Chapter 3 The Internal Audit Function An Integral
Chapter 3 The Internal Audit Function An Integral
CHAPTER 3
THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION:
AN INTEGRAL PART OF
ORGANIZATIONAL GOVERNANCE
T. Flemming Ruud
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I. Introduction
Chapter 1 provides considerable discussion on the evolution of the internal auditing profession
over the last 60 years. To better understand and position internal audit in the context of
contemporary global organizations, a conceptual framework containing several organizational
governance issues is introduced in this chapter. Furthermore, this conceptual framework
serves as a road map to key topics presented in the remainder of the monograph. Relevant
authoritative standards from the newly issued Professional Practices Framework are cited to
support, clarify, or expand upon this new role for internal audit.
Exhibit 3-1
Internal Auditing in an Organizational Governance Framework
Shareholders
Financial Markets
Creditors
Government
Nomination
Committee
BoD
DIRECTION
CEO
Remuneration
Committee
Audit
Committee
Vision
In
Control
Goals
te
rn
Strategies
al
External Audit
Au
d
it
Risk Management
Controlling
Customers
Suppliers
CONTROL
Public
Implementation
Indicators
Signals
Employees
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based compensation and incentives) all influence the organizational objectives and
capabilities.
An in-depth understanding of an organizations objectives- and goals-hierarchy is a
prerequisite for every successful internal audit function. The alignment of the internal audit
functions objectives with the organizations goals is also explicitly recognized in Standard
2010, these factors strongly influencing the nature, scope, and purpose of the internal audit
function.
The chief audit executive should establish risk-based plans to determine the priorities
of the internal audit activity, consistent with the organizations goals. (emphasis
added)
This top-down organizational objective hierarchy is illustrated graphically in Exhibit 3-1. It
indicates how an organization at best in congruence with the expectations of its stakeholders
chooses its desired strategic directions, how these objectives and goals are turned into
operating measures, and how they become important parts of organizational governance.
Decisions as to changing the organizational structures and operations as well as developments
in management and organizational practices influence the organizational governance.
Understanding these organizational relationships thus also forms the basis for structuring an
effective internal audit function.
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understanding risks, the internal audit function needs to assess risk management processes
in order to determine whether structure, functioning, and control processes are appropriate
to manage the identified risk factors. Assurance Standard 2010.A1 states:
The internal audit activitys plan of engagements should be based on a risk
assessment, undertaken at least annually. The input of senior management and the
board should be considered in this process.
Over the last few years, The IIA Research Foundation has released several excellent
publications on the topic of risk and risk management, viz., McNamee & Selim (1998), the
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin Study on Enterprise Risk Management (2001), and more recently
the study by Walker et al. (2002). The internal audit functions role in risk management is
explored further in the ROIA chapter by Kinney.
Internal Stakeholders
The board of directors, top management, operational management, and employees as main
internal stakeholders have direct responsibility for the organizational activities.
Shareholders and investors charge the board and top management with the responsibility
of managing their invested funds. Direction and control are top managements main
instruments to assume this responsibility (see Exhibit 3-1). Middle managements
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responsibilities are primarily defined at the operational level. Middle management redefines
strategies and objectives defined by top management as organizational goals, which are
further broken down into key performance indicators and signal systems. These key
performance indicators and signal systems can be analyzed in order to ensure the proper
functioning of systems and processes, and to eventually answer the question as to whether
the organization functions as intended. Employees perform operational activities. However,
given trends such as a higher knowledge level of employees, empowerment, enhanced
automation or in-line controls, management can increasingly delegate control activities.
The board of directors, as a special group of internal stakeholders, is mainly charged with
the definition of the overall strategic direction and with the supervision of operational activities.
The board of directors should be adequately diversified and have a sufficient number of
qualified members, without being too large for efficient decision-making. Two types of
board systems are prevalent the two-tier or dualistic system with a management and a
supervisory board (e.g., found in continental Europe and particularly in France, Germany)
and the one-tier or monistic system with one board of directors found, for example, in the
UK and U.S. Several countries feature board systems with elements of both the monistic and
the dualistic type.
The board of directors is commonly divided into subcommittees in order to take advantage
of the board members special knowledge, experience, and expertise. Typical committees
are the nomination and the remuneration (or compensation) as well as the audit committee,
the latter being most important in the context of internal auditing.
The audit committee functions as the coordinator between the external, financial audit, and
the internal audit function as well as other assurance functions (e.g., risk management,
compliance, code of conduct, legal matters, etc.). Typically, the audit committee is mandated
with the financial monitoring (Blue Ribbon Committee, 1999). An interesting feature in
some organizations is that the audit committee has a broader responsibility and oversees
both operational and financial aspects of governance. An excellent example of this is the
Swiss pharmaceutical company, Hoffmann La Roche, where the audit committee coordinates
both financial and operational issues, while a separate financial committee considers the
financial aspects.
To be able to assume its role as representative of shareholders interests, the board of directors
is supported by different organizational functions, e.g., risk management, organizational
compliance, and organizational controlling and organizational security that help ensure the
existence of adequate and effective governance. Risk management has gained widespread
acceptance as mentioned earlier. Typically, the function is positioned high in the organization,
often reporting directly to the CEO. Offering an enterprise-wide, comprehensive risk analysis,
the internal audit function can base its own planning on risk managements results. The
organizational compliance function is typically located at the board secretary level and focuses
on compliance of legal and regulatory issues. In addition, depending on the structuring of
the organization, functions such as organizational controlling and organizational security as
well as other organizational bodies such as information security can offer assurance to internal
and external stakeholders. A close relationship of the described functions with the internal
audit function can lead to better cooperation between assurance functions and offer a higher
level of organizational assurance. For the purpose of this report, these activities are not
being further considered here; however, several research issues as to the relationship of the
differing functions can be identified and explored. The conceptual framework in Exhibit
3-1 illustrates these potential relationships.
Depending on the organizational structure, the audit committee organizes and coordinates
further governance promoting activities such as the risk management, corporate compliance,
corporate controlling, and corporate security. A key issue here is that the internal audit
function can take on varying assurance assignments to improve organizational governance.
External Stakeholders
An organization faces different groups of external stakeholders, i.e., shareholders, financial
markets, customers, suppliers, regulators, government, neighbors, and the public at large.
These stakeholders are not directly involved in the business activities, but have an interest in
the activities of the organization (ref. Standard 2130). Further, they influence the organization
through their decision-making (for example, shareholders influence the market valuation of
companies, or financial creditors offer or restrict credit).
Offering assurance as to the functioning of the organization to these external decisionmakers is an issue of utmost importance as organizations struggle to make themselves attractive
to investors, creditors, suppliers, and customers. As explained, the internal audit function
can contribute effectively to improve governance in several aspects.
To investors, the issue is to ensure capital availability and liquidity as well as keeping the
cost of capital within reasonable ranges. By offering assurance on information and on
operational processes, the internal audit function can contribute in analyzing the needs for
capital and liquidity, reduce the probability of a capital and liquidity squeeze, as well as
provide creditors and investors with assured information as to the standing of the organization.
It is to be expected that the cost of capital should be lower in a company where a high level
of assurance is offered as compared to a company with higher uncertainty and risk.
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To suppliers, the main focus is to stay as an attractive partner, which can negotiate favorable
conditions.
To customers, a primary interest lies in the delivery of products and services that satisfy
their needs in a timely and economic way.
Further external stakeholders such as the public at large and the government have other
interests. Through development of regulations, supervision of their compliance as well as
the judicial processes against potential infringement, the government plays several roles of
significance to organizations. The pressure from the national and local government is not to
be underestimated and, consequently, this importance should be understood.
Different stakeholders may have very different needs for information and assurance.
Furthermore, between the organization and the stakeholders, there are different potential
conflicts of interest. For example, the organization may not want to supply certain types of
information to a financial creditor because of a potentially higher interest rate. Or similarly,
investors may want more and assured information to make a buy-or-sell decision.
Many of these potential situations can be explained through the concept of an asymmetric
information situation where the manager has better in-depth knowledge and understanding
than the organizational body supervising him or her. In order to alleviate this information
bottleneck situation where some people are better informed than others, internal or external
assurers such as the internal audit function can offer assurance to the decision makers that
the information is factual and correct.
The asymmetric information issue can also be exemplified between a one-tier (monistic)
and a two-tier (dualistic) board of directors system. In situations where the chairman of the
board also functions as CEO, the person has superior knowledge, which mostly is efficient
for the daily business and decision-making. However, the supervisory role of the board is
lacking and becomes more of a challenge.
The internal audit function can take on a more extensive role in systems with adequate and
effective organizational governance. A key issue in this context is how the role and function
of the internal audit function differ under the two systems of boards. This could be studied
empirically across organizations as well as across nations with varying governance systems.
The Formulation of the Role of the Internal Audit Function in the Audit Charter
Understanding the role and the functioning of the internal audit function begins with an indepth understanding of the organizational objectives- and goals-hierarchy. Standard 2010
states:
The chief audit executive should establish risk-based plans to determine the priorities
of the internal audit activity, consistent with the organizations goals.
The agreed role of the internal audit function needs to be linked closely to what the organization
is doing and must be formulated in the audit charter (Purpose, Authority, and Responsibility).
Standard 1000, Purpose, Authority, and Responsibility, states:
The purpose, authority, and responsibility of the internal audit activity should be
formally defined in a charter, consistent with the Standards, and approved by the
board.
The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation
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1000.C1 - The nature of consulting services should be defined in the audit charter.
The internal audit function is the single most important internal assurance provider. It is
essential for top management and the board to employ the available assurance functions in
an optimal fashion, i.e., to evaluate how and what each assurance function contributes to the
overall desired assurance level. In addition to the responsibility of the chief audit executive,
this is to be decided upon by the relevant organizational level such as top management or
the board. Standard 2050 says:
The chief audit executive should share information and coordinate activities with
other internal and external providers of relevant assurance and consulting services
to ensure proper coverage and minimize duplication of efforts.
This standard relates to the external audit function, but internal assurance providing functions
such as risk management and corporate compliance can similarly contribute effectively to
total assurance coverage.
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The nature of work of the internal audit function (according to Standard 2100):
...is to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the following three processes:
Control processes policies, procedures, and activities which ensure that risks
are kept within the limits defined by management in the risk management process.
The internal audit function can thus contribute both by evaluating the systems functioning
and reliability (assurance services) and supporting the design of these systems by providing
specific recommendations (consulting services). The services actually provided by the internal
audit function depend on the positioning in the organization as well as on its intended function.
Internal audit can contribute to effective governance in several ways. First, it can assist in
the identification of risk factors, the analysis of the consequences, as well as in assisting
management in the prioritization of risk management and control systems. Internal audit can
add assurance that the risk management processes in fact are functioning as intended. Through
consulting services, the internal audit function can furthermore assist management and the
board by improving risk management and control processes.
The internal audit function can then assume an important role as an in-house advisory function
that offers analyses and assurance to the board as to the functioning of the risk management
and internal control systems.
Felix et al. (1998) characterize the general current status of the relationship between the
internal and external auditors as follows:
1. Internal and external auditors independently develop and then share information
on risk analysis.
2. Some attempts are made to coordinate audit plans.
3. When joint auditing is performed, the external auditor typically determines when
and where such joint activities take place.
However these authors point out that the quality of communications between the two groups
can be enhanced and that internal audit participation and assistance at the consolidated
financial statement level can further be optimized. This coordination of different audit
functions (internal and external audit) is known as total audit coverage.2 Clearly, this is one
area where existing governance structures and processes can be reviewed and further
optimized for the benefit of all parties concerned.
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A related topic as to who is providing the internal audit services is the cost of the internal
audit function, especially in the case of employing external service providers. Commonly,
the internal audit function is regarded as a fixed cost pertaining to a separate function within
an organization. With the introduction of new and more flexible organizational forms, and
by contracting with external firms for in-sourcing, co-sourcing, or outsourcing, the costs of
the internal audit function can be classified, at least partly, as a variable cost. It would be an
interesting research project to investigate why some organizations regard the costs of the
internal audit function as fixed, while others classify them as variable.
In terms of questions regarding capacity and/or competency, a current research topic is to
consider the developments in the market for externally provided internal audit services.
Regulators in countries such as Brazil and the U.S., citing the dangers of compromising
auditor independence, have introduced rules prohibiting public accounting firms from offering
internal audit services to audit clients.
In addition to carrying out research with the aim of understanding, evaluating, and improving
professional judgment, it is also important to consider the use of decision aids and technologybased tools for conducting more efficient and effective audits. This may include the use of
statistical sampling applications, ACL, IDEA, Microsoft Excel, CAATs, and other information
systems auditing tools, as well as regression analysis and other statistical techniques. The
IIAs Systems Auditability and Control (SAC) product from the 1970s has been updated to
accommodate the needs of e-commerce, and the eSAC guidance is now available online.
More recently, innovations such as Benfords Law for identifying errors and discrepancies,
as well as the use of artificial intelligence techniques such as neural networks (see Ramamoorti
& Traver, 1998), have made their debut. It should be noted that data warehousing procedures
go hand-in-hand with data mining applications, and internal auditors with an eye toward the
future need to gain familiarity with this burgeoning but highly relevant literature in computer
science, database management and applications, expert systems, and artificial intelligence.
The professional internal auditing environment continues to be dynamic, uncertain, and
complex, and has continually dictated that internal auditors gain industry specialization.
Internal auditors are specializing by gaining industry-specific experience and/or by qualifying
for specialty designations in governmental auditing, control self-assessment, or financial
services.4 This trend toward more proliferation of certifications and designations is likely to
continue. What is required today is a combination of both experience and industry expertise,
and internal audit practitioners are struggling to cope with the resulting information overload.
In this connection, The IIAs Professional Practices Framework supplemented by the periodic
issuance of Practice Advisories and other Guidance are helpful to the chief audit executive
and the practitioner. This is an area in which academics interested in the internal auditing
profession can play pioneering roles in advancing the goals of education, research, and
practice.
V. Summary
This chapter of the ROIA monograph has attempted to demonstrate the important relationships
between the internal audit function and other organizational units. The exhibit introduced
initially in the chapter graphically shows these relationships and issues presented throughout
the chapter. In each and every one of these relationships, interesting research topics can be
identified and explored. In the Appendix to this chapter, several relevant research questions
are outlined.
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How does the structure of the board of directors influence the organizational
governance and the role of the internal audit function? What are the differences
between the unitary vs. the dualistic board system and its effect on the internal audit
function and organizational governance?
What national differences are there to the structure and role of boards of directors?
What is the role of the internal audit function in establishing and ensuring effective
organizational governance?
How can the internal audit function best contribute to reduce information asymmetries
between internal and external stakeholders?
Which communication channels are the optimal ones to create between the board
and the internal auditors? For example, how often and to what board members (audit
committee) should the internal auditors report to ensure adequate and effective
organizational governance?
What is (are) the potential impact(s) of having the internal audit function report to
different organizational levels (e.g., board of directors in general, audit committee,
the CEO, the COO, the CFO)?
1. In terms of the impact on the effectiveness of organizational governance.
2. In terms of the impact on other organizational issues.
For the outsourced internal audit function, does communication between the board
and the internal auditors differ?
What are the current trends of the structure and content of internal audit charters?
What changes were performed after the introductions of the new definition? How do
these trends differ across countries?
What national differences are there to the structure and role of internal audit function?
How is the coordination between the internal audit function and other assurance or
organizational governance functions (e.g., risk management, organizational
compliance, external auditing)? What is the best practice?
What are the consequences of changing the scope of work to the nature of work
for internal auditors (from the 300 Standards to the 2100 Standards):
1. How is the role of the internal audit function affected?
2. How does this change the needs for changing competencies of the internal audit?
3. Which consequences are to be identified for the audited organization?
How does the emphasis on soft factors (competency, trust, understanding the
importance of culture, ethics, moral, etc., replacing detailed guidelines and regulations,
teamwork and transparency) influence the internal audit activity? For example, one
could assess the importance of change in management and organizations, or how
empowered organizations function and what the effects on internal audit are. Further,
in-depth understanding of the organizational goals and objectives and the value
drivers replace formal communication.
1. What are the effects of organizational changes on the structuring and assignments
of the internal audit function?
2. How do auditors have to base the audit in an empowered organization? How in
case of a changing control environment?
3. How do auditors have to audit the ethical climate and the softer issues of the
organization (importance, methods, effects, and consequences)?
Why do some organizations regard the costs of the internal audit function as fixed,
while others classify them as variable?
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Why are there differences in the internal audit function across industries? A
comparative study as to the differing roles of the internal audit function in industry
sectors (for example, banking vs. industry or transportation sector).
What is the relationship between external and internal auditors and the audit
committee?
What is the nature of coordination between the internal audit function and other
assurance or organizational governance functions (e.g., risk management,
organizational compliance, external auditing)? What is the best practice?
Footnotes
1
The notion of independence as it is construed with respect to internal and external auditors
is different. An external auditor must be independent, in fact and in appearance, in the eyes
of those outside the organization that place reliance on the external auditors opinion on the
financial statements. An internal auditor, on the other hand, must be seen as independent
and objective by those who rely on his or her work inside the organization, viz., management
and the board of directors (Rittenberg & Schwieger, 1997).
For further information about total audit coverage, see Felix et al., (1998).
The recently issued title in the IIA Handbook Series, Implementing the Professional Practices
Framework by Chapman & Anderson (2002), is an important resource for practitioners and
educators.
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Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Andy Bailey, Audrey Gramling, Sri Ramamoorti,
and Larry Rittenberg for their review of and comments on the structure, scope, and presentation of this ROIA chapter. I am grateful to Betty McPhilimy, chapter discussant, for her
critical and helpful remarks presented at the ROIA Chicago Conference from May 22-23,
2002, and to Richard Traver for his review of an earlier version of this chapter. I would also
like to acknowledge Susan Liones assistance in providing necessary reference materials.