3) RODOLFO C. VELASCO vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

483 SCRA 649
February 28, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On April 19, 1998, at about 7:30 oclock in the morning,
private complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and
washing his owner type jeep in front of his house at Lasip
Grande, Dagupan City when a motorized tricycle stopped
near him. Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the
tricycle, approached the complainant and fired at him
several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused
missed with his first shot but the second one hit the
complainant in the upper arm, causing him to stumble on
the ground. The complainant stood up and ran, while the
accused continued firing at him but missed.
Accused-petitioner Rodolfo C. Velasco was convicted of
Attempted Murder. According to the Information filed
against him, the complainant-accused Velasco, being then
armed with a gun, with treachery and with intent to kill,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon Frederick
Maramba by shooting him, hitting him on the left upper
arm, the said accused having thus commenced a felony
directly by overt acts but did not perform all the acts of
execution which could have produced the crime of
murder, by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance, to the damage and
prejudice of complainant Maramba.
Velasco alleged that he must not be convicted of
attempted murder but only attempted homicide as there
was no treachery since private complainant was still able

to observe or focus his eyes on him for a period of 10

seconds until he drew his .45 caliber pistol and fired at
Maramba. After the first shot, the victim was able to run
away.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner-accused Velasco is
guilty of attempted murder.
HELD: YES. Velasco is guilty of attempted murder.
In accordance with Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code,
Velascos acts, having commenced the criminal act by
overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to
produce the felony by reason of some cause other than
his own spontaneous desistance, constitute an attempted
felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a
manifest intent to kill by shooting private complainant
seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of
execution by reason of causes independent of his will,
that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private
complainant sustained a wound on the left arm that is not
sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that
where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to
cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder,
since the accused did not perform all the acts of
execution that would have brought about death.
Petitioners asserted that he has no motive to harm, much
less kill the latter, he being a total strange. Motive is not
an element of the crime, and as such does not have to be
proved. Even in the absence of a known motive, the timehonored rule is that motive is not essential to convict
when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit.
Motive assumes significance only where there is no
showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was. In the
case at bar, since petitioner has been positively identified
as the assailant, the lack of motive is no longer of
consequence.

at the sala and cried. He was later seen embracing Mary

Ann and telling her that he was innocent.
4) NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
559 SCRA 461, 473
July 23, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga had three
daughters, Marianne, Mary Ann married with petitioneraccused Nover Bryan Salvador and the victim
Arlene. Mary Ann was married to the petitioner
herein. They all live together at 550 Coloong
I, Valenzuela City. Their residence had three bedrooms
one for the Zuiga spouses; the other for Marianne and
Arlene; and the last for Mary Ann and the petitioner.
On September 20, 1997, the Zuiga spouses, together with
Marianne, went to Bulacan to attend the wake of
Ernestos mother; while Mary Ann with her new born child,
and Arlene, stayed at their Valenzuela home. Petitioner
Salvador, at that time, asked permission to attend a
birthday party. At about 9:00 in the evening, Salvador,
accompanied by Eduardo Palomares, returned home to
get some karaoke tapes to be used at the birthday
party. They thereafter went back to the party and stayed
there until 12 midnight before heading back home.
At 4:30 in the morning, the following day, the Zuiga
spouses and Marianne arrived home. Marianne proceeded
to the room which she was sharing with Arlene. There she
saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds, already
dead. After seeing Arlenes body, the Zuiga spouses
rushed to the room of Mary Ann and the petitioner. While
Mary Ann proceeded to Arlenes room, petitioner stayed

The police found no forcible entry into the house; no

valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts
of the house except Arlenes room. They likewise
discovered, on top of the kitchen table, petitioners
underwear (briefs), gray t-shirt and short pants. They
further found hair strands on Arlenes bed. These pieces of
evidence were brought to the laboratory for examination.
It was found that Arlene suffered 21 stab wounds
produced by a pointed instrument, one side of which was
sharp like a balisong or a kitchen knife.
Petitioner was thus charged with Homicide on the basis of
the evidences: 1) the non-employment of force in
entering the scene of the crime; 2) no missing personal
belongings; 3) the absence of bloodstains in other parts of
the house except Arlenes room; 4) petitioners ownership
of a balisong, the same weapon used in stabbing the
victim; 5) the presence of type O human blood on
petitioners T-shirt and briefs; 6) the positive result of the
DNA analysis using the bloodstains found in petitioners
shirt and briefs; and 7) petitioners unusual behavior after
the discovery of the victims lifeless body.
Petitioner questions the sufficiency of each and every
circumstance enumerated above and denied such
accusations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner-accused Salvador is guilty
of homicide.
HELD:
YES. Salvador is guilty of homicide.

Direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix

wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to
rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion
of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which
proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference. At times, resort to
circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on
direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting
felonies free and deny proper protection to the
community.

More importantly, intent to kill was duly established

by the witnesses when they testified relative to the
peeping incident. Although there was no evidence or
allegation of sexual advances, such incident manifested
petitioners evil motive. It is a rule in criminal law that
motive, being a state of mind, is established by the
testimony of witnesses on the acts or statements of the
accused before or immediately after the commission of
the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from
which his motive or reason for committing it may be
inferred. Motive and intent may be considered one and
the same, in some instances, as in the present case.

Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, provides that

circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the
following requisites are complied with:
(1) There is more than one circumstance;
(2) The facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and
(3)
The combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
All the circumstances must be consistent with one
another that the accused is guilty. Thus, conviction based
on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that
the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
guilty person. Thus, in the present case, all circumstantial
evidences were proved against the accused and such can
conclude the guilt of the accused Salvador.
Ill motive was shown by petitioners previous act of
peeping through the bathroom and Arlenes room on two
occasions while she was taking a bath and while she was
inside the room with Marianne.

7) EDUARDO L. BAXINELA, vs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
485 SCRA 331
March 24, 2006
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS:
On the late night of October 18, 1996, petitioner-accused
SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela was in Superstar Disco Pub was
already drinking with INSP. Regimen and SPO4 Legarda.
After witnessing an altercation between SGT Ruperto Lajo
and another customer, on Lajos way out, Baxinela
decided to confront him. Baxinela approached Lajo from
behind and held the latter on the left shoulder with one
hand while holding on to his .45 caliber service firearm
with the other and accosted Lajo why he had in his
possession a firearm Lajo respond "I am a MIG, Pare".
Then, when Lajo was about to get his wallet on his back
pocket for his ID, SPO2 Eduardo Baxinela anticipated that
the victim was drawing his firearm on his waist prompting
said policeman to shoot the victim. Baxinela then got a
gun from Lajos waist and handed it over to Regimen.
Afterwards Baxinela held both of Lajos arms, who was

still standing, and pushed him against the wall and

repeated his question. Lajo answered "Why did you shoot
me? I am also a military." At this point Lajo got out his
wallet and gave it to Baxinela. Baxinela opened the wallet
and looked at an ID. Afterwards Baxinela and Regimen
just left and did nothing to aid Lajo. Lajo was pronounced
dead due to cardiopulmonary arrest and severe bleeding
caused by the gunshot wound.

Article 11, paragraphs 1 and 5, respectively, of the

Revised Penal Code.

On defense, Baxinela alleged that he, together with

Regimen, proceeded to the Superstar Disco Pub in
response to the information given by Romy Manuba that
there was an armed drunken man creating trouble inside
the pub. He introduced himself as a policeman and asked
the man why he had a gun with him. The man did not
respond and, instead, suddenly drew out his gun. Baxinela
then drew his sidearm and was able to fire first, hitting
the man on his upper left arm, critically wounding him.
When the man fell down, Baxinela took his gun and wallet
and handed them over to Regimen. Regimen then stated
that he enlisted the services of the pubs security guard
to bring the wounded man to the hospital. Thereafter,
Baxinela and Regimen went to the Kalibo Police Station to
report the incident and turned over the wallet. Next, they
proceeded to Camp Pastor Martelino and also reported
the incident to Col. Bianson.

The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression

on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of
reasonable means to prevent and repel and aggression.
By invoking self-defense, Baxinela, in effect, admits killing
Lajo, thus shifting upon him the burden of the evidence
on these elements.

The Court now proceeds to determine if, following the

prosecutions version of what happened, Baxinela can
claim the justifying circumstances of self-defense and
fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner-accused Baxinela can claim the
justifying circumstances of self defense or in the
alternative the lawful performance of official duty under

HELD:
No. Baxinela cannot claim the justifying circumstances of
self-defense or the lawful performance of official duty
under the Revised Penal Code, Article 11.

The first requisite is an indispensable requirement of selfdefense. It is a condition sine qua non, without which
there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete. On this requisite alone, Baxinelas defense
fails. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden
and unexpected attack on the life and limb of a person or
an imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude. The attack must be
real, or at least imminent. Mere belief by a person of an
impending attack would not be sufficient. As the evidence
shows, there was no imminent threat that necessitated
shooting Lajo at that moment. Just before Baxinela shot
Lajo, the former was safely behind the victim and holding
his arm. It was Lajo who was at a disadvantage. In fact, it
was Baxinela who was the aggressor when he grabbed
Lajos shoulder and started questioning him. And when
Lajo was shot, it appears that he was just turning around
to face Baxinela and, quite possibly, reaching for his
wallet. None of these acts could conceivably be deemed
as unlawful aggression on the part of Lajo.

Next, we consider the alternative defense of fulfillment of

a duty. In order to avail of this justifying circumstance it
must be shown that: 1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
or office; and 2) the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due
performance of duty or the lawful exercise of a right or
office. While the first condition is present, the second is
clearly lacking. Baxinelas duty was to investigate the
reason why Lajo had a gun tucked behind his waist in a
public place. This was what Baxinela was doing when he
confronted Lajo at the entrance, but perhaps through
anxiety, edginess or the desire to take no chances,
Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajo who was
not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannot be
considered due performance of a duty if at that time Lajo
posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinela or to the
civilians in the pub.
In the present case, the Court finds that there was
negligence on the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was
shot, was simply turning around to see who was accosting
him. Moreover, he identified himself saying "I am MIG."
These circumstances alone would not lead a reasonable
and prudent person to believe that Baxinelas life was in
peril. Thus, his act of shooting Lajo, to the mind of this
Court, constitutes clear negligence. But even if the Court
assumes that Lajos actions were aggressive enough to
appear that he was going for his gun, there were a
number of procedures that could have been followed in
order to avoid a confrontation and take control of the
situation. The events inside the disco pub that
unnecessarily cost the life of Lajo did not have to happen
had Baxinela not been negligent in performing his duty as
a police officer.
8) ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, vs
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, ET AL.,

482 SCRA 44
February 9, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim
Philip Cantre and witness Saano, together with two other
companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in
Crossing Capsay,Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. On their way
home, they crossed paths with petitioner-accused Rollie
Calimutan and a certain
Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge
against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit
responsible for throwing stones at the Cantres house on a
previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao,
victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran
away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of
victim Cantre and
witness Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a
stone, as big as a mans fist, which he threw at
victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his
back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a
moment and held his back. Witness Saano put himself
between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and
attempted to pacify the two, even convincing
petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was
already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and
petitioner Calimutanto just go
home. Witness Saano accompanied victim Cantre to the
latters house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained
of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the
stone.They arrived at the Cantres house at
around 12:00 noon, and witness Saano left
victim Cantre to the care of the latters mother, Belen.
Calimutan opposed to such testimony alleging that
Cantre refused to calm down at that time and pulled out
from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering

that he was looking for trouble, either to kill or be

killed. At that point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten
meters away from the victim Cantre and was too
frightened to move any closer for fear that the enraged
man would turn on him. When he saw that the
victim Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao,
petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he
described as approximately one-inch in diameter, and
threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the
victim Cantre on his right buttock.

2. Whether or not Calimutan is guilty of an intentional crime

of Homicide.

A day after, Victim Cantre died. According to his

exhumation and autopsy report conducted by Dr. Ronaldo
Mendez, it was due to internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity
due to his lacerated spleen which can be caused by any
blunt instrument, such as a stone. Before such autopsy,
victim Cantre was also examined by
Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer
of Aroroy, Masbate and the Post-Mortem Examination
Report stated that the cause of death of
victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
suspected food poisoning which cannot be given much
weight because there was no showing that further
laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm
such suspicion.
Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what
had happened to the victim Cantre after the stoning
incident and knew that Cantre died the following the day
because of food
poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan maintained that he had no
personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the
stoning incident.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner-accused Calimutan can be held
criminally liable.

HELD:
1. YES. Calimutan can be held criminally liable.
In accordance with Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code
stating Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended, thus,
the accused is criminally liable for all the direct and
natural consequences of the unlawful act even if the
ultimate result had not been intended.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution
was able to establish that the proximate cause of the
death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by
petitioner Calimutan. Proximate cause has been defined
as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the
injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.
Other
than
being
stoned
by
petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when
the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt
instrument which could have caused the laceration of his
spleen.
2. NO. Calimutan is not guilty of intentional
crime of homicide but is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies
according to the means by which they are committed, in

particular: (1) intentional felonies which was done with

deliberate intent to cause injury, and (2) culpable felonies
which is unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice or as stated in Art.
3 of the Revised Penal Code, the wrongful act results from
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill.
In the case at present, petitioner Calimutan cannot be
attributed to any malicious intent to injure, much less to
kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent,
this
Court
cannot
sustain
the
conviction
of
petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide,
as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Instead,
this
Court
finds
petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal.
Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by
a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the
victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable
lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the
size of a mans fist could inflict substantial injury on
someone. He also miscalculated his own strength,
perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that
he could throw a stone with such force as to seriously
injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance
of ten meters.

12) SULPICIO INTOD, vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
October 21, 1992
CAMPOS, JR., J.:

FACTS:
On February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian,
Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador
Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of
Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto
Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute
between them and that Mandaya should accompany the
four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day,
Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all
armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in
Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the
instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location
of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner,
Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned
out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and
her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his
family. No one was in the room when the accused fired
the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified
by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five
men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the
witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we
will come back if (sic) you were not injured".
Intod was convicted of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks
from this Court a modification of the judgment by holding
him liable only for an impossible crime Article 4(2) of the
Revised Penal Code contending that Palangpangan's
absence from her room on the night he and his

companions riddled it with bullets made the crime

inherently impossible.
ISSUE: Whether or not Intod is guilty of an impossible
crime.
HELD: YES. Intod is guilty of an impossible crime.
Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim
would be, although in reality, the victim was not present
in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish
his end. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible
crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts,
even if completed, would not amount to a crime, there be
a motive, desire or expectation is to perform an act in
violation of the law; intention to perform the physical act;
and performance of the intended physical act.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense

was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of
the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article
4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act
"which would be an offense against persons or property,
were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense will be
treated as an accident independent of the actor's will
which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
Petitioner is thus guilty of an impossible crime as defined
and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the
Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the
social danger and degree of criminality shown by
Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty
of six (6) months of arresto mayor,.