Case 1:16-cv-01513 Document 1 Filed 10/27/16 Page 1 of 96 PageID #: 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO.:

CHRISTOPHER FEW, CATHERINE

MARDIS AND CANDACE FEW
Plaintiffs
v.

JUDGE:
MAGISTRATE JUDGE:

DERRICK STAFFORD, NORRIS

GREENHOUSE, JR., FLOYD
VOINCHE, CITY COURT OF THE
TOWN OF MARKSVILLE, TOWN OF
MARKSVILLE, PARISH OF
AVOYELLES, PROGRESSIVE
PALOVERDE INSURANCE
COMPANY, JASON BROUILLETTE,
AND KENNETH PARNELL, III
Defendants
COMPLAINT
NOW INTO COURT, come plaintiffs, Christopher Few (Chris, Christopher, or
Few), Catherine Mardis (Catherine or Mardis) and Candace Few (Candace), who submit
this Complaint and seek damages, redress and relief, as follows:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1.

Six (6) year old Jeremy Mardis (Jeremy) was recklessly gunned down, and his

father Christopher Few was callously shot and critically wounded on November 3, 2015 in
Marksville, Louisiana as a result of the objectively unreasonable and unconstitutionally deadly
force used by defendants, Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr. Stafford and Greenhouse
are deputy city marshals for the City Court of the Town of Marksville and were acting in that
capacity when they chased down and shot Jeremy and Christopher.

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2.

This is a civil action seeking damages against defendants for committing acts

under color of law, and depriving plaintiffs including Christopher Few, decedent Jeremy Mardis,
and Catherine Mardis of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and the
State of Louisiana.
3.

Through this action, plaintiffs seek all relief to which they may be entitled under

the law, including an award of compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and
costs from defendants for the deprivation and violation of plaintiffs and Jeremys rights under
the United States Constitution and Louisiana law, including but not limited to the Louisiana State
Constitution. Plaintiffs contend that defendants are guilty of certain acts and/or omissions,
created, maintained, and/or engaged in policies, procedures, practices, and/or customs which
have contravened and violated the rights guaranteed to plaintiffs under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as various provisions of Louisiana law
including but not limited to the Louisiana Constitution, Article I, 2 & 5.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

This Court has original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331

and 1343. This action is also brought under and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 for
violations of Plaintiffs rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution including the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
5.

Venue is proper in the Western District of Louisiana pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391

in that all of the relevant events, acts and omissions occurred in this judicial district, the
defendants maintain offices in this judicial district, the defendants regularly conduct business in
this district and/or the defendants reside in this judicial district.

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6.

This Court also has supplemental jurisdiction over the Louisiana state law claims

asserted herein pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367, including but not limited to claims asserted
pursuant to La-C.C. arts. 2315, 2315.6, 2316, 2317 and 2320, the Louisiana Revised Statutes,
and for violations of Article I, Sections 2 & 5 of the Louisiana Constitution.
PARTIES
Plaintiffs:
7.

Plaintiff, Christopher Few (Chris, Christopher or Few), is a resident of

and domiciled in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, and is a citizen of the United States of America
and the State of Louisiana.
8.

Plaintiff, Catherine Mardis (Catherine or Mardis), is a resident of and

domiciled in Lamar County, Mississippi, and is a citizen of the United States of America and the
State of Mississippi.
9.

Plaintiff, Candace Few (Candace), is a resident of and domiciled in Avoyelles

Parish, Louisiana, and is a citizen of the United States of America and the State of Louisiana.
Defendants:
10.

Derrick Stafford (Stafford) is a resident of and domiciled in Avoyelles Parish,

Louisiana, and is a citizen of the United States of America and the State of Louisiana. Stafford is
sued in his individual capacity, as well as in his capacity of a deputy city marshal of the City
Court of the Town of Marksville.
11.

Norris Greenhouse, Jr. (Greenhouse) is a resident of and domiciled in

Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana, and is a citizen of the United States of America and the State of
Louisiana. Greenhouse is sued in his individual capacity, as well as in his capacity of a deputy
city marshal of the City Court of the Town of Marksville.

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12.

Floyd Voinche (Voinche), is a resident of and domiciled in Avoyelles Parish,

Louisiana, and is a citizen of the United States of America and the State of Louisiana and, at all
times relevant hereto, the duly elected marshal of City Court of the Town of Marksville and
Town of Marksville. Voinche is sued both in his individual capacity and in his official capacity
as a policymaker and decision maker of City Court of the Town of Marksville, Town of
Marksville, and Parish of Avoyelles.
13.

City Court of the Town of Marksville (City Court), is a body politic created

by LA-R.S. 13:2488.51 consisting of a city judge, marshal and clerk and is domiciled in
Marksville, Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana. City Courts agent is its executive officer, Floyd
Voinche.
14.

The Town of Marksville (the Town) (Alternatively, this municipality and

political subdivision may be known as City of Marksville) is a municipality and political

subdivision of the State of Louisiana. For purposes of this complaint, references to departments
or subdivisions within the Town such as Marksville Police Department or MPD are intended
to refer to the Town and the individuals acting within the department or subdivision, as
appropriate. The Towns agent is Mayor John H. Lemoine, 427 North Washington Street,
Marksville, LA 71351.
15.

Parish of Avoyelles (Parish or Avoyelles Parish), is a political subdivision of

the State of Louisiana which may be served through the President of the Avoyelles Parish Policy
Jury, Col. Charles B. Jones, at 213 N. Main St., Marksville, LA 71351.
16.

Progressive Paloverde Insurance Company (Progressive), is a foreign

insurance company licensed to do and doing business in the State of Louisiana, and domiciled in
the State of Indiana.

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17.

Jason Brouillette (Brouillette) is a resident of and domiciled in Avoyelles

Parish, Louisiana, and is a citizen of the United States of America and the State of Louisiana.
Brouillette is sued in his individual capacity, as well as in his capacity of a deputy city marshal
of the City Court of the Town of Marksville.
18.

Kenneth Parnell, III, (Parnell) is a resident of and domiciled in Avoyelles

Parish, Louisiana, and is a citizen of the United States of America and the State of Louisiana.
Parnell is sued in his individual capacity, as well as in his capacity as an officer of the Marksville
Police Department.
FACTS
Facts Applicable to All Counts, Claims, Rights and Causes of Action
19.

Each of the foregoing facts and paragraphs is incorporated as if fully set forth

herein. Moreover, the facts set forth in the remainder of this Complaint are applicable to all
Counts, Claims, Rights, and Causes of Action asserted herein in order to provide context
specificity.
20.

For purposes of this Complaint, plaintiffs will use the terms deputy city marshal,

law enforcement officer, police officer, peace officer or simply officer. These terms are used and
to be taken in context and are intended to be synonymous, unless otherwise indicated.
Facts Surrounding the Shooting of Jeremy Mardis and Christopher Few
21.

The tragic series of events that give rise to this case occurred on November 3,

2015 in Marksville, Louisiana. Marksville is located in Avoyelles Parish.

22.

On November 3, 2015, at approximately 9:20 p.m., Greenhouse, a Marksville

Ward 2 Deputy City Marshal, while on duty and acting in his official capacity, initiated and
engaged in a vehicle pursuit of a 2000 Kia Sport (sometimes referred to herein as Vehicle 1).

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23.

The 2000 Kia Sport (Vehicle 1) was owned by Candace Few, and was operated

by plaintiff, Christopher Few. Christopher and Candace are siblings. Vehicle 1 was also occupied
by Jeremy Mardis, the six-year-old son of plaintiffs, Christopher Few and Catherine Mardis.
Jeremy, who suffered from autism spectrum disorder, occupied the front passenger seat of
Vehicle 1.
24.

The reason for the pursuit remains unclear given that Greenhouse, in a breach of

policy, failed to transmit his reason for initiating a stop to the dispatcher or otherwise indicate
same over the police radio frequency. In fact, to date, Greenhouse has yet to provide a reason for
having initiated the stop to any law enforcement personnel officially involved in the
investigation of these events.
25.

At the time Greenhouse initiated the pursuit, there was no outstanding warrant for

Christopher Fews arrest, and Greenhouse was not presented with nor did he have knowledge of
any facts that would lead a reasonably objective law enforcement officer to conclude that Few
had committed some crime, was committing a crime, or was about to commit a crime, or that he
posed a threat or risk of death or great bodily harm to anyone. Greenhouse did not have
reasonable cause to initiate an investigatory stop of Few nor did he have probable cause to arrest
Few, or otherwise effect a seizure of Few.
26.

Greenhouse was operating a patrol car or unit (Vehicle 2) owned by, in the

custody or under the control, or garde of City Court, Voinche, and the Town.
27.

The pursuit was initiated on Spring Bayou Road, within the territorial jurisdiction

of City Court and the Town.

28.

At the same time, Marksville Ward 2 Deputy City Marshals Jason Brouillette

(Brouillette) and Derrick Stafford were also on duty and acting in an official capacity while on

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patrol in a Marksville Ward 2 City patrol unit (Vehicle 3). Vehicle 3 was driven by Brouillette
and Stafford was a guest passenger in the unit.
29.

Vehicle 3 was also owned by, in the custody or under the control, or garde of City

Court, Voinche and the Town.

30.

Having received a call for assistance, ostensibly from Greenhouse, Brouillette and

Stafford also engaged in the vehicle pursuit of Vehicle 1, the 2000 Kia Sport driven by
Christopher. During that pursuit, Brouillette positioned Vehicle 3 behind Vehicle 2 which was
being operated by Greenhouse.
31.

Marksville City Police Sgt. Kenneth Parnell, III (Parnell) responded to the call

for assistance, as well, and joined the pursuing units. Parnell was operating a patrol car (Vehicle
4) owned by, in the custody or under the control, or garde of the Town.
32.

Parnell maneuvered his patrol car (Vehicle 4) behind Vehicle 3 as they turned

from Preston Street onto Martin Luther King, Jr. Street. As Parnell followed in the pursuit, he
activated his body camera capturing some of the events that were unfolding.
33.

The pursuit ended at the dead-end intersection of Martin Luther King, Jr. Street

and Taensas Street. The ends of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Taensas Streets intersected with the
streets forming an approximate right-angle.
34.

As Few reached the end of Martin Luther King, Jr. Street, he made a left-hand

turn onto Taensas Street where it abruptly came to a dead-end. Vehicle 2 (the Marksville Ward 2
Deputy City Marshal police unit operated by Greenhouse), Vehicle 3 (the Marksville Ward 2
Deputy City Marshal police unit occupied operated by Brouillette and occupied by Stafford), and
Vehicle 4 (the Marksville Police Department police unit operated by Parnell) were all stopped in
the intersection of Martin Luther King, Jr. Street and Taensas Street, as well.

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35.

The drivers of the three police units oriented their respective vehicles roughly

perpendicular to the Few vehicle, ranging from approximately 16 40 feet away, with their
headlights trained on Vehicle 1 and its occupants, Christopher and Jeremy. Attached as Exhibit
A, is a Crime Scene Diagram prepared by the Louisiana State Police which depicts the location
of all four vehicles at the time of the shooting. Attached as Exhibit B is an overhead depiction of
the scene. Both Exhibits A & B, and the factual information contained therein are incorporated
herein by reference.
36.

Once Vehicles 2 and 3 were stopped, Stafford and Greenhouse immediately

exited each of their vehicles and drew their duty weapons .40 caliber semi-automatic pistols
loaded with jacketed hollow-point bullets and aimed them at Christopher Few.
37.

Stafford and Greenhouses firearms were powerful weapons capable of causing

death or great bodily injury. And, Stafford and Greenhouse knew or should have known this.
38.

After Stafford and Greenhouse exited their patrol cars, Christopher was

commanded to put his hands up in the air and he complied. Despite Christopher putting his
empty hands in the air, Stafford and Greenhouse almost immediately began firing their duty
weapons at Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis.
39.

Greenhouse fired his duty weapon a total of four (4) times and Stafford fired his

duty weapon a total of fourteen (14) times. Between the two, a total of eighteen (18) rounds
were fired at Christopher and Jeremy.
40.

There was no precipitating gunfire by Christopher and there was no return fire.

Christopher was unarmed. And, Jeremy was unarmed. No firearms or other weapons capable of
causing death or great bodily harm were found in Christopher or Jeremys possession, or in
Vehicle 1.

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41.

Brouillette and Parnell, having also immediately exited their respective police

vehicles prior to the shooting did not fire their duty weapons, though their weapons were drawn
and aimed at Christopher and Jeremy.
42.

Christopher and Jeremy, along with Vehicle 1, were struck by multiple gunshots.

The forensic investigation by the Louisiana State Police forensically confirmed that both
Christopher and Jeremy were shot multiple times by bullets fired by Stafford. The forensic
investigation by the Louisiana State Police also reveals that both Christopher and Jeremy each
sustained one or more gunshot wounds caused by bullets that cannot be conclusively linked to
Stafford or Greenhouse. In other words, at least one or more bullet wounds sustained by
Christopher and Jeremy could have been caused by bullets fired from either Staffords or
Greenhouses duty weapons.
43.

Brouillette and Parnell were the only other officers present at the time. While

armed, they did not fire their weapons. Thus, the gunshot wounds that cannot be conclusively
linked to Stafford or Greenhouse had to come from either or both of their weapons.
44.

Upon information and belief, the reason that the gunshot wounds are forensically

inconclusive is because the wounds were exiting-type of wounds where the projectiles passed
through the victims bodies and were unrecovered or were recovered and were too deformed to
make a forensic match, or the projectiles were recovered from the victims body and were too
deformed to make a conclusive forensic match to either firearm.
45.

As a direct result of the actions of Deputy City Marshals Stafford and

Greenhouse, Christopher Few was critically wounded, having been shot in his head and chest
with at least two gunshots, and Jeremy was fatally wounded having received at least four or five

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gunshot wounds. While Jeremy was ultimately pronounced dead at the scene, he did not
immediately die from his wounds, and continued to suffer for a period of time before expiring.
46.

Toward the end of the pursuit, Parnell activated his body camera. The video

obtained by Parnells body camera captured much of the events and is believed to contain some
thirteen minutes and forty-seven seconds of events including, but not limited to, the final seconds
of the vehicular pursuit, the shooting of Christopher and Jeremy, and several minutes of the
aftermath of the shooting. The body camera video has or will be hand filed with the Clerk of
Court as plaintiffs Exhibit C and is incorporated herein by reference, as well.
47.

Upon information and belief, at approximately twenty-six (26) or so seconds into

the video, Christophers empty hands are raised and visible when Stafford and Greenhouse begin
firing their duty weapons at Christopher and Jeremy.
48.

Plaintiffs show that prior to the shooting, one or more officers on the scene

verbally commanded Christopher to put his hands in the air and he complied. Nonetheless,
Stafford and Greenhouse began shooting eighteen times between them despite Christopher
having peacefully surrendered by placing his hands in the air and despite not having first
determined whether or not Christopher was alone in the vehicle or whether or not anyone else
was in the line of fire.
49.

Parnells body camera video clearly shows that Stafford and Greenhouse

continued to fire multiple rounds at Christopher and Jeremy even after Christopher had his
empty, unarmed hands in the air. This was a barbaric and excessive use of deadly force that
demonstrates Stafford and Greenhouses deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of
Jeremy and Christopher.

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50.

At the time Stafford and Greenhouse began firing their weapons, the front and

rear of Vehicle 1 were pointing away from all officers on the scene such that any movement of
Vehicle 1 forwards or backwards did not present and would not have presented an imminent
threat of death or great bodily harm to any of the law enforcement officers at the scene or anyone
else, and there was no conduct, actions or behavior demonstrated by Christopher or Jeremy at the
time of the shooting or in the moments leading up to the shooting that presented an imminent
threat of death or great bodily harm to any of the law enforcement officers on the scene or
anyone else.
51.

Stafford and Greenhouses use of deadly force under the circumstances was not

objectively reasonable.
52.

In using deadly force under the circumstance with which they were confronted,

Stafford and Greenhouse acted with callous and reckless disregard and deliberate indifference to
the constitutional rights of Jeremy and Christopher.
53.

All three of plaintiffs exhibits, Exhibits A, B & C, which are incorporated herein

by reference, clearly show that the orientation of all four vehicles at the scene was such that
Vehicle 1 even if it were moving forward or backwards - did not and could not have presented
an imminent threat of death or great bodily harm to any of the officers at the scene or innocent
bystanders. There is no evidence, however, that any innocent bystanders were present.
54.

Under these circumstances, any objectively reasonable officer would and should

have concluded that deadly force was not necessary or justified as no imminent threat of death or
great bodily harm existed when Stafford and Greenhouse began firing. Said another way, it was
objectively unreasonable for Stafford and Greenhouse to use deadly force against Christopher
and Jeremy.

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55.

Moreover, at the time the pursuit of Christopher was initiated, and thereafter

during the pursuit, none of the officers had reasonable or probable cause to believe that
Christopher had committed some crime, was committing a crime or was about to commit a
crime. The pursuit was unlawful, as was the subsequent use of deadly force.
56.

Any objectively reasonable officer presented with the same or similar

circumstances as those with which Stafford and Greenhouse were presented, would not have
used deadly force against Christopher and Jeremy, and Stafford and Greenhouse in doing so
violated the constitutional rights of plaintiffs.
57.

Following the shooting, Parnell was interviewed as part of the Louisiana State

Police investigation and admitted to Louisiana State Police Detectives that he did not fire his
duty weapon because he did not fear for his life.
58.

Stafford and Greenhouses use of deadly force was not warranted, justified or

necessary for their own self-defense or in defense of others.

59.

Upon information and belief, in the hail of gun fire, Christopher Few was struck

two (2) to three (3) times including in the head and chest, and Jeremy was struck at least four (4)
or five (5) times including in his head and neck. Jeremys wounds were fatal but he did survive
the shooting for a short period of time believed to be at least some ten (10) or so minutes
following the fatal shooting. During this time, Jeremy was bleeding profusely and suffered
immensely due to the gunshot wounds.
60.

When the firing stopped, the officers on the scene ordered Christopher to exit his

vehicle. Even though he had been seriously wounded by the officers gunshots, Christopher
managed to open his door, and fell out the vehicle onto the ground. Few was seriously wounded

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in the head and chest, bleeding profusely, was having difficulty breathing, and could barely
move or communicate.
61.

Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell did not render or provide first aid,

timely medical treatment or any comfort measures intended to alleviate pain and suffering to
Christopher or Jeremy.
62.

At some point shortly after the shooting, Christopher was placed in handcuffs.

63.

Both Christopher and Vehicle 1 were ultimately searched and no weapons were

ever found. However, as is evident from Parnells body camera video, neither Christopher nor
Vehicle 1 appear to have been searched immediately after the shooting for a weapon. In fact,
most if not all of the officers at the scene appear to have holstered their duty weapons shortly
after the shooting and prior to searching Christopher and Vehicle 1 making it apparent that they
did not perceive Christopher or Jeremy as an imminent threat or risk of death or great bodily
harm. In fact, each of the officers at the scene appear to have holstered or otherwise secured
their weapons prior to Christopher ever being handcuffed or otherwise secured.
64.

Shortly after the shooting, one or more of the officers on the scene approached

and peered into the vehicle where they found that Jeremy was a guest passenger in Vehicle 1 and
had been seriously wounded. In fact, one of the officers remarked that there was a juvenile in the
car.
65.

Jeremys traumatic wounds were so obvious to the officers at the scene, including

Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell, that even a lay person would have reasonably
concluded that he was suffering and in dire need of emergent medical treatment.
66.

Based on the actions and conduct of the officers at the scene, which is captured in

part on Parnells body camera video, it appears that Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell

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initially and erroneously believed or assumed that Jeremy was dead, simply did not care whether
or not he was alive. It was not until approximately some seven and one-half (7 ) to eight (8)
minutes or so after the hail of gunfire, that an officer at the scene, believed to be Parnell, finally
checked Jeremy for a pulse and discovered that he was still alive, despite having been shot
multiple times including in the head and neck. However, none of the officers at the scene,
including Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell initiated or rendered any form of first
aid, nor did they undertake any other measures in an attempt to stop Jeremys bleeding or
otherwise alleviate or mitigate Jeremys suffering, or made any attempts to save his life. Sadly,
Jeremy was left to suffer and die while the officers casually searched for gloves.
67.

Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell each demonstrated a callous and

deliberate indifference to the suffering and serious medical needs of both Jeremy Mardis and
Christopher Few.
68.

The callous and deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of Jeremy

Mardis and Christopher Few constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and
suffering and, in the case of Jeremy Mardis, a denial of a chance of survival, and death. This
deliberate indifference was shown by Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell.
69.

Stafford and Greenhouses use of deadly force in firing their duty weapons was

not in self-defense as they did not and could not have reasonably believed that they, or anyone
else, were in imminent danger of losing their lives or receiving great bodily harm, nor was the
firing of their weapons necessary to save themselves or anyone else at the scene from any such
risk or danger.

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70.

Stafford and Greenhouses use of deadly force was unnecessary and objectively

unreasonable, and constituted deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of plaintiffs

including Christopher and Jeremy.
71.

Following the shooting, the Louisiana State Police conducted an investigation of

the incident and within days arrested both Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr. for
willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally committing second degree murder under LaR.S. 14:30.1 and attempted second degree murder under La-R.S. 14:30.1 as modified by La-R.S.
14:27.
72.

Following a meeting of a legally convened grand jury, the grand jury returned a

true bill indictment against both Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr. for those criminal
offenses, as well. Plaintiffs believe that the facts prove that both Derrick Stafford and Norris
Greenhouse, Jr. are guilty of second degree murder of Jeremy Mardis and attempted second
degree murder of Christopher Few.
73.

Since the shooting, both Stafford and Greenhouse have refused to provide any

public statement concerning or any explanation why Greenhouse initiated a pursuit of

Christopher and Jeremy, or why they used deadly force against them. In fact, Stafford and
Greenhouse have refused to cooperate in any investigation of the shooting. Instead, in a
cowardly and conspiratorial fashion, both have maintained their silence and, in doing so, they
have exacerbated the emotional pain and suffering and mental anguish that plaintiffs have had to
endure as a result of this tragedy.
74.

Upon information and belief, on November 4 or 5, 2015, Stafford and Greenhouse

met with Terence Grines, Alexandria City Marshal, to discuss the events of November 3, 2015
surrounding the shooting but Stafford and Greenhouse have yet to publicly reveal the substance

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of those discussions, why they met with Mr. Grines, or why they would meet with Mr. Grines
but not give a statement to the Louisiana State Police investigators regarding the shooting.
75.

The actions of Stafford and Greenhouse following the shooting, including their

meeting with Grines, but refusal to provide an explanation for their actions to the Louisiana State
Police investigators suggests a guilty state of mind.
Defendants are Persons for Purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983
76.

Defendants, Derrick Stafford, Norris Greenhouse, Jr., Jason Brouillette, Kenneth

Parnell, Jr. and Floyd Voinche are all natural persons and, therefore, are persons for purposes of
this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983.
77.

Defendant, City Court of the Town of Marksville, is a local governmental unit

and a body politic created by LA-R.S. 13:2488.51. City Court is not an agency, department or
arm of the State of Louisiana. Therefore, City Court is a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C.
1983. Defendant, Town of Marksville, is a municipality and political subdivision of the State of
Louisiana. The Town of Marksville is not an agency, department or arm of the State of
Louisiana. Therefore, the Town is a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983.
78.

Defendant, Parish of Avoyelles, is a political subdivision of the State of

Louisiana. Parish of Avoyelles is not an agency, department or arm of the State of Louisiana.
Therefore, the Parish is a person for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Additional Relevant Facts Regarding Norris Greenhouse, Jr. Acting Under Color of Law
79.

At all times relevant hereto, Greenhouse was employed by and acting in the

course and scope of his employment as a deputy marshal with City Court, having been hired and
appointed as such by Voinche.

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80.

In working as a deputy city marshal, attempting to stop the Few vehicle, initiating

a pursuit of Few, attempting to seize or take Few into custody, using law enforcement equipment
and police unit, and in firing his duty weapon at Christopher and Jeremy, Greenhouse was acting
under color of law. La-R.S. 13:1881(B).
81.

Greenhouse was initially hired or appointed as a Marksville Ward 2 Deputy City

Marshal on December 3, 2014.

Additional Relevant Facts Regarding Derrick Stafford Acting Under Color of Law
82.

At all times relevant hereto, Stafford was employed by and acting in the course

and scope of his employment as a deputy marshal with City Court, having been hired and
appointed as such by Voinche.
83.

In working as a deputy city marshal, attempting to stop the Few vehicle, engaging

in the pursuit of Few, assisting or backing up Greenhouse, attempting to seize or take Few into
custody, using law enforcement equipment and police unit, and in firing his duty weapon at
Christopher and Jeremy, Stafford was acting under color of law. La-R.S. 13:1881(B).
84.

Stafford was initially hired or appointed as a Marksville Ward 2 Deputy City

Marshal on or about December 3, 2014.

85.

At the time of the shooting, Derrick Stafford was also employed as a city police

officer with the Marksville Police Department but was moonlighting as a Marksville Ward 2
Deputy City Marshal. Notwithstanding, at all times relevant hereto including at the time of the
pursuit and shooting, Derrick Stafford was subject to the direction, supervision and control of the
Marksville Police Department and Town of Marksville.

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Additional Relevant Facts Regarding Jason Brouillette Acting Under Color of Law
86.

At all times relevant hereto, Brouillette was employed by and acting in the course

of scope of his employment as a deputy marshal with City Court, having been hired and
appointed as such by Voinche.
87.

In working as a deputy city marshal, attempting to stop the Few vehicle, engaging

in the pursuit of Few, assisting or backing up Greenhouse, using law enforcement equipment and
police unit, and attempting to seize or take Few into custody, Brouillette was acting under color
of law. La-R.S. 13:1881(B).
Additional Relevant Facts Regarding Kenneth Parnell, III Acting Under Color of Law
88.

At all times relevant hereto, Parnell was employed by and acting in the course and

scope and his employment as a city police officer with the Town of Marksville.
89.

In working as a police officer employed by Marksville Police Department,

assisting or backing up Greenhouse, attempting to stop the Few vehicle, using law enforcement
equipment and police unit, and attempting to seize or take Few into custody, Parnell was acting
under color of law.
Additional Relevant Facts Regarding Floyd Voinche Acting Under Color of Law
90.

At all times relevant hereto, Voinche was the duly-elected City Marshal of City

Court, and was engaged and performing duties within the course and scope and his office. All
actions attributable herein to Voinche were in furtherance of his position as City Marshal, and
executive officer of City Court. Voinches actions were in furtherance of his statutory duties to
execute the orders and mandates of the court as well as in furtherance of his authority to
preserve the peace within the territorial jurisdiction of City Court and the Town of Marksville.

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91.

Thus, at all times material hereto, Voinche was acting under color of law when

performing his duties as City Marshal.

Facts Regarding the Organization and Policy Making of The Town of Marksville,
The City Court of the Town of Marksville, and The Parish of Avoyelles
92.

The Town of Marksville is a municipality and political subdivision of the State of

Louisiana.
93.

The Town of Marksville utilizes and/or employs its own police department known

as the Marksville Police Department. The Chief of Marksville Police Department is Elster Smith,
Jr. Smith is a decision maker and policy maker of not only the Marksville Police Department
but the Town of Marksville, as well.
94.

Defendant, City Court of the Town of Marksville (City Court), is a body politic

created by LA-R.S. 13:2488.51 and consists of a city judge, marshal and clerk.
95.

The territorial jurisdiction of City Court extends throughout the Town of

Marksville. LA-R.S. 13:2488.51

96.

The shooting sued upon herein occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of City

Court and the Town of Marksville.

97.

At all times material hereto, Chief Elster Smith, Jr., Marksville Police Department

and Town of Marksville employed Derrick Stafford as a full-time police officer of the Marksville
Police Department and had a custom, policy or practice of allowing Stafford to work part-time as
a deputy city marshal.
98.

Even when serving as a deputy city marshal, Stafford was still subject to the same

ethical, professional, and legal standards and requirements and the same custom, policies and
practices expected of Marksville City Police officers.

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99.

In addition, on November 3, 2015, Chief Elster Smith, Jr., Marksville Police

Department and Town of Marksville employed Kenneth Parnell, III as a full-time police officer
of the Marksville Police Department.
100.

At all times relevant hereto, Defendant, Floyd Voinche (Voinche), was and has

been the duly elected marshal of City Court. As marshal, Voinche is executive officer of City
Court and is authorized to execute the orders and mandates of the court and in the execution
thereof, and in making arrests and preserving the peace, he has the same powers and authority of
a sheriff. La-R.S. 13:1881.
101.

Voinche is a decision maker and policy maker of City Court, Town of

Marksville, and the Parish.

102.

At times relevant hereto prior to the shooting, City Court ordered and mandated

that Voinche enforce and support the laws of the United States, the Constitution, laws of State of
Louisiana, and the ordinances of the Town within the territorial jurisdictional limits of the Town
of Marksville. In fact, upon assuming his office, Voinche took an oath to do this.
103.

In furtherance of the City Court orders and mandates, Voinche obtained certain

equipment to be used by and on behalf of the Ward 2 city marshals and deputy city marshals
including at least two police patrol cars. The patrol cars utilized by Greenhouse, Stafford and
Brouillette in the pursuit of Christopher and Jeremy were cars obtained by Voinche, on behalf of
City Court and the Town, for purposes of executing the orders and mandates of City Court,
making arrests and preserving the peace within the territorial jurisdiction of City Court.
104.

As city marshal, Voinche also had authority to appoint one or more deputy

marshals that have the same powers and authority as the marshal. La-R.S. 13:1881(B). These
powers and authority were co-extensive with that of the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff, as well.

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105.

As city marshal, Voinche is and was responsible for the actions of the deputy

marshals he appoints. La-R.S. 13:1881(B). This responsibility arises by operation of Louisiana

law and makes no exception for actions or conduct attributable to deputy city marshals that result
in the deprivation of rights protected by the United States Constitution and enforceable under 42
U.S.C. 1983.
106.

As city marshal, Voinche appointed Greenhouse, Stafford and Brouillette as

deputy city marshals. This was in furtherance of Voinches duty to execute the orders and
mandates of City Court.
107.

As such, Voinche is responsible for the actions of Greenhouse, Stafford, and

Brouillette including the consequences of their actions. See La-R.S. 13:1881(B).

108.

The authority granted Voinche by statute, and pursuant to the orders and

mandates of City Court, the Town and Parish make him a policy maker and decision maker of
these defendants.
109.

At all times material hereto, Voinche was acting under color of law when

performing his functions as City Marshal.

110.

At times relevant hereto, the Town of Marksville had in force and effect a custom,

policy and/or practice that allowed its employees, including Stafford, to hold outside
employment including serving as deputy city marshals of City Court and the Town.
111.

City Court and the Town had a policy, custom or practice that required deputy

city marshals to carry approved handguns while on duty.

112.

Avoyelles Parish is a local governmental subdivision and political subdivision of

the State of Louisiana. The governing body of Avoyelles Parish is the Avoyelles Parish Police
Jury.

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113.

The compensation of Voinche, Greenhouse, Stafford and Brouillette was fixed

and paid for, at least in part, by the Town of Marksville and Avoyelles Parish.
114.

As deputy marshals, and at all times relevant hereto on November 3, 2015,

Greenhouse, Stafford and Brouillette were exercising their authority, as derived from the
marshal, Voinche, of making arrests and preserving the peace and, therefore, were acting
under color of law when they engaged in the pursuit and, ultimately, the unconstitutional seizure
and shooting of Few and Jeremy.
115.

At all times relevant to this Complaint, Greenhouse, Stafford and Brouillette, as

police officers and deputy city marshals of City Court, were acting under the direction and
control of Voinche, City Court, Town of Marksville and the Parish.
116.

At all times relevant to this Complaint, Parnell was acting in the course and scope

of his employment as an officer with the Marksville Police Department, was exercising his
authority of a police officer, and therefore was acting under color of law when he joined the
pursuit and participated in the stop of Vehicle 1 and its occupants, Jeremy and Christopher.
117.

The relationship of City Court vis--vis the Town of Marksville and Avoyelles

Parish is such that both the Town of Marksville and Avoyelles Parish is the master, employer,
and/or supervisor of Floyd Voinche, Norris Greenhouse, Jr., Derrick Stafford, Jason Brouillette,
and Kenneth Parnell, III.
118.

City Court, The Town of Marksville and Avoyelles Parish had the authority, right

and duty to control, direct and supervise the actions of Voinche, Stafford, Greenhouse,
Brouillette and Parnell.
119.

The salaries or compensation of the city judge, marshal, and deputy city marshals

was provided, in part, by the Town of Marksville and Avoyelles Parish.

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120.

In addition, the day-to-day operating funds of City Court were likewise provided,

in part, by the Town of Marksville and Avoyelles Parish.

121.

Along these same lines, a portion of the fines collected for the prosecution of the

violation of local ordinances was paid to the Town and a portion of the fines collected for the
prosecution of violations of state laws was paid to Avoyelles Parish.
122.

Therefore, in his official capacity as City Marshal, Voinche was a decision

maker and policy maker of City Court, the Town and Parish such that actions or inactions on
Voinches part are attributable and imputable to City Court, the Town and Parish.
123.

In both his individual and official capacity as City Marshal, Voinche was

responsible for adopting, promulgating, implementing and enforcing policies, customs or

practices pertaining to making arrests and preserving the peace within the City Courts territorial
jurisdiction, as well as other customs, policies or practices including customs, policies and
practices regarding and governing the screening, hiring, discipline, training, supervision and
retaining of deputy city marshals to ensure that each deputy city marshal was properly qualified
and trained to perform the duties and functions of a peace officer, including making arrests,
preserving the peace, and the constitutional use of deadly force. These hiring customs, policies
and practices include the proper scrutinization of the backgrounds of potential deputy city
marshal candidates, and the promulgation, enforcement and training on constitutionallycompliant use of deadly force policy.
124.

The need for such policies is so obvious especially where, as here, the deputy

city marshals are armed and have a history of the use of excessive force that the failure to
promulgate and enforce such policies amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional
rights of those persons encountering the deputy city marshals.

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125.

In appointing Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy city marshals, Voinche

demonstrated deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons within the territorial
jurisdiction of City Court, including Christopher and Jeremy, because Voinche did not properly
scrutinize the backgrounds of Stafford and Greenhouse, did not adopt or follow an adequate or
proper hiring and retention policy, did not adopt or follow an appropriate training policy, and did
not adopt and enforce a constitutionally-compliant use of deadly force policy.
126.

Stafford and Greenhouse had a history of exercising excessive force when making

arrests and assisting other law enforcement officers, which history was known or should have
been known by Voinche, City Court, the Town, and Parish.
127.

This history included numerous citizen complaints of excessive force, as well as

numerous civil lawsuits alleging excessive force on the part of Greenhouse and Stafford. Many
of these complaints and lawsuits were documented in the business records of City Court, the
Town of Marksville, and Parish, and/or were a matter of public record.
128.

Voinche did not properly vet Stafford and Greenhouse, or scrutinize their

backgrounds prior to appointing them deputy city marshals because neither he, City Court, the
Town or Parish had an appropriate policy to screen the backgrounds of candidates or potential
appointees, or adequate criteria for the screening of candidates or potential appointees that, if
applied, would have not only identified Stafford and Greenhouse as being unfit for appointment
but would have caused Voinche to decline or refuse such appointments.
129.

Voinches appointment, hiring and retention of Stafford and Greenhouse was an

exercise of his decision making and policy making authority on behalf of City Court, the Town,
and Parish such that his actions are fairly and reasonably imputable to City Court, the Town, and
Parish.

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130.

Voinches failure to properly vet Stafford and Greenhouse and scrutinize their

backgrounds, coupled with City Court, the Town and Parishs failure to have an adequate or
proper hiring policy resulted in Voinche appointing two deputy city marshals who had a long
history of the use of excessive force that should have excluded them from serving as deputy city
marshals.
131.

The long history of excessive use of force, some examples of which will be

discussed in this Complaint, was known or should have been known by Voinche, and Voinches
appointment of Stafford and Greenhouse adopted or ratified such history as an acceptable policy,
custom or usage of City Court, the Town and Parish.
132.

Moreover, Stafford and Greenhouses long history of the use of excessive force

133.

Further, Voinche, as City Marshal, was responsible for adopting, implementing

and enforcing policies to ensure the proper supervision and training of deputy city marshals in
making arrests and in the use of force including the use of deadly force within the contours of the
United States Constitution and Louisiana State Constitution.
134.

However, City Court, the Town and Parish lacked a use of deadly force policy,

written or otherwise. The need for such policies is so obvious for the safety of the public and the
protection of constitutional rights that the lack of such policies constitutes deliberate indifference
and a reckless disregard for the public and plaintiffs constitutional rights.
135.

Voinche and hence City Court, Town and Parish authorized the arming of deputy

city marshals (including Stafford and Greenhouse) and it was not only reasonably foreseeable
but also a virtual certainty that authorized firearms would be used by deputy city marshals in
making arrests and preserving the peace, functions they were authorized to perform by Louisiana

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statue, and were performing the night of November 3, 2015 when Stafford and Greenhouse
pursued and then shot Christopher and Jeremy.
136.

Both Stafford and Greenhouse were authorized by Voinche and City Court to

carry firearms or duty weapons in keeping with the custom, policy and practice of Voinche, City
Court, Town and Parish. Despite arming the deputy marshals, these defendants provided no
training, prior to arming them or on an ongoing basis, regarding the constitutional limitations of
the use of deadly force or shoot, dont shoot scenarios that would have enabled them to make
objectively reasonable decisions on when to use deadly force, nor did these defendants
promulgate and enforce a written constitutionally-compliant use of deadly force policy.
137.

The lack of proper use of deadly force training and shoot, dont shoot training,

resulted in, was a direct cause of and the moving force behind Stafford and Greenhouses
shooting of Christopher and Jeremy when the circumstances were such that it was not objectively
reasonable to use deadly force.
138.

Plaintiffs show that the conduct, acts and/or omissions of Voinche, in both his

individual and official capacity, resulted in the implementation, utilization and execution of
unconstitutional customs, policies and practices that were a direct and proximate cause and
moving force of the shooting of Christopher and Jeremy.
139.

Proper use of deadly force training would have enabled Stafford and Greenhouse

to recognize that the facts and circumstances with which they were presented did not justify the
use of deadly force, that it was not objectively reasonable to use deadly force and that they
should not use deadly force against Christopher and Jeremy.
140.

Proper use of deadly force training would have enabled Stafford and Greenhouse

to recognize that neither Christopher nor Jeremy presented an imminent risk of death or great

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bodily harm to anyone at or near the scene, and that the use of deadly force was not necessary,
warranted or justified for their own self-defense or the defense of others.
141. Moreover, Voinches actions or rather policy of inaction in failing to train
Stafford and Greenhouse on the constitutional limitations of the use of deadly force constituted
deliberate indifference to violations of others constitutional rights committed by his
subordinates, Greenhouse and Stafford.
Additional Facts Regarding the Screening, Hiring,
Training and Discipline of Peace Officers
142.

On December 15, 2015, plaintiffs counsel sent Floyd Voinche, in his official

capacity as executive officer of City Court, a public records request (the Voinche Public
Records Request) pursuant to the Louisiana Public Records Act, La-R.S. 44:1, et seq.
143.

In the Voinche Public Records Request, Voinche, as executive officer of the City

Court of the Town of Marksville, was asked to produce for inspection or copying public records
concerning, pertaining to and/or regarding, among other things, the following:
3.

Policies and procedures pertaining to the hiring, training and discipline of

law enforcement officers or deputies employed by the Ward 2 City
Marshals office that were in force and effect on November 3, 2015 and at
any time during the ten (10) years preceding that date.

144.

In response to the above request, Voinche indicated that No such records are

known.
145.

This response shows that Voinche, City Court, and Town did not have policies

and procedures pertaining to the hiring, training and discipline of law enforcement officers or
deputies employed by the Ward 2 City Marshals office that were in force and effect on
November 3, 2015.

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146.

The need for such policies is so obvious for the safety of the public and the

protection of constitutional rights that the lack of such policies constitutes deliberate indifference
and a reckless disregard for the public and plaintiffs constitutional rights.
Additional Facts Regarding the Lack of a Use of Deadly Force Policy
147.

Similarly, Voinche, City Court, the Town, and Parish lacked a use of deadly force

148.

By Louisiana statute, La-R.S. 13:1881, City Marshal Voinche and his deputy

policy.

city marshals, Stafford and Greenhouse, have authority to make arrests and preserve the peace,
and within their jurisdiction, the same powers and authority of a sheriff.
149.

The State of Louisiana recognizes that the proper and safe use of a firearm is

probably the most important facet of basic law enforcement training. See Pre-Academy
Firearms Training Home Study Manual, Second Edition, Louisiana Commission on Law
Enforcement.
150.

Because law enforcement contemplates the arming of police officers with duty

weapons capable of causing death or great bodily injury, it is incumbent upon law enforcement
agencies and agencies employing or supervising police officers to adopt, implement, and enforce
appropriate deadly force policies, and to provide police officers such as Stafford and Greenhouse
adequate training regarding those policies, in order to ensure the safety of those persons coming
into contact with armed deputy city marshals, and to ensure that deadly force would not be used
unless it was objectively reasonable to do so.
151.

Here, Voinche, City Court, Town of Marksville, and Parish failed to adopt,

implement and enforce a constitutionally-compliant use of deadly force policy and failed to
provide adequate training of Stafford and Greenhouse on the constitutional limitations of the use

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of deadly force, which failures were a direct and proximate cause of and the moving force behind
the shooting of Christopher and Jeremy.
152.

A municipality's policy of inaction despite awareness - constructive or actual -

that its policy will cause a constitutional violation may be "'the functional equivalent of a
decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.'" Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 131
S.Ct. 1350, 1360, 179 L.Ed.2d 417 (2011) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
395, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). Converse v. City of Kemah, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 141647 * (S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2016). These are standards recognized by the United States
Supreme Court and, as decision makers and policy makers, defendants City Marshal Voinche,
City Court, Town and Parish should have been well aware of these standards. Thus, the failure
of Voinche, City Court, the Town, and Parish to adopt, promulgate, implement and utilize
appropriate use of deadly force standards is, in itself, a policy of inaction and, therefore, a
decision to violate the Constitutional rights of those persons coming into contact with deputy city
marshals while they are performing their peacekeeping functions.
153.

In the Voinche Public Records Request, Voinche, as executive officer of the City

Court of the Town of Marksville, was asked to produce for inspection or copying public records
concerning, pertaining to and/or regarding, among other things, the following:
6.

Policy and Procedure Manual and/or compilation for the Ward 2 City
Marshals office that was in force and effect on November 3, 2015 and at
any time during the ten (10) years preceding that date. This should cover
all policies and procedures pertaining to the following subject matter:
a.
Hiring of police officers and deputy marshals;
b.
Firing or terminating employment of police officers and deputy
marshals;
c.
Disciplining police officers and deputy marshals;
d.
Use of force and use of deadly force policies;
e.
Training of police officers and deputy marshals;
f.
Job description for police officers and deputy marshals.
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154.

In response to the above request, Voinche indicated that No such records are

known.
155.

In the Voinche Public Records Request, Voinche, as executive officer of the City

Court of the Town of Marksville, was asked to produce for inspection or copying public records
concerning, pertaining to and/or regarding, among other things, the following:
13.

Records concerning, pertaining to and/or regarding the law enforcement

training of Norris Greenhouse, Jr.

14.

Records concerning, pertaining to and/or regarding the law enforcement

training of Norris Greenhouse, Jr.

156.

In response to the above requests, Voinche indicated that No such records are

known.
157.

In the Voinche Public Records Request, Voinche, as executive officer of the City

Court of the Town of Marksville, was asked to produce for inspection or copying public records
concerning, pertaining to and/or regarding, among other things, the following:
19.

All memoranda, policies, procedure or other written records concerning,

pertaining to and/or regarding the duties, power and/or authority of the
City Marshal and deputy marshals to make arrests and preserve the peace
(as contemplated by La-R.S. 13:1881).

158.

In response to the above requests, Voinche indicated that No such records are

159.

The responses provided by Voinche, as executive officer of City Court, prove that

known.

on the date of the shooting sued upon herein, City Court and Voinche had NO written policy in
force and effect concerning, pertaining to and/or regarding (a) the hiring, training and discipline
of law enforcement officers or deputies employed by the Ward 2 City Marshals office; (b)
hiring of police officers and deputy marshals; (c) firing or terminating employment of police
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officers and deputy

marshals; (d) disciplining police officers and deputy marshals; (e) use of

force and use of deadly force policies; or (f) the training of police officers and deputy
marshals.
160.

Voinche is the statutorily-designated executive officer of City Court and is

statutorily charged with executing the orders and mandates of City Court, as well as in making
arrests and preserving the peace. See La-R.S. 13:1881(A). As executive officer of City Court,
Voinche is a policymaker and decision maker of City Court, the Town of Marksville, and Parish.
Voinche is endowed with supervisory authority over his deputy city marshals, for whom he is
statutorily responsible (La-R.S. 13:1881(B)), and therefore is liable for the natural
consequences of the defendants failure to implement, enforce and train deputy city marshals on
an appropriate use of deadly force and shoot, dont shoot policy.
161.

Moreover, the acts and/or omissions of Voinche, in his official capacity, are

attributable and imputable to City Court, the Town and Parish.

162.

At the time of the shooting and at all times during the employment or appointment

of Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy city marshals, neither Voinche, City Court, Town of
Marksville or Parish had in force and effect a written use of deadly force or shoot, dont shoot
policy required of the deputy city marshals or law enforcement officers making arrests or
preserving the peace within the territorial jurisdiction of City Court or Town of Marksville.
163.

The lack of an appropriate use of deadly force policy or shoot, dont shoot

policy constituted the official policy of Voinche, City Court, Town of Marksville, and Parish.
This was in effect a no policy is the policy or a policy of inaction and constitutes a deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and those coming into contact with armed
deputy city marshals.

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164.

Because the discharge of duty weapons and, in particular, the type of firearms

with which Greenhouse and Stafford were equipped - .40 caliber semi-automatic handguns
loaded with jacketed hollow-point bullets - on the night of the shooting, presents the reasonable
and foreseeable risk of death or great bodily harm, it was necessary that Voinche, City Court,
Town of Marksville and Parish adopt, implement and enforce appropriate use of deadly force
policies and to train and supervise Stafford and Greenhouse on those policies to ensure the
protection of the constitutional rights of those persons coming into contact with armed deputy
city marshals including the plaintiffs.
165.

The failure to adopt, implement, and enforce adequate use of deadly force policies

and train and supervise Stafford and Greenhouse regarding such policies, constitutes deliberate
indifference and reckless and callous disregard for the constitutional rights of those persons
encountering armed deputy city marshals including Christopher and Jeremy.
166.

This deliberate indifference is attributable to Voinche, City Court, the Town and

167.

Plaintiffs next show that the failure to implement, enforce and train the deputy

Parish.

city marshals on an appropriate use of deadly force or shoot or dont shoot policy was a direct
and proximate cause of Stafford and Greenhouse discharging their duty weapons and shooting
Jeremy and Christopher when they did not present an imminent risk or danger of death or great
bodily harm, and under the circumstances that existed with these defendants, did not justify the
use of deadly force.
168.

Where, as in this case, a warrant did not exist for the arrest of Christopher,

probable cause did not exist to arrest Christopher or to otherwise initiate a valid stop or pursuit,
Christopher was not suspected of having committed a crime, was committing a crime, or was

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about to commit a crime, Christophers avenue of escape was completely blocked at the end of
the pursuit, Christopher was unarmed, Christopher complied with the commands he was given
and surrendered with his empty hands in the air, and Stafford and Greenhouse had not
determined that an innocent six-year old passenger was in the line of fire, the use of deadly force
was objectively unreasonable, and could not and cannot be justified. Thus, Greenhouse and
Staffords use of deadly force violated the constitutional rights of plaintiffs to be free from
unreasonable seizure and excessive force.
Additional Facts Regarding the Backgrounds and Hiring of Stafford and Greenhouse
169.

As plaintiffs have previously alleged, according to La-R.S. 13:1881(B) Voinche

is authorized to appoint one or more deputy marshals having the same powers and authority as
the marshal but, by statute, Voinche is responsible for the actions of the deputy marshals,
including Greenhouse and Stafford. Specifically, La-R.S. 13:1881(B) states that [T]he
marshal may appoint one or more deputy marshals having the same powers and authority as the
marshal, but the marshal shall be responsible for their actions.
170.

Prior to Stafford and Greenhouse being hired as deputy city marshals, both had a

long history of the use of excessive force when making arrests or assisting other officers that are
documented in numerous citizen complaints to City Court, Voinche, the Town, and Parish and
are of record in publicly-filed lawsuits against Stafford and Greenhouse. Voinche, City Court,
the Town, and Parish knew or should have known of this history and declined or rejected the
appointment of Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy city marshals and, in the case of the Town,
terminated Staffords employment with the Marksville Police Department.
171.

At all times relevant hereto, City Court of the Town of Marksville, Floyd

Voinche, the Town of Marksville, and Parish had indifferent policies, customs, habits, training

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and procedures which permitted, allowed or ratified law enforcement officers use of deadly or
excessive force when subjects did not present an imminent threat or risk of death or great bodily
harm or force that was otherwise excessive to the need.
172.

In fact, as plaintiffs earlier allegations made clear at all times material hereto,

City Court and Voinche had NO written policy in force and effect concerning, pertaining to
and/or regarding (a) the hiring, training and discipline of law enforcement officers or deputies
employed by the Ward 2 City Marshals office; (b) hiring of police officers and deputy marshals;
(c) firing or terminating employment of police officers and deputy marshals; (d) disciplining
police officers and deputy marshals; (e) use of force and use of deadly force policies; or (f)
the training of police officers and deputy marshals.
173.

The Louisiana legislature has found that law enforcement work is of such

importance to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this state and is of such a nature as
to require education and training of a professional character. La. R.S. 40:2401
174.

Given the moral certainty that law enforcement officers will be called upon to use

force including deadly force when apprehending suspects or otherwise discharging their duties as
peace officers, the need to refrain from hiring officers with a history of excessive use of force
and to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force is so obvious, that
the failure to do so and the failure to adopt, implement, and enforce appropriate and adequate
policies to ensure these objectives is properly characterized as deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights. See, for example, City of Canton v. Ohio, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197
(1989); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)
175.

In hiring Stafford and Greenhouse, City Court of the Town of Marksville, Floyd

Voinche the Town of Marksville, and Parish ratified and accepted their long history of the use of

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excessive force and, in so doing, made such excessive use of force their official, custom, policy
or practice by ratification or inaction. Stafford and Greenhouses history of excessive force and
prior bad acts include the following examples.
176.

Aleathia Barbin

On January 3, 2011, a tow truck driver attempted to repossess Aleathia Barbins vehicle
and a dispute arose prompting the tow truck driver to call the police. After police arrived, Barbin
indicated that she needed to remove her belongings from the vehicle and proceeded into her
home to retrieve the keys. After she went inside her home, a Marksville Police Department
Officer, while Barbin was holding her infant son, grabbed her by the arm and began to violently
place her into handcuffs. Defendant Stafford joined in the detention and seizure, as well.
177.

Stafford then escorted the now handcuffed Barbin towards a nearby police car and

tossed her into the backseat. Once inside and with her hands behind her back, Stafford stunned
the young mother with a Taser, a potentially deadly use of force, while she was seated, secured
and not a threat to Stafford.
178.

As a result of this incident, Aleathia Barbin filed a civil lawsuit on January 3,

2012, against the Marksville Police Department through the Town of Marksville and Derrick
Stafford in the 12th Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of Avoyelles in the matter
Aleathia Barbin v. Marksville Police Department through the Town of Marksville & Derrick
Stafford, Individually and In His Official Capacity, No. 21027482, 12th Judicial District Court
(the Barbin suit). The Barbin suit is a matter of public record of which defendants City Court
of the Town of Marksville, Floyd Voinche and The Town of Marksville have actual and/or
constructive knowledge.

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179.

Sammy Carmouche

On June 20, 2011, Stafford responded to a call for assistance by a Marksville Police
Department who had handcuffed a suspect by the name of Sammy Carmouche. While Sammy
Carmouche was in handcuffs and in the officers secured custody, Stafford arrived on scene and
discharged his duty Taser into the chest of Sammy Carmouche releasing a charge of electricity
through Carmouches body. At the time, Carmouche did not present an imminent threat or risk
of death or great bodily harm to Stafford, the Marksville Police Department Officer or anyone
else at or near the scene.
180.

Upon information and belief, the arrest of Sammy Carmouche and the

circumstance surrounding the arrest are part of a file maintained by the Marksville Police
Department of which defendants City Court of the Town of Marksville, Floyd Voinche and The
Town of Marksville have actual and/or constructive knowledge.
181.

Kiana Martin

On December 3, 2012, Kiana Martin was attacked by a boy on a school bus. After she
began to defend herself, the bus driver stopped and called for assistance. Three Marksville
Police Department officers including defendant Stafford arrived on scene and attempted to break
up the fight. Initially, one of the officers jumped on top of the sixteen-year-old Martin and held
her down. Stafford joined in to assist the officer, pressed down on Martins back and then pulled
her arm up with such physical force that she suffered a broken arm.
182.

As a result of the December 3, 2012, a lawsuit seeking civil damages was filed on

behalf of Kiana Martin against the Town of Marksville and Derrick Stafford and bears the
caption Donald Martin on behalf of the Minor Child, Kiana Martin v. City of Marksville, et al,
No. 20139981, 12th Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles (the Martin suit).

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183.

Steven McIntosh

On or about July 4, 2013, Steven McIntosh was leaving a Fourth of July celebration when
an altercation broke out in or near where he was walking. McIntosh was not involved in the
altercation.
184.

Officers with the Marksville Police Department responded to the altercation. One

of the officers deployed a dangerous chemical agent by spraying individuals in the area and, in
so doing, escalated the altercation and caused a great deal of confusion among those in the area
including Steven McIntosh. During the confusion, McIntosh misplaced the keys to his vehicle
and began searching the area in the hopes of finding his keys. While searching the area, one of
the officers suddenly, without warning or provocation, threw McIntosh to the ground. The
officer was assisted by defendants, Norris Greenhouse, Jr. and Derrick Stafford, in the battery
against McIntosh.
185.

This event resulted in at least two lawsuits being filed against Derrick Stafford,

Norris Greenhouse, Jr. and the City of Marksville, among others. The caption of these lawsuits
include Steven McIntosh v. Chad Mayeaux, et al, No. 20140693, 12th Judicial District Court,
Parish of Avoyelles (the McIntosh suit); and Tameka Greenhouse, et al v. Johnathan Ducote,
et al, No. 20140696, 12th Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles.
186.

Patrick Jeansonne

On or about July 4, 2012, Jeansonne made two calls to the Marksville Police Department
to complain about the behavior of Derrick Stafford that he had experienced during an earlier
confrontation that occurred in the Town of Marksville at a local parade. Following the complaint
calls, Stafford ordered that another Marksville Police Department officer effect a warrantless
arrest of Patrick Jeansonne during which Jeansonne was placed in handcuffs. Following the

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arrest, Stafford arrived, removed the handcuffs, and proceeding to place his own handcuffs on
Jeansonne. Jeansonne was then booked with a misdemeanor charge of disturbing the peace.
According to Jeansonne, Stafford used excessive force when applying his handcuffs.
187.

On January 7, 2013, Jeansonne filed a civil suit for damages against Derrick

Stafford and Town of Marksville stemming from the events of July 4, 2012 including Staffords
excessive use of force. The caption of that suit is Patrick Jeansonne, et ux v. City of Marksville,
et al, No. 20138845, 12th Judicial District Court, Parish of Avoyelles (the Jeansonne suit).
188.

Ian Fridge

Ian Fridge was arrested in Marksville on July 4, 2014 while attending a public festival.
189.

Upon information and belief, there have been other incidents of violence or

conduct in which Norris Greenhouse, Jr. and Derrick Stafford have engaged or that bears upon
their fitness to have served as a law enforcement officer and that will be revealed through
discovery. By way of example, plaintiffs have information suggesting that Stafford may have
been charged with rape, attempted rape or some other sexual crime of violence and that the City
Court judge had represented or defended him on those charges.
190.

At all times relevant hereto, Voinche, City Court, the Town and Parish knew or

should have known of the above-described incidents involving Stafford and Greenhouse, all of
which are recorded in the business records of Voinche, City Court, the Town, and Parish and/or a
matter of public record readily available to these defendants.
191.

The above-described incidents reveal and demonstrate a pattern of the use of

excessive use of force by Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr. that has spanned several
years and that has been ratified over and over again by the Town of Marksville such that it has
become a custom, policy or practice of the Town of Marksville and because the City Court of the

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Town of Marksville and Floyd Voinche had actual or constructive knowledge of the reputation,
character, conduct, history and background of Stafford and Greenhouse, these events and the
prior lawsuits and complaints against Stafford and Greenhouse, or knew or should have known
of their prior history of excessive force, the City Court of the Town of Marksville and Floyd
Voinche ratified such excessive use of force by appointing Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy
city marshals such that the excessive use of force, under the same and similar circumstances as
those presented in the events described herein, became and was the custom, policy or practice of
the City Court of the Town of Marksville and Floyd Voinche.
192.

The Town, City Court, Parish, and Voinches ratification of these prior acts of

excessive use of force by Stafford and Greenhouse became their official custom, policy or
practice and are a direct cause of the shooting. Moreover, the pattern of use of excessive force
on the part of Stafford and Greenhouse is sufficiently numerous and common, and is such a
pervasive practice of these officers, that the use of excessive force is a practice, custom and
policy fairly attributable to the Town, City Court and Voinche and, in this case, was the moving
force and a direct cause of the shooting of Christopher and Jeremy and a violation of plaintiffs
constitutional rights.
Additional Facts Regarding Chief Elster Smith, Jr. and Floyd Voinche
193.

Voinche is a decision maker and policy maker of City Court and Town of

Marksville. Smith is a decision maker and policy maker of the Marksville Police Department
and Town of Marksville.
194.

Both Voinche and Smith possess the authority to make decisions and policies on

behalf of City Court and Town of Marksville, and adopt, promulgate, implement, and enforce
policies and procedures applicable to City Court and, in particular, the functions of the deputy

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city marshals and peace officers serving within the territorial jurisdiction of City Court and the
Town of Marksville.
195.

Through the exercise of their policy making and decision making functions,

Voinche and Smith have encouraged, tolerated and/or ratified the use of police tactics by
Greenhouse and Stafford, and perhaps other law enforcement officers in their respective
departments, which are improper, constitute an excessive use of force, and that result in the
violation of rights protected by the United States Constitution and Louisiana State Constitution.
196.

Voinche and Smith have tolerated and ratified the use of excessive force by both

Stafford and Greenhouse, have failed to implement and enforce appropriate use of force policies,
have failed to implement and enforce appropriate use of deadly force policies, and have
essentially adopted, implemented, enforced, accepted and ratified a policy of no policy is the
policy when it comes to the use of excessive or deadly force by peace officers under their direct
line of supervision.
197.

Voinche, City Court and the Town also lacked an appropriate and effective

discipline policy that not only fails to prevent or discourage an excessive use of force but which
effectively served to accept or ratify the unconstitutionally excessive use of force such that the
lack of an adequate discipline policy has become the de facto policy of City Court and the Town.
The long history of use of excessive force and other prior bad acts by Stafford and Greenhouse
shows that they have never been disciplined in such a manner as to correct or prevent their
further abuses and excessive use of force. The lack of disciplinary consequences was a direct
cause of their use of deadly force against Christopher and Jeremy, as they used excessive force
as they have been allowed to do for years.

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Additional Facts Regarding Progressive

198.

On November 3, 2015, Progressive had in force and effect a policy of automobile

liability insurance that provided automobile liability insurance coverage on the two Marksville
Ward 2 City Marshal patrol units, previously described herein as Vehicle 2 and Vehicle 3. The
Progressive policy provided coverage for the acts, omissions, and fault attributable to
Greenhouse and Stafford described in this Complaint and, therefore, is liable for plaintiffs
injuries and damages.
199.

Vehicles 2 and 3 were uniquely designed, manufactured, equipped and intended

to be used as police patrol units. As such an intended and actual purpose of such vehicles was to
engage in police pursuits and otherwise as a means to apprehend persons suspected of having
committed crimes.
200.

When Vehicles 2 and 3 were stopped at the dead-end corner of the intersection of

Martin Luther King, Jr. Street and Taensas Street, they were situated in such a way as to block
Fews vehicle from any avenue of escape or further movement on the roadways, and the lights
on Vehicles 2 and 3 were used to illuminate Fews vehicle and Few the targets of Greenhouse
and Staffords gunfire.
201.

Greenhouse and Brouillettes tactical use of Vehicles 2 and 3 to block Fews

escape and to illuminate Few when firing their duty weapons constitutes a use of the vehicles for
which Progressive provides liability coverage. In that the shooting took place at night, after
dark, the headlights of the police units were used to illuminate the officers targets.
202.

Therefore, Progressive is liability, jointly, severally, and/or in solido with

Greenhouse and Stafford for the injuries and damages plaintiffs have suffered.

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Additional Facts Regarding Parnells Use of Vehicle

203.

During the pursuit and at the time of the shooting, Parnell was using a patrol car

(Vehicle 4) owned by, in the custody or under the control, or garde of the Town. To the extent
the Town has automobile liability coverage under an automobile liability insurance policy or
other risk and indemnity agreement, such insurer or indemnitor is liable for the claims, rights and
causes of action sued upon herein because Parnells use of the vehicle lights to illuminate Few
and Fews vehicle assisted Greenhouse and Stafford to target Few and Jeremy in the same
manner as Vehicles 2 and 3.
Additional Facts Regarding the Claims of Candace Few
204.

At the time of the shooting, Vehicle 1 was owned by Candace Few, who

permitted Christopher to use and operate her vehicle.

205.

As a result of the gunshots fired by Stafford and Greenhouse, Candaces vehicle

was damaged. The damage was caused not only by the gunshots themselves but also from the
bleeding of the gunshot victims. The cost of repairing the vehicle exceeds its value.
206.

Defendants are liable to Candace Few for her property damages and loss of use of

her vehicle.
Additional Facts Regarding Damages
207.

Plaintiffs sustained damages, both general and special, as a result of the mortal

wounds inflicted upon and the death of Jeremy Mardis, and the gunshot wounds inflicted upon
Christopher Few.
208.

Jeremy Mardis was the six-year old child of Christopher Few and Catherine

Mardis. As a result of Jeremys death, Christopher Few and Catherine Mardis have suffered a

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loss of their sons love, companionship and affection, and they have suffered loss of society and
consortium, mental anguish and anxiety, as well as emotional distress.
209.

Plaintiffs would also show that prior to his death, Jeremy suffered a tremendous

amount of pain, mental anguish and emotional distress. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover from the
defendants damages for Jeremys physical pain and suffering prior to death, as well as his
emotional distress and suffering, and mental anguish and anxiety prior to death.
210.

Christopher Few and Catherine Mardis are entitled to recover these damages from

the defendants.
211.

Christopher Few was present and viewed the shooting of his son, Jeremy.

Because of witnessing these tragic events, Christopher has suffered mental anguish and
emotional distress. Christopher is, therefore, entitled to recover these damages.
212.

By having sustained serious injuries due to the gunshot wounds, Christopher Few

was hospitalized for an extended period. During that time, Christopher was forced to miss
Jeremys funeral. This caused further emotional distress and mental anguish and anxiety for
which defendants are liable, as well.
213.

In addition, Christopher Few is entitled to damages, both general and special,

because of his own injuries damages. Because of the gunshot wounds, Christopher sustained
serious injuries to his head and chest, among other areas of his body. Christopher has
experienced both physical and mental pain and suffering, mental anguish and anxiety, emotional
distress, scarring and disfigurement, and other general damages, as well as special damages such
as medical expenses, and low wages. Christopher Few is entitled to recover these damages from
the defendants.

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214.

Plaintiffs are entitled to recover compensatory damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983

for all injuries suffered because of the violation of their constitutional rights under the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. These compensatory damages include
plaintiffs actual losses, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, anxiety, and emotional
distress, as well as all such other general and special damages suffered because of the violations
alleged in this Complaint.
215.

Plaintiffs further show that under 42 U.S.C. 1983, they are entitled to recover

punitive damages from the defendants sued in their individual capacities to include Stafford,
Greenhouse, Voinche, Brouillette and Parnell. As more particularly alleged throughout this
Complaint, Stafford and Greenhouse acted with an evil motive or demonstrated reckless
indifference to the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs when they intentionally began shooting
and killed Jeremy and critically injured Christopher under circumstance that did not warrant or
justify the use of deadly force.
216.

Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell are guilty of acting with an evil

motive or demonstrated reckless indifference to the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs when
they failed to render or delayed the rendering of first aid and medical attention to Jeremy and
Christopher.
217.

Voinche is guilty of acting with an evil motive or demonstrated reckless

indifference in his hiring of Stafford and Greenhouse both of whom had long histories of the use
of excessive force which was known or should have been known to Voinche, and in failing to
adopt, promulgate and enforce an adequate use of deadly force policy, to adequately train
Stafford and Greenhouse on the use of deadly force and for such other acts and omissions
described in this Complaint.

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218.

The conduct of the defendants sued in their individual capacities merit an award

of punitive damages.
PLAINTIFFS CLAIMS, RIGHTS AND CAUSES OF ACTION
219.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint in each of the Counts, whether specifically stated or not. It is
plaintiffs intent that all factual allegations contained within this Complaint, including the
exhibits specifically incorporated in the Complaint by reference, are applicable to each of
plaintiffs claims, rights and causes of action in order to provide contextual specificity.
220.

Plaintiffs assert claims, rights and causes of action arising from violations and

deprivations of their rights arising under the United States Constitution, including the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments, which are enforceable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 & 1988. Plaintiffs seek
compensatory damages, punitive damages (against the defendants sued in their individual
capacities), attorney fees (under 42 U.S.C. 1988) and all taxable costs. Plaintiffs also assert
claims, rights and causes of action arising under Louisiana state law including La-C.C. arts.
2315, 2315.6 2316, 2317 and 2320, the Louisiana Revised Statutes, and for violations of Article
I, Sections 2 & 5 of the Louisiana Constitution.
COUNT I
42 U.S.C. 1983 General Statement Regarding Claims Applicable to All Defendants
221.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts set forth in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
222.

This Count is applicable to all defendants.

Plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

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223.

42 U.S.C. 1983 provides that:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officers judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.

224.

While 42 U.S.C. 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, it does provide

a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386
(1989).
225.

Here, plaintiffs seek vindication of certain rights conferred upon them under the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution including the rights to be
free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force that defendants violated on November 3,
2015.
226.

Plaintiffs bring these against defendants, Derrick Stafford, Norris Greenhouse,

Jr., Jason Brouillette and Kenneth Parnell, III in their individual capacities; and Floyd Voinche,
in both his individual and official capacities. Plaintiffs also bring these claims against City
Court, the Town and Parish for municipal liability under Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Services of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978) for the improper screening
of Stafford and Greenhouses backgrounds, for the hiring or appointment of Stafford and
Greenhouse as deputy city marshals, for failing to properly train and supervise Stafford and
Greenhouse regarding the constitutional limitations of the use of deadly force, for the failure to
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promulgate and operationalize a constitutionally-compliant use of deadly force policy, among

other claims described herein including the deliberate indifference to the protection of plaintiffs
constitutional rights. Jeremys death, and plaintiffs injuries and damages were the result of
official policy, custom, or practice of these defendants, the act of an official policy maker
attributable to these defendants, and/or the direct result of deliberate indifference attributable to
these defendants.
COUNT II
42 U.S.C. 1988 Claim for Attorney Fees Applicable to All Defendants
227.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
228.

This Count is applicable to all defendants.

229.

Plaintiffs also bring this action under 42 U.S.C. 1988. 42 U.S.C. 1988 provides

for an award of attorneys fees to prevailing plaintiffs in actions under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Plaintiffs submit that an award of attorney fees would not be unjust and, therefore, plaintiffs seek
an award of attorney fees for which defendants are liable.
230.

Plaintiffs have had to retain counsel to prosecute their claims, rights and causes of

action against these defendants and, therefore, plaintiffs and their counsel are entitled to an
award of attorney fees.
COUNT III
Plaintiffs Seek Damages for Violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983
Applicable to All Defendants
231.

Plaintiffs suffered damages caused by defendants violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983,

and the deprivation of their constitutionally-protected rights. The damages include

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compensatory damages, both general and special, as well as prejudgment interest on their
compensatory damages.
232.

Christopher Fews compensatory damages arising as a result of his own injuries

include, but are not limited to his pain and suffering, mental anguish and emotional distress,
medical bills, and lost wages.
233.

Christopher Few and Catherine Mardis, as the natural parents of Jeremy Mardis,

have also suffered damages because of his death. These damages include their loss of decedents
life, loss of companionship, service and society, emotional distress, and hedonic damages or the
pleasurable value of Jeremys life. Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover survival damages for
the predeath pain and suffering, and mental and emotional distress Jeremy suffered after being
shot and prior to his death.
234.

Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988, as well

as all taxable costs.

235.

Candace Few is entitled to recover for the property damages to her vehicle and the

loss of use of that vehicle.

236.

Finally, the defendants sued in their individual capacity including Derrick

Stafford, Norris Greenhouse, Jr., Jason Brouillette and Kenneth Parnell, III are liable for punitive
damages.
COUNT IV
42 U.S.C. 1983 - Plaintiffs General Statement Regarding Claims for
Deprivation of Rights Protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
To The United States Constitution
Applicable to All Defendants

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237.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
238.

This Count is applicable to all defendants.

239.

Plaintiffs also bring this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution for deprivation of their

constitutionally-protected rights. These rights include due process and equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as rights guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment such as
the right to be free from unreasonable seizure and excessive force.
240.

The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides, "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized."
241.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitutions says:

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
242.

Plaintiffs show that defendants, Derrick Stafford, Norris Greenhouse, Jr., and

Jason Brouillette, while acting in the course and scope of their employment with City Court and
the Town of Marksville as deputy city marshals, and Kenneth Parnell, III, while in the course
and scope of his employment with the Town of Marksville as an office of the Marksville Police

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Department, committed acts under color of law, and deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
243.

The defendants, while acting in their capacities as peace officers, deprived Jeremy

Mardis and Christopher Few of liberty without due process of law, made an unreasonable seizure
of their person, and thereby deprived plaintiffs of their rights, privileges and immunities as
guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. These
rights include the right to be free from unreasonable seizure and the use of excessive force.
244.

By using the deadly and excessive force described in this Complaint when it was

not objectively reasonable to do so, Stafford and Greenhouse denied Jeremy Mardis of his
constitutionally protected right of life and liberty and denied Christopher Few of his
constitutionally protected right of liberty, all without due process of law.
245.

The defendants are liable to plaintiffs for all compensatory damages, attorney

fees, punitive damages and costs to which they are entitled under the applicable law.
COUNT V
Excessive Force by Unlawful Use of Deadly Force
Deprivation of Rights Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983
Liability of Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr.
246.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
247.

This action is brought against Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr., each

in their individual capacities, pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 & 1988.

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248.

Plaintiffs seek all damages to which they are entitled under the law including

compensatory damages (both general and special damages), punitive damages, attorney fees and
costs.
249.

The conduct and actions of defendants, Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse,

Jr., while in the course and scope of their employment as deputy city marshals, in shooting and
killing Jeremy Mardis, and shooting and critically wounding Christopher Few, was excessive and
objectively unreasonable, was done intentionally, willfully, maliciously, and with deliberate
indifference and reckless disregard for the natural and probable consequences of their acts, was
done without justification, and was designed to and did cause serious physical and emotional
pain and suffering, and death, in violation and deprivation of plaintiffs constitutionallyprotected rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution including the right to be free of unreasonable seizure and the right to
be free from the use of excessive, unreasonable, and unjustified force and especially deadly
force.
250.

At all times material hereto, Stafford and Greenhouse, were acting under color of

state law as peace officers, agents and employees of defendants, City Court and Voinche, and
were acting in the course and scope of such employment as deputy city marshals when they shot
and killed Jeremy, and shot and injured Few.
251.

At the time of the events that occurred on November 3, 2015, it was clearly

established that law enforcement officers such as Stafford and Greenhouse could not use deadly
force against a person that did not pose an actual and imminent threat of death or great bodily
harm. This is particularly true where a person has peacefully surrendered by placing his
unarmed hands in the air indicating his submission to law enforcement authority and, therefore,

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did not and could not otherwise create or present an actual or imminent threat of death or great
bodily harm to anyone in the area.
252.

Any reasonable law enforcement officer knew or should have known of these

constitutionally-protected rights at the time of the pursuit and at the time of the shooting of
Christopher and Jeremy, as they were clearly established and were or should have been a part of
each officers training.
253.

Moreover, in connection with their employment as deputy marshals for City Court

of the Town of Marksville and City Marshal Floyd Voinche, both Stafford and Greenhouse
undertook an oath to support the Constitution and Laws of the United States and the
Constitution and Laws of this State, of which the rights and protections afforded by the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution are included.
254.

Plaintiffs show that on November 3, 2015, Norris Greenhouse, Jr. and Derrick

Stafford did intentionally use deadly and excessive force when they discharged their duty
weapons and shot and killed Jeremy Mardis, and shot and critically wounded Christopher Few.
255.

At the time Stafford and Greenhouse discharged their duty weapons, they knew or

should have known that bullets fired at Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis were certain or
reasonably likely to cause death or great bodily harm to those at whom they were shooting, as
well as those persons in the line of fire.
256.

Force is excessive, and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment of the United

States Constitution, if it is not reasonable in light of the circumstances facing the officer. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (U.S. 1989) The facts and circumstances of
this case show that Stafford and Greenhouses act of shooting Christopher and Jeremy was
clearly and objectively unreasonable in light of the particular circumstances facing these officers.

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257.

At the time of the shooting, Christopher had his empty, unarmed hands raised in

the air, clearly visible to both Stafford and Greenhouse, and he did not present a risk of death or
great bodily harm to anyone at the scene including any of the officers at the scene. Further,
because of the positioning of the officers at the scene including Greenhouse, Stafford, Brouillette
and Parnell at the time the weapons were fired, none of these officers were in imminent danger
or risk of death or great bodily harm by the actual or potential movement of Vehicle 1.
258.

In fact, the evidence shows that Greenhouse, Stafford, Brouillette and Parnell

were anywhere from sixteen (16) to forty (40) feet away from and perpendicular to Vehicle 1
such that any movement forwards or backwards of Vehicle 1 would not have presented a risk of
death or great bodily harm.
259.

In fact, Parnells body camera video and other evidence will show that when

Stafford and Greenhouse discharged their duty weapons at Vehicle 1, Christopher and Jeremy,
Christopher Fews empty hands were in the air demonstrating that he was surrendering to the
authority of the law enforcement officers at the scene and, thus, did not pose an imminent danger
or threat of death or great bodily harm.
260.

Under the circumstances, Stafford and Greenhouses act of shooting their duty

weapons at Christopher and Jeremy was excessive and violated Christopher and Jeremys Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the amount of force used was not and could not be
considered reasonable by any objectively reasonable police officer in the same or similar
circumstances.
261.

At the time of the shooting, Parnell was at the scene in very close proximity to

both Stafford and Greenhouse and did not fire his duty weapon because he did not fear for his
life.

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262.

Both immediately before and at the time of the shooting, none of the police

officers at the scene were physically in a position of imminent danger or risk of death or great
bodily harm that might have been presented by movement of Christophers vehicle, and
Christophers hands were empty and in the air such that it was clear he was not brandishing a
weapon. Christopher had surrendered to the law enforcement officers at the scene as he had
been ordered to do - and posed no imminent danger or threat of death or great bodily harm to
anyone. Thus, Stafford and Greenhouses actions of shooting Christopher and Jeremy were
objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
263.

At the time Stafford and Greenhouse used deadly force against Jeremy and

Christopher, both Jeremy and Christopher had been unreasonably seized by Stafford,
Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell. Christopher was the driver of Vehicle 1 and Jeremy was a
passenger in Vehicle 1. All avenues of travel or means of so-called escape were blocked by
Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnells placement of their respective police units. This effected a
seizure of Jeremy and Christopher that was unreasonable.
264.

Leading up to the unreasonable seizure, the defendants did not have reasonable or

probable cause to arrest or even stop Christopher Few. There was no warrant for Christophers
arrest, and the defendants had no evidence indicating that he had committed a crime, was
committing a crime or was not about to commit a crime. The seizure was unreasonable and a
deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights.
265.

During this seizure, Stafford and Greenhouse fired their service weapons at

Christopher and Jeremy and, in so doing, fatally wounded Jeremy and critically wounded
Christopher. As set forth in other parts of this Complaint, the circumstances with which Stafford
and Greenhouse were presented in the moments leading up to the shooting and at the time they

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fired their weapons were such that it was objectively unreasonable for them to have used deadly
force against Christopher and Jeremy.
266.

Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell are liable for all damages plaintiffs

have suffered because of their unreasonable seizure of Christopher and Jeremy, and Stafford and
Greenhouse are liable for all damages caused by their objectively unreasonable use of deadly
force against Jeremy and Christopher.
COUNT VI
Unreasonable Seizure
Deprivation of Rights Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983
Liability of Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr.,
Jason Brouillette and Kenneth Parnell, III

267.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
268.

Stafford, Greenhouse, and Brouillette, while acting in the course and scope of

their employment as deputy city marshals of City Court and Town of Marksville and Parnell, as
an officer with Marksville Police Department, used their department-issued police vehicles to
block Vehicle 1 so as to prevent any movement or travel of Christopher and Jeremy, without
lawful reason or justification. Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnells actions constituted
an unreasonable seizure of Jeremy and Christopher.
269.

In addition, Stafford and Greenhouses use of deadly force against Christopher

and Jeremy constituted an unreasonable seizure of them, as well.

270.

Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnells actions in effecting a seizure of

Jeremy and Christopher were objectively unreasonable.

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271.

Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnells unlawful and unreasonable seizure

of Jeremy and Christopher were a direct and proximate cause of the shooting, Jeremys death and
Christophers injuries. Thus, Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnell are liable for the
natural and probable consequences of having unreasonably seized Jeremy and Christopher,
including the damages plaintiffs have suffered as a result of same.
272.

Because Stafford, Greenhouse, Brouillette and Parnells actions resulted in and

were a direct cause of Jeremy Mardis death and severe injuries to Christopher Few, they are
liable to plaintiffs for all damages they have suffered.
COUNT VII
42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
Violation of Substantive Due Process Rights
Denial of Familial Relationship
273.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
274.

Plaintiff, Few and Mardis, had a cognizable interest under the due process clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in being free from state actions
that cause unwarranted interference with the plaintiffs right to familial relationship with the
decedent, Jeremy.
275.

Few and Mardis are the natural parents of Jeremy and are within the class of

beneficiaries entitled to bring a wrongful death and survival action for damages under 42 U.S.C.
1983.
276.

Stafford and Greenhouses intentional acts, omissions, conduct, and fault caused

and resulted in the tragic death of Jeremy and, therefore, deprived plaintiffs, Few and Mardis, of
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their familial relationship with the decedent. In firing their duty weapons when Few held his
empty hands in the air, and neither Few nor Jeremy posed an imminent danger or threat of
danger of death or great bodily harm to anyone, shocks the conscience.
277.

Moreover, Stafford and Greenhouses deliberate indifference to the serious

medical need of Jeremy by failing to render any sort of urgent medical care or first aid including
failing to make attempts to stop Jeremys bleeding or implement resuscitative measures, violates
not only the constitutionally protected rights of Jeremy but those of his parents, Christopher Few
and Catherine Mardis, as well.
278.

Stafford and Greenhouses intentional acts, omissions, conduct, and fault did not

comply nor were they consistent with any legitimate law enforcement objective.
279.

As a direct result of Stafford and Greenhouses intentional acts, omissions,

conduct, and fault and their deliberate indifference to plaintiffs Few and Mardis constitutional
right to the enjoyment of and exercise their familial relationship with their six-year-old son,
Jeremy, Few and Mardis have been deprived of the life-long love, companionship, comfort,
support, society, care and sustenance of the decedent, and will continue to be so deprived.
280.

By virtue of the Stafford and Greenhouses violation of plaintiffs constitutional

rights, they are liable for the following:

a.

Decedent's physical pain and suffering prior to death;

b.

Decedent's mental anguish and anxiety prior to death;

c.

Scarring and disfigurement suffered prior to death;

d.

Decedent's funeral expenses;

e.

Plaintiffs loss of love, affection, society, consortium and services;

f.

Plaintiffs mental anguish and anxiety;

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g.

Plaintiffs loss of support;

h.

Medical and related expenses; and

i.

Punitive damages;

j.

Reasonable attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1988;

l.

Any and all such other damages, both general and special, which will be proved
at the trial hereof and otherwise as allowed by law.

281.

Stafford and Greenhouses intentional acts, omissions, conduct, and fault caused

and resulted in the denial or violation of Christopher Fews constitutionally protected rights of
his person and liberty, as well.
282.

The acts and omissions of Stafford and Greenhouse described herein and that

constitute violations of plaintiffs rights under the United States Constitution including the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments have caused plaintiffs damages for which these defendants
are liable. These damages including, but are not limited to, general and special damages, attorney
fees, and costs for which defendants are liable.
COUNT VIII
42 U.S.C. 1983 Supervisory Liability of Floyd Voinche Individual Capacity
283.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
284.

Plaintiffs show that Floyd Voinche, in his individual capacity, is liable to

plaintiffs for violation of their constitutional rights for (1) his own culpable action or inaction in
failing to properly screen the background of Stafford and Greenhouse, (2) his own culpable
action or inaction in failing to adopt, implement and enforce an adequate hiring and retention

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policy, (3) his own culpable conduct in failing to promulgate and enforce a constitutionallycompliant use of deadly force policy, (4) his own culpable conduct in failing to adequately train
Stafford and Greenhouse on the constitutional limitations of the use of deadly force, and (5) for
conduct that shows a deliberate indifference to the constitutionally-protected rights of those with
whom deputy city marshals come into contact while in the course and scope of their
employment.
285.

Plaintiffs Complaint shows that both Stafford and Greenhouse have a history of

using excessive force when making arrests, assisting other officers in making arrests, and
otherwise in preserving the peace.
286.

Adequate scrutiny of the background of Stafford and Greenhouse would lead any

reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the decision to (1)
forego establishing adequate hiring guidelines that ensure that only candidates possessing the
proper skills and policing demeanor are hired; and (2) to hire candidates that have a history or
background of the use of excessive force when making arrests or assisting other officers in
making arrests and otherwise in keeping the peace, would be the deprivation of a third partys
federally protected rights and, therefore, Voinches failure to conduct such adequate scrutiny of
the background of Stafford and Greenhouse, and thus his hiring of the two officers who have a
long and documented history of using excessive force when making arrests or assisting other
officers, amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutionally-protected rights of persons
coming into contact with such officers, including Jeremy and Christopher.
287.

Here, a full review of Stafford and Greenhouses backgrounds reveal that they

both have a history of using excessive force when making arrests or assisting other officers as
evidenced by the numerous documented citizen complaints and lawsuits against them and the

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law enforcement agencies with which they were employed. In fact, the documented complaints
and lawsuits are so numerous that any reasonable supervisor, policymaker or decision maker in
Voinches position of authority to hire would be compelled to conclude that their continued use
of excessive force is not just likely but rather a plainly obvious consequence of the decision to
hire them.
288.

Similarly, plaintiffs show that Floyd Voinche, in his individual capacity, is liable

to plaintiffs for violation of their constitutional rights for (1) his own culpable action or inaction
in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates and, in particular, Stafford and
Greenhouse; and/or (2) for conduct that shows a deliberate indifference to the constitutionallyprotected rights of those with whom deputy city marshals come into contact while in the course
and scope of their employment, including Jeremy and Christopher.
289.

"A failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately indifferent when it is obvious that

the likely consequences of not adopting a policy will be a deprivation of constitutional rights."
Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992). A supervisor may also be liable
for failure to supervise or train if: "(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the
subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the
violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate
indifference." Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009).
290.

Here, Voinche (1) failed to supervise or train Stafford and Greenhouse on the

constitutional limitations of use of deadly force; (2) the failure to properly train and supervise
Stafford and Greenhouse caused them to use and was a moving force behind their use of deadly
force when it was not objectively reasonable to do so which resulted in Jeremy Mardis being shot
to death and Christopher Few being shot and critically injured in violation of plaintiffs

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constitutionally-protected rights; and (3) because Voinche failed to adopt, promulgate, enforce
and train his subordinates on a constitutionally-compliant use of deadly force policy, especially
when the background of his subordinates revealed a propensity to use or history of using
excessive force (such as in the case of Stafford and Greenhouse), his failure to train or supervise
amounts to deliberate indifference.
291.

Voinche hired deputy city marshals who possessed the propensity to use

excessive force, armed them with lethal weapons, did not train them on the constitutional
limitations on the use of deadly force, did not provide them with a written use of deadly force
policy, did not provide ongoing shoot, dont shoot training, and then authorized them to go out
into the public to make arrests and otherwise preserve the peace while armed with deadly
weapons. Such reckless disregard for the safety of persons with whom these deputy city
marshals would come into contact including the plaintiffs amounts to deliberate indifference
to the plaintiffs constitutionally-protected rights for which Voinche is liable in his individual
capacity.
292.

Well before Voinche ever appointed Stafford and Greenhouse, the United States

Supreme Court, in discussing municipal liability for failure to train, observed in City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (U.S. 1989):
For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police
officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers
with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the need to
train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, see
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), can be said to be "so obvious," that
failure to do so could properly be characterized as "deliberate indifference" to
constitutional rights.
293.

The legal principles and law discussed in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S.

378 (U.S. 1989) Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) set forth standards or expectations of
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policymakers and supervisors - such as Voinche. Voinche knew or should have known that the
need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force is so obvious that
the failure to do so constitutes deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. This is especially
so when the subordinates have a history of the use of excessive force when making arrests or
assisting other officers as in this case.
294.

In fact, upon taking his office as City Marshal, Voinche took an oath to support

and uphold the Constitution and Laws of the United States and the Constitution and Laws of this
State. Embodied in that oath, as supervisor, was a duty to train and supervise his subordinates in
the constitutional limitations and contours of the use of deadly force.
295.

Notwithstanding, Voinche failed to promulgate a use of deadly force policy,

written or otherwise, or train Stafford and Greenhouse in the constitutional limitations on the use
of deadly force. Moreover, Voinche having actual or constructive knowledge of the background
of Stafford and Greenhouses history of use of excessive force, citizen complaints and lawsuits,
makes Voinches failure to promulgate a use of deadly force policy or to train Stafford and
Greenhouse in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, substantially more
callous and reckless, and amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of the
plaintiffs and others who come into contact with these armed deputy city marshals.
COUNT IX
42 U.S.C. 1983 Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
Supervisory Liability of Floyd Voinche
In His Official Capacity and Municipal Liability of City Court, and Liability of City Court,
Town of Marksville, And Parish of Avoyelles
Custom, Policy or Practice and Deliberate Indifference

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296.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
297.

This Count is brought against Floyd Voinche, in his official capacity, as City

Marshal of City Court, City Court and the Town of Marksville. By statute, Voinche is the
executive officer of City Court and, therefore, is a policymaker and decision maker of City Court
and Town of Marksville.
298.

Plaintiffs show that City Court, Town of Marksville and the Parish are liable

under 42 U.S.C. 1983 because the deprivation of plaintiffs constitutionally-protected rights,

arising under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, occurred as a result of one or more
customs, policies or practices of City Court, Town of Marksville, and Parish and that of officials
such as Voinche and Smith, both policy makers and decision makers, whose acts may fairly be
said to be those of City Court, Town of Marksville and the Parish.
299.

These defendants are also liable because of their deliberate indifference to the

constitutional rights of the plaintiffs.

300.

By statute, Voinche has the authority to decide who to hire as deputy city

marshals and is responsible for their actions.

301.

Plaintiffs show that Floyd Voinche, in his official capacity as City Marshal of

City Court, City Court and Town of Marksville are liable to plaintiffs for depriving them of
constitutionally-protected rights.
302.

The allegations set forth in the preceding Count VIII - 42 U.S.C. 1983

Supervisory Liability of Floyd Voinche Individual Capacity are specifically adopted by

reference for purposes of this Count. Plaintiffs contend these allegations establish the requisite

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elements of proof necessary to hold Voinche, in his official capacity, City Court and Town of
Marksville liable to plaintiffs for the deprivations of their constitutionally-protected rights.
303.

Plaintiffs show that Voinches subordinates, Stafford and Greenhouse, violated

the plaintiffs rights under the United States Constitution by using deadly force against them
when it was objectively unreasonable to do so, and that Voinche, in his official capacity as City
Marshal of City Court, and as a policy maker and decision maker of City Court, the Town, and
Parish, should be liable for the conduct of Stafford and Greenhouse, because his deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with whom his subordinates would come into
contact while in the course and scope of their employment, including plaintiffs, was the moving
force behind the deprivation of plaintiffs constitutionally-protected rights.
304.

Voinche acted with deliberate indifference to the consequences, and established

and maintained a policy, practice or custom of inaction which directly caused or was the moving
force behind the violations of plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights by his subordinates,
Stafford and Greenhouse.
305.

Here, Voinche (1) failed to adequately supervise and train Stafford and

Greenhouse; (2) a causal link exists between Voinches failure to adequately train or supervise
Stafford and Greenhouse and the violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or
supervise amounts to deliberate indifference.
306.

The facts set forth in the Complaint show that Voinche and City Court failed to

adopt, promulgate or enforce a written policy pertaining to (1) the hiring, training, and discipline
of law enforcement officers or deputies employed by the Ward 2 City Marshals office that were
in effect on November 3, 2015; (2) the hiring of police officers and deputy marshals; (3) firing or
terminating employment of police officers and deputy marshals; (4) disciplining police officers

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and deputy marshals; (5) use of force and use of deadly force policies; or (6) the training of
police officers and deputy marshals.
307.

The lack of such policies amounted to a policy of inaction and resulted in and

were a direct cause of Greenhouse initiating and Stafford joining in a vehicular pursuit that
violated plaintiffs constitutional rights as it was not supported by a warrant, probable cause or
even reasonable cause to believe that Few had committed a crime, was committing a crime or
was about to commit a crime. Properly vetted and trained officers would never have initiated
such a pursuit because it was not objectively reasonable to do so.
308.

The lack of such policies amounted to a policy of inaction and resulted in and

were a direct cause of Stafford and Greenhouse using deadly force by firing their duty weapons
at Christopher and Jeremy when it was not objectively reasonable to do so. The facts show that
Fews vehicle was blocked with no avenue of escape, the position of all officers at the scene was
such that any potential movement of Fews vehicle did not present an imminent risk of death or
great bodily harm, and Few was commanded to place his hands in the air and he complied by
placing his empty, unarmed hands in the air. Any objectively reasonable officer perceiving these
circumstances would conclude that none of the officers in the area were at imminent risk of death
or great bodily harm.
309.

Stafford and Greenhouse were both armed with lethal weapons and they were

authorized by Voinche to carry those weapons and use them to carry out their functions as peace
officers. Thus, it was a moral certainty that Stafford and Greenhouse would utilize their duty
weapons in making arrests and preserving the peace.
310.

Therefore, given the moral certainty that deputy city marshals who are charged

with making arrests and preserving the peace will be called upon to use deadly force in the

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form of their duty weapons when apprehending suspects, making arrests and preserving the
peace, the need for proper vetting of such officers to prevent the hiring and arming of officers
that have a history or propensity to use excessive force, and the need to properly train and
supervise such officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force is so obvious,
that the failure to do so and the failure to adopt, implement, and enforce appropriate and
adequate policies to ensure these objectives and to protect the constitutional rights of persons
with whom the deputy city marshals come into contact is properly characterized as deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.
311.

Voinches deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons with

whom the deputy city marshals that he appointed and for whom he is statutorily responsible
including the plaintiffs resulted in and caused Stafford and Greenhouse to use deadly force when
it was not objectively reasonable to do so.
312.

Further, Voinches appointment of Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy city

marshals when he knew or should have known of their long history and propensity to use
excessive force when making arrests or preserving the peace in the course and scope of their
employment as deputy city marshals constitutes a ratification or acceptance of Stafford and
Greenhouses excessive use of force and establishes such excessive use of force as the official
custom, policy or practice of City Court.
313.

Acting under color of law and pursuant to official custom, policy or practice,

Voinche and City Court knowingly, recklessly, or with deliberate indifference and callous
disregard of plaintiffs constitutionally-protected rights, failed to instruct, supervise, control and
discipline on a continuing basis Stafford and Greenhouse in their duties to refrain from: (1)
initiating and perpetuating an unlawful vehicular pursuit; (2) using deadly force when it was not

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objectively reasonable to do so; and (3) otherwise depriving plaintiffs of their constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities.
314.

Voinche, City Court and the Town had actual or constructive knowledge that (a)

hiring deputy city marshals with a history of using excessive force, (b) arming them and
bestowing upon them authority to make arrests and preserve the peace (c) while not providing
adequate training on the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, and, (d) not
promulgating and operationalizing a written use of deadly force policy, made it virtually certain
that Stafford and Greenhouses firing of their service weapons where it was objectively
unreasonable to do so and these defendants failure to prevent such a misuse of the deadly force
through proper instruction, supervision, control, discipline and training on a continuing and
ongoing basis, and the promulgation and enforcement of an appropriate use of deadly force
policy constitutes deliberate indifference to plaintiffs constitutional rights.
315.

As a direct cause of the acts of Voinche and City Court, and their policies of

inaction and lack of proper vetting, training, supervision, and discipline, Jeremy Mardis was
killed and Christopher sustained very serious injuries. As a result of Jeremys death and
Christophers injuries, plaintiffs suffered damages, both general and special which are described
more fully in other areas of this Complaint (which are incorporated herein by reference), all of
which flow from the deprivation of plaintiffs constitutional rights guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and protected by 42 U.S.C. 1983.
COUNT X
42 U.S.C. 1983 Violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
Supervisory Liability of Floyd Voinche
In His Official Capacity and Municipal Liability of City Court, and Liability of City Court,
Town of Marksville, And Parish of Avoyelles
Custom, Policy or Practice and Deliberate Indifference
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316.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
317.

Through the individual actions or inactions of Voinche for such conduct as

erroneous and wrongful hiring or appointing Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy city marshals,
failing to adopt, promulgate and utilize an adequate policy for the vetting of deputy city
marshals, failing to properly train Stafford and Greenhouse regarding use of force and use of
deadly force, failing to adopt, promulgate and enforce an adequate force and use of deadly force
policy, and in ratifying Stafford and Greenhouses prior history of use of excessive force,
Voinche is liable to plaintiffs because such actions and inactions were a direct cause of the
shooting, the death of Jeremy Mardis, and the critical injury of Christopher Few, and the
violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights.
318.

"A failure to adopt a policy can be deliberately indifferent when it is obvious that

the likely consequences of not adopting a policy will be a deprivation of constitutional rights."
Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1992). A supervisor may also be liable
for failure to supervise or train if: "(1) the supervisor either failed to supervise or train the
subordinate official; (2) a causal link exists between the failure to train or supervise and the
violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or supervise amounts to deliberate
indifference." Goodman v. Harris Cnty., 571 F.3d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 2009).
319.

In addition to plaintiffs claims against Norris Greenhouse, Jr. and Derrick

Stafford, plaintiffs are also asserting claims against their supervisor, Floyd Voinche, City Court,
and the Town. Voinches own conduct violated plaintiffs constitutionally protected rights and
was a direct cause of the death of Jeremy Mardis and severe injuries to Christopher Few.

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320.

Voinche was a policy maker of City Court. In that capacity, Voinche knew or

should have known and it was obvious that a likely consequence of the failure to implement a
use of deadly force policy would be the deprivation of the constitutional rights of subjects and
innocent bystanders such as in this case.
321.

On the date of the shooting, City Court and Voinche had equipped and authorized

both Stafford and Greenhouse to be equipped with firearms. Stafford and Greenhouse were in
the course and scope of employment with City Court and acting as deputy city marshals.
322.

Voinche is the statutorily-designated executive officer of City Court and is

statutorily charged with executing the orders and mandates of City Court, as well as in making
arrests and preserving the peace. See La-R.S. 13:1881(A). As executive officer of City Court,
Voinche is a policymaker and decision maker of City Court and the Town of Marksville.
323.

By statute, Voinche is authorized to appoint one or more deputy marshals having

the same powers and authority as the marshal. La-R.S. 13:1881(B). And, by statute, Voinche is
responsible for the actions of the deputy marshals, including Stafford and Greenhouse.
Specifically, La-R.S. 13:1881(B) states that [T]he marshal may appoint one or more deputy
marshals having the same powers and authority as the marshal, but the marshal shall be
responsible for their actions.
324.

Here, Stafford and Greenhouse, in engaging in the pursuit of Christopher and

Jeremy and in drawing and discharging their duty weapons, were engaged in conduct reasonably
foreseeable to Voinche and City Court. Voinche and City Court armed Stafford and Greenhouse
to assist in making arrests and preserving the peace.
325.

Voinche and City Court knew to a moral certainty that deputy city marshals, when

engaged in the course and scope of their employment, will be required from time to time to

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initiate vehicular pursuits, make arrests, and utilize their duty weapons when engaged in such
law enforcement actions. Voinche and City Court armed Stafford and Greenhouse so that they
would be equipped to perform such actions.
326.

Therefore, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of

deadly force is so obvious that the failure to do so can properly be characterized as deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights. See Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989);
327.

In addition, given the history of Stafford and Greenhouse in using excessive force

when making arrests, the need for continuing and ongoing training is so plainly obvious to
Voinche and City Court that failure to provide such continuing and ongoing training on the use
of force and, in particular use of deadly force can properly be characterized as deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.
328.

Further, given the moral certainty that the use of duty weapons will be used when

performing their functions as deputy city marshals, the need to have an appropriate written and
enforceable use of deadly force policy which Voinche and City Court did not have is so
obvious that their failure to have such a policy can properly be characterized as deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights.
329.

Plaintiffs show that the deliberate indifference of Voinche, City Court and the

Town in failing to implement and enforce a constitutionally-compliant use of deadly force

policy, and the failure to provide continuing and ongoing training on the use of deadly force
including such matters as shoot, dont shoot were direct causes of the death of Jeremy Mardis
and serious injury to Christopher Few.
330.

Therefore, defendants are liable to plaintiffs for the violation of plaintiffs rights

under the United States Constitution including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

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COUNT XI
42 U.S.C. 1983 Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for Deliberate
Indifference to the Serious Medical Needs Of Jeremy Mardis and Christopher Few
Liability of Derrick Stafford, Norris Greenhouse, Jr., Jason Brouillette, and Kenneth Parnell, III
331.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
332.

As a result of the shooting, Jeremy Mardis sustained multiple gunshot wounds to

his head, body and extremities. These wounds caused severe loss of blood and ultimately,
Jeremys death approximately ten (10) minutes following being shot. Jeremy sustained a nonexiting gunshot entry wound to the left eye, an exiting gunshot wound to the neck/back area, a
non-exiting gunshot wound to his body and right arm, an exiting gunshot wound to his left arm, a
non-exiting gunshot wound to the left leg, among other miscellaneous trauma, and was bleeding
profusely. Jeremys traumatic gunshot wounds were open and obvious and the degree of these
injuries were so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for medical
attention. To be sure, Jeremys gunshot wounds constituted a serious medical need.
333.

During the intervening minutes between the time of being shot and his death,

none of the officers on scene provided any comfort measures, first aid, or otherwise attempted to
stop Jeremys bleeding, or alleviate his suffering. In fact, in excess of eight (8) minutes passed
before any of the officers even checked Jeremy for a pulse.
334.

From the moment Jeremy was shot until he died, the officers on the scene

including Greenhouse, Stafford, Brouillette and Parnell exhibited callous and deliberate
indifference to Jeremys medical needs and condition. This deliberate indifference to Jeremys
serious medical needs caused him undue and extreme pain and suffering, hastened his death and
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denied Jeremy a chance of survival. The defendants actions and omissions constitute a violation
of Jeremys rights under the United States Constitution including the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
335.

Similarly, Greenhouse, Stafford, Brouillette and Parnell exhibited callous and

deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of Christopher Few by denying or delaying
him medical treatment.
336.

During the shooting, Christopher sustained multiple gunshot wounds to the head

and chest that caused him to bleed profusely and audibly choke on his own blood due to internal
bleeding. Christophers gunshot wounds were so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for medical attention. To be sure, Christophers gunshot wounds
constituted a serious medical need.
337.

Following the shooting, Christopher was handcuffed but Greenhouse, Stafford,

Brouillette and Parnell exhibited deliberate indifference to Christophers serious medical needs
in that they failed to provide comfort measures, failed to provide first aid, and otherwise denied
or delayed medical treatment. This deliberate indifference to Christophers serious medical needs
caused him undue pain and suffering and constitutes a violation of Christophers rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
338.

In both Jeremy and Christophers case, the defendant officers Greenhouse,

Stafford, Brouillette and Parnell knew of the risk of serious harm to Jeremy and Christopher,
disregarded that risk, and demonstrated a level of conduct far beyond and more egregious than
mere negligence or gross negligence but rather a callous and deliberate indifference to plaintiffs
serious medical needs.

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339.

As a direct result of the acts, omissions and deliberate indifference to Jeremys

serious medical need, Stafford and Greenhouse deprived Jeremy of the right to life, the right to
be free of suffering, equal protection, due process of law, and the right to receive timely medical
care for a serious medical need guaranteed to him by the United States Constitution including the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
COUNT XII
42 U.S.C. 1983 Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
Supervisory Liability of Floyd Voinche
In His Official Capacity and Municipal Liability of City Court, and Liability of City Court,
Town of Marksville, And Parish of Avoyelles
Custom, Policy or Practice and Deliberate Indifference
340.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
341.

Prior to November 3, 2015, defendants Voinche, City Court and the Town

developed, maintained, utilized and/or adhered to one or more policies, customs, patterns or
practices (collectively policy or policies) exhibiting deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of persons in the community and those persons coming into contact with
armed deputy city marshals, that caused or was the moving force behind the violation of
plaintiffs constitutional rights including those protected by 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the United
States Constitution, including Amendments thereto.
342.

These policies exhibited deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of

persons in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana including, but not limited to, those persons subject to the
jurisdiction and peacekeeping authority of the Marksville Ward 2 City Marshal and Marksville

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Ward 2 Deputy City Marshals, as well as those persons coming into contact with deputy city
marshals and officers of the Marksville Police Department.
343.

These policies caused or resulted in the violation plaintiffs and Jeremys

constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution, to be free from state actions that cause (a) an unreasonable seizure of persons such
as Jeremy and Christopher; (b) the use of excessive and deadly force against Jeremy and
Christopher, (c) an unwarranted state interference with plaintiffs right to a familial relationship
with Jeremy.
344.

Defendants Voinche, City Court and Town developed, maintained, utilized and/or

adhered to one or more policies, customs, patterns or practices (collectively policy or

policies) of the use of excessive or deadly force against citizens when such force was
excessive or disproportionate to the need, objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, or
when such use was unwarranted due to the lack of an imminent danger or threat of danger of
death or great bodily harm to anyone. In short, the customs, policies or practice caused the use
of excessive or deadly force against persons when such force was not objectively reasonable as
in this case.
345.

The unconstitutional policies and deliberate indifference demonstrated by

Voinche, City Court and Town consists of the recklessly inadequate or non-existent policy
protecting against the hiring of deputy city marshals that (a) have a history of use of excessive
force; (b) that were not fit to serve as deputy city marshals; and (c) that lacked appropriate use of
deadly force and shoot, dont shoot training. The deliberate indifference of these defendants is
also manifest in their lack of a constitutionally-compliant use of deadly force policy.

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346.

The shooting of Christopher and Jeremy were caused by recklessly inadequate or

non-existence of such policies because Stafford and Greenhouse possessed and demonstrated the
propensity to use excessive force on persons when making an arrest or assisting officers and by
arming deputy city marshals the need to have competent and qualified officers were so obvious
and apparent that the failure to adopt, promulgate and enforce policies intended to guard against
the hiring of officers with such dangerous propensities amounts to deliberate indifference to
constitutional rights.
347.

In addition, these defendants deliberate indifference extended to its failure to

properly supervise and train deputy city marshals including Stafford and Greenhouse on the
constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force, which failure was a direct cause of the
shooting of Jeremy and Christopher.
348.

Given the moral certainty that law enforcement officers will be called upon to use

force including deadly force when apprehending suspects or otherwise discharging their duties as
peace officers, the need to promulgate and enforce a written use of deadly force policy and train
deputy city marshals in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force is so obvious,
that the failure to do so is properly characterized as deliberate indifference to constitutional
rights.
349.

Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of these defendants deliberate indifference

violations and, therefore, the defendants are liable for plaintiffs damages.
COUNT XIII
42 U.S.C. 1983 Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
for Custom, Policy or Practice of Use of Excessive Force
Liability of City Court, Town of Marksville, and Parish

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350.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
351.

Prior to November 3, 2015, defendants Voinche, City Court, Town and Parish

developed, maintained, utilized and/or adhered to one or more policies, customs, patterns or
practices (collectively policy or policies) exhibiting deliberate indifference to the
constitutional rights of persons in the community and those persons coming into contact with
armed deputy city marshals, that caused or was the moving force behind the violation of
plaintiffs constitutional rights including those protected by 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the United
States Constitution, including Amendments thereto.
352.

These policies exhibited deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of

persons in Avoyelles Parish, Louisiana including, but not limited to, those persons subject to the
jurisdiction and peacekeeping authority of the Marksville Ward 2 City Marshal and Marksville
Ward 2 Deputy City Marshals, as well as those persons coming into contact with deputy city
marshals and officers of the Marksville Police Department.
353.

The defendants Voinche, City Court, Town and Parish maintained a policy,

custom or practice of inadequately and improperly investigating citizen complaints of police

misconduct and peace officers excessive use of force and/or allowing the use of excessive force,
failing to properly discipline officers accused of using excessive force, and failing to provide
proper training to guard against the use of excessive force.
354.

Prior to Voinche appointing Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy city marshals,

Voinche, City Court, Town and Parish had knowledge, actual and/or constructive, of the

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propensity of Stafford and Greenhouse to use excessive force when making arrests or assisting
officers.
355.

These defendants also had knowledge, actual and/or constructive, of complaints

and lawsuits alleging excessive use of force by other officers employed by the Town of
Marksville, as well.
356.

Despite this knowledge of numerous incidents involving the excessive use of

force by peace officers, these defendants failed to properly investigate the complaints and
incidents, failed to properly discipline the involved officers, failed to properly scrutinize the
background of new hires, and failed to properly train peace officers regarding the constitutional
limitations on the use of force such that these defendants ratified the excessive use of force.
357.

The ratification of excessive use of force by peace officers serving in the

territorial limits of City Court and the Town of Marksville became and was the custom, policy
and practice of these defendants and was the cause and moving force of the deprivation of
plaintiffs constitutional rights and the shooting of Jeremy and Christopher.
358.

Because the incidents generally described herein are and were so numerous, it

was obvious to any reasonable policy maker or decision maker that it would continue if
appropriate policies were not promulgated, implemented, and enforced through training and
discipline. The defendants conduct, acts and/or omissions described herein amount to deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights plaintiffs and others coming into contact with deputy city
marshals.
359.

These defendants are liable for plaintiffs damages caused by their deliberate

indifference.

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COUNT XIV
Punitive Damages
Applicable to All Defendants Sued in Their Individual Capacity Including
Derrick Stafford, Norris Greenhouse, Jr., Floyd Voinche,
Jason Brouillette, and Kenneth Parnell, III
360.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
361.

Plaintiffs show that under 42 U.S.C. 1983, punitive damages may be awarded if

the official conduct of the defendant is motivated by evil intent or demonstrates reckless or
callous indifference to a person's constitutional rights. Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 192 (5th
Cir. 1994); Smith v. Wagner, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105115 * (W.D. La. Aug. 10, 2015).
362.

Here, Stafford and Greenhouses conduct demonstrated not only evil intent but

reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of Christopher and Jeremy.

363.

Norris Greenhouse, Jr. initiated a warrantless stop and pursuit where he lacked

probable cause to believe Christopher had committed a crime.

364.

Both Stafford and Greenhouse discharged their duty weapons under

circumstances where neither Christopher nor Jeremy presented an imminent threat of death or
great bodily harm. When Stafford and Greenhouse unleashed the hail of gunfire, Christopher
and Jeremy were unarmed, and Christopher had his empty hands held in the air in conformance
with the verbal instructions and commands of one or more of the officers on scene. According to
statements made by Stafford and captured on Parnells body camera video, he did not even see
Jeremy before he discharged his duty weapon fourteen (14) times. Moreover, Parnells body
camera video confirms that Christophers hands are in the air, signaling his peaceful surrender,
when Stafford and Greenhouse begin shooting a total of eighteen (18) times. And, when
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Stafford and Greenhouse began discharging their duty weapons, none of the officers on the scene
were in a position of danger relative to the any movement of Christophers vehicle.
365.

Any objectively reasonable officer presented with these circumstances, would not

have used deadly force.

366.

Stafford and Greenhouses conduct demonstrated deliberate indifference and/or

reckless and/or callous disregard for Christopher and Jeremys constitutional rights such that
plaintiffs are entitled to and defendants, Norris Greenhouse, Jr. and Derrick Stafford, are liable
for punitive damages.
367.

In addition, Floyd Voinche, in his individual capacity, is liable for punitive

damages, as well.
368.

Floyd Voinche is and has been the duly elected marshal of City Court. Voinche is

also statutorily-designated executive officer of City Court and is statutorily charged with
executing the orders and mandates of City Court, as well as in making arrests and preserving the
peace. See La-R.S. 13:1881(A). As executive officer of City Court, Voinche is a policymaker
and decision maker of City Court and the Town of Marksville.
369.

According to La-R.S. 13:1881(B) Voinche is authorized to appoint one or more

deputy marshals having the same powers and authority as the marshal but, by statute, Voinche is
responsible for the actions of the deputy marshals, including Stafford and Greenhouse.
Specifically, La-R.S. 13:1881(B) states that [T]he marshal may appoint one or more deputy
marshals having the same powers and authority as the marshal, but the marshal shall be
responsible for their actions.
370.

At times relevant hereto, Voinche, as marshal of City Court, appointed defendants

Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy marshals of City Court. As deputy marshals, Stafford and

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Greenhouse were exercising their authority, as derived from the marshal, Voinche, of making
arrests and preserving the peace and, therefore, were acting under color of law when they
engaged in the pursuit and, ultimately, the unconstitutional seizure of Few and Jeremy.
371.

Voinche is responsible for the actions of Stafford and Greenhouse, including the

consequences of their actions.

372.

The facts demonstrate that both Stafford and Greenhouse have a long history of

using excessive force, which history is documented in their personnel files, official records of
Voinche, City Court, Town of Marksville, and the public records and in for the Parish of
Avoyelles. Voinche, City Court, and Town of Marksville has actual and/or constructive
knowledge of these records including the public records.
373.

Voinche, City Court, and Town of Marksville allowed Stafford and Greenhouse

to be hired and retained as deputy city marshals, and allowed them to be equipped with duty
weapons that had the capacity to employ deadly force against subjects such as Christopher Few
and Jeremy Mardis.
374.

And, as further evidence of the recklessness of these defendants, neither Voinche,

City Court nor Town of Marksville provided any initial or ongoing training regarding shoot,
dont shoot scenarios, or the use of deadly force and, in fact, none of these defendants even had
a written departmental policy on the use of deadly force. Such failure to train deputy marshals
Stafford and Greenhouse on use of deadly force and failure to implement a constitutionallycompliant use of deadly force policy constitutes deliberate indifference and a reckless and
callous disregard for the constitutional rights of Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis. Thus,
Voinche, City Court, and Town of Marksville is liable for punitive damages, as well.

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COUNT XV
Deprivation of Rights Under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. 1983

375.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
376.

This claim is asserted by plaintiff, Candace Few. Candace owned Vehicle 1 that

was severely damaged as a result of the gunshots fired by Stafford and Greenhouse, as well as
the bleeding of the gunshot victims, Jeremy and Christopher. The total damages of her vehicle
exceed the value of the vehicle such that it is a total loss.
377.

Through the actions of Stafford and Greenhouse, acting under color of law, these

defendants have violated the constitutional rights of Candace arising under the Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and enforceable under 42 U.S.C.
1983.
378.

Stafford and Greenhouse have deprived Candace of her property without due

compensation and without due process of law.

379.

Stafford and Greenhouse are, therefore, liable for Candaces damages.

COUNT XVI

380.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
381.

Plaintiffs seek an award of costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). These costs include

(1) fees of the clerk and marshal; (2) fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts
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necessarily obtained for use in the case; (3) fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are
necessarily obtained for use in the case; (5) docket fees; (6) compensation of court-appointed
experts, as well as any and all such other costs allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
or other law.
COUNT XVII
Liability Under Louisiana State Tort Law La-C.C. art. 2315, et seq.
Violation of La-R.S. 14:30.1 and 14:27
Second Degree Murder and Attempted Second Degree Murder
Liability of Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr.
382.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
383.

La-C.C. art. 2315 requires that every act whatever of man that causes damage to

another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. Violations of La-R.S. 14:30.1
(Second Degree Murder) and La-R.S. 14:30.1 as modified by La-R.S. 14:27 (Attempted
Second Degree Murder) constitute fault under La-C.C. art. 2315.
384.

On November 3, 2015, Stafford and Greenhouse, with specific intent to kill or

inflict great bodily harm, shot and killed Jeremy Mardis, and shoot and critically wounded
Christopher Few. Stafford and Greenhouses actions in shooting Few and Jeremy constitute
violations of La-R.S. 14:30.1 (Second Degree Murder) and La-R.S. 14:30.1 as modified by
La-R.S. 14:27 (Attempted Second Degree Murder). Both of these Louisiana Revised Statutes
are incorporated herein by reference.
385.

La-R.S. 14:30.1 (Second Degree Murder) is the killing of a human being when

the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. La-R.S. 14:27
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(Attempted Second Degree Murder) is the attempted killing of a human being when the offender
has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.
386.

Stafford and Greenhouse willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally

committed second degree murder under La-R.S. 14:30.1 and attempted second degree murder
under La-R.S. 14:30.1 as modified by La-R.S. 14:27 in that they did shoot Christopher Few with
the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm against him when he did not pose an imminent threat
or danger of death or great bodily harm to the lives of Stafford and Greenhouse, or that of
another, and, further, Stafford and Greenhouse fatally shot Jeremy, who was a six-year-old minor
child seated in the front passenger seat of the Few vehicle and did not pose an imminent threat or
danger of death or great bodily harm to the lives of Stafford and Greenhouse, or that of another.
387.

La-R.S. 14:30.1 (Second Degree Murder) and La-R.S. 14:30.1 as modified by

La-R.S. 14:27 (Attempted Second Degree Murder) both give rise to a civil duty not to kill a
human being or attempt to kill a human being. Both Stafford and Greenhouse breached this duty
and caused Few to sustain serious physical injuries and killed Jeremy.
388.

Thus, Stafford and Greenhouse are liable for plaintiffs damages for these acts.
COUNT XVIII
Liability Under Louisiana State Tort Law La-C.C. art. 2315, et seq.
Intentional Assault and Battery
Liability of Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr.

389.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.

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390.

La-C.C. art. 2315 requires that every act whatever of man that causes damage to

another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. The fault of Derrick Stafford and
Norris Greenhouse, Jr. includes the intentional torts of assault and battery.
391.

On November 3, 2015, Stafford and Greenhouse, by shooting, did intentionally

commit harmful or offensive contact with Jeremy Mardis and Christopher Few by shooting
which was intended by Stafford and Greenhouse to cause Jeremy and Chistopher to suffer such a
contact, without their consent. Therefore, Stafford and Greenhouse committed a battery upon
both Jeremy Mardis and Christopher Few.
392.

Similarly, Stafford and Greenhouse committed an assault upon Jeremy and

Christopher by placing them in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery, without their

consent.
393.

As a result of the assault and battery, Jeremy and Christopher sustained damages,

both general and special, for which defendants are liable to plaintiffs.
COUNT XIX
Liability Under Louisiana State Tort Law La-C.C. art. 2315, et seq.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Liability of Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr
394.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
395.

Stafford and Greenhouses actions constitute extreme and outrageous conduct that

caused Jeremy Mardis and Christopher Few to suffer severe emotional distress and defendants,
Stafford and Greenhouse, knew that severe emotional distress would be certain or substantially
certain to result from the shooting.
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396.

Stafford and Greenhouses use of deadly force, under the circumstances with

which they were presented, was objectively unreasonable and so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and must necessarily be
regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.
397.

Stafford and Greenhouse are therefore liable for the emotional distress they

caused Jeremy Mardis and Christopher Few to suffer.

COUNT XX
Liability Under Louisiana State Tort Law
La-C.C. art. 2315.6
Liability of Derrick Stafford and Norris Greenhouse, Jr.
398.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
399.

Christopher Few was present for and viewed the events that resulted in the violent

and traumatic death of Jeremy Mardis. As a result, Christopher suffered mental anguish and
emotional distress as a result of bearing witness to the tragic and gruesome death of his son,
Jeremy.
400.

Under La-C.C. art. 2315.6, Christopher is entitled to recover all damages for the

mental anguish and emotional distress he suffered as a result of having viewed these events
which caused the death of his son. Further, defendants are liable to Christopher for these
damages.

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COUNT XXI
Liability Under Louisiana State Tort Law
La-C.C. arts. 2315, 2316, 2317, and 2320
Liability of Derrick Stafford, Norris Greenhouse, Jr., Floyd Voinche,
City Court, and Town of Marksville
401.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
402.

La-C.C. art. 2315 requires that every act whatever of man that causes damage to

another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it.

403.

La-C.C. art. 2316 provides that every person is responsible for the damage he

occasions not merely by his act, but also by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill.
404.

La-C.C. art. 2317 provides that individuals are responsible not only for the

damage occasioned by their own acts, but also for damage caused by the acts of persons for
whom the individual is answerable, or of the things which the individual has in his custody.
405.

La-C.C. art. 2320 provides that employers are answerable for the damage

occasioned by their employees in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed.
406.

Here, Stafford and Greenhouse had a duty not to shoot and kill Jeremy Mardis,

and a duty not to shoot and critically injure Christopher Few. At the time of the shooting, any
objectively reasonable officer would have recognized that Christopher and Jeremy did not
present an imminent risk of death or great bodily harm to anyone in the vicinity, and that they
were not committing nor did they commit a crime that warranted the use of deadly force.
Moreover, in compliance with the commands of the law enforcement officers, Christopher Few

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surrendered with his empty hands raised in the air prior to any shots being fired. Christopher
Few was unarmed.
407.

Using deadly force under the facts, Stafford and Greenhouse breached the duty

owed to Christopher and Jeremy.

408.

Stafford and Greenhouses breach of duty; namely, the use of deadly force by

shooting Christopher and Jeremy were a direct cause of the death of Jeremy and serious injuries
to Christopher. And, as a result of the shooting of Christopher and Jeremy, plaintiffs suffered
damages for which defendants are liable.
409.

In the instant case, Greenhouse is liable to plaintiffs for the injuries and damages

they sustained, due to acts and/or omissions of negligence and/or fault that include but are not
limited to the following:
a.

Attempting to initiate a traffic stop and, thereafter, a pursuit of Christopher Few

without legal or probable cause to do so;

b.

Shooting Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis and/or creating or causing

circumstances under which Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis were shot;

c.

Inciting or causing Derrick Stafford to shoot Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis;

d.

Excessive use of deadly force;

e.

Failing to ensure the safety of Jeremy Mardis;

f.

Utilizing an amount of force disproportionate to the need;

g.

Failing to act as a reasonably prudent police officer;

h.

Violation of applicable law enforcement standards;

i.

Other acts and/or omissions of fault set forth in other parts of the Complaint, all of
which are incorporated herein by reference.
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410.

In the instant case, Stafford is liable to plaintiffs for the injuries and damages they

sustained, due to acts and/or omissions of negligence and/or fault that include but are not limited
to the following:
a. Attempting to initiate a traffic stop and, thereafter, a pursuit of Christopher Few
without legal or probable cause to do so;
b. Shooting Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis and/or creating or causing
circumstances under which Christopher Few and Jeremy Mardis were shot;
c. Inciting or causing Norris Greenhouse, Jr. to shoot Christopher Few and Jeremy
Mardis;
d. Excessive use of deadly force;
e. Failing to ensure the safety of Jeremy Mardis;
f. Utilizing an amount of force disproportionate to the need;
g. Failing to act as a reasonably prudent police officer;
h. Violation of applicable law enforcement standards;
i. Other acts and/or omissions of fault set forth in other parts of the Complaint, all of
which are incorporated herein by reference.
411.

The Town, City Court, and Voinche in his official capacity as City Marshal, are

the masters or employers of Stafford and Greenhouse. Moreover, by statute, Voinche is

responsible for the actions of his deputy city marshals. At the time of the shooting, both Stafford
and Greenhouse were in the course and scope of their employment with The Town, City Court
and Voinche.

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412.

The Town, City Court and Voinche are vicariously liable under La-C.C. art. 2320,

for the tortious acts and/or omissions of Norris Greenhouse, Jr. and Derrick Stafford by virtue of
the master/servant relationship, or principle of respondeat superior.
COUNT XXII
Liability of Floyd Voinche under La-R.S. 13:1881(B)
413.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
414.

La-R.S. 13:1881(B) states that [T]he marshal may appoint one or more deputy

marshals having the same powers and authority as the marshal, but the marshal shall be
responsible for their actions.
415.

Voinche is the marshal of City Court and, acting under the statutory authority of

La-R.S. 13:1881 appointed both Stafford and Greenhouse as deputy marshals. As such,
Voinche is responsible for their actions.
416.

Therefore, Voinche is responsible for the actions and conduct of Stafford and

Greenhouse as set forth and described in this Complaint, which actions and conduct caused the
death of Jeremy and serious injury to Christopher.
417.

Thus, Voinche, individually and in his official capacity as City Marshal, are liable

for plaintiffs injuries and damages.

418.

Plaintiffs further show that Voinches responsibility arises by operation of law,

La-R.S. 13:1881(B), and is not limited to liability arising under Louisiana law but makes
Voinche responsible for Stafford and Greenhouses violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the United
States Constitution, including Amendments thereto, as well.

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COUNT XXIII
Municipal Liability Under La-R.S. 42:1441.3
419.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
420.

Under La-R.S. 42:1441.3, City Court, Voinche, the Town, and Parish are liable

for offenses and torts of Norris Greenhouse, Jr., Derrick Stafford, Jason Brouillette, and Kenneth
Parnell, III.
COUNT XXIV
Liability for violations of Article I 2 of the Louisiana State Constitution
421.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
422.

Article I 2 of the Louisiana State Constitution provides, in part, that No person

shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law. LSA-Const. Art. 1
2.
COUNT XXV
Liability for violations of Article I 5 of the Louisiana State Constitution
423.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.

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424.

Article I 5 of the Louisiana State Constitution establishes the rights of

Louisianas citizens to be secure in his person, property, communications, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy. LSA-Const. Art. 1 5.
425.

Defendants, Stafford and Greenhouse, violated plaintiffs clearly established state

constitutional rights under Article I 5 of the Louisiana State Constitution to be free from
unreasonable seizures.
COUNT XXVI
General Statement of Wrongful Death and Survival Action Claims
Brought by Christopher Few and Catherine Mardis - La-C.C. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2
426.

Christopher Few and Catherine Mardis are the natural, surviving parents of

Jeremy Mardis. In that capacity, each are entitled to bring an action to recover damages
sustained or arising out of the death of Jeremy Mardis under Louisiana law, including La.C.C.
arts. 2315.1 entitled "Survival action" and 2315.2 entitled "Wrongful death action", and include,
but are not limited to, the following:
a.

Decedent's physical pain and suffering prior to death;

b.

Decedent's mental anguish and anxiety prior to death;

c.

Scarring and disfigurement suffered prior to death;

d.

Decedent's funeral expenses;

e.

Plaintiffs loss of love, affection, society, consortium and services;

f.

Plaintiffs mental anguish and anxiety;

g.

Plaintiffs loss of support;

h.

Medical and related expenses; and

i.

Any and all such other damages, both general and special, which will be proved at
the trial hereof and otherwise as allowed by law.
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427.

The damages are recoverable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for defendants violations of

the United States Constitution, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well.
COUNT XXVII
The Individual Injuries and Damages of Christopher Few
428.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
429.

Plaintiff, Few, sustained injuries and damages for which defendants are liable.

These injuries and damages include but are not limited to the following:
a.

Traumatic injury to plaintiffs head and neck, as well as other parts of plaintiffs
body including the soft tissues;

b.

Other traumatic injuries which are described in plaintiffs medical records and
which will be described in the testimony of plaintiff and plaintiffs treating health
care providers;

c.

Other injuries which will be shown with particularity at the trial of this matter.

430.

Plaintiff, Few, individually, has suffered damages, both general and special, past,

present and future, for which defendants are liable. These damages include, but are not limited
to, the following:
a.

Physical pain and suffering (past, present and future);

b.

Mental anguish and anxiety and depression (past, present and future);

c.

Residual physical disability;

d.

Loss of enjoyment of life;

e.

Medical and rehabilitation expenses;

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f.

Property damage, loss of use damage, and depreciation or depreciated value of

plaintiffs vehicle;

g.

Loss of income and earning capacity;

h.

Loss of consortium, service and society; and

i.

Other damages, both general and special, which will be shown with particularity
at the trial hereof.

431.

The damages are recoverable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for defendants violations of

the United States Constitution, including the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well.
COUNT XXVIII
432.

Plaintiffs hereby incorporate all of the foregoing paragraphs and factual

allegations of this Complaint, as well as all facts pled in the remainder of the Complaint, as if
fully set forth herein.
433.

This claim is asserted by plaintiff, Candace Few. Candace owned Vehicle 1 that

was severely damaged as a result of the gunshots fired by Stafford and Greenhouse, as well as
the bleeding of the gunshot victims, Jeremy and Christopher. The total damages of her vehicle
exceed the value of the vehicle such that it is a total loss.
434.

Candace shows that defendants, Stafford and Greenhouse, are liable for her

property damage and loss of use damages under Louisiana tort law, La-C.C. art. 2315, et seq.
Defendants, City Court, Voinche, the Town, and Parish are likewise liable under La-C.C. art.
2320, for respondeat superior liability, and under La-R.S. 42:1441.3.
435.

Voinche is responsible for the actions of Stafford and Greenhouse under La-R.S.

13:1881(B).

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436.

Stafford and Greenhouse have deprived Candace of her property without due

compensation and without due process of law and, therefore, they are liable under the Louisiana
Constitution, as well.
DEMAND FOR TRIAL BY JURY
437.

Plaintiffs hereby demand a trial by jury.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs, Christopher Few, Catherine Mardis, and Candace Few

demand and pray for Judgment against Defendants, Derrick Stafford, in his individual capacity;
Norris Greenhouse, Jr., in his individual capacity; Floyd Voinche, in his individual and official
capacity; City Court of the Town of Marksville; Town of Marksville; Progressive Paloverde
Insurance Company; Jason Brouillette, in his individual capacity; and Kenneth Parnell, III, in his
individual capacity; jointly, severally and/or in solido, as allowed by applicable law, for all sums
reasonable in the premises, general and special damages, compensatory damages, punitive
damages as allowed by law, attorney fees, all costs of these proceedings, prejudgment interest as
allowed by law, legal interest from the date of judicial demand until paid, and any and all such
other relief, whether in law or in equity, to which the plaintiffs are entitled.
BY ATTORNEYS:
/s/Steven P. Lemoine
STEVEN P. LEMOINE, T.A. (#20269)
ROBERT H. SCHMOLKE (#8802)
ROBERT H. SCHMOLKE, A
PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
4313 Bluebonnet Blvd, Suite A
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Telephone: (225)292-1717
Fax:
(225)292-1727
E-mail: [email protected]
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Attorney for Plaintiffs, Christopher

Catherine Mardis and Candace Few

Few,

AND
/s/Joseph H. Jolissaint
JOSEPH H. JOLISSAINT (#28939)
ATTORNEY AT LAW
4313 Bluebonnet Blvd, Suite A
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Telephone: (225)757-5600
Fax:
(225)757-8022
E-mail: [email protected]
Attorney for Plaintiffs, Christopher
Catherine Mardis and Candace Few

Few,

AND
/s/Mark A. Jeansonne
MARK A. JEANSONNE (#20883)
MARK A. JEANSONNE,
A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION
2472 Main Street
Hessmer, LA 71341
Telephone: (318)563-9000
Fax:
(318)563-9003
Email: [email protected]
Attorney for Plaintiff, Christopher Few

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PLAINTIFFS REQUESTS ISSUANCE OF SUMMONS FOR:

Derrick Stafford
207 Tricia Park Road
Mansura, LA 71350

Parish of Avoyelles
Through its agent:
President of the Avoyelles Parish Policy
Jury, Col. Charles B. Jones
213 N. Main St.
Marksville, LA 71351

Norris Greenhouse, Jr.

522 West Bontemps
Marksville, LA 71351

Progressive Paloverde Insurance

Company
Through its agent:
Louisiana Secretary of State
8585 Archives Ave.
Baton Rouge, LA 70809

Floyd Voinche
2951 Highway 1192
Marksville, LA 71351-3728
City Court of the Town of Marksville
Through its executive officer:
Floyd Voinche
2951 Highway 1192
Marksville, LA 71351-3728

Jason Brouillette
130 Magnolia Estates
Marksville, LA 71351-3484

Town of Marksville
Through its agent:
Mayor John H. Lemoine
427 North Washington Street
Marksville, LA 71351

Kenneth Parnell, III

472 Island Rd.
Marksville, LA 71351-4517

96