong was issued a policy by Philamlife on Nov. 6, 1973.

> On Aprl 26, 1975, Tan died of hepatoma. His beneficiaries then filed a claim with
Philamlife for the proceeds of the insurance.

> Philamlife wrote the beneficiaries in Sep. 1975 denying their claim and rescinding
the contract on the ground of misrepresentation. The beneficiaries contend that
Philamlife can no longer rescind the contract on the ground of misrepresentation as
rescission must allegedly be done during the lifetime of the insured within two
years and prior to the commencement of the action following the wording of Sec.
48, par. 2.

Issue:
Whether or not Philamlife can rescind the contract.

Held:
YES.

The phrase during the lifetime found in Sec. 48 simply means that the policy is no
longer in force after the insured has died. The key phrase in the second paragraph
is for a period of two years.

What is a simpler illustration of the ruling in Tan v. CA?

The period to consider in a life insurance poiicy is two years from the date of issue
or of the last reinstatement. So if for example the policy was issued/reinstated on
Jan 1, 2000, the insurer can still exercise his right to rescind up to Jan. 1, 2003 or

two years from the date of issue/reinstatement, REGARDLESS of whether the

insured died before or after Jan. 1, 2003.

CALUB V. CA
Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law. A replevin case against the State, without its consent,
cannot prosper.

FACTS:
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber and thereafter
confiscated them. The owners of the vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover the vehicles. They
won in the trial court on the ground that petitioner did not act in accordance with the law. So
petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and is
therefore valid.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of property under custodia legis.
2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State

RULING:
1) No! Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law.
2) Yes! This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued without its consent or when the
public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his duties. It has been established that the DENR
acted within its authority. Hence, its action is the action of the State.

SARMIENTO V. CA|CRUZ, 250

SCRA 108
FACTS:
Generosa Cruz owned a parcel of land in Bataan. The adjacent land belongs to the Nuguids but is
being used and occupied by Eufemia Sarmiento for several years now. It was found out by the
Geodetic Engineer that Sarmientos fence is encroaching Cruzs land for about 71 meters. Cruz
requested Sarmiento to remove the fence, but the latter refused so Cruz filed a complaint for
ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court.
MTC decided for Cruz. Sarmiento appealed in the RTC, assailing the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC
decided for Sarmiento and held that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. CA reversed RTC
and reinstated the MTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of origin (MTC) had jurisdiction over the ejectment case? (Apparently, Cruz
failed to state details on how the encroachment was done.)

Held:
No. To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as the proceedings are summary in
nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol evidence.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver
facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as when it does not state how entry was
effected or how and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be
an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

Motion to dismiss; hypothetical admission. In filing a motion to dismiss, the movant

hypothetically admits the truth of the material and relevant facts alleged and pleaded in the
complaint. The court, in resolving the motion to dismiss, must consider such hypothetical admission,
the documentary evidence presented during the hearing thereof, and the relevant laws and
jurisprudence bearing on the issues or subject matter of the complaint. Aqualab Philippines, Inc.
vs. Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo, et al., G.R. No. 182673, October 12, 2009.
Motion to dismiss; lack of cause of action. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has
been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain. However, a perusal of respondents
Complaint before the RTC, in light of Aqualabs motion to dismiss which hypothetically admitted the
truth of the allegations in the complaint, shows that respondents action before the RTC has
sufficiently stated a cause of action. Hypothetically admitting fraud in the transfers of subject lots,
which indisputably were first transferred in apparent violation of pertinent provisions in CA 141
prohibiting alienation of homesteads within five years from the grant of the homestead patent, and
the continuing possession of respondents until 1991 of the subject lots, the action for reconveyance
and nullification filed in 1994 not only sufficiently stated a cause of action but also has not yet
prescribed. Aqualab Philippines, Inc. vs. Heirs of Marcelino Pagobo, et al., G.R. No.
182673, October 12, 2009.