i

[H.A.S.C. No. 11084]

FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES REGARDING NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION

HEARING
BEFORE THE

MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
AUGUST 2, 2007

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON

38-315

2008

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MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California, Chairwoman
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
NANCY BOYDA, Kansas
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
KEVIN COUGHLIN, Professional Staff Member
JEANETTE JAMES, Professional Staff Member
JOE HICKEN, Staff Assistant

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CONTENTS
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2007
Page

HEARING:
Thursday, August 2, 2007, Further Inquiry into Marine Corps Policies and
Procedures Regarding Next-of-Kin Notification ................................................
APPENDIX:
Thursday, August 2, 2007 .......................................................................................

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25

THURSDAY, AUGUST 2, 2007

FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES REGARDING NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Chairwoman, Military Personnel Subcommittee .............................................................................
McHugh, Hon. John M., a Representative from New York, Ranking Member,
Military Personnel Subcommittee ......................................................................

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2

WITNESSES
Magnus, Gen. Robert, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, U.S.
Marine Corps ........................................................................................................

APPENDIX
PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Davis, Hon. Susan A. .......................................................................................
Magnus, Gen. Robert ........................................................................................
McHugh, Hon. John M. ....................................................................................
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Questions submitted.]

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36
33

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FURTHER INQUIRY INTO MARINE CORPS POLICIES AND

PROCEDURES REGARDING NEXT-OF-KIN NOTIFICATION

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, August 2, 2007.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in room
2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Susan Davis (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRWOMAN, MILITARY
PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Ms. DAVIS. The meeting will come to order.

I want to thank you all for being here.
This hearing is being held today because the subcommittee was
not satisfied with the information provided to us on June 27, 2007,
in our hearing on the policies and procedures regarding the notification of next of kin of deceased service members.
At that hearing, the Marine Corps provided testimony that was
not accurate. So, as a result of that, Ranking Member McHugh, Dr.
Snyder, myself met with Lieutenant General Ronald Coleman, the
Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, on July 17, 2007, to discuss some of the issues and questions
that arose from that hearing.
But as a result of that particular briefing, we still unfortunately,
did not feel comfortable that the casualty notification process that
the Marine Corps had in effect was sufficient, especially concerning
those Marines who were either wounded or killed as a result of
friendly fire.
So the purpose of this hearing today is to correct any inaccurate
or incorrect information that was previously provided to this committee and to the public, and allow the Marine Corps to set the
record straight on this issue.
I look forward to the discussion that we will have here regarding
the issue to ensure that the procedures and the tracking system
that the Marine Corps has in effect are sufficient to ensure accurate and timely notification to our service members and their families.
Before I introduce our witness, I just wanted to give Congressman McHugh an opportunity for any opening remarks that he may
wish to make.
And I certainly want to welcome here General Magnus. We welcome you. We thank you for your service to the country, and we
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2
know that we will want to move forward with this hearing today.
Thank you.
Mr. McHugh.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM NEW YORK, RANKING MEMBER, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Let me join you in welcoming our distinguished panelist here
today. General Magnus is to be thanked by every American for the
great leadership he brings and, quite honestly, for showing some
pretty significant courage for being here today as we look back over
the history as you defined it, Madam Chair.
I would ask, Madam Chair, that my prepared statement be entered into the record in its entirety. Let me just make a couple of
comments.
I really, when we started out here, wondered if another hearing
was necessary. But as we have gone forward, and as the data continuously changes, including as recently as last night, as I understand it, where we were provided yet with another incident ofat
least insofar as we are awareunreported incident, I just have
found myself in a position of really doubting virtually everything
we have heard. And I find it difficult to find much veracity in what
we might hear. And that is a hard thing for me to say, and it is
a terrible place for us to be.
I think we have actually come to the pointand I dont want to
pre-judge anything General Magnus says. And I am not in any way
questioning his honesty. I know the caliber of the man, and I know
he will be here today providing the best data that he possibly can.
But given the very difficult road we traveled to this point, I really fear that, particularly amongst the families of those who have
suffered, either wounded in action, or of course at the extreme,
killed in action, can possibly have in the process that have supposedly assured them of how their loved one met whichever fate
they may have encountered.
And I think, Madam Chair, we may be at a point where it would
be almost impossible to avoid soliciting the help of an outside organization, be it the GAO, Government Accountability Office, or some
other, to take a look at the entire range of incidences, starting with
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF), as to how the reporting has been done.
None of us want to see a circumstanceand I know the Marines
are right at the head of this linenone of us want to see a circumstance where a loved one receiving notification or not receiving
a notification makes an incorrect assumption based on a system
that, for whatever reason, has not worked well and hasnt filled its
challenge.
So with that, Madam Chair, I do look forward to General
Magnuss comments. And, again, none of what I have said is in any
way intended to cast aspersions upon his outstanding record of
servicewe are so lucky as a country to have individuals such as

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3
hebut as to a system that, frankly, I think has caused doubts in
all of us.
So I will yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McHugh can be found in the Appendix on page 33.]
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
We are honored today to be joined by the Chairman of the Armed
Services Committee, Mr. Ike Skelton, who was previously, quite a
number of years ago, chairman of the Personnel Committee. And
he tells me every day that he wants to watch and be sure that I
handle this committee just the way he did, and I am working to
do that.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being here, and we look forward
to your participation if you so choose. And I appreciate your being
here.
As I mentioned earlier, we have one witness today, General Robert Magnus, assistant commandant of the United States Marine
Corps.
As I said earlier as well, we thank you very much for your service to our country. And we know that this has been difficult going
back and trying to understand why, in fact, some of the reporting
did not occur as it should have, trying to correct that, and to move
forward.
We are concerned, as I know you are as well, with how change
of notices impact our families. The initial notice is very difficult,
but further notices make it especially hard on them. And so we
want to be certain that we have it right. And I know that the Marine Corps is working to do that as well.
Your written comments and statements, of course, will be made
part of the hearing record, so we encourage you to summarize your
remarks if you would like.
We are going to try and keep, I think, today, Mr. McHugh, perhaps to five minutes so people have an opportunity to go around.
And I appreciate everybody being very patient with me yesterday
as well.
So, we will get started. General Magnus, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GEN. ROBERT MAGNUS, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General MAGNUS. Thank you, Chairwoman Davis, Congressman

McHugh, distinguished members of the subcommittee, and Chairman Skelton. Thank you very much for this opportunity to correct
the record on next of kin notification.
I deeply regret that information the Marine Corps officials provided at the hearing on June 27th and the subsequent briefing on
July the 17th was inaccurate. On behalf of the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, I offer our sincerest apology to the subcommittee.
Also, for our Marines and families, the Commandant and I are
personally and professionally distressed that we have not always
provided timely and accurate information to them, which did not
alleviate their stress or help them to come to closure.
However, the Commandant and I thank the subcommittee for
bringing this problem to light. I solemnly assure you that we will

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4
do the right thing for our Marines, sailors, and their families, making every effort to preclude future errors.
We previously reported that next of kin of Marines killed by
friendly fire on the 12th of April, 2004, had been notified. That report was unintentionally inaccurate, although late notifications
have been made by general officer visits to those families on the
20th and 23rd of July to the Marine families that were involved.
We also incorrectly reported the number of friendly fire incidents
and casualties. That number, as we understand it today, is 23 suspected friendly fire incidents with 19 of those confirmed, including
6 deaths and 38 wounded due to friendly fire.
It is important to note that we are not confident that this is definitive because a preliminary review of our processes has revealed
inconsistencies in our record.
That preliminary review revealed deficiencies in three key processes related to notification, processes that we now realize are
interrelated.
The first process is the command casualty reporting process,
which includes a telephonic report followed by initial and any supplemental personnel casualty reports or PCRs. These reports were
not uniformly accurate or complete. While we understand that this
was probably due to the stresses of intense combat on reporting
commands, increased emphasis on and possibly changes to our casualty reporting process are needed to ensure accuracy and timeliness.
Second, the command casualty inquiry and investigation process
may not have been consistently documented, including completion
of any actions requested by higher command endorsements to those
investigations.
Third, our process for notifications to next of kin was not always
in compliance with statute or our own policies and procedures. As
a result of these deficiencies, our command reporting information,
inquiry and investigation, and casualty notification processes have
not always been consistent, accurate, or timely. Timely delivery of
accurate information to the next of kin is our responsibility.
Although we believe investigations were conducted on all suspected friendly fire cases, our preliminary review revealed that the
PCRs have not uniformly reported all friendly fire investigations
as required by regulations.
Although notifications were made to next of kin, in some cases
they were late and did not indicate that friendly fire was suspected
or determined.
Clearly, the three processes need improved emphasis, training of
personnel, and linkages, as well as appropriate oversight measures.
The Inspector General (IG) of the Marine Corps has been
charged with providing recommendations to ensure that we have
definitive information in order to take effective remedial actions.
The Commandant has directed the Inspector General to conduct a
detailed and thorough investigation into our casualty reporting and
notification processes with full access to all records and personnel.
This subcommittee will be provided a copy of the completed investigation.
We are working with the United States Army to ensure uniform
and consistent casualty procedures. We believe that the U.S. Army

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5
has an effective model which can be rapidly adopted by the Marine
Corps.
We are also working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) and the Navy Secretariat to ensure compliance with the requirements of National Defense Authorization Acts for fiscal year
2006 and fiscal year 2007.
We are taking action without waiting for results of the IGs investigation. We will issue guidance to commanders, reemphasizing
the need for timely, accurate reporting, inquiries and investigations, and the linkages to ensure proper notifications are made.
Our duty is to ensure notification is conducted in accordance
with statute and casualty procedures. I accept responsibility for the
process failures that negatively affected the families of our fallen
and wounded warriors. On behalf of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, I apologize for our errors.
We thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to correct the
record. We also thank the Congress for its abiding concern for the
welfare and care of our Marines, sailors, and their families. Caring
for them is simply the right thing to do. It is part of our ethos as
Marines, and we will do it.
I am prepared to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Magnus can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, General.
What I would like to do, because I think it would be for the benefit of the members, if we could go through several of the hearings
that we have had, to try and go back a little bit on those numbers.
On the 27th of June, when the Marine Corps testified, they said
there were only 19 friendly fire casualties from 2 incidents.
And then on the 17th of July, we were briefed that actually there
were 77 friendly fire casualties from 20 incidents.
And then, of course, yesterday we learned that, in fact, there
were actually 82 friendly fire casualties from 23 different incidents.
So I would hope that you could go back and help us out a little
here. Where did the Marine Corps get the numbers that we received on July 17th?
General MAGNUS. The numbers we received from July 17th were
as a result of a first preliminary review, not by the Inspector General, of the records that we had at Headquarters Marine Corps of
these three processes and in telephonic contact with Marines in
Marine Central Command Headquarters in California.
That preliminary review, particularly subsequent to my review of
the briefing that was conducted on the 17th of July, led me to immediately go to the Commandant and indicate that not only had
the numbers changed between the 27th of June and the 17th of
July, but the reason why the changes gave me pause as to the accuracy of the records that were being cross-referenced.
And subsequent to that, a second reviewnot by the Inspector
Generalwas done, which gave us the best information that I
have, which as I have noted earlier, Madam Chairwoman, I am not
confident it is definitive. And it is based upon direct contact between the 17th of July and the date of my letter to the subcommittee between senior officers in Marine Corps Central Command,
Camp Pendleton, and officials at Headquarters Marine Corps.

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I will be confident in the definition of the process deficiencies we
have and in the numbers of incidents and, most importantly of
course, in the numbers of killed and wounded casualties on completion of the Inspector Generals report.
Ms. DAVIS. If we go beyond the 17th then, and we go to August
1st, what is it then about the new numberwhere did you look for
that information then? Was that also going back to the preliminary
review?
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, the first review gave us
the numbers which were still not complete and correct that you received in the briefing on the 17th of July.
A second, more in-depth review, but not by the Inspector General, not with a methodical investigative process, revealed updated
numbers. Those numbers were provided, and when I reviewed, subsequent to the briefing, the method by which the numbers were derived, serious questions arose, not as to the professionalism or intent of Marines that were providing the numbers, but simply in the
way these numbers were accounted.
And in fact, as you indicated, the number of cases of wounded
Marines increased and gave us great pause as to the accuracy of
these processes and the checks and balances that would give us
numbers. I think the numbers are, of course, different numbers,
but we will only be confident when we are 100 percent accurate
and are able to change our processes in the future.
Ms. DAVIS. When do you think that the IGs investigation will be
completed?
General MAGNUS. Within a matter of weeks.
I have spoken to the Acting Inspector General of the Marine
Corps, Mr. Holmgren. He has been given full latitude to go through
all of our major subordinate commands that have had casualties,
including our reserves. And to ensure that we have access to all the
records to be able to cross-reference all of the documents, to ensure
that we know each individual by name, their status, the determination of whether or not there was friendly fire, and also to determine our process for ensuring notification.
Notifications, maam, are ongoing right now with some of the
wounded that were identified in the 12 April, 2004, investigation.
Lance Corporals Zurheide and Shuder were killed in action and
that, I think, was covered in the earlier testimony, maam.
Ms. DAVIS. Okay, thank you, General.
So that we can get around to members and have several rounds,
Mr. McHugh? Would you like to pick it up?
Mr. MCHUGH. Thank you very much.
I would also note, Madam Chair, in your very thorough review,
that on the 17th of July briefing, not only were the numbers wrong,
we were also misinformed that two families had been notified of
the circumstances of their loved ones death when, in fact, what
they had received were letters that an investigation was being
done. They could receive those investigations if they asked for it.
So there were really two layers in this information, just to fill out
the record.
General Magnus, I heard you describe in part the Marine Corps
IGs process of reviewing those cases, but tell me again: Is he trying to coordinate the data and the information strictly between the

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headquarters of the Marine Corps and Marine Central Command?
Is that the extent of his look-see?
General MAGNUS. No, sir. I wasnt clear
Mr. MCHUGH. You probably were. I probably just didnt
General MAGNUS. The Inspector General is going wherever he
needs to go. He is going, of course, to Marine Forces Central Command, but he will go to each one of the major subordinate commands that provided Marines since this war began.
So he will be going to all four divisions, all four wings, all four
Marines logistics groups, to ensure that we not only have got an
accounting for those commands that were deployed, but also that
we have taken the effective actions in terms of notifications to next
of kin back here, which is mainly in the continental United States
and Hawaii.
Mr. MCHUGH. And I appreciate that, and that is what a good Inspector General does, but it may not take him everywhere that perhaps we would like to see it done.
For example, after the very tragic case of Corporal Pat Tillman,
the Army really initiated a review from top to bottom and went
back to all of the battalions to direct a specific investigation that
were done at friendly fire incidences to see if there were any inaccuracies.
Has the Marine Corps done anything like that, contemplated
anything like that? Because it seems to me that the Inspector General is going to be subject to whatever data he may be provided
that may not be corrected back enough.
General MAGNUS. Again, Congressman McHugh, I must not have
been clear. We are doing precisely that. We are going back to every
single investigation.
We are also going back to all of our casualties. In other words,
this is broader than just friendly fire. This is about the casualty
notification and reporting process, a very important part of that, of
course, is regarding actual or suspected friendly fire.
So it is the overall process that needs to be looked at and with
specific emphasis on the notification of next of kin. So we are doing
exactly what the Army is doing.
Mr. MCHUGH. So the place where I was a little unclear, not that
he would go to that level, but indeed every case at the battalion
level has been directly ordered to be revisited.
General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MCHUGH. Okay.
Can you help us understand what it was in the system, for example, that caused the discrepancies between the two numbers, with
respect to Headquarters Marine Corps and Marine Central Command? I understand you had some reconciliation, some kinds of
problems in the system, but do you have any preliminary information as to how those two numbers could have been so disjointed?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, it would be speculative, and so
therefore I will go there because it is the reason why I advised the
Commandant that we needed an Inspector Generals investigation.
When I reviewed the terminology that was used in charts and in
information papers that I was provided with terminology in statute
and in our regulations and on the documents, people were using
different words to describe certain conditions. So there is the termi-

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nology, but that doesnt account for the fact that even when you
add up the numbers, the numbers changed.
In fact, there were five of the wounded that apparently had just
not been correctly accounted for. Those five wounded in the personnel casualty records were in Headquarters Marine Corps.
The system for ensuring that we had a rigorous accounting did
not have the checks and balances that I know we need now.
Mr. MCHUGH. I just have a moment left.
When General Downs came before the committee the first time
on June 27th, I assume he was taking data from one source. Otherwise, he would have known there was a conflict. Which source was
he deriving the data from?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, I cant answer what source the
general would have used.
I can tell you that the Marine Corps is in compliance with the
Department of Defense (DOD) instructions. There is one casualty
reporting and responsible section in each one of the military services. Our casualty section is under Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
I believe retired General Mike Downs testified before the committee. He is the senior officer in that section. That is the one section where these processes need to come together.
Mr. MCHUGH. I see my time has expired.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, the hearing on June 27th was my last hearing in which
I participated in as the chairman of this committee, and all of us
got really uncomfortable as the hearing proceeded with what we
were hearing. But one of them was the very strong testimony from
General Downs that there had only been two incidents, two incidents with multiple casualties, but two incidents.
And we challenged him on that: Has anyone ever wondered perhaps, and given everything the Marine Corps has done since spring
of 2003, that there couldnt possibly be other incidents? And some
very firm statements were made.
Subsequent to that, I think we have gotten information that
there had been discussions prior to the hearing that perhaps that
is not accurate. Perhaps there had been more than two incidents.
I mean, issue number one is to get this information and get a
system right that will work for these families for the Marine Corps,
but a lesser issue is this Congress, as a representative for the
American people, deserves accurate information.
And this is pretty close to a man sitting there being asked a
question, Did you have any uncertainty about this information?,
and had been told before the hearing that there was uncertainty
about that information and did not pass it on to this committee.
Have you looked into that aspect of things at all?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, I have not looked into that, and
that is part of the
Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. I would encourage you to do that.
General MAGNUS. Sir, yes, sir, and that is part of the charter of
the Inspector General. If in fact, information was incorrectly de-

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rived, we will find out why. If, in fact, there was any intentional
violation, that will also be reported.
To the best of my understanding, sir, I believe General Downs
incorrectly understood what he was preparing for, but I cannot account for why there was literally almost an order of magnitude difference between the numbers.
Dr. SNYDER. Well, it is also my understanding that he was put
on notice, that there may well have been
General MAGNUS. Yes, sir.
Dr. SNYDER [continuing]. Some problems with more junior Marines saying, We think there may be more than two, and you are
about to testify before Congress very firmly there is only two. And
we were informed within less than 24 hours by well-meaning Marines that they thought that they were going to need to come and
give us a briefing because their information was incorrect.
So my second question is: We were also informed that one of the
incorrect things that we were informed was that the Marine Corps
did not investigate or have any kind of a preliminary investigation
of all deaths. And in fact, when we challenged that a little bit because the Army does that now, probably as a result of the Corporal
Tillman case amongst others, we are told that would be a waste of
time to do that, that it would be real clear in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) explosion of what had occurred.
Well, it turned out, as we were subsequently told, that you do indeed do a preliminary investigation on all deaths. Is that correct
information?
General MAGNUS. Neither of those, I believe, is correct, but I will
talk for the Marine Corps, sir.
The regulation does not require a preliminary inquiry in accordance with our Judge Advocate Generals manual which is the same
as Army Regulation 156, when on the scene it is clear to the senior official there that a death or injury was due to enemy fire.
When there is any doubt of the cause of any casualty including,
of course, a mishapand in this case, we are talking about a hostile actiona preliminary inquiry is done to ascertain that. And
then, of course, if in fact that suspicion sustains after a preliminary
inquiry, which simply could be a commissioned officer looking at
the scene and determining that there is some doubt, then of course,
a formal investigation will be undertaken.
The regulations do not require, when there is certainty at the
scene that the casualty was caused by friendly fire, for there to be
an inquiry.
Dr. SNYDER. Maybe what we have is a terminology problem because I would perhaps argue in defense of your system that, in
fact, that was the preliminary inquiry.
General MAGNUS. And, Congressman, that is a great point because we have had that discussion with our service judge advocate,
in fact, if there is in fact a questioning, an inquiry at the siteand
it is determined by competent authority that it was enemy fire
to their certainty, then what we have to do is document that that
took place. Right now, the only documentation of that is the line
in the personnel casualty report that indicates enemy fire.

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It turns out that, subsequently, that may not be good and sufficient documentation. We are reviewing that along with what the
Army does.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General. I will have other questions
later.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.
Thank you, Dr. Snyder.
And I want to move to Mr. Kline. Mr. Kline, would you yield one
second?
Could you define preliminary inquiry for us? What does that
entailreporting, telephone call? I mean, it can be a range of
thingsis that correct? So it is not a written-down report necessarily?
General MAGNUS. Not necessarily, and that is one of the aspects
that we are looking at because, to have checks and balances, you
have to have some kind of record or documentation to have an
audit trail.
Ms. DAVIS. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, General, for being here and sort of stepping up to the
plate, as it were, to answer the questions which in our minds were
unanswered and had risen our concern to quite high levels and, I
am sure with great confidence, yours and the Commandants.
I know that there are very good professionals trying to do their
very best in very tough circumstances. There is no doubt that in
my 25 years, and I am sure in your 35 years, there is nothing harder than going and informing a next of kin that a Marine has been
killed.
And so in the process, I think that the Marine Corps has developed in making sure that there is an officer in uniform who shows
up to do that and does that very hard job, does a very good one,
and is taken very, very seriously for many years, certainly all the
years since you and I came into the court.
But clearly, the system had some flaws in it. You have mentioned some of them today, and in your written testimonyI have
got it all marked up heresome of them jump out. Obviously, the
personnel casualty report, as you indicated, is sometimes disconnected from the investigation.
And so without those two things together, well-meaning, hardworking, serious officers and enlisted can just make a mistake because the information is not accurately recorded onto the PCR, for
example.
So I applaud the four of you and the Commandant for getting the
IG in it, and I trust that the IG will dig far and wide and deep
as we go forward on this.
I see some of your remedies in your written testimony. One of
them says, We will change higher headquarters reporting procedures. I am not sure what that is. I dont know if you know what
it is either, but I would like to see those very solid, and perhaps
you can tell us when this is done what those might be.
One of your remedies is, We must and will ensure tight links
between the investigation and reporting processes. Again, I dont

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know what that is, but I trust those will be written down in Marine
Corps order and will be visible to you and to us.
And then with that, you say that you are going to ensure training is rigorous and effective and therefore, I trust, ongoing as all
training is, that it maintains from commanding officer to commanding officer to commanding officer. Because no matter how good the
training is, if it is not done consistently, you wont maintain those
links.
And similarly, I have a little bit of a concern when your number
sevenit says, there will be proactive coordination between Head
Quarters Marine Corps (HQMC) and our subordinate command elements to strengthen oversight of reporting compliance. Unless
that is a documented procedure, proactive coordination often
doesnt last past the Marine who is in the office at the time.
So all this is to say that at the end of this process, I presume,
when the IG completes the investigation, Headquarters of the Marine Corps will be writing these down and promulgating these
changes. And I would ask that this subcommittee see what those
are as we go forward. Because I know that you are appalled by
this, and the Commandant and every Marine, that this could be so
confusing, that the testimony here could be so wrong over the period of time that the chairman has indicated, but more importantly,
that families didnt know.
And so I dont have a question except to ask that we be allowed
to see what these procedures are when the Marine Corps promulgates them.
General MAGNUS. We will ensure, Congressman Kline, that the
subcommittee receives copies of all the correspondence, including
the Commandants letter to his commanders, as well as any
changes we make in our procedures and, of course, the changes
that will be made, that are ongoing right now, and to update the
DOD instruction on casualty reporting and notification in general,
and we are
Mr. KLINE. Is there a white letter out now?
General MAGNUS. No, the Commandant is in Iraq right now, and
when the Commandant gets back, we will sit down and make sure
that we have a letter that does more than simply exhort for reemphasis on the system.
Because we know that there are potential deficiencies in these
systems. So we want to make sure that the systems are being reported and done by Marines; they are human beings like everyone
else. And so we need more than just reemphasizing the procedures
we have.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.
Ms. Shea-Porter.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.
The question I have, General, is two-fold. First of all, wouldnt
it help if we had some standard operating procedure across the
branches of military? And why dont we at this point; and would
you recommend it?

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General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, the answer is yes.
We are now actively workingI literally met with the Army three
times in the past week.
We believe that the Army has a good if not outstanding model,
and we are going to make recommendations to change our procedures. If we believe that the Army procedures need clarification, we
will recommend that to them, and we are going to.
And I have already met this morning with the principal deputy
undersecretary for personnel and readiness, Mike Dominguez. And
he is directing the new overarching DOD instruction so that we are
consistent. And I believe that not only uniformity, accuracy, and
timeliness within the Marine Corps, but uniformity across the four
military services and DOD, is essential.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How quickly do you think you would be able
to implement a joint policy?
General MAGNUS. I believe that the Army and the Marine Corps
can implement the changes within a matter of weeks. The signing
out of a DOD instruction might take a bit longer.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. And the other question I had was: What impact has this had on any of your troops at all? Can you speak to
that? Has there been an increased anxiety level? Has there been
any kind of blow-back from families? Has there been a negative impact, basically, on Marines from within the ranks?
General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, I am not aware of a
negative impact.
On the other hand, I am a dad. I have gone to the Intensive Care
Units (ICUs), and I have hugged the moms whose Marines were
expectant. I know that this cannot have eased their grief, could not
have calmed their uncertainty, and could not have brought them to
closure. So we are mindful of our responsibility to take care of our
troops and their families. So I just have to take this as seriously
as it is.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Have you spoken to them? Has the letter gone
out, or has there been any kind of communication with everybody
to state that yes, you know, it was wrong, it is going to be fixed,
and to reassure?
General MAGNUS. In the cases that were investigated determining suspected friendly fire, in the case of Lance Corporal Shuders
and Lance Corporal Zurheides family, which were the April 12,
2004, incident, that a general officer visited the family at the time
of their choosing. That happened on the 20th and the 23rd of July.
We believe we have made contact with the family of every Marine who has been killed in action. I spoke to Lieutenant General
Mattis, the commander of Marine Forces Central Command, last
night, and he is re-doubling efforts to go back and ensure that we
make contact with every Marine who has been seriously injured, or
is very seriously injured, as a result of wounds received in hostile
fire.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Do you think it would be helpful to address
everybody and all family members, stating that this situation is
being remedied for those who have family members who have not
been injured but wonder what would happen to them?
General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, that will be the purpose of the Commandants white letter to all of his commanders,

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which will be followed up by appropriate broader distribution instructions to Marines. And we will make sure that the communication is broad and effective. We dont want any Marine or family to
feel that we are not going to take good care of them, and to accurately, and in a timely manner, inform their families of the circumstances of their injury or their death.
Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. JONES. Madam Chairman, thank you.
And, General Magnus, it is good to see you again here in August.
I am having lunch withI am looking forward to seeing
Lieutentant Ilario Pantano, sir.
General, I want to thank you and the Marine Corps as well as
the services. It is a very difficult war, trying to make sure that the
families are as well-informed as they can be, and whether that be
friendly fire or killed by the enemy.
The casualty officer that goes to tell the family that the loved one
has been killed, how long does the casualty officerand let me tell
you, this deals with the Army, and I have already got this settled,
but it has raised a lot of questions for me at leastif a Marine is
killed in action, how long does it take before the Marine Corps can
bring that case to a close?
And the reason I am asking is I have a constituent whose son
was killed five months ago. She has requested the autopsy report.
She has requested the investigation report as toand again, he
was killed by an IED.
And I have been a little bit amazed, not disappointed, because
war is war and you just cant run to a computer and get on a computer and say, This happened.
How long, generally, should it take for a family to have total closure, meaning that questions they might ask about the death of
that loved one, before the Marine Corps can say that the family
has received everything that they have requested and we are now
ready to close the case?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, thank you for the question.
Unfortunately, it varies depending upon the circumstances of the
casualty. Our instructions require that a family be notified within
hours of receipt of the casualty report at Headquarters of the Marine Corps.
And the only caveat to that is that we go to family, the next of
kin that is identified by the Marine normally in their record of
emergency data, during the hours of 5 in the morning and midnight, so that if we are not able to get the right kind of people and
they cant get the family members to them in the event that they
need other support.
That normally happens within hours or within one day, and it
is not a working day; it is one day. And very frequently that happens, literally, within hours.
That information provided is the information that is as good as
in the initial personnel casualty report. The initial casualty report
in the case of hostile action may indicate enemy fire determined by
the official on the scene, or it may indicate that it is indeterminate.

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14
I have not seen one that indicated in the first casualty report
that it was friendly fire.
So that is provided to the family within hours.
If there is some doubt as to the circumstance of a Marines injury
or death, the family is notified as soon as we know that there is
some doubt. And then there is an investigation process that proceeds that is a legal process as the Judge Advocate Generals
manuals determination.
And when that is finally endorsedand for killed in action, those
go to the commander of U.S. Central Command for his endorsement. At that point, we will then give the final results of the investigation and its endorsements, including a redacted copy of the investigation as appropriate to the family.
We are required to update the family every 30 days if that investigation has not completed within 30 days of our initial notification.
And that should be backed up by not only a telephonic notification
of the status, but backed up by a letter.
That is all of the smaller procedures that are in these processes
I talked about, which create a series of documents and checks and
balances that we need to ensure take place.
Mr. JONES. General, thank you very much.
And, Madam Chairman, I will yield back.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you.
Ms. Boyda.
Mrs. BOYDA. Thank you for coming and for your testimony.
And thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I just had a question about process. Generally, and my background is in the pharmaceutical industry, so zero tolerance is pretty much the name of the game there.
And I was just wondering from the Marines standpoint, when
you do something, and when you check something, who is the person who is ultimately responsible for that process? Is it the person
who does it or the person who checks it, or do you determine that?
Is that part of your ethos?
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Madam Congresswoman.
Ultimately, the Commandant of the Marine Corps is responsible
for ensuring these processes come. The checks and balances should
be periodic examinations of the process, and it is required by regulation by the Inspector General of each service.
Mrs. BOYDA. May I just ask then, is theremaybe I made an assumptionwith each one of these friendly fires, is each one processed? And then, is it also checked by someone? Is there a one-toone, somebody does it, somebody checks it?
General MAGNUS. There should be, yes, maam. That is in accordance with the regulations.
Mrs. BOYDA. I am just curious, is that currently the process?
General MAGNUS. That is correct.
Mrs. BOYDA. Is there something that says in our procedures or
in our processand again, in the industry that I have come from,
guess who is the one who is responsible for it? Not the person who
did it, the person who checks it. And they are the one whose job
is on the line, whose performance review is on the line. The person
who does the checking is the person who takes it, and it is very
clear to everyone whose name is on the line what that means.

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So just again, it doesnt sound like that is necessarily a written
procedure, and I just wondered if it might, in fact, be something
that is helpful or something that you have ever considered.
General MAGNUS. Madam Congresswoman, I think it is in the
regulation that each service have a casualty office that is responsible. Those responsibilities are not delineated; they are implied. I
know what they are.
But we need to make sure in the checklist of each office that Mr.
Downs represents the senior officer that is responsible for casualty
reporting, that he is also aware that he has to be mindful of whether or not the status of a friendly fire legal investigation is complete,
and if not, why not, so that from the personal casualty report on,
we are constantly checking the completeness of the actions we may
take.
If an action is not taken at the beginning, if something is not reported, there is no action that we can take. If an investigation is
not correctly done, then it is the responsibility of the endorsers to
challenge that.
But as each process comes to its milestones, there needs to be
someone who is checking that it has actually been done and that
we transmit that information to the families.
Mrs. BOYDA. And I yield back. I dont have any other additional
questions.
Thank you.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Ms. Boyda.
I just wanted to check, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. SANCHEZ. I have no questions.
Ms. DAVIS. All right, great. Thank you.
Just going back for a second, General, if I may, I think one of
the concerns, and I am recalling the meeting that we had also on
the 17th of July, because I think we had a clear sense then that
that was kind of all there was.
And then as you mentioned earlier, going back and taking another look I think that, from our standpoint, I think it is appropriate to characterize that as still a work in progress essentially,
rather than something that is pretty definite as I think the impression of those of us who were at that meeting had. Conveying that,
is that a better way to move forward?
Obviously, we want to have definite numbers, but on the other
hand, it is unsettling to come back and have different numbers as
time moves on.
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, it is unsettling to us, not
only in leadership positions but anyone that has been associated
with us, including the officials that are responsible for the processing. We believe that we will have definitive information, definitive
numbers when the Inspector General is complete with his investigation.
Hope is not a principle of war. I hope that our numbers that we
have done on our initial accountings turn out to be definitive. I am
not confident in that as I sit here. And we will provide the subcommittee a copy of the Inspector Generals investigation.
Ms. DAVIS. A follow up as well, on the 17th, when the Marine
Corps stated that 24 MarinesMarine Corps Central Command
(MARCENT) had reportedthat were killed from friendly fire in

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the Nazaria incident. And then they stated that all 18 were included because they were killed as part of the friendly fire incident.
But then we learned that actually eight of the 18 were killed by
hostile fire.
So I am wondering why the eight would be grouped with the remaining 10 if, in fact, they were not part of the friendly fire incident?
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, that incident that you
are referring to, the 23rd of March, 2003, was the 1st Battalion,
2nd Marines. The investigation on that, which I believe was complete, was done by CENTAF, the Air Forces Component Central
Command.
The troops in the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines were engaged in
fierce combat with Iraqi Army forces on Nazaria. Unbeknownst to
the company that was literally behind them, they were in front,
and when the fires were authorized by their fellow company, that
company thought that they were part of the Iraqi Army.
The Air Force was cleared in on a mission when U.S. troops were
in fierce, close contact, already receiving numerous casualties. As
a result of the fact that the A10s then conducted a strike on that
vicinity, the Air Force then became the suspected afflicting agency
of the friendly fire and therefore it was their responsibility, according to regulations, to conduct a full and complete investigation.
A full and complete investigation, as you can imagine, is quite
extensive, including medical forensics.
It turns out that eight of the 18 killed in action were determined
to have been killed by the Iraqis and, in fact, the vicinity of the
A10 attack was a casualty collection point for that infantry company.
The other 10 of the 18 casualties were literally indeterminate
cause of their death. And you can imagine the tremendous amount
of damage that was being done in fierce close-combat, plus the ordinance that was delivered by the A10, made it medically impossible for the investigating officer to determine the exact cause of
death.
Likewise, that battalion also reported 17 wounded in action that
day. Of the 17, 15 were due to wounds from enemy fire; 2 seemed
to be indeterminate, and I know for a fact that 1 of them actually
received woundsthis is a living, wounded Marinefrom both
Iraqi fire and apparently from shrapnel delivered by the A10.
The actual timing of the fatal injuries and the timing of the
wounds can only be determined by the living. The wounded can tell
you when they believe they got wounded. It is very difficult to determine the timing of deaths.
Ms. DAVIS. I think the question is why the eight were listed on
the friendly fire list at all, though.
General MAGNUS. Because they were part of a friendly fire investigation. And in fact, because the fires were delivered in support
of and believed to be against the enemyso the investigation determines whether or not we can determine whether it is friendly
fire, enemy fire, or in some cases here as I have discussed, it is indeterminate.

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Ms. DAVIS. So in other instances where there are sizable numbers and there is a friendly fire investigation, all the others would
come under that investigation?
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, in a given incidence. So
in other words, at a certain time and place, if there are a number
of casualties and friendly fire is suspected, that will all be done in
one investigation with determinations made for each and every one
of the suspected wounded or killed. If the same unit has a separate
operation going on, there would be, if necessary, a separate investigation.
Ms. DAVIS. Does that designation change, though, after the full
investigation is done and it is determined that that was not the
cause? Should that change in the listing of casualties?
General MAGNUS. Maam, no. The reason for the investigation
wont change. The determination of the causal factors of the injury
of death, they will change upon final determination of the investigating officer and the endorsers.
Ms. DAVIS. But when someone goes back and looks at the lists
then, they would still see not the final determination on that list.
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, it depends on who
makes up the list. As I might have indicated earlier, there were 23
total suspected friendly fire incidents, only 19 of which had actual
friendly fire determinations for the casualties, 4 of which did not.
Ms. DAVIS. I see. But I think still, for our viewing, when we go
back and when we look at the list that we had asked for, those are
still listed in that framework. And that is our concern, how that
gets changed so that we have that appropriate information. Maybe
we can review that.
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, we will review that. I
tried to correctly characterize that in my written letter response
back to the subcommittee. If there is a way we can improve it so
there is no misunderstanding; accuracy and timeliness of a response to the families and, of course, to the Congress, is essential.
Ms. DAVIS. Okay, certainly. We are just looking for the system
to essentially reflect that, and if that is what we are given, that
is what we see. And we would like to try to figure out a way to
make certain that that isnt there.
Thank you.
Mr. McHugh, did you have any more questions?
Mr. MCHUGH. Yes.
Of course, the comment, General,well, he is back. I want to associate myself with the comments of the great Marine warrior to
my left, Mr. Kline. You spoke about the Army, and the Army, I
would tend to agree with you at least in the comparative sense, has
a pretty good system. On paper, it looks great, and they have had
it in place for a number of years now.
But I think as we look at what did or didnt happen in the Corporal Pat Tillman case where, although the regulations and directive out of the Army required notifications to occur while an investigation was ongoing, virtually every one of the officers with the exception, apparently, of one, were operating under the assumption
that that wasnt the policy. They werent aware even though it was.
So while changing the structure and redefining it through directives is important, as Mr. Kline said, we have got to get that word

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out to the field or at least in that one case with Corporal Tillman,
it may not work.
So I just wanted to add my one and a half cents onto that.
The only other thing I want to pursue right now is just for my
own edification.
General, when you spoke about the evolving data that we have
received over the first hearing of June 27th, the briefing of July
17th, and then last evenings letter of August 1st from you, there
was apparentlyfor lack of a better descriptiona disconnect between MARCENT and Headquarters Marine Corps.
Did I hear that correctly?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, I dont necessarily have the information that MARCENT did not correctly report. What I do know
is the records that we have at Headquarters Marine Corps are inconsistent.
Mr. MCHUGH. Well, that is why I said disconnect. I am not trying to characterize. They werent the same for whatever reason.
That is what you are trying to determine.
General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir.
Mr. MCHUGH. When General Downsand I agree pretty much
with Dr. Snyders comments in the beginning about General
Downs kind of attitude, but I dont know if that is fair, but it is
certainly the impression that many of us got.
But as I look through the transcript of that hearing, I mean, I
can at least understand the source of his certainty when we are
going through the processes, the two incidences since OEF/OIF as
query to the defense casualty system.
He was certain that his data was correct because, as he put it,
and I am reading from the comments on the transcript, this, the
data, includes all updated reports, Ms. Davis. He was responding
to the Chair. The casualty information processing system includes
the original personnel casualty report and any supplements that
have been issued, so the information is updated as each PCR is received.
Where does that process, the defense casualty processing system,
fit into this continuum, if you will? Where do the PCRs come in?
Where is it then transmitted to, and where did you look to give us
the latest updated figures of the 82 casualties, comprised of 23
incidences?
General MAGNUS. The command reporting system that I spoke of
as the first of those three processes includes a telephonic report
normally within an hour of the command realizing a casualty. It
is followed immediately, probably within minutes in most cases, by
a digital electronic personnel casualty report.
At the same time, data is entered by the command into DCIPS,
the Defense Casualty Information Processing System, which also
feeds into a thing called defense casualty system, which is a registry or record that has been accumulated, I believe, going back to
at least Vietnam if not before. But those are simply feeder systems.
They are taking the data that is originally in the PCR as it is reported, and as it is modified by supplemental PCRs from the command.

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Mr. MCHUGH. So it is transmitted initially from the field, as I
hear you say it, almost simultaneously to both the defense casualty
processing system, sent into that, but also into MARCENT. True?
General MAGNUS. The command in the field will begin to enter
casualty information processing as the Marine is evacuated from
the battlefield, assuming he has to be evacuated. And at each time
there is a change in his casualty information, if he goes from Al
Anbar to Balad to Landstuhl, the defense casualty information updates that status.
Now of course, if in fact, there is a fatality, that information
stops there. That then feeds into the other system which is the defense casualty system, but each time there is a change in status
by the command, they are supposed to indicate a supplemental personnel casualty report until the time that that individual either becomes fatal or the injury is lowered to the status of what is called
not seriously injured. That determination of that status is made
by a competent medical authority.
Mr. MCHUGH. The discrepancy, the numbers, was really rectified
at least in the moment, and I have heard you say that you are not
entirely confident, and I understand that, and you have got an ongoing review.
But that ongoing review really deals between whatever the two
data sets are held by the Headquarters of the Marine Corps and
MARCENT, yes? What I am concerned about, and I dont know if
this is strictly the Marine Corps duty here, but I am concerned
about the quality of data entered across the board into the defense
casualty processing system.
Is there any assurance that those data are accurate or jibing
with anything else? Did anybody look at that in your case or not?
General MAGNUS. That is going to be part of the deeper review
by, basically, a professional investigator. That is what their job is.
I think from my cursory look at thisand I know you have emphasized, Congressman, that I am not yet confident in our information or our numbersmy cursory review is that any error in system has a tendency to be perpetuated inside that system. The
Judge Advocate Generals investigation is about as close to the
flawless process that the congresswoman mentioned that is similar
in the pharmaceutical profession, because that is rigorously gone
over by lawyers and vetted at each chain.
But it is the casualty reporting chain that is the one that is subject to having either incorrect information later corrected. If it is
never entered into that system, it may not have the checks and balances to be corrected.
Mr. MCHUGH. I thank you, General. General, thank you for being
here today.
I yield back.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. McHugh.
Dr. Snyder.
Dr. SNYDER. Thank you.
General, you said, I think in response to Ms. Shea-Porter, that
you thought that a DOD-wide policy is essential, was your words,
and that Secretariat Dominguez is working on putting that together.

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Now the Commandants going to come out with a white letter to
disseminate to everyone. Is the timing of that potentially going to
be that the Commandant comes out with a white letter, then DOD
comes out with a policy, and you are going to have to say, Well,
our white letter is not quite consistent with DOD policy, and we
are going to have to adjust it?
I mean, the Army is very satisfied with their procedures now
after going through some real heartache, primarily because of Corporal Tillmans case. The Navy and the Air Force are satisfied;
they have recognized their numbers are lower than the Army and
Marine Corps.
Do we have the potential that everyone is going to have to adjust
in order to follow along this DOD-wide policy that you think is
coming?
General MAGNUS. Thank you, Congressman.
While I cant guarantee that we might not have a disconnect, we
are working closely with the Navy Secretariat and OSD to ensure
that their higher level guidance is consistent with what the Army
and the Marine Corps will be doing.
And our job is going to have implementing instructions far beyond that that is going to be in the white letter to the commanders
that will literally guide the training, the checklists, and if necessary, any modifications to our process, to ensure that we take
note of the Army model and make appropriate changes for the Marine Corps procedures.
Dr. SNYDER. I got you.
You said earlier that it is the inflicting force that is responsible
for the investigation. Is that correct?
General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir.
Dr. SNYDER. Is that true, then, if it is the inflicting force that
causes casualties of DOD civilians that are in Iraq or Afghanistan?
General MAGNUS. That is correct, sir. The DOD instructions
cover DOD civilians and DOD contractors that were killed or injured by hostile fire.
Dr. SNYDER. And what if the inflicting forceyour responsibility
would be a Marine Corps incident in which other government agency other than DOD civilians are casualties of a friendly fire in
which the Marine Corps is inflicting force, are you responsible for
that investigation?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, I am not aware of any circumstance, but of course, that potential exists particularly in this
war. A determination would be made by the appropriate command
as to who is going to do the investigation. And in the event that
it was classifiedand we have done classified investigations, I just
looked at one todaythat appropriate unclassified parts of that
were transmitted back into the systems that go to track casualties.
Dr. SNYDER. And then you have the potential issues ofI am focusing now on just U.S. citizensU.S. citizens who would get hurt
by a friendly fire incident, which may have no connection with government. They may be missionaries, they may be business people.
That is a third potential level of investigation.
My final question is, I would assume that when these incidents
occur, they are always heart-breaking for the soldiers and Marines
that are a part of them, that there is a learning experience that

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goes on at some level, perhaps multiple levels. What could we have
done different to avoid this?
And if you had asked me before Mr. McHugh, and I, and Ms.
Davis participated in this hearing at the end of June, I would have
thought that there would have been, perhaps fairly high level,
maybe in the Commandants office somewhere, someone responsible forYes, we have got a file on each one of these incidents;
we are looking for common links; we think it is because, I dont
know, the uniforms we were wearing; we think it is poor communication, but there seem to be some links.
But the fact that this has taken literally weeks of gathering
these different incidents together, I mean, it is pretty firm evidence
there is no one looking at these incidents saying, Is there a commonality that we can avoid this in the future? Is that a fair statement?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, I would say that as of today,
that is not a correct statement. There are lots of folks looking at
this.
Dr. SNYDER. As of a few weeks ago, it was a fair statement.
General MAGNUS. Unfortunately, that is true.
Dr. SNYDER. Because it would have seemed like that would have
been the first place you would have gone to is we have got this
overt colonel who is responsible for looking at all these just like we
have an office that looks at all IEDthat we are looking for ways
to prevent things from occurring in the future, but there hasnt
been any of that occurring in the Marine Corps as near as we can
tell. And that is probably unfortunate.
But thank you, General, for being here. We appreciate your time
and your service and working on this issue.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. DAVIS. Mr. Kline.
Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General, I would suspect that, following up on Dr. Snyders questions and remarks, if there are, over time, organizations that look
at things like this: the Center for Naval Analysis, the folks down
at Quantico who are looking at lessons learned, and so forth.
But that is different from the sort of on-the-spot taking a look
at the casualty reports that come in and the investigation. I dont
know that to be true, but I know that historically, it is true.
Dr. SNYDER. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. KLINE. Oh, happy to.
Dr. SNYDER. But if the official word six weeks ago was that there
had only been two incidents, that means that those groups that you
cited would have probably been only informed of two incidents.
Mr. KLINE. Entirely possible. I am not disagreeing at all. I am
just saying that as a matter of course, that sort of after-action investigation has gone on conflict after conflict and I am sure it
would here, too. I am not excusing all the discrepancies.
And as I said in my earlier comments, there is no doubt that
processes have to be changed, and that is what you are moving forward with.
And I just want to get clear for our understanding, for the record,
that in the Inspector Generals effort, as he looks at everything
that happened, should there be an indication that something other

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than courage, honor and commitment was demonstrated by someone involved. That there was an expectation in this process that
such person would then be moved to administrative or legal, Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), that there will beif misconduct of any kind occurredthat will be addressed as well? Is
that correct?
General MAGNUS. Congressman, that is absolutely correct.
Mr. KLINE. I thought I heard that in an earlier question. I just
wanted to make it perfectly clear that as part of this process goes
forward, you are not only looking at what happened to an end of
change in processes, but if there were misbehavior of any sort, that
will be brought to light as well. You have answered it. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Kline.
All right, thank you.
General, we really appreciate the fact that you have been here
and answering the questions and trying to help us clarify a number
of issues.
One of the concerns that we heard as we sat in the meeting on
the 27th centered around the term, suspected friendly fire, and
it was our understanding that the family wasnt notified of that initially, but that that has changed. And I just wanted to clarify that.
At what point is a family notified of a suspected friendly fire incident?
General MAGNUS. A family is required to be notified of suspected
friendly fire or indeterminate cause of either a fatality, a very serious injury, or serious injury. They are required to be notified at the
same time frames as our preliminary personnel casualty report; in
other words, within the hours of 0500 until midnight.
If that status changes, if for good reason it was incorrectly reported as enemy fire, subsequently determined to be indeterminate,
we are to immediately do the same thing and then to update that
family in 30 days unless there has been a completion backing that
up with a letter to let them know what the status is.
Ms. DAVIS. So it is correct to say that families are notified earlier
today than they were before we started to take a look at this incident. Is that correct? Because it was our understanding that actually they werent notified until after an investigation was done, if
it was indeterminate.
Are you saying that now it is that they are notified, if it is indeterminate, early on?
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, that is correct. And they
should have been notified in accordance with statute and regulation previously.
In the case of Lance Corporals Shuder and Zurheide, that incident on the 12th of April, that was not even in accordance with our
regulations. Literally, it was over two years to the notification.
Ms. DAVIS. Right, okay.
And finally, just to focus on the educational process for those
that are part of this process and are part of the notification process. What do you see in terms of changes, reforms, that would be
taking place at the adjutant schools as a result of changes in the
white letter, which we understand has not come out yet, and you
are suggesting that it is going to be more than a reemphasis. It is

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going to be more specific in terms of the standard of procedures
that follow that, which we hope are in line with thatthere is still
this educational process over here.
What changes do you foresee? And is it a matter of time spent
in trying to retrain, difference of emphasis? What do you anticipate
will be taking place?
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, first off, I think this will
take place quite rapidly. I actually think that our procedures, although they need to be reviewed and there will probably be some
changes, they were more than adequate if people understood the
necessity to cross check.
But the commanding officers and the commanding generals will
be advised of not only the reemphasis, but the changes that we
want to put in place immediately and any changes that come subsequently with the DOD instruction and changes in Marine Corps
order.
The judge advocates will be advised. And quite frankly, I think
they do their process quite well. But of the connectivity, again, of
these systems, and perhaps most importantly, the noncommissioned officers and officers that manned the command operational
centers which do the initial and update reporting, they need to be
ensured that the procedures they are trained by and their reports
are consistent.
Quite frankly, the lynchpin on this, though, Madam Chairman,
is the casualty section itself. To be ensured that they are aware
and get the information on all three of these processes, that they
rigorously cross-check and question things that dont match up.
And, ultimately, the Inspector Generals checklist has to be modified to ensure that we periodically go back and check this process,
which cant be something that you only check once every 12
months.
So there are other things the IG, himself, is going to do to ensure
that we have appropriate checks and balances.
Ms. DAVIS. What do you think is a fair amount of time for us to
allow these changes to take place, whatever training is required,
the white letter to move forward, and to bring either you back,
General, or your representative to take a look at this and see how
we are doing? Is it six months? Is it a year? What is a fair amount
of time to take a look?
General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, after you receive the results of the IGs investigation with our endorsements for actions on
it, I believe we will have made the necessary changes within the
Marine Corps within 30 to 60 days, to get it promulgated across
the core. Obviously, the focus will be on the deployed and deploying
combat units.
Any changes that may become from changing orders and directives may happen later, but I think the ones that are going to address everyones correct concerns about the deficiencies in these
systems, they will be done within 30 to 60 days.
Ms. DAVIS. I appreciate that.
Can I assume that if there are some problems that arise, that
you will let us know about those so that we have an
opportunity

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General MAGNUS. Madam Chairwoman, we are going to provide
the committee staff copies of every single directive document, including the Commandants letter that occurs as a result of this.
Ms. DAVIS. Okay, thank you very much, General.
Again, thank you very much for your service. Thank you for your
frankness here, today. We appreciate it.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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A P P E N D I X
AUGUST 2, 2007

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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

AUGUST 2, 2007

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