Advances in Developing Human

Resources
http://adh.sagepub.com

Using Scenarios to Develop Crisis Managers: Applications of Scenario

Planning and Scenario-Based Training
Jason B. Moats, Thomas J. Chermack and Larry M. Dooley
Advances in Developing Human Resources 2008; 10; 397 originally published online
Apr 3, 2008;
DOI: 10.1177/1523422308316456
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://adh.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/10/3/397

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:

Academy of Human Resource Development

Additional services and information for Advances in Developing Human Resources can be found at:

Email Alerts: http://adh.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts

Subscriptions: http://adh.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations http://adh.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/10/3/397

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Using Scenarios to Develop

Crisis Managers: Applications
of Scenario Planning and
Scenario-Based Training
Jason B. Moats
Thomas J. Chermack
Larry M. Dooley

The problem and the solution. Since the events of September 11,
2001, and Hurricane Katrina during the summer of 2005, the words
crisis and disaster evoke images of families stranded on causeways
turned islands, surrounded by what little property they could carry;
houses smashed by killing winds; and skyscrapers crumbling out of the
sky. Disastrous events, such as fires, tornadoes, hurricanes, terrorist
incidents, and chemical spills, cause the loss of resources, destruction
of property, financial hardship, and death. During these events, local,
state, and federal governments commit large numbers of resources,
time, and money to mitigate the consequences of the disaster.To manage the response to these events, leaders of public safety organizations and agencies such as fire and police departments, emergency
medical services, and health-care organizations, public works departments, private industry, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
descend on the disaster site.These leaders are required to make high
consequence decisions with incomplete or inaccurate information, illdefined goals, and the pressures of time and a constantly changing situation by drawing on their training and experience. This article
positions scenario planning and scenario-based training as two
cutting-edge methods for organizational leaders to understand better
their environments so as to avoid disastrous events and to put in
place efficient and effective plans for coping if disaster should strike.
Keywords:

crisis management; scenario planning; scenario-based training

This article was subjected to a two-tier blind review process that did not involve the authors who
are currently members of the editorial board.
Advances in Developing Human Resources Vol. 10, No. 3 June 2008 397-424
DOI: 10.1177/1523422308316456
Copyright 2008 Sage Publications

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

398

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

Corporate scandals, terrorism, mechanical failures, and natural disasters have

caused catastrophic damage to public and private organizations resulting in
losses of billions of dollars (Mitroff, 2002; Roberts, 2006; Townsend, 2006).
Preparing crisis managers to be effective decision makers in crises, regardless
of the magnitude, requires comprehensive and coordinated planning and training (Klein, 1999; Lindell et al., 2007). Emergency responders make decisions
in the mitigation of a disaster with the benefit of intensive prior planning and
rigorous, comprehensive training (Lindell et al., 2007; Montgomery, Lipshitz,
& Brehmer, 2005). In fact, emergency managers develop detailed, comprehensive plans to aid decision makers as they lead emergency response efforts
(Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act [EPCRA], 1986;
Lindell et al., 2007; Lindell & Perry, 1992). In addition, the decision makers
who lead these efforts participate in intensive training sessions and exercises
to prepare them for their tasks.

Statement of the Problem and Research Question

The problem is clear: Leaders of organizations and agencies of all kinds are
struggling in highly complex environments, and more than ever, they need
effective methods for (a) minimizing the risk of a crisis and (b) managing crisis should it develop. Thus, the overarching research question that forms the
basis of this article is What are the cutting-edge methods for avoiding and
managing crisis?
This article proceeds by clearly defining disasters and crises. Once these
terms are clarified, two cutting-edge methods for avoiding and managing crisis are proposed: (a) scenario planning and (b) scenario-based training (SBT).
Using case study research (Dooley, 2002), these methods are discussed in the
context of two recent, well-known examples of crisis in the United States,
namely, (a) the events of September 11, 2001, and (b) Hurricane Katrina. Key
reasons for failure are proposed in these cases based on our analyses.
Conclusions for how scenario planning and SBT can aid in various forms of
disaster and crisis management are provided as well as implications for
research, theory, and practice.

Defining and Understanding Disasters and Crises

In emergency disciplines, multiple definitions of disaster are found in federal regulations and law, state laws, and local ordinances, typically for the purposes of enabling response and recovery efforts (Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 2007). However, Lindell et al. (2007)
provide a comprehensive definition by stating that a disaster is an event that
produces greater losses than a community can control, including casualties,
property damage, and significant environmental damage (p. 549). For a wider

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

organizational context, we define disaster to mean an event that causes greater

losses than the organization can handle, including personnel and financial losses, the loss of property, and irreparable damage to the organizational
culture.
In studying this definition of disaster, it may seem that planning efforts are
futile because a disaster, by its very nature, is more than an organization can handle, regardless of any planning efforts. However, this is not true. Although
Mitroff and Alpasian (2003) state that in todays world, it is no longer sufficient
to plan for the occurrence of individual crises . . . such plans sit on the shelves
and are not rehearsed until necessary. By that time, it is often too late (p. 18),
we suggest that the planning process provides more than a plan. Chermack
(2004) supported this position by asserting that scenario planning can break the
constraints of bounded rationality (Simon, 1990), by empowering the individuals to be more open to multiple perspectives, help individuals and organizations
cope better with complexity, and provide a context that frames the experienced
events. More importantly, Mitroff and Alpasian (2003) contended that
the fact that we cannot, and never will be able to, prevent all crises from occurring does not
relieve us from the moral responsibility of doing everything that we can do to make their
occurrence less likely and of less impact. (p. 19)

Therefore, planning for a disaster is not futile; it is also not the whole solution
(Chermack, 2004; Mitroff & Alpasian, 2003). Ultimately, planning provides
more experience to build the decision-making capabilities of the individual
and the organization (Klein, 1999, 2004).
In contrast to disaster, a crisis has been defined as a decisive or critical
moment (Merriam-Websters Dictionary, 2005). Other references define crisis as an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change
is impending; especially one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome (Encyclopedia Britannica Online, 2007). Crisis management
literature provides us with diverse meanings for crisis. Reilly (1998) defined
crisis as
A situation which is harmful and disruptive (versus a turning point or an opportunity); is of
high magnitude (versus a threat or a problem); is sudden, acute, and demands a timely
response (versus decline); and is outside the firms typical operating frameworks (versus routine, such as fire to firefighters). (p. 284)

Pearson and Clair (1998) provided a more appropriate definition: An organizational crisis is a low-probability, high-impact event that threatens the viability of the organization and is characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect,
and means of resolution, as well as by a belief that decisions must be made
swiftly (p. 60). Pearson and Clairs (1998) definition provides greater flexibility in how we think about crisis because Reilly (1998) asserted that the situation is harmful and disruptive as opposed to one that threatens the viability.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

399

400

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

In other words, not all crises are harmful and disruptive (Boin, Kofman-Bos,
& Overdijk, 2004; Borodzicz & van Haperen, 2002). We submit that only the
magnitude of the event separates disaster from crisis. Mitroff (2002) supports
our assertion by suggesting that crises represent the breakdown of complex
systems whereas disasters represent the breakup of those systems. Mitroff
(2002) infers that normal accidents are inadvertent and should be expected
because we operate exceedingly complex technologies and systems with
management and safety systems that are faulty or simply inadequate (p. 19).
These accidents represent a shift . . . from safe to unsafe conditions (Mitroff,
2002, p. 20), whereas incidents such as the World Trade Center and the
ENRON collapse were intentional (p. 19) and represented the shift from
good to evil (p. 20). Although the metaphysical approach is dramatic, it does
provide a distinct difference in magnitude.
Conditions are similar in both a crisis and a disaster. High consequence decisions are required to be made in spite of a constantly changing situation, incomplete or inaccurate information, ill-defined goals, and the pressures of time
(Klein, 1999, 2004; Mitroff, 2002; Reilly, 1998). Those making decisions are
organizational leaders who must draw on their training and experience (Klein,
1999, 2004). Unfortunately and all too often, these decision makers are ineffective and ultimately their efforts to manage the crisis are inefficient (Klein,
1999). In this article, we address why we believe this failure in decision making occurs by reviewing two cases from emergency response disciplines.

Cutting-Edge Methods for Understanding

the Environment and Managing Contingencies
Human resource development (HRD) is a discipline concerned with the
development of expertise (Swanson, 2007), and increasingly, the development
of communities and nations (Lynham & Cunningham, 2006; McLean, 2004).
Based on expertise in adult learning, and by using this expertise in a context
in which learning is considered the most appropriate approach to strategy (de
Geus, 1988, 1999), HRD is poised to play a significant role in minimizing the
risk of, and recovery from, crisis situations. HRD professionals are beginning
to demonstrate their planning expertise in corporate (Chermack & van der
Merwe, 2003), nonprofit (Chermack, van der Merwe, & Lynham, 2007), and
national contexts (Lynham & Cunningham, 2006). (For a detailed outline of
how HRD professionals encourage, engage, and increasingly drive organization strategy through scenario-based planning, see Bartlett & Ghoshal [2002],
Chermack [2004], Yorks [2004], and Walton [1999].)
Two tools that have a track record of success in practice are scenario
planning and SBT (Bloom & Menefee, 1994; Lynch, 2005; OReilly &
Brandenburg, 2006; Schwartz, 1991). These methods allow disaster and crisis
response workers to evaluate multiple potential outcomes of volatile situations

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

and consider a variety of responses, aiming for the most efficient and effective
of both. Scenario planning has been defined as
a process of positing several informed, plausible and imagined alternative future environments
in which decisions about the future may be played out, for the purpose of changing current
thinking, improving decision making, enhancing human and organization learning and
improving performance. (Chermack & Lynham, 2002, p. 376)

This definition has been used with considerable success, with widely documented cases (Kahane, 1992; Wack, 1985a). SBT (operating at a more detailed
level concerning what action to take given the unfolding of a specific scenario,
and then using that plan to train responders to execute the response efficiently)
has long been in use in varying emergency response professions including
wilderness search and rescue teams, firefighters, law enforcement teams, and
many others with success (Jenvald & Morin, 2004; Lynch, 2005; Mirabella &
Macpherson, 1995; OReilly & Brandenburg, 2006; Strohschneider & Gerdes,
2004; Whitcomb, 1999).
To clarify, scenario planning explores the potential realities whereas SBT
provides the opportunity to experience interaction within the potential reality
to develop and test possible solutions to the problems presented. Each of these
tools warrants further description and clarification.

Scenario Planning
Scenario planning evolved from Herman Kahns methods to think the
unthinkable (Kahn & Wiener, 1967) in the 1950s. The scenario approach recognizes the inherent weaknesses in forecasts, and single-outcome methods
that essentially aim to predict the future. Instead, scenario planning makes use
of multiple scenarios or stories of different futures to underscore the fact that
the future is unpredictable, unstable, and inherently filled with uncertainty.
Reframed as tools for learning, scenarios are intended to shift the thinking
inside the organization (Wack, 1985a, p. 34) and help managers and decision
makers reperceive the organizational situation and consider numerous ways in
which the future might unfold.
Pierre Wack translated Kahns ideas into a corporate setting in his years as
the head of long-range planning at Royal Dutch/Shell. Wack spent most of the
1970s experimenting with and refining his methods and he credited Shells
ability to anticipate the oil shocks of the mid-1970s and 1980s to this new
technique. Eventually, he published Shells successes with scenarios in the
Harvard Business Review (Wack, 1985a, 1985b). Wacks work at Shell served
as the foundation for the modern scenario planning methods used and sold
through the Global Business Network (www.gbn.org)the organization most
commonly sought for expertise in scenario practices today.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

401

402

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

A General Scenario Planning Process

Although there are numerous variations on how to conduct a scenario planning exercise, all are variations on a theme. That is, all have certain elements
in common. Wilson and Ralston (2006) provided a comprehensive and
detailed process for developing and using scenarios. Their process involves 18
steps, which are provided in Table 1. Each step in this process is a critical point
of adding value and exposing mental models and assumptions during the scenario project. These 18 steps are also in four general phases of scenario planning, namely, (a) getting started, (b) laying the environmental analysis
foundation, (c) creating the scenarios, and (d) moving from scenarios to a decision (Wilson & Ralston, 2006, p. 25).
Steps 1-6 are all related to starting up the scenario project, and these steps
are meant to define the scope of the project and assemble the scenario project
team. Steps 7-10 are concerned with exploring the internal and external environments and putting these together in a cohesive picture. Steps 11-14 focus
on developing the scenarios themselves based on all of the work done in the
previous steps. The final phase includes steps 15-18 that cover the use of the
scenarios to examine current strategies and decisions. Wilson and Ralstons
(2006) text provides a detailed road map through each of these steps with specific instructions and practitioner tips.

SBT
SBT is a training method that provides a context in which individuals and
groups can experience and interact with a possible future (Funke, 1998;
Hermann, 1997; Jenvald & Morin, 2004; Kirkley & Kirkley, 2005; Mirabella
& Macpherson, 1995; Smith, 2004; Strohschneider & Gerdes, 2004;
Whitcomb, 1999; Yusko & Goldstein, 1997). SBT presents learners with an
interactive story and places them in a specific environment that resembles the
context in which the problem would typically be encountered (i.e., work environment). The story is reactive to the actions of the participants. Through the
story and the environment, learners are presented a problem or a series of
problems at specific points in the story that flow logically throughout, called
decision points (Whitcomb, 1999). The story and corresponding decision
points are developed to stimulate specific learning outcomes (Lynch, 2005).
The decision points are arranged in a specific order and frequency to increase
or decrease the complexity of the given problem.
SBT is a versatile training method that can be used to reinforce classroom
lectures on a single topic to providing an environment to hone command and
control skills and enhance decision-making skills (Moats, Hightower, Ware, &
Wall, 2004; Texas Engineering Extension Service [TEEX], 2005; Whitcomb,
1999) to providing integrated scenarios that can be used as a comprehensive
evaluation of skills (Babicz, 2003; Lebow & Wager, 1994; Lynch, 2005;
Whitcomb, 1999). The method has been in practice for many years
Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

TABLE 1:

A Step-by-Step Approach to Developing and Using

Scenarios

Step 1: Develop the case for scenarios

Step 2: Gain executive understanding,
support, and participation
Step 3: Define the decision focus
Step 4: Design the process
Step 5: Select the facilitator
Step 6: Form the scenario team
Step 7: Gather available data, views,
and projections
Step 8: Identify and assess key
decision factors
Step 9: Identify the critical forces
and drivers

Step 10: Conduct focused research on key

issues, forces, and drivers
Step 11: Assess the importance and
uncertainty of forces and drivers
Step 12: Identify key axes of uncertainty
Step 13: Select scenario logics to cover
the envelope of uncertainty
Step 14:Write the story lines for the
scenarios
Step 15: Rehearse the future with scenarios
Step 16: Get to the decision recommendations
Step 17: Identify signposts to monitor
Step 18: Communicate the results to the
organization

Source: Wilson and Ralston (2006, p. 25). Copyright 2006 Southwestern Educational.

(Whitcomb, 1999) and combines techniques and processes from theater, storytelling, and training, often mixed with computer-based simulations (Boin
et al., 2004; Borodzicz & van Haperen, 2002; Diehl, 1991; Funke, 1998;
Hermann, 1997; Whitcomb, 1999). However, there has not been any significant empirical study of the topic, although it is widely assumed that this is an
effective method of training (OReilly & Brandenburg, 2006). SBT is a technique that is supported by experiential learning theory (Kolb, 1984; Kolb,
Rubin, & McIntyre, 1983), transformational learning theory (Cranton, 2002;
Mezirow, 1991, 1994, 1997; Taylor, 1997) and many principles of naturalistic
decision making (Alby & Zucchermaglio, 2006; Gore, Banks, Millward, &
Kyriakidou, 2006; Klein, 1999, 2004; Klein & Calderwood, 1990; Lipshitz,
Klein, & Carroll, 2006; Montgomery et al., 2005). In addition, some SBT
applications also use computer-based simulations to provide a level of fidelity
(realism) (Boin et al., 2004; Borodzicz, 2004; Borodzicz & van Haperen,
2002; Dugdale, Pallamin, & Pavard, 2006; Helsloot, 2005; Hermann, 1997;
Issenberg, Gordon, Gordon, & Safford, 2001; Jenvald & Morin, 2004;
Mirabella & Macpherson, 1995; OReilly & Brandenburg, 2006; Smith, 2004;
Strohschneider & Gerdes, 2004; Yusko & Goldstein, 1997).
A Common SBT Process
There are many accepted ways to develop, execute, and revise SBT applications. Figure 1 shows the most common elements of the SBT methodology
Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

403

404

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

grouped into three main stages: (a) scenario development, (b) delivery, and (c)
after action review(s) (Babicz, 2003; Borodzicz, 2004; Borodzicz & van
Haperen, 2002; Jenvald & Morin, 2004; Kirkley & Kirkley, 2005; Lynch,
2005; Mirabella & Macpherson, 1995; Whitcomb, 1999). The first stage, scenario development, begins with determining the scope and intent of the training. An ill-prepared or inappropriate scenario can result in huge transfer
distances and negative learning (Holton, Bates, & Ruona, 2000). The use of an
appropriate scenario can provide the participant a small transfer distance and
make it much easier to utilize the knowledge and skills acquired in a number
of applications. Fidelity plays a large role in lessening this distance (Holton
et al., 2000; OReilly & Brandenburg, 2006). During this first phase of scenario
development, the scope of the scenario and the most appropriate context is
determined (Noe, 2005). The learning objectives should be oriented to define
expected task performance, outline the conditions in which the outcomes
should take place, and define the criteria that describes to what level of accuracy and what level of proficiency the activity is to be performed (OReilly &
Brandenburg, 2006). The scenarios should reinforce the learning objectives
and ensure there is an opportunity for each objective to be met. To illustrate
this point, Smith (2004) wrote: Any scenario has to be grounded in the realities of the organization but sufficiently challenging to expose gaps in the
knowledge base of those managers in the various crisis teams (p. 356).
Once the objectives are determined, the second phase of scenario development incorporates a process such as scenario planning to develop the detailed
storyline and decision points of the scenario. This process is one of the most
critical in the development of SBT. The development of the scenario should be
done by a comprehensive committee that has the necessary knowledge to
develop a logical and appropriate storyline. Whitcomb (1999) stated, The
committee should be diverse enough to reflect disparate training interests and
broad enough to address all core competencies (p. 44). Whitcomb (1999)
added that the committee should be led by someone who fully understands the
training objectives and intent of the mission to make the appropriate decisions
concerning the details of the scenario and the logic that supports it.
Once the detailed storyline has been developed with the integrated decision
points, extensive and detailed care should be taken to develop scripts and
actions consistent with the storyline (Lynch, 2005). These scripts and actions
are essential to building the fidelity, or realism, of the scenarios. If these scripts
are unrealistic or flawed, they have the potential to inhibit or interrupt the
learning process (Lebow & Wager, 1994). In addition to the scenario, the context of the training is equally important to the fidelity of the training (Lynch,
2005; Whitcomb, 1999).
The aesthetic value, in essence, the look and feel of the training environment, including props, equipment, and the facility, has obvious value to the
context. However, safety and logistical concerns, such as the appropriate
number of instructors, actors, and coordination specialists, are important to

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

FIGURE 1:

General Model of Scenario-Based Training

maintaining the illusion of realism (Lynch, 2005; Whitcomb, 1999). These

logistical concerns must be addressed before advancing to the next stage of
SBT, delivery of the training.
During the delivery of the training, a subprocess supports the larger training process. Figure 2 illustrates the subprocess of this stage. First, the scenario
is presented to the learners. They react to the scenario and their actions
and reactions are observed and recorded by the observers and controllers.
Observations are also used for a myriad of purposes, including the sequencing
of the scenario to maintain the fidelity of the scenario and evaluation of the
participants mastery of the competencies (Whitcomb, 1999).
The scenario is then adjusted to participant reactions based on the training
needs and the fidelity of the training. For example, if the intent of the training is
simply familiarization with a problem, then the scenario may be much less complex and require much less detail to be observed. If the intent of the training is
mastery, then the observations are likely to require more detail. Additionally, the
level of coordination between the observers, controllers, actors, and coordinators
is the single most important process that takes place. If this coordination fails,
the fidelity of the scenario collapses (Lynch, 2005; Whitcomb, 1999).
The final stage of SBT is the debriefing. A debriefing can be defined as a
process in which people who have had an experience are led through a purposive discussion of that experience (Lederman, 1992, p. 146). This technique
is a means to provide feedback on participant performance (Jenvald & Morin,

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

405

406

Advances in Developing Human Resources

FIGURE 2:

June 2008

The Delivery Component of Scenario-Based Training

2004), to bring learners to connect the dots from the old knowledge and skills
they have, and to provide learners opportunities to apply new knowledge and
skills. Carefully planned debriefings can help minimize the weaknesses caused
by problems with fidelity, whether they occur because of a poor scenario or
other unavoidable problems to manage the sense of reality (Diehl, 1991).
The debriefing is led by an instructor and provides participants the opportunity to review the actions of the course and ultimately change their worldview and individually held paradigms (Ellis, Mendel, & Nir, 2006; Lederman,
1992). These guided reflections, and ultimately SBT, rely heavily on what
Mezirow (1994, 2003; Mezirow & Associates, 1990) refers to as discourse.
Discourse refers to a special type of dialogue that involves the introspective
assessment of ones held beliefs, feelings and values (Mezirow, 2003, p. 59).
The after action review portion of SBT provides the opportunity to make good
use of dialogue as a mediating process. Lederman (1992) states that this
process is not ancillary to the educational process . . . [it] is an integral part
of any learning experience (p. 158).

Case Study Research

Dooley (2002) described case study research in a manner that demonstrated
its flexibility and that is used to structure the remainder of this article. Based
on a clear analysis of other authors on the topic (Soy, 1996; Stake, 1994; Yin,
1981, 1994), Dooley (2002) synthesized the following elements of case study
research:

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

determine and define the research questions,

select case(s) and determine the data gathering and analysis
techniques,
prepare to collect data,
collect data in the field,
present and analyze the data,
prepare the report. (Pp. 338-339)
These components of case study research were used in the definition and
selection of two cases in which we illustrate the two key contributing factors
that led to recent well-known disaster and crisis situations. The cases selected
to demonstrate failure in the effective management of crises include the events
of September 11, 2001, focusing specifically on the incident in New York City,
and Hurricane Katrina, focusing specifically on New Orleans and the immediate surrounding area. Both of these events involve situations in which a failure
to seriously consider action plans based on possible outcomes and a proper
allocation of resources led to even further chaos.
Defining the Problem and Research Question
Events such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and Hurricane
Katrina are examples of crises that challenge organizations as well as change
forever the social, political, and economic environments (Mitroff, 2002).
Events such as these pose serious questions to people interested in planning as
they provide clear examples of the consequences of misreading actions and
their potential outcomes. For clarity, the key problem statement and research
questions are presented again as follows:
Problem: Leaders of organizations and agencies of all kinds are struggling in highly complex environments, and more than ever, they need effective methods for (a) avoiding
crisis and (b) managing crisis should it develop.
Research question: What are the cutting-edge methods for avoiding and managing crisis?

Selection of the Cases and Analysis Techniques

The two cases selected to illustrate the key points of the article are (a) the
events of September 11, 2001, and (b) Hurricane Katrina. These cases were
selected based on their prominence in the national and global media (although
these are both examples based in the United States which is a limitation to this
article) and because they feature clear examples of failure that can provide critical learning. Case reports of both of these events were obtained from the U.S.
Congress, newsprint, and various other published analyses that provided guidance and various accounts of what happened and what went wrong in each case.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

407

408

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

Preparation and Data Collection

The case reports and other documentation were obtained through the utilization of the online library system at a major research university in the southern United States and through the databases of an agency specializing in
emergency response, also located in the southern United States. These events
were chosen because (a) each provides an example of a series of events that is
highly complex involving multiple organizations and (b) each has a myriad of
information published about it from a wide variety of perspectives. Searches
included the following databases: Academic Search Premier; Cambridge
Scientific Abstracts, including Social Service, Management, and Organization
Studies; Communication Studies and Education SAGE Full-Text Collections;
Ingenta; and Emerald Insight. These databases were searched using the following keywords: World Trade Center Response; Arlington County Response;
Pentagon Response; September 11, 2001; 9:11; Hurricane Katrina; Katrina;
and 2005 Hurricane Season.
Analysis of the Cases
This section describes an analysis of the two cases, centering on two key
issues that ran through both cases. These were (a) a lack of vision in considering the possible outcomes and (b) a lack of action once the crises began to
unfold. These issues are described in each case with particular attention to evidence gleaned from reports and publications concerning each event.
Lack of visionplanning failures. Mitroff (2005b) suggested that lack of vision
and denial are two of the most powerful hindrances to effective crisis management (Wagner, 2005). Organizations often engage in multiple approaches to
planning (Chermack, Lynham, & Ruona, 2001; Lindell & Perry, 1992;
Mintzberg, 1994; Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, & Lampel, 1998). Unfortunately, plans
still fail (Bloom & Menefee, 1994; Lindell & Perry, 1992). Failure occurs
because planners lose perspective on an essential characteristic of a crisis; it is
a low-probability event (Boin et al., 2004; Mitroff, 2002, 2005b; Pearson &
Clair, 1998; Reilly, 1998; Wagner, 2005). Planners fail to imagine the possibilities beyond the most likely. Examinations of various planning tools such as the
traditional SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, forecasting, and other predictive orientations toward planning reveal that most traditional approaches to planning are inadequate because they do not allow
decision makers to expand their view of what is possible and may happen in the
future (Bloom & Menefee, 1994; Mintzberg, 1994).
In August 2005, Hurricane Katrina, a powerful Category 4 storm devastated
the central Gulf Coast region of the United States. Hundreds of square miles,
including homes, commercial, and industrial areas and even whole cities were
annihilated by the powerful winds and water of the hurricane. To magnify the

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

effects of the storm, the city of New Orleans and the surrounding parishes
were flooded when the levees, which were to protect the city, failed
(Townsend, 2006; U.S. Congress, 2006).
Several events surrounding Hurricane Katrina provide powerful and tragic
examples of failures in the management of the crisis. However, a lack of willingness to entertain scenarios that were circulated more than a year before
Hurricane Katrinas landfall provides a clear example of failure to consider the
possible over the likely. In July 2004, federal, state, and local emergency planners and responders were confronted with a planning exercise that used a hurricane scenario called Hurricane PAM. The scenario had an eerie likeness to
Hurricane Katrina which followed some 13 months later (U.S. Congress,
2006). The report submitted to Congress detailing the events before, during,
and after Hurricane Katrina provide a concise description of the Hurricane
PAM scenario (U.S. Congress, 2006).
The Hurricane Pam scenario focused on 13 parishes in southeast LouisianaAscension,
Assumption, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, St. Bernard, St. Charles, St. James,
St. John, St. Tammany, Tangipahoa, and Terrebonne. Representatives from outside the primary
parishes, including officials from Mississippis Emergency Management Agency (EMA), participated because hurricane evacuation and sheltering involve communities throughout
Louisiana and into Arkansas, Mississippi, and Texas. The Hurricane Pam exercise scenario
was prescient. The virtual storm brought sustained winds of 120 mph, up to 20 inches of rain
in parts of Southeast Louisiana, and storm surges that topped the levees and flooded the New
Orleans area. The exercise assumed that:
300,000 people would not evacuate in advance;
500,000 to 600,000 buildings would be destroyed;
Phone and sewer services would be knocked out and chemical plants would be flooded;
97 percent of all communications would be down;
About 175,000 people would be injured, 200,000 would become sick, and more than 60,000
would be killed;
About 1,000 shelters would be needed for evacuees;
Boats and helicopters would be needed for thousands of rescues because many residents would
be stranded by floodwaters;
A catastrophic flood would leave swaths of southeast Louisiana uninhabitable for more than a
year. (U.S. Congress, 2006, p. 81)

When confronted with this scenario, emergency planners denied the vision
and thought it too extreme and then failed to implement many of the recommendations and lessons learned as a result of the exercise (Mitroff, 2005a;
Phillips, 2006; U.S. Congress, 2006). Scenario planning was used in this situation however; the reluctance of decision makers to seriously entertain the

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

409

410

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

possibility of a disaster in New Orleans prevented them from taking the proper
precautionary measures. This was a case of scenario planning in which decision makers were not compelled by the content of PAM scenario and represents both a lack of vision (in terms of a willingness to explore catastrophe as
a real possibility) and denial.
However, these facts also prompt us to ask whether learning actually
occurred (Phillips, 2006). Perhaps, this is an example in which no learning
occurred. Or, was the knowledge gained, the learning, forgotten? We propose
that the weakness in crisis management planning is a lack of vision that is adequate for the unexpected, unanticipated, and abnormal. Mitroff (2005a) supported our assertion:
Most natural disasters, such as earthquakes, are neither predictable nor preventable. However,
many, such as hurricanes and tsunamis, are somewhat predictable even if they are not fully
preventable. . . . In the case of Katrina, it was thought that the probability of a hurricane of its
magnitude occurring was only 0.03. . . . To his credit, Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff wants to replace traditional RM [risk management] by approaches that focus on the
magnitude of the consequences only. If we dont, then we will continue to downplay high consequence-low probability crises like Katrina, not to mention atrocities like 9/11. (Pp. 2-3)

On Tuesday, September 11, 2001, 19 terrorists, equipped with box cutters,

hijacked four commercial aircraft flying transcontinental routes. The terrorists
flew three of these planes, loaded with passengers, into the north and south
towers of the World Trade Center in New York; the Pentagon, located in
Arlington County, Virginia, near Washington DC; the fourth plane was crashed
into an empty field near the small town of Shanksville, Pennsylvania. These
tragic events transpired in little more than 60 min. These attacks marked the
first time in the history of the United States that mass, simultaneous attacks .
. . of such devastating potential (Hoffman, 2002, p. 17) were perpetrated on
domestic soil. More than 2,000 people, including hundreds of emergency
response personnel, perished as a result. What made this more tragic was that
the planning and intelligence communities failed to recognize that an event of
this type and magnitude was possible in the United States (Hoffman, 2002).
The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were well planned
and executed by the terrorists (9/11 Commission, 2004). The National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, also known as the
9/11 Commission, cited interagency communication failures, lapses within the
national intelligence system and lapses of national security policies and procedures as the most significant failures that ultimately led to the terrorists access
to carry out their acts. More significantly, these failures can be traced to the
inability of the planning and intelligence communities to imagine a potential
reality that included an attack on the United States, let alone a coordinated,
simultaneous attack on multiple targets spread over wide geographic area
(Hoffman, 2002). The testimony of CIA operative recorded in the 9/11
Commission Report (2004) supports our assertion, no one looked at the bigger picture; no analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

thundercloud to the ground (p. 297). In other words, had the vision of such
an attack been understood, the attacks could have possibly been avoided.
Unfortunately, the planning failures that would have prevented or lessened
the impact of September 11 were not limited to the intelligence community. The
engineering and emergency response communities failed to envision and consequently plan for the possibility that the towers of the World Trade Center would
collapse (Greenhom & OMara, Incorporated, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004).
Emergency response planners failed to imagine the consequences if the towers,
each more than 1,000 ft into the New York skyline, were to collapse. The consequences of this lack of vision allowed emergency response vehicles and personnel as well as command and control centers to locate in the collapse zone. When
the buildings did fail, they literally crushed the incident response efforts.
A second failure of the planning effort existed in the inability to conceive of
an event that would overwhelm the considerable resources of New York City
(Hoffman, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004). Prior to September 11, 2001, there
had been multiple large-scale incidents, such as the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing; however, the complexity and magnitude of the 2001 attack made all
previous incidents pale in comparison. Because the emergency response planners failed to envision any event that would overwhelm New York, the emergency responders and city government officials were lulled into a false sense of
security (Hoffman, 2002) allowing the various major response agencies to
remain virtually autonomous (9/11 Commission, 2004). In addition, many policy decisions were made in an attempt to resolve conflicts instead of improve
the functionality of the holistic response effort (9/11 Commission, 2004). The
result of this inability to vision this event was an uncoordinated, inefficient
response effort (McKinsey & Company, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004).
Lack of abilityproblem-solving failures. In the current business environment,
executives and crises planners are subject to the same failures as those in emergency response organizations (Klein, 1999; Reilly, 1998). As Smith (2004)
wrote, The manager was, after all, employed because of his or her demonstrable skills in steady-state management (p. 347). The events surrounding
Hurricane Katrina provide another example of a failure of crisis management.
However, this is not a breakdown of imagination; it is a collapse of action
decision making. The failure to make timely decisions about a myriad of topics
resulted in exacerbating the Hurricane Katrina disaster to a magnitude of the
highest proportions (Townsend, 2006; U.S. Congress, 2006). The most agonizing example of this breakdown concerns the decision, or rather lack thereof, to
evacuate New Orleans and the surrounding parishes (U.S. Congress, 2006).
More than 56 hr before landfall, the National Weather Service (NWS) and
National Hurricane Center had provided accurate and timely predictions of the
storms path (NWS, 2006; Reston, 2005; U.S. Congress, 2006). Emergency
plans, recently revised since Hurricane Ivan in 2005, also provided prompts for
evacuation decisions (U.S. Congress, 2006). The information proved useful for

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

411

412

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

others under similar conditions in the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and in

other areas of Louisiana. Yet, those designated to make these important decisions, including the decision of when and how to evacuate New Orleans and the
surrounding parishes, delayed action while waiting for more information
(Roberts, 2006; Townsend, 2006; U.S. Congress, 2006). A brief analysis of this
phenomenon suggests that in a crisis, most managers experience tunnel vision
resulting in the inability to mitigate the situation (Smith, 2004). This desire to
wait for more information before making a decision is euphemistically referred
to as paralysis by analysis. However, it is often very costly and in the case of
Katrina, it cost many people the ultimate price (U.S. Congress, 2006).
Exercise scenarios predicted the likely impact of a severe hurricane coming
ashore near New Orleans with uncanny accuracy (U.S. Congress, 2006). The
crisis managers, emergency response officials, and the general public knew
that Katrinas landfall was imminent (NWS, 2006; Townsend, 2006; U.S.
Congress, 2006). Others in the same situation were making decisions. Yet, the
decision makers in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes failed to make
a decision (U.S. Congress, 2006). They failed to act because they could not
determine when and how to make a decision. In other words, the problem with
decision makers in crisis situations is often that they do not know how to make
crisis decisions.
Similarly, the emergency response leaders lack of experience conspired
against them and ultimately led to the largest loss of responder lives in the
history of the United States during the New York response to September 11
(McKinsey & Company, 2002). As stated previously, few emergency response
leaders had encountered the challenges that the dynamic, highly complex,
large-scale New York incident presented (McKinsey & Company, 2002). As a
result of the emergency response leaders lack of experience, the command,
coordination, and control efforts collapsed when the towers collapsed and did
not fully recover for several days after (McKinsey & Company, 2002; 9/11
Commission, 2004). Specifically at issue was that the response leaders failed
to recognize the key indicators that the buildings were failing and were unable
to recognize the communications shortfalls that existed (McKinsey &
Company, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004).
When the towers collapsed in New York, it was estimated that 44% of the
on-duty command staff for the New York Fire Department were incapacitated
or killed. Additionally, the communications, logistics, and coordination infrastructure was severely damaged and rendered ineffective. These complications
also contributed to the ineffectiveness of the command and control capabilities
(McKinsey & Company, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004). The New York Fire
Department lost 343 personnel, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
Police Department lost 37 personnel, and the New York Police Department lost
23 personnel for a total of 403 emergency responders lost in the collapse of the
twin towers (McKinsey & Company, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004)

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

When the September 11 New York response is compared to the September

11 Arlington County response, it becomes clear that New York suffered the
most from the failures of planning and lack of experience (Hoffman, 2002;
McKinsey & Company, 2002; 9/11 Commission, 2004), whereas Arlington
County benefited from the successes of planning and the experience gained
from routinely making calls and exercising together (J. Chinn, personal communication, May 9, 2007; Davis, 2002; Titan Systems, 2002). Although neither
response was flawless, the Arlington County response was able to capitalize on
the benefits of comprehensive and coordinated preincident planning and collaboration between the multiple jurisdictions that surround the Pentagon (9/11
Commission, 2004; Titan Systems, 2002). The 9/11 Commission (2004) attributes three primary reasons for the success of the Pentagon response: (a) there
was a strong sense of trust among the responding agencies, (b) the institutionalization of the Incident Command System, and (c) the coordination and execution of the response at a regional level. The 9/11 Commission (2004)
recognized the significance of the effect of the planning and training efforts in
the final report by stating, Many fire and police agencies that responded had
extensive prior experience [italics added] working together on regional events
and training exercises (p. 314). In fact, many of these agencies worked cooperatively and collaboratively to develop systems and processes to solve problems. These agencies not only responded together, but they also practiced
together using the scenarios that represented the worst case possibilities that
they developed (J. Chinn, personal communication, May 9, 2007).

Exploring the Cases

In the case of Hurricane Katrina, scenario-planning methods were used and
the possibilities of those tragedies were examined (Darcy, OHanlong,
Orszag, Shapiro, & Steinberg, 2006; Freidman, 2005). With Hurricane
Katrina, there was not necessarily a lack of vision. However, it seems that the
Hurricane PAM scenario was dismissed as too extreme and consequently
given a low probability assignment (Townsend, 2006; U.S. Congress, 2006).
Assigning probability estimates to scenarios is a classic pitfall in the process
(Schoemaker, 1995). As soon as probabilities are assigned, naturally, the scenarios with low probabilities are dismissed and energy is focused on those
with high assignments. This approach also undermines the entire purpose of
scenario planningto stretch the thinking, to expand the assumptions, and to
learn about the future by taking in a variety of options.
The case of Hurricane Katrina illustrates failure in translating vision to
action. Stated another way, the scenarios were either not convincing enough to
warrant serious consideration by decision makers, or there was a complete
breakdown in how those scenarios were used to develop contingency plans.
Admittedly, the scenario planning literature is not clear about what to do with

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

413

414

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

the scenarios once they have been developed. In fact, so much focus has been
placed on scenario development that no documented process for using scenarios to examine strategy is available. Some reference is made to a process called
windtunnelling, but again a detailed description is missing. We propose in
this article that once a set of scenarios are developed, SBT may be a valuable
method for translating new thinking gleaned from scenario development into
action plans for responding as situations unfold.
SBT Strategies
There is no doubt that the recent events, such as September 11, 2001, and
Hurricane Katrina, have heightened the organizations awareness to increase
their crisis management capability (Boin et al., 2004). Unfortunately, crisis
management planning and training are happenstance and not institutionalized
(Mitroff, 2005a). Certain federal initiatives, such as the National Incident
Management System (U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2004)
require that some organizations included in critical infrastructure or business
sectors must be trained in the incident command system (Homeland Security
Act of 2002, 2002). In addition, some federal regulations, such as the EPCRA
require organizations to have emergency operations plans and train select
employees in emergency response procedures if they meet certain criteria,
such as storing or manufacturing a specified quantity of hazardous substances.
However, this requirement affects a relatively small number of organizations.
In most organizations that are not subject to federal requirements, crisis
management training is typically relegated to annual employee in-service sessions or is not conducted. One reason may be that crisis management is often
viewed as a drain on profits (Klein, 1999, p. 238). A search of the Internet
shows that a significant amount of the available crisis management training is
typically oriented toward emergency situations (i.e., fire, bomb threats, active
shooters, etc.). Many consulting firms do provide customized crisis management training designed to meet the customers needs. However, these programs
are usually expensive (Sachs, 2007).
Emergency response organizations have a greater selection of training strategies; however, it is not optimal. Larger cities, such as New York, Dallas, Los
Angeles, and Houston have their own public safety training institutions.
Typically, the training offered by these institutions typically meets or exceeds
national and industry standards. However, training is developed based on the
needs of the organization and is typically limited to members of the organization.
State agencies, such as the TEEX, the Maryland Fire Rescue Institute (MFRI),
and the Kentucky Community and Technical College System (KCTCS), are designated by state legislation as state public safetyoriented training agencies. Federal departments, such as the U.S. DHS and the Department of
Transportation provide training and training funds. The training may be delivered

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

by institutions such as the National Fire Academy (NFA) and Emergency

Management Institute (EMI), located at Emmitsburg, Maryland, or by contractors, including some of the designated state training agencies. EMI and NFA
offer resident courses as well as regionally and locally delivered training.
Finally, many organizations are left to design, develop, and deliver their own
training for their members. These organizations supplement their training needs
through using federal, state, and local monies to purchase training or take
advantage of the aforementioned federally sponsored training, assuming it
meets the needs of the organization. Much of this training is conducted through
didactic courses with some hands-on activities to supplement the didactic portion. Some programs, such as those at TEEXs Texas Firemans Training Center
and the Center for Domestic Preparedness, provide hands-on training supplemented by didactic sections. This hands-on training includes using simulations
and exercises with varying levels of fidelity and context. For example, the
TEEX training area provides simulated industrial appliances, including petroleum refinery equipment props. These props can be burned to simulate a rupture and subsequent fire. However, the training is typically task oriented and
focused on developing a specific skill. At the Center for Domestic Preparedness
in Anniston, Alabama, participants are allowed to don chemical protective
equipment and enter controlled hazardous environments where highly toxic
chemical weapons are released. Again, these training activities focus on a particular task or procedure without placing trainees in the context of a situation.
Organizations use training exercises for multiorganizational training. These
exercises have several derivations, and each has a particular function. The
functions of the exercises range from familiarizing the participants with the
specific procedures of a plan to providing participants at all levels with decisionmaking opportunities in the context of a crisis. In some cases, these exercises
are facilitated by simulations. However, no standard of design, development, or
evaluation exists beyond vague federal recommendations.

Optimal Training Strategies

We suggest that the optimal crisis management training programs must
have a strategic approach. As a crisis is among other things, an unexpected
event, crisis managers need to be able to understand the issues created by the
situation(s) they may encounter. Moreover, crisis managers need to be capable
of making decisions and cannot be shocked into decision-making paralysis
(Townsend, 2006; U.S. Congress, 2006). To be effective and efficient decision
makers, crisis managers, above all else, need a vast and varied experience base
from which they can pull from to make decisions (Alby & Zucchermaglio,
2006; Klein, 1999; Klein & Calderwood, 1990; Montgomery et al., 2005).
Once the decisions are made, the crisis manager must know how to develop
and implement strategies that are capable of mitigating the presenting problems, yet flexible enough to adapt to rapidly developing changes.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

415

416

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

Given these requirements, the optimal training strategy will include an

interwoven training process that addresses the needs of the consumers. Policy
makers and emergency response agency officials should collaborate to work
through the scenario planning process to identify the possible future realities.
In doing this, they identify many of the problems in which future policy decisions can mitigate in an informed manner, as opposed to guessing or flowing
with trends (Mitroff, 2005a; Mitroff & Alpasian, 2003). However, for this to be
more than an exercise in theoretical assumptions, the developed potential realities must be engaged (Lynch, 2005; Whitcomb, 1999). SBT is the perfect tool
to achieve this task (Boin et al., 2004). Additionally, when crisis managers
engage the scenarios, there can be manifold rewards. For example, mechanical
issues such as estimates of logistical needs, time requirements, and the unavoidable conflicts that cannot otherwise be detected can be identified, engaged, and
worked through (Mitroff, 2005a). All the while, this engagement is building the
mental processes and tactile skills of the crisis manager. Learning occurs at the
most concrete levels of SBT, such as training intended to develop individual
skills (Lynch, 2005). It also occurs at every level of abstraction beyond this
(Quanjel, Willems, & Talen, 1998). For example, a higher level of abstraction
may be used to train a policy group consisting of the chief elected officials from
several jurisdictions who are concerned with the mitigation of a problem, such
as financing a prolonged response and returning the community back to normal.
More concrete training would be used for the application of the proper tactics
of a physical rescue. SBT provides a context and environment in which these
chief elected officers are able to develop their decision-making processes in the
context of an actual, real-time event (Moats et al., 2004).

Implications for Research, Theory, and Practice

What we can conclude in this article is based on our consideration of these two
well-known cases of crisis. In both of these cases, individuals (a) failed to believe
that the actual outcome was possible when presented with it beforehand and
(b) spent minimal time and effort on training for dealing with the outcome, or both.
The consequences of failing to believe and consider responses to these unbelievable situations were dire. These key conclusions have implications for HRD professionals in three domains, namely, (a) research, (b) theory, and (c) practice.
Implications for Research
Problems with believability are not new in scenario planning. Often, organizational leaders lack the courage to act on information provided in scenarios and
other what if exercises (de Geus, 1999) as it can be incorrect. Still, rigorous
research about precisely what makes for an effective set of scenarios that
change the mindset of the organization (Korte & Chermack, 2007, p. 646) is

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

severely lacking. Qualitative research with scenario-planning participants would

be very valuable in terms of gaining a better understanding of what makes scenarios effective or ineffective, and yet it is missing from the literature entirely.
Overall, research on scenario planning is generally minimal although an
ambitions research agenda is beginning to show relationships between scenario planning and organizational learning (Chermack, Lynham, & van der
Merwe, 2006), between scenario planning and conversation skills (Chermack
et al., 2007), and between scenario planning and decision-making styles
(Chermack, 2008). However, remaining questions center on the role of
leadership in the scenario-planning process, investigating a link between scenario planning and overall organization performance.
Implications for Theory
This article poses two key implications for HRD theory. First, although scenario planning is most commonly used in corporate strategic planning, its use
in crisis avoidance provides another way in which HRD professionals may be
involved in local, state, and national policy issues. However, the theory development work that has been done on scenario planning (Chermack, 2004)
implies a corporate planning context explicitly. Therefore, if scenario planning
is gaining use in contexts such as city planning, weather, and other natural disaster consideration, and even in issues related to national policy (such as
homeland security), the theory developed by Chermack may need to be
adjusted and modified to understand what scenario planning is and how it may
work differently in this alternate context.
Second, although there is a long history of using SBT in the emergency
response discipline (Lynch, 2005; Whitcomb, 1999), there has not been any clear
theory development effort in this area. It seems clear that such an effort would
draw from transformational and experiential learning theories, but a theory
development effort in this area is an opportunity to bring the other components
into a model that helps us understand how to more effectively engage in this kind
of training. By developing a theory of SBT, HRD professionals have yet an additional research agenda that seems important in local, state, and national governments not only in the Unites States, but increasingly around the world.
Implications for Practice
As a result of considering these two cases and these two key points of failure, we can make further recommendations for the practice of scenario planning and SBT. A key is implementing checkpoints in scenario planning and
SBT. These checkpoints can serve as evaluation points in any scenario-based
project and we suggest that the use of these will support the effective use of
scenario-based methodologies.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

417

418

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

First, the tendency to ignore certain scenarios that are perceived to be

unlikely is a serious pitfall and has been identified in several situations as a
problem that has thwarted the intent of scenario planning (de Geus, 1988,
1999). To work around this issue, practitioners can make sure that probability
assignments are avoided at all costs. The goal in scenario planning is to treat
each scenario as an equally likely case of how the future may unfold. Thus,
each scenario should receive serious consideration. Scenario planning can be
an iterative process, and some scenarios may be rejected throughout the project. Even so, any final set of scenarios includes 4-6 scenarios and each of
these should be individually relevant, plausible, and challenging.
An additional consideration is to clarify the purpose of scenario planning
from the outset. Often, executive teams have difficulties shifting away from
their tendencies to want to predict the future, rather than to learn from considering a variety of plausible alternatives. This emphasis on learning redirects
the project and its purpose, and this learning purpose may need to be revisited
and stressed throughout the project. Implementing some kind of learning
checkpoints or creating time and space specifically for reflecting on what
learning is happening during the project is one way of ensuring commitment
to the learning purpose. In short, scenario planning should not simply be a
new version of strategic planning as the purposes of these two activities are
fundamentally different. van der Heijden (2002) discussed that one-shot
attempts at replacing traditional strategic planning processes with scenario
planning are generally ineffective as the assumptions underlying scenario
planning and its purposes are so drastically different.

Conclusions
This article has described two cutting-edge methods for managing and
avoiding crisis. The thesis of this article was that these methods were not properly used in two recent cases of crisis. Our analysis has suggested where the
use of these methods went wrong and has provided suggestions and key tips
for improving the use of these methods in the future. Two key pitfalls were
identified in both cases: (a) lack of vision and (b) lack of action once crisis
began to unfold. The implications of the suggested solutions to these key pitfalls have been discussed in the context of HRD research, theory, and practice.
Planning can be considered one of the most difficult and ambiguous organizational activities (Mintzberg et al., 1998), and the level of uncertainty for
decision makers to account for has never been so high. There will never be a
method that is 100% reliable in terms of its ability to steer organizations away
from crisis (Mitroff, 2005a). However, scenario planning and SBT are the best
of what can be offered to address these serious deficiencies. Study is required
to understand how and why these practice-born techniques work. In addition,
study should also look for ways to transfer these techniques to organizations.
Mitroff (2005a) offered this warning to all organizations:

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

Like everything else in a complex world, proper crisis planning can never be a purely technical activity. It is profoundly political. But, as I have been arguing, it is profoundly philosophical as well. Indeed, it is the failure of our underlying concepts and institutions to keep pace
and to change that is at the root of difficulties.
The clock for the next crisis is ticking constantly. It never rests. It is already recording
how well and how poorly we have been doing in preparing for the next crisis. Is anyone learning? (p. 3)

These techniques can initiate change and equip crisis managers to prepare
and respond to the next crisis.

References
Alby, F., & Zucchermaglio, C. (2006). Afterwards we can understand what went
wrong, but now lets fix it: How situated work practices shape group decision making. Organization Studies, 27(7), 943-966.
Babicz, G. (2003). Simulation: Making it real. Quality, 42(4), 90-91.
Bartlett, C., & Ghoshal, S. (2002). Building competitive advantage through people.
MIT Sloan Management Review, 43(2), 34-41.
Bloom, M. J., & Menefee, M. K. (1994). Scenario planning and contingency planning.
Productivity and Management Review, 17(2), 223-230.
Boin, A., Kofman-Bos, C., & Overdijk, W. (2004). Crisis simulations: Exploring
tomorrows vulnerabilities and threats. Simulation & Gaming, 35(3), 378-393.
Borodzicz, E. (2004). The missing ingredient is the value of flexibility. Simulation &
Gaming, 35(5), 414-426.
Borodzicz, E., & van Haperen, K. (2002). Individual and group learning in crisis simulations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 10(3), 139-147.
Chermack, T. J. (2004). Improving decision-making with scenario planning. Futures,
36(3), 295-309.
Chermack, T. J. (2008). Exploring the impact of scenario planning on participant decision-making styles. In T. J. Chermack, J. Storberg-Walker, & C. Graham (Eds.),
Academy of Human Resource Development Conference Proceedings (pp. 799-807).
Bowling Green, OH: Academy of Human Resource Development.
Chermack, T. J., & Lynham, S. A. (2002). Definitions and outcome variables of scenario planning. Human Resource Development Review, 1(3), 366-383.
Chermack, T. J., Lynham, S. A., & Ruona, W. E. A. (2001, Summer). A review of scenario planning literature. Futures Research Quarterly, 7-31.
Chermack, T. J., Lynham, S. A., & van der Merwe, L. (2006). Exploring the relationship between scenario planning and perceptions of learning organization characteristics. Futures, 38(7), 767-777.
Chermack, T. J., & van der Merwe, L. (2003). The role of constructivist learning in scenario planning. Futures, 35(5), 445-460.
Chermack, T. J., van der Merwe, L., & Lynham, S. A. (2007). Exploring the relationship between scenario planning and perceptions of strategic conversation quality.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74(3), 379-390.
Cranton, P. (2002). Teaching for transformation. New Directions for Adult and
Continuing Education, 93, 63-71.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

419

420

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

Darcy, M., OHanlong, M., Orszag, P., Shapiro, J., & Steinberg, J. (2006). Protecting
the homeland. New York: Brookings Institution Press.
Davis, P. (2002, July 24, Wednesday). Report calls response at Pentagon successful.
Washington Post, p. B.01.
de Geus, A. (1988). Planning as learning. Harvard Business Review, 66(2), 70-74.
de Geus, A. P. (1999). The living company. New York: John Wiley.
Diehl, B. J. (1991). CRISIS: A process evaluation. Simulation & Gaming, 22(3), 293-307.
Dooley, L. M. (2002). Case study research and theory building. Advances in
Developing Human Resources, 4(3), 335-354.
Dugdale, J., Pallamin, N., & Pavard, B. (2006). An assessment of a mixed reality environment: Toward an ethnomethodological approach. Simulation & Gaming, 37(2),
226-244.
Ellis, S., Mendel, R., & Nir, M. (2006). Learning from successful and failed experience: The moderating role of kind of after-event review. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 91(3), 669-680.
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. 9601
et seq. (1986).
Encyclopedia Britannica online. (2007). Retrieved February 3, 2007, from http://www
.britannica.com/dictionary?hdwd=crisis&book=Dictionary&jump=crisis&list=crisis%3D240388%3Bidentity+crisis%3D524377%3Bmidlife+crisis%3D673836a
Freidman, T. (2005). The world is flat. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
Funke, J. (1998). Computer-based testing and training with scenarios from complex
problem-solving research: Advantages and disadvantages. International Journal of
Selection and Assessment, 6(2), 90-96.
Gore, J., Banks, A., Millward, L., & Kyriakidou, O. (2006). Naturalistic decision making
and organizations: Reviewing pragmatic science. Organization Studies, 27(7), 925-942.
Greenhom & OMara, Incorporated. (2002). World Trade Center building performance
study: Data collection, preliminary observations and recommendations. Washington,
DC: FEMA.
Helsloot, I. (2005). Bordering on reality: Findings on the Bonfire crisis management
simulation. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 13(4), 159-169.
Hermann, M. G. (1997). In conclusion: The multiple pay-offs of crisis simulations.
Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 5(4), 241-243.
Hoffman, B. (2002). Lessons of 9/11: Testimony before the United States Joint
September 11, 2001 Inquiry Staff of the House and Senate Select Committees on
Intelligence on October 8, 2002. Arlington, VA: Rand Corporation. (Rand
Corporation Document No. CT-201)
Holton, E. F., Bates, R. A., & Ruona, W. E. A. (2000). Development of a generalized
learning transfer system inventory. Human Resource Development Quarterly, 11(4),
333-360.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, 107-296 6 U.S.C. 101 (2002).
Issenberg, S. B., Gordon, M. S., Gordon, D. L., & Safford, R. E. (2001). Simulation
and new learning technology. Medical Teacher, 23(1), 16-23.
Jenvald, J., & Morin, M. (2004). Simulation-supported live training for emergency
response in hazardous environment. Simulation & Gaming, 35(3), 363-377.
Kahane, A. (1992). The Mont Fleur scenarios: What will South Africa be like in the
year 2002? (Supplement to the Weekly Mail and The Guardian Weekly). Bellville,
South Africa: Global Business Network.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

Kahn, H., & Wiener, A. J. (1967). The next thirty-three years: A framework for speculation. Daedalus, 96(3), 705-732.
Kirkley, S. E., & Kirkley, J. R. (2005). Creating next generation blended learning environments using mixed reality, video games and simulations. TechTrends: Linking
Research and Practice to Improve Learning, 49(3), 42-89.
Klein, G. A. (1999). Sources of power: How people make decisions. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Klein, G. A. (2004). The power of intuition: How to use your gut feelings to make
better decisions at work. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Klein, G. A., & Calderwood, R. (1990). Investigations of naturalistic decision making
and the recognition-primed decision model (No. KATR8802Z, ARIRN9059,
ADA2260065). Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and
Social Sciences.
Kolb, D. A. (1984). Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and
development. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Kolb, D. A., Rubin, I. M., & McIntyre, J. M. (1983). Organizational psychology: An
experiential approach to organizational behavior (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall.
Korte, R. F., & Chermack, T. J. (2007). Changing organizational culture: Using scenario
planning to change the collective mind of the organization. Futures, 39(2), 645-656.
Lebow, D. G., & Wager, W. W. (1994). Authentic activity as a model for appropriate
learning activity: Implications for design of computer-based simulations. Paper presented at the 1994 National Convention of the Association for Educational
Communications and Technology, Nashville, TN.
Lederman, L. C. (1992). Debriefing: Toward a systematic assessment of theory and
practice. Simulation & Gaming, 23(2),145-160.
Lindell, M. K., & Perry, R. W. (1992). Behavioral foundations of community emergency planning. Washington, DC: Hemisphere.
Lindell, M. K., Prater, C. S., & Perry, R. W. (2007). Introduction to emergency management. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Lipshitz, R., Klein, G., & Carroll, J. S. (2006). Introduction to the special issue.
Naturalistic decision making and organizational decision making: Exploring the
intersections. Organization Studies, 27(7), 917-923.
Lynch, M. D. (2005). Developing a scenario-based training program. FBI Law
Enforcement Bulletin, 74(10), 1-8.
Lynham, S. A., & Cunningham, P. W. (2006). HRD in transitioning societies in the
developing world: A model and synthesis of perspectives. Advances in Developing
Human Resources, 8(1), 116-135.
McKinsey & Company. (2002). Increasing FDNYs preparedness. New York: New
York City Fire Department.
McLean, G. N. (2004). National human resource development: What in the world is it?
Advances in Developing Human Resources, 6(3), 269-275.
Merriam-Websters dictionary (Vol. 1). (2005). Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster.
Mezirow, J. (1991). Transformative dimensions of adult learning. San Francisco:
Jossey-Bass.
Mezirow, J. (1994). Understanding transformation theory. Adult Education Quarterly,
44(4), 222-232.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

421

422

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

Mezirow, J. (1997). Transformative learning: Theory to practice. New Directions for

Adult Learning and Continuing Education, 74, 5-12.
Mezirow, J. (2003). Transformative learning as discourse. Journal of Transformative
Education, 1(1), 58-63.
Mezirow, J., & Associates. (1990). Fostering critical reflection in adulthood: A guide
to transformative and emancipatory learning. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Mintzberg, H. (1994). The rise and fall of strategic planning. London: Prentice Hall.
Mintzberg, H., Ahlstrand, B., & Lampel, J. (1998). Strategy safari: A guided tour
through the wilds of strategic management. New York: Free Press.
Mirabella, A., & Macpherson, D. (1995). Computer-supported simulation at the
National Fire Academy: Lessons learned for incident command training.
Washington, DC: U.S. Army Research Institute. (Research Report 1673)
Mitroff, I. I. (2002). Crisis learning: The lessons of failure. The Futurist, 36(5), 19-21.
Mitroff, I. I. (2005a). Disaster planning is an unmitigated disaster: Planning for the
next disaster may already be too late. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Southern California.
Mitroff, I. I. (2005b). Why some companies emerge stronger and better from a crisis: 7
essential lessons for surviving disaster. New York: American Management Association.
Mitroff, I. I., & Alpasian, M. C. (2003). Coping with a crisis century. USA Today
Magazine, 131(2694), p. 18.
Moats, J., Hightower, S., Ware, C., & Wall, J. (2004). Enhanced incident management/unified command course MGT 314. College Station: Texas Engineering
Extension Service.
Montgomery, H., Lipshitz, R., & Brehmer, B. (Eds.). (2005). How professionals make
decisions. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
National Weather Service. (2006). Post-tropical cyclone report for Hurricane Katrina.
New Orleans, LA: National Weather Service Forecast Office.
9/11 Commission. (2004). The 9/11 commission report. Washington, DC: National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.
Noe, R. A. (2005). Employee training and development (3rd ed.). New York: McGrawHill/Irwin.
OReilly, D. J., & Brandenburg, D. C. (2006, February). Simulation and learning in
disaster preparedness: A research and theory review. Paper presented at the AHRD
2006 International Conference, Columbus, OH.
Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. The Academy of
Management Review, 23(1), 59-76.
Phillips, Z. (2006). Emergency preparedness exercises remain an imperfect science.
GovExec.com. Retrieved March 4, 2008, from http://www.govexec.com/features/1106-01/1106-01s1.htm
Quanjel, M. M. H., Willems, A. J., & Talen, A. N. (1998). CRISISLAB: Evaluation and
improvement of crisis management through simulation/gaming. Simulation &
Gaming, 29(4), 450-455.
Reilly, A. (1998). Exploring human resources issues in organizational crises: A preliminary analysis of the banking industry. Current Topics in Management, 3, 283-298.
Reston, M. (2005, September 10). Santorum criticizes weather service. Post-gazette.
Retrieved March 4, 2008, from http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/05253/
569133-84.stm

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

Moats et al. / SCENARIO PLANNING AND SCENARIO-BASED TRAINING

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 100-707 42 U.S.C.
5121-5207 (2007).
Roberts, P. S. (2006). FEMA after Katrina. Policy Review, 137, 15-33.
Sachs, A. (2007, April 30). The crisis doctors. Time Pacific South, 16, pp. 53-54.
Schoemaker, P. (1995). Scenario planning: A tool for strategic thinking. Sloan
Management Review, 36(2), 25-40.
Schwartz, P. (1991). The art of the long view. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Simon, H. A. (1990). Invariants of human behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 41,
1-19.
Smith, D. (2004). For whom the bell tolls: Imagining accidents and the development of
crisis simulation in organizations. Simulation & Gaming, 35(3), 347-362.
Soy, S. K. (1996). The case study as a research method [Electronic version]. University
of Texas, Graduate School of Library and Information Science web site. Retrieved
December 1, 2001, from http://www.gslis.utexas.edu/~ssoy/usesusers/l391d1b.htm
Stake, R. E. (1994). Case studies. In N. K. Denzin & Y. E. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook
of qualitative research (pp. 236-246). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Strohschneider, S., & Gerdes, J. (2004). MS ANTWERPEN: Emergency management
training for low-risk environments. Simulation & Gaming, 36(3), 394-413.
Swanson, R. A. (2007). Analysis for improving performance: Tools for diagnosing
organizations and documenting workplace expertise (2nd ed.). San Francisco:
Berrett-Koehler.
Taylor, E. W. (1997). Building upon the theoretical debate: A critical review of the
empirical studies of Mezirows transformative learning theory. Adult Education
Quarterly, 48(1), 34-59.
Texas Engineering Extension Service. (2005). E IMUC course information. Retrieved
March 4, 2008, from http://www.teex.com/teex-third.cfm?area=NERRTC&templateid=176
Titan Systems. (2002). Arlington County after action report on the response to the
September 11 terrorist attack on the Pentagon. Washington, DC: Department of Justice.
Townsend, F. F. (2006). The federal response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons learned.
Washington, DC: The White House.
U.S. Congress. (2006). A failure of initiative: Final report of the select bipartisan committee to investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina.
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2004). National incident management system.
Washington, DC: Author.
van der Heijden, K. (2002). Sixth sense: Accelerating organizational learning with scenarios. Chichester, UK: Wiley.
Wack, P. (1985a). Scenarios: Shooting the rapids. Harvard Business Review, 63(5),
139-150.
Wack, P. (1985b). Scenarios: Uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, 63(5),
73-89.
Wagner, C. G. (2005). Proactive crisis management. The Futurist, 39(2), 6-6.
Walton, J. (1999). Strategic human resource development. London: Financial Times Hall.
Whitcomb, C. (1999). Scenario-based training at the F.B.I. Training and Development,
53(6), 42-46.
Wilson, I., & Ralston, W. (2006). Scenario planning handbook: Developing strategies
in uncertain times. Belmont, CA: South-Western Educational.

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009

423

424

Advances in Developing Human Resources

June 2008

Yin, R. K. (1981). The case study crisis: Some answers. Administrative Science
Quarterly, 26, 58-65.
Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd ed., Vol. 5).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Yorks, L. (2004). Toward a political economy model for comparative analysis of the
role of strategic human resource development leadership. Human Resource
Development Review, 3(3), 198-208.
Yusko, K. P., & Goldstein, H. W. (1997). Selecting and developing crisis leaders using
competency-based simulations. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management,
5(4), 216-223.
Jason B. Moats is a training manager with the Texas Engineering Extension Service
(TEEX). He manages, designs, and develops scenarios and training programs to train
emergency responders in incident management. He is also a student in Texas A&Ms
Human Resources Development doctoral program. His areas of research interest
include scenario-based training, leadership development, and workforce development.
His first book Agroterrorism: A Guide for First Responders was released in April 2007.
Thomas J. Chermack is an assistant professor at the Colorado State University in the
Organizational Performance and Change Program. His research focuses on the use of
scenario planning in organizations and theory-building methods in applied disciplines.
He is the founder and managing partner of Chermack Scenarios, a consulting organization affiliated with the Centre for Innovative Leadership. His research has appeared
in scholarly publications such as Futures, Futures Research Quarterly, and The
Academy of Strategic Management Journal, among others.
Larry M. Dooley is an associate professor in the Human Resource Development
Program in the Department of Educational Administration and Human Resource
Development at Texas A&M University. He is also a visiting professor both in the School
of Business and Law at Napier University, Edinburgh, Scotland, and in the Center for
Human Resource Management Research at Peking University, Beijing, China. He is past
president of the board of the Academy of Human Resource Development. In addition he
serves on the board of the Academy of Human Resource Development Foundation and
as the International Chief Operating Officer for the Academy of Human Resource
Development. His research interests include e-learning and international human resource
development.
This refereed journal article is part of an entire issue on organizational crisis management. For more information or to read other articles in the issue, see Hutchins, H. M., &
Wang, J. (2008). Crisis management in organizations: The role of human resource development [Special issue]. Advances in Developing Human Resources, 10(3).

Downloaded from http://adh.sagepub.com by kimbao bao on April 13, 2009