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HANS KELSENS THEORY AND THE KEY TO

HIS NORMATIVIST DIMENSION
KENDRA FREW*

INTRODUCTION

Writers have both praised and criticised Hans Kelsens work, however all
would agree that he is a theorist to be reckoned with.1 The focus of this
research paper is to critically examine whether the key to the normative
dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law, first published in his book
of the same name in 1934, is a neo-Kantian or regressive version of
Kants transcendental argument.

This paper will begin by outlining

Kelsens theory and discuss the middle-way approach he adopts

between the traditional theories of natural law and legal positivism. 2 This
paper will then outline Kants transcendental argument and apply the
dimensions of Kelsens neo-Kantian or regressive version to this
argument. This paper will demonstrate how Kelsens system of basic
norms apply to Kants transcendental argument and conclude with a
statement as to the problems inherent in Kelsens application of the neoKantian or regressive version of Kants theory.

Law Student, Murdoch University. This essay was selected for publication
as a highly distinguished essay that was written for assessment as part of the Legal
Theory unit at Murdoch University.
1
Stanley Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of
Law (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 311, 312.
2
Ibid.

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Frew, Kelsens Theory and His Normativist Dimension

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2013

KELSENS PURE THEORY OF LAW

Paulson states that Kelsen would have his Pure Theory of Law
understood as a theory of legal cognition, of legal knowledge and that
the sole aim of the Pure Theory is cognition or knowledge of its object,
precisely specified as the law itself. 3 Kelsen believed that utilising
alien disciplines such as ethics, theology, psychology and biology to
answer legal questions have led legal theorists astray and hence his pure
theory of law must be sharply distinguished.4 Kelsen wished to create a
science of law which ought to be distinguished from the philosophy of
justice on the one hand and from sociology, or the cognition of social
reality, on the other. 5 Thus Kelsens pure theory provides the basic
forms under which meanings can be known scientifically as legal
norms.6 These legal norms form a normative system which requires
that individuals conform to the modes of behaviour stated in each of these
norms, ie an ought proposition.7 This normative system is expressed in
a hierarchical structure where the validity of a legal norm is inferred from
a higher order norm, whose validity is thus derived from an even higher
order norm and so on until it reaches the highest order norm, through a
direct appeal to the Constitution, which is the source of the validity of all
the derivative norms, ie the Grundnorm or origin-norm.8 The premise
on which Kelsen bases this validity has been the subject of much
3

Ibid 313.
Ibid.
5
Hans Kelsen, What is Justice? (California University Press, 1957) 266
quoted in Augusto Zimmermann, Western Legal Theory: History, Concepts and
Perspectives (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2013) 72.
6
Michael Freeman, Introduction to Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell, 8th ed,
2008) 307 quoted in Zimmermann, above n 5, 73.
7
Peter Langford and Ian Bryan, Hans Kelsens Concept of Normative
Imputation (2013) 26 Ratio Juris 85.
8
Andreas Kalyvas, The Basic Norm and Democracy in Hans Kelsens Legal
and Political Theory (2006) 32 Philosophy & Social Criticism 573, 577.
4

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discussion and criticism, particularly by his main intellectual opponent,

Carl Schmitt, who mockingly comments that a legal norm is valid if it is
valid and because it is valid. 9

Kelsens validity theory and its

transcendental application will be discussed further below.

Kelsen distinguishes his pure theory of law from both traditional natural
law theory and traditional legal positivism, and instead identifies his
theory as a middle-way between the two traditional theories.

10

Historically, natural law theory is subject to moral constraints while

empirico-positivist theory is seen as part of the world of fact.11 Kelsen
rejects both theories, stating that neither are defensible and thus produces
his alternative theory of pure law, one which is free from the foreign
elements of either theory, ie matters of morality and matters of fact.12
Pure Theory of Law is Kelsens attempt to combine the separability of
law and morality (or separation thesis) with the separability of law and
fact (or normativity thesis).13 The separation thesis is the usual domain
of legal positivism and the normativity thesis reflects a classical part of
natural law theory, hence the combination of both theses effectively
adopts a Kantian or neo-Kantian middle-way or, as Kelsen put it
mittelweg, between the two theories. 14

Kelsens alternative theory,

however, is not a reflection of Kants moral or legal philosophy as, in

fact, Kelsen saw himself as a champion of legal positivism, but rather

Carl Schmitt, Die Verfassungslehre (Duncker and Humblot, 1928) 9 quoted

in William Scheuerman, Carl Schmitts Critique of Liberal Constitutionalism (1996)
58 Review of Politics 299, 303.
10
Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,
above n 1, 312.
11
Ibid 314.
12
Ibid 31415.
13
Stanley Paulson, On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsens Basic Norm
(2000) 13 Ratio Juris 279, 282.
14
Ibid 2812.

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Kants ability to develop a middle-way in his transcendental

argument,15 to which this paper will now turn.

III

KANTS TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT

Kant is known for retaining some of the terminology of the medieval

transcendentals,

while

rejecting

the

general

features

of

the

classification, 16 such as his disregard for God-given natural law in his

formulaic development of the categorical imperative. 17 Instead, Kant
uses transcendental to identify the conditions of possible cognition.18 In
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant writes that he is using the term to speak of
cognition or knowledge that is concerned not so much with the objects
of cognition as with how we cognise objects, insofar as this may be
possible a priori.19 Kant refers to the study of a priori knowledge as
transcendental metaphysics.20 Thus Kants transcendental argument asks
how such knowledge or cognition is possible.21 Similarly, Kelsen retains
something of the terminology of fundamental norms, through his basic
norm (Grundnorm), but rejects the import of the norms as they are

15

Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,

above n 1, 3203.
16
Paulson, On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsens Basic Norm, above n
13, 283.
17
Zimmermann, above n 5, 36. For a discussion of Kants formula of universal
law and moral duty (ie the categorical imperative or ought proposition) see
Patricia Kitcher, Kants Argument for the Categorical Imperative (2004) 38 NOS
555.
18
Paulson, On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsens Basic Norm, above n
13, 283.
19
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Norman Kemp Smith trans,
Macmillan, 1929) [trans of: Critic der Reinen Bernunft (first published 1781)] B25
quoted in Paulson, above n 1, 323; Paulson, above n 13, 283.
20
Anthony Kenny (ed), The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy
(Oxford University Press, 1994) 168.
21
Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,
above n 1, 323.

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understood in the traditional sense, ie from a moral standpoint.22 Thus,

Kelsen utilises Kants metaphysical, or abstract, transcendental argument
of legal cognition on which to base his theory of the fundamental, or
basic norm. It is important to note here, as Paulson does,23 that Kelsen
makes it clear that his theory does not follow the progressive version of
Kants transcendental argument, but rather the regressive or neo-Kantian
version. The following is an explanation of this premise.

IV

NEO-KANTIAN OR REGRESSIVE DIMENSIONS OF

KELSENS THEORY

In Pure Theory of Law Kelsen clearly dissociates his theory with a

progressive version of Kants transcendental argument by stating that ...
the Pure Theory is well aware that one cannot prove the existence of the
law as one proves the existence of natural material facts and the natural
laws governing them ...24 Instead, Kelsen relies on the neo-Kantian or
regressive version which takes, as its starting point, the assumption that
one already has the knowledge or cognition of legal propositions.25 In
his later works, Kelsen explains this concept by stating that
[o]ne can distinguish between lawful and unlawful command acts
and objectively interpret interpersonal relations as legal relations,

22

Ibid.
See ibid; Paulson, On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsens Basic Norm,
above n 13, 283, 287.
24
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (California University Press, 1967) 16
[trans of: Reine Rechtslehre (first published 1934)] quoted in Paulson, The NeoKantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law, above n 1, 328; Paulson, On
the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsens Basic Norm, above n 13, 283.
25
Paulson, On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsens Basic Norm, above n
13, 284.
23

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2013

specifically, as legal duties, rights, and powers, only if one

presupposes the basic norm ...26

As an illustration of this point, Paulson outlines Kelsens regressive

version of the transcendental argument in three phases; starting with a
persons cognition of legal norms (which is given), then ensuring that the
cognition of legal norms is possible only if the category of normative
imputation is presupposed (ie the transcendental premise) and thus
concluding, therefore, that the category of normative imputation is
presupposed (ie the transcendental conclusion).27 Kelsen compares the
category of imputation with causation, stating that the ...laws of nature
link a certain material fact as cause with another as effect [ie causation],
so [do] positive laws link legal condition with legal consequence [ie
imputation] ...28 Thus, Kelsen interprets Kants transcendental argument
in the same way as the neo-Kantians, that is in a backward or regressive
sense from a theory that is already cognised (given) to the presupposed
category or principle.29

KELSENS BASIC NORM AND THE NEO-KANTIAN OR

REGRESSIVE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT

According to Scheuerman, Kelsens theory represented the most

important mid-twentieth-century effort to construct an identifiably neo-

26

Hans Kelsen, On the Basis of Legal Validity (1981) 26 American Journal

of Jurisprudence 178 quoted in Paulson, above n 1, 328; Paulson, above n 13, 287.
27
Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,
above n 1, 326; Paulson, On the Puzzle Surrounding Hans Kelsens Basic Norm,
above n 13, 288.
28
Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson and Stanley Paulson trans, Clarendon Press, 1992) s11b [trans
of: Reine Rechtslehre (first published 1934)] quoted in Paulson, The Neo-Kantian
Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law, above n 1, 326.
29
Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,
above n 1, 330.

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Kantian legal theory.

30

291

Kelsens characteristically neo-Kantian

delineation of Sein (is) from Sollen (ought) formed the basis of his
middle-way approach (discussed above) whilst, at the same time,
distinguished his system of norms from any discussions of morality,
ethics and questions of substantive justice.31 This distinction between is
and ought helped establish, inter alia, the validity of Kelsens legal
norms.32 As has been addressed above, Kelsens system of norms formed
a hierarchical structure whereby the validity of the basic norm is simply
assumed, which is unsatisfactory as it does not answer the question as to
why the norm is valid. Kelsen, himself, does not provide any clarification
within his work, but could argue that Kants universal categorical
imperative to obey authority is justification enough of the validity of the
basic norm.33 Paulson states that to understand the validity of Kelsens
basic norm, the neo-Kantian or regressive version of Kants
transcendental argument must be implicit in the basic norm. 34 Hence,
where Kelsen introduces his notion of normative imputation as his
fundamental category, he implicitly introduces a transcendental argument
to demonstrate this fundamental category as a presupposition.35 Kelsen
describes the basic norm as a transcendental-logical presupposition

30

William Scheuerman, Realism and the Kantian Tradition: A Revisionist

Account (2012) 26 Industrial Relations 453, 458.
31
Ibid.
32
Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,
above n 1, 324.
33
Zimmermann, above n 5, 74. See Alida Wilson, The Imperative Fallacy in
Kelsens Theory (1981) 44 Modern Law Review 270 for a discussion on the
irreconcilability of the origin and validity of Kelsens system of norms.
34
Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,
above n 1, 325.
35
Ibid 3256.

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which enables the scientific study of the objective validity of his legal
system of norms.36
Therefore, in general, the issuance of legal norms, compliance with them,
and their application of sanctions for non-compliance is possible only if
the fundamental legal category of imputation is presupposed.37 Paulson
holds that no matter how Kelsens neo-Kantian argument on behalf of the
fundamental legal category is formulated or constructed, it still remains
problematic.38 The main problem being that the second premise of the
three-phase argument outlined above claims too much in that the only
way to support a normativist legal theory were by way of the category of
imputation.39 Kantians would argue though that ruling out all possible
alternatives to Kelsens category of normative imputation is tantamount
to the progressive version of the transcendental argument; an argument
which Kelsen did not have in mind when developing his theory. 40
Therein lies the problem because it appears that, as Kelsen had no
intention of using the progressive version, he is using the regressive
version independently of the progressive version which robs it of its
transcendental force. 41 Where the transcendental element is lost, the
regressive version thus reverts to a scheme of analysis or, more simply, as
a legal point of view.42 These problems aside, Paulson still maintains that
36

Kalyvas, above n 8, 575.

Stanley Paulson, Hans Kelsens Earliest Legal Theory: Critical
Constructivism (1996) 59 Modern Law Review 797, 811.
38
Ibid 81112. See Stanley Paulson, Arriving at a Defensible Periodization of
Hans Kelsens Legal Theory (1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 351 for an
account of the period between 19602 where Kelsen identified the problems
associated with his theory and abandoned neo-Kantianism precepts in his
transcendental approach.
39
Paulson, The Neo-Kantian Dimension of Kelsens Pure Theory of Law,
above n 1, 331.
40
Ibid.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid 332.
37

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Kelsens neo-Kantian foundation of his legal theory is work that counts

as one of the most provocative efforts of our time in coming to terms with
the perennial problems of legal philosophy.43

VI

CONCLUSION

Kelsen based his pure theory of law, not on sociological considerations,

but on the strict science of law itself. His pure theory reflects Kants
transcendental argument on legal cognition without adopting Kants
moral or legal philosophy. In applying the transcendental argument,
Kelsen adopts a neo-Kantian or regressive version of Kants theory which
assumes that one already has knowledge or cognition of legal
propositions. This assumption forms the basis of the validity of Kelsens
system of norms, supported by the presupposition of the category of
normative imputation, ie the link between legal condition and legal
consequence.

As his critics point out, Kelsen does not provide

clarification as to why these norms are valid, but relies instead on his
ought proposition (acting as a categorical imperative to obey authority)
to justify the validity of the basic or ultimate norm. Although Kelsens
theory is viewed by some as problematic, it is still considered among
many as important work in the field of legal philosophy.

43

Paulson, Hans Kelsens Earliest Legal Theory: Critical Constructivism,

above n 37, 812.