i

[H.A.S.C. No. 112104]

HEARING
ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED

PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 28, 2012

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

73430

WASHINGTON

2012

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HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
HOWARD P. BUCK MCKEON, California, Chairman
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
ADAM SMITH, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
JEFF MILLER, Florida
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado
CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine
ROB WITTMAN, Virginia
LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana
BILL OWENS, New York
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado
JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
TOM ROONEY, Florida
MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
TIM RYAN, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia
C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
CHRIS GIBSON, New York
HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri
BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
JOE HECK, Nevada
COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois
KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey
JACKIE SPEIER, California
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama
MO BROOKS, Alabama
TODD YOUNG, Indiana
ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director
DOUG ROACH, Professional Staff Member
DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member
LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant

(II)

CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page

HEARING:
Tuesday, February 28, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force ....................................
APPENDIX:
Tuesday, February 28, 2012 ...................................................................................

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53

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 2012

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET
REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. Buck, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services ..................................................................
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member,
Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................

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2

WITNESSES
Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force ............................................
Schwartz, Gen Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force .........................

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6

APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Donley, Hon. Michael B., joint with Gen Norton A. Schwartz .....................
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. Buck ....................................................................
Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:
Mr. Smith ..........................................................................................................
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING:
Ms. Bordallo ......................................................................................................
Mr. Conaway .....................................................................................................
Mr. Courtney .....................................................................................................
Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................
Mr. Forbes .........................................................................................................
Mr. Griffin .........................................................................................................
Dr. Heck ............................................................................................................
Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................
Mr. Johnson ......................................................................................................
Mr. Langevin .....................................................................................................
Mr. Loebsack .....................................................................................................
Mr. McIntyre .....................................................................................................
(III)

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137
127
121
126
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IV
Page

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARINGContinued

Mr. McKeon .......................................................................................................
Mr. Miller ..........................................................................................................
Mrs. Roby ..........................................................................................................
Mr. Runyan .......................................................................................................
Mr. Ruppersberger ...........................................................................................
Mr. Schilling .....................................................................................................
Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................
Mr. Shuster .......................................................................................................
Mr. Smith ..........................................................................................................
Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................
Mr. Wittman .....................................................................................................

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FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE AIR FORCE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 2012.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m. in room 2118,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. Buck McKeon
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. BUCK MCKEON,
A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us
today as we consider the Presidents fiscal year 2013 Budget Request for the Department of the Air Force.
Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, it is good to have you back
again before the committee today, at least for us. I hope you enjoy
your time here.
We are fortunate to have experienced leadership on our Air Force
in this challenging period. We appreciate all that you do and we
are truly grateful to have leaders like you in service to our Nation.
When you took your respective positions, you probably didnt fully
appreciate the leadership challenges that you would confront.
The Air Force has been engaged in combat operations supporting
the Joint Forces for the past 20 years, beginning with the Gulf war
in 1991 and continuing thereafter through enforcement of the Iraq
no-fly zones; combat operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan; the related logistics support missions; and worldwide humanitarian support missions. And of course the Air Force has continued
the 24/7, 365-day-a-year nuclear-deterrence mission.
Everyone should fully understand that our vital interests have
not changed since last year. The threats to those interests have not
decreased, and they are not likely to diminish over the next 5
years. What has changed is that the President directed at least
$400 billion in cuts to our military, which were reflected in the
Budget Control Act.
Despite the suggestion by some that the strategy evolved independent of the Presidents fiscal guidance, each of the military
services is making force-structure and equipment-modernization
recommendations to Congress based purely on the budget and not
based on the world security environment.
For example, there are 54 aircrafts in the Air Force budget request. If procurement continues at this rate, and assuming an air(1)

2
craft lifespan of 25 years, the resulting force structure is 1,350 aircraft; one-quarter the size of the current force. I do not believe
1,350 total Air Force aircraftbombers, fighters, airlifts, searchand-rescue, rotorcraft, and trainersis in the national security interest of this country. And this is without the potential of sequestration.
Furthermore, the budget request does little to mitigate the consequences of aging force structure resulting from the procurement
holiday of the 1990s. Operation and Maintenance accounts are not
increasing to sustain and extend these aging platforms. Other
budget-driven choices include the requested increase in TRICARE
fees for retirees. Congress addressed this issue at length last year
and enacted what I considered a reasonable approach for managing
cost.
The Departments proposal would increase the fees by 96 percent
to 345 percent over a 5-year period which, in my opinion, is unreasonable. With that said, I am pleased to see the priorities for strategic airlift, a new bomber, and an airborne tanker have been preserved. As well, the Air Force has deliberately elected to ensure the
percentage of the Air Forces combat and mobility forces that are
on Active Duty will increase after the implementation of the force
structure changes.
This is appropriate from a risk perspective, but I believe it is important for the Air Force leadership to continue this public discussion to better ensure that Guard and Reserve personnel fully accept that they have received and will receive equitable and fair
treatment in this transition process.
Thank you very much again for being here. Representative
Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

And I thank Secretary Donley and General Schwartz for being,
once again, before this committee, and for their great leadership of
the Air Force and their service to our country. It is terrific to have
such able people in charge of such an important task. We appreciate you being here.
The Air Force has been critical to all of our missions in the recent pastin Iraq, in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, as the chairman
mentionedand also, you know, providing critical lift capacity for
humanitarian response in Haiti and Japan and many other places.
The strength of our Air Force is one of the great strengths of our
national security and the strengths of our entire Nation, and we do
appreciate that leadership.
This is a very challenging time, as the chairman mentioned. The
needs are still great. We are still fighting in Afghanistan. We still
face threats on a number of fronts and needs globally. At the same
time, the budget picture is not good. We are running a significant
deficit and we have challenges to figure out how to make that work
within the budget. We have had that debate, and I am sure we will

3
continue to have the debate on the committee about whether or not
strategy or budget should drive what we do in the national-security
realm; and of course my position is both.
We are always, no matter what you are doing, constrained by the
budget to a certain extent. And we would not pretend that nobody
thought for a second about the budget when putting together the
strategy. But I do think that the gentlemen before us and everyone
over at the Pentagon and the White House did put together a strategy looking at our national security needs first to figure out what
needs to be met, and then figuring out how to match that strategy
to the budget constraints that we have. And I want to compliment
both of these gentlemen for doing a great job of thatfor, I think,
realistically looking at our choices going forward.
I mean, the bottom line is, over the course of the last 10 years
in the Air Force and elsewhere, we have started more projects than
we could ever possibly have the money to finish; in part, because
some of them have wound up costing far more than we thought
they would. But that forces difficult choices, frankly, almost no
matter the budget environment. I think those choices have been
made wisely in the Air Force budget that has been put forth. And
we have a good strategy and I think we have a budget to match
it, but there will be challenges.
And I think this hearing is a perfectly appropriate form to have
the gentlemen before us explain how they met some of those challenges; how they see some of the tougher aspects of it coming to
pass over the course in the next several years. And I look forward
to their comments. And, again, I thank them for their leadership
in very, very difficult times. I look forward to the testimony, and
I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 59.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF
THE AIR FORCE

Secretary DONLEY. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member

Smith and Members of the committee.
It is a pleasure to be here representing more than 690,000 Active
Duty Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen. I am also honored to be
here today with my teammate, who is now the dean of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and one of our Nations finest public servants, General Norty Schwartz.
For fiscal year 2013, the United States Air Force requests $110.1
billion in our baseline budget and $11.5 billion in the Overseas
Contingency Operation supplemental appropriation to support our
work.
This budget request represents the culmination of many hard decisions taken to align our fiscal year 2013 budget submission with
the new strategic guidance, and with the cuts required by the
Budget Control Act over the next 10 years. Finding the proper balance between force structure, readiness, and modernization is our
guiding principle. In short, we determine that the Air Forces best

4
course of action is to trade size for quality. We will become smaller
in order to protect a high-quality and ready force; one that will continue to modernize and grow more capable in the future.
The capabilities resident in the Air Force mission set are fundamental to the priorities outlined in the new strategic guidance. And
in assessing how to adjust the Air Force programs and budgets in
the future, we have taken care to protect the distinctive capabilities our Air Force brings to the table: Control of airspace and
cyberspace, global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
rapid global mobility, and global strike; all enabled by effective
command and control.
The Air Force and our joint interagency and coalition teammates
and partners rely on these capabilities. And though we will be
smaller, we intend to be a superb force at any size, maintaining the
agility and the flexibility that is inherent in our air-power capabilities, and ready to engage a full range of contingencies and threats.
This budget protects the Air Forces top priorities. We protect the
size of the bomber force. We are ramping up our remotely piloted
aircraft force to a goal of 65 combat air patrols, with the ability to
surge to 85 CAPS [combat air patrols].
We protect our Special Operations Forces capabilities; largely
protect space programs and our cyber capabilities. But as we get
smaller, it is not possible to protect everything. Our proposed force
structure changes include the reduction of 286 aircraft over the Future Years Defense Plan, including 123 fighters, 133 mobility aircraft, and 30 ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]
platforms. Many of these changes correspond to adjustments in the
overall size of the Armed Forces, especially the Army and the Marine Corps ground forces, which is the case for the proposed reduction in A10s [Thunderbolt II close air support jets].
Our smaller force structure has also led us to favor divesting
smaller niche fleets such as the C27J [Spartan medium-sized
airlifter], and emphasizing multirole capabilities that will provide
operational flexibility across the spectrum of conflict, demonstrated
by our C130s [Hercules strategic airlifters] and by our choices in
fighter-force structure, which include a smaller A10 fleet and
plans for F16 [Fighting Falcon multirole jet fighter] service-life extension. We also emphasize common configurations which can be
seen in the adjustments to the C5 [Galaxy heavy intercontinentalrange strategic airlifter] force structure and the C17 [Globemaster
III strategic airlifter] mobility fleets; and in ongoing efforts to seek
common configuration within the F22 [Raptor fifth-generation
stealth fighter jet] and F15C [Eagle tactical fighter jet] fleets.
Because force structure changes have a ripple effect on manpower, our budget proposals call for a reduction of 9,900 Air Force
military personnel. By component, this amounts to reductions of
3,900 in Active Duty; 5,100 in Air National Guard; and 900 Air Reserve personnel. And the Chief and I are joined today by the Chief
of the Air Force Reserve, Charlie Stenner, and the Director of the
Air National Guard, Lieutenant General Bud Wyatt.
Fighter mobility and other force-structure changes have been
strategy-driven, based on changed requirements. And consistent
with that strategy, especially where Air National Guard units are
affected, we have proposed to remission units where feasible.

5
We have carefully balanced our Active and Reserve Component
changes to make sure that we can meet the demanding operational
tempos, including both surge and rotational requirements that are
part of the current and projected strategic environment. As our
force gets smaller, all of our components gets smaller together, and
will become even more closely integrated.
We remain fully committed to our total force capability, and have
proposed several initiatives to strengthen integration of effort, including increasing the number of Active Reserve Component associations from 100 to 115.
Our intention is to protect readiness at any force level; because
if we are going to be smaller, we have to be prepared. To that end,
we put funds in critical areas such as flying hours and weapon system sustainment.
We also support the Air National Guard readiness reset, which
balances manpower across the States from lower-demand units to
new high-demand intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
missions, and increases readiness in 39 units. We are committed to
ensuring that our military forces do not go hollow. And readiness
bears close watching as we move forward.
Modernization is our most significant concern, especially as our
fleets age and new technologies drive new investment needs. In
this years budget proposal, we slow modernizations as we protect
programs that are critical to future capabilities. We also restructure or terminate some major programs to protect key priorities.
Protected modernization priorities include the long-range strike
bomber, the KC46 refueling tanker; and key space programs such
as the space-based infrared and advanced extremely high-frequency
satellites; and follow-on global-positioning-system work; and advanced ISR.
We remain fully committed to the F35 [Lightning II fifth-generation stealth fighter] Joint Strike Fighter, which is the future of
the fighter force. But we reduced the rate of procurement for a few
years because, in our judgment, Lockheed Martin is not ready to
ramp up to full-rate production. Due to recent delays in the F35
program, we have also proposed to proceed with an F16 servicelife-extension program.
Among the programs slated for termination are the Global Hawk
RQ4 [surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle] Block 30 Aircraft because, among other reasons, we could not justify the cost to improve the Block 30 sensors to achieve capability that already exists
in the U2 [Dragon Lady high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft].
We also terminated the Defense Weather Satellite System, a termination initiated by Congress, but one that we can accept for now
because the program is early to need.
As noted earlier, we decided to divest the C27J, but we have a
good alternative to this aircraft with the multirole C130, which
has demonstrated its ability to provide the direct support mission
in Iraq and Afghanistan. And we remain committed to providing
this support to the Army. In other cases, we eliminated programs
that were judged to be nonessential in the current budget environment such as the light mobility aircraft and the light attack and
armed reconnaissance aircraft.

6
Through a more disciplined use of resources, our Air Force continues to ring savings out of overhead; to squeeze discretionary
spending; and find more efficient ways of doing business. In fiscal
year 2012, we committed to $33.3 billion in efficiencies across the
FYDP. In this years budget, we have identified about $3.4 billion
in additional efficiencies and another $3.2 billion in programmatic
adjustments to add on top of that $33.3 billion.
In keeping with our enduring obligation to take care of our people, we will keep faith with airmen and their families. Doing right
by our service members is key to our ability to recruit and retain
a high-quality force.
Nevertheless, the impact of increasing personnel costs continues
to be a serious concern. Therefore, we support the military-compensation program reforms in the Presidents Budget which include
a modest pay raise, proposals to control health-care costs and calls
for a commission to recommend reforms in retired pay. We must
continue to seek and develop reforms to ensure the long-term sustainability of the benefits our men and women in uniform have
earned.
Identifying $487 billion in defense cuts to comply with the current requirements of the Budget Control Act has been difficult. Our
Air Force will get smaller, but we are confident that we can build
and sustain a quality force that is ready for the contingencies
ahead, and that will improve in capability over time. However, further cuts through sequestration or other means will put at risk our
ability to execute the new strategy.
To get this far, we have made tough decisions to align structure
and balance our forces in a way that can meet the new strategic
guidance. If substantially more reductions are imposed on DOD
[Department of Defense], we will have to revisit the new strategy.
We cannot afford the risk of a hollow force.
Mr. Chairman, General Schwartz and I feel deeply that our leadership team has inherited the finest Air Force in the world. It is
our obligation to keep it that way so that our joint and coalition
partners know they can count on the United States Air Force to deliver the capabilities that we need to meet the security challenges
ahead, and so that our future airmen remained confident as we are
today that they are serving in the worlds finest Air Force. That is
our obligation going forward, and we are going to meet it.
We remain grateful for the continued support and service of this
committee and we look forward to discussing our proposed budget.
Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Donley and General
Schwartz can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. AIR FORCE

General SCHWARTZ. Thank you Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman,

Congressman Smith, and Members of the committee.
I am privileged to be here today with Secretary Donley, representing the men and women of the United States Air Force.

7
When we appeared before you last year to discuss our budget request, Americas airmen were serving in Iraq and Afghanistan
alongside their joint and coalition teammates. Little did anyone
know at that time that we were on the verge of surging into two
additional theaters of operation ranging more than 5,500 miles
apart; engaging in operations spanning the entire spectrum of activities.
But when multiple disasters struck in Japan on March 11th, and
when the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973
6 days later, the men and women of the United States Air Force
and the Armed Forces were ready to respond; and respond they
did.
The ability to address the concurrent surge requirements while
we remained fully engaged on two fronts in the United States Central Command area of responsibility was most assuredly not trivial.
Such a capability and the capacity to address potential similar scenarios remains important to our success in the future security environment.
But in light of our fiscal circumstances both presently and for the
foreseeable future, helping to ensure Americas success in these
and other contingencies requires carefully tailored preparedness of
our Air Force and the Armed Forces.
The budget request we have forwarded to you, fully appreciating
the Departments role in helping to stabilize the Nations extraordinary fiscal condition, supports our airmen in our continuing efforts to structure the Force for maximum versatility with minimum
risk across the range of operations.
So using our very own version of March Madness last year, as
an example, this spectrum includes humanitarian relief operations
in places like Japan, where more than 13,000 personnel were called
to action to increase much needed airfield capacity; to conduct
search-and-rescue operations; to provide airborne wide-angle views
of the devastation for overall situation awareness; and to provide
rapid and tailored airlift capability delivering some 5 million
pounds of cargo. The operational continuum also includes airpowerintensive combat operations such as Libya, where airmen surged to
contribute more than 65 percent of all coalition sorties; notably, 99
percent of the lift, 79 percent of the in-flight refueling, 50 percent
of the airborne reconnaissance, and 40 percent of the strike missions.
And our Nations full spectrum requirements that rely on Air
Force capabilities include everything else from counterinsurgency
to counterterrorism; to our regular operations; to safe and reliable
operation and maintenance and security of two of the Nations
three legs of the strategic deterrent.
In all of these mission areas, our airmen are committed to the
task of leveraging air-and-space power with all of its inherent
versatility, tailor-ability and rapidity. Ultimately, Air Force capabilities present to the President and the national leadership a
range of strategic options to meet priorities of the new defense
strategic guidance such as projecting power in anti-access and
area-denial environments; preventing the spread of weapons of
mass destruction; conducting space and cyber operations; and
maintaining the preponderance of the Nations nuclear deterrent.

8
The wide array of Air Force capabilities which will remain vital
to our Nations diplomatic, economic, and military interests fall into
four general categoriesair and-space control; global intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance; rapid global mobility; and global
strike.
As part of the defense strategic guidance, we are structuring our
force to be more agile and responsive even as we accept some risk
with the smaller force.
While still maintaining quality, we will divest nearly 230 fighter,
mobility, and ISR aircraft in fiscal 2013 toward a total of 286 aircraft retirements over the program period. We project that these
targeted divestitures will save some $8.7 billion.
And when applied to our modernization strategy, as Secretary
Donley discussed, as well as to all important operations and maintenance sustainment accounts, our guiding principles in these careful and responsible reductions were to favor multirole systems over
those with more niche capabilities so that we could maximize
versatility; and to retire entire aircraft types where possible, that
we could potentially eliminate the entire support infrastructure,
thereby, achieving greater efficiency.
But where retirement of entire fleets was not feasible, we evaluated options for eliminating aircraft that were the least capable or
the most expensive to operate.
For the assets that we will retainthat is 54 combat-coded fighter squadrons, 275 airlifters, 453 tankers, and a robust mix of remotely piloted, U2, E3 [Sentry airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft], EA, and other ISR systemswe are emphasizing common configurations for fewer support-andsustainment requirements. And therefore, we would be positioned
to achieve greater efficiency in delivering the core capabilities I addressed earlier.
The defense strategic guidance articulates our plan to execute a
$487 billion defense-spending reduction over 10 years. And although we have no illusionno illusion at allabout the road
ahead being easy, we have confidence in our ability to manage this
tight fiscal circumstance.
I must echo, however, Secretary Donleys concern that across-theboard cuts driven by sequestration would dramatically change the
complexion of our thoroughly deliberated defense strategy.
We would effectively be sent back to the drawing board because
indiscriminate salami-slicing of the budget would nullify the carefully considered and responsible reductions that preserve our readiness, our effectiveness; notwithstanding the fiscal constraints in a
smaller force.
The comprehensive nature of our fiscal year 2013 budget request
includes a holistic interstate approach to Air National Guard and
Air Force Reserve force structure. From both an operational-effectiveness and fiscal-responsibility perspective, we prefer this strategy over a more piecemeal State-by-State approach.
Our proposed efforts will correct several manpower disconnects,
rebalance forces, and improve sortie generation and aircraft utilization rates, thereby improving the total forces readiness and responsiveness across the spectrum of operation.

9
It allows us to better resource our high-priority requirements
such as ISR; distributed and mission training; and domestic and
homeland defense operations.
On our manpower side, our program total-force realignment on
the order of 10,000 Active Guard and Reserve airmen will bring the
total force end strength down to 501,000 by the end of fiscal year
2013. And we hold no illusions that these personnel reductions affecting all 54 States and U.S. territories will be easy. Taken comprehensively, however, this recalibration will robust nearly 40
units across the Air National Guard and, thus, enhance overall
total force readiness.
Clearly, the Air Forces vitality and effectiveness is dependent on
the strength of the total force, and therefore the leadership of both
the Active and the Reserve Components work closely together in all
deliberations and decisions affecting the total force.
Understandably, we did not always achieve to total unanimity,
but we most certainly were unified and we remain unified in the
common goal of ensuring total force vitality and viability. And together we remain committed to fulfilling the requirements of the
defense strategic guidance as one Air Force.
Mr. Chairman and committee Members, the Air Force remains
committed to the providing of global vigilance, reach, and power for
Americans needs today, and for her aspirations and challenges
that we know the Nation will face tomorrow.
Every single day, our airmen, Active Guard, and Reserve proudly
serve on behalf of the American people as trusted stewards of the
Nations resources and stalwart defenders of her security.
Finally, please allow me to make one comment concerning military compensation. I appeal to the committee to carefully consider
those initiatives in our budget proposal that begin to tackle the escalating personnel costs of compensation, health care, and retirement. Among all the other challenges facing us, the reality of fewer
members of the Armed Forcescosting increasingly more to recruit, train, and retain for promising careersis the monumental
defense issue of our time.
Our inability to address this issue properly will place other areas
of the budget, including force structure and modernization, under
yet more pressure, forcing out needed military capability at the
time when we are already right-sized for the likely missions ahead.
Thank you again, sir, for your continued support of the United
States Air Force and for the committees support of our airmen and
their families. We look forward to your questions, Mr. Chairman.
[The joint prepared statement of General Schwartz and Secretary
Donley can be found in the Appendix on page 60.]
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
General Schwartz, in this budget, the Air Force made the choice
to cut older platforms in favor of newer modernized platforms. For
example, you sustained the F35 and the old and retired older F
16s and A10s. Similarly, you retire all the C5As and the C
130Hs.
While I would prefer we didnt retire so much force structure, I
understand that given the choice between old and new, the Air
Force went for the most modernized advanced program. One of two

10
notable exceptions is the decision to cut the Global Hawk Block 30
and extend the use of U2s.
Please explain why, in this case, the Air Force chose to retain a
plane that was flown by the grandparents of todays U2 pilots, especially given that 8 months ago, the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics certified to Congress that
the continuation of the Global Hawk program was essential to national security; and that there are no alternatives to provide acceptable capability at less cost.
At that time, we were told that the U2 aircraft cost $220 million
per year more than the Global Hawk Block 30 to operate. Isnt this
a short-sighted decision that favors near-term savings over longterm capability and cost?
General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, the Block 30 decision was
made on two basesone, that the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council reduced the demand signal for high-altitude surveillance.
I cant go in the explicit detail here. I would be happy to do so in
another manner. That was one factor.
The second factor was a realization that the operating cost of the
two systems was, at best, to push; in the neighborhood of $32,000
per flying hourU2 versus Global Hawk Block 30.
The third factor was the realization that the sensor capability on
the U2particularly for EO [electro-optical], IR [infrared] and, to
some degree, also on the signal sidewas better, and required improvements in the Global Hawk system that were yet not funded.
And I acknowledge the Nunn-McCurdy certification which occurred last year, but I would only remind that that occurred prior
to the Budget Control Act and its implications in terms of resources
for our Air Force.
So, our choice wasit is true the U2 has been flying a long
time, the U2 is not the senior plane that our grandfathers flew.
It has been improved and modified and continues to be modified as
we speak. And it was our judgment thatgiven the demand signal,
the sensor capability, and the relative modest, if any, cost differentialthat sustaining the U2 was a better bet.
I would conclude by saying, sir, that we are not giving up on
Global Hawk by any means. Block 20 will continue to perform the
communications mission. Block 40 will continue to perform the
ground moving-target-indicator mission. And that is, under these
circumstances, the best package we could offer our joint teammates.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Also, General Schwartz, you talked a little bit at the conclusion
of thefor the compensation to the ForceI have one other question on that.
The Departments proposal to increase the TRICARE prime enrollment fee is a tiered approach based on an individuals retired
pay. The health-care benefit for retired Federal employees is not
based on an individuals retirement pay.
So in essence, the President would pay the same for Federal retirement health care as the lowest level Federal employee. Why,
then, should the military retirement health care benefits be means
tested?

11
General SCHWARTZ. It was a recognition, Mr. Chairman, that
there were those among our alumni who were less able to accommodate the increases in the fees than others. And so, this simply
was, in my viewwas a recognition of reality in that enlisted retirees were certainly not as capable of absorbing these costs as retired
flag officers. And it was simply done on that basis in an attempt
to be as fair as possible.
The CHAIRMAN. So you probably did the right thing, and the rest
of the Federal employees should probably follow suit?
General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I am not in the position to
The CHAIRMAN. I understand.
General SCHWARTZ [continuing]. To make policy here.
But I can tell you that I am comfortable with what we decided
to do.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ask about the F35it is still a little bit uncertain exactly where
that program is going exactly. Over the course of the next 4 or 5
years, what are you counting on from the F35? How many planes?
What is the cost point that is going to become problematic? And
how confident are you that those planes can be delivered at this
point on whatever the current schedule is? And I say that, because,
as you know, every year it seems like we have to readjust that
schedule based on delays; increases in cost.
As of right now, what are you counting on in terms of the number of planes? What are the cost points? And then how confident
are you that this schedule is actually going to hold up?
Secretary DONLEY. Mr. Smith, we are currently working through
the concurrency in the program that I think the committee is
aware of, where the development program is not yet complete. And
we have started production and we are weighing carefully, year to
year, the progress of the program to make sure that we do not
ramp up production too quickly, and that we worked out all the
kinks in the program. And there is a list of issues that the Joint
Program Office and the Air Force and the Navy are watching and
managing together, going forward.
We have worked hard with Lockheed Martin to reach conclusion
on the low-rate initial production of LRIP4 contracts last year. We
are in negotiations with them now on Lot 5, and we think that
work needs to continue and to come to closure soon.
Mr. SMITH. And it is interesting. As you talked about, you know,
we dont want to produce them until they are actually ready, but
we kind of are, as we have gone through a series of lots.
But within those productions lots, we are still not at the point
where we are like, Okay, it is good. We are building a plane that
we know is going to be ready to go. We are still saying, Okay,
we are working out concurrency. We are working out these different things. And it is not at all clear at this point when that is
going to be worked out. We are hoping at certain points that it will
be worked out, but it is not locked in by any stretched imagination.
Is that correct?
Secretary DONLEY. It is becoming more locked in. The Joint Program Office

12
Mr. SMITH. Right.
Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Just completed a baseline review
really capturing the last 2 years
Mr. SMITH. Not to be overly philosophical, but you are locked in
or you are not. There is no such thing as more locked in. So, we
are still
Secretary DONLEY. The Joint Program just finished preparing a
new program baseline based on the changes over the last 2 years;
the cumulative adjustments to set the way forward for the program.
So Admiral Venlet, I think, has a good handle on how to push
the program forward. The program of record for us has not
changed. It is 1,763 of the A-models for the United States Air
Force. That is obviously taking a little bit longer than we would
like, so production is being pushed out a bit. But we remain fully
committed to this aircraft going forward.
Mr. SMITH. And what is the per-unit cost estimate at this point?
Secretary DONLEY. This is still to be negotiated. The early lots
tend to cost more than the others. So let me give to you some numbers for the record which reflect
Mr. SMITH. Okay.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on
page 95.]
Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Sort of where we are today.
But we have ongoing negotiations with Lockheed on this. And I
will say that the Joint Program Office and the Air Force and the
Navy are working together to get the best deal for the taxpayer;
to push this program forward, but at an affordable cost that represents continuing progress down the price curve, as we should expect in this program.
Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you.
And just one quick question on the Guard and Reservethere
are concerns and been expressed by a number of adjutant generals
aboutI guess it is 5,100 Guard airmen that are being cut, and
then a fair number of planes are being cut from the Reserve and
Guard components. They are concerned about the impact of that.
What is your response as to why you made the decisions that you
made?
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, a few points here.
First, the adjustments in the aircraft were driven by the changes
in strategy that we referred to in our opening statements. So the
Departments assessment was that the Air Force could take additional risk in fighter force structure. We just went through some
significant changes in fighter force structure a couple of years ago,
where most of those reductions took place in the F16 fleet and in
the F15C fleet; so we just went through some significant adjustments there.
As we look at the strategy changes and the sizing of the fighter
force going forward, it was determined that we could take additional risk in the A10 fleet. We will still have in excess of 300 A
10s in our inventory. But going forward, it looked like we could
take additional risk in that area.
On the C130 sideon the mobility, for examplethe prior Mobility Capability Requirement Study, MCRSbefore we even got in

13
to the strategic reviewhad told us that we had excess tactical-lift
capabilities in excess to requirements. So we felt like we could take
additional risk in the size of the C130 fleet going forward.
So, again, these are the force structure adjustments and strategic
adjustments that started the force structure changes.
Then, the issue was how to mix the Active Duty and the Guard
capabilities most effectively to meet the requirements of the strategy, but also provide for surge and provide for rotational capabilities at the same timemake sure the Force is robust.
So this is why, while we are getting smaller, we are focused on
making sure that the Active Guard and Reserve are more integrated going forward. And I would defer to the chief for some additional comments.
General SCHWARTZ. I would only make one additional comment
in that it is important from a force-management point of view to
understand what the likely tempo is of the respective forces.
For the Active, the goal was set at not less than one to twothat
is a deploy-to-dwell ratio of 6 months deployed, for example, 1 year
home; and a tempo of not less than 1 to 4, ideally 1 to 5, for the
National Guard and Reserve components.
And the reason for that is so that we do not overuse any of the
components, with the downside of forcing folks either to leave the
Active Duty; or because of the multiple demands on the Guard and
Reserve, including their employment in the private sector, to leave
the Guard and Reserve.
So this was fundamentally in a smaller Air Force, recognizing
the activity level that is anticipated to have the right mix that allowed us to manage the tempo at levels which were sustainable for
the future.
Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your service.
General Schwartz, in February of 2008, the Air Force certified to
Congress in a letterand I want to quote from that letter, sir
Time-sensitive mission-critical resupply is crucial to our success as
war fighters. We also believe there are mission steps that may support additional procurement of the C27, such as building international partnerships around the common airframe; National
Guard support of Federal Emergency Management Agency regions;
delivery of Special Operations Forces teams, and others small unit
maneuvers; more efficient movement of small payloads in theater;
taking convoys off the road; precision air-drop of bundles and joint
precision air-drop systems operations; and recapitalization of operational support aircraft inventories.
This is the direct quote from that letter of February of 2008. Fifteen months later, you were in front of this committeeand let me
quote from your testimony thereOur programs reflect their commitment to pursuing joint multimission solutions such as the procurement of eight C27Js in the fiscal year 2010.
These appear to be in direct conflict to your written testimony,
where you say that the Air Force is divesting the C27 aircraft in

14
favor of the multirole C130 because you consider the C27J a
niche capability.
Again, this seems to be in direct contrast to these two previous
quotes. Why, sir, do you believe 3 years later that this C27J is no
longer a multimission capable aircraft? Has there been any formal
Air Force testing or analysis conducted that proves the C27 is no
longer a multimission aircraft?
General SCHWARTZ. It is a multimission aircraft. We dont dispute that, Congressman Bartlett.
But what I would saythe significant thing that has changed
since both 2008 to 2010 testimony is $487 billion. I mean that is
a factor in our approach to how to address the force structure.
When we looked at the C27, sir, as attractive at was, there was
a personal commitment from me to George Casey in the 2010 timeframe to perform that mission for the Army.
We looked at a couple thingslife-cycle costs, for example. The
C27 life-cycle cost over 25 years is $308 million an aircraft. For
the C130J, it is $213 million per aircraft. For the C130H, it is
$185 million per aircraft. So there was a cost differential; sometimes it is worth it. But in this fiscal environment it certainly
caught our attention.
Additionally, we had demonstrated our capacity, both in Iraq and
Afghanistan, to provide the time-critical support mission for the
maneuver units with the C130 platform.
Mr. BARTLETT. Excuse me, I am led to understand that because
we do not have enough C27Js that we areand I am quoting your
peopleflying the blades off the 47 [CH-47 Chinook heavy-lift helicopter], and using the 130, which is more expensive and cannot
be used on short air strips.
The C27 procurement costs us less than the C130. It has only
two engines as compared to four. It is one-half the size of a 130.
The hourly cost is $3,000 less than the 130 and $5,000 less per
hour than the helicopter.
The parts and avionics of the C27 are 35 percent to 40 percent
in common with the C130. They should be. The engines are identical, as I understand. Yet, the Air Force claims that the C27 is
more expensive to own and operate than the C130.
Given these facts, can you please explain to me how the Air
Force determined that operating a C27 is more expensive than the
130 and the 47?
General SCHWARTZ. I didnt talk about the 47. I did talk about
the 130. And it has to do with the basing arrangement; it has to
do with the contract logistic support, rather than organic
sustainment. There are a number of factors that affect life-cycle
costs, sir, but I would justallow me to make this pointthat
there is not a single airfield in Afghanistan today that the C27
is using that the C130 cannot. That is a reality on the ground
today.
Mr. BARTLETT. My time has expired. I thank you very much.
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. LARSEN. Thanks Mr. Chairman.

15
Several questionsI didnt note it in your testimonyin the past
couple of years we have had discussions here with you all about
electronic warfare; and, in particular, some of that platforms we
have for use for the Air Forces electronic warfare capability, including the information operations like Compass Call and so on.
But I didnt note anything in your testimony specific to EW [electronic warfare], and I was wondering if you could enlighten us to
the investment the Air Force has been able to make despite the
budget constraints you are under.
General SCHWARTZ. Certainly the Compass Callwe will sustain
the Compass Call mission and continue to expand its repertoire
with the onboard equipment and so on and so forth.
We are equipping some of the remotely piloted aircraft with EW
capabilities as well, and we arein the intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance area, this is mapping adversary signals and so
on and so forth; there is certainly a concerted effort in that domain.
So the other area which is not as obvious is part of ourfor example, our service-life extension proposal on the F16 introduces
an electronically scanned array radar, an AESA [active electronically scanned array]. That in itself is an EW capability, both offensively and defensively. So there are traditional investments in the
traditional platforms, but there are also efforts under way in less
visible ways like the AESA radars, which will magnify our EW confidence.
Mr. LARSEN. Mr. Secretary, is that good enough? Yes, okay.
With regards to anything you are doing on EW jointly with either Navy or Army or Marine Corpscan you discuss that?
General SCHWARTZ. Sure. And this is something, sir, that is a
part of the air-sea battle collaboration between the Navy and the
Air Force. There are electronic-warfare potential capabilities out
there that concern us greatly. And we are collaborating with the
Navy in order to introduce countermeasures; to introduce resilience
into our respective systems to make sure, for example, that our
data links are robust enough so that we can assist one another
mutually support one anotherwhen, say, one aircraft is being
jammed, but we can link with another aircraft of the other service
to still engage a target.
These are the kinds of things that I think hold great promise for
us in making better use of the assets we possess.
Mr. LARSEN. And as this is the budget-posture hearing, then are
these activities reflected in the budget?
General SCHWARTZ. They certainly are, and they will be more
visible over time.
Mr. LARSEN. Sure. And I gather from your answer there may be
room for a bigger discussion in a different setting as well?
General SCHWARTZ. I would be happy to do that, sir.
Mr. LARSEN. Okay, good.
In your testimony, with regards to the nuclear deterrentsorry,
page 20 or soyes, nuclear-deterrence operationscan you talk a
little bit about the Air Forces investment in the two legs of the
triad that you have isobviously, I am on the Strategic Forces
Subcommitteeseveral of us are, certainly, and we will probably
look into this further. But if you could give us an introduction of
what we might be looking into on the subcommittee?

16
Secretary DONLEY. Sure. Sure.
Just quickly, an overviewnuclear-deterrent operations make up
about 6 percent of our overall Air Force budget. We made no major
force structure adjustments in this area, pending presidential decisions on how to structure the nuclear triad going forward. Broadly
speaking, there are funds in the budget to support the beginning
of START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] implementation.
In the START regime and in the current force structure, we have
what are referred to as phantom capabilities that count against us
but, are purely not operational. I refer here to Peacekeeper [LGM118A missile] silos, which are still in existence but have not been
dismantled, but have no missiles in them; and bombers that have
been retired for several years and are no longer capable but still
count in the totals. So we are making the investments to start dismantling the phantom capabilities that are present in the force
structure. And we are working on other measures that would lead
in to the START implantation work ahead of us.
The existing decisions, as they stand are that we would plan on
no more than 420 ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and
up to 420 ICBMs, up to 60 nuclear-capable bombers. So these are
decisions that the President has in front of him about how to shape
the nuclear posture going forward. And we will wait for those decisions before taking next steps.
Just two additional points quickly
Mr. LARSEN. Sure.
Secretary DONLEY. Our immediate goal for the ICBM force is to
get the Minuteman [LGM-30 ICBM] to 2030, and so we have the
resources in there to support that. And I would remind the committee that the long-range strike bomber, while it is intended to be
nuclear-capable, is a factor in considering the nuclear-deterrent
force structure. But we are building this bomber for conventional
operations over 20 or 30 years. Where our bomber capabilities have
been used is on the conventional side.
Mr. LARSEN. Yes good. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you both for being here.
Mr. Conaway and I both share a concern about a particular issue
and I will yield to him to ask you about that.
Mr. CONAWAY. Well thanks for your time, Mr. Thornberry. In the
force-restructure plan, you are moving C130s from Dallas/Fort
Worth to Montana; you are moving F15s from Montana to California; and then you are moving something called the MC12 [Liberty ISR turboprop aircraft] I guess a twin-engine ISR platform to
Fort Worth.
Moving aircraft is very simple. But these are Guard assets and
the Guard complement that they currently flythe C130smaintain them, evaluate them and train the pilots, all that kind of
stuffthey are not moving to Montana.
And I suspect that the F16 protection team in Montana is not
going to move to California. You got MILCON [military construction] considerations in all these places. Given the overall cuts of
the budget, can you walk us through the business plan for why this
makes sense?

17
Because, while it may seem parochial because Mike and I are
from Texas, it is not; I have going to answer questions back home
to folks who are looking at tough decisions. And moving things for
the sake of moving thing doesnt make a lot of sense at this stage.
General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it goes something like thisthat F15s
are a air-sovereignty mission in the Air National Guard. And they
are better utilized on the West Coast than they are in the north
central part of the United States. That is why the F15s are moving to Fresno, because that is an established air-sovereignty location for North America
Mr. CONAWAY. And how long have the F15s been in Montana
that we are making the exchange for? I mean this is a new air-sovereignty issue for the F15s?
General SCHWARTZ. Remember we are taking out 200 fighter aircraft in the Fiscal 2013 program and so
Mr. CONAWAY. Let us focus on the C130s because
General SCHWARTZ. Okay.
Mr. CONAWAY [continuing]. As I understand it, they are the only
C130s available to Governors on the Gulf Coast that are Governor-to-Governor as opposed to going to the Pentagon to get those.
Can you walk us through why we are moving C130s to Montana?
General SCHWARTZ. I think that the fundamental reason is because there are other multitudes of other C130s in the region that
you are well aware of, regardless of their component affiliation.
And there was a requirementthere has been a need for lift in the
central northwestern part of the StatesFEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency] Region 10, specifically.
The logic here was to try to position lift capabilitiesagain, total
force lift capabilitiesin a way that that could posture for potential
natural disasters and the like.
Mr. CONAWAY. And those considerations overweigh the financial
circumstancesthe millions of dollars in training, the pilots that
current fly for commercial carriers in Dallas, Fort Worth, who fly
the C130s, you got
General SCHWARTZ. And they will fly MC12s which is an enduring mission for our Air Force, as far as the eye can see, sir.
Mr. CONAWAY. But I am more interested in what the C130s do
for our National Guard and their ability to respond to fires in
Texas and hurricanes throughout the region. It is a 2.5-hour flight
from Montana to Texas and a 2.5-hour back flight.
General SCHWARTZ. And Abilene has 28 C130s.
Mr. CONAWAY. But those belong to you, and they are not controlled by the National Guard. And I got to believe, unless you can
show differently, that a Governor-to-Governor response time is
quicker than a Governor-to-Pentagon-and-back-to-the-Governor
whatever.
General SCHWARTZ. And the Governor of Arkansas and the Governor of Mississippi, I am sure, will happily support the needs of
the Governor of Texas, sir.
Mr. CONAWAY. You have got C130s that belong to the Guard in
Arkansas, and where else did you say?
General SCHWARTZ. Mississippi.
Mr. CONAWAY. Mississippi.

18
All right; well, I stand corrected, as I was told that these are the
only ones available in the Gulf Coast.
It is troubling. And again it looks like it is parochial, but it is
not, and
General SCHWARTZ. No, I take your point, sir.
Mr. CONAWAY. All right.
And I do yield back.
Thank you.
Mr. THORNBERRY. General, let me ask you briefly one other
thingyou all delayed the follow-on to the T38 [Talon twin-engine
supersonic jet trainer] trainer a year. There are some questions to
how serious you are about bringing that trainer on. It is not just
us. It is our European allies who jointly train. How big a deal is
that for you all?
General SCHWARTZ. There is just no space, sir.
Mr. THORNBERRY. But next year?
General SCHWARTZ. I cant promise you. I mean this is an issue
of resources. And, you know, we need a new trainer. As you are
well aware, the T38 is older than I am, almost. And we need a
new trainer. But the bottom line is that we simply did not have
space to pursue that in the current budget environment.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Courtney.
Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both witnesses.
General, just to go back to the C27 issue, theit is my understanding that the decision to end this program is not simply to
truncate it, but to actually take these brand-new planes and send
them to the boneyardI think was the term that was used in the
description of the budget earlier.
These are planes that are bought and paid for. Can you explain
how that is a good business plan? Because, frankly, it feels like a
60 Minutes moment in terms of the taxpayer. And again, first of
all, is that correct? And number two, just explain how that works.
General SCHWARTZ. There are multiple options which havent
played out. Yes, they certainly could go into what we call flyable
storage. It happened out in Arizona.
They could also become foreign military sales vehicles to other
air forces. And there are other air forces interested in the platforms. So I mean there are a couple of options which, again,
havent played out. And certainly that would happen in the next
number of months.
Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, I think for some of us that is an
issue we kind of need to understand a little better. I mean it is my
understanding the producer is not too thrilled about the idea of us
turning around and sort of flipping the planes for resale. And,
frankly that is pretty understandable.
Secretary DONLEY. Maybe. But I mean we have a mandate from
you to
Mr. COURTNEY. Understood.
Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Get smaller; and we are.
Mr. COURTNEY. Again, but so when the F22 production line
came to an end, I mean we truncated the program. And that,

19
frankly, for some of us it was a bitter pill; but nonethelessI mean
those planes are still being used. And that is sort of a thing that
I think we are struggling to understand is why perfectly brand-new
planes are not being sort of at least used.
And again, I am sure that is something that the budget folks can
walk us through.
For Guard and Reserves who have been given sort of an alternative for theis it the 12MCor the MC12 rather, excuse me
Mr. Secretary, you indicated that the adjustments to Guard and
Reserves aircraft is being driven by strategy.
Again, those planes are, in my understandingare used for intelligence and reconnaissance given the fact that, you know, the strategy horizon is that we are sort of going to be leaving Afghanistan
sometime in the future.
I am just trying to visualize, for Guard units who are being told,
This is your new assignmentwhat is the strategy that will
make that a firm commitment? I mean this has been an issue. I
dont have to tell you that, you know, Guard units are kind of feeling like, you know, their head is spinning in terms of trying to keep
up with what their mission is.
Secretary DONLEY. This is a fair point. And we struggle as well
with rapid changes in force structure; the rapid changes in the fiscal environment that have caused us to have to take decisions, revisit decisions and continue to adjust.
This is a challenging part of the environment in which we live.
I would say when the MC12 came into the inventory, we gave serious consideration to putting it in the Guard and Reserve from the
beginning. It does have a counterdrug kind of capability that is
well beyond the existing capabilities of the RC26 [Metroliner twin
turboprop aircraft], which has been used in that capacity across the
southern tier of the U.S. to support Guard and counterdrug activities. So it does represent an increase in those capabilities.
But when we brought the MC12 into the Force, the Guard did
not have the manpower to support and to generate quickly the required capability to operate that down range.
You should be awareI think already arethe MC12s are not
in the United States. They went straight from the factory into the
theater, and that is where they are operating today. But as we look
forward, we think this is a more sustainable mission for the Guard
as the op tempo adjusts a little bit. And I believe that the Air National Guard looked at the locations of the MC12 along the southern tier mainly as a good fit.
Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, certainly we want to work with you
in terms of trying to, you know, find missions. It is critical, obviously, to keep that capability which you talked about earlier. But
obviously there is going to be questions and look forward to working with you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Forbes.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary and Generalthank you for your service to
our country. I only have 5 minutes so I have got to be kind of concise and I just want to say at the outset that I am going to ask

20
you to forgive me for not swimming in the same sea of accolades
that some of my colleagues are comfortable in doing.
But when I first came into office, the way we would have these
hearingswe would spend a lot of time bragging about you; you
would spend a lot of time bragging about us. And we never really
asked the tough questions necessary to defend this country. And I
vowed never to do that again.
Mr. Secretary, you said that your decisions are strategy-driven.
And, General, you have said thatit is in your written statementthat the strategy was driven by security changes. You dont
mention in there that it was also driven by $427 billion of cuts. So
I want to focus on those security changes.
When I first came into office, I had this report that the RAND
Corporation did that said if we were involved in a conflict between
China and Taiwan, the United States Air Force would easily defeat
the Chinese in that particular situation.
Since you have been in the position that you are in, you have
canceled the F22. You have retired 235 F15s and F16 fighters.
You are now proposing retiring another 123 combat aircraft. You
put all our eggs in the F35 platform, which I think everybody acknowledges is smaller, slower; less lethal than the F22.
And now I see a new study that has come out by the RAND Corporation that takes a totally different tack. It says that we would
lose in that conflict between China and Taiwan.
Now, I dont have time in the 5 minutes I have to get into the
specifics of those studies. But my question for you is: Do you have
any other studies that you can present to this committee that we
can review, that would refute the conclusion that the RAND Corporation had in this study?
General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I would have to take a look at
that study. I will certainly
Mr. FORBES. You have not seen the study by RAND Corporation?
General SCHWARTZ. I am not sure. I cant see it from this distance. I certainly will
Mr. FORBES. Are you familiar with any study that RAND Corporation did, as big as this one was, that said that we would lose
in that conflict?
General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I dont know what the assumptions are in that study. I dont know what the premises were.
You need to allow me to exercise that professional judgment.
Mr. FORBES. And I will, General. I just want you say for the
record today that you are not aware of this RAND study and you
havent reviewed the study. Is that correct?
General SCHWARTZ. What I am saying is I have not seen that
what is the title of the study, Congressman?
Mr. FORBES. Question of Balance, Political Context and Military
Aspects of the China and Taiwan Dispute by the RAND Corporation.
General SCHWARTZ. I have not seen that study.
Mr. FORBES. Okay. It is a big one.
I would suggest the Air Force look at it. Second thing I would
say is if that conclusion in that study was correct, would that be
an acceptable risk for the Air Force to have?
I am not saying it is. I am saying if it would be?

21
General SCHWARTZ. If the conclusion is correct, I would say that
would be, decidedly, a concern for all of the entire Armed Forces.
Mr. FORBES. Let me come back to the F22 decision that you
made.
When you did that, you and the Secretary wrote this at op-ed
piece saying that we should have 183 F22s. Prior to that decision,
according to the Congressional Research Service, not me, there
were 30 air-campaign studies that said you were wrong.
Did you review a single study that said that you were correct,
and that we should reduce the F22s down to only 183? And the
reason I say itbecause right when you did it, the commander of
the Air Combat Command said that there were no such studies out
there at all. Did you review any of those? And can you just present
them to the committee for us to review?
General SCHWARTZ. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. FORBES. Were there any
General SCHWARTZ. There was. And the Department and Congress chose otherwise in the end.
Mr. FORBES. So General Corley was incorrect when he said there
were no studies out there that justified that?
General SCHWARTZ. The study that I refer to talked about more
than 187 aircraft.
Mr. FORBES. If you would, present that to us.
Can you tell us now, General, what is the current strike-fighter
shortfall that the United States Air Force has?
General SCHWARTZ. Given the new strategy, we have sufficient
aircraft to deal with the threats that are outlined in the forcesizing construct at moderate risk.
Mr. FORBES. And, General, was that strategy, according to your
testimony today, driven completely by security changes or was it
driven by the 427
General SCHWARTZ. Of course it was driven by both, but
Mr. FORBES. And
General SCHWARTZ. The recognition was that we were out of
Iraq, that we were going to diminish our presence in Afghanistan
Mr. FORBES. General, my time is running out.
Can you tell us if you can distinguish between the part of the
strategy that was driven by the cuts, and the part by the security
changes?
General SCHWARTZ. Clearly, it is a combination of both. But I
would submit to you, sir, that the F35, the long-range strike
bomber, and the new tankerthose programs are sustained by the
new strategy and not diminished by it.
Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Loebsack.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to thank both of you for being here today as well. Thank
you for your service. And, of course, as I have discussed with both
of you, I remain, I guess, deeply concerned about the proposal to
retire the Iowa National Guards 132nd Fighter Wings F16s, as

22
well as the broader budget decisions affecting the Air National
Guard. I know this issue is brought up by Ranking Member Smith
earlier as well.
Roughly 130 airmen from the 132nd are currently deployed to Afghanistan or elsewhere across the globe. They have proven time
and again that they are one of the most-experienced, best-performing fighter wings in the Air Force; maintaining a very high degree of readiness for some of the lowest personnel, maintenance,
and flying costs of all F16 units. As you know, in other words, this
is a very, very effective unit by any measure.
And while I am still baffled by the proposal to retire the 132nd
F16s, I am deeply concerned about the budget proposals affecting
the entire Air National Guard as well, which would bearmy understanding is59 percent of the total aircraft cuts, and see most
of their personnel reductions occur in fiscal year 2013, if I am not
mistaken; which provides little leeway to reserve course from a
strategy that is stated to be meant to be irreversible.
Given that the Air National Guard also plays a critical homeland-security role for our States and our country at lower basing
personnel and life-cycle costs to the taxpayers, I have a couple of
questions related to these issues.
In your joint testimony, you state that the right mix of Active
Duty and Reserve Components must be maintained. And I think
we can all agree that that is the case. How did you determine the
appropriate mix, what the appropriate mix would be, and what
were the factors such as experience and personnel and operational
cost that were taken into account? Could you be specific about the
factors and the mix?
Secretary DONLEY. I go back to the rationale that we provided in
the opening statement. And I think we have been clear about it.
The issue here was where we could take risk in the force structure.
And the DOD and Air Force decision collectively was that we could
take additional risk in the fighter force structure.
We have already taken significant reductions in the F16 force,
but the assessment was we could take an additional squadron this
time around.
The unit at Des Moines, while it continues to perform very, very
wellthere is no question about the competency and the capability
of this unitthe aircraft are a little bit older and less capable than
some others. And they are not participating in the Air Sovereignty
Alert mission. This has not been a mission that has been assigned
or associated with Des Moines for the North American Air Defense
Command. So those were the factors that went into this particular
decision.
The issue on the Active Reserve Component balance, I think the
chief has been very clear on. This is not just about the cost to operate the unit. This is how the unit fits into the force structure, and
how that force structure not only meets the demands of the strategy, but our ability to surge and then sustain combat operations
going forward. And we have tried to strike the right balance.
Our Air Force is now small enough; small enough that we have
to go forward as one Air Force together and become more integrated going forward. As we get smaller, the requirements for read-

23
iness and immediate capability go up here. So these were the decisions that factored into the Active arc balance.
And, again, it is notas you suggested, we understand the perception the reductions are disproportionate on the Air Guard. Certainly, that is the way the numbers fall in fiscal year 2013.
But this is a multiyear look backwards and forwards in terms of
how we are going to structure our Air Force going forward. And we
need the right balance of Active Duty and Reserve Components, so
we dont break these components
Mr. LOEBSACK. Yes.
Just one quick historical questionbecause we mentioned certainly we have got to be able to deploy folks fairly quickly. Accessibility is an issue. I think it is an issue that the Guardit has been
raised as a concern. And I just have one question about that. Over
the last 10 years, have there been any instances where the Air
Guard has not been able to fulfill request for deployment?
General SCHWARTZ. There have been no occasions where we did
notif we resorted to mobilizationwhere the guard was not
available. And there were very few cases when we ride on volunteer status of the guardsmen.
I would just say, sir, that the Guard and the Reserve are an essential part of our family. And we respect what they do. And in the
case of your unit, sir, they are going to go transition into a remotely piloted aircraft mission that clearly is for the ages.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Thank you. Thanks to both of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Miller.
Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To both gentlemenI would like to knowSecretary Panetta recently talked about the call for maybe two more rounds of BRAC
[base closure and realignment]. I would like to go back to our last
round of BRAC, if I mightand just ask: Do each of you think that
BRAC of 2005the recommendations in that documentcarry the
force of law?
Secretary DONLEY. Yes.
Mr. MILLER. And I think it was section 2703 of the 2012 NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] requires that you complete all
the closures and realignments recommended by the 2005 BRAC
Commission as expeditiously as possible. So you are finished now
with all of the BRAC recommendations and requirements?
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we believe we have complied with the law
at Eglin.
Mr. MILLER. So a comment by General Hoffman last week at the
AFA [Air Force Association] Convention that, BRAC 2005 has expired, it is irrelevant, and that, people just need to get over it,
is a correct statement?
General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I was there. That is not what
he said.
Mr. MILLER. What did he say, General?
General SCHWARTZ. Congressman Miller, what he said was that
BRAC 2005 was complete, and that what we propose now with respect specifically to the Air Armament Center and the mission at

24
Eglin is something to address today, in todays context, and not relative to something which, in our view, is a completed project.
Mr. MILLER. So the Recommendation 185 to create an integrated
weapons-and-armament, research development and acquisition,
test-and-evaluation center at Eglin has been done?
General SCHWARTZ. I would argue that it has, sir.
Mr. MILLER. Not co-locationintegration at Eglin?
General SCHWARTZ. I would argue that it has.
Mr. MILLER. How does disestablishing the Air Armament Center
support your compliance with the BRAC law?
General SCHWARTZ. We are not disestablishing the Air Armament Center, sir. Nothing is migrating from Eglin with respect to
the proposal for AFMC [Air Force Materiel Command] reorganizationnothing. The one major change that is involved is collapsing
the two wings which exist at Eglin into one, which is fundamentally an efficiency move.
So the 96th wing and the test wing will become one organization.
And the overhead that is associated with the two will be thinned
out. That is the major element of the changes that we proposed
here.
I acknowledge forthrightly that we are talking about establishing
a brigadier rather than a two-star in this instance. We have had
pressure, as you are aware, to reduce 39 flag officers in the Air
Forceno doubt more in the future.
But, again, the bottom line is we are not migrating a thing away
from Eglin. We simply are collapsing overhead.
Mr. MILLER. And it is not your intent in the future to move forward with moving things away from Eglin?
General SCHWARTZ. I would say it is not our intent to do that,
Congressman Miller. I cant presuppose the future; but there is no
secret effort, no clandestine effort here, to change the chemistry.
What we had to do was wethe Air Force had a target of 16,000
civilian spaces to reduce. And so one of the ways that we approached that problem was in the Air Force Materiel Command reorganizationwas to go from 12 direct reports to Don Hoffman to
5, and to reduce the overhead throughout the command. That overhead involved more than 1,000 civilian spaces. This was a mandate
we had to accomplish. And this is one of the ways we achieved that
end.
Mr. MILLER. General, you were sent a letter from the Ranking
Member Bordallo and Chairman Forbes of the Readiness Subcommittee expressing their opinion that changes materially impacting BRAC decisions should be made only within the BRAC process.
With that in mindand I dont believe they received a responsedo you intend to continue the disestablishment of the Air
Armament Center?
General SCHWARTZ. We do not intend to disestablish the Air Armament Center. What we are doing is renaming it the Air Armament Complex, and it will remain in its current state, sir.
Mr. MILLER. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Ms. Tsongas.
Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25
Good morning, gentlemen. I commend the diligence with which
you have prepared your fiscal year 2013 budget, shaped as it was
by the Defense Departments strategic guidance, and the initial
round of cuts required by the Budget Control Act; cuts which I recognize as necessary.
However, it is important that we work together to make sure
that these cuts are made to programs and installations in a manner that minimizes risk to our national security and future readiness.
My district borders Hanscom Air Force Base, a facility which can
uniquely leverage local assets such as the numerous defense firms
and exceptional universities nearby, including MITs [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Labs, which is located onsite
to research and develop cutting-edge capabilities. It is an ideal site
for cybersecurity R&D [Research and Development], an area in
which the Department seeks to increase spending while so many
cuts are being made elsewhere.
We have incredible capability and value-added technology that
we should be growing at Hanscom, because technology is even more
important in a smaller military, which is what the strategic guidance in the budget envisions. However, a February 21 article in the
Boston Globe revealed that internal Air Force documents showed
that Hanscom was sustained a double hita loss of 380 Government positions and a 74-percent decrease in funding for contract of
services over the next 4 years.
My office, along with Representative Markey and Representative
Tierneys offices, have jointly requested a briefing to learn more
about these cuts, and we look forward to it.
But as you are both here, could I ask: Given that greater Boston
has an extraordinarily skilled workforceone of the best in the
worldand that we are in a world that needs less boots and planes
and more intelligence in cyber, why isnt Hanscom growing?
Secretary DONLEY. As the chief articulated, Hanscom has been
it remains an important center forcethe Electronic Security Complex there is extremely important. But I would say that it has
faced the results of the AFMC restructure and the requirement for
us to take down 16,000 civilian spaces across the Air Force, which
we have been working through over the last year or so.
And we also recognize that Hanscom has been hit by programmatic impacts in areas where programs have been restructured or canceled. So we have been working through, with General
Davisa broader assessment of the capabilities at Hanscom and of
the surrounding community; the impact of the program reductions
that are coming there; to understand how we can best fit the workforce with the available work going forward, and build a plan for
how to take that forward.
So General Davis has had this mandate from the chief and I
since he arrived last year.
Ms. TSONGAS. General Schwartz, would you like to add anything?
General SCHWARTZ. And we heard earlier a question regarding
electronic warfare, command and control, software, enterprise resource, planning systemsall these very important kinds of capabilities are the expertise that resides within C.R. Davis organization. And that is not going to change.

26
But I would just reiterate that we are getting smaller. And so
those reductions will be reflected at Hanscom, as they are at the
other locations that have been addressed here.
Ms. TSONGAS. Well, as we wrestle with this, I know the Hanscom
community wants to work with you. Is there anything that it
should do in particular to expand its mission; to help the Air Force
be successful in these challenging times? Is there anything you
would suggest?
Secretary DONLEY. I think the same thing we would require,
maam, from any of our acquisition enterprisesand that is to
produce on cost, on time, and to have successful programs; not ones
that are subject to termination or restructure.
Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you.
And I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for your service. But I am very, very concerned
about the reductions in the personnel of our militaryother reductionsat the time of war. And I have just gotten back from visiting
in Pakistan, and how horrible it was. There was an attack on a bus
station; the next day, an attack on a police station. Today I read
where a convoy of buses were stopped and persons associated with
the Taliban took out certain persons and assassinated them right
there, 16 people.
This is incrediblean ally so important as oursa nuclear
powerand we have just got to be prepared. And I am very, very
concerned.
General Schwartz, the Air Force has made headlines recently
with the involuntary separation of 157 majors, and selective early
retirement boards selecting 106 colonels for early retirement. You
have indicatedand I am concerned, tooabout leading to a hollow force.
To what extent does the Air Force intend to use the Temporary
Early Retirement Authority in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act?
General SCHWARTZ. We will use it very, very selectively; very
surgically only. This will not be broadly applied at all. In fact, we
did not anticipate, sir, the use of involuntary measures in 2013. We
will wrap up the difficult work we have done to try to reduce our
over-strength through 2012.
Mr. WILSON. Well, that is reassuring because the experienced
people we haveit is just crucial of what we are facing.
Mr. Secretary, according to the Washington Free Beacon today,
the Administrations proposal of defense budget cuts for military
families and retirees to pay more for the health care, while leaving
unionized civilian defense workers benefits untouched. Why is
there a disparity in treatment between civilian and uniformed personnel?
Secretary DONLEY. I think, as the chief indicated, when the Department looked at the rising personnel costs facing usand in
particular the rising cost of health care, we determined that we
needed to slow that growth, and that the best way to do this was
to propose increases in premiums for working-age retirees.

27
And as we looked at options in front of us for how that might
be done, the sense was that we should scale those premiums to
match the resources available to our retirees
Mr. WILSON. Well
Secretary DONLEY. Our staff sergeants versus retired flag officers, for example.
Mr. WILSON. But why would that only be applied to uniformed
personnel and not civilian employees?
Secretary DONLEY. Yes. We did not address the civilian healthcare systems that exist across the Federal Government. We did not
have a mandate to address that. That was not part of our discussions or deliberations in the Department. Our focus was on the
military piece of this.
Mr. WILSON. That strikes me as tragic for retention and recruiting.
And Mr. Secretary, this has already been brought up about the
Global Hawk system, but the Deputy Secretary had certified earlier, just a couple of months ago, that it was essential to national
security; additionally, that the Global Hawk is $220 million cheaper per year to operate than U2. And now it is being terminated
the Block 30. How can we understand that an asset critical to national security and costs less than an alternative be terminated?
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we got a lot of careful attention in the
Department, recognizing that we have been in the middle of procurement and these are relatively new capabilities being fielded.
When the Department came back to Congress on the NunnMcCurdy certification previously on Global Hawk Block 30, the
question was, What would it take to operate any other capability
at the Global Hawk level of capability? That is, the U2 was compared to the Global Hawk capability.
We understood and we still understand that the Global Hawk offers persistence that the U2 does not have, sobut that was the
measure in the Nunn-McCurdyis measuring the U2 against the
persistence of the Global Hawk, and the cost variable between the
two.
Mr. WILSON. And
Secretary DONLEY. Subsequent to that, the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council adjusted the requirements for high-altitude ISR.
And they took a broader look at ISR capabilities across the Department, not just one or two programsdetermined that those requirements could be adjusted.
After they adjusted those requirements, we then went back and
looked at the existing fleets and capabilities, and we said, Can we
live with the U2 capability that we have, because the U2 will be
good through 2040, basically?
Mr. WILSON. And finally, you referenced through 2040could
you provide us information on what the cost would be to upgrade
and support the U2s through 2025? Thank you.
Secretary DONLEY. We can do that, sir. And the main message
here is
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemans time is up.
Could you do that for the record please?
Secretary DONLEY. Sure, we can.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Critz.

28
Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, thank you for your service to the country.
My first question is more of a statement or a request. The recent
Air Force structure change has announced the closing of an Air Reserve station in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania outside of the BRAC
process. This base serves 1,400 Active Reserve and Guard units of
both the Air Force and the Navy. The base just completed an $8.1
million housing project and is set to break ground on a $13.8 million joint Reserve center.
Now, to give you some perspective of the efficiencies at this base,
the Air Force leases 100 acres at this base. It includes access to
four runways, an FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] control
tower, medical and crash-fire response and zero-cost airfield maintenance, including snow removal and capital improvements for
$20,000 a year.
It is also worth pointing out that the Pittsburgh region has significant success with recruiting, and that the 911th Airlift Wing is
one of the highest manned units in the Air Force Reserve command. This being said, I cant understand why the Air Force would
make the decision to close this Air Reserve station.
If this is truly an issue with retiring C130s, then let us bring
in new C130s to this very efficient and very effective wing so that
this cost-effective base can continue to serve both the Air Force and
the Pittsburgh community.
Mr. Secretary General, I would like to see the cost analysis of the
911th Airlift Wing compared to others throughout the Air Force
and the justification for closing this base.
My first question concerns the reduction of 65 C130 tactical
airlifters, getting us to a total fleet projection of 318. And I am
going to go through some notes here so that you know where I am
coming from.
Mobility Airlift Aircraft Program has previously discussed the
budget request for fiscal year of 2013plans to divest intertheater
and intratheater force structure in support of the new defense
strategy. Air Force officials state that Case 3 of the Mobility Capability and Requirement Study 2016, MCRS16, was the analytical
underpinning for the new mobility force structure associated with
the 2012 defense strategy.
Air Force minimum C130 force structure has concluded MCRS
16 was to go no lower than 335 C130s under the QDR 2010. However, MCRS16 also did not take into account United States Code
title 32 Air National Guard or Army Guard airlift missions that
would be required to support State Governor mobilization missions.
MCRS16 also did not analyze the Armys time-sensitive mission-critical mission, and noted that additional C130s beyond the
planned program of record of 335 aircraft and 38 C27J aircraft
may be required. Note, time-sensitive mission-critical missions
noted that additional may be required to supplement C27s to support the mission.
Part of my concern is that the Army is going down to 490,000,
approximately, members. Pre-9/11, we were at about 480,000 and
we had 530 C130s.

29
Now, General Dempsey, when he was in here, sort of referenced
that, Lessons learned mean we need less. But the MCRS16 says
otherwise. So can you elaborate on how we are going from 530 for
480,000 to 318 for 490,000; and how that workseither for the
General or for you, Secretary Donley?
General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, the MCRS put the floor at
335. Our analysis indicates that 275 is sufficient to support the
intratheater requirements. And the excess has to do with the timesensitive, mission-critical mission that you referred to, for a total
of 318.
It is also important to appreciate the fact that we were talking
about C130H models at one point in time, and now we are talking
about a force that is currently about a third Js and, over time, will
become more and more dominated by the J version, which is a
more capable platform.
There is a mix of analysis. MCRS is one piece of that, certainly.
Our own that we havethat 318 C130s is the minimum number
in order to perform the strategy that we have been given, and its
inherent force-sizing construct, which no longer supports a longtermI am missing the wordstabilityyes, sir, a long-term stability operation, which the former QDR strategy did include.
Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, gentlemen.
I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Your time expired.
Mr. LoBiondo.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Schwartz, a little over a week ago, there was a memo
from NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command] outlining a reduction of two ACA [Aerospace Control Alert]formerly
ASA [Air Sovereignty Alert]sites; one in Duluth, Minnesota and
the other in Langley, Virginia. The justification was said to be
based on a year-long comprehensive risk analysis completed by
NORAD in deliberation with the United States Air Force.
There was a GAO [Government Accountability Office] report in
2009 that gave specific recommendations for, among other things,
conducting routine risk assessments of ACA operations. However,
in a follow-up memo in 2009a study released just last month
the GAO stated, and I am quoting, Although NORAD has not conducted routine risk assessments, it took steps toward implementing
our 2009 recommendation by developing a computer model to
evaluate current ASA basing locations.
However, we found that the model had certain limitations that
limit its ability to provide NORAD commanders, DOD decision
makers, and Congress risk-based information.
And additionally, GAO report notes that, In 2009, NORAD analyzed its ASA basing strategy to identify whether it could chance
the number and location of ASA sites without affecting its ability
to defend the homeland from an aviation-related attack. However,
the analysis did not identify potential cost savings that could result
from eliminating a given number of sites.
So General, can you explain what risk assessment and potential
cost-saving conclusions you are using to justify your decision, since
the GAO could not identify any? And it would be appreciated if you
could provide the committee with any copies.

30
General SCHWARTZ. Be happy to give you what our part of this
was. But I think that is a question better directed at General
Jacoby, who performed that analysis as NORTHCOM [Northern
Command]NORAD, and came to the conclusion thatand justified this through the program process in the Pentagonthat we
could reduce the alert sites.
I acted, we acted, the Air Force acted on that basis; that there
was proposal made by the relevant combatant commander to reduce the number of alert sites, and that there are benefits associated with that. And we would be happy to provide that to you, sir.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. So if I am understanding this right, you
will attempt to determine if there are studies you can provide to
us that justify this and give us an analysis?
General SCHWARTZ. I will certainly ask Chuck Jacoby to make
available his analysis, on which we acted in good faith.
Mr. LOBIONDO. Mr. Chairman, do we have a mechanism to, in
an appropriate amount of time, follow up to see if the General can
comply with our request of the committee?
Do we have a mechanism to do that? I am a little concerned with
just the timeline getting stretched out and months and months go
by, and then somehow we just dont hear anything back.
The CHAIRMAN. May I ask when we can expect those answers?
General SCHWARTZ. How about the end of March?
Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary and General, for joining us here today.
I have heard many cries about the cuts proposed to sacred cows
that are made in our backyards. I have heard others claiming that
this 1-percent reduction in the Pentagons base budget from 2012
to 2013 could mean the difference between the worlds greatest
military and a hollowed out force. And I frankly just dont see how
that would happen with a 1 percent cut.
But now, General, some of us on this panel have a poor understanding of how military planning is carried out. For our benefit,
could you explain to us how and why strategic considerations must
merge with a pragmatic assessment of available resources as the
Department develops its budget proposals in any given year?
General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, it starts with what is required: What do we want the Armed Forces of the United States
to do, and where? And what are the relative priorities in terms of
the likely missions that we are going to be assigned?
That was the genesis and the motivation for the strategic review
which the Department undertook over a period of many months to
provide the backdrop for the program review which followed.
The bottom line, sir, is thatand the Secretary of Defense, sir,
was determined not to make this a bookkeeping exercise. And I
think we avoided that.
Mr. JOHNSON. But you have to look at what Congress has mandated that you do within a certain amount of funding. You must
take that into consideration, isnt that correct?

31
General SCHWARTZ. It certainly influenced the program decision
process. But it was independent of the strategic formulation.
Mr. JOHNSON. I understand.
Mr. Secretary, can you remind this committee that it was the Republican-controlled House that forced passage of the Budget Control Act which mandated the caps on defense spending; and those
cuts are reflected in this proposal.
Secretary DONLEY. Well, Congressman, certainly the Budget
Control Act represented the work of the House and the Senate together in crafting a compromised bill, which was acceptable to the
President, which was signed.
Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.
Now, General, we have got a penetrating-bomber capability from
the B2s [Spirit stealth strategic bombers] for several more decades. And we have got cruise missiles. We have got unmanned
stealth strike aircraft. And we are developing a prompt global
strike capability. Why in the world do we need a next-generation
bomber?
General SCHWARTZ. There are 20 B2s. They are great platforms,
but they are 20 years old now. And the technology on which they
were designed, with respect to signature management and so on
the stealth capabilities is 1980s vintage.
And the reality is that the B2, over time, will become less survivable in contested air space.
Mr. JOHNSON. Well, let me ask this question. You have said that
the next-generation bomber wont be an exquisite aircraft in
order to keep costs under control.
Can you tell us how much is too much to pay for this next-generation bomber?
General SCHWARTZ. We have a rough target of about $550 million per aircraft flyaway.
Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.
I have got time to yield back, Mr. Chairman. So I will do so.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Generalboth of you in your statements indicated
the importance of our global ISR assets and the increasing reliance
upon those assets.
Remotely piloted aircraft remain, and are increasing their role as
part of that infrastructure. There is an effort by Congress, of which
I have been a part, to see ways in which remotely piloted aircraft
could be integrated into our domestic air space for the issues of
testing, training, and pursuing additional capabilities.
In the FAA Reauthorization Bill, there is the establishment of six
test ranges. We also put language in the National Defense Authorization Act last year that calls for a report on the ways in which
the FAA and DOD were working together on this issue; and also
how support languageencouraging the FAA and the DOD to work
together. Recognizing the FAA, of course, has jurisdiction in this
area, AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory] and NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] are working with the FAA
on trying to resolve the conflicts that may be inherent in remotely
pilot aircraft being in domestic air space.

32
As we look to formulate this National Defense Authorization Act
this year, gentlemen, what do you believe might be helpful in assisting the AFRL efforts in working with the FAA to incorporate
them into our domestic air space?
General SCHWARTZ. Congressman, I think that the key thing
here is to increase confidence on the part of civil airspace control
authorities that remotely piloted aircraft are predictable. That is
the key thingthat if an anomaly occursthat we know how the
machine will respond. And that is the key technology, in my view,
and certainly something that AFRL has a place in fielding, ultimately; but being able to assure the civil airspace authorities that
the remotely piloted aircraftif we lose link, if there is an anomaly
on the weapon systemwill react in a predictable manner is the
coin of the realm here.
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I would simply add that this is a very important issue to our Air Force going forward. We have had several
interactions with AFAreally, it has been on a continuing basis
the last several years. We have Air Force personnel in the FAA
headquarters helping work through these issues relative to the development to the National Airspace system; and how to make sure
unmanned systems are part of that and an accepted part of the
normal way of doing business going forward.
Mr. TURNER. So I also have a question concerning the Air Force
Institute of Technology that I am going to submit and request your
statements for the record, hoping of course to have your strong support for AFIT [Air Force Institute of Technology].
Last year, in the National Defense Authorization Act, I inserted
a language that allowed for students to enroll on a space-available
basis. The Air Force has not taken advantage of that. We hope that
in your written answers that we will have your commitment to
that.
As you know, I am also chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. And as you are aware, the President established a modernization plan in the 1251 Plan in the 2010 NPR [Nuclear Posture
Review]. The fiscal year 2013 budget, after the new START Treaty
was ratifiedwe see that the President is backing off those plans.
Let us review that list.
The B61 gravity bomber is 2 years delayed. The associated tail
kit is late, and we understand that certain high-accuracy options
are not being looked at. The W78 warhead is being pushed back,
and a certain modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off
the table. The new bomber wont be certified at the outset. And the
new cruise missile is late at least 2 years. And the plan for modernization of the Minuteman III appears to be lacking commitment.
So my question, gentlemen, is: Can you assure us that the Air
Force has an ironclad, no-caveat commitment to field a new ICBM,
to field a new nuclear-capable bomber and cruise missile; and will
this commitment change result in the Administrations many EPR,
which the Administration is not sharing with Congress as it is formulating?
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, let me assure you that these issues have
the most senior attention in the Department. The Nuclear Weapons
Council has been meeting on these issues over the last month, a

33
month and a halfon an extended basis, again, for many months
now, but we are
Mr. TURNER. Does it surprise you that Congress has not had any
of this information shared with them, regardless of the fact that we
have repeatedly asked?
Secretary DONLEY. You are about to get a communication from
the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energyjoint communication on the subject.
I wont address what is in that letter at this point, but that communication is being prepared.
I will say that the B61 LEP [Lifetime Extension Program] program is important to the United States Air Force and the work on
the W78 as well. These are priority issues for our Air Force, among
others.
Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemans time has expired.
It is my intention after the next question period to call a 5minute recess for the committee.
Ms. Hanabusa.
Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Secretary, one of the most intriguing things that I have
learnedand as you know I am a freshman coming inis the fact
that in the building of F35, we actually have nine allies who are
participating with us in that construction and technology. And, you
know, I had never even envisioned that we would be doing something like that.
Having said thaton page six of your report to us, you talk
about the budgetseeking to leverage strong relationships with
allies and partners including the development of new partners
so this seems to tell me that the Air Force of the future may not
be as we envision it.
So can you first tell me what is meant by the leveraging of the
strong relationships? And in addition to that, how is that going to,
then, affect what we may look at the Air Force into the future?
Secretary DONLEY. Maam, just a couple of thoughts to leave with
you on this model hereour thinking for this is the F16 program,
which has been a very successful multinational program since the
early to mid-1970s. Much of that program was put together after
the United States had made a decision to build the F16; and the
international partners came in after.
So there are many, many nations that fly the F16. This provides for interoperability in operations. It provides for more efficient logistics and worldwide access to logistics as we collaborate
with partners on availability in the supply chain and such.
And I think from an operationalI will let the chief speak to the
operational point. But on the F35 program, we are doing that
work upfront. So the partners are more involved earlier and they
are participating in the development as well. So we are sharing the
cost in that work.
General SCHWARTZ. I would only to add, maam, that when we
do programs like this, it establishes a relationship that lasts decades. In the case of the F16, it will be 40 years with the allies
who have flown the F16. Same thing is true with the F15, C
130J, or you knowthe C130 is the same thing.

34
Establishing these relationships, these professional relationships,
with counterpart air forces is important to us for both professional
reasons; for our ability to influence others thinking; for the potential of gaining access in areas where the military and military relationship can be beneficial. All of these things revolve around common equipment.
Mrs. HANABUSA. I understand what was unique about the F35
is that we were doing it right upfront as we were developing it. Because you hear people like, for example, Representatives of Taiwan
coming in saying, We want you to sell us the F16, or whatever
it is that they are looking for, versus now that you have it upfront
with F35, I assume that, in the development of that relationship
military relationshipwe have already defined who will, then, buy
or, who will have access to the jet, with whatever kinds of components in itbecause I cant imagine we are sharing everything.
But I guess the long-term effect is this our way of holding our
allies close? And then, if we are going to ever unfortunately enter
another theater, we would be able to rely on them because of this
relationship? Is this the way we are playing well together, so to
speak?
General SCHWARTZ. I think clearly there is a process within the
Government to make decisions about what to export, who to partner with, and so on and so forth. And there is certainly congressional involvement in that process.
But a key thing here is that, yes, it is certainly my experience,
over many years, that the relationships that we have created
when I was a captain, Ithere are still people serving in other air
forcesthey all have a gray hair now, but these kinds of things are
profoundly important. And they do influence the thinking we
when we can offer the best military advice of our civilian masters.
Mrs. HANABUSA. And I am running out of time, but do you foresee that what we are aiming towards is some sort of a global military? When I say globalis that we are not going to have such
defined lines between countries?
General SCHWARTZ. Maam, I think sovereignty will always be
primary. I mean, national interest is national interest. But to the
extent that one can collaborate for positive outcomes, I think it
makes sense.
Mrs. HANABUSA. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess for 5 minutes
and when we return, Mr. Lamborn will have the next round of
questions.
[Recess.]
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Lamborn?
Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, both, for your work and your service.
And on page 20 of the Posture Statement, under Nuclear Deterrence Operations, the somewhat inconsistent information is found
that you are looking for $20.1 million to fund treaty preparatory
actions and other additional actions necessary to accomplish treatyrequired reductions by 2018. Specifically what is it that you are
wanting to do with that $20 million?

35
General SCHWARTZ. Sir, it is a couple things.
The Secretary addressed this earlier. Some of that is eliminating
the missile silos and the bombers that are out at Davis-Monthan
that are still counters against treaty limits but havent been dismantled in a way that it takes them off the books. That is what
part of the cost is for.
Some of the additional cost is associated with the design effort
that is required to convert nuclear-capable B52s [Stratofortress
strategic bombers] to conventional-only B52s. That design effort is
necessary. As you know, the 1251 report said up to 60 airplanes.
We have 76. So there is at least 16 birds that need to be converted
and
Mr. LAMBORN. Under New START?
General SCHWARTZ. Under New START. That is correct.
Mr. LAMBORN. And I have problems with New START. It was
passed by a lame duck Senate; the same lame duck session that
repealed Dont Ask, Dont Tell.
And so I just am concerned about the other things that are going
on that might be unilateral actions by this Administration. Is there
any activity that either of you are aware of to de-MIRV [multiple
independently targetable reentry vehicle]to take from multiple
warheads or ICBMs and convert them to single-warhead status?
General SCHWARTZ. I think I would prefer to talk with you about
this in a classified forum. But it should be no surprise that our intent, expressed over many years, was to move away from MIRV
ICBMs towards single-warhead ICBMs. And that is unrelated,
frankly, to START limitations.
Mr. LAMBORN. Secretary Donley, were you going to add something on that?
Secretary DONLEY. I just was going to mention that that was a
result of the Nuclear Posture Review. And it was not a treaty compliance issue. This was a U.S. Government choice to do that.
Mr. LAMBORN. And we are talking about the new-generation
bomber, but isnt that decades away?
General SCHWARTZ. We anticipate having platform at least for
test in the mid-2020s. So it is a decade away.
Mr. LAMBORN. And it is not even on the drawing board yet.
General SCHWARTZ. Well
Mr. LAMBORN. Sometimes you say something is just on thethis
isnt even on the drawing board.
General SCHWARTZ. The program is now under way, sir. And,
again, the target is the mid-2020s; 80 to 100 total aircraft inventory. And, very importantly, we intend to manage this very carefully, and with discipline. We are not going to repeat the B2 experience with long-range strike bomber.
Mr. LAMBORN. What do you mean? Could you clarify what you
meant by that?
General SCHWARTZ. The B2 requirement set moved around over
a period of time. And as a result, in some respects, we overdesigned
the airplane. And that is why it was $1.5 billion-plus per copy.
And, of course, we only acquired 21, as wellanother issue.
And so the mandate that we have from the Department is that
we are going to produce a machine where we are disciplined on its
requirementsthat it will have an opportunity to grow over time.

36
But it is not going to be the end-all, be-all the first time it flies.
And we are going to do this in a way that allows us to purchase
the aircraft in sufficient numbers, again, to succeed the B52s; the
B1s [Lancer strategic bombers].
Mr. LAMBORN. Okay.
Changing subject entirely in my last 45 seconds herethe Presidents budget request has zeroed out the Operationally Responsive
Space Mission. And with the modular space vehicles, in particular,
I guess that that is included. But isnt that meeting a need that
we absolutely have to haveand so we are zeroing it out?
General SCHWARTZ. So the Department remains committed to the
Operationally Responsive Space concept, sir. But as we looked at
affordability and other ways to do this, we determined this year
that the best approach was really to build in resiliency in the existing constellations of satellites across each mission area, and not to
rely on a single program office to try to provide that capability from
a single program.
Mr. LAMBORN. Okay. Thank you both.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Ms. Hochul.
Ms. HOCHUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary and General, I appreciate your service to our
country and, certainly, the challenge that you have before us.
In your opening statement, Mr. Secretary, you talked about the
fact that in some cases you provided new missions to guard units
whenever possible. And I believe that 14 of 24 will receive new missions.
Can you tell me what the analysis that went into the decision as
to which locations receive new missions, and help me understand
the thought process?
Secretary DONLEY. The considerations that the Air National
Guard went through in making these decisions involved making
sure that there was a flying operation in each State, to the extent
that we could do that; and also, judging across individual locations
whether or not there were other Guard or Reserve units on station
or very close by.
So we have a number of States that have multiple Guard and
Reserve and flying missions. New York is one of those. And at Niagara, in particular, while the Guard unit there was proposed to
be taken down, the Reserve unit at that same location remains intact.
So this was a reason why Niagara was not prioritized higher for
a re-missioned unit, if you willcoming in behind the Guard unit.
Ms. HOCHUL. Do you also take into consideration geographic location and the fact that the Niagara Falls Air Reserve station is
on the border with Canada, protecting hydroelectric power plants
as well, and four bridge crossings?
I mean I know that some geographic locations and all the cities
in the center of this country have received two new missions. And
I am just asking whether you look at our strategic location on the
border with a foreign country like Canada, which has different
you know, we have relationship with them. And I just wanted to
know whether or not that, you know, any priority in your mind
should be given to a location on the border with Canada.

37
Secretary DONLEY. As we look at adjustments across all the 50
States here, there remains significant C130 capability in New
York. And we think the reductions here, while they are painful at
the unit level, and certainly the manpower associated with it, the
reductions in the number of aircraft are relatively marginal.
Ms. HOCHUL. And certainly, that being said, Iif the aircraft
need to go to a different function elsewhere or removed completely,
that is understandable.
But what I am asking, again, as a considerationsince the decision is not finalthat a new mission be given to this, given that,
number one, the strategic location; but also, the investment the Air
Force has already made into this facility. And that is why I want
to make sure that our taxpayer dollars are being spent wisely; that
if you have already put money in here since 2005, why not continue, instead of pulling out one of the two operations and, you
know, just ceasing that?
So as a watchdog of our taxpayer dollars, as you are as well, that
is something I am asking, as you undertake your reconsideration
of the Niagara Falls Air Station Guard missionwe will take another mission. It doesnt have to be the C130s. We will take another mission. And again, location and investments that have already made is something I would ask you to consider.
I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Secretary Donley and thank you, General Schwartz
for being here. You know, I never want to miss an opportunity to
thank people such as yourselfGeneral Schwartzon behalf of my
3-year-olds for your lifetime dedication to the cause of freedom. You
all are the most noble figures in our society.
Most of my questions have been asked. So I am going to ask one
that is going to be a little longer, if you will indulge me. It is an
energy-related question. And I find very little discussion in the
hearing materials about energy, apart from some references in the
HASC Memorandum on Energy Horizons Papers, it is titled. It
outlines the Air Force plans to increase energy supply by reduced
demand; and change the culture to meet mission requirements.
And then there is some general discussion about green and renewable energy initiatives in the Air Force that it intends to implement over the next few years.
My question is more about an immediate energy challenge in my
mind. A lot of the studies, as you knowwe have had several
major ones nowshow our civilian power grid is critically vulnerable to both natural and man-made electromagnetic pulse. Furthermore, the reports show that domestic military instillations received
99 percent of their electricity needs from the civilian power grid.
And when I look in your summary for what the Air Force is
doing to eliminate or to mitigate or to really fully understand those
vulnerabilities to our electric-power supply coming from the civilian
government, I reallyI am not finding anything, now, that may be
there. And it is not a rhetorical question.
So if I am missing something, you know, Iit is hard for me to
see thatin the green initiativesthe real effort in that direction.

38
And so I guess my question is along the lineshas the Air Force
considered the magnitude in the immediacy of what is potentially
a catastrophic danger to the nation if our civilian power grid were
to go down for an extended period of time, you know, as a result
of natural or man-made EMP [electromagnetic pulse].
Bottom line, does the Air Force feel like they have a strong handle on this? And have they considered the magnitude of the challenges it would face in trying to carry out its mission in such an
environment if we did have a major catastrophic power-grid failure? And what are the plans here to deal with this issue?
And I will start with you, Secretary Donley; and then General
Schwartz.
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, we would be happy to fill in the record
on your specific question regarding EMP, which is a significant
one. But I would offerand as we fill in this discussion for you
that many of our initiatives on alternative forms ofsolar, wind,
other renewable projectsare focused on the local instillation capabilities. So they are generating capabilities sometimes upwards of
20 percent, 23 percent, 25 percent of local power needsgenerated
on the base.
So in some cases we are trying to get towe are at the Air Force
Academy, trying to get to 100 percent as a test effort, if you will.
So there is a connection between our application of renewable-energy sources at local bases and a reduction in our dependency on
the local grid. But it is true that we still get most of our power
from local grids.
General SCHWARTZ. I would only add, Congressman, that we do
have a process of evaluating such vulnerabilities. And there are
about 900 of these vulnerabilities currently in our database, 62 of
which are considered significant enough that it would affect at a
strategic level of military mission. And 22 of those 62 are considered national-level vulnerabilities.
So again, we have this process to assessto identify these
vulnerabilities. And as the Secretary suggested, certainly we have
backup power for key functions on our installations; primarily hydrocarbon-driven, obviously. But we are working hard on the renewables, as the Secretary said. And Nellis Air Force base is a
case-in-point, where obviously solar is abundant. And it powers just
under 25 percent of the daily requirement.
Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, given the magnitude of that
kind of a possibility, I still guess I am not hearing what seemed
I mean I dont even know if EMP is one of those 22 national categories. But I am hoping that we can have further discussion about
this because if Iran or someone like that should gain nuclear capability, then the equation is changed dramatically.
Thank you.
Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Ms. Speier.
Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you to Mr. Secretary and General. I too would like to
add my thanks to you for the sacrifices you have made through a
lifetime career protecting us.

39
General, you had said earlier when we were discussing the F
16s that the relationships that have developed with many of our
allies have lasted a generation and have been very constructive to
us. I noted that with the F35, there have been reports to suggest
that Australiathat originally was going to purchase 12is now
rethinking that. So are Turkey and Italy. And I am wondering,
with the F16 experience as a backdrop, what does that tell us
about, one, relationship-building, but, two, whether there is really
confidence in the F35 around the world?
General SCHWARTZ. Maam, I think this is less a question of confidence than it is an issue of the economic circumstances that many
nations find themselves in right now. And it is affecting us too, obviously, with the Budget Control Act. I think that it should not be
a surprise that Canada, Australia, Italy, others, you know, are
watching their checkbooks.
And so the fact that military programs in general are getting additional scrutiny shouldntyou know, is not that much of a surprise.
It should not be read as a diminished commitment to pursuing
this capability over the longer term. I know personallyyou know,
I interact with my counterparts routinelyCanada, Australia,
Italy, Turkey, each on the military-to-military basisare committed to moving to the generation-five level of capability as soon
as their economic circumstances permit.
Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you.
Just this morning, the Government Accounting Office just released a report. It is its Annual Report on Opportunities to Reduce
Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, and Achieve Savings.
The very first two areas that they focus on deal with the military
and, in particular, electronic warfare; and they point that the Navy
and the Air Force have been in discussions historically to try and
reduce the duplication; try and find ways to acquire much of this
equipment jointly so the costs can be reduced. And, yet, not much
has happened. Can you give us an update on that?
General SCHWARTZ. I guess I would dispute that assessment. We
walked away from the EF111 [Raven electronic warfare aircraft]
aircraft, which was our dedicated jammer platform, in favor of
what, at the time, was the EA6 [Prowler electronic warfare aircraft] capability in the United States Navy.
And we have been dependent on EA6 capability for some period
of years. I think the key thing here is that certainly there is a renewed effort on the part of the Navy and the Air Force; not just
in electronic warfare, but in other areas. Global Hawk and BAMS
[Broad Area Maritime Surveillance] is a case in point, maam,
where we are using a common system. There is a different sensor
because their mission is maritime and ours is over land. But fundamentally it is the same platform and we are pursuing it together.
Ms. SPEIER. They specifically reference the services MALDhyphen-JMALDJ, Increment II, and Airborne Electronic Attack
Expendable Initiatives to determine if these activities should be
merged.
General SCHWARTZ. Well, in fact, we terminated Increment II in
the 2013 program in our proposals. So it is no longer in play.
Ms. SPEIER. All right.

40
And then, with my 40 seconds remainingalso reference the unmanned-aircraft systems and pointed that since 2008, in an effort
to save money, there have been requests made to see if there could
be joint efforts there.
According to a DOD-sponsored study in 2010, the Department
could have saved almost $1.2 billion had the Air Force acquired the
same sensor as the Army. Would you like to comment on that?
General SCHWARTZ. Maam, I would have to see the specific reference and what sensor they were referring to. I would be happy
to do that for the record.
Ms. SPEIER. Thank you.
I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Dr. Fleming.
Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you gentlemen for being here today; and thank you
for your service. My first question is for General Schwartz.
General, week before last, Secretary of Defense Panetta visited
Barksdale Air Force Base, which is in my district.
And while I couldnt be therewe were here votingmy understanding is that he laid out a very positive plan for moving forward
with our bomber platform. And, in fact, I met with Global Strike
Command and the 8th Air Force this past Friday. And it looks
likethat nearly $300 million requested in fiscal year 2013 and
$6.3 billion is programmed through fiscal year 2017. So it looks like
the commitment is real; that the long-range strike bomber is really
beginning to come together; and so as it should.
Now, picking up on some of the questions you have already answered, we understand it will probably be beyond the decade before
they will actually roll out and be operational. We also know that
there will probably be at an estimated cost of $550 million each
and numbers as high as 100. That is all good to know. And, I will
give you a personal experience.
About 6 months ago, I actually flew inside of a B52. And it was
a very interesting experience. Number one, it is a giant airplane
but it is very cramped on the inside. It is sort of like being inside
a cave or inside of a mine or perhaps a submarine. So it is jammed
with a lot of stuff. And what is interestingit has all of the old
1950s vintage dials and gauges and tubesactually tubesstill in
operation.
Well, I am seriously concerned that the budget bans a number
of vital modernization programs that will fill in the gap between
now and when these new bombers roll out; and that is legacy radar
of the 1960s, which they cant even turn it off because they are
afraid they cant get it back on. And that can seriously hamper our
readiness, bringing us down to maybe a 37-percent mission-success
probability; and also, the EHF [Extremely High Frequency] FAB
T [Family of Advanced Beyond-Line-of-Sight Terminals] program
which, as you know, is a communication with satellites, receiving
orders for nuclear deployment and missions.
So my questionand as I understand it, both of these have been
completely zeroed outif you could respond to that please?
General SCHWARTZ. Sure.

41
With respect to FABTreally, that was a priority decision. And
by the way, FABT is a terminal to allow communications with the
new advanced, extremely high-frequency satellites protected communications architecture.
The priority was to do ground terminals and command-and-control requirements first. And it had been deferred for the B52 because the B52 has a reliable proven LF [Low Frequency], VLF
[Very Low Frequency] command-and-control capabilitylow-frequency, very-low-frequency capabilityon the platform as it
stands.
So I think was an appropriate prioritization, sir, to go with the
command-and-control platforms first, both air and ground, and
then to rely on the existing capability for the time being in the B
52.
With respect to the radar, we looked at that carefully. I believe
it is the APQ166is the designation for the radar in the B52.
And the cost of the new radar relative to what we saw as a renovationin other words, maintaining the 166, but perhaps going solid
state in some of its subcomponentswas a wiser path than putting
a brand-new, probably, electronically scanned radar on the B52.
So bottom line is these are choices based on priority and available resources. And they were carefully considered. And that is
kind of where we stand. They have not been eliminated in the context you mentioned.
Dr. FLEMING. Okay.
To follow up then, the radar, there is sort of a semi-modernization or aparts or componentsand the FABT, you are really
looking at other capabilities that can get around that reliably.
Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Donley, General Schwartz, I want to thank you
very much for appearing before the committee today, and for your
testimony; of course, most especially for your service to our Nation.
As a ranking member of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee, I
have long maintained, as you probably know, a strong interest in
mitigating vulnerabilities in cyberspace. In particular, I have long
been concerned about the potential of what a cyberattack in our
electric gridand its impact on our ability to conduct military operations.
In the past hearings before the committee, of course, I have been
pleased with the Air Forces engagement on this issue. I did have
a question, Secretary Donley, on what progress the Air Force has
made in evaluating threats to our bases that rely on civilian power
sources and how the Air Force has strengthened its plans for alternative energy sources.
I think you probably answered a lot of that question when Mr.
Franks asked his question. If there is anything else you want to
add, feel free.
But I will go to the next one, which isI also continue to be concerned about the overall strength and size of our nations cybersecurity workforce. So in that point, perhaps, if you both could commentwhat is the Air Force doing to recruit and train airmen with

42
cyberskills? And what is it doing to encourage them to stay in uniform?
In particular, then, the next questionthis one, perhaps, is more
directed at General Schwartz. General, I recently visited 24th Air
Force at Lackland Air Force Base, and was very impressed with
General Vautrinot and the work that her team is doing there with
its operations. We have clearly made great strides in our ability to
impact the cyber domain. But, as I am sure you would agree, we
really have to continue to innovate and transform in order to maintain and expand that ability.
In your view, what must the Air Force do next in order to ensure
the ability of its networks to support the full spectrum of operations?
Perhaps, Secretary Donley, if we could start with you; and then
we will go to General Schwartz?
Secretary DONLEY. Well, just a couple of general points here.
This is a key capability for us and for the joint force moving forward. No question about it. It is an emerging threat. It is actually
with us today.
The first order of business for the Air Force was to establish our
component 24th Air Force to do this work, and to give control of
what we referred to as Air ForceAFNetOpsAir Force Network
Operationsacross all our bases so that we view this as an entire
enterprise together; and especially to work through the
cyberdefense issues that are immediately in front of us; also to
build the forensic capability that will allow us to move from just
defensive operations to more of a dynamic defense environment;
and also to develop the offensive tools that our commanders will
need going forward. So this is the general evolution of our cyber
capability.
The airmen that we recruit for this work are outstanding. They
perform not just Air Force work but also joint work. They are in
high demand in the Defenseat the Defense Department level for
the work that they do. And we also have Guard and Reserve units
that are contributing here based on regional expertise from the
Northwest and also from the San Francisco Bay Area; Northern
California areaso a very important capability for us.
General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I think the major thing we need to do
is to recognize that this is not an administrative activity, if it ever
was. It is to change mindset that this is about operations. This is
a recognition that these are operators, not network controllers or
managers, but operators.
And I know Sue Vautrinot, I am sure, explained that to you. It
is a culture issue that will take a bit longer to inculcate throughout
our Air Force. But this is a military capability, and it needs to be
employed and cultivated and so on, along those lines.
Our recruiting and retention has generally been good in part, no
doubt, over the last couple of years, because of the economyhas
been suffering some. But, again, there are exciting things that we
do that I would argue that IT [Information Technology]-competent
people in the private sector dont get to do.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you gentlemen. I appreciate the work you
are doing.
Chairman, I yield back.

43
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Rooney.
Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to go back to the more specific discussion on the Global
Hawk, if I could, and some of the things that you have already said
in your testimonyjust to clear up. I am an Army guy, so I apologize for any confusion I may have. But I think, General, you talked
about the B52 being 20 years old, you know. We know the U2
is at least that old.
And then I think that you said at the beginning of your testimony that the decision was made to discontinue the Block 30 part
of the Global Hawk because ofthe U2 cost versus the Global
Hawk was essentially a push. Correct me if I am wrong on that.
I guess my questionwhat I want to start my question off is
I have seen the Global Hawk up close. It was very impressive. You
know, it makes you feel proud to be an American that this is the
kind of stuff that we are putting out. Nothing against the U2, but
when you talk about antiquated systems versus what we have got
to show the world in the future, it was just impressive.
And so I guess if we are worried about the age of the B52, and
the cost of the Global Hawk and the U2 was essentially a push,
why dont we error why dont we decide for the future that the
capability that we are going to use is something thatI assume
that where we are going in this kind of surveillance in the future
would be unmanned aircraft like the Global Hawk, someday in the
future. So why wouldnt we err on the side of starting to use that
now, especially if we have already built some of these things?
General SCHWARTZ. If resources were not an issue or were less
an issue, we might well make a strategic decision to do something
on those lines; but we did not have that option.
Just to put it in contextso you have a sensekeeping the U
2 vs. terminating Block 30 yielded $2.5 billion in savings in the
program period; not trivial. So, you know, if there were $2.5 billion,
you know, more in our top line, I am not sure how we would use
it.
Mr. ROONEY. Right.
General SCHWARTZ. I just want to give you that sense that we
recognize that. And remotely piloted aircraft are growing in our inventory and will continue to grow. And we will have a foothold
with Global Hawk. And the Department of Defense will have a
broader one, including the Navy. This was a choice that we had an
asset that could do the mission as it is currently specified, and
could do it overall at much less cost.
Mr. ROONEY. I just want tofor the sake of presenting this letter
that I have from my colleague from Florida, Mr. Young, from Secretary Ashton Carter, which highlightsand this is just 6 months
ago. The continuation of the program is essential to national security and there are no alternatives to the program which will provide acceptable capability to meet the joint military requirement at
less cost.
There is also language in here that talks about how, because of
the need for a U2 not being able to fly continuously and that a
Global Hawk could, itthe cost for U2 would actually be $220
million more per year.

44
I understand that those numbers, you know, arent matching up
now. But 6 months agowhat I look at when you say We have
spent or We have appropriated $4 billion for you to make, or for
us to be able to purchase, I think, 21 of these Global Hawks. We
have got 14 built.
When I have to talk to my constituents and the taxpayers, and
I say, Yes, we have got these really cool surveillance Global
Hawks that are going to take the place of this 50-year-old plane.
We have got 14 of them made, but now we have made the decision
to just park them in the garage somewhereyou see, it is hard
for me to be able to explain that toespecially in this kind of age.
So, I mean, I guess what I am asking you is: What do I tell them,
you know, when we talk about how we are going to park this vehicle in a garage for God knows how long?
General SCHWARTZ. We will put the platforms into recoverable
storage.
So we are not talking about breaking the birds up. We want to
be able to have access to them. And as circumstances change, you
know, perhaps there will be a time when they come back out of
storage. But right nowright now, we strongly recommend the U
2 solution set given all the demands that we face.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemans time has expired.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And for Secretary Donley and General SchwartzI am impressed by your ability to stay with this. I want to thank you for
your answers; the forthcoming way in which you have dealt with
the multitude of questions here.
I was going to ask you about the Global Hawk, but that has been
covered at least by five of us. And I will let it go at that. And I
thank you for a private discussion that you gave me earlier.
My question is going to go on the mobility side. Obviously, it is
extremely important element in the future of war planning and the
direction we are going. You are downsizing some elements of it.
Could you just give us a quick overview on the downsizing and
then see where it takes us?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir.
We are going fromon the intratheater lift side from somewherewell, down to 318 aircraft; C130 class aircraft. And we
were at about 390 to start. So 65 birds come out, 39 of which can
retire in 2013on the big-airplane life side, we will reduce 27 C
5As. And that will keep 275 total big airplanesthat is 223 C17s
and 52 C5Ms. That is the re-engined version of the C5, a very
efficienta good lifter; so that is the basic approach on the lift
side.
I would just say that the analysis that was done based on the
new strategy suggested that we neededone of the metrics we use
is called million-ton miles per daythat the former mobility-capability requirements studies specified a minimum of 32.7 millionton miles per day. The analysis we have based on the new strategy
and the reduced force size, and the other components of the Department of Defense is 29.4 million-ton miles. And our actual capacity is somewhere around 30.5. So there is a little bit of excess
there. It is okay to have a little management reserve here, in my

45
view. And so we think that, again, 275 and 318 is the right combination.
Mr. GARAMENDI. Are you going to continue to upgrade the C
5As?
General SCHWARTZ. The remaining C5As will go out of the inventory before there is an opportunity to modify them. So there
will be 52 total C5s, all of which will be the re-engined version
of the C5M.
Mr. GARAMENDI. And how many do you have to day on the C
5s?
General SCHWARTZ. There are 89 total C5s and
Mr. GARAMENDI. Reducing 27.
General SCHWARTZ. And reduce it by 27.
Mr. GARAMENDI. Have you decided where they are going to be deployed, the remaining?
General SCHWARTZ. I dont think we have decided that specifically. I would indicate, however, that the units that were donors on
the C5As, as reflected in the program, either are going to get C
5Ms or, in one case, get Active Duty C17s. It is a Guard unit.
Mr. GARAMENDI. You know I would have the preference as to
where you would locate those.
On the tankersyou are retiring some tankers and looking forward to the new tanker coming in. Is this a transition process that
is under way?
Secretary DONLEY. Well, the tanker program does not deliver an
initial operational per-squadron-level capability until about 2017.
So we will, this year, go through the process of establishing the requirements for basing, and then make decisions at the end of this
calendar year on the first two bases for initial bed-down of the
tanker.
Mr. GARAMENDI. We do like the West Coast.
Thank you, gentlemen.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Griffin.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, I have got several questions here, so I want to try to
move quickly. First and foremost, I saw thatand this is for Secretary DonleyI saw that there has been a reversal with regard
to the LAS [Light Air Support] contract involving Hawker
Beechcraft. I have got the statement you put out today, Mr. Secretary. Is there anything you would want to add to that?
Secretary DONLEY. No, certainly, the situation is that as we went
to make a court filing on this issue, we foundthe service acquisition executive and support staff found that the documentation for
this source selection was not what it needed to be.
And, certainly, we are disappointed that that has been the case,
and that we have fallen short here. But we need to go back and
take corrective action. We are in the process of doing that.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Okayanother quick question on that issue. It was
brought to my attention that there was a change or a lowering in
the pilot-safety standards with regard to ejection in this contract.
Are you familiar with that? Do you know if there was lowering of
safety standards so that the Super Tucano would be compliant?
Secretary DONLEY. I am not familiar with those details.

46
Mr. GRIFFIN. General, are you familiar with that at all?
General SCHWARTZ. I am not.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay.
We may submit that in writing for more detail.
With regard to the A10s that are outside of my district, I am
going to ask a question here to try to assist my colleague who had
the A10s in his district in Fort Smith.
My understanding is that the BRAC report cited the airspace
around the airfield in Fort Smith, a low-level route, as to why Fort
Smith was an ideal location for the A10.
Now the A10s are being moved. Was there something in the
current basing commission report that contradicted the BRAC findings? Can you give me any insight as to why the A10s might be
moved from there?
Secretary DONLEY. The A10s are not moving. The A10s are
being retired out of the fleet. So it really doesnt affect BRAC-related issues that
Mr. GRIFFIN. So we will have no A10s left at all?
Secretary DONLEY. No. The Air Force will still have about 248 A
10s in the inventory. But we have made a decision at a corporate
and strategic level that we could take additional risk in the fighter
force structure. And that inside the fighter force structure, the best
place to take that was probably in the size of the A10 fleet. So
that was the basis for the decision.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Right, but
Secretary DONLEY. And I think in this case, as has been applied
in other locations where it was feasiblewe have a mission to
backfill at this location with an RPA [remotely piloted aircraft]
Mr. GRIFFIN. Rightwith the unmanned.
Secretary DONLEY. Right.
Mr. GRIFFIN. But you said they are completely retired. But then
you said, But we are keeping A10s.
I think the question here is if you are going to keep them anywhereBRAC indicated that this was a type of place you would
want to keep them. But if youI have only got like 50 seconds, but
if you have anything else to add on that?
General SCHWARTZ. Again, sir, one of the imperatives for us was
to try to retain a flying mission in each State; a Guard mission.
And in this case, of course, there is a substantial presence in the
Little Rock area, with the National Guard.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Sure. Sure.
Let me move on to the next question. This is regarding AMP
[Avionics Modernization Program] vs. AMP lightsome call it AMP
light. I met with the pilots out at the Little Rock Air Force Base
last week.
Can you talk aboutwhen you were comparing AMP to what
some have called AMP light, were you considering the cost of supporting that navigator position for the AMP light, which you
wouldnt have to do with the AMP? If you couldI dont if the
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemans time has expired.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. If you will answer for the record?
And we are going towe will have a briefing onclassified briefing on that.

47
Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to thank both the Secretary and the General
for your service, and for being here today. When we have less than
20 percent to 22 percent of the people serving as Members of Congress with any previous military experiences, it is always great to
hear from those who have served and are serving, and representing
hundreds of thousands of our men and women in uniformto be
able to come share your experience, your insight, and expertise
with us.
It is definitely a tough time for our military, and it is pretty
tough for you all having to propose and make these tough forcestructure decisions. I definitely dont envy you. But at the same
time we have a lot of questions, you know, the C130J and the C
27J, we have talked about it. So, Mr. Secretary, thank you for
briefing the Mississippi delegation on those two projects. And we
are going to be talking about it probably for a long time as we
move ahead.
So my first question really involves the C130J. And if you dont
mind, I will read my question. I do want to know how the decisions
were made to move the airplanes within the Air Force.
My staff and I have been looking at this for quite some time now,
and still fail to see any military benefit or cost benefit to some of
these moves. In fact, some of the numbers we are looking at seem
like it is going to cost into the millions in new construction, training and other incidentals and collateral costs just to move these
aircraft a couple hundred miles from their current location.
Can you tell me what kinds of calculations were used when making these decisions? And were some of thesethat would be my
first questionthe calculations used in making these decisions.
General SCHWARTZ. It had to do with what demands were there
for both Federal and State missions. It had to do with what backfill
opportunities did we have, even as we were getting smaller. And
it had to do with the ability of the local community to recruit and
provide the expertise for a new mission, if that was, in fact, going
to materialize. And so those are three of the thought processes involved in deciding, again, how to allocate scarcity; how to allocate
the reduction of 286 aircraft in total, and so on.
Secretary DONLEY. I would just add that it is complex work to
do this across 50 States. And we have been working with and supportive of the Air Guard as General Wyatt and his staff work
through these issues on how best to balance capabilities across the
50 States in these different disciplinesC130s, ISR capabilities,
et cetera.
Mr. PALAZZO. Right.
I mean I have four pages of reasons why we think the C130J
should stay where they are at, and why it is possibly a bad decision
to move them, again, just a couple of hundred milesinfrastructure improvements; the amount of money that this congress or
prior congresses in the administrations have invested in Keesler for
the C130Js, especially post-Katrinabrand new hangars, the
wreckers, the accomplishments, the squadrons just received from
completing missions in Afghanistan, and so forth and so on.

48
The fact that we have great training areasvery, very limited
interference from civilian population. We have, you know, Camp
Shelby to the North, Stennis Space Center to the Westjust hundredand then, of course, we have the entire expense of the Gulf
of Mexico as un-encroached training areas for the Air Force. And
so I mean, I do have some valid concerns.
I guess if we continue to propose these, what is the next step?
I mean if we canI mean, in concrete? It is done? It has been
penned in blood? This is a covenant going forward? Can we have
an opportunity to explain as we are here today that can possibly
change your mind that this is not in the best interest of our national security or our force structure?
Secretary DONLEY. Well, the force structure proposals we made
are part of the Presidents fiscal year 2013 budgetmany moving
parts. And, you know, we are happy to answer questions and support, you know, further discussion. But it is really up to Congress
now to
Mr. PALAZZO. I am out of time. Thank you very much.
Secretary DONLEY [continuing]. Take the next steps.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I want to thank
you for being here. And more importantly, as a Member of Congress, I want to thank you for standing up for the Air Force.
When the Secretary of the Army and their respective commanders were here, I didnt really get the sense that they were
standing up for their divisions.
And talking aboutusing the terms, if you will, that you have
usedyou know, we have talked aboutyou have talked about additional risk that comes from the force structure changes.
And, General, you used the word indiscriminant salami-slicing.
I think that is an accurate word for what has been done to the
military. And, quite honestly, it leaves Americans at risk.
And as a Member of Congress, what we need is the two of you
and your colleagues standing up and saying that, you know, it is
not just the magnitude of the cuts, it is the pace of the cuts and
it is the mandate of how the cuts are done that is putting the security of Americans at risk.
So I hope you will continue that. We have to undo the sequestration. I am interested in your suggestions with regard to that.
In dealing with the force structure changes that you have proposed to usas you know, I represent Robins Air Force Base. And
obviously, the depots are extremely important to us. And I would
like, if you will, just speak to the potential loss of a qualified workforce and how much greater that loss may be because of the pace
at which the cuts have to be made.
Secretary DONLEY. Well, certainly, sir, we value all three depots.
And our intent is to move forward with the three-depot strategy.
We think it would be very costly and a complex operation to consider changing that. And I think there would be a penalty paid in
trying to move or recreate the workforces that have built up
around these three depots.

49
I would offer that the workload at these locations does ebb and
flow. And this is what our working capital fund is intended to address. So employment does not always stay level; it goes up and
down with the aircraft that are being inducted and worked on and
then depart. So the workload issues will continue with us going forward, but our intent is to stick with the three-depot approach.
Mr. SCOTT. Thank you so much.
You have got a wonderful gentleman in Warner Robins right
now, and General McMahon, that is going to be retiring. And he
has done an excellent job of maximizing the performance of that
base; a lot of great men and women out there supporting the
warfighter.
But we also have the JSTARS [Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System] unit there. Certainly, there is the ability to expand their intelligence capabilities. I hope that is something that
you will continue to pursue.
And gentlemen, I want to help you solve this problem. I want
suggestions on how we are going to do the sequestration and find
a better national security for Americans.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining balance of my
time.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Platts.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz, certainly I want to
echo my colleagues in expressing our gratitude for both of your
great service to our nation and the important work that you are
doing, and the challenges with the budget restraints that you are
working under.
Before I ask or comment specifically on a force structure issue,
Mr. Secretary, could you kind of give me an update? I have had a
lot of inquiries in my district, as I know Members across the country have, about the Dover mortuary issue and with the most recent
report. And I apologize. I am in a markup in another hearing. If
this was asked earlier, I apologizebut with the Special Counsels
findings and the report being issued, and the repercussions that
were suffered by those who sought to do the right thing, where we
stand and both from a disciplinary standpoint and going forward
in the best way possible?
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I will just give you a quick overview.
General Abizaid completed his work this week; briefed that out to
the Secretary of Defense. The chief and I were there yesterday.
And we will have some more to say about that today. But we do
support the results of the Abizaid panel and are embracing their
recommendations. And we intend to move out on those. I will speak
to those later.
Mr. PLATTS. Okay.
Secretary DONLEY. We did receive, at the end of January, a report from the Office of Special Counsel concerning reprisals against
the whistle blowers in the originalduring the original investigation of this. And the OSC [Office of Special Counsel] report concluded that, indeed, reprisals had taken place and this raised a
new requirement for us to consider the need for additional disciplinary action against those involved in that work. And I assigned

50
that to a two-star general who has undertaken that work. And I
expect him to report out in sort of mid-Marcharound the 19th of
March is what we are forecasting at this point.
Mr. PLATTS. I appreciate those continued efforts in this issue and
the importance ofthat we properly honor the fallen, and properly
hold accountable those who sought to punish those who are doing
the right thing.
I am thehave been, for 8 years, working on strengthening our
whistleblower-protection laws so that Federal employees who see
wrong can come forward and know they are not going to be punished for doing the right thing as, unfortunately, happened in this
case. So staying focused on that is, I think, very important.
A follow up on that issueand I know there is, I guess, not great
certainty about the partial remains that were then incinerated in
landfills of some of our fallen heroesis there any consideration
and this is a specific question from one of my constituentsa veteran himself who lost a brother in combat years backnot related
to this current situation, but where the legs of the fallen were not
recovered with the body and buried appropriately.
His question was, If we know that a lot of these remains were
landfilled, is there any current review of how to properly honor
those remains with a memorial marker or something, because we
have the remains of fallen that apparently are in a landfill, not
properly acknowledged?
Secretary DONLEY. Sir, I am not sure it is possible for the Department of Defense to go back and reconstruct the history for
every single case priorwhere this practice was in place. Certainly
we are in a better place today. And certainly we apologize for any
additional grief or concern caused to the families as a result of this
prior practice. It changed in 2008.
And the Abizaid panel actually has additional ideas for us to consider going forward that we might consider for how best to honor
the disassociated remains of the fallen that are subsequently
come in after the remains are processed through Dover.
So we will continue to work this issue going forward and make
sure that we honor our fallen and treat them with the respect that
they deserve.
Mr. PLATTS. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.
And any way that we are able to honor the fallen that we do so
especially going forward, but even if there is a way in retrospect.
And just a final comment
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlemans time has expired.
We are into the vote.
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Roby.
Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And as you can see, there
are several of us that have been running back and forth. So I
apologize for my absence.
But I do appreciate General Schwartz and Secretary Donley, you
being here today. And all of my concerns today, although there are
many concernsbut if I could focus in a little bit on the Air National Guard and the decisionmaking processI know you touched
on somethe C130s. But I really would like an opportunity,

51
mainly for the benefit of those back in Alabama, for you to expand
upon the Air National Guards ability.
I know that the Air Force has said that they were a full partner
in these cuts, but could you just kind of paint a picture for what
that looked like? Did they have a vote? To what extent was their
input taken?
General SCHWARTZ. I would describe it asand again, you know,
the two gentlemen behind us certainly were there throughout. And
their voices were heard. They were not timid.
You know, discussions unfolded and we debated. And ultimately,
the Secretary decides. I mean that is the way it unfolds. As I have
suggested in another forumI mean it is not to say that everyone
agrees with the outcome necessarily. But it is also incorrect to contend that their interests were not represented. That is not the case.
Mrs. ROBY. That is the message that we want to make sure we
get back to home, Secretary.
Secretary DONLEY. Just an additional pointand I think the
chief and General Stenner and General Wyatt articulated that view
jointly together.
And as we went through the decision processyou are aware of
the mitigating efforts that we made to remission units, even moving some capability from the Active to the Reserve Components.
And the Guard and Reserve helped work through all those decisions about what units and where, and how to make the adjustments.
Mrs. ROBY. Okay.
So the Air Force justified the reduction for the Air National
Guard. Is that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when
the Air National Guard has grown. And if you could, just talk
about that. Is that true?
Secretary DONLEY. It is part of the context, but that wasnt the
motivation.
Mrs. ROBY. Okay.
Secretary DONLEY. It wasnt the case of what is their turn; not
at all. What this really was, was a recognition that we had a new
strategy in force-sizing construct first and a recognition that the
Air Force as a whole was getting to a size where we had to have
access in utility out of every asset.
Mrs. ROBY. Right.
Secretary DONLEY. And that suggested, again, having that utility
in a way, though, that wouldnt destroy the fabric of the units either on the Active Duty side with expected tempo for full time, or
on the Guard and Reserve side where there is a lesser expectation
of personal availability because of structure of those organizations.
And so the bottom line is that we worried about tempo and making sure that the mix would accommodate both the surge and the
rotational requirements that we foresee in the future. And again,
exactly how we did that, others might differ, but you have the proposal before you.
Secretary DONLEY. And as we go forward, the Air National
Guard, with our support, is going forward with a multiyear effort
to increase the readiness of the Guard.
We are all going to have to be focused on that going forward together, as we get smaller. So readiness is more important. The

52
Guard is working on that. And we support them in that effort. And
we are increasing the number of associations between the Active
and the Reserve Components from 100 to 115, with maybe more
coming.
So this reflects a closer integration of effort to get the most combat capability out of all of our units going forward.
Mrs. ROBY. Well, thank very so much. I have other question and
I will submit them to the record because my time is about to expire.
But thank you so much.
And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The CHAIRMAN. The lady yields back. Thank you very much.
Thank you General, Secretary, for being here today; for all the
work that you have done to get to this point in the process. You
can see with all the questions there is lots of angst over these cuts.
And I think only one or two mentions of sequestration, which will
be that much worse on top of it.
So that is something that I think we really need to address and
focus on. And we will be doing that.
We have started the vote.
Thank you all.
With that, we will conclude our hearing here today.
[Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X
FEBRUARY 28, 2012

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 28, 2012

Statement of Hon. Howard P. Buck McKeon

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force
February 28, 2012
The Air Force has been engaged in combat operations supporting
the joint forces for the past 20 years, beginning with the Gulf War
in 1991 and continuing thereafter, through enforcement of the Iraq
no-fly zones, combat operations in the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the related logistics support missions, and worldwide humanitarian support missions. And of course the Air Force has continued
the 24/7, 365-day-a-year nuclear-deterrence mission.
Everyone should fully understand that our vital interests have
not changed since last year. The threats to those interests have not
decreased and are not likely to diminish over the next 5 years.
What has changed is that the President directed at least $400 billion in cuts to our military, which were reflected in the Budget
Control Act.
Despite the suggestion by some that the strategy evolved independent of the Presidents fiscal guidance, each of the military
services is making force structure and equipment modernization
recommendations to Congress based purely on the budget and not
based on the world security environment.
For example, there are 54 aircraft in the budget request. If procurement continues at this rate, and assuming an aircraft lifespan
of 25 years, the resulting force structure is 1350 aircraft, one quarter the size of the current force. I do not believe 1350 total Air
Force aircraftbombers, fighters, airlift, search and rescue, rotorcraft, and trainersis in the national security interests of this
country. And this is without the potential of sequestration. Furthermore, the budget request does little to mitigate the consequences of aging force structure, resulting from the procurement
holiday of the 1990s. Operation and Maintenance accounts are not
increasing to sustain and extend these aging platforms.
Other budget-driven choices include the requested increase in
TRICARE fees for retirees. Congress addressed this issue at length
last year and enacted what I consider a reasonable approach for
managing costs. The Departments proposal would increase the fees
by 96 percent to 345 percent over a 5-year period which, in my
opinion, is unreasonable.
With that said, I am pleased to see that priorities for strategic
airlift, a new bomber and an airborne tanker have been preserved.
(57)

58
As well, the Air Force has deliberately elected to ensure the percentage of the Air Forces combat and mobility forces that are Active Duty will increase after the implementation of the force structure changes. This is appropriate from a risk perspective. But I believe it is important for the Air Force leadership to continue its
public discussion to better ensure that Guard and Reserve personnel fully accept that they have received and will receive equitable and fair treatment in this transition process.

59
Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization
Budget Request from the Department of the Air Force
February 28, 2012
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I want
to also thank the witnesses, Secretary of the Air Force, Michael
Donley, and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, for
appearing here today and for their dedicated service to our country.
Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed
focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, which will
likely result in an enhanced role for the Air Force in our national
defense.
Over the last 10 years, the Air Force has contributed greatly to
the recently concluded war in Iraq and the ongoing war in Afghanistan. The contributions of Air Force personnel who have provided
air support, transport, reconnaissance, and other key functions
have been invaluable. Going forward, under the new strategic guidance, the Air Force will continue to carry out those missions, although the relative balance between and the geographic area of
focus may change. The budget put forth 2 weeks ago will enable
the Air Force to continue to be the greatest air power in the world.
I have consistently said that we can rationally evaluate our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current
set of missions we ask the military to undertake and come up with
a strategy that enhances national security by spending taxpayer
dollars more wisely and effectively. I believe this budget supports
that goal as well.
Overall, the defense budget is also fully consistent with the funding levels set by the Budget Control Act passed by Congress. Although I did not support this act, many members of the House
Armed Services Committee did, Congress passed it, and the Department of Defense has submitted a budget that complies with the
congressionally mandated funding levels.
Over the last few years, with the strong support of the Air Force,
our military has put together a significant string of foreign policy
successes, including the death of bin Laden, Anwar Al-Awlaki, the
elimination of much of Al Qaedas leadership, the end of the war
in Iraq, and supporting the uprising in Libya. The budget lays out
a strategy that will enable the United States to build on those successes and confront the threats of today as well as in the future.
I want to thank the witnesses again and I look forward to hearing their testimony.

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

THE HEARING
FEBRUARY 28, 2012

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH

Secretary DONLEY. Based on the December 2011 F35 Selected Acquisition Report
(SAR) to Congress, the unit recurring flyaway cost numbers for the aircraft we are
procuring in FY13 are: $123.2 million for the F35A conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) variant; $155.0 million for the F35B short take-off and vertical landing
(STOVL) variant; and $131.7 million for the F35C carrier (CV) variant. These unit
cost numbers account for the must fix concurrency changes (captured in the engineering change order line) but do not account for block upgrades. [See page 12.]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

FEBRUARY 28, 2012

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. I am pleased to see the Department has continued funding in FY
13 for the TX Advanced Jet Trainer Replacement Program. Replacing the aging T
38s with a new trainer suitable to train pilots for 4th and 5th generation fighters
such as F22 and F35 is critical to readiness. The contract award for this program
slipped a year in the budget from FY 15 to FY 16. Is replacement of the current
Air Force trainer an important component of USAF readiness and training? Is the
Air Force committed to moving forward with the TX program with procurement
funding in FY 16?
General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. SMITH. What is the Air Forces plan in the FY1317 FYDP to address the
aging 707 and C135 fleet of C2ISR aircraft? Given the historical precedent that acquisition programs take many years and that the E8 JSTARS may only continue
operations until about 2025, is there a plan to start to address this issue?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force continues to sustain/modernize the 707 and C
135 fleet of C2ISR aircraft. All platforms are considered viable through the 2035
2040 timeframe. Airborne Warning and Control system (AWACS) Prime Mission
Equipment Diminishing Manufacturing Source (DMS) and Avionics DMS cockpit
issues are being addressed through the Block 40/45 and DRAGON programs. The
upgrades will ensure AWACS remains compliant with military, civil, and international flight certifications and flight safety standards.
Air Combat Commands recently completed Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/
Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint STARS Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) evaluated materiel solutions to fulfill future overall SAR/MTI requirements. JSTARS Prime Mission Equipment DMS and Avionics DMS cockpit
issues will be addressed based on the approved way-ahead of the AoA. Based on the
data from the E8C Fleet Viability Board the E8C is viable until 2035.
Mr. SMITH. How does the Air Force plan to provide continued support to the Army
in SAR/GMTI/DMTI mission area?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to providing continued support to
the Army to fulfill the ever growing demand for SAR/GMTI/DMTI data. The Air
Force continues to sustain and modernize, as required, the E8C Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), fielding Global Hawk Block 40 with MultiPlatform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MPRTIP) with Initial Operational
Capability 4th quarter FY14, and fielding Dismount Detection Radar (DDR) on the
MQ9 in late FY14 to early FY15.
Mr. SMITH. Assuming the retirement of the E8 JSTARS in 2025, what is the Air
Force doing to ensure that future ground surveillance radar capability will be available to the ground forces and intelligence community after that date?
General SCHWARTZ. Based on the data from the E8C Fleet Viability Board the
E8C is viable until 2035. The Air Force continues to sustain the E8C with necessary Prime Mission Equipment Diminishing Manufacturing Source (DMS) and
Avionics DMS cockpit upgrades work to ensure the E8C remains compliant with
military, civil, and international flight certifications and flight safety standards. Air
Combat Commands recently completed Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/Moving
Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) evaluated materiel solutions to fulfill
future overall SAR/MTI requirements.
Mr. SMITH. As part of the ongoing analysis of alternatives, has the Air Force done
a complete cost analysis of all of its alternatives? When will Congress see the result
of this analysis?
General SCHWARTZ. Air Combat Command presented the final results of the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council
(AFROC) for validation on 30 November 2011. Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force
approved the AoAs release on 25 Jan 12 to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). OSD/CAPE is currently
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reviewing the final report for sufficiency. A complete cost analysis was accomplished
on the 10 AFROC validated alternatives during the AoA.
Air Force senior leadership has not made a decision on when the data will be released.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCINTYRE
Mr. MCINTYRE. The fiscal year 2012 NDAA requires the Air Force to maintain a
combat-coded B1 fleet of 36 aircraft during fiscal years 2012 and 2013. Does the
budget request for FY 2013 include funding to comply with this legislative directive?
General SCHWARTZ. The fiscal year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) requires the Air Force to maintain not less than 36 B1 aircraft as combatcoded in a common capability configuration. The Air Force will comply with this requirement by performing the necessary maintenance actions to keep a minimum of
36 combat-coded aircraft flyable and mission capable at their respective Main Operating Bases. However, since the FY12 NDAA did not provide additional funding for
the continued operation of the three combat-coded aircraft planned for retirement,
the Air Force prioritized the programmed reinvestment of the expected savings in
both the B1 program and other department priorities over the restoral of Operation
& Maintenance funding for flying hours in the FY13 Presidents Budget request. To
this end, three combat-coded aircraft will be withheld from daily operations until
their planned retirement dates as permitted by the FY12 NDAA, but these aircraft
will remain available to support Combatant Commander requirements during the
phased retirement period.
Mr. MCINTYRE. With the decision to delay procurement of 179 F35s in the FYDP,
what steps is the Air Force taking to prevent fighter inventory shortfalls in the midto long-term?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is modernizing and extending F16 Block 40
52 service life via the Combat Avionics Programmed Extension Suite (CAPES) and
Service Life Extension Programs (SLEP). The programs are planned for 350 aircraft,
yet still only programmed for 300 within the Future Years Defense Plan. Both programs are scalable and able to grow to 650 aircraft if needed. Additionally, the Air
Force continues to modernize F15 C/D/Es with system upgrades to include Active
Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars, Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS), Eagle Passive Attack Sensor System (EPASS), Infrared
Search and Track (IRST), Advanced Display Core Processor (ADCP) II, and Beyond
Line of Sight (BLOS) radios. Additionally, F22A modernization remains on track
and includes Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) mapping, Small Diameter Bomb
(SDB), Electronic Protection, Combat ID, AIM9X, AIM120D, Link-16 upgrades,
and Geo-location capability. Finally, the Air Force remains committed to the F35
and procurement of 1,763 Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) variants. The
decision to delay procurement was an effort to minimize concurrency costs and
maximize combat capability when the aircraft moves into full rate production in
2019.
Mr. MCINTYRE. The committee has been informed that the recent F22 scientific
advisory board did not determine a root cause of the recent hypoxia incidents. What
action is the Air Force taking to address the risk of future hypoxia events with the
F22?
General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. MCINTYRE. The Navy has a plan to continue low-rate production of the D5
ballistic missile to keep the industrial base healthy. The Air Force does not appear
to have a similar program for the Minuteman III ICBMs. Why not? What are the
risks to the ICBM industrial base?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force recognizes the importance of maintaining the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) industrial base and has programs in place
to ensure the Minuteman III remains viable through 2030 and to support any follow-on ground based strategic deterrent system. The research and development portion of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base, exercised as part of ICBM
Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), matures SRM technologies for insertion into any future propulsion modernization program. The Air Force PAP program exercises design and systems engineering skills
critical to maintaining a healthy SRM industrial base.
Mr. MCINTYRE. Just last year the Global Hawk Block 30 program was certified
as essential to national security, yet the FY 2013 budget request proposes
mothballing all of the Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft. How can you explain such a
dramatic change in the Air Forces position on this program?
General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. FORBES. I am pleased to see the Department has continued funding in FY
13 for the TX Advanced Jet Trainer Replacement Program. Replacing the aging T
38s with a new trainer suitable to train pilots for 4th and 5th generation fighters
such as F22 and F35 is critical to readiness. The contract award for this program
slipped a year in the budget from FY 13 to FY 14. Is replacement of the current
Air Force trainer an important component of USAF readiness and training? Is the
Air Force committed to moving forward with the TX program with procurement
funding in FY 14?
Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Mr. FORBES. Submitted on behalf of Congresswoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers: In
the FY13 proposed budget, the Air Force is proposing to purchase only 54 aircraft.
How is the Air Force planning to recapitalize its aging fleet?
Secretary DONLEY. While the Air Force continues to advocate for strong investment in recapitalizing our aging fleet, modernizing the Air Force during a period
of budget decline is a significant challenge. In order to address this challenge, we
are slowing the pace and scope of modernization while protecting programs critical
to future warfighter needs. Focused investment in high priority programs such as
the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, Long Range Strike Bomber, and KC46A refueling
tanker is critical to the Departments overall strategy. Simultaneously, investment
in service life extensions for legacy aircraft is necessary to sustain the capacity necessary to meet the new Defense Strategic Guidance. The Air Force objective is to
mitigate risk by addressing recapitalization concerns as aggressively as possible
within fiscal constraints, while ensuring our existing force structure remains ready,
capable, and relevant in the near-term. As budget pressures ease in future years,
the Air Force will be postured to resume a more expansive recapitalization effort.
Mr. FORBES. Submitted on behalf of Congresswoman Cathy McMorris Rodgers:
Funding for the KC46A Refueling Tanker is largely preserved in the FY2013 Budget. Should sequestration go into effect this year, will the KC46A tanker remain an
Air Force priority? What would be the effect of sequestration upon the KC46A
tanker program?
Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER
Mr. MILLER. What is the Air Forces definition of a Center, as the term is used
by Air Force Materiel Command to describe commands such as the Electronic Systems Center, the Air Armament Center, and the Flight Test Center? What functions
must be present for a location to be designated a Center? Is strategic planning
an essential part of a Center?
Secretary DONLEY. Within the Air Force, a Center is a named unit that performs a specialized mission. A primary characteristic of a Center is that it performs
most of its mission within a large complex at one location and usually has only a
few subordinate units. There are a number of centers across the Air Force. Other
commands outside of Air Force Materiel Command use the term Center such as
the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center which is a Direct Reporting
Unit to Headquarters United States Air Force. Aside from the characteristics mentioned above, there are no standard functions that must be present for an organization to be designated a Center. Additionally, since a Center is a unit that may
have functions at multiple locations, it is the organization (and not the location)
that is designated a Center. Strategic planning is not a mandated Center function, but by the nature of their functions, most Centers do support strategic planning, either at the Major Command or Headquarters Air Force level.
Mr. MILLER. What is the Air Forces definition of a Center, as the term is used
by Air Force Materiel Command to describe commands such as the Electronic Systems Center, the Air Armament Center, and the Flight Test Center? What functions
must be present for a location to be designated a Center? Is strategic planning
an essential part of a Center?
General SCHWARTZ. Within the Air Force, a Center is a named unit that performs a specialized mission. A primary characteristic of a Center is that it performs
most of its mission within a large complex at one location and usually has only a
few subordinate units. There are a number of centers across the Air Force. Other
commands outside of Air Force Materiel Command use the term Center such as
the Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center which is a Direct Reporting
Unit to Headquarters United States Air Force. Aside from the characteristics mentioned above, there are no standard functions that must be present for an organiza-

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tion to be designated a Center. Additionally, since a Center is a unit that may
have functions at multiple locations, it is the organization (and not the location)
that is designated a Center. Strategic planning is not a mandated Center function, but by the nature of their functions, most Centers do support strategic planning, either at the Major Command or Headquarters Air Force level.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Donley, what progress has the Air Force made in evaluating threats to our bases that rely on civilian power sources, and how has the Air
Force strengthened its plans for alternative energy sources?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Forces dependency on the commercial power grid represents a critical asymmetric vulnerability that must be mitigated through partnerships with industry, state and local governments. The Air Force conducts Critical
Asset Risk Assessments (CARAs) to identify key critical assets and supporting infrastructure. Identification of critical assets focuses within installation boundaries, and
extends to the first critical infrastructure nodes outside perimeters. The Air Force
has identified over 900 critical assets, and 62 of those are Tier 1 assets, where loss
or degradation of energy would impact strategic-level missions. Of the 62 Tier 1 assets, 22 of them are Defense Critical Assets (DCA); the loss of a DCA would result
in mission failure for the entire Department of Defense (DOD) capability.
To date, the Air Force has completed 30 CARAs (12 in FY11). In FY12, there are
nine CARAs scheduled. The Air Force expects to complete CARAs for all Tier 1 assets by the end of FY13. Eight CARAs have been conducted on DCAs and two more
are scheduled for FY12. The Air Force is also a member of the DODs Energy Grid
Security Executive Council, which exists to discuss grid concerns across the Services.
The Air Force uses the CARA report as a starting point to work with the owning
organizations to develop risk response plan that identifies discrete courses of action
to address identified risks. CARA reports are provided to Commanders, Major Commands (MAJCOM), Combatant Commanders, the Joint Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Secutity Affairs
(ASD(HD&ASA)), Headquarters Air Force functional stakeholders, and the Air
Force Directorate for Air Operations, to inform Commanders decisions on how to
apply limited resources, and provide visibility to asset owners and mission owners
of those issues affecting their roles and responsibilities. Decisions on responses to
identified risks can be made at various levels of the organization. Such decisions
may be to remediate, mitigate, or following a comprehensive review by leadership
and evaluation within the corporate process, to accept risk.
The Air Force also prepares Critical Asset Risk Management (CARM) Plans for
a select subgroup of critical assets. Of the 17 course of action (COA) recommendations developed thus far in the seven CARM Plans submitted to ASD(HD&ASA), 3
have been funded at a total Operations and Maintenance cost of $250,000, and the
corresponding vulnerability to the respective critical assets remediated. Remediation
is currently in progress for two additional COAs, at a total cost of $6.65 million.
COA examples include installing power generators to provide electricity to a critical asset in the event of a power failure or developing a continuity of operations
plan. Projects addressing risks identified in CARA reports can receive higher
weighting factors during Air Force budgeting process. Additionally, a further six
CARM Plans are currently in development.
The ability of the Air Force to ensure continuity of operations is dependent upon
not only the delivery of reliable and uninterrupted energy supplies in the necessary
quantities, but also on the adaptability of mission platforms to operate on diversified
energy sources, such as biofuels or synthetic fuels. To assure its energy supply, the
Air Force has two very ambitious goals in placeto certify aircraft to use alternative aviation fuels and to develop on-base source of renewable energy. The Air
Force is certifying its fleet on several alternative aviation fuels to ensure our aircraft could fly on commercially available fuels by 2016. Those alternative fuels will
need to be drop-in fuels that are cost competitive with traditional petroleum-based
jet fuels, and meet our environmental and technical specifications. For the second
goal, the Air Force is focused on developing on-site sources of renewable energy, particularly those sources that can insulate the Air Force from grid failure or other
supply disruptions, and plans to achieve 1,000 megawatts of on-site capacity by
2016. This will largely be accomplished through third-party investments and at
those installations where renewable energy is mission compatible.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I continue to be concerned about the overall strength and size of
the nations cybersecurity workforce. What is the Air Force doing to recruit and

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train airmen with cyberskill and what is it doing to encourage them to stay in uniform?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force, in order to improve the identification of future
enlisted and officer cyberspace operators during the recruitment process, partnered
with Navy and the Army in the development of a cyber test that could be used as
a supplement to the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. At this time, the
test has been used at selected military entrance processing stations as part of a pilot
program to test enlisted recruits cyberspace aptitude. However, the results have not
yet been used in the selection of a recruits Air Force Specialty Code. Additional
work needs to be completed to ensure test results identify cyberspace aptitude
versus simply identifying current skill level and knowledge. The United States Air
Force Academy and Air Force Reserve Officer Program have also created three
cyberspace emphasis pre-accessions programs for officers. These programs have an
annual throughput of 330 future cyberspace officers. Additionally, over the last two
years, the Air Force has implemented 10 separate training programs that have an
annual throughput of over 2,600 cyberspace operators. Finally, in regards to the retention of our cyberspace enlisted career fields, as of October 2011, 5 Air Force Specialty Codes have varying levels of retention bonuses, which are used to encourage
re-enlistment. Currently, no incentive programs are used to retain the officer and
civilian cyberspace populations.
Mr. LANGEVIN. General Schwartz, I recently visited 24th Air Force at Lackland
Air Force Base and was very impressed with its operations. We have clearly made
great strides in our ability to impact the cyber domain, but as I am sure you agree,
we must continue to innovate and transform in order to maintain and expand that
ability. In your view, what must the Air Force do next in order to ensure the ability
of its networks to support Full Spectrum Operations?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force contributes to the Joint force by developing, integrating, and operating cyberspace capabilities in three mission areas: support, defense, and offense. Future capabilities will enable effects across the full spectrum
of operations.
The Air Force Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master Plan specifies nine
capabilities that require programmatic actions to evolve the force from its current capability state: Passive Defense, Defensive Counter Cyberspace, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance & Situational Awareness, Persistent
Network Operations, Data Confidentiality & Integrity Systems, Cyberspace Air
Operations Center, Offensive Counter Cyberspace for Global Reach and Access,
Contingency Extension, and Influence Operations.
A shift in mindsets from support to operations will foster greater concentration
of effort. Air Force members will understand their contributions to the joint
fight. The shift in mindset will engender greater operational integration across
all warfighting domains.
Attaining the Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master Plans specified capabilities and shifting from a support to operational mindset sets the conditions
for attaining partnership capabilities. Partnerships with other governmental
agencies, industry, allies, and partners, will enhance mission effectiveness. The
ability to integrate and leverage partnerships will underpin force projection in
all domains. The Air Force will invest as required to ensure its ability to operate effectively and enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical cyber capabilities.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. TURNER. The President established a modernization plan in the 1251 plan
and the 2010 NPR. The FY13 budget, after the New START treaty was ratified, is
backing off those plans. Let me review the list, the B61 gravity bomb is 2 years delayed; the associated tail kit is late, and we understand that certain high-accuracy
options are not being looked at; the W78 warhead is being pushed back, and certain
modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off the table; the new bomber,
wont be nuclear-certified at the outset, and new cruise missile are late by at least
2 years; and the plan for the modernization of the Minute Man III appears to be
lacking commitment. Further we hear all of these programs are dependent on the
Presidents reviewthe so-called mini-NPRabout which this Committee has been
completely shut out by the White House.
1) Can you assure us that the Air Force has an iron-clad, no-caveat, commitment
to field a new ICBM, to field a new nuclear-capable bomber and cruise missile? Will
this commitment change as a result of the Administrations mini-NPR?

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2) Why would the plan to implement the New START treaty, which was ratified
in 2010, depend on the Presidents mini-NPR which is being conducted in complete
secrecy from the Congress?
3) Secretary Panetta promised to assist this committee in oversight of the nuclear
war plan, in fact promising read-ins last December, but nothing has happened since
then. What accesses do you have to the so-called 8010 plan? How many Air Force
personnel have access to that plan? Tens? Hundreds? More?
a. Does it surprise you that the Department is denying any access to that plan
to the Congress? Understand that were told that the Administration may be considering 80% reductions in the nuclear force, and no one in Congress has been allowed
to see the plan.
Secretary DONLEY. The Presidents fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Budget reflects the Air
Forces continued commitment to invest in the enduring and compelling attributes
the Nation needs for a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force. The Air
Force fully funded and is conducting the materiel solution analysis to identify the
options for both a follow-on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system and a cruise
missile to follow the Air Launch Cruise Missile. Reports are expected to be completed in FY14. A nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bomber is also funded in the
Presidents FY13 budget. The Administrations post-Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)
analysis has not altered these commitments.
Air Force plans to implement New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are
not dependent on current Post-NPR analysis efforts underway. As stated in the
2010 NPR, the Administration is conducting follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the levels in New START. Although a final New
START force structure decision has not been made, the Air Force has fully funded
NST implementation actions to achieve the baseline force structure as outlined in
the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1251 Report: 240 deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles on 14 strategic nuclear submarines, up to 420 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and up to 60 deployed nuclear-capable
heavy bombers.
As a Service component to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) responsible for providing assets and capabilities required for execution, several echelons of the Air Force have access to Operational Plan 8010. Since this is a
USSTRATCOM plan, the Air Force defers to USSTRATCOM and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense regarding your concerns in this question.
Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen
our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted
aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military
operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely
piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the
FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge
within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of
RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps
are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of
AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and
NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and ground
based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted aircraft
(RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working technology
development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to
acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete our
ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete certification
of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this
system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our
readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAAs) Unmanned Aircraft Systems
airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for full
RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further serve
to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Air Force

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Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA
integration into the National Airspace System.
Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget
environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in
the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term
needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future
leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced
technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).
Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper
educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental
equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers
with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve
this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the
critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the
students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the
DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible
to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain
maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT.
Mr. TURNER. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act included an
amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
to enroll up to 125 civilians on a space-available basis. This is similar to authority
granted other defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this
new policy will be implemented and have been told soon. We are now working on
the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate implementing the provision and what is causing the delay?
Secretary DONLEY. The Title 10 language clearly requires permission by Secretary
of the Air Force to admit defense industry employees as students. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed the strategy and policy needed to manage this new student base and has coordinated the draft language with senior Air
Force leadership, including our legal staff. A staff package implementing this program is currently in coordination for Secretary of the Air Force signature. The implementation guidance gives AFIT permission to proceed and delegates authority for
annual reviews to the AFIT Commandant. We do not anticipate any further delays
and expect to enroll defense industry employees in our September 2012 class.
Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen
our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted
aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military
operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely
piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the
FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge
within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of
RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps
are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of
AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and
NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and ground
based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted aircraft
(RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working technology
development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to
acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to complete our
ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete certification
of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this
system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our
readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAAs) Unmanned Aircraft Systems

106
airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for full
RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further serve
to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Air Force
Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA
integration into the National Airspace System.
Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget
environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in
the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term
needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future
leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced
technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).
Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper
educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental
equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers
with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve
this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the
critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the
students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the
DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible
to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain
maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT.
Mr. TURNER. The President established a modernization plan in the 1251 plan
and the 2010 NPR. The FY13 budget, after the New START treaty was ratified, is
backing off those plans. Let me review the list, the B61 gravity bomb is 2 years delayed; the associated tail kit is late, and we understand that certain high-accuracy
options are not being looked at; the W78 warhead is being pushed back, and certain
modernization options have been arbitrarily taken off the table; the new bomber,
wont be nuclear-certified at the outset, and new cruise missile are late by at least
2 years; and the plan for the modernization of the Minute Man III appears to be
lacking commitment. Further we hear all of these programs are dependent on the
Presidents reviewthe so-called mini-NPRabout which this Committee has been
completely shut out by the White House.
1) Can you assure us that the Air Force has an iron-clad, no-caveat, commitment
to field a new ICBM, to field a new nuclear-capable bomber and cruise missile? Will
this commitment change as a result of the Administrations mini-NPR?
2) Why would the plan to implement the New START treaty, which was ratified
in 2010, depend on the Presidents mini-NPR which is being conducted in complete
secrecy from the Congress?
3) Secretary Panetta promised to assist this committee in oversight of the nuclear
war plan, in fact promising read-ins last December, but nothing has happened since
then. What accesses do you have to the so-called 8010 plan? How many Air Force
personnel have access to that plan? Tens? Hundreds? More?
a. Does it surprise you that the Department is denying any access to that plan
to the Congress? Understand that were told that the Administration may be considering 80% reductions in the nuclear force, and no one in Congress has been allowed
to see the plan.
General SCHWARTZ. The Presidents fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Budget reflects the
Air Forces continued commitment to invest in the enduring and compelling attributes the Nation needs for a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent force.
The Air Force fully funded and is conducting the materiel solution analysis to identify the options for both a follow-on Intercontinental Ballistic Missile system and a
cruise missile to follow the Air Launch Cruise Missile. Reports are expected to be
completed in FY14. A nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bomber is also funded in

107
the Presidents FY13 budget. The Administrations post-Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) analysis has not altered these commitments.
Air Force plans to implement New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are
not dependent on current Post-NPR analysis efforts underway. As stated in the
2010 NPR, the Administration is conducting follow-on analysis to set goals for future nuclear reductions below the levels in New START. Although a final New
START force structure decision has not been made, the Air Force has fully funded
NST implementation actions to achieve the baseline force structure as outlined in
the National Defense Authorization Act Section 1251 Report: 240 deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles on 14 strategic nuclear submarines, up to 420 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and up to 60 deployed nuclear-capable
heavy bombers.
As a Service component to United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) responsible for providing assets and capabilities required for execution, several echelons of the Air Force have access to Operational Plan 8010. Since this is a
USSTRATCOM plan, the Air Force defers to USSTRATCOM and the Office of the
Secretary of Defense regarding your concerns in this question.
Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen
our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted
aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military
operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely
piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the
FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge
within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of
RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps
are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of
AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and
NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and
ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted
aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working
technology development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to
complete our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete
certification of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department
of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional
authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAAs) Unmanned Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step
forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for
full RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further
serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air
Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into the National Airspace System.
Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget
environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in
the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term
needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future
leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced
technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).
Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper
educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental
equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers
with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines; AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve
this objective.

108
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the
critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the
students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the
DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible
to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain
maximum benefits. Policies are in places that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT.
Mr. TURNER. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act included an
amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
to enroll up to 125 civilians on a space-available basis. This is similar to authority
granted other defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this
new policy will be implemented and have been told soon. We are now working on
the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate implementing the provision and what is causing the delay?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced
technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).
Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper
educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental
equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers
with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines; AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve
this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the
critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the
students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the
DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible
to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain
maximum benefits. Policies are in places that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT.
Mr. TURNER. As an estimate, how much of the development and procurement
costs associated with the long range strike bomber can be associated with making
it nuclear-capable and nuclear-certified? What percentage of the total development
and procurement costs is this? Does the Air Force plan to buy additional aircraft
for the nuclear mission, or would the same number of aircraft be procured if the
bomber were only for conventional missions?
General SCHWARTZ. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Long Range
Strike Bomber program was started in Fiscal Year 2012. The Air Force recently
began the process of building detailed cost estimates for the development, procurement, and sustainment of the Long Range Strike Bomber. We are working closely
with the nuclear centers of excellence to understand the stringent nuclear design
and certification requirements to inform these cost estimates. Upon completion, we
will fully disclose the requested information within appropriate channels.
The Air Force plans to field 80100 nuclear-capable Long Range Strike Bombers
beginning in the mid-2020s by leveraging mature technologies and making capability tradeoffs to hold down procurement costs. The $550 million average procurement unit cost (Base Year 2010) includes sufficient funding to make the bombers
survivable in a nuclear environment and capable of nuclear weapons employment.
The Long Range Strike Bomber will be certified for nuclear operations in time to
meet USSTRATCOMs nuclear force structure requirements.
Mr. TURNER. The Navy has a continuous low-rate production program for D5 ballistic missiles to keep the industrial base healthy and responsive. The Air Force
does not have a similar program for Minuteman III ICBMswhy not? What are the
risks of this approach?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force recognizes the importance of maintaining the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) industrial base and has programs in place
to ensure the Minuteman III remains viable through 2030 and to support any follow-on ground based strategic deterrent system. The research and development portion of the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) industrial base, exercised as part of ICBM
Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP), matures SRM technologies for insertion into any future propulsion modernization program. The Air Force PAP program exercises design and systems engineering skills
critical to maintaining a healthy SRM industrial base.
Mr. TURNER. Does the FY12 request include funds to make the F35 Joint Strike
Fighter dual-capable (to carry nuclear payloads)? When is the F35 expected to be
fully nuclear-capable and nuclear-certified? Have the estimated costs for this nu-

109
clear-capable retrofit increased, and if so, is that a lesson for the new bomber (i.e.,
to make it nuclear-capable from the outset)?
General SCHWARTZ. The JSF Operational Requirement Document (ORD) directed
the F35 program to incorporate Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) capability in the first
post-System Development and Demonstration (SDD) block upgrade, Block 4, currently projected to field in the 2021 timeframe. The Air Force fully supports our
commitment to our NATO partners to provide forward deployed DCA capable fighters in European Command (EUCOM), and is reviewing available options to maintain DCA requirements in the European theatre by other means until nuclear capable F35As are ready to assume the mission.
In the Presidents Budget 2013, the Air Force chose to defer further dual capable
aircraft (DCA) funding. The Air Force made this decision based on several factors:
1) Uncertainty in the F35 Block 4 delivery timeline and associated candidate list
due to congressional marks on F35 Follow-on Development funding and F35 SDD
re-plan activities
2) Uncertainty in the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) approach and timeline;
the B61 LEP is a joint DOD/DoE effort that will provide a digital nuclear weapon
capability that can be integrated on the F35A
3) The ability to mitigate delays in F35A DCA capability through Service Life
Extension Programs (SLEP) for legacy aircraft
The Air Force fully supports the commitment to provide forward deployed DCA
capable fighters and is reassessing DCA need dates and development timelines. To
mitigate potential future hardware changes and retrofit costs, DCA basic provisions,
to include power, wiring, cooling, and weapons bay volume, were accounted for in
the current F35A design. Should the Department of Defense decide to fund for F
35A DCA integration in PB 14, funding will total $309M across the Future Years
Defense Plan. Including fiscal year 2012 funding and additional funding in fiscal
year 2019+, the total DCA cost is still anticipated to be $339M.
Mr. TURNER. Please describe the Air Forces plans for a follow-on to the nuclearcapable Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). When is such a capability needed and
what is the anticipated total quantity and cost needed? Why has the program been
delayed?
General SCHWARTZ. Long Range Standoff (LRSO) is the Air Forces plan for the
follow-on to the nuclear-capable Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM). The need
date is based on survivability of the ALCM, to mitigate risk to this validated capability requirement. The Air Force is currently executing an Analysis of Alternatives
(AoA) to determine the best materiel solution to meet the future need in a quantity
required by the combatant commanders. Affordability is one factor to be assessed
during the AoA. Potential options under analysis range from modification of existing
inventory to new weapon system development. Once the AoA is complete, the Air
Force will be able to determine options that best provide our Nation a safe, secure
and effective nuclear deterrent in the 21st Century.
The Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) AoA, which began in August 2011, continues
and is scheduled to be completed in early fiscal year 2013 (FY13). The LRSO program was delayed until FY15. This delay was driven by necessary adjustments
within the current fiscally-constrained environment.
Mr. TURNER. The Air Force plans to spend $80 million in FY13 on development
of the tail kit for the B6112, the life-extended nuclear gravity bomb. The National
Nuclear Security Administration has delayed production of the first B6112 by 2
years, to FY2019. How does this affect the Air Forces plans for the tail kit? Is the
Air Force comfortable with National Nuclear Security Administrations decision to
delay the B6112 by 2 years? What risks are there in this delay? Is there any more
room for schedule slippage, or have we taken all of the flexibility out of the schedule? Please provide a classified response detailing the technical requirements for the
new tail kit as compared to the technical requirements of the current B61; how will
the CEPs of the B61 mods differ?
General SCHWARTZ. The new schedule for the first production unit was incorporated into the B6112 Tailkit Assembly (TKA) Service Cost Position/Independent
Cost Estimate and is reflected in the FY13 Presidents Budget. The tail kit development schedule was extended so it remains in synch with the National Nuclear Security Administrations (NNSA) schedule.
The Air Force is comfortable with NNSAs decision to delay the B6112 by two
years. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DoE) conducted an integrated schedule review to ensure both efforts remain synchronized.
This delay adds schedule risk to the program, as legacy B61s continue to age and
must be replaced. As a result, flexibility has been removed. Mitigation efforts have
already been implemented to extend the life of legacy B61s so that the B6112 can

110
be fielded before they retire. Further life extensions of the legacy stockpile may be
possible, but they would likely be very expensive and difficult to execute.
A classified response will be forwarded separately detailing the technical requirements for the new tail kit as compared to the technical requirements of the current
B61.
Mr. TURNER. Will the next-generation bomber be built to meet nuclear-hardening
requirements? Will nuclear certification of the next-generation bombers be delayed
after initial operational capability is achievedif so, when would nuclear certification be expected? What are the costs and risks for delaying certification of a nuclear-capable bomber?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, the Long Range Strike Bomber will meet nuclear-hardening requirements in accordance with current military standards.
Currently, nuclear certification is planned after the Long Range Strike Bomber
has met initial operational capability. The Long Range Strike Bomber will achieve
nuclear certification in time to meet United States Strategic Commands
(USSTRATCOM) nuclear force structure requirements. USSTRATCOM is integrally
involved with the Air Force in this process to ensure the U.S. nuclear deterrent
force will remain credible and effective.
Delaying nuclear certification until after conventional certification reduces the
costs and risks to the Long Range Strike Bomber program because it minimizes concurrency during baseline program integration and test activities. It also ensures sufficient, production representative test assets are available for a dedicated nuclear
certification effort.
Mr. TURNER. In your statement you emphasize the need to continue to strengthen
our global ISR infrastructure. Clearly, the development and use of remotely piloted
aircraft (RPAs) play an integral role in that infrastructure, yet there are a very limited number of areas where these systems can be freely tested. With the military
operations overseas winding down, there is an increasing need to integrate remotely
piloted aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). Working with the
FAA and NASA, the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is leading the charge
within the Air Force in developing the future technology for the safe operation of
RPAs in the national airspace. Can you provide an update on the effort? What steps
are needed to strengthen this relationship so that the full research capabilities of
AFRL can be teamed with the FAA and NASA to solve the challenges of RPA integration into the NAS which is so central to the future of U.S. aerospace? Would additional authorities specifically to leverage the work of the Air Force, FAA, and
NASA as a goal to shorten the time to integrate RPAs be valuable to the Air Force?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is working both airborne (long term) and
ground based (near term) sense and avoid programs to integrate remotely piloted
aircraft (RPAs) into the national airspace system (NAS). We have been working
technology development in this area for 10 years and are transitioning those technologies to acquisition over the next several years. As a key milestone, we plan to
complete our ground based proof of concept demonstration in mid-2012 and complete
certification of the system approximately 18 months later. Once certification is complete, this system will enable more routine access to portions of the NAS and enhance our readiness. Equally important, we are developing the required Department
of Defense certification standards for those components unique to RPAs. Additional
authorities: The Federal Aviation Administration (FAAs) Unmanned Aircraft Systems airspace integration and test site mandate in both the 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act and the FAA Reform and Modernization Act is a significant step
forward to both expand technology and establish performance standards needed for
full RPA integration. The involvement of both industry and academia will further
serve to safely advance UAS/RPA access nationally and internationally. The Air
Force believes that coordinated oversight of the overarching research and development objectives between FAA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration and
Air Force Research Laboratory is vital to effectively meet the legislated 2015 deadline for RPA integration into the National Airspace System.
Mr. TURNER. The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) is the primary postsecondary education institution for the Air Force and it has educated numerous senior leaders for the Air Force, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines required for modern aeronautical warfare. In this increasingly tight budget
environment, I am deeply concerned that AFIT, which represents an investment in
the future of the Air Force, will be given a lower priority in light of short-term
needs. Can you assure me that the Air Force remains committed to offering future
leaders the kind of advanced technical degrees that AFIT provides?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to continuing to offer advanced
technical degrees to future leaders via the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT).
Air Force senior leaders have become intimately involved in determining the proper

111
educational development for the officers within their career fields. Advanced academic degrees are the means to fulfill this critical piece of the officer developmental
equation. Air Force senior leaders place increased emphasis on providing officers
with the right education, particularly in specialized scientific and technical disciplines, AFIT becomes an invaluable capability the Air Force can use to achieve
this objective.
AFIT offers advanced academic degree opportunities in programs that meet the
critical Air Force and Department of Defense (DOD) needs. Their faculty and students are engaged in research on the cutting edge of technology, which allows the
students to work on projects that will advance the technical exploitations of the
DOD. Given our fiscally challenged environment, we plan to do everything possible
to leverage this educational advantage as a means of stretching our dollars to obtain
maximum benefits. Policies are in place that require efficient use of educational assets to help ensure the continued viability of AFIT.
Mr. TURNER. The fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act included an
amendment I offered that would allow the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
to enroll up to 125 civilians on a space-available basis. This is similar to authority
granted other defense schools. I have asked repeatedly over the past year when this
new policy will be implemented and have been told soon. We are now working on
the FY13 NDAA. Could you let us know when you anticipate implementing the provision and what is causing the delay?
General SCHWARTZ. The Title 10 language clearly requires permission by Secretary of the Air Force to admit defense industry employees as students. The Air
Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has developed the strategy and policy needed
to manage this new student base and has coordinated the draft language with senior Air Force leadership, including our legal staff. A staff package implementing this
program is currently in coordination for Secretary of the Air Force signature. The
implementation guidance gives AFIT permission to proceed and delegates authority
for annual reviews to the AFIT Commandant. We do not anticipate any further
delays and expect to enroll defense industry employees in our September 2012 class.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO
Ms. BORDALLO. Will the divesture of the C27J have a logistical impact on the
supply chain in theater and if so, what will the impact be?
Secretary DONLEY. No, divestiture of the C27J will not impact the supply chain
in-theater as the C130 has sufficient airlift capability and capacity. The Air Force
remains committed to providing this support to the Army.
Ms. BORDALLO. Could either of you explain in more detail why you proposed a
larger cut in Air Guard & Reserve forces, than you did in Active Duty forces?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force FY13 Budget Request achieves $8.7 billion in
savings across the Active and Reserve Components by retiring over 200 aircraft in
FY13 and nearly 300 aircraft over the FYDP, consistent with the new strategic
guidance. Our programmed force reductions are wide ranging and affect over 60 installations. Without the Total Force re-missioning actions our plan would have significantly affected 24 units and left eight installations without an Air Force presence. After specific efforts to reallocate Air Force missions to locations affected by
force structure reductions, we were able to preserve 14 squadron level units and
leave only one installation without an operational mission. With the re-missioning,
the plan would have direct impact in 33 states, but in order to support Total Force
re-missioning, the manpower realignment plan built by the Reserve Components ultimately will affect additional units in all 54 states and territories.
Our analysis of requirements driven by the new strategy shaped all of our decisions. Air Force force sizing analysis answered two complementary questions: what
is the maximum, or surge, requirement posed by the force sizing model of the new
strategy; and what is the steady state, or post-surge, requirement for deployed rotational forces? Because the new guidance requires the Joint Force to be capable of
fighting one large scale, combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to
also deny a second adversary, and deemphasized large-scale, prolonged stability operations, our FY13 budget request accepts risk by retiring fighter, mobility, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft excess to the surge requirements of the new force sizing construct. Although the U.S. has removed all
combat forces from Iraq and the new strategic guidance reduces the steady state requirement for ground forces, we expect Air Force steady state rotational requirements to remain nearly constant, or perhaps increase, under the new strategy. This
continuing rotational post-surge requirement is a key factor in determining the required mix between Active and Reserve Component forces due to differences in sus-

112
tainable deployment rates and operations tempo. Where possible, we attempted to
retire all aircraft of a specific type, allowing us to also divest the unique training
and logistic support structure for that aircraft. Where that was not possible, we
worked to retire the oldest aircraft first, and redistributed aircraft into effective and
economical units, eliminating other units when that was most efficient. Where we
retained older aircraft, we are taking steps to ensure they will remain viable into
the future.
Ms. BORDALLO. One of the cut programs is the CONECT program. It provides
much-needed digital communication and mission retasking capability for our
warfighters, which is essential for B52 missions, especially with the added emphasis on the Pacific theater. With this program successfully finishing flight test, why
would the Air Force cut the production funding, and leave our crews with a temporary laptop solution that doesnt satisfy the CONECT operational requirements?
Secretary DONLEY. Based on competing budget priorities, the Air Force restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) to address the sustainability issues within the program and the replacement of legacy displays. The
restructured program also funds conversion of the temporary Evolutionary Datalink
(EDL) system into a permanent modification, which provides a viable (although less
robust) communication capability for the B52. This decision was made as part of
a balanced investment strategy for the Air Force Nuclear Deterrence portfolio. At
the time the decision was made, CONECT had not completed the flight test program, and the program faced significant cost, schedule, and performance issues. The
completion of MS C certification later this year provides the Air Force an option to
re-examine the CONECT program in future budget cycles.
Ms. BORDALLO. Another program proposed to be completely terminated is the replacement of the B52 radar. The reliability of the current radar, which will continue to degrade, results in ever-increasing cost and unacceptable impact to the
probability of success of long missions. With the nuclear and conventional importance of the B52, how do we maintain a much-needed capability without a radar
replacement program?
Secretary DONLEY. To meet higher priorities, the Air Force has elected to maintain the current B52 APQ166 radar versus investing in a replacement radar with
higher near-term costs. Analysis indicates that the current B52 radar system is
sustainable through the B52s service life (2040). Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WRALC) will pursue reverse engineering/sustainment initiatives to address
radar reliability and availability to meet B52 mission requirements.
Ms. BORDALLO. You prepared a statement that read The Air Force will meet its
OSD-directed civilian end strength target for FY12. How do you reconcile that
statement and direction with the requirements of sections 129 and 129a of title 10
that prohibit management to a civilian personnel constraint such as end-strength?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force does not manage its civilian workforce by any
constraint or limitation in terms of man-years, end-strength, fulltime equivalent positions, or maximum number of employees. Based on fiscal constraints, OSD-directed civilian workforce targets for FY12; and these targets were achieved through
strategic reviews to improve business operations, streamline administrative functions, and eliminate low-priority/overhead functions and expenses. As such, the Air
Force has followed section 129 of title 10 with regard to execution of civilian personnel management.
Ms. BORDALLO. In your prepared statement, you addressed congressionally mandated military end strength and OSD-directed civilian end strengthwhat kind
of limitations or levels have been placed, or have you imposed, on your contract support workforce?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Forces sourcing of functions and work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable
laws and statute. The Air Force remains committed to meeting its statutory obligations to annually review missions, functions, and workforce composition, including
reliance on contracted services, and to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and aligned to our most critical priorities.
Ms. BORDALLO. In your prepared statement, the Air Force wrote that We continue to put downward pressure on service support contract spending and are committing to an additional $200 million reduction in FY13 and $1 billion across the
FYDP. Considering that in the fiscal year 2010 inventory of contracts for service
the Air Force reported more than $24 billion in obligationsfor a single yearon
contracted services, this downward pressure is laughable. Why are the reductions
so small?
Secretary DONLEY. The inventory of contract services (ICS) is a much broader set
of service contracts than what was referred to in testimony as service support con-

113
tractors. While the Air Force submitted $24.8 billion in our Fiscal Year 2010 ICS,
that amount captured all Air Force-funded service contracts that perform critical
missions across every functional domain across the Air Force. These include service
and maintenance of our aircraft, base operations, and supply chain management.
The service support contractors definition is stated in the Secretary of Defenses
memo, Reducing Reliance on DOD Service Support Contracts, dated September 24,
2010, which directed a 30 percent reduction from the FY10 levels by FY13 (10 percent per year). The definition of support contracts/contractor is any contracted personnel who provide support as staff augmentation for Government employees; i.e.,
personnel who are subject to the direction of a Government official and function as
a staff/action officer.
The additional $200 million savings in FY13 and a total of $1 billion across the
FYDP is over and above our past service support contractor reductions. Our intent
in additional reductions was to target headquarters staff augmentation contract
support to a more manageable level as this is an area that has grown tremendously
since 2001.
Ms. BORDALLO. How do these reductions of less than 1% over the FYDP compare
to the fiscal and manpower reductions associated with the mandated civilian workforce levels?
Secretary DONLEY. The true service support contractor reduction (staff augmentation dollars) is approximately 62 percent ($390M from a $634M baseline) which is
drastically higher than our programmed civilian reduction of approximately 8 percent (16K positions from a 199K baseline).
Ms. BORDALLO. You also stated that These efforts are consistent with . . . OMB
guidance to reduce contract spending by 15 percent by the end of FY12 from an
FY10 baseline. That would mean that you should reduce by $3.6B annually from
the $24B in FY10, as opposed to the $200M you stated. This is an exponentially
large discrepancy and I am requesting further explanation and justification of your
statement, and the small reductions planned in the Air Force in contracted services.
Secretary DONLEY. Again, there is a definitional issue that must be clarified in
answering this question. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance
has its prime focus to reduce contract spending on management support services
which is quantified by 12 separate product service codes in such areas as automated
information systems development and services; system engineering; intelligence
services; personal services; and acquisition/contract support. The Federal Procurement Data SystemNext Generation (FPDSNG) captures approximately $5.6B
management support services funded by the Air Force in FY10. The OMB mandated
15 percent reduction equates to approximately $843M. Currently, the Air Force is
ahead of schedule based on a FPDSNG current FY12 obligations of approximately
$1.7B through the end of month February.
Ms. BORDALLO. You stated that you had a target of 16,000 civilian spaces to reduce. Can you please provide a list of those 16,000 based on the Air Forces FAIR
Act inventory, including the location, functions performed, and manpower mix criteria associated with each? Can you estimate the cost savings associated with each?
Can you assure the Committee that the workload associated with any one of these
16,000 reductions was not absorbed by contract as you executed the AFMC reorganization and reduced overhead? Where did this target of 16,000 civilian space reductions come from, and was that target based on a workforce analysis considering mission risk and cost, or did the Air Force essentially have to reverse engineer it and
associated workload/organizational structures to achieve that number?
Secretary DONLEY. 1) The Air Force does not have a specific list of the civilian
positions based on the Air Forces Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act
inventory because a large portion of the reductions were tied to planned growth;
thus, these positions were not captured by any previous or existing FAIR Act inventory.
2) These changes in programmed growth resulted in an approximate total savings
of $1.6 billion through Fiscal Year 2012.
3) The workload associated with the reductions was not absorbed by contract because in addition to the civilian funding reductions, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense also strove to achieve savings by reducing the number of service support
contractors. The AFMC reorganization and other Air Force consolidation efforts
were a means to achieve savings in both civilian and contractor funds; the AFMC
reorganization resulted in a workforce reduction.
4) The target reductions were based on workforce analysis considering mission
risk, readiness and cost. The Secretary of Defense issued Department of Defensewide efficiency measures to reduce overhead and eliminate redundancies while reducing the associated funding. To meet the guidance issued by Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic review to

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streamline operations and consolidate overhead while preserving or growing the
most critical mission areas. The Air Force maintained some growth in areas like acquisition, nuclear enterprise, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance,
while streamlining headquarters and support functions.
Ms. BORDALLO. Given the civilian personnel constraints first reflected in last
years budget and continued in the FY13 submission, can you certify in full accordance with 10 USC sections 129 and section 129a? Your certification was due on 1
February. When can the committee expect it?
Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
Ms. BORDALLO. How does the Department of Air Forces budget request for FY13
reconcile with legislative language set forth in Division A, Section 8012 of Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 11274) which states that . . . during fiscal
year 2012, the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense may not be managed
on the basis of any end-strength, and the management of such personnel during
that fiscal year shall not be subject to any constraint or limitation (known as an
end-strength), and more specifically, that the fiscal year 2013 budget request be
prepared and submitted to the Congress as if this provision were effective with regard to fiscal year 2013?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force does not manage its civilian workforce by any
constraint or limitation in terms of man-years, end-strength, fulltime equivalent positions, or maximum number of employees. Based on fiscal constraints, the Office
of the Secretary of Defense-directed civilian workforce budgetary targets for fiscal
year 2012 achieved through strategic reviews to improve business operations,
streamline administrative functions, and eliminate low-priority/overhead functions
and expenses. For the fiscal year 2013 (FY13) budget request, the Air Force determined the best workforce mix based on the most-efficient and cost-effective means
to perform the Air Force mission. The FY13 budget request also accounted for budget constraints while at the same time returning a flexible, agile, and ready workforce.
Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and
rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In
your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed
by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the Air Force FY13 budget request
reflect an appropriately balanced workforce across all major capabilities, functional
areas, and requirements?
Secretary DONLEY. The fiscal year 2013 (FY13) budget request reflects an appropriately balanced workforce that meets required budget reductions that preserves
readiness while avoiding a hollow force. The Air Forces sourcing of functions and
work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with
workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as
well as applicable laws and statute. The FY13 budget request reflects our best judgment today and represents a carefully coordinated approach based on the Department of Defenses strategy and policy that balances operational needs and fiscal reality. The Air Force remains committed to meeting its statutory obligations to annually review missions, functions, and workforce composition, including reliance on
contracted services, and to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and
aligned to our most critical priorities.
Ms. BORDALLO. The Departments budget request overview included discussion of
improved buying power and how acquisitions are managed. To what extent is the
Department of Air Force using its Inventory of Contracts for Services to make such
improvements and influence how it manages the Air Force Total Force?
Secretary DONLEY. This is currently one of many tools available internal to the
Air Force to help manage our total force. Although we have fully complied with Department of Defense Guidance each year, there is room to improve the Air Forces
use of this inventory of contract services. To this end, we are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the other Services in order to determine the
best way to document and use our annual Inventory of Contracts for Services as
required by Title 10, Section 2330a, Procurement of Services.
Ms. BORDALLO. Did the Department of Air Force seek relief from DOD-mandated
civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively
performed by civilians?
Secretary DONLEY. As part of our fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Presidents Budget submission, the Air Force did not seek relief from Department of Defense (DOD) mandated civilian personnel levels. Our overall strategic review of all civilian resource
allowed the Air Force to retain civilian end strength to satisfy our most critical
insourcing initiatives. While the Air Force uses civilian end strength as a target for
management, there are mechanisms in place to permit exceptions to the target, if
justified, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) approval. In order to

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pursue any further/new insourcing initiatives, the Air Force would plan on requesting OSD approve the corresponding civilian end strength increase as allowable
growth given it drives efficiencies or is a result of converting inherently governmental workload to in-house DOD civilians. The Air Force is committed to ensuring
no inherently governmental functions are outsourced or otherwise contracted.
Ms. BORDALLO. If relief was not sought, does that mean that the Department of
Air Force is comfortable that all contracted services currently procured by the Department are the most cost-effective source of labor and minimize risk?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Forces sourcing of functions and work between military, civilian, and contracted services must be consistent with workload requirements, funding availability, readiness and management needs, as well as applicable
laws and statute. The fiscal year 2013 budget request reflects our best judgment
today and represents a carefully coordinated approach based on the Department of
Defenses strategy and policy that balances operational needs and fiscal reality. The
Air Force remains committed to meeting its statutory obligations to annually review
missions, functions, and workforce composition, including reliance on contracted
services, and to ensure the workforce is appropriately balanced and aligned to our
most critical priorities.
Ms. BORDALLO. What assurances can you give me that as civilian reductions or
hiring freezes are occurring across Air Force installations work is not shifting illegally to contract performance?
Secretary DONLEY. We are tracking, on a monthly basis, our use of support contractors performing knowledge based services, service support contractors, management support services, and advisory studies to ensure that we achieve already
planned/programmed reductions. These actions, coupled with the current monthly
tracking of the financial obligations of contract usage, facilitate prevention of inappropriate migration of workload from organic to contract support. In addition, we
worked closely with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness (USD (P&R)) who developed a memo dated 1 Dec 2011 Prohibition on
Converting Certain Functions to Contract Performance. The basic intent of this
memo was to inform leadership at all levels and to reiterate the need to be cognizant of not converting work performed by organic personnel to contract performance.
Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within the Air Force to ensure the
workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact
ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or
military personnel?
Secretary DONLEY. The main process is the Air Forces planning, programming,
and budget execution process. The Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic
review to increase efficiency, reduce overhead, and eliminate redundancy while preserving or growing the most critical mission areas in our civilian workforce. This
force mix determination will be reviewed annually as we submit our presidents
budget submission to ensure that we maintain the most-efficient and cost-effective
means to perform the Air Force mission, taking into account current budget realities.
Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the exceptions to
the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list
of all exceptions the Department of Air Force has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions across that were requested but
not approved, and the justification for such.
Secretary DONLEY. The Office of the Secretary of Defense allowed limited Service
growth for certain requirements. The exceptions include: portions of Combat Commander requirements, joint basing requirements and acquisition workforce requirements. The warfighter requirements were linked to Joint Staff-approved changes at
Combatant Commands where the Air Force is the executive agent. Allowances were
provided for Joint basing growth to ensure equivalency across all Services as a result of the transfer of responsibilities, and the associated manpower, from other
Services. Acquisition workforce growth was allowed due to the Departments focus
on strengthening and growing our in-house acquisition workforce.
Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent have the existing data sets available to Air Force
planners, specifically the annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial activities, contributed to the functional streamlining, organizational realignments, workforce shaping decisions, and civilian personnel reductions reflected in
last years efficiencies initiative and continued in this years budget?
Secretary DONLEY. The efficiencies initiatives began under Secretary Gates, and
continued in this years budget, were implemented based on guidance to conduct organizational assessments and mission/function prioritization. This guidance required the Air Force to: baseline our organizations; assess and prioritize missions;

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eliminate duplication; ensure workload distribution; and submit recommendations
for organization restructuring and reallocation of manpower, including workforce reductions.
While the guidance did not specifically require the Department of Defense components to use their annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial activities, it is one of many data sets and workload quantification sources that the Air
Force utilizes during the planning, programming, and budget execution process.
Ms. BORDALLO. In achieving the right mix for the Total Force, how does the Department of Air Force use the annual inventory of inherently governmental and
commercial activities, and associated manpower mix determinations, to identify the
civilian workforce reductions reflected in the past two budgets?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force conducted a comprehensive strategic manpower
review to size civilian workload contained in our past two budgets with the goal to
increase efficiency, reduce overhead, and eliminate redundancy while preserving or
growing the most critical mission areasnot necessarily the Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activities (IGCA) review. However, the Air Force continually refines our Total Force skill mix to include civil servants and contractors, to
determine the most appropriate, efficient, and cost-effective means of performing Air
Force missions. As outlined in Department of Defense Instruction, 1100.22, Policy
and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, as well as Federal Acquisition Regulations 7.5, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 207.5, and Air Force Instruction, 38204, Programming United States Air Force USAF Manpower, the Air Force
adheres to the overarching guidance regarding workforce mix determination. Also,
the Air Force annually performs a comprehensive annual IGCA review to ensure it
has the proper work force mix. This review categorizes all organically performed
work as either an inherently governmental function (which must be performed by
organic personnel) or a commercial activity (could be performed by organic or contractor support).
Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across the Department of Air
Force, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions?
Secretary DONLEY. The annual Inherently Governmental and Commercial Activity
review is not currently utilized to track eliminated or divested functions, but rather,
identifies current positions that are either inherently governmental or a commercial
activity in nature. As efficiencies are realized, government positions identified with
performing those functions are removed from unit manning documents. Contractor
reductions associated with efficiencies are tracked via a combination of financial
commitments and organization surveys.
Ms. BORDALLO. Id like to ask you questions I posed to the service vice chiefs during an October hearing. Why would Congress consider any potential changes to recruiting and retention incentives such as military retirement and health care or reductions to essential training accounts when the military departments cant identify
the cost of what they pay for contracted services? So what is your military department doing to reduce contracted services and work requirements instead of just reducing dollars? If you are only reducing dollars then you are likely setting up conditions to default to contractors in light of the current civilian personnel constraints.
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force knows the dollars obligated/programmed for
contracted services and continues toward implementing a contractor manpower data
collection system, similar to the system the Army has developed, to manage the contractor full time equivalents providing these services. The Air Force is using the
planning, programming, and budget execution process to ensure workload reductions remain consistent with the contract dollar reduction. This force mix determination is reviewed annually during the presidents budget submission process to
ensure the Air Force maintains the most efficient and cost-effective means to perform the Air Force mission taking into account the current budget realities.
Ms. BORDALLO. When the Air Force says they are going to divest the block 30 inventory, does that mean that they are going to cut their losses with just the block
30s that havent hit the production or will you be mothballing all block 30s in the
inventory? How will this affect Guams strike/ISR capabilities?
General SCHWARTZ. Fourteen Global Hawk Block 30 aircraft have been delivered
to the Air Force and an additional four are in production. Pending congressional direction and consistent with appropriate statutes and regulations, the Air Force will
gauge interest for the transfer of these eighteen aircraft to qualified entities, both
internal and external to the Department of Defense (DOD), who express an interest.
The Air Force does not plan to spend fiscal year 2012 funding for the remaining
three Block 30 aircraft at this time.

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In September 2011, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that high-altitude intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance force structure could be reduced. The Air
Force further determined the U2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was
sufficient to meet these reduced requirements. There will be no impact to
warfighting capability, and peacetime support will be managed by the current Global Force Management Process.
Ms. BORDALLO. Have you worked with the Army to come up with a plan to compensate or fill the gap for the loss of the C27J platform and if so, what is it?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force and Army signed a Direct Support Memorandum of Understanding on 27 January 2012. Divesting the C27J fleet does not
create a capability gap as the Air Force continues to maintain the more capable and
cost effective C130. The Air Force remains fully committed to support time-sensitive, mission-critical direct support airlift to the Army and will continue to provide
direct airlift support to the U.S. Army with the fleet of 318 C130s. Currently, C
130s are providing daily direct support airlift in the Central Command area of responsibility.
Ms. BORDALLO. Could either of you explain in more detail why you proposed a
larger cut in Air Guard & Reserve forces, than you did in Active Duty forces? Will
this impact the Air Forces deployment ops tempo and if so, how?
General SCHWARTZ. The new Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic Guidance
Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense directs the
services to build a force that will be smaller and leaner, flexible, ready and technologically advanced. To deliver the capabilities required by this strategy, and remain
within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all service core
functions. While remaining consistent with the new strategy, the Air Force FY13
Budget submission achieves $8.7 billion in savings across the Active and Reserve
Components by retiring over 200 aircraft in FY13 and 286 aircraft over the Future
Years Defense Plan. Our programmed force reductions are wide-ranging and affect
over 60 installations.
This was an integrated, Total Force effortActive Duty, Reserve and National
Guardworking together to achieve our end state of a ready and sustainable force
that can meet our surge and rotational requirements. My directive to the Air Force
was to realign our forces to better meet this new strategic guidance using the following four principles: ensure the Total Force can fulfill surge requirements; maintain a balance between components that allows us to fulfill continuing rotational requirements at sustainable rates; retain the recruiting, training and operational seasoning base required to sustain the Total Forces needs into the future; and ensure
the Reserve Component remains relevant and engaged in both enduring and evolving missions.
To meet this end, the Air National Guard (ANG) developed five Capstone Principles to help guide this transition: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG
equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular
Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. Similarly, our Reserve Component used the following four principles: ensure aircraft reductions do not negatively impact operational support to
Combatant Commands; ensure force structure movements do not create any new Air
Force bills; ensure risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected
increases in mission capability rates; and, consider locations that continue to have
an Air Force mission due to the presence of another Air Force Component. This
Total Force approach allowed us to maintain the right Active/Air Guard/Reserve
mix, which will allow us to meet our operational demands with a leaner force while
taking care of our Airmen.
Ms. BORDALLO. In reviewing the Presidents proposed FY13 budget it appears
many critical B52 programs were cut. As the backbone of the Air Forces nuclear
and conventional bomber fleet, what is the Air Forces plan to maintain a reliable
and viable B52 with such drastic cuts?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force continues to ensure the B52 stays relevant
throughout its service life (2040) by focusing on bomber sustainment and addressing
diminishing manufacturing source (DMS) issues in the fiscal year 2013 Presidents
Budget. Efforts such as the development of replacement visual displays in the restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) program and
modernization of the anti-skid braking system address existing supportability
issues. Multiple smaller efforts continue to add B52 capability including Military
Standard 1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade (1760 IWBU) and Mode S/5 Identification Friend or Foe (IFF). Funding totals include $202M for research, development, test and evaluation and $250M for procurement across the Future Years De-

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fense Plan. The B52 remains the backbone of the USAF manned strategic bomber
force; we are actively supporting the continued bomber presence in Guam and maintaining a high state of nuclear mission readiness.
Ms. BORDALLO. One of the cut programs is the CONECT program. It provides
much-needed digital communication and mission retasking capability for our
warfighters, which is essential for B52 missions, especially with the added emphasis on the Pacific theater. With this program successfully finishing flight test, why
would the Air Force cut the production funding, and leave our crews with a temporary laptop solution that doesnt satisfy the CONECT operational requirements?
General SCHWARTZ. Based on competing budget priorities, the Air Force restructured Combat Network Communications Technology (CONECT) to address the sustainability issues within the program and the replacement of legacy displays. The
restructured program also funds conversion of the temporary Evolutionary Datalink
(EDL) system into a permanent modification, which provides a viable (although less
robust) communication capability for the B52. This decision was made as part of
a balanced investment strategy for the Air Force Nuclear Deterrence portfolio. At
the time the decision was made, CONECT had not completed the flight test program, and the program faced significant cost, schedule, and performance issues. The
completion of MS C certification later this year provides the Air Force an option to
re-examine the CONECT program in future budget cycles.
Ms. BORDALLO. Another program proposed to be completely terminated is the replacement of the B52 radar. The reliability of the current radar, which will continue to degrade, results in ever-increasing cost and unacceptable impact to the
probability of success of long missions. With the nuclear and conventional importance of the B52, how do we maintain a much-needed capability without a radar
replacement program?
General SCHWARTZ. To meet higher priorities, the Air Force has elected to maintain the current B52 APQ166 radar versus investing in a replacement radar with
higher near-term costs. Analysis indicates that the current B52 radar system is
sustainable through the B52s service life (2040). Warner Robins Air Logistics Center (WRALC) will pursue reverse engineering/sustainment initiatives to address
radar reliability and availability to meet B52 mission requirements.
Ms. BORDALLO. In October when General Breedlove testified to this committee, I
asked him about the statutorily required inventory of contracts for services. His response was that there the Air Force as in an ongoing review that was looking at
everything we do contractually and particularly What is inherently governmental
and what should we be retaining as a blue suit requirement versus those things
that we contract for . . . and how does that relate to those jobs that typically our
civilians also do, civilians who are a part of our Air Force. Can you please share
the results of that review and what the end-result has been in terms of realignment
of work? Please provide a list identifying services that have since been cut or reduced, and instances where contracted work has been reassigned to Airmen or Air
Force civilians.
General SCHWARTZ. The review to which General Breedlove was referring was the
inventory of contract services review requirements, defined in Title 10, Section
2330a, Procurement of Services. The end result is that we preliminarily identified
approximately 400 contractor full-time equivalents who may be performing inherently governmental functions out of our full inventory of 143,184 contractor full-time
equivalents. This work spans the 91 instances reflected in government Accountability Office (GAO) Report Number GAO12357, Defense AcquisitionsFurther
Actions Needed to Improve Accountability for the Department of Defenses Inventory of Contracted Services. This includes a variety of acquisition and professional
services, primarily technical functions, such as accounting, quality control, management support services, engineering and technical, financial, program management,
and other professional services. We are still working on our final assessment and
disposition. For those functions determined to be inherently governmental, remedial
actions may range from divestiture of the service, restructuring the contract, or
insourcing the function.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY

Mr. COURTNEY. Please describe the anticipated mission and use of the MC12
once transferred to the Air National Guard. Do you see this mission as a long-term,
enduring mission for those units receiving this platform? Is the USAF committed
to the MC12 program through the FYDP, to include all necessary manpower and
platform funding requirements?

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Secretary DONLEY. Once transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG), the MC
12W could provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, homeland defense, and border patrol missions, as well as continue to support deployed ISR operations. Once
they reach Full Operational Capability (FOC), the ANG will sustain two steady
state Combat Air Patrols (CAP), with the ability to surge to six total CAPs. In addition, the Air Force will create an active duty associate unit to augment MC12W
operations which will maintain long-term active duty Air Force expertise/presence
in MC12W operations/capabilities. The active unit will augment the ANGs steady
state CAPs and have the capability to surge to four CAPs if required for a total of
ten Total Force MC12W CAPs. The MC12W is an enduring Air Force capability
that will stay with us beyond the conclusion of the current engagements. The Air
Force has programmed all necessary funds and manpower through the FYDP.
Mr. COURTNEY. Please describe the anticipated mission and use of the MC12
once transferred to the Air National Guard. Do you see this mission as a long-term,
enduring mission for those units receiving this platform? Is the USAF committed
to the MC12 program through the FYDP, to include all necessary manpower and
platform funding requirements?
General SCHWARTZ. Once transferred to the Air National Guard (ANG), the MC
12W could provide Defense Support to Civil Authorities, homeland defense, and border patrol missions, as well as continue to support deployed ISR operations. Once
they reach Full Operational Capability (FOC), the ANG will sustain two steady
state Combat Air Patrols (CAP), with the ability to surge to six total CAPs. In addition, the Air Force will create an active duty associate unit to augment MC12W
operations which will maintain long-term active duty Air Force expertise/presence
in MC12W operations/capabilities. The active unit will augment the ANGs steady
state CAPs and have the capability to surge to four CAPs if required for a total of
ten Total Force MC12W CAPs. The MC12W is an enduring Air Force capability
that will stay with us beyond the conclusion of the current engagements. The Air
Force has programmed all necessary funds and manpower through the FYDP.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK
Mr. LOEBSACK. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is an important initiative
intended to build capabilities and partnerships between the U.S. military and our
allies where our shared interest in defeating insurgency and other threats are advanced through the operation of aircraft familiar to the U.S. military and well suited to the relevant missions. Is it the Air Forces intention that the LAS aircraft comply with U.S. weapons, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners to work seamlessly?
Secretary DONLEY. The Afghan LAS aircraft will comply with U.S. weapon, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners
to work seamlessly. That said, the LAS aircraft program will also adhere to U.S.
export policy governing military equipment transfers to Afghanistan. Accordingly,
the LAS aircraft communications and weapons capabilities will be configured to the
envisioned future Afghan Air Force (AAF), but not necessarily state-of-the-art U.S.
Air Force capability. U.S. Air Force and NATO military personnel will train and advise the AAF on maintaining and employing the LAS aircraft. The aircraft will employ U.S. and NATO-standard weaponry, interface with friendly forces via common
communications equipment and follow U.S. design standards to ensure safety and
maintainability.
Mr. LOEBSACK. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is an important initiative
intended to build capabilities and partnerships between the U.S. military and our
allies where our shared interest in defeating insurgency and other threats are advanced through the operation of aircraft familiar to the U.S. military and well suited to the relevant missions. Is it the Air Forces intention that the LAS aircraft comply with U.S. weapons, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners to work seamlessly?
General SCHWARTZ. The Afghan LAS aircraft will comply with U.S. weapon, communications, and design standards in order for U.S. military personnel and partners
to work seamlessly. That said, the LAS aircraft program will also adhere to U.S.
export policy governing military equipment transfers to Afghanistan. Accordingly,
the LAS aircraft communications and weapons capabilities will be configured to the
envisioned future Afghan Air Force (AAF), but not necessarily state-of-the-art U.S.
Air Force capability. U.S. Air Force and NATO military personnel will train and advise the AAF on maintaining and employing the LAS aircraft. The aircraft will employ U.S. and NATO-standard weaponry, interface with friendly forces via common

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communications equipment and follow U.S. design standards to ensure safety and
maintainability.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER
Mr. SHUSTER. The current FMS LAS requirement is 20 aircraft for Afghanistan.
Over the course of the next 10 to 15 years, do you anticipate the LAS program expanding to other countries beyond Afghanistan and if so, will the contract made
with Afghanistan serve as any type of program of record for future foreign military
sales? Is there a requirement within the FMS LAS program to Afghanistan that
U.S. forces will partner with Afghanistan to train and mentor them on the system?
If so, should the LAS platform be familiar to U.S. forces to facilitate this training?
Secretary DONLEY. The Light Air Support (LAS) program is funded by Afghan Security Forces Funds and provides a light attack capability specifically for Afghanistan. This program is specifically for Afghanistan and no plan currently exists to
extend the platform beyond Afghanistan. However, it could be used as a model for
future light attack foreign military sales. There is a requirement within the Afghan
LAS program for U.S. forces to partner with the Afghan Air Force to train and advise them on the system. Although there are advantages to U.S. forces being familiar with the LAS platform, this is not an absolute requirement. The USAF will leverage experienced USAF instructor pilots, maintainers and logisticians capable of
quickly learning the LAS system and then training and advising their Afghan counterparts.
Mr. SHUSTER. What is the Air Force justification for not acquiring the technical
data rights to the F117 engine? Does the Air Force have a plan to acquire such data
rights?
Secretary DONLEY. Under the procurement and sustainment contracts, the Air
Force has never purchased data rights for the F117 engine because: (1) under the
C17 contract, Boeing acquired the engines from Pratt & Whitney (P&W) as a commercial item; and (2) under the Air Force contract to acquire engines, the Air Force
used a commercial contract. P&W paid for the development of these engines. Also,
the C17 sustainment program included Contractor Logistics Support for life; therefore, there was no need to acquire data rights. Since then, the Air Force has decided
to break out the engine technical overhaul, supply chain management and systems
engineering from the C17 support. As a result, the Air Force is currently working
two separate contract actions to acquire licensed use of P&Ws technical manual,
and to acquire the data rights for the System Engineering and Supply Chain Management processes for the F117 engine. In December 2011, P&W agreed to a General Terms Agreement release of their technical manual for basic F117 repairs, and
the Air Force will further pursue Government Purpose Rights on historical supply
chain management and systems engineering to enhance future competition.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY
Mr. CONAWAY. During our review of the FY11 Omnibus reprogramming, it came
to light that funds to support the operations in Libya would be funded internally.
The total realignment from within Operation & Maintenance, Air Force was estimated at over $400 million. What was the final realignment in FY11, and with realignments of this magnitude, what mission requirements were not supported due
to this internal support of the Libyan operation?
Secretary DONLEY. The final FY11 Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Air Force
costs in support of operations in Libya were $408 million (both flying hours and
non-flying hours). In addition, O&M, Air Force had to reimburse the Air National
Guard O&M $99 million for flying hours flown in support of Title 10 missions.
The flying hours were sourced from the Air Forces baseline flying hour program.
Instead of the hours being flown at home station, they were flown in support of
Libya. The pilots still received some level of training therefore there was no loss to
the flying hour training program. The remainder of the support funding supported
transportation, travel, base support, communication and global lift and sustainment.
To fully support Libyan operations, funding was sourced from the Airlift Readiness
Account and lower priority base operating requirements.
Mr. CONAWAY. The MCRS16 study recommends using C17s for intratheater airlift but several senior mobility leaders in the past have been concerned that we are
overusing the 30-year/30,000-hour life expectancy of that airframe too quickly. Can
you tell me what the average age and number of hours our C17 fleet currently has
on it?

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General SCHWARTZ. As of 29 February 2012, the average age of the C17 fleet was
8.9 years and the average number of hours per aircraft was 10,104.
Mr. CONAWAY. During our review of the FY11 Omnibus reprogramming, it came
to light that funds to support the operations in Libya would be funded internally.
The total realignment from within Operation & Maintenance, Air Force was estimated at over $400 million. What was the final realignment in FY11, and with realignments of this magnitude, what mission requirements were not supported due
to this internal support of the Libyan operation?
General SCHWARTZ. The final FY11 Operation & Maintenance (O&M), Air Force
costs in support of operations in Libya were $408 million (both flying hours and
non-flying hours). In addition, O&M, Air Force had to reimburse the Air National
Guard O&M $99 million for flying hours flown in support of Title 10 missions.
The flying hours were sourced from the Air Forces baseline flying hour program.
Instead of the hours being flown at home station, they were flown in support of
Libya. The pilots still received some level of training therefore there was no loss to
the flying hour training program. The remainder of the support funding supported
transportation, travel, base support, communication and global lift and sustainment.
To fully support Libyan operations, funding was sourced from the Airlift Readiness
Account and lower priority base operating requirements.
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. WITTMAN. General Schwartz: With the reduction in strategic lift assets for the
Air Force and the previous reduction in the prepositioned stocks of the Army and
the Marine Corps, what missions will be eliminated to meet the equipment availability? How will the Administration be able to accomplish all combatant commander theater plans with reduced strategic lift capabilities?
General SCHWARTZ. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. HUNTER. I understand that only about 15% of Air Forces engine sustainment
contracts are competed. What is your estimate of the savings that could be achieved
from more effective use of competition in this area?
Secretary DONLEY. The United States Air Force is committed to competition in the
propulsion enterprise to achieve the best value for our warfighter while preserving
system safety. Typically, life-cycle sustainment decisions regarding data rights made
in the early phases of a propulsion systems acquisition significantly impact the pace
and degree of competition for an engine during the sustainment phase.
Today, the Air Force leverages competition at three different levels of an engine
during sustainment:
1. At the weapon system/whole engine level, the Air Force attempts to gain sufficient access (e.g., via licensing) to sustainment data in order to facilitate competition
of engine overhaul and supply chain management. As an example, the Air Force secured the necessary sustainment data to compete the sustainment, to include overhaul and supply chain management, of the F103 engine (KC10 aircraft).
2. At the component repair/replace decision point, the Air Force leverages the use
of component repairs to the maximum extent practicable. Components can often be
repaired more economically than replaced with new components, and a repair capability provides the Air Force with an additional source of supply. For example, the
Air Force introduced a repair for an air seal in the F100 engine (F15/F16 aircraft)
reducing the need for new air seal replacement by 90 percent.
3. At the individual part level, the Air Force is engaged in several initiatives to
create alternative sources. These initiatives include expanding the base of new manufacturers beyond the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) and evaluating
potential sources for repaired and used parts. To expand to new manufacturers, the
Air Force encourages industry to submit Source Approval Requests (SARs) to obtain
certification to compete as alternative sources. The SAR process is designed to balance safety with competition and cost improvement objectives. Evaluating sources
for repaired and used parts, the Air Force recently competed new, OEM parts
against used parts with exceptional results. The Air Force achieved a $36M savings
(projected cost of $43M, versus contract cost of $7M) by leveraging a source of used
fan blades for the F108 (KC135 engine). The Air Force continues to expand this
type of individual part competition and the pool of alternative sources.
Mr. HUNTER. The Air Force awarded an $11.75 billion sole source maintenance
contract for continuing the C17 Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) using the justification and approval rationale from 2009 without change.

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What actions do you intend to take with regard to this issue to ensure competition
in sustainment of weapon systems?
What are you doing to increase opportunities for competition, particularly at the
subsystem and component level where broad commercial capabilities often exist?
Secretary DONLEY. On November 29, 2009, the Air Force Service Acquisition Executive approved a justification and approval document that permitted the award
of a sole source contract to the Boeing Company to provide Performance Based Logistics (PBL) for the C17 weapon system. The Air Force entered into this contract
with the Boeing Company on October 1, 2011.
The structure of the contract allows the program office to evaluate Boeing support
on a monthly basis as well as develop alternative sustainment strategies should the
contractor not produce desired outcomes at committed-to costs. While not a traditional form of competition, the option to move work from Boeing to the Government
has proven to be a successful incentive and form of competition for the C17 program.
The C17 Program Office is pursuing further competition for sustainment of the
F117 engine. The Program Office is planning a competitive award for Performance
Based Service Arrangement (PBSA) for overhaul of F117PW100 (C17) engines,
to include F117 depot Supply Chain Management (SCM). This competitive acquisition strategy should yield F117 engine sustainment at reduced costs, while sustaining F117 performance outcomes.
To increase competition at the weapon system subsystem and component level,
Air Force Instruction 63101 (October 2011) mandates that all source of repair analysis (SORA) determinations be conducted at the System/Subsystem level. In the C
17 PBL program, all depot maintenance is placed on contract to Boeing, the product
support integrator (PSI) responsible for performance outcomes. The PSI contracts
with either Government depots or other product support providers, for repairs in
support of the weapon system. Boeing and the technical repair centers negotiate repair quantities quarterly, based on the repair center capacity and best value to the
Government. For example, two viable sources of C17 airframe depot repair are
maintained, fostering competition, supporting required C17 maintenance and modification throughput, reducing program costs and depot schedule risk.
Mr. HUNTER. As the Air Force moves to transition engines such as the F119,
F117, F135 into Tinker Air Logistics Center, what is being done to ensure competition and to reduce organizational conflict of interest in the supply chain relating to
the servicing of systems, subsystems, and components?
General SCHWARTZ. The F119 has transitioned to organic depot maintenance
under a partnership arrangement with Pratt & Whitney. However, the supply chain
management (SCM) responsibilities for the F119 engine remains with the contractor. The Air Force made the decision to keep SCM responsibilities for the F
22 airframe and engine with their respective contractors for another five years
based on the Jan 10 F22 Product Support Strategy Business Case Analysis to reduce risk to the government by allowing the F22 weapon system to fully mature.
The F22 Program Manager will revisit the BCA decision in five years to determine
if SCM responsibilities should be transitioned to organic execution.
The United States Air Force (USAF) approach to increasing competition for the
F117 engine is to secure access to the overhaul and component repair manuals as
well as other technical data. Access to these manuals and data will allow the Air
Force to compete touch labor and supply chain management. In addition, because
the F117 is a commercial derivative engine, the USAF is working to approve NonOriginal Equipment Manufacturer parts and repairs by using the Source Approval
Process (SAR) detailed in AFMCI 23113. The USAF will implement this strategy
over a two year transition period to ensure all potential offerors are provided an opportunity to compete. This process injects competition at the engine and component
levels for parts and repairs. The strategy is designed to balance operational risk and
cost savings while providing support at the best competitive cost.
The F135 engine is still in acquisition and details of the sustainment strategy are
still being finalized.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ
Mr. CRITZ. The recent Air Force structure changes announced the closing of an
Air Reserve station in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, outside of the BRAC process. This
base serves 1,400 Active, Reserve and Guard units of both the Air Force and the
Navy. The base just completed an $8.1 million housing project and is set to break
ground on a $13.8 million joint Reserve center. The Air Force leases a hundred
acres at this base. It includes access to four runways, an FAA control tower, medical

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and crash fire response and zero-cost airfield maintenance, including snow removal
and capital improvements for $20,000 a year. The Pittsburgh region has significant
success with recruiting and that the 911th Airlift Wing is one of the highest manned
units in the Air Force Reserve Command. This being said, I cant understand why
the Air Force would make the decision to close this Air Reserve station. If this is
truly an issue with retiring C130s, then lets bring in new C130s to this very efficient and very effective wing so that this cost-effective base can continue to serve
both the Air Force and the Pittsburgh community. Can you provide, for congressional review, the cost analysis of the 911th Airlift Wing compared to others
throughout the Air Force that was used as the justification for closing this base?
Secretary DONLEY. While cost savings are part of the decision-making process, the
most important factor is the Air Forces ability to provide the capabilities required
by the new Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. This new strategy directs the services to build a
leaner, more flexible, and technologically advanced force. We made these decisions
after careful analysis. As we assessed intra-theater airlift using scenarios consistent
with the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air
Force studies determined excess capacity exists in the Air Force fleet. The reduced
intra-theater airlift requirement permitted retirement of 65 C130H aircraft. The
C130s proposed for retirement are among the oldest in the USAF fleet and would
require costly modifications and modernization efforts to keep the aircraft viable.
Twenty-seven bases worldwide have C130s assigned; of the 27 bases, either force
structure reductions or aircraft transfers affected 18 of them. Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station has seven C130H2 aircraft assigned to the 911th Airlift Wing. The
FY13 President Budget submission retires all seven C130H2s in FY13, resulting
in a savings of $41 million across the Future Years Defense Plan and avoidance of
approximately $77 million in modernization costs.
With the reduction of the C130H2s, Pittsburgh Air Reserve Station becomes excess to Air Force needs. Since the number of full time civilians assigned to the installations below the BRAC threshold defined by 10 USC 2687(a)(1), I have recommended the base for closure. It is currently the only Air Force Reserve installation that meets these criteria, and as such, presents an opportunity to preserve national resources. After installation shutdown actions are complete, we expect an annual installation savings of approximately $25 million for the Air Force. In addition,
manpower savings associated with the C130 divestment will result in approximately $16 million savings the first year, and $32 million annual savings after that.
Other factors we considered in the decision are that Air Force Reserve bases at
Youngstown and Niagara are both within reasonable commuting distance from
Pittsburgh. As a result, those bases may be able to support continued military service for those members of the 911th Airlift Wing who wish to remain serving but are
unable to relocate to more distant Air Force Reserve
Mr. CRITZ. Regarding the reduction of 65 C130 tactical airlifters getting us to
a total fleet projection of 318: The Air Force planned in the fiscal year 2012 budget
to eventually modernize and upgrade 383 C130s and procure 38 C27Js to support intratheater, homeland defense, stead-state rotational, building partnership capacity, and Army time-sensitive/mission-critical airlift requirements. The Air Forces
minimum C130 force structure, as concluded in the Mobility Capability and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS16), was to go no lower than 335 C130s under the
QDR 2010 defense strategy. The budget request for fiscal year 2013 plans to divest
intertheater (strategic) and intratheater (tactical) force structure in support of the
new defense strategy. Air Force officials have stated that Case 3 of the MCRS
16 was the analytical underpinning for new mobility force structure associated with
the new 2012 defense strategy. As stated above, Air Force minimum C130 force
structure as concluded in MCRS16 was to go no lower than 335 C130s. However,
MCRS16 did not take into account United States Code Title 32 Air National Guard
or Army Guard airlift missions that would be required to support State Governor
mobilization missions nor did it account for the Armys time-sensitive/mission-critical mission and noted that additional C130s beyond the planned program of record
of 335 aircraft and 38 C27J aircraft may be required. Additionally, pre-9/11 the
Army was around 480,000 strong with 530 C130s, and now we are drawing down
to similar force levels, 490,000, with only 318 C130s planned. How will 318 C130s
support a force of 490,000 when pre-9/11 historical lift capacity indicates otherwise,
and MCRS16 Case 3 states that 335 C130s PLUS 38 C27Js is also not enough
to execute Title 32 and Army time-sensitive missions? Is the Air Forces plan to reduce or restrict Title 32 and other Army requirements?
Secretary DONLEY. The 2013 Presidential Budget Request reduced the C130 fleet
size to 318 aircraft to meet the requirement that was outlined in the new strategy
presented by the President and the Secretary of Defense. The fleet is sized to fulfill

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intra-theater (270 aircraft) and Direct Support Mission (48 aircraft). The new strategy reduces the requirements as forces are no longer sized to meet two near-simultaneous large scale campaigns. The MCRS16 had previously influenced sizing with
Case 1 (335 C130s) and Case 3 (270 C130s). However, Case 1 was based on two
near-simultaneous large-scale campaigns and, per the Office of the Secretary of Defense, is no longer a valid force-sizing scenario under the new strategy. Case 3, on
the other hand, is consistent with the new strategy. Although the MCRS scenarios
did not examine the Direct Support Mission, Case 3 did include airlift to support
two domestic missions, a major regional disaster, and a Homeland Defense event
to inform its 270 intra-theater aircraft requirements.
Mr. CRITZ. Part of my concern is that we are actually adding duties to the Air
Forces C130s, because they are going to be doing the C27J lift as well. Just as
a sort of general idea, I look at the C27J, it was going to be sort of the pick-up
truck and the C130 might be more like a tractor trailer truck. Im just curious if
the C130 is going to be able to get into the same airports as the C27, and is it
really a cost savings or are we going to start saying well we cant get into these
places so were going to up the tempo for the Chinooks to do what the C130s cant
do. My question is, long-termthis is a short-term savingsis it also a long-term
savings? Have we looked at the 2030 year life cycle of these aircraft?
Secretary DONLEY. According to the RAND USAF Intra-Theater Airlift Fleet Mix
Analysis, Oct 2010; during sea-level/standard day conditions, the C27J and C130J
require 2000 ft/2200 ft runway respectively. However, under high pressure altitude/
high temperature conditions which are representative of the majority of current operations in Afghanistan, the C130J only requires 2600 feet while the C27J requires 2700 feet with approximately 43% less payload. Further analysis of take off
capability for the C27J, C130J, and C130H reveals very similar short-field take
off characteristics, with relatively miniscule differences in take off capability. The
C27J is a niche capability providing access to airfields that are 1700 feet or less
in length. While this capability is not without value, current operations in deployed
locations show that there are no airfields being used by the C27J that cannot be
accessed by the C130J.
In regard to long-term savings, there are substantial long-term savings associated
with the divestiture of the C27J. The 25-year life-cycle cost of the aircraft is $308M
based on the May, 2011 Service Cost Position. Overall long-term cost avoidance for
divesting the previously programmed fleet of 38 aircraft is $11.7B.
Mr. CRITZ. What are the Air Forces plans for the 21 C27s already procured?
Secretary DONLEY. The final disposition determination of the C27J fleet will not
be made until the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act is signed into law. The
full range of disposition options is being considered.
Mr. CRITZ. The Air Forces decision to delay orders for 179 F35s over the next
five years will likely have an impact on overall program cost, and the cost-per-aircraft. This will affect our international partners as well as our own bottom line. In
your budget analysis, what cost increases were assumed for the purchase delays?
Secretary DONLEY. The Department of Defense made a decision reflected in the
Presidents Budget 2013 (PB13) budget request to delay the order of 179 F35s (all
three variants). The Air Force share of this delay includes a reduced procurement
of 98 conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017. When a decision is made to delay procurement of aircraft, there are
two primary effects on unit recurring flyaway cost. First, the contractor will not be
as far down the learning curve in procurement and so average costs of the smaller
quantity procured will be higher. Second, fixed contractor costs will be spread over
fewer quantities. The increase in CTOL (F35A) Unit Recurring Flyaway cost between PB12 and PB13 are shown below.
CTOL URF
Buy Year

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

FY12 (SAR 10)

$112.1

$96.7

$91.2

$80.6

$84.8

FY13 (SAR 11)

$123.2

$122.0

$107.7

$93.4

$91.4

URF Increase ($)

$11.1

$25.3

$16.5

$12.8

$6.6

URF Increase (%)

9.9%

26.2%

18.1%

15.9%

7.8%

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Despite this projected increase in unit cost, the Air Force felt it a prudent choice
to delay these quantities so as to reduce the risk of concurrent development and procurement. Since flight testing is not scheduled to be complete until fiscal year 2017,
there is risk that planes procured now may require expensive retrofits later. The
Air Force felt reducing this risk of concurrency outweighs any short-term increases
in unit cost driven by the delay in procurement quantities within the Future Years
Defense Plan. In addition, these delays allow the aircraft prime contractor time to
stabilize production, decrease scrap and rework, and work through final finishes/
flight line issues.
Mr. CRITZ. In an interview with Defense News 27 February, DOD Comptroller
Robert Hale, in response to a question regarding the cancelling of the C27J program, stated that In the case of the C27, we have enough C130s to do most of
that mission. What percentage of the mission will C130s not be able to cover, and
what asset(s) will cover the remainder of that mission?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is postured to fully meet the Direct Support airlift mission requirements. C27J was developed and procured to provide direct support airlift to Army urgent needs in difficult environments such as Afghanistan
where we thought the C130 might not be able to operate effectively. However, in
practice, we did not experience the anticipated airfield constraints for C130 operations in Afghanistan; furthermore, we expect these constraints to be marginal in
future scenarios. The Air Force has analyzed scenarios consistent with the new
strategy and determined a range of 2250 aircraft would meet direct support airlift
requirements. The 2013 Presidential Budget Request reduced the C130 fleet size
to 318 aircraft to meet the requirements of the new strategy. The fleet is sized to
fulfill intra-theater airlift (270 aircraft) and the Direct Support airlift mission (48
aircraft).
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What contracting structure will the Air Force pursue regarding its EELV procurement? Has Air Force determined a quantity or duration
for the next EELV acquisition, starting in FY13? If so, what types of off-ramps
are you considering to the block buy, if/when a New Entrant is qualified?
Secretary DONLEY. The contracting structure is two-fold: release a Request for
Proposal (RFP) that will properly inform a government decision on the quantity and
length of the first block buy; and then award a contract based on analysis of the
most advantageous approach to the government. The Air Force has not determined
a final quantity or duration for the contract starting in fiscal year 2013. The Air
Force believes it is essential to have more fidelity in the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle (EELV) pricing strategy before making a long term contractual
agreement. In order to validate the most advantageous production rate and commitment period, and to use maximum leverage in negotiations, the Government will require the contractor to propose a range of fixed prices for various rate and commitment options. The Government decision on the specific contractual commitment will
be balanced among price, operational requirements, budget realities (including all
fiscal law constraints), and potential for competition. Requirements above the commitment will be met through a full-and-open competition among all certified providers. While United Launch Alliance (ULA) is currently the only responsible source
certified to launch EELV class payloads, research indicates there are potential New
Entrants; however, the earliest timeframe to meet all EELV-class launch requirements appears to be fiscal year 20162017.
To facilitate the certification of potential New Entrants, the Air Force has identified two opportunities that providers may bid onthe Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) mission, targeted for launch in late fiscal year 2014, and the Space
Test Program (STP) mission, targeted for launch in late fiscal year 2015. These
EELV-class missions have a higher risk tolerance and will provide an opportunity
for potential New Entrants to prove their capability for certification. When the
Phase I Block Buy expires, assuming New Entrants are certified, we will have a
full and open competition for launch services for the second Block Buy.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Currently the Air Force has 39 rocket booster cores purchased from ULA for 35 missions that have not yet launched, some purchased back
in 1998. Given this substantial backlog of orders, why havent prices come down already? Indeed, why have they continued to increase by more than 50 percent?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force currently has 16 rocket booster cores on order
to support 16 mission launches. For all National Security Space partners (National
Reconnaissance Office, Navy, Air Force, and Australia) combined there are 32 rocket
booster cores for 28 mission launches on order; 17 of these are currently in the pro-

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duction flow to be launched in fiscal year 2012 and 2013. Another 9 cores are projected to be launched in fiscal year 2014, while the remaining five are projected to
fly out by fiscal year 2016, exhausting the backlog. The backlog does not affect the
current vehicle pricing as the programs initial inventory of components and smaller
follow-on lot quantity buys are being depleted. Additionally, production breaks, production rework, subsequent recertification, annual inflation and a reduced supplier
business base have driven higher unit costs, particularly from propulsion system
suppliers. As a result of these factors, United Launch Alliances costs to build the
launch vehicle have increased.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. When my staff looks at the Air Force Total Ownership Cost
data for U2 and Global Hawk, we see that in 2011 the cost per operational hour
(that is, the cost per hour executing missions) for Global Hawk is lower than U
2. This seems to be a much more relevant number than cost per flying hour. How
does this square with your claim that Global Hawk operating costs are higher?
Secretary DONLEY. The Global Hawk Block 30 has not matured to the point where
a true apples-to-apples cost comparison of operational costs is possible. Nevertheless, the Department conducted an analysis during the FY13 budget review using
the Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database where Global Hawk and U
2 operating and support costs were compared using the operational cost per flying
hour (CPFH) metric. This metric reflects costs associated with the sum total of a
platforms flying hours including training hours and the flying hours associated with
mission execution. The AFTOC figures for FY11 show the U2 had $32K per hour
and the RQ4 also had $32K per hour. The Air Force did not begin flying the RQ
4 Block 30 until March 2011, so there is only six months of representative flying
hour information in the database. Also, the Air Force did not fly the RQ4 Block
30 with the SIGINT sensor in 2011. The Air Force will begin flying this payload
in April 2012 and once operational, we expect the Global Hawk CPFH to increase
relative to those of the U2. Given these flying hour cost considerations, and the
large investment required for the RQ4, the Air Force chose to divest the Block 30
program and save a net of $2.5B.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. The Department based its Global Hawk Block 30 divestment
decision on it being more expensive to operate than the U2. Can you explain how
the Department determined these costs?
Secretary DONLEY. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON
Mr. JOHNSON. Secretary Donley: How long will the A10 aircraft remaining in
service under your budget proposal stay in the fleet?
Secretary DONLEY. Under our current plans, the A10 will remain in the Air
Force inventory through 2035. At that time, the average age of remaining A10s
in the fleet will be approximately 53 years old.
Mr. JOHNSON. General Schwartz: Even after the B2 is not adequately survivable
in the least permissive air defense environments, the U.S. Armed Forces will have
the F35, the F22, cruise missiles, prompt global strike capability, and long-range
stealthy unmanned strike aircraft. To complement this set of impressive strike systems, what unique capabilities will a manned next-generation bomber provide?
Please specify those unique capabilities the bomber would provide such that its role
is not redundant given the other systems at the disposal of the Armed Forces.
General SCHWARTZ. The Long Range Strike Bombers unique capabilities include
long range, significant payload capacity, operational flexibility, and survivability in
anti-access environments.
The Long Range Strike Bomber will provide the President with the option to hold
any target at risk at any point on the globe. Its long range, large payload, and survivability will provide operational flexibility and necessary capacity to satisfy Joint
commander needs across the range of military operations. Fighters provide great
value in shorter range engagements, but offer limited capability and capacity to
service targets deep within enemy territory, especially if theater basing is constrained or unavailable.
The Long Range Strike Bomber will employ a broad mix of standoff and direct
attack munitions to provide effects within hours across the spectrum of conflict,
from deterrence to raids to campaigns. While standoff weapons provide an essential
capability to prosecute targets in dense anti-access environments, their significant
expense and limited quantity constrain their capacity to address an extensive target
set. Further, standoff weapons are less effective against mobile targets due to the
fleeting nature of the targets coupled with the finite speed of the weapons. A surviv-

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able bomber fleet is necessary to penetrate enemy air defenses and deliver the volume of munitions required to address the potential target set.
In addition, bombers remain a key element of our nuclear deterrence capability
and are the only systems that can be surged, relocated, and recalled. The Long
Range Strike Bomber will be designed from the outset to be capable of nuclear
weapons employment and certified for nuclear operations in time to meet United
States Strategic Commands nuclear force structure requirements.
Despite upgrades, our aging bomber inventories are increasingly at risk to modern
air defenses and are becoming increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain and
modernize. The Air Force plans to field 80100 Long Range Strike Bombers beginning in the mid-2020s to ensure they are available before the current aging bomber
fleet begins to go out of service.
Mr. JOHNSON. General: Were retiring A10s, unmanned systems provide useful
air-to-ground capabilities but are controlled from thousands of miles away, and the
F35 cant fully replicate the close air support capabilities of the A10. In future
land warfare scenarios, how are we going to provide close air support to troops in
combat?
General SCHWARTZ. The remaining A10, F16, MQ9, MQ1, F15E, B1, & B
52 aircraft force structure will meet the requirements for air-to-ground and Close
Air Support capability. This aircraft force structure is based on conducting one
large-scale combined-arms campaign in a single region while simultaneously denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, an opportunistic aggressor
in a second region. Multi-role platforms were preferred over the A10 due to providing greater utility across the range of potential missions for which the Air Force
is directed to prepare.
Mr. JOHNSON. General: Does the F35 fully replicate the close air support capabilities of the A10?
General SCHWARTZ. When test and development is complete and the USAF has
sufficient capability and capacity of Joint Strike Fighters to begin replacing our legacy fleet, the F35 will have the appropriate capabilities to safely and effectively
conduct the close air support (CAS) mission, similar to our F16 and F15E fleets.
While not optimized for CAS like the A10, the F35 will be able to conduct this
mission and survive in the higher threat scenarios we expect to face in the future.
Although the F35 will eventually replace the A10, the USAF is planning to keep
A10s in our fleet to provide CAS for ground forces until at least the 2030s. Replacement of the single-mission focused A10 with the multi-role F35 provides the
USAF and the Department of Defense a more affordable solution to retire and replace our aging legacy fleet while ensuring our ability to meet National Military
Strategy requirements.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. HECK
Dr. HECK. The F35 provides a significant challenge to the Nevada Test and
Training Range (NTTR). The F35 has new unique capabilites in the way that it
detects and engages ground threats (Surface to Air Missile Systems, Aquisition Radars, etc.) F35 targets are not only detected via radio signals and infared signatures, but also proper visual signatures. At this time, the NTTR does not have
ground target systems that can provide all three parameters to the F35s being
trained at the NTTR.
1) Does the Air Force see this as a challenge in supporting current and future
F35 training within the existing NTTR infrastructure?
2) How does the Air Force intend on employing the existing NTTR capability in
support of that training?
3) If there are identified shortfalls in support of F35 training, what are they,
what are the capabilities required to alleviate them, and what are the associated
costs and priorities for each needed capability?
4) If capabilites are needed, when do they need to be in place to support propper
F35 training?
5) What are the current personnel authorization changes at Nellis AFB or the
NTTR resulting from the current F35 program in FY13 budget and are they quantified at this time?
Secretary DONLEY. The unique capabilities of the F35 do create challenges for
the Air Force in providing support for future training at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). However, these challenges are being addressed and will be met
through various avenues of approach. The Air Force is in the process of investigating and acquiring threat emitters that will be used to meet the requirements
of the F35. Additionally, many of the challenges posed by the F35 will be met by

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creating a training environment that is not only composed of traditional threats and
threat emitters, but will synthesize virtual threats creating a combined Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training environment. This composition will allow the
NTTR and other ranges supporting the F35 to provide necessary training.
The NTTR will employ its existing capabilities, along with those in the acquisition
process, to provide the live portion of the LVC concept. To meet the unique sensor
requirements of the F35, the NTTR is developing a CONOPs for a dry sensor fusion range that will consist of realistic targets/decoys. Additionally, the NTTR is
investigating the use of assets currently located at other ranges to increase its capabilities. The NTTR is working with Pacific Air Forces to examine the option of entering into a phased threat sharing agreement that will provide additional threat
density and realistic threat emitters to meet the F35 training requirements. The
first phase will only include one threat emitter. While the NTTR currently provides
the best training for F22 and 5th gen aircraft and has the best target sets available, these target sets alone are not sufficient to provide realistic training when
multiple sensors (EO, visual, Radar) are fused into a single picture. (These limitations also exist within current 4th generation training.) Current emitters are also
insufficient to provide adequate density to fully replicate threat environments. To
meet these shortfalls Air Combat Command (ACC) is procuring more threat
emitters for NTTR; however it is impractical to procure enough emitters to fully represent threats anticipated in current operational plans. ACC intends to use LVC
training to overcome these shortfalls by providing sufficient threat density and realistic training to stress pilots. New targets need to be in-place by 1 August 2014
when the first F35s are scheduled to arrive at the Air Force Weapons School.
There are no personnel authorization changes at the NTTR resulting from the current F35 program in the FY13 budget.
Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop:
1) Secretary Donnelly, in FY2013, the Air Force has requested $135.4 million in
RDT&E funds in the Intercontinental Ballistic MissileEngineering and Manufacturing Development funding line (PE 0604851F). Air Force budget justification documents cite a sub-element request of $8.0 million for a new start Solid Rocket Motor
Modernization program. Specifically, related justification documents state that the
Air Force plans to use these funds to:
Accomplish studies to investigate the application of new technologies in the Minuteman III booster stack. Evaluate current Minuteman III solid rocket motor requirements and update as required based on legacy system issues and availability
of mature technology that will reduce total ownership costs. Prepare for release of
requests for proposals.
What new technologies do you foresee being investigated during these studies?
Budget documents show no funds requested in the out-years for this effort. With no
follow-on funding requested, how will any of these technologies be fully developed?
Secretary DONLEY. New technology candidates for insertion into a possible solid
rocket motor program include components the Air Force has developed within the
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Demonstration/Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP). Included in these are advanced propellants, igniters, composite case materials, case insulation, thrust vector actuators, and nozzles. In fiscal year 2013, the Air Force will analyze the maturity level of available
technologies and identify the most promising candidates.
ICBM Dem/Val matures technology to a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 6 and
then makes it available for use within a program where it can be fully developed
and integrated into a production effort. The candidates identified in fiscal year 2013
will be assessed for use in a future Minuteman III Solid Rocket Motor Modernization program as well as in any ICBM follow-on program considered in the Ground
Based Strategic Deterrence (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives, which is funded in fiscal year 2013 and fiscal year 2014.
Dr. HECK. The F35 provides a significant challenge to the Nevada Test and
Training Range (NTTR). The F35 has new unique capabilites in the way that it
detects and engages ground threats (Surface to Air Missile Systems, Aquisition Radars, etc.) F35 targets are not only detected via radio signals and infared signatures, but also proper visual signatures. At this time, the NTTR does not have
ground target systems that can provide all three parameters to the F35s being
trained at the NTTR.
1) Does the Air Force see this as a challenge in supporting current and future
F35 training within the existing NTTR infrastructure?
2) How does the Air Force intend on employing the existing NTTR capability in
support of that training?

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3) If there are identified shortfalls in support of F35 training, what are they,
what are the capabilities required to alleviate them, and what are the associated
costs and priorities for each needed capability?
4) If capabilites are needed, when do they need to be in place to support propper
F35 training?
5) What are the current personnel authorization changes at Nellis AFB or the
NTTR resulting from the current F35 program in FY13 budget and are they quantified at this time?
General SCHWARTZ. The unique capabilities of the F35 do create challenges for
the Air Force in providing support for future training at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). However, these challenges are being addressed and will be met
through various avenues of approach. The Air Force is in the process of investigating and acquiring threat emitters that will be used to meet the requirements
of the F35. Additionally, many of the challenges posed by the F35 will be met by
creating a training environment that is not only composed of traditional threats and
threat emitters, but will synthesize virtual threats creating a combined Live-Virtual-Constructive (LVC) training environment. This composition will allow the
NTTR and other ranges supporting the F35 to provide necessary training.
The NTTR will employ its existing capabilities, along with those in the acquisition
process, to provide the live portion of the LVC concept. To meet the unique sensor
requirements of the F35, the NTTR is developing a CONOPs for a dry sensor fusion range that will consist of realistic targets/decoys. Additionally, the NTTR is
investigating the use of assets currently located at other ranges to increase its capabilities. The NTTR is working with Pacific Air Forces to examine the option of entering into a phased threat sharing agreement that will provide additional threat
density and realistic threat emitters to meet the F35 training requirements. The
first phase will only include one threat emitter. While the NTTR currently provides
the best training for F22 and 5th gen aircraft and has the best target sets available, these target sets alone are not sufficient to provide realistic training when
multiple sensors (EO, visual, Radar) are fused into a single picture. (These limitations also exist within current 4th generation training.) Current emitters are also
insufficient to provide adequate density to fully replicate threat environments. To
meet these shortfalls Air Combat Command (ACC) is procuring more threat
emitters for NTTR; however it is impractical to procure enough emitters to fully represent threats anticipated in current operational plans. ACC intends to use LVC
training to overcome these shortfalls by providing sufficient threat density and realistic training to stress pilots. New targets need to be in-place by 1 August 2014
when the first F35s are scheduled to arrive at the Air Force Weapons School.
There are no personnel authorization changes at the NTTR resulting from the current F35 program in the FY13 budget.
Dr. HECK. The Air Force recently announced that it is setting aside the award
for the Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft program. In subsequent press statements,
Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz called the issue embarrassing and cited poor documentation processes as the reason for delaying this important capability to help
transition U.S. force out of Afghanistan. Was the issue in fact a matter of documentation or rather of specific decision process substance? What is the Air Forces
specific plan moving forward? Will the service continue to use the same solicitation
or delay this time-sensitive program with another RFP? What is the new timeline
for contract award?
General SCHWARTZ. After the Air Force announced that it is setting aside the
award for the Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft program, on February 27, 2012, the
Air Force Materiel Command Commander initiated a commander directed investigation (CDI). The CDI into the LAS procurement confirmed that inconsistencies in
level of documentation, failure to fully adhere to Source Selection processes outline
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and supplements and source selection
team inexperience contributed to the need to restart the LAS source selection. As
a result, a new source selection team was established and an amended RFP was
released to both offerors on May 4, 2012. The amended RFP did not include any
changes to requirements but more clearly defined the evaluation criteria and decision-making process. Air Force officials met individually with both original offerors,
SNC and HBDC, to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line on April 17, 2012.
Both offerors submitted comments on the draft amended RFP, which were individually addressed prior to release of the amended RFP. While the decision process will
be event-driven, the Air Force targets a source selection decision in early calendar
year 2013. This would allow first aircraft delivery to Afghanistan in third quarter
2014.
Dr. HECK. With respect to a recompetition of the LAS program, since the RFP was
for a nondevelopmental solution, will new or readmitted competitors be allowed to

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introduce new information, such as product developments or improvements that
were accomplished after the deadlines for original RFP submissions? Will the Air
Force maintain the mission-based performance requirements from the original competition, or lower the requirements to allow additional competitors? Will offerings
that have not previously been produced in the United States be barred from the future competition? If so, please explain why. Additionally, please explain fully why
Hawker Beechcraft was found technicially insufficient and therefore excluded from
the competitive range during the original LAS competition.
General SCHWARTZ. Consistent with the corrective action accepted by the Court
of Federal Claims, the Air Force decided to issue an amendment to the LAS request
for proposal (RFP) to current offerors. The amended RFP did not include any
changes to requirements but more clearly defined the evaluation criteria and decision-making process. Because offerors may submit entirely new proposals in response to this amended RFP, either offeror could conceivably submit new information.
Offerings that have not previously been produced in the United States are not
barred from the LAS competition. LAS offerors with proposals that meet the requirements and other terms and conditions of the request for proposal will be considered for award. Specifically, the RFP incorporates provisions required by the Buy
American Act and the Balance of Payments Program. Each offeror will be required
to certify whether it will provide domestic end products, qualifying country end
products, or other foreign end products. The Buy American Act and Balance of Payments Program clause (DFARS 252.2257001) incorporated in the solicitation defines a domestic end product, in part, as an end product manufactured in the United
States if the cost of its qualifying country components and its components that are
mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds 50 percent of the
cost of all its components. The evaluated price would be adjusted, if and as required by DFARS 225, for an offeror who proposes a foreign end product. The
Source Selection Authority will consider the adjusted evaluated price in the bestvalue award decision.
The results of the evaluation of HBDCs proposal are considered to be source selection and proprietary information and only releasable by HBDC.
Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop:
The Senate version of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act included
report language stating:
. . . the Air Force may use up to $12.0 million of the funds available for the solid
rocket motor warm line for consolidation purposes. The committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to inform the committee no later than December 1, 2011,
of its decision and the funding needed to carry out such decision.
What decision has been made concerning this consolidation?
General SCHWARTZ. The Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line program will close out in
fiscal year 2012 and will document, disassemble, clean and store the government
furnished equipment used during the Warm Line program. Before the Air Force
puts its equipment in long term storage, we will use up to $10M of fiscal year 2012
Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line closeout funds to perform a Solid Rocket Motor
Smart Transition. The Solid Rocket Motor Warm Line Smart Transition activity will
transfer and install Stage 1 equipment at the ATK Bacchus facility. After washing
out and recasting a Stage 1 motor, we will static fire the motor, document the result, then disassemble, clean, and store all equipment. Through this testing and documentation, the Air Force will establish the procedures necessary to quickly install
the equipment at a consolidated production facility in the future. This ensures the
Air Force retains the capability to re-pour the current motors while helping to sustain the industrial base through consolidation of excess infrastructure. This consolidation also allows the contractor to manufacture a variety of solid rocket motors
more efficiently, thereby reducing contractor overhead and providing an overall cost
savings to the government. The Air Forces decision to implement this smart transition is consistent with the Office of the Secretary of Defense Solid Rocket Motor
Interagency Task Force recommendation to right-size solid rocket motor contractor
production facilities.
Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf on Representative Rob Bishop:
In FY2013, the Air Force has requested $71.2 million in RDT&E funds in the
Intercontinental Ballistic MissileDemonstration/Validation funding line (PE
0603851F). Air Force budget justification documents cite a sub-element request of
$45.0 million for the ICBM Propulsion Applications Program, a program otherwise
known as PAP. Related justification documents state that the Air Force plans to
use some PAP funds to continue LCS [Large Class Stage] motor development. In
fact, I understand that as much as 25% of FY2012 funds are being used to integrate
Minuteman LCS stages into a demonstration launch vehicle, a task in the past left

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for industry, even as there are no funds for LCS flight tests. Please tell me why
these funds are not better spent on the continued development of MCS [Medium
Class Stage] motors, where there appear to be sufficient funds for flight tests?
General SCHWARTZ. The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) Demonstration/
Validation (Dem/Val) Propulsion Applications Program (PAP) is transitioning technology development efforts from Large Class Stage (LCS) to Medium Class Stage
(MCS) in fiscal year 2013. Technologies demonstrated under LCS, (e.g.) domestic
fiber case qualifications and thrust vector control development, as well as early integration work will help reduce MCS motor development risk. There is no plan to
flight test the integrated LCS booster in the PAP program, but exercising the systems engineering expertise required to do the integration work has value for continued MCS development.
Dr. HECK. Submitted on behalf of Representative Rob Bishop:
This Administration has repeatedly stated that they wish to reduce negative environmental impacts made by Department of Defense programs and activities. At the
same time, the Air Force continues to demilitarize its excess rocket motors, specifically Minuteman stages 1 and 2, through open burning. I understand industry has
developed an alternative method, where propellant is washed out, and then key ingredientssuch as ammonium perchlorateare recovered. While this process may
be slightly more expensive, since it eliminates introduction of pollutants to the atmosphere, is the Air Force considering moving in this direction?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Forces Rocket System Launch Program (RSLP) is responsible for storage, aging surveillance, and demilitarization of many excess and
decommissioned motor assets, primarily Minuteman and Peacekeeper Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) motors. The decision to dispose of excess solid rocket
motors via burning or chemical wash-out is subject to many considerations, to include motor type, environmental regulations, existing Depot 50/50 law, weather, facility capacity, contract availability, and costs. While the Air Force Comprehensive
Assessment of Nuclear Sustainment (AFCANS) 2 Report resulted in the addition of
$11 million over fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 for motor destruction (which
is being used to dispose of approximately 150 motors, including at least 15 Minuteman 1st Stage motors by the washout method) most years have no funding available
for motor destruction. Without AFCANS funds, the near-total of RSLP funds are
utilized to store excess motor assets and complete safety-of-storage aging surveillance. The Air Force will continue to apply its current decision-making processes for
motor destruction, to include adherence to existing laws and environmental regulations, when demilitarization funding is available.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING

Mr. SCHILLING. What is the Air Force doing to increase competition opportunities
and therefore cut down on costs for DOD on all levels of the industrial basefrom
subsystem and component levels to major platforms?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force continually looks to find places, both large and
small, where we can leverage competition and reduce costs. The Air Force is working to understand the interrelated supply chains that support our programs at all
levels of the industrial base. As we increase supply chain visibility we will be able
to identify risk. It will also allow the Air Force to identify opportunities to evaluate
for cost effective breakouts, as well as the potential to move competition to lower,
more competitive tiers in the supply chain.
The Air Force is also taking a comprehensive approach that looks at both our legacy platforms and our new platforms in terms of data rights and ownership. Where
our legacy platforms did not include full ownership of data rights, thus limiting
competition, the Air Force has initiated a business case analysis to determine which
data rights are required to organically sustain our legacy major weapons systems.
We then look at ways to pursue attaining the rights for that data and the trade
off of attaining the rights versus the cost to do so. Where new platforms are established, the Air Force is taking a proactive planning approach by determining what
type of data rights are required for both acquisition and sustainment. This approach
will lend itself to greater competition and cost savings at various milestones through
the acquisition and sustainment life cycles.
Mr. SCHILLING. How does the Air Force intend to ensure that small and medium
sized business are able to compete for contracts?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force recently released the Small Business Improvement Plan which has several recommendations. The first four are adopted from the
plan:

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a) More standardization of North American Industrial Classification System
(NAICS) Code (dollar and size standards). Contracting officers too often assign two
or more NAICS codes to the same or very similar types of acquisitions resulting in
lost opportunities for small businesses that have grown out of the small business
category when a larger more appropriate NAIC S size standard could have been applied. Where flexibility in application of NAICS codes exists, Air Force leadership
will provide guidance for the uniform selection of NAICS codes that maximizes practicable opportunity for small business prime contract participation.
b) Use of a Bundling and Consolidation early warning report to alert key stakeholders as early as possible and to ensure that the Air Force provides maximum
practicable opportunity for small business participation
c) Encourage teaming by small businesses with firms other than small (there is
no such term as medium size in federal contracting) in order to compete for larger
dollar contracts Solicitations should contain language that encourages teaming arrangements and/or joint ventures to counter the tendency to issue larger, sometimes
bundled or consolidated contracts
d) Improve the quality and availability of acquisition procurement forecasting information available to small businesses. This would allow small businesses more
time to plan for responding to upcoming acquisitions, to more fully consider teaming
arrangements and to produce a higher quality Request for Proposal
e) Identify and standardize market research processes to maximize small business
opportunities in Air Force services contracts. After processes are developed, provide
training to our small business specialists who, in turn, can train the acquisition
community
f) Require that the small business specialist fully participate in all early acquisition planning meetings and review all documentation. These include review of requirement approval documents (RADs). This provides more planning time to fashion successful small business set-aside strategies
Mr. SCHILLING. How do the Air Forces views on best practices compare to the
commercial sectors best practices?
The above QFR was rephrased by the committee POC and/or Military Legislative
Fellow Derek R. Noel, as of 04/09/2012: QFR: The commercial aircraft industry has
embraced FAA-approved components and repairs for the PW2000 engine, but the
Air Force has still not found these practices acceptable for F117 repair contracts.
If the commercial industry is finding considerable success in using FAA-approved
components and repairs, why is the Air Force not considering the same practice for
the F117 engine?
Secretary DONLEY. In December, Pratt and Whitney (P&W) agreed to share their
repair and overhaul manuals, which was a major step to enable proper overhaul and
supply chain competition. With access to the repair manuals, the Air Force proposes
a F117 competitive contract which aligns F117 supply chain with industry best
practice.
The P&W manuals allowed the Air Force to enhance the competitive playing field
by building on PW2000 commercial approaches, and allow the Air Force to more
rapidly reduce the F117s reliance on the original equipment manufacturer (OEM)
in parts repair and new parts source approval process. Because the Air Force flies
its engines in six profiles for which the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) will
not certify the F117 engine, we cannot rely on FAA certified parts manufacturer approval (PMA) parts. Instead, we have elected to mimic the Delta Airline engine repair approach we learned of during further market research. More specifically, like
Delta, we will rely on P&W as the OEM for as much as 95 percent of the new engine parts in the near term and rather than continually buying new parts, the commercial data P&W made available allows us to repair the parts rather than replace
them. We expect this strategy to deliver significant savings over exclusive parts replacement, which we believe has been P&Ws technique.
Additionally, to seek new part cost savings through our Source Approval Request
(SAR) process, similar to those we believe are achieved by United/Chromalloy
(through the FAAs PMA process), the P&W data will allow the Air Force to procure
and use non-OEM parts. This will separate us from an exclusive relationship with
P&W for OEM parts. However, to immediately and unconditionally accept FAA certified PMA parts for the F117 engine puts our crews and aircraft at operational
safety risk. Without validation that the parts can perform to our military mission,
the Air Force cannot accept the risk. Once PMA parts are validated and found to
be safe, suitable and cost effective they will be used for the military application.
The competitive approach the Air Force has proposed puts us on an ownership
track that keeps our crews safe, will deliver near-term and long-term savings in repaired part costs, and promises more savings to come via the source approval process for new non-OEM parts.

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Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated that cutting squadrons was painful, but necessary. What assessments were made when deciding that the Air Force should cut
these squadrons? Would other efficiencies have been able to cover the costs of keeping some of these important squadrons?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force formed a General Officer-led team of Active
Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined force structure changes at
various locations. Each course of action was assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location
(e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or
disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level units were in jeopardy of
being eliminated and eight installations would have been left without an operational
Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units
were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission.
The new Department of Defense (DOD) Strategic Guidance Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense directs the services to build a
force that will be smaller and leaner, flexible, ready and technologically advanced.
As such, the Air Force was able to make force structure reductions, with acceptable
risk, to provide the capabilities required by the new DOD Strategic Guidance. The
Air Force identified $33 billion in efficiencies in the FY12 Presidents Budget (PB),
which the Air Force was able to realign from tail to tooth, and an additional $6 billion in efficiencies in the FY13 PB. Additional efficiencies would come at the expense of other programs and possibly prevent the Air Force from meeting the capability required in the new DOD Strategic Guidance.
Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated the importance of the Air Forces work on cyberspace security issues for some time and have now reiterated that point and noted
that it is vital for our networked force. You also mentioned that our adversaries are
realizing the benefits of doing so as well. How do you see the Air Forces role in
addressing this force structure change in current and future adversaries?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force Cyberspace Superiority Core Function Master
Plan, submitted by the Air Force Core Function Lead Integrator for Cyberspace Superiority (AFSPC/CC), specifies nine capabilities that require programmatic actions
to evolve the force from its current capability state: Passive Defense, Defensive
Counter Cyberspace, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Situational
Awareness, Persistent Network Operations, Data Confidentiality & Integrity Systems, Cyberspace Air Operations Center, Offensive Counter Cyberspace for Global
Reach and Access, Contingency Extension, and Influence Operations. The ability to
integrate and leverage these capabilities will underpin force projection in all domains while serving to deny adversaries operational and informational advantages.
The Air Force will meet this challenge by dedicating funding to ensure its ability
to operate effectively and enhance the resiliency and effectiveness of critical cyber
capabilities. Cyberspace capabilities will assure freedom of action to conduct operations at times of our choosing by safeguarding cyberspace systems and negating
adversary cyberspace capabilities.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN
Mr. RUNYAN. How much do you anticipate saving if you retire the C5s, C130s,
and the six fighter squadrons?
General SCHWARTZ. Based on the retirements of 27 C5As, 65 C130s, and 123
A10s and F16s, the Air Force projects to save approximately $458 million in FY13
and $4.1 billion over the Future Years Defense Program.
Mr. RUNYAN. What would be the economic effect on the Air Force if you put all
those aircraft (C5s, C130s, and the six fighter squadrons) you plan to retire into
the Reserve and Guard instead of retiring them?
General SCHWARTZ. Retaining C5A and C130H aircraft retired in the FY13
Presidents Budget (PB) would provide excess strategic and theater airlift capacity
at the expense of other programs vital to national defense. Replacing the aircraft
in the Guard and Reserve would result in the requirement to restore over $2.97 billion in operations, maintenance, and personnel funds. This amount does not include
additional costs associated with modification programs or the cost to address obsolescence and diminishing manufacturing source issues unique to the C5A and C
130H fleets. Placing those aircraft back in the Reserve and Guard would require the
Air Force to divert funds from other critical programs. The FY13 PB divested five
Air Reserve Component (ARC) fighter squadrons and one Active component fighter

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squadron. The economic effect of restoring five ARC squadrons to the FY12 PB level
is an unfunded cost of $207 million in FY14 and $1,414 billion over the next five
years in both manpower and operations & maintenance costs. Notionally moving the
sixth combat coded squadron from the Active Component to the ARC generates an
unfunded cost of $38M in FY14 and $265M over the next five years in both manpower and operations & maintenance costs.
Mr. RUNYAN. Can you retire less aircraft if you put more of them in the National
Guard and Reserve? Could you not have more aircraft available if you made the
ratio of Active to Reserve Component flying squadrons 1:3?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force does not intend to change the planned active
and reserve component mix. Force structure adjustments have been and will continue to be supported by Force Composition Analyses of weapon system and career
field communities, which use models developed by SAF/FMs Center of Expertise
(COE) to present cost and benefit information for several Active and Reserve Component mixes produced by combinations of stand-alone units and Total Force Integration Associations. The Air Force will continue to leverage the Total Forces Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve components to maintain the same high capabilities and standards across the components
while meeting our many and varied commitments. Maintaining the appropriate mix
of forces between the Active and Reserve Components is critical to sustaining Air
Force capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate rotational demands with a smaller overall force. In 1990, the Reserve Component represented
25 percent of Total Force end strength; today that percentage is 35 percent. The
proper ratio between Components must be achieved to maintain acceptable operations tempo levels within each Component, and to preserve the ability of a smaller
Air Force to meet continued overseas presence demands and the rapid deployment
and rotational force requirements of the strategic guidance. After the proposed force
reductions and mitigations of FY13, Reserve Component end strength will make up
33 percent of Total Force military personnel, a reduction of two percent from the
FY12 numbers. Within the Combat Air Forces (CAF), the Reserve Component will
have 38 percent of total aircraft which is only four percent lower than FY12. For
the Mobility Air Forces (MAF), the Reserve Component shares shift from 51 percent
to 46 percent. In order to maintain and enhance combat capability, the Air Force
intends to grow the number of Total Force Integration Associations from 100 to 115.
This will enable the seasoning of our RegAF personnel while improving the combat
capacity of our Reserve Component. The FY13 Active and Reserve Component mix
is the appropriate mix to maintain the Air Forces combat capability.
Mr. RUNYAN. Do you think that keeping a smaller Active force and greatly increasing the Reserve Component forces will decrease your combat capability? Why
or why not?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force does not intend to change the planned active
and reserve component mix. Force structure adjustments have been and will continue to be supported by Force Composition Analyses of weapon system and career
field communities, which use models developed by SAF/FMs Center of Expertise
(COE) to present cost and benefit information for several Active and Reserve Component mixes produced by combinations of stand-alone units and Total Force Integration Associations. The Air Force will continue to leverage the Total Forces Regular Air Force (RegAF), Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve components to maintain the same high capabilities and standards across the components
while meeting our many and varied commitments. Maintaining the appropriate mix
of forces between the Active and Reserve Components is critical to sustaining Air
Force capabilities for forward presence, rapid response, and high-rate rotational demands with a smaller overall force. In 1990, the Reserve Component represented
25 percent of Total Force end strength; today that percentage is 35 percent. The
proper ratio between Components must be achieved to maintain acceptable operations tempo levels within each Component, and to preserve the ability of a smaller
Air Force to meet continued overseas presence demands and the rapid deployment
and rotational force requirements of the strategic guidance. After the proposed force
reductions and mitigations of FY13, Reserve Component end strength will make up
33 percent of Total Force military personnel, a reduction of two percent from the
FY12 numbers. Within the Combat Air Forces (CAF), the Reserve Component will
have 38 percent of total aircraft which is only four percent lower than FY12. For
the Mobility Air Forces (MAF), the Reserve Component shares shift from 51 percent
to 46 percent. In order to maintain and enhance combat capability, the Air Force
intends to grow the number of Total Force Integration Associations from 100 to 115.
This will enable the seasoning of our RegAF personnel while improving the combat
capacity of our Reserve Component. The FY13 Active and Reserve Component mix
is the appropriate mix to maintain the Air Forces combat capability.

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Mr. RUNYAN. What missions can you put into the Reserve Component forces
where you can perform them at lower cost? ICBM? Pilot training?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is rebalancing the Total Force to match capability and capacity requirements of the new Defense Strategy. The Air Force, in full
collaboration with Reserve Component (RC) leadership, will make decisions placing
mission capabilities in the Guard/Reserve to achieve an appropriate mix in order to
sustain the Air Forces ability to provide forward presence, rapid crisis response,
and high rotational demands. Examples of these missions include remotely piloted
aircraft operations, MC12W, and intelligence.
Decisions on the placement of capabilities into RC forces were based upon mission
requirements and included analysis of the costs involved. RC value is enhanced by
a part-time model and the continuum-of-service construct whereby their participation in all mission sets is valuable, but more cost effective in missions that do not
require full-time participation to meet daily requirements, such as pilot training.
The RC is already a full partner in the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise and is fully
integrated in six of the thirteen core nuclear career fields. The Air Force is currently
evaluating several additional mission areas where greater RC participation would
benefit the Air Force through increased continuity and retention of critical nuclear
expertise. RC Security Forces currently support of the Intercontinental Ballistic
Missille (ICBM) mission at Minot AFB and the Air Force continues to assess other
areas of the ICBM mission that may be compatible with RC participation.
The Air Force will continue to analyze the best mix of forces and capabilities between the Active and RC forces balancing costs and mission requirements.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. SCOTT. How would you describe the relationship between the U.S. Air Force
and the Republic of China Air Force? What impact does the ban on U.S. general
officers visiting Taiwan have on enhancing and building upon this relationship?
General SCHWARTZ. The United States Air Force (USAF) and Taiwan Air Force
relationship is strong. Our current Air Force leadership has developed enduring relationships with their Taiwan Air Force counterparts through annual meetings here
in Washington. The USAF works closely with our Taiwan counterparts to provide
the services they need to transform their force into one that will continue to deter
aggression from the Peoples Republic of China. Last September the Administration
announced a $5.85B sale to Taiwan that included retrofitting their F16 A/Bs. This
retrofit will significantly increase the war-fighting capability of Taiwans Air Force.
What impact does the ban on U.S. general officers visiting Taiwan have on enhancing and building upon this relationship?
The ban has had minimal impact to the USAFTaiwan Air Force relationship, due
to the strong relationships built through engagement here in Washington. In addition, consistent with our longstanding policy, we will continue the practice of sending USAF Senior Executive Service (SES) leaders and retired flag officers to Taiwan
to assist in improving their defense capabilities. Most recently, Ms. Grant (SAF/IA)
and Mr. Wert (ESC) visited Taiwan and provided security cooperation on F16 A/
B retrofit program and the Surveillance Radar Program (SRP). Retired flag officer
visitors have included Admiral (ret) Blair, Admiral (ret) Natter, Lieutenant General
(ret) Gregson, and Lieutenant General (ret) Leaf. They have all spent weeks in Taiwan sharing their decades of experience and mentoring senior Taiwan flag officers
on how to improve Taiwans defenses, culminating in the annual Han Kuang exercise. We will continue to send these highly-qualified Air Force leaders to preserve
our strong ties and help ensure Taiwan maintains a robust self-defense capability.
Mr. SCOTT. When do you expect to complete the JSTARS Analysis of Alternatives
(AoA) study?
General SCHWARTZ. Air Combat Command (ACC) presented the results of the Airborne Synthetic Aperture Radar/Moving Target Indicator (SAR/MTI) and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System Mission Area Analysis of Alternatives (AoA)
to the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC) for validation on 30 November 2011. Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force approved the AoAs release on 25
Jan 12 to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE). OSD/CAPE is currently reviewing the final report for sufficiency.
Mr. SCOTT. DODs new strategic guidance calls for cooperative partnerships to bolster common interests around the world. What are some examples of the kinds of
innovative partnerships that the U.S. Air Force can assist in developing?
General SCHWARTZ. Developing mutually beneficial partnerships with militaries
around the world enables interoperability, integration and interdependence between

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Coalition forces while providing our partner nations the capability and capacity to
resolve their own national security challenges. Through these relationships, we are
able to develop innovative partnerships such as the Wideband Global SATCOM, C
17 Heavy Airlift Wing at Papa Air Base Hungary, the deployment of UAE F16s
in support of operation ODYSSEY DAWN, the U.S. and U.K. RC135V/W RIVET
JOINT (RJ) weapon system, and the C130J multi-national cooperative upgrade
program.
The Wideband Global SATCOM satellite system, with the first satellite launched
in 2007, will reach full operational capability with 5 operational satellites in FY13.
WGS increased our communications capacity more than ten times over the existing
legacy system. As a result of a partnership with Australia, a 6th satellite is in production, which will increase U.S. overall capabilities at zero additional U.S. cost, yet
enable Australia to realize 100% of their global SATCOM requirements. In January
of this year, the U.S. signed another cooperative agreement with 5 new partners for
a 9th satellite, increasing capacity for the U.S. and our international partners.
A Heavy Airlift Wing activated on 27 July 2009 at Papa Air Base Hungary, the
result of a cooperative-agreement among 12 NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP)
nations. The wings, mission is to provide strategic airlift to the consortiums members in support of national, NATO, European Union and United Nations humanitarian assistance/disaster relief operations. Through a consortium, economies of
scale provide a capability for numerous nations that did not have the resources to
realize an airlift capability on their own. Additionally, missions this wing executes
are sorties the USAF does not have to fly, potentially saving the USAF upwards
of $200M/yr. In August, 2009, the wing began delivering supplies to the Swedish
ISAF contingent in Afghanistan. A C17 from the wing delivered construction material to Haiti, seven days after the devastating earthquake. Last fall, a multinational
crew supported the U.S. Armys hundred and seventy-third airborne Brigade Combat Team jump-week with multiple airdrop training sorties.
The United Arab Emirates demonstrated their capability to carry out integrated
coalition combat air operations in support of a NATO-led humanitarian mission
when they flew their Block 60 F16s in Operations ODYSSEY DAWN and UNIFIED PROTECTOR. Their participation was made possible due to the strong relationship the USAF cultivated through multiple personnel exchanges, direct commercial sale of F16s, foreign military sales cases for maintenance, equipment, parts,
training and logistical support, pilot training from the Air National Guards 162nd
Fighter Wing, participation in RED FLAG and GREEN FLAG exercises, and training at the Gulf Air Warfare Center.
The RC135V/W RIVET JOINT (RJ) weapon system merges the respective U.S.
and U.K. RIVET JOINT fleets into a single, cooperative program for upgrade and
sustainment (RIVET JOINT Sustainment and Follow-on Development MOU) of RJ
aircraft and mission systems, and provides cooperative training for the initial cadre
of operations and support personnel. This initiative allows for the U.S./U.K. to jointly train, operate and base a combined RJ fleet, increasing ISR capability 20 percent,
saving the USAF $841M in follow-on and sustainment costs, and enabling economies of scale in training, maintenance, and personnel.
The C130J Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was established between the
U.S. and 6 member nations as a vehicle for cooperative C130J projects enabling
common requirement studies, block upgrades, and capability updates for continued
flight. Project Arrangements (PAs) pursuant to the MOU concluded under the MOU
have totaled over $667M, and leveraged $376M in participant investment.
Mr. SCOTT. How does JSTARS operations provide a test bed for the networked future of air warfare?
General SCHWARTZ. Through the use of a dedicated test aircraft, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) program has delivered capability to inform the networked future of air warfare. JSTARS robust onboard Line of Sight
(LOS)/Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) data links and Battle Management Command
& Control (BMC2) mission aircrew employed on JSTARS provide ample network capability to develop improved network capabilities. JSTARS are able to digitally commit fighters to targets in air to ground engagements within an electronically contested environment without ever speaking on the radio. Moreover the majority of
all Command/Control taskings now occur in chat room environments vice traditional
radio voice methods. In 2010 JSTARS demonstrated the ability of an Intelligence,
Surveillance and Reconnaissance platform to provide terminal guidance of net enabled weapons (NEWs) such as the Joint Surface Warfare (JSuW) to an intended
target from increased stand-off ranges. In 2011 JSTARS tested and fielded a Quick
Reaction Capability (QRC) to improve the Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) reach back.
Near-real-time aircraft collection data was provided via Satellite to any Secret Internet protocol Router network (SIPRnet) subscriber to an expanded audience including

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the Air and Space Operations Center. The capability reduced Air Operations Center
leadership decision making timelines tremendously informing Rules of Engagement
(ROE).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN

Mr. GRIFFIN. C130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): According to the
Presidents budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the Administration plans to cancel
the AMP and replace the AMP with a less ambitious, less costly program, commonly
referred to as AMP Lite, for modernization of the C130 fleet, including 184 C
130 aircraft. According to General Schwartz, these upgrades would likely be similar
to those used on the KC10 refueling aircraft and would keep the navigators in our
C130s.
When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider the cost of
retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the legacy C130 fleet? If so,
what is the cost? What were other criteria for considering the cost of AMP Lite?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force did consider the cost of retaining the navigator.
As reported in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), eliminating
the navigator position results in a mission personnel cost savings of $482 million
(Base-Year 2010 dollars) over 15 years for the 221 C130 Avionics Modernization
Program (AMP) aircraft fleet. This equates to a cost savings of $694 million in
Then-Year dollars (i.e., dollars that are reflected in the budget).
Other criteria weighed when considering the cost of the C130 Communication,
Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program vice C130
AMP, were that the C130 CNS/ATM program has 40 percent fewer requirements,
to include retaining the navigator (which drove less avionics integration), and not
driving commonality across the legacy C130H fleet.
Although the fiscal year 2013 Presidents Budget reflects funding for 176 aircraft,
the Air Force plans to modernize all 184 aircraft legacy C130H combat delivery
fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM
solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC10, KC135), and an awareness
of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations C130 aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The Presidents FY13 budget proposed to terminate the C130 AMP
and claims this will save $2.2 billion. However, it is my understanding that the $2.2
billion in savings does not include the cost of a new program start, current contract
termination costs or the life-cycle savings that AMP will provide.
How much will the new start effort truly save after considering the termination
liability, and other life-cycle cost savings are removed from the solution?
Secretary DONLEY. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), fiscal year 20132017,
investment cost savings from terminating C130 Avionics Modernization Program
(AMP) and initiating the Optimize Legacy C130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program is $2.3 billion. Additionally,
when adding the To Complete cost of AMP in the fiscal year 2012 Presidents
Budget (PB) and comparing to what the Air Force has funded in the fiscal year 2013
PB for CNS/ATM including its To Complete cost, the Air Force identified a total
investment cost savings of $3.5 billion.
By going with the new Optimize Legacy C130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission
personnel cost savings of $482 million in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010
C130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. This additional cost of retaining the navigator reduces the program savings referenced in the
above paragraph.
Furthermore, the 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) identified that there
were no other life-cycle costs savings by continuing with AMP. AMP was a program
intended as a force enhancement, not an efficiency.
The termination liability for C130 AMP is $5.1 million, and has been factored
into the cost savings referenced above.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commissions final report
to the President cited airspace, low level routes, and auxiliary airfields and nearby
Fort Chaffee as reasons why Fort Smith is an ideal location for the A10. Since
the report was released, the unit has significantly modernized its facilities, greatly
expanded its existing world-class airspace, become a leader in data link operations,
and solidified training relationships with attack controllers special forces.
What did the current Basing Commission find to contradict the BRAC commissions findings and suggest the transition from the A10 to a remotely piloted air-

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craft mission at Fort Smith? Is the Air Force moving the A10s at Fort Smith to
other guard units to replace aging A10s?
Secretary DONLEY. The reduction of A10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce
excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven
by a basing study. In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air
Force considered the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by (the Adjutant Generals (TAGs)) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort
Smith, AR, as one of three (ANG) A10 unit closures because the base, along with
those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A10
units selected for divestment. Final disposition of the individual tail numbers is determined during fleet management reviews and some aircraft may be realigned to
other units to replace older A10 aircraft. Our intent is to keep the remaining A
10 fleet in the best possible health.
Additionally, the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted
Aircraft as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas Razorback
Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area
(MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive
location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint training. The divestiture of the A
10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and
take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training.
Mr. GRIFFIN. I am concerned that the Air Forces acquisition strategy for the LAS
was flawed, for example, for LAS, the Air Force lowered modern pilot safety standards for accommodating women pilots in ejection seat aircraft. The choice for the
LAS contract, the Brazilian Super Tucano doesnt even meet these lowered safety
standards.
Why did the Air Force roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety requirements
that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft, instead of using the modern,
and congressionally mandated pilot size accommodation requirements used for your
T6, F35, and T38 modernization programs?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety standards for the light
air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a security assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training CommandAfghanistan (NATCA) defined the ejection
seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating height range
for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected
for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards.
Mr. GRIFFIN. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY12, the Senate
Armed Services Committee commends the Air Force for its commitment to developing and maintaining a transparent, repeatable, and effective strategic basing
process. They went on to say the Air Force has developed a process that consists,
in part, of establishing basing criteria, developing a preliminary list of candidate
bases based upon those criteria, and selecting final bases following a detailed evaluation of a smaller group of installations (Senate Bill 1253). Removal of aircraft is
a basing decision and will affect future basing actions. Is there an A10 basing
study? If not, what criteria did you use to determine basing? Can I see the scores?
If there was not a study, then explain how you compared options?
Secretary DONLEY. The reduction of A10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce
excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven
by a basing study. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that U.S. Forces will
no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Analysis
based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A10 retirements
were selected in lieu of other combat aircraft and the Air Force made the difficult
choice to retire five A10 squadrons comprised of 102 A10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 Presidents Budget request rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable force structure over the long term. In
conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the
Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) of
maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force
chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A10 unit closures because the State, along with those in Michigan, has other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, the
proximity of Arkansas Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and
Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities,
make Fort Smith a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint
training. The divestiture of the A10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to as-

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sign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate
joint training.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the fall of 2008, Secretary of the Air Force Michael
Donley and the Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz sought to redefine how
the Air Force expects to make basing decisions. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Installations Kathleen Ferguson said We created a process that
was deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities.
(Official Air Force Web site) Did the Air Force follow their established procedures
for A10 basing decisions, and was the process deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force basing process is a great tool to determine the
optimal location for assigning assets; however, the Air Forces goal was to reduce
force structure based on the new Defense Strategy. The Air Force formed a General
Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined
force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action was assessed
using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation,
Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of
Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level
units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations would have been
left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY12,
the Senate Armed Services Committee stated: Given the high cost of operating aircraft and the fact that these flying operation costs are recurring, the committee believes these costs warrant examination in the strategic basing process. These flying
operation costs include, at a minimum, the costs associated with the additional flying time resulting from a candidate bases relative distance to (1) operational training areas for fighters and training aircraft, (2) operational refueling tracks for tankers, and (3) critical logistic centers for strategic and tactical airlift aircraft. The
188th Fighter Wings distance to their operational training areas is the closest in
the Air National Guard which significantly minimizes its operations costs. The committee directed, no later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force to review and report on the role that the efficiency of flying
operation costs should play in the strategic basing process and any steps that it
plans to take to capture these costs in evaluating candidate bases in that process.
Was the Armed Services Committees guidance to consider distance to the operational training areas followed in the A10 basing process? If so, what weight was
given to the significant taxpayer savings due to reduced transit time to the 188ths
training areas?
Secretary DONLEY. When determining A10 divestitures, Air Force assessed various criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for
a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership, and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Arkansas Razorback Range and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA) make Fort Smith a
very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft joint training, providing an enduring mission capability to Fort Smith while facilitating training with our joint
warfighters.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: The Commander of United States Special Operations
Command Admiral Eric Olson testified to Congress in March 2011: The shortage
of readily available, local ranges currently hampers special operations forces ability
to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to travel to train,
further increasing their already excessive time away from home. Additionally Vice
Admiral William McRaven (current Special Operations Commander) testified in his
confirmation hearing June 28, 2011, that high operational tempo has impacted
readiness. He went on to say among the areas effecting the high operations tempo
was the lack of fixed wing aircraft for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint
Tactical Air Controllers. (SOF Background and Issues for Congress) The 188th
Fighter Wing is a leader in Special Forces integration with an extensive history of
SOF integration (All Services), the unique ability to conduct face-to-face briefs/debriefs, and an on-site Special Forces unit (SEALs). Without tactical fighters at Fort
Smith, SOF training quality would significantly decrease. In addition, SOF operations tempo would increase since forces would have more travel to train require-

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ments. Were the Special Operations Forces training needs and their operations
tempo considered in the A10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant joint force multiplier capabilities of the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary DONLEY. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability
to execute strategic guidance. Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and
a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability to successfully prosecute each scenario. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all
joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon
systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A10s from Fort Smith. The Air Force will continue to provide the necessary training capability required by special operations forces. United
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is aware of the divestiture of A
10s at Fort Smith and has not expressed any concerns with operational training impacts.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the 2010 QDR and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY12, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended the services produce formal Memoranda of Agreements (MOA) between general purpose
forces and special operations forces. A recent report required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 stated the requirement to codify support through
formal agreements, and eventually get SOF units and their general purpose forces
counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle. The 188FW has
numerous formal MOAs in coordination with SOF and effectively trains with special
operations throughout their deployment cycle. Does closing the 188FW and losing
their unique SOF training relationship, support the special operations forces in accordance with the Senate Armed Services direction?
Secretary DONLEY. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability
to execute strategic guidance. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all
joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon
systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A10s from Fort Smith.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On October 5, 2009, the President signed Executive
Order (EO) 13514, which set sustainability goals for federal agencies to make improvements in their environmental, energy, and economic performance. He went on
to say The Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it
is organized, staffed, and operatedindeed, every aspect of how it does business.
The 188th Fighter Wing is a leader in renewable energy, energy conversation, and
has among the lowest energy costs in the Air National Guard. When making basing
decisions did the Air Force consider energy costs and sustainability? If so, what
weight was given to the significant energy cost savings of the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary DONLEY. The impact of energy on basing decisions can be important.
However, the changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a
force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was
made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guards (ANG) first Capstone Principle, allocate at least one
flying unit with ANG equipment to each state, when deciding which A10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A10 units, two have no other flying
unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have
other flying units.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On May 8, 2010, the Secretary of Defense gave a
speech at the Eisenhower Library, in which he announced his intention of reforming
the business operations of the Pentagon in an effort to root out duplication, waste,
and excess spending. The Secretary stated: The Defense Department must take a
hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operatedindeed,
every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask: First, is this
respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal duress? And
second, is this activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the
pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in
the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?
Additionally, in January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released the Defense
Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget, the DOD
first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things operations expenses
across the defense enterprise. Flight hour costs represent a significant proportion
of fighter training expenses. Flight time spent transiting to/from the training areas
is waste of taxpayer resources. The 188th Fighter Wing has the closest airspace
therefore, it also has the lowest flight hour cost per training event. Were operational

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costs considered in the A10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant cost savings provided by the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active
Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include
manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in
the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g.,
MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was
not weighted. The teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership
and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief
of Staff of the Air Force.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released
the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things personnel
costs across the defense enterprise. Fort Smith, (compared to all current A10 bases
and all air-to-ground Air National Guard fighter units) has the lowest combined
health, housing and utility costs. Were personnel costs included when A10 basing
decisions were made? If so, what weight was given to the significant personnel cost
savings at the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active
Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include
manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in
the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g.,
MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the Air Forces formal strategic basing process, the
specific personnel cost criteria was not weighted. The advantages of the relatively
low cost of living found near Fort Smith, AR will continue to benefit the members
of the unit who will perform the new MQ1/9 Remote Split Operations mission. The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On Oct. 25, 2010, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Michael Mullen responding to a letter on JTAC training said I share his
concern regarding the increased demand signal for JTACs and the stress it exerts
on the current production capacities. On November 16, 2010, General Raymond
Odierno, the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command, wrote Admiral
Mullen to express concerns he had over JTAC tasking and training. He said The
increased demand has resulted in a more than 100 percent increase in schoolhouse
throughput with a corresponding increase in the number of required support sorties. Since the 188ths primary mission is Close Air Support almost every training
sortie is in support of ground forces. With unmatched airspace proximity, volume,
and availability, the 188th produces the most JTAC training per flight hour in the
entire Air Force. When making fighter basing decisions, did the Air Force consider
JTAC training requirements? If so, what weight was given to the significant JTAC
training production of the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary DONLEY. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense, directs the
Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one
large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second
adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smiths A10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train Joint terminal Attack Controller to support
the new Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how
well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and
range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not
part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: Quality attack controller training has long been a problem for the DOD. A Due to airspace and asset limitations at other locations throughout the country the quality of attack controller sometimes suffers. The 188th Fighter
Wing with its unique capability to face-to-face brief/debrief, diverse training environment, regional training partners, and incorporation of leading edge technology
provides the best training for the services JTACs, When making fighter basing decisions did the Air Force consider the quality of JTAC training? If so, what weight
was given to the second-to-none JTAC training VALUE at the 188th Fighter Wing?

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Secretary DONLEY. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense, directs the
Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one
large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second
adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smiths A10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train JTACs to support the new Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how
well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and
range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not
part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the
Air Force.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did the Air Force consider innovation and joint network capabilities
when developing the A10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the leading
edge initiatives of the 188th Fighter Wing?
Secretary DONLEY. The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing are not a
basing decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guards (ANG) first Capstone Principle, allocate at least one flying unit with ANG equipment to each state, when
deciding which A10 bases would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A10
units, two have no other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states,
including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer
led review considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location
of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range
and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria were not weighted. The teams
recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a
force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was
made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guards (ANG) first Capstone Principle, allocate at least one
flying unit with ANG equipment to each state, when deciding which A10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A10 units, two have no other flying
unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have
other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer led review considered a variety
of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for
a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since
these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process,
the specific criteria was not weighted. The teams recommendations were reviewed
by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was F35 basing considered in the A10 basing study? If so, how
did bases that scored lower in the study keep their manned fighter aircraft?
Secretary DONLEY. F35 basing was not considered when making force structure
reduction or backfill mission decisions that take effect in FY13 and FY14. Given current F35 production estimates, the next set of F35 basing decisions will include
domestic and overseas bases and will not be required prior to FY17. The Air Force
formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts
that determined force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action
was assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of
the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and
airspace availability). The teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force
and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24
squadron-level units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations
would have been left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was the capability to support Total Force Initiatives considered in
the A10 basing decisions? If so what weight was given to Fort Smiths efficiencies
and unique strengths?

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Secretary DONLEY. The new Defense Strategic Guidance drove a holistic interstate approach to Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve force structure. The
Air Forces proposed efforts will correct several manpower disconnects, rebalance
forces, and improve sortie generation and aircraft utilization rates across the Total
Force. This combination is intended to improve the Total Forces readiness and responsiveness across the spectrum of operations. From both an operational effectiveness and fiscal responsibility perspective, this strategy was preferred over a more
piecemeal state-by-state approach.
In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered
the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs)
of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air
Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A10
unit closures because the base, along with those in Michigan, have other manned
ANG flying units in addition to the A10 units selected for divestment. Additionally,
the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)
as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas Razorback Range
(less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive location
for RPA joint training. The divestiture of the A10s affords an opportunity for the
Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Questions regarding AMP
Why are you now choosing to end a program that is over 98% complete with development activities and with very little risk going forward?
With a reasonable learning curve, what is a cost of the current AMP system fully
installed? What would the cost be for the alternative system?
Could you explain the numbers that have been floating around in the press on
the cost of the current program? My understanding is weve invested about $2.1B
and should have around $2.5B to go. However, it appears the USAF is using a $6.2B
total program cost, leaving over $4.1B yet to be spent. With less than 200 aircraft
to be modified and using $8M a copy, we should be able to finish the program for
around $2B.
Has there been any analysis of the long-term cost savings the current AMP solution provides versus the new start for just a CNS/ATM capability that is proposed
for FY 13?
So that the taxpayers money invested in the program and research is not lost,
have you considered restructuring the current program to work within your new
funding profile and avoid the cost and inherent risks of a new start effort?
Can the current program be scaled down and still retain its certification? If so,
have you thought about doing that instead of starting all over again?
Secretary DONLEY. Due to budget constraints, the fiscal year 2013 Presidents
Budget (PB) terminated the C130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP).
As reflected in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the C130
AMP per aircraft estimate is $19 million. The fiscal year 2012 PB per aircraft cost
of Optimize Legacy C130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic
Management (CNS/ATM) program is $3.7 million.
A total of $1.8 billion has been spent to date on C130 AMP. A breakdown by
phase follows: RDT&E: $1.7 billion Procurement: $0.1 billion
Total cost of the 221 C130 AMP aircraft fleet is $6.3 billion: The latest cost estimate is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluations (CAPE) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) dated 23 March 2010;
it reflects total cost of $6.3 billion (Then-Year dollars): RDT&E: $1.8 billion Procurement: $4.5 billion
A specific comparative analysis of the long-term cost savings the current C130
AMP solution provides versus the new C130 CNS/ATM program was not accomplished. Compliance with looming CNS/ATM mandates was the primary reason behind the C130 AMP program, and remains the primary reason for the planned C
130 CNS/ATM program. The Air Force plans to modernize the 184 aircraft legacy
C130 combat delivery fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC10,
KC135), and an awareness of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations C130
aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available.
The C130 CNS/ATM program will provide the capabilities related to global access and global engagement that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
determined are essential to national security.
The primary differences between the C130 AMP and the C130 CNS/ATM program are: The new program retains the navigator position, thereby requiring much
less avionics integration than C130 AMP, the new program does not standardize

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the aircraft cockpit across the C130H fleet, and there is more than a 40 percent
reduction in requirements when compared to C130 AMP. These changes were too
large to restructure the C130 AMP program or to simply scale it down. The goal
is for an open and transparent defense industry competition, with C130 CNS/ATM
program contract award in fiscal year 2014. This is required to ensure the legacy
C130H combat delivery fleet meets the Federal Aviation Administrations air traffic management 1 January 2020 mandate.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Today, the Air Force advised the Department of Justice that it will
take corrective action on the Afghanistan Light Air Support Contract and will set
aside the contract award to Sierra Nevada effective March 2, 2012.
What does this announcement mean for the LAS contract award and is the AF
planning on reopening the competition for the LAS contract?
Secretary DONLEY. On February 28, 2012, the Air Force initiated review of appropriate corrective action in response to litigation and dissatisfaction with source selection documentation. At a minimum, the Air Force corrective action would:
1) Set aside (terminate) the award to Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC), 2) Reinstate Hawker Beechcraft Defense Company, LLC (HBDC) to the competitive range
under the procurement, 3) Accept new proposals from the parties, based upon the
existing solicitation in its original form, or as amended, 4) Conduct meaningful discussions with the parties, and 5) Reevaluate proposals in accordance with the terms
of the solicitation; or 6) Reserve the right to conduct a whole new competition
Concurrently, the Air Force Materiel Command initiated a Commander Directed
Investigation (CDI) into the Light Air Support (LAS) procurement. After studying
the circumstances prompting the corrective action and facts from the subsequent
CDI, the Air Force decided to issue an amendment to the LAS Request for Proposal
(RFP) to both offerors. Air Force officials met with both original offerors, SNC and
HBDC, individually to review the amended RFP changes line-by-line on April 17,
2012. Both will have time to submit comments on the draft RFP amendment, after
which the Air Force expects to release the final amended RFP on approximately
April 30, 2012. While the decision process will be event-driven, the Air Force targets
a source selection decision in early calendar year 2013. This would allow first aircraft delivery to Afghanistan in third quarter 2014.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Why did the USAF roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety requirements that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft instead of using the
modern, and congressionally mandated pilot size accommodation requirements used
for your T6, F35, and T38 modernization programs?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety standards for the light
air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a security assistance effort for Afghanistan, NATO Air Training CommandAfghanistan (NATCA) defined the ejection
seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating height range
for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected
for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Why did the USAF ignore inputs from industry that pointed out that
the LAS solicitation was using outdated pilot size accommodation requirements and
instead should be using the state of the art safety standards established for the
JPATS, JSF, and T38 modernization programs?
Secretary DONLEY. Since light air support (LAS) is a security assistance effort for
Afghanistan, NATO Air Training CommandAfghanistan (NATCA) defined the
ejection seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating
height range for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards.
Mr. GRIFFIN. C130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP): According to the
Presidents budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the Administration plans to cancel
the AMP and replace the AMP with a less ambitious, less costly program, commonly
referred to as AMP Lite, for modernization of the C130 fleet, including 184 C
130 aircraft. According to General Schwartz, these upgrades would likely be similar
to those used on the KC10 refueling aircraft and would keep the navigators in our
C130s.
When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider the cost of
retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the legacy C130 fleet? If so,
what is the cost? What were other criteria for considering the cost of AMP Lite?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force did consider the cost of retaining the navigator.
As reported in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), eliminating
the navigator position results in a mission personnel cost savings of $482 million
(Base-Year 2010 dollars) over 15 years for the 221 C130 Avionics Modernization

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Program (AMP) aircraft fleet. This equates to a cost savings of $694 million in
Then-Year dollars (i.e., dollars that are reflected in the budget).
Other criteria weighed when considering the cost of the C130 Communication,
Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program vice C130
AMP, were that the C130 CNS/ATM program has 40 percent fewer requirements,
to include retaining the navigator (which drove less avionics integration), and not
driving commonality across the legacy C130H fleet.
Although the fiscal year 2013 Presidents Budget reflects funding for 176 aircraft,
the Air Force plans to modernize all 184 aircraft legacy C130H combat delivery
fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM
solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC10, KC135), and an awareness
of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations C130 aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The Presidents FY13 budget proposed to terminate the C130 AMP
and claims this will save $2.2 billion. However, it is my understanding that the $2.2
billion in savings does not include the cost of a new program start, current contract
termination costs or the life-cycle savings that AMP will provide.
How much will the new start effort truly save after considering the termination
liability, and other life-cycle cost savings are removed from the solution?
General SCHWARTZ. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), fiscal year 20132017,
investment cost savings from terminating C130 Avionics Modernization Program
(AMP) and initiating the Optimize Legacy C130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) program is $2.3 billion. Additionally,
when adding the To Complete cost of AMP in the fiscal year 2012 Presidents
Budget (PB) and comparing to what the Air Force has funded in the fiscal year 2013
PB for CNS/ATM including its To Complete cost, the Air Force identified a total
investment cost savings of $3.5 billion.
By going with the new Optimize Legacy C130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission
personnel cost savings of $482 million in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010
C130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. This additional cost of retaining the navigator reduces the program savings referenced in the
above paragraph.
Furthermore, the 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) identified that there
were no other life-cycle costs savings by continuing with AMP. AMP was a program
intended as a force enhancement, not an efficiency.
The termination liability for C130 AMP is $5.1 million, and has been factored
into the cost savings referenced above.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure Commissions final report
to the President cited airspace, low level routes, and auxiliary airfields and nearby
Fort Chaffee as reasons why Fort Smith is an ideal location for the A10. Since
the report was released, the unit has significantly modernized its facilities, greatly
expanded its existing world-class airspace, become a leader in data link operations,
and solidified training relationships with attack controllers special forces.
What did the current Basing Commission find to contradict the BRAC commissions findings and suggest the transition from the A10 to a remotely piloted aircraft mission at Fort Smith? Is the Air Force moving the A10s at Fort Smith to
other guard units to replace aging A10s?
General SCHWARTZ. The reduction of A10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce
excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven
by a basing study. In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air
Force considered the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by (the Adjutant Generals (TAGs)) of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort
Smith, AR, as one of three (ANG) A10 unit closures because the base, along with
those in Michigan, have other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A10
units selected for divestment. Final disposition of the individual tail numbers is determined during fleet management reviews and some aircraft may be realigned to
other units to replace older A10 aircraft. Our intent is to keep the remaining A
10 fleet in the best possible health.
Additionally, the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted
Aircraft as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas Razorback
Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area
(MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive
location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint training. The divestiture of the A
10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and
take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training.

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Mr. GRIFFIN. I am concerned that the Air Forces acquisition strategy for the LAS
was flawed, for example, for LAS, the Air Force lowered modern pilot safety standards for accommodating women pilots in ejection seat aircraft. The choice for the
LAS contract, the Brazilian Super Tucano doesnt even meet these lowered safety
standards.
Why did the Air Force roll back the clock on LAS aircraft safety requirements
that accommodated women in ejection seat aircraft, instead of using the modern,
and congressionally mandated pilot size accommodation requirements used for your
T6, F35, and T38 modernization programs?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force did not lower pilot safety standards for the
light air support (LAS) ejection seat. Since LAS is a security assistance effort for
Afghanistan, NATO Air Training CommandAfghanistan (NATCA) defined the
ejection seat and pilot accommodation requirements based on expected seating
height range for potential Afghanistan Air Force (AAF) and NATO pilots. The aircraft selected for the LAS competition will meet all required safety and accommodation standards.
Mr. GRIFFIN. In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY12, the Senate
Armed Services Committee commends the Air Force for its commitment to developing and maintaining a transparent, repeatable, and effective strategic basing
process. They went on to say the Air Force has developed a process that consists,
in part, of establishing basing criteria, developing a preliminary list of candidate
bases based upon those criteria, and selecting final bases following a detailed evaluation of a smaller group of installations (Senate Bill 1253) Removal of aircraft is
a basing decision and will affect future basing actions. Is there an A10 basing
study? If not, what criteria did you use to determine basing? Can I see the scores?
If there was not a study, then explain how you compared options?
General SCHWARTZ. The reduction of A10 aircraft is driven by the need to reduce
excess force structure as identified in the new Defense Strategy and was not driven
by a basing study. The new Defense Strategic Guidance states that U.S. Forces will
no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations. Analysis
based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability within each scenario. As a result, A10 retirements
were selected in lieu of other combat aircraft and the Air Force made the difficult
choice to retire five A10 squadrons comprised of 102 A10 aircraft. Previous reductions in fighter force structure shifted the Total Force ratio toward Reserve component forces, and Air Force decisions in the FY13 Presidents Budget request rebalanced that ratio to create a more sustainable force structure over the long term. In
conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the
Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs) of
maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air Force
chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A10 unit closures because the State, along with those in Michigan, has other manned ANG flying units in addition to the A10 units selected for divestment. Additionally, the
proximity of Arkansas Razorback Range (less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and
Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities,
make Fort Smith a very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) joint
training. The divestiture of the A10s afford an opportunity for the Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate
joint training.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the fall of 2008, Secretary of the Air Force Michael
Donley and the Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz sought to redefine how
the Air Force expects to make basing decisions. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Installations Kathleen Ferguson said We created a process that
was deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities.
(Official Air Force Web site) Did the Air Force follow their established procedures
for A10 basing decisions, and was the process deliberate, repeatable and transparent with defined roles and responsibilities?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force basing process is a great tool to determine the
optimal location for assigning assets; however, the Air Forces goal was to reduce
force structure based on the new Defense Strategy. The Air Force formed a General
Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that determined
force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action was assessed
using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation,
Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is
suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of

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Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24 squadron-level
units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations would have been
left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the National Defense Authorization Act for FY12,
the Senate Armed Services Committee stated: Given the high cost of operating aircraft and the fact that these flying operation costs are recurring, the committee believes these costs warrant examination in the strategic basing process. These flying
operation costs include, at a minimum, the costs associated with the additional flying time resulting from a candidate bases relative distance to (1) operational training areas for fighters and training aircraft, (2) operational refueling tracks for tankers, and (3) critical logistic centers for strategic and tactical airlift aircraft. The
188th Fighter Wings distance to their operational training areas is the closest in
the Air National Guard which significantly minimizes its operations costs. The committee directed, no later than 180 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Air Force to review and report on the role that the efficiency of flying
operation costs should play in the strategic basing process and any steps that it
plans to take to capture these costs in evaluating candidate bases in that process.
Was the Armed Services Committees guidance to consider distance to the operational training areas followed in the A10 basing process? If so, what weight was
given to the significant taxpayer savings due to reduced transit time to the 188ths
training areas?
General SCHWARTZ. When determining A10 divestitures, Air Force assessed various criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for
a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership, and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Arkansas Razorback Range and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA) make Fort Smith a
very attractive location for Remotely Piloted Aircraft joint training, providing an enduring mission capability to Fort Smith while facilitating training with our joint
warfighters.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: The Commander of United States Special Operations
Command Admiral Eric Olson testified to Congress in March 2011: The shortage
of readily available, local ranges currently hampers special operations forces ability
to meet deployment training timelines and causes our operators to travel to train,
further increasing their already excessive time away from home. Additionally Vice
Admiral William McRaven (current Special Operations Commander) testified in his
confirmation hearing June 28, 2011 that high operational tempo has impacted
readiness. He went on to say among the areas effecting the high operations tempo
was the lack of fixed wing aircraft for live ordnance drops needed to train Joint
Tactical Air Controllers. (SOF Background and Issues for Congress) The 188th
Fighter Wing is a leader in Special Forces integration with an extensive history of
SOF integration (All Services), the unique ability to conduct face-to-face briefs/debriefs, and an on-site Special Forces unit (SEALs). Without tactical fighters at Fort
Smith, SOF training quality would significantly decrease. In addition, SOF operations tempo would increase since forces would have more travel to train requirements. Were the Special Operations Forces training needs and their operations
tempo considered in the A10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant joint force multiplier capabilities of the 188th Fighter Wing?
General SCHWARTZ. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability
to execute strategic guidance. Analysis based on scenarios consistent with the Strategic Guidance resulted in a reduced requirement for tactical combat aircraft and
a preference for multi-role fighters to provide the most flexible capability to successfully prosecute each scenario. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all
joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon
systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A10s from Fort Smith. The Air Force will continue to provide the necessary training capability required by special operations forces. United
States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is aware of the divestiture of A
10s at Fort Smith and has not expressed any concerns with operational training impacts.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In the 2010 QDR and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY12, the Senate Armed Services Committee recommended the services produce formal Memoranda of Agreements (MOA) between general purpose
forces and special operations forces. A recent report required by the National De-

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fense Authorization Act of 2010 stated the requirement to codify support through
formal agreements, and eventually get SOF units and their general purpose forces
counterparts training together throughout the deployment cycle. The 188FW has
numerous formal MOAs in coordination with SOF and effectively trains with special
operations throughout their deployment cycle. Does closing the 188FW and losing
their unique SOF training relationship, support the special operations forces in accordance with the Senate Armed Services direction?
General SCHWARTZ. Working with our Guard and Reserve leaders, we used a balanced approach to adjust our Total Force end strength while maintaining the ability
to execute strategic guidance. The Air Force provides full spectrum support to all
joint warfighters. Special operations forces training involves a variety of weapon
systems, and the Air Force will continue to provide required support while accounting for the divestiture of A10s from Fort Smith.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On October 5, 2009, the President signed Executive
Order (EO) 13514, which set sustainability goals for federal agencies to make improvements in their environmental, energy, and economic performance. He went on
to say The Defense Department must take a hard look at every aspect of how it
is organized, staffed, and operatedindeed, every aspect of how it does business.
The 188th Fighter Wing is a leader in renewable energy, energy conversation, and
has among the lowest energy costs in the Air National Guard. When making basing
decisions did the Air Force consider energy costs and sustainability? If so, what
weight was given to the significant energy cost savings of the 188th Fighter Wing?
General SCHWARTZ. The impact of energy on basing decisions can be important.
However, the changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a
force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was
made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guards (ANG) first Capstone Principle, allocate at least one
flying unit with ANG equipment to each state, when deciding which A10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A10 units, two have no other flying
unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have
other flying units.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On May 8, 2010, the Secretary of Defense gave a
speech at the Eisenhower Library, in which he announced his intention of reforming
the business operations of the Pentagon in an effort to root out duplication, waste,
and excess spending. The Secretary stated: The Defense Department must take a
hard look at every aspect of how it is organized, staffed, and operatedindeed,
every aspect of how it does business. In each instance we must ask: First, is this
respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and fiscal duress? And
second, is this activity or arrangement the best use of limited dollars, given the
pressing needs to take care of our people, win the wars we are in, and invest in
the capabilities necessary to deal with the most likely and lethal future threats?
Additionally, in January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released the Defense
Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget, the DOD
first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things operations expenses
across the defense enterprise. Flight hour costs represent a significant proportion
of fighter training expenses. Flight time spent transiting to/from the training areas
is waste of taxpayer resources. The 188th Fighter Wing has the closest airspace
therefore, it also has the lowest flight hour cost per training event. Were operational
costs considered in the A10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the significant cost savings provided by the 188th Fighter Wing?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active
Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include
manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in
the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g.,
MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was
not weighted. The teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership
and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief
of Staff of the Air Force.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: In January 2012 Defense Secretary Panetta released
the Defense Budget Priorities and Choices. In it he said that in developing the budget the DOD first turned to where DOD could reduce among other things personnel
costs across the defense enterprise. Fort Smith, (compared to all current A10 bases
and all air-to-ground Air National Guard fighter units) has the lowest combined
health, housing and utility costs. Were personnel costs included when A10 basing
decisions were made? If so, what weight was given to the significant personnel cost
savings at the 188th Fighter Wing?

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General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active
Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include
manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in
the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g.,
MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part of the Air Forces formal strategic basing process, the
specific personnel cost criteria was not weighted. The advantages of the relatively
low cost of living found near Fort Smith, AR will continue to benefit the members
of the unit who will perform the new MQ1/9 Remote Split Operations mission. The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: On Oct. 25, 2010, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Michael Mullen responding to a letter on JTAC training said I share his
concern regarding the increased demand signal for JTACs and the stress it exerts
on the current production capacities On November 16, 2010, General Raymond
Odierno the Commander of United States Joint Forces Command wrote Admiral
Mullen to express concerns he had over JTAC tasking and training. He said The
increased demand has resulted in a more than 100 percent increase in schoolhouse
throughput with a corresponding increase in the number of required support sorties. Since the 188ths primary mission is Close Air Support almost every training
sortie is in support of ground forces. With unmatched airspace proximity, volume,
and availability, the 188th produces the most JTAC training per flight hour in the
entire Air Force. When making fighter basing decisions, did the Air Force consider
JTAC training requirements? If so, what weight was given to the significant JTAC
training production of the 188th Fighter Wing?
General SCHWARTZ. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense, directs the
Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one
large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second
adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smiths A10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train Joint terminal Attack Controller to support
the new Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how
well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and
range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not
part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Background: Quality attack controller training has long been a problem for the DOD. A Due to airspace and asset limitations at other locations throughout the country the quality of attack controller sometimes suffers. The 188th Fighter
Wing with its unique capability to face-to-face brief/debrief, diverse training environment, regional training partners, and incorporation of leading edge technology
provides the best training for the services JTACs, When making fighter basing decisions did the Air Force consider the quality of JTAC training? If so, what weight
was given to the second-to-none JTAC training VALUE at the 188th Fighter Wing?
General SCHWARTZ. The new Department of Defense Strategic Guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities For 21st Century Defense, directs the
Services to build a force that will be smaller, leaner, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. As a result, the Air Force is reducing its size to support one
large-scale combined arms campaign with sufficient combat power to deny a second
adversary. With the divestiture of Fort Smiths A10s, the Air Force will maintain
sufficient capacity to produce and train JTACs to support the new Defense Strategy.
The Air Force formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts that considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how
well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and
range and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not
part of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria was not weighted. The
teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force and Chief of Staff of the
Air Force.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did the Air Force consider innovation and joint network capabilities
when developing the A10 basing plan? If so, what weight was given to the leading
edge initiatives of the 188th Fighter Wing?

150
General SCHWARTZ. The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing are not a
basing decision but a force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guards (ANG) first Capstone Principle, allocate at least one flying unit with ANG equipment to each state, when
deciding which A10 bases would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A10
units, two have no other flying unit and so reductions came from the three states,
including Arkansas, that have other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer
led review considered a variety of criteria to include manpower composition, location
of the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range
and airspace availability). Since these were force structure reductions and not part
of the strategic basing process, the specific criteria were not weighted. The teams
recommendations were reviewed by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
The proposed changes for the 188th Fighter Wing is not a basing decision but a
force structure realignment decision. This force structure realignment decision was
made in conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered the Air National Guards (ANG) first Capstone Principle, allocate at least one
flying unit with ANG equipment to each state, when deciding which A10 bases
would be affected. Of the five states with ANG A10 units, two have no other flying
unit and so reductions came from the three states, including Arkansas, that have
other flying units. Additionally, our General Officer led review considered a variety
of criteria to include manpower composition, location of the installation, Reserve
Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for
a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and airspace availability). Since
these were force structure reductions and not part of the strategic basing process,
the specific criteria was not weighted. The teams recommendations were reviewed
by Air Force leadership and ultimately approved.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was F35 basing considered in the A10 basing study? If so, how
did bases that scored lower in the study keep their manned fighter aircraft?
General SCHWARTZ. F35 basing was not considered when making force structure
reduction or backfill mission decisions that take effect in FY13 and FY14. Given current F35 production estimates, the next set of F35 basing decisions will include
domestic and overseas bases and will not be required prior to FY17. The Air Force
formed a General Officer led team of Active Duty and Reserve Component experts
that determined force structure changes at various locations. Each course of action
was assessed using specified criteria to include manpower composition, location of
the installation, Reserve Component presence in the state, and how well a replacement mission is suited for a given location (e.g., MILCON needed and range and
airspace availability). The teams recommendations were reviewed by Air Force
leadership and ultimately approved or disapproved by the Secretary of the Air Force
and Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Before backfill missions were identified, 24
squadron-level units were in jeopardy of being eliminated and eight installations
would have been left without an operational Air Force mission. After backfill missions were identified, 14 squadron-level units were preserved and only one installation was left without an operational mission.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Was the capability to support Total Force Initiatives considered in
the A10 basing decisions? If so what weight was given to Fort Smiths efficiencies
and unique strengths?
General SCHWARTZ. The new Defense Strategic Guidance drove a holistic interstate approach to Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve force structure. The
Air Forces proposed efforts will correct several manpower disconnects, rebalance
forces, and improve sortie generation and aircraft utilization rates across the Total
Force. This combination is intended to improve the Total Forces readiness and responsiveness across the spectrum of operations. From both an operational effectiveness and fiscal responsibility perspective, this strategy was preferred over a more
piecemeal state-by-state approach.
In conjunction with National Guard Bureau leadership, the Air Force considered
the Air National Guard (ANG) Capstone Principle (previously approved by TAGs)
of maintaining at least one Air Force flying unit in each state. As such, the Air
Force chose the 188th Fighter Wing, Fort Smith, AR, as one of three ANG A10
unit closures because the base, along with those in Michigan, have other manned
ANG flying units in addition to the A10 units selected for divestment. Additionally,
the Arkansas Future Missions Database identifies Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA)
as a preferred mission for Arkansas. The proximity of Arkansas Razorback Range
(less than 10 miles from Fort Smith) and Hog Military Operation Area (MOA), coupled with joint training opportunities, make Fort Smith a very attractive location
for RPA joint training. The divestiture of the A10s affords an opportunity for the

151
Air Force to assign Fort Smith a RPA mission and take advantage of range capabilities to facilitate joint training.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Why are you now choosing to end a program that is over 98% complete with development activities and with very little risk going forward?
With a reasonable learning curve, what is a cost of the current AMP system fully
installed? What would the cost be for the alternative system?
Could you explain the numbers that have been floating around in the press on
the cost of the current program? My understanding is weve invested about $2.1B
and should have around $2.5B to go. However, it appears the USAF is using a $6.2B
total program cost, leaving over $4.1B yet to be spent. With less than 200 aircraft
to be modified and using $8M a copy, we should be able to finish the program for
around $2B.
Has there been any analysis of the long-term cost savings the current AMP solution provides versus the new start for just a CNS/ATM capability that is proposed
for FY 13?
So that the taxpayers money invested in the program and research is not lost,
have you considered restructuring the current program to work within your new
funding profile and avoid the cost and inherent risks of a new start effort?
Can the current program be scaled down and still retain its certification? If so,
have you thought about doing that instead of starting all over again?
General SCHWARTZ. Due to budget constraints, the fiscal year 2013 Presidents
Budget (PB) terminated the C130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP).
As reflected in the December 2010 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), the C130
AMP per aircraft estimate is $19 million. The fiscal year 2012 PB per aircraft cost
of Optimize Legacy C130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic
Management (CNS/ATM) program is $3.7 million.
A total of $1.8 billion has been spent to date on C130 AMP. A breakdown by
phase follows: RDT&E: $1.7 billion Procurement: $0.1 billion
Total cost of the 221 C130 AMP aircraft fleet is $6.3 billion: The latest cost estimate is from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluations (CAPE) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) dated 23 March 2010;
it reflects total cost of $6.3 billion (Then-Year dollars): RDT&E: $1.8 billion Procurement: $4.5 billion
A specific comparative analysis of the long-term cost savings the current C130
AMP solution provides versus the new C130 CNS/ATM program was not accomplished. Compliance with looming CNS/ATM mandates was the primary reason behind the C130 AMP program, and remains the primary reason for the planned C
130 CNS/ATM program. The Air Force plans to modernize the 184 aircraft legacy
C130 combat delivery fleet in the most economically efficient way possible. A review of similar CNS/ATM solutions on other Air Force mobility aircraft (KC10,
KC135), and an awareness of CNS/ATM modifications to foreign nations C130
aircraft, indicate that less expensive CNS/ATM solutions are currently available.
The C130 CNS/ATM program will provide the capabilities related to global access and global engagement that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
determined are essential to national security.
The primary differences between the C130 AMP and the C130 CNS/ATM program are: The new program retains the navigator position, thereby requiring much
less avionics integration than C130 AMP, the new program does not standardize
the aircraft cockpit across the C130H fleet, and there is more than a 40 percent
reduction in requirements when compared to C130 AMP. These changes were too
large to restructure the C130 AMP program or to simply scale it down. The goal
is for an open and transparent defense industry competition, with C130 CNS/ATM
program contract award in fiscal year 2014. This is required to ensure the legacy
C130H combat delivery fleet meets the Federal Aviation Administrations air traffic management 1 January 2020 mandate.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The Air Force has stated that you were a full partner in the decisions to cut force structure and manpower from the Air National Guard in the budget process. Does this mean that you had a vote in the decisions? How did you vote
on the decision to cut three (3) A10 squadrons from the Air National Guard? 65
x C130s? F16s? Did you offer alternate solutions?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air National Guard (ANG) was a participant in the budget discussions during the decision-making process. Neither ANG, Air Force Reserve
Command (AFRC) or Active Duty Major Command (MAJCOM) leadership took part
in a vote on the final force structure decisions. The Secretary of the Air Force,
with the Chief of Staffs best military input, made the call on determining which
planes would be cut from the Guard component. ANG leadership did provide inputs
on which squadrons to stand down based on the five ANG Captsone Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concur-

152
rently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG
people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities
(Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the Presidents fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget proposal, the
Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest
changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered
two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided
to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results
of the DODs assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Do you think we can leverage the cost savings in the ANG to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally sensible way for FY13 compared to what was
released earlier this week in the Presidents Budget Request? Can your staff prepare
some alternate options for the Congress to consider that the Air Force may not have
been willing to look at?
General SCHWARTZ. Following release of the Presidents FY13 budget proposal, the
Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest
changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered
two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided
to the Air Force and the Department of Defense through the Chief of the National
Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results of the Department of Defenses assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed
FY13 budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The Air Forces justification for reducing the Air National Guard is
that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when the Air National Guard
has grown? Is this true? Do you believe that it was the right decision to reduce the
Active Air Force rather than gutting the ANG in the past? Has anything changed
that would change our way of doing business since those reductions were made?
General SCHWARTZ. Its not correct to say the Air Force is reducing the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty force. To meet the
requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle
was balance. To retain critical core capabilities and maintain our ability to rapidly
respond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, the Air Force balanced risk to force structure and modernization.
Mr. GRIFFIN. Did the AF consider Homeland Security capacity in their reductions?
Do you think the AF places the same interest or emphasis on homeland missions
as it does overseas missions? What happened with the C27J? Was it a good aircraft
for the Homeland Security mission? How is it doing in Afghanistan?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and disaster response (Homeland Defense) scenarios consistent with the new the Department of Defense strategic guidance and validated a reduced airlift requirement,
leaving the Air Force with excess airlift capacity. As a result the Air Force was able
to reduce the C130 fleet by 65 aircraft and divest the C27J fleet. The Air Force
is exploring options on the disposition of the C27J fleet. While the C27J can perform the Homeland Security mission, the C130 is a more cost effective and capable
aircraft. In support the Homeland Security mission, the Air Force meets mission requirements/taskings through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes
all combatant commanders (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements.
Feedback from CENTCOM indicates the C130 has generally outperformed the C
27J providing intra-theater airlift support in Afghanistan.
Mr. GRIFFIN. It appears the AF is changing the force mix out of its concern for
readiness and to avoid asking too much of the air reserve components (ARC). How
is your retention? Are you maxed out in the ANG and need the AF to reduce your
operational load? Or do you have the capacity to do more in some of your missions?
Where are you near capacity?
General SCHWARTZ. Retention in the Air Force is at a 17 year record high. Although weve had to implement Force Management programs to ensure we remain
within authorized end strength, we also continue to invest in retention programs for
certain critical career fields to guarantee we maintain the right balance of skills and
experience.
The FY13 Presidents Budget proposal outlined a total force mix to meet the requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy. The Air Force retains critical core
capabilities and maintains its ability to meet the operational load. Balancing the
right mix of Active Duty, Guard and Reserve components allows us to rapidly re-

153
spond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, while balancing risk
to force structure and modernization.
Mr. GRIFFIN. The experience levels in the ANG are well known, and are a major
factor in how you can fly older aircraft less often and thus extend their service life
and save money. Will the same hold true for RPA and MC12? What can we expect
regarding these missions? Are they good ANG missions, and can we count on having
them longer than the plan to retire the A10s? Did the MC12s and RPA missions
come to you at your request? Were these missions part of a long term strategy to
equip the ANG?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, the ability of the Air National Guard (ANG) to establish
and maintain superior experience levels, regardless of the particular platform, is
well known. History tells us that there is no reason to believe that would be any
different in the Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) and MC12 and in fact, the ANG
currently has the highest experience levels in RPAs.
As part of the plan to meet the increased RPA taskings to the Air Force from the
SecDef, Air Combat Command (ACC) has asked the ANG to operate 11 steady state
Combat Air Patrols (CAP) indefinitely. The fiscal year (FY13) budget proposal takes
this into account and converts an additional four units from former missions to
RPAs in order for the ANG to meet this requirement. As an end state, there will
be a total of 11 ANG RPA units operating 11 steady state CAPs with the ability
to mobilize more.
The RPA mission is excellent for the ANG for several reasons. First, ANG Airmen
are able to augment active duty forces in a wartime tasking while deployed in
place. This means these Guard Airmen are able to maintain relevancy in the fight,
but are able to be with their families at the end of the duty day; traditional guardsmen are able to maintain their important roles in business and community life. Second, ANG RPA units are part of that traditional rheostat of reserve forces that continue to be called upon when demand increases and then can go back to civilian life
when not needed. Case in point, the ANG has been asked and is continuing to fly
five surge CAPs while ACC reconstitutes its active duty RPA force. Finally, RPAs
could be an invaluable asset to State Governors and Department of Homeland Security in both the DomOps and Defense Support to Civil Authorities role for events
such as natural disasters or Incident Awareness and Assessment.
The transition of RPAs and the MC12s to the ANG may extend the service life
of the aircraft based on predicted reduced operational use after the Afghanistan
drawdown. The MC12 provides a replacement for the retiring RC26, preserving
ANG aviation capabilities and experience. The addition of the MC12 mission also
mitigates some mission losses sustained by the ANG in the FY13 Presidents budget. The reliance on the Guard for these important missions is, indeed, an important
part of our long term strategy to equip the ANG to continue its important national
role into the foreseeable future.
Mr. GRIFFIN. If approved, this new plan will once again require many units to
convert to new missions and require retraining of hundreds of airmen. How much
do these conversions cost? Were there options to save this expense on our people
and to avoid losing all the experience the ANG possesses?
General SCHWARTZ. The conversion costs will vary between units and missions.
Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion costs. When exploring
options we were guided by the Air National Guard (ANG)-developed five Capstone
Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build
dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the Presidents fiscal year (FY13) budget proposal, the Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest
changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered
two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided
to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results
of the DODs assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY

Mrs. ROBY. I understand that the Air Force decision to cut the C130s was based
on removing the older aircraft from the fleet that require costly modification and
modernization efforts to remain viable. However, some of these older aircrafts have

154
not put on as many flight hours than others and are only portionally through their
life cycle. Was this at all considered than just arbitrarily retiring the older aircrafts?
Secretary DONLEY. Yes, this was one of multiple factors considered when deciding
which aircraft to retire. While the relative age of each model was the primary factor
for consideration, existing and required modifications and creating fleet commonality were also considered.
Mrs. ROBY. In regard to the C130s being retired, how was the decision made in
which squadrons to retire rather than any consideration made to the actual performance and role of the squadrons than just that the older C130s were at those
locations?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force found very little variance in squadron performance and roles when it looked at C130 force structure reductions. The Air Force
used two primary means to determine the optimum way to reduce intra-theater
force structure while retaining needed capacity and capability. Using scenarios consistent with Defense Strategic Guidance, the Air Force determined that excess capacity exists in the Air Force intra-theater airlift fleet. A reduced intra-theater airlift requirement enabled the retirement of 65 C130H aircraft. To not only meet
surge requirements, but also to meet a 62-aircraft post-surge and steady-state requirement with a reduced total fleet size, adjustments to the Active Duty (AD)/Air
Reserve Component (ARC) mix were necessary. The previous AD/ARC mix of 33%/
67% was problematic during post-surge and steady-state operations with excessive
AD deploy-to-dwell rates. Therefore, 65 aircraft were removed from the Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve changing the AD/ARC mix to 41%/59% which more
closely aligns with other Air Force force structure.
Mrs. ROBY. Was there a consideration given to moving the C130s to any of these
squadrons due to their mission and location rather than retiring those units with
the oldest aircraft?
Secretary DONLEY. Yes, besides retiring 65 older C130H aircraft, the Air Force
realigned a substantial portion of its C130 fleet to ensure fleet commonality at individual units, effectively streamlining operations and maintenance. In some cases,
units gained newer C130H models or C130J aircraft. Besides realignment, the Air
Force in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, considered State-by-State
capability and in multiple cases employed mission mitigating options to avoid divesting entire units.
Mrs. ROBY. Do you believe that we can leverage the cost savings in the Air National Guard to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally sensible way for Fiscal Year
2013 compared to what was released earlier this week in the Presidents Budget Request?
Secretary DONLEY. The proposed FY13 Presidents Budget provides the most cost
effective force structure to meet the new U.S. defense strategy. Out of this assessment, the Department of Defense developed a strategy that transitions our defense
enterprise from an emphasis on todays wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Departments
efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of
deficit reduction by reducing defense spending. The resulting strategic guidance provided a set of precepts to guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force
over subsequent budget cycles.
Mrs. ROBY. The Air Forces justification for reducing the Air National Guard is
that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when the Air National Guard
has grown. Is this true and has anything changed that would change our way of
doing business since those reductions were made?
Secretary DONLEY. Its not correct to say the Air Force is reducing the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty force. To meet the
requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle
was balance. The Air Force retains critical core capabilities and maintains its ability
to rapidly respond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, while
balancing risk to force structure and modernization.
Mrs. ROBY. Does the Air Force places the same interest or emphasis on homeland
missions as it does overseas missions when it comes to the Air National Guard and
was homeland security capacity consider with reductions?
Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force recognizes that the first responsibility of U.S.
forces is to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors.
When directed by the President or approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Air
Force conducts defense support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in preventing, protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and responding to man-made
or natural disasters. To fully analyze the effects of impending reductions, the Air

155
Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and disaster response scenarios consistent with the new Department of Defense strategic guidance. In support of the
Homeland Security mission, the Air Force continues to meet mission requirements/
taskings through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes all combatant commanders (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements.
Mrs. ROBY. If approved, this new plan will once again require many units to convert to new missions. Were there options to save this expense on our people and
to avoid losing all the experience the Air National Guard possesses?
Secretary DONLEY. The conversion costs will vary between units and missions.
Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion costs. When exploring
options we were guided by the Air National Guard (ANG)-developed five Capstone
Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build
dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the Presidents fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget proposal, the
Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest
changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered
two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided
to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results
of the DODs assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.
Mrs. ROBY. I understand that the Air Force decision to cut the C130s was based
on removing the older aircraft from the fleet that require costly modification and
modernization efforts to remain viable. However, some of these older aircrafts have
not put on as many flight hours than others and are only portionally through their
life cycle. Was this at all considered than just arbitrarily retiring the older aircrafts?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, this was one of multiple factors considered when deciding
which aircraft to retire. While the relative age of each model was the primary factor
for consideration, existing and required modifications and creating fleet commonality were also considered.
Mrs. ROBY. In regard to the C130s being retired, how was the decision made in
which squadrons to retire rather than any consideration made to the actual performance and role of the squadrons than just that the older C130s were at those
locations?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force found very little variance in squadron performance and roles when it looked at C130 force structure reductions. The Air Force
used two primary means to determine the optimum way to reduce intra-theater
force structure while retaining needed capacity and capability. Using scenarios consistent with Defense Strategic Guidance, the Air Force determined that excess capacity exists in the Air Force intra-theater airlift fleet. A reduced intra-theater airlift requirement enabled the retirement of 65 C130H aircraft. To not only meet
surge requirements, but also to meet a 62-aircraft post-surge and steady-state requirement with a reduced total fleet size, adjustments to the Active Duty (AD)/Air
Reserve Component (ARC) mix were necessary. The previous AD/ARC mix of 33%/
67% was problematic during post-surge and steady-state operations with excessive
AD deploy-to-dwell rates. Therefore, 65 aircraft were removed from the Air National
Guard and Air Force Reserve changing the AD/ARC mix to 41%/59% which more
closely aligns with other Air Force force structure.
Mrs. ROBY. Was there a consideration given to moving the C130s to any of these
squadrons due to their mission and location rather than retiring those units with
the oldest aircraft?
General SCHWARTZ. Yes, besides retiring 65 older C130H aircraft, the Air Force
realigned a substantial portion of its C130 fleet to ensure fleet commonality at individual units, effectively streamlining operations and maintenance. In some cases,
units gained newer C130H models or C130J aircraft. Besides realignment, the Air
Force in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, considered State-by-State
capability and in multiple cases employed mission mitigating options to avoid divesting entire units.
Mrs. ROBY. Do you believe that we can leverage the cost savings in the Air National Guard to balance the Air Force in a more fiscally sensible way for Fiscal Year
2013 compared to what was released earlier this week in the Presidents Budget Request?
General SCHWARTZ. The proposed FY13 Presidents Budget provides the most cost
effective force structure to meet the new U.S. defense strategy. Out of this assessment, the Department of Defense developed a strategy that transitions our defense

156
enterprise from an emphasis on todays wars to preparing for future challenges, protects the broad range of U.S. national security interests, advances the Departments
efforts to rebalance and reform, and supports the national security imperative of
deficit reduction by reducing defense spending. The resulting strategic guidance provided a set of precepts to guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force
over subsequent budget cycles.
Mrs. ROBY. The Air Forces justification for reducing the Air National Guard is
that the Active Air Force has made cuts in the past when the Air National Guard
has grown. Is this true and has anything changed that would change our way of
doing business since those reductions were made?
General SCHWARTZ. Its not correct to say the Air Force is reducing the Air National Guard because of previous cuts made to the Active Duty force. To meet the
requirements outlined by the U.S. defense strategy and remain within funding constraints, the Air Force made difficult choices in all core functions, including the decision to divest portions of combat and combat enabler forces. The guiding principle
was balance. The Air Force retains critical core capabilities and maintains its ability
to rapidly respond with a sustainable agile force to meet mission demands, while
balancing risk to force structure and modernization.
Mrs. ROBY. Does the Air Force places the same interest or emphasis on homeland
missions as it does overseas missions when it comes to the Air National Guard and
was homeland security capacity consider with reductions?
General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force recognizes that the first responsibility of U.S.
forces is to defend U.S. territory from direct attack by state and non-state actors.
When directed by the President or approved by the Secretary of Defense, the Air
Force conducts defense support of civil authorities and assists at all levels in preventing, protecting against, mitigating the effects of, and responding to man-made
or natural disasters. To fully analyze the effects of impending reductions, the Air
Force conducted detailed analysis of wartime and disaster response scenarios consistent with the new Department of Defense strategic guidance. In support of the
Homeland Security mission, the Air Force continues to meet mission requirements/
taskings through the Global Force Management process that prioritizes all combatant commanders (NORTHCOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, etc) requirements.
Mrs. ROBY. If approved, this new plan will once again require many units to convert to new missions. Were there options to save this expense on our people and
to avoid losing all the experience the Air National Guard possesses?
General SCHWARTZ. The conversion costs will vary between units and missions.
Where, possible, options were examined to reduce conversion costs. When exploring
options we were guided by the Air National Guard (ANG)-developed five Capstone
Principles: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build
dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states.
Following release of the Presidents fiscal year 2012 (FY13) budget proposal, the
Council of Governors (CoG) asked Secretary Panetta for an opportunity to suggest
changes to those proposals affecting the Air National Guard. The CoG empowered
two state Adjutants General to develop an alternative which was recently provided
to the Air Force and the Department of Defense (DOD) through the Chief of the
National Guard Bureau. This alternative is currently under review and the results
of the DODs assessment and any recommended changes to the proposed FY13
budget will be provided to Congress within the next few weeks.