[No.

88]

G.R. No. L-19382

August 31, 1965

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.

Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.

Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS:
On December 22, 1960 Filomena ABELLANA de Bacayo filed a petition for the
summary settlement of the estate of MELODIA Ferraris before the Cebu CFI. Melodia was last
seen in Intramuros, Manila (where she was a resident since 1937). The estate proceedings were
had since Melodia was presumptively dead (she was last seen in 1944).

She left 6,000 pesos worth of properties located in Cebu City. She left no direct descendants, her
only surviving relatives being;
Abellana (Melodias aunt; half-sister of her father);
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris (FERRARIS
SIBLINGS, children of Melodias only brother Arturo, who died in 1947
[predeceased Melodia]). They opposed the estate proceedings.

On September 20, 1961 RULING of CFI: In favor of the Ferraris siblings. The Ferraris
siblings, as children of Melodias only predeceased brother, exclude Abellana because the former
are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by right of
representation, while Abellana is three degrees distant from Melodia, and because other collateral
relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in
accordance with Article1009, NCC.

Abellana filed a paupers appeal before the SC.

ISSUE:

Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is survived only by
collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her?
Otherwise, will the aunt concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or
will the former be excluded by the latter?

HELD:

The nieces and nephew are the intestate heirs. The aunt is excluded.

We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews from
the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong
degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and then descending to the heir
(Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces
alone do not inherit by right of representation (i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers
or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they
shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts.
But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions.

Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and
nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the
succession. This is readily apparent from Articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent
is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that immediately
preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles 952 and 954 of the Code of
1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces, children of the
former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving
spouse, if not separated by a final
decree of divorce, shall succeed to the
entire estate of the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers
or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate
deceased.

of

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of the
whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces
inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals succeeded only after
the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines merely placed the spouse on a
par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters of the deceased, but without altering the
preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other collaterals.
Under Arts. 952 and 954 of the old Code, siblings and niblings of the decedent
inherited ahead of the surviving spouse, while the other collateral relatives inherited only after
the surviving spouse. The New Civil Code simply placed the spouse on par with the siblings and
niblings of the deceased, without altering the preferred position of the latter vis--vis the other
collateral relatives.
The reliance on Tolentinos commentaries to Article 1009 is misplaced. Indeed there is no
order of preference under Article 1009, but this is true with respect to Other collaterals because
their order of preference is already provided for in Article 962, which embodied the general
principle that relatives nearer in degree exclude the farther ones.
Tolentino does not say that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of equal
degree. In fact he is of the opposing view (and counsel for Abellana unethically failed to quote
the whole portion of Tolentinos comments which shows this :
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or
children of brothers or sisters.
They are, however, limited to relatives within
the fifth degree. Beyond this, we can safely
say there is hardly any
affection to merit the succession of collaterals. Under the law,

therefore,
relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer considered as relatives, for
successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest
relatives exclude the farther.
Collaterals of the same degree inherit in
equal parts, there being no right of representation.
They succeed without
distinction of lines or preference among them on account of the
whole blood relationship.
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts
may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are
willing and qualified to succeed.

[ Number 89]
NERI VS. HEIRS OF SPOUSES UY
Facts: This case is a petition for review on certiorari by petitioners: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda,
Rosa, Douglas, Eutropia, and Victoria seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of the CA
which annulled the Decision of the RTC of Davao del Norte, and entered a new one dismissing
Ps complaint for annulment of sale and damages against herein respondent.
During the lifetime of Ps mother, Anunciacion, she and her 2nd husband, Enrique, acquired
several homestead properties. When Anunciacion died, however, Enrique in his personal capacity
and as natural guardian of his minor children Rosa and Douglas, together with, Napoleon, Alicia

and Visminda executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale
(1979) adjudicating among themselves the said homestead properties, and thereafter, sold the
properties to the late spouses Uy for a consideration of 80,000.
On 1996, the children of Enrique filed a complaint for annulment of the said sale against spouses
Uy, assailing the validity of the sale for having been sold within the prohibited period. And, also,
for having been executed without the consent or approval of Eutropia, Victoria, Rosa and
Douglas; thus, depriving the latter siblings of their legitime.
Uy countered that the sale took place beyond the 5 year prohibitory period from the issuance of
the homestead patents. They also denied that Eutropia and Victoria were excluded from the
Extra-judicial settlement and sale of the subject properties, and interposed further the defense of
prescription and laches.
RTC rendered a Decision annulling the Extra-judicial settlement of estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale. It ruled that the sale is void because Eutropia and Victoria were deprived of their hereditary
rights and that Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the shares of his minor children, Rosa and
Douglas.
On appeal, however, CA reserved and set aside RTC decision. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether Enrique, as guardian of his children and co-owner (with his children), sell their
co-owned property?
Decision: No, as to the shares of the minor children because as a natural guardian, he is merely
clothed with powers of administration.
Doctrine: Parents should apply for judicial guardianship in order for them to sell properties of
their children.
*Even the parents of their minor children are bound to post bond.*
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were minors at the time of the execution of the settlement
and sale, their NATURAL GUARDIAN and father, Enrique, represented them in the transaction.
However, on the basis of the laws prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely clothed with
POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION and bereft of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in
the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Power of dominion, is granted by law only to a JUDICIAL GUARDIAN of the wards property
and even then only with courts prior approval secured in accordance with the proceedings set
forth by the Rules.
Exception: RATIFICATION. Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by Enrique in behalf of
his minor children without the proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them upon reaching
the age of majority, is unenforceable in accordance with Art. 1317 and 1403(1) of the Civil Code.

Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with
absolute deed of sale. The same, however, is not true with respect to Douglas for lack of
evidence showing ratification.
THEREFORE, the extrajudicial settlement with sale is invalid and not binding on Eutropia,
Victoria and Douglas. Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted heirs became pro indiviso
co-owners of the homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who retained title to
their respective shares.

[ No. 90]
Francisca Alsua-Betts, Joseph O. Betts, Jose Madareta, Esteban P. Ramirez, And The Register
Of Deeds For Albay Province vs Court Of Appeals, Amparo Alsua Buenviaje, Fernando
Buenviaje, Fernando Alsua, Represented By His Guardian, Clotilde S. Alsua And Pablo Alsua.
92 SCRA 332 July 30, 1979

FACTS:

Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Doa Tinay, together with all their living children, entered into a
duly notarized agreement, (escritura de particion extrajudicial/extra judicial partition) for the
inventory and partition of all the spouses present and existing properties. In the provision of said
extra judicial partition, each of the four children was allotted with the properties considered as
their share in the estate or as inheritance left by the deceased where they will be the absolute
owner of the properties assigned in case of death of one of the spouses. (2)Don Jesus and Doa
Tinay also separately executed holographic will with exactly the same terms and conditions in
conformity with the executed extra judicial partition naming each other as an executor without
having to post any bond. That in case new properties be acquired same shall be partitioned one
half to the surviving spouse and the other half to children of equal parts.
(3).Spouses subsequently executed separately a codicil of exactly the same terms and conditions,
amending and supplementing their holographic wills stating that they reserved for themselves the
other half not disposed of to their legitimate heirs under the agreement of partition and mutually
and reciprocally bequeathed each other their participation as well all properties which might be
acquired subsequently. Doa Tinay died in effect Don Jesus by order of the probate court was
name as executor.
Before Don Jesus died he cancelled his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and
secretary and instructed his lawyer to draft a new will. This was a notarial will and testament of 3
essential features as follows;
1. It expressly cancelled revoked and annulled all the provisions of his holographic will and
codicil.
2. It provided for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living children by virtue of
the Escritura de Partition Extra judicial.
3. It instituted his children as legatees / devisees of specific properties, and as to the rest of the
properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the future, before his death, were to be
given to Francisca and Pablo naming Francisca as executor to serve without a bond.
ISSUE:
1.W/N oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to question the competence of testator
Don Jesus Alsua.
2.Whether testator Don Jesus can or cannot revoke his previous will.
RULING:
1.The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings ( case of Testate Estate of the
Late Procopia Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, Probate proceedings
involve public interest, and the application therein of the rule of estoppel, when it will block the
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the execution of a testament,
would seem inimical to public policy. Over and above the interest of private parties is that of the
state to see that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if, executed conformably to
law.
2. We rule that Don Jesus was not forever bound of his previous holographic will and codicil as
such, would remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is clear: "A will
may be revoked by the testator at any time before his death. Any waiver or restriction of this

right is void." There can be no restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke
his holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold true even if such previous
will had as in the case at bar already been probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in
the first place, probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the efficacy of the
dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the succession are transmitted only from the
moment of the death of the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus retained
the liberty of disposing of his property before his death to whomsoever he chose, provided the
legitime of the forced heirs are not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed
that only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is being contested

[ No. 91]
Spouses Ramon Doromal, Sr. and Rosario Salas, and Spouses Ramon Doromal, Jr. and
Gaudelia Vega
vs.
Honorable Court of Appeals and Filomena Javellana
G.R. No. L-36083
05 September 1975
FACTS

Lot 3504 of the cadastral survey of Iloilo, situated in the Poblacion of La Paz with an area of two
and half hectares was originally decreed in the name of the late Justice Antonio Horilleno in
1916 under Original Certificate of Title No. 1314. Before Justice Horilleno died, he executed a
last will and testament attesting to the fact that it was a co-ownership between himself and his
brothers and sisters, Luis, Soledad, Fe, Rosita, Carlos, and Esperanza who is survived by her
daughter Filomena Javellana.
Since early 1967, Carlos and the other co-owners with the daughter of decease Justice Horilleno,
decided to sell their shares even before their rights had not yet been annotated in the title. The coowners made an SPA in favour of Mary Jimenez and caused the preparation of another SPA for
the plaintiff, Filomenas signature, with a letter from Carlos informing her that the selling price is
PhP4.00 per square meter although it turned out that Carlos received an earnest money from
defendant, Ramon Doromal, Jr. and that the price therein agreed upon is PhP5.00 per square
meter as stated in the subsequent letter of Carlos to the plaintiff dated 05 November 1967.
The plaintiff did not agree to the sale, hence, did not sign the SPA sent by the other co-owners.
The rest of the co-owners which comprises 6/7 of the shares on the property proceeded with the
sale. On 29 April 1968, Carlos went to the Register of Deeds and caused the registration of the
order of the cadastral court approving the issuance of a new title in the name of the co-owners as
well as the Deed of Sale to the Doromals, as a result of which, a new title was issued under the
name of the vendees, Doromals with 6/7 shares and the plaintiff, Filomena Javellana, with 1/7
shares. The Deed of Sale indicated a selling price of PhP30,000.00, however, the vendees
actually paid PhP115, 250.00.
One 08 June 1968 the plaintiffs lawyer went to the residence of the Doromals bringing with him
a letter stating that the plaintiff would like make a formal offer to repurchase or redeem the
property which was sold by her co-owners in the amount of PhP30, 000.00. However, the
Doromals refused to accept the offer on the ground that the plaintiff had no more right to redeem
the property as it was out of time, and granting that the plaintiff has the right to repurchase the
property, the value to be paid should be PhP115, 250.00 which represents the amount that was
actually paid the Doromals.
The Trial court ruled in favor of the Doromals stating that the plaintiff was informed of the
intended sale of the 6/7 share of the property and that the plaintiff wanted to enrich herself at the
expense of her own blood relatives.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Trial court ruling that although Javellana was
informed of her co-owners proposal to sell the land in question to petitioners, she was, however,
never notified at least in writing of the actual execution and registration of the corresponding
Deed of Sale, hence, her right to redeem had not yet expired at the time she made the offer on 08
June 1968. The appellate court also held that the redemption price to be paid by the respondent
should be that what is stated in the Deed of Sale which is PhP30, 000.00.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Trial Courts Decision on the
ground that the notice in writing contemplated in Article 1623 of the Civil Code refers to
the notice in writing after the execution of the Document of Sale.

Assuming arguendo that Filomena Javellana has the right to redeem the property in
question, whether or not the redemption price should be the amount that is stated in the
Deed of Sale.

RULING
On the first issue:
No. Article 1623 of the Civil Code provides:
The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty
days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case
may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all
possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.
With the aforementioned law, it is of the Opinion of the Supreme Court the notice in writing
which Article 1623 requires to be made to the other co-owners and from receipt of which the 30day period to redeem should be counted is a notice not only of a perfected sale but of the actual
execution and delivery of the deed of sale. This is implied from the latter portion of Article 1623
which requires that before a register of deeds can record a sale by a co-owner, there must be
presented to him, an affidavit to the effect that the notice of the sale had been sent in writing to
the other co-owners.
In this case, the letter sent by Carlos Horilleno to respondent dated 18 January 1968 and 05
November 1967 constituted the required notice in writing from which the 30-day period fixed in
the said provision should be computed. However, there is no showing that said letters were in
fact received by respondent and when they were actually received.
On the second issue:
No. As stated in the Decision under review, the trial court found that the consideration of
PhP30,000.00 was only placed in the Deed of Sale to minimize the payment of the registration
fees, stamps, and sales tax. With this undisputed fact in mind, it is impossible for the Supreme
Court to sanction petitioners pragmatic but immoral posture. Being patently violative of public
policy and injurious to public interest, the seemingly wide practice of understating considerations
of transactions for the purpose of evading taxes and fees due to the government must be
condemned and all parties guilty thereof must be made to suffer the consequences of their illadvised agreement to defraud the state.

The Supreme Court also pointed out two provisions in the Civil Code: Article 1619 and 1620 to
justify that the Court of Appeals was correct in its considerations supporting the conclusion that
the redemption in controversy should be only for the price stipulated in the Deed.

[ No. 92]
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72873, May 28, 1987
CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA,respondents.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered
in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac.
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the
herein petitioners for the sum of P550 by way of absolute sale. One year later, Eustaquia Padua,
his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de
Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440. By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after
the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to
them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent,
their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an
American citizen.
On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint
invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the right had lapsed, not
having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although
there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
satisfied the requirement of the law. In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs
cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot,
which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners .
Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla,
who later claimed redemption petition. Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents
were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together.
CA, reversed the trial court decision. It declared that the notice required by Art.1088 of
the Civil Code was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. To wit:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger
before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the
rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they
were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.
ISSUE:
1.) WON there was a valid and sufficient notice of the sale.
2.) WON there was laches.
RULING:
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases
make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no
written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article
1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period
for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general
rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged
delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla
Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The
delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there
was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.
1.) YES.
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense
that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor
of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose.
The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We
are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not
in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.
2.) YES.
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963
and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for
redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the
30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during
the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties
sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had
already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired. The following
doctrine is also worth noting:
While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion
of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the
facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as
should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were
readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be
chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts.
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who
were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of
strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee.
This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the coheirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It
took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it
was already too late.

We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter
of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence.
The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this
Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not
abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an
exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended
during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption
in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for
this exception.

[ No. 93]
BAUTISTA VS. GRINO-AQUINO
FACTS: The case is about Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate among the heirs of the late Juliana
Nojadera, the first wife of Manuel Bautista, the petitioner. Based on the agreed stipulation of
facts of the Extra-Judicial partition , both parties admitted that the land in question was
registered in the name of the petitioner , Manuel Bautista under TCT No. 2210, and the latter
inherited this land from his father, Mariano Bautista. A Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was
executed. Private respondents were signatories to the deed, and the signature of petitioner

Manuel Bautista was supposed to appear in that document, although petitioner Manuel Bautista
denied having signed that Extrajudicial Partition. The parties admit that the private respondents,
with the exception of Manolito Bautista, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Manolito
Bautista of that property, which later on conveyed back the property through Contract of Sale to
the other respondents. Parties admit that Manuel Bautista and his second wife, Emiliana Tamayo,
had only a child, Evangeline Bautista. The petitioner denied participation in the Extrajudicial
Partition of Property. They brought the document to the NBI to test the genuineness of the
document and it concluded that the questioned document and signature was authentic.
Issue: Whether or not the property of the surviving husband be the subject of an extrajudicial
partition of the estate of the deceased wife.
Held: No. Even granting that the signature of Manuel Bautista in the questioned Extrajudicial
Deed of Partition is genuine, an examination of the document based on admitted and proven facts
renders the document fatally defective. The extrajudicial partition was supposed to be a partition
without court intervention of the estate of the late Juliana Nojadera, first wife of Manuel
Bautista, constituting the subject property. In the same document Manuel Bautista appears to
have waived his right or share in the property in favor of private respondents.The property
subject matter of said extrajudicial partition does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera. It
is the exclusive property of Manuel Bautista who inherited the same from his father Mariano
Bautista, which was registered in his name .
Under Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court an extrajudicial settlement of the Estate applies
only to the estate left by the decedent who died without a will, and with no creditors, and the
heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives. If the
property does not belong to the estate of the decedent certainly it cannot be the subject matter of
an extrajudicial partition.
As the subject property does not belong to the estate of Juliana Nojadera, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition, is void ab initio being contrary to law.
The said partition also effectively resulted in the preterition of the right of Evangeline
Bautista as a compulsory heir of Manuel Bautista, daughter of the latter by his second marriage.

[ No. 94]
De los Santos v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-29192, 22 February 1971

FACTS

The parties admit that the owner of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate; that defendant-appellant (De la Cruz)is a
nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee (De los Santos) is a grandniece of Pelagia de
la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece who predeceased said Pelagia de la Cruz;
and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the
estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

ISSUE

What is the effect of an extra-judicial partition which included a person who is not an heir of the
deceased?

RULING

The extrajudicial partition agreement is void with respect to plaintiff-appellee.

Article 1105 of the Civil Code provides: A partition which includes a person believed to be a
heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. Partition of property
affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner thereof and another person
who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the
rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null and void. A fortiori,
plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its terms enforced.

[ No. 95]
G.R. No. 169272
NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA'IS OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by its Secretary General vs. ALFREDO S. PASCUAL, in his capacity as the Regional Executive
Director, Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, Regional Office No. 32.
FACTS:

The petitioner alleged that it is the lawful and absolute owner of two (2) parcels of land, known
as Cadastral Lot Nos. 3 and 361, together with the two-storey building thereon, situated in
Victory Sur, Santiago City, acquired through a sale in 1967 from Armando Valdez and Emma
Valdez, respectively, who, in turn, acquired ownership from Marcelina Ordoo. The petitioner
had been in open, continuous and adverse possession for a period of more than thirty (30) years,
and a cloud exists on its title because of an invalid December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of
Lands. This invalid decision rejected the miscellaneous sales applications of the petitioners
predecessors-in-interest for the lots, and ordered all those in privity with them (specifically
including the petitioner) to vacate the lots and to remove their improvements thereon. The DENR
Secretary affirmed the Bureau of Lands decision.
The DENR Regional Office No. 2, moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. It argued that the petitioner had no legal right or title to file the complaint since the final
and executory Bureau of Lands December 4, 1985 decision ruled that the petitioner was not
entitled to possess the lots.
CA set aside the RTCs order and dismissed the complaint for quieting of title for failure to state
a cause of action. It found that the respondents admission of the Bureau of Lands adverse
decision precluded the respondents claim over the lots. The Bureau of Lands decision, being
final and executory, is binding and conclusive upon the petitioner. Even assuming that the OPs
ruling on the appeal was still "unavailable," the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for
prematurity; an action to quiet title is not the proper remedy from an adverse decision issued by
an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in finding that the RTC committed a grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing the petitioners complaint for quieting of title for failure to state a
cause of action.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit as the CA committed no reversible error in its ruling. The court finds it
clear that the petitioner no longer had any legal or equitable title to or interest in the
lots.1wphi1 The petitioners status as possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the
final and executory decision of the Bureau of Lands that the DENR Secretary and the OP
affirmed on appeal. Thus, the petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the
lots. Jurisprudence teaches us that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, such as
the Bureau of Lands, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, upon finality, have the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.
The foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once.

[ No. 96]
G.R. No. L-612
JOSEFA AGUSTINES, ENCARNACION AGUSTINES, JOSE AGUSTINES, LOURDES
AGUSTINES, ESTELA AGUSTINES, and ABELARDO AGUSTINES, petitioners,
vs.

THE JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BULACAN, SEVERO

VALENZUELA, and THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF
MANILA, respondents.
FACTS
In August, 1934, Generosa Agustines died leaving a will which was submitted for probate
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Having no children, her surviving husband Severo
Valenzuela is her universal heir, but she specified some bequests. There was opposition to the
approval of the will, however, after some negotiations, the sister and the nephews and nieces of
the testator executed on February 8, 1935, an extrajudicial partition with the respondent, dividing
the properties of the deceased. They promised specifically to respect the wishes of the testatrix,
one of which was this:
Sexto Encargo a mi marido que, despues de que haya percibido
todos los bienes recayentes en mi herencia done ... a la
xxx
xxx
xxx
Iglesia Catolica de Polo otra porcion que no exceda de nueve
hectareas, a discrecion tambien de mi marido, del mismo terreno
palayero e inculto, en el sitio de Quiririt, para que su producto se
invierta en misas en sufragio de mi alma.
Severo Valenzuela failed to transmit the lot or part thereof to the parish church of Polo or
to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. In May 1944, the Agustines connections,
petitioners herein, filed a complaint against Severo Valenzuela to return to them of that ninehectare lot in Quiririt, alleging his breach of trust, plus renunciation on the part of the church of
Polo that had reportedly neglected to demand compliance with the beneficial legacy.
The surviving husband submitted a motion in which he represented that under the will he
had discretion to determine the area of land to be conveyed to the Polo church and that,
exercising such discretion, he elected to assign that tract actually cultivated by a tenant. He asked
that this assignment be declared full compliance with the testamentary directions. The other
parties were not given due notice of this petition, hence it was approved on December 2, 1944.
After the petitioners acquired knowledge of the same they filed their Motion for
Reconsideration alleging that the 9 hectare tract, when repudiated by the Roman Catholic
Church, said parcel will revert back to the entire portion and hence subject of partition among the
remaining relatives of the deceased. On the other hand, Severo Valenzuela's position is that the
whole nine-hectare realty was awarded to him, subject to his obligation to donate to the Polo
church such portion thereof as he may designate in his discretion. The intervenor, the Archbishop
of Manila, representing the Polo church, shares the petitioner's opinion that a nine-hectare lot had
been granted to said church. He maintains, however, that no voluntary renunciation of the legacy
ever took place.
ISSUES

Will the deed of partition or the will of the deceased which was opposed will govern the
disposition?
HELD
The extrajudicial partition definitely alloted a nine-hectare parcel to the Polo church.,
under the will Valenzuela's discretion included the determination of the area to be transferred and
not merely the selection of the site where the nine-hectare portion is to be segregated still in the
partition he elected or agreed that a nine-hectare portion shall be conveyed to the Polo church for
masses.
It must be emphasized that in the distribution of the decedent's assets, we must face the
deed of partition which bear's the court's fiat. The last will becomes secondary in value.
Wherefore, the order of the Bulacan court of December 2, 1944 is declared null and void
and of no effect whatsoever.

G.R. No. 183053

[ No. 97]
October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner,

vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

FACTS: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico), died
intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina
and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her husband, Federico, and
several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay.
Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women,
Concepcion Mendoza and Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine
months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the
spouses Federico and Cristina.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted
their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.Respondent filed a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration in her favor. Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his
grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging,
among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition
was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio III
and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of
Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one who managed their
conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was
grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels allegation that some of the properties are in the
hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed
a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator
of the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better
right to the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which
essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his

stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the
decedent, Cristina.
The trial court ruled in favor of federico and Emilio III but upon appeal, it was reversed by the
CA.
ISSUE: WON EMILIO III HAS A BETTER RIGHT TO BE APPOINTED AS
ADMINISTRATOR.
HELD: Yes!
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the
wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule,[18] is quite
the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico
and Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of
legitimate relatives;
3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who
both acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as
forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her husband,
Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death,
remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate
of Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering
that the CA even declared that under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have
the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his
share in the conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal
reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative
by reason of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will,
or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court.In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.

[No. 98]
G.R. No. 193161
August 22, 2011
DIOSDADO S. MANUNGAS, Petitioner,
vs.
MARGARITA AVILA LORETO and FLORENCIA AVILA PARREO, Respondents.

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
Engracia Manungas was the wife of Florentino Manungas. They had no children. Instead, they
adopted Samuel David Avila (Avila) on August 12, 1968. Florentino Manungas died intestate on
May 29, 1977, while Avila predeceased his adoptive mother. Avila was survived by his wife
Sarah Abarte Vda. de Manungas.
Thereafter, Engracia Manungas filed a Motion for Partition of Estate on March 31, 1980 in the
intestate estate proceedings of Florentino Manungas, of which she was the administratrix. She
stated that there are no other legal and compulsory heirs of Florentino Manungas except for
herself, Avila and a Ramon Manungas whom she acknowledged as the natural son of Florentino
Manungas. Meanwhile, Avilas widow executed a Waiver of Rights and Participation on October
29, 1980, renouncing her rights over the separate property of her husband in favor of Engracia
Manungas.
A Decree of Final Distribution was issued in the intestate estate proceedings of Florentino
Manungas distributing the properties to Engracia Manungas and Ramon Manungas, the surviving
heirs.
On October 25, 1995, the RTC, Branch 4 in Panabo City, appointed Parreo, the niece of
Engracia Manungas, as the Judicial Guardian of the properties and person of her incompetent
aunt. Engracia Manungas, through Parreo, then instituted Civil Case No. 5196-96 against the
spouses Diosdado Salinas Manungas and Milagros Pacifico for illegal detainer and damages with
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Panabo City. In their answer, the spouses Salinas claimed
that Diosdado is the illegitimate son of Florentino Manungas.
On appeal to this Court, defendants petition was denied for having been filed out of time in a
Resolution which became final on April 20, 1998.9
Thereafter, on August 7, 1998, Diosdado instituted a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over the Estate of Engracia Manungas (Estate of Manungas) in his favor before
the RTC, Branch 2 in Tagum City, Davao. He alleged that he, being an illegitimate son of
Florentino Manungas, is an heir of Engracia Manungas. However, as opposed by the Loreto
dated on May 15, 2002, the RTC issued an Order appointing Parreo as the administrator of the
Estate of Manungas.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Diosdado should be the the administrator of Manungas Estate on the ground that
hes illegitimate child of Florentino.
HELD: NO.

The fact that Diosdado is an heir to the estate of Florentino Manungas does not mean that he is
entitled or even qualified to become the special administrator of the Estate of Manungas.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the appointment of a special administrator lies within the discretion
of the court. In Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo v. Lacuata-Gabriel, it was stated that:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain
persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory
provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No.
190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. x
x x As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the
person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to
reason, justice or equity. (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted.)
While the trial court has the discretion to appoint anyone as a special administrator of the estate,
such discretion must be exercised with reason, guided by the directives of equity, justice and
legal principles. It may, therefore, not be remiss to reiterate that the role of a special
administrator is to preserve the estate until a regular administrator is appointed. As stated in Sec.
2, Rule 80 of the Rules:
Section 2. Powers and duties of special adminsitrator. Such special administrator shall
take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased
and preserve the same for the executors or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that
purpose may commence and maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable
and other property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any
debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.
Given this duty on the part of the special administrator, it would, therefore, be prudent and
reasonable to appoint someone interested in preserving the estate for its eventual distribution to
the heirs. Such choice would ensure that such person would not expose the estate to losses that
would effectively diminish his or her share. While the court may use its discretion and depart
from such reasoning, still, there is no logical reason to appoint a person who is a debtor of the
estate and otherwise a stranger to the deceased. To do so would be tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion.
Hence, the CA ruled that the trial court erred in issuing the November 4, 2002 Order, acting with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as the special administrator of Engracia
Manungas estate:
In any case, the trial court erred in revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila
Parreo as Special Administrator on the ground that it found merit in Diosdados
contention that he is the illegitimate child of the late Florentino Manangus. The
evidence on record shows that Diosdado is not related to the late Engracia and so
he is not interested in preserving the latters estate. On the other hand, Florencia,

who is a former Judicial guardian of Engracia when she was still alive and who is
also the niece of the latter, is interested in protecting and preserving the estate of
her late aunt Engracia, as by doing so she would reap the benefit of a wise
administration of the decedents estate.Hence, the Order of the lower court
revoking the appointment of Florencia Avila Parreo as special administrator
constitutes not only a reversible error, but also a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the lower court
exercised its power in a despotic, arbitrary or capricious manner, as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act at all in contemplation of law. (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must
be remembered that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate
proceedings that have long been terminated with the proceeds distributed to the heirs with the
issuance of a Decree of Final Distribution. With the termination of the intestate estate
proceedings of Florentino Manungas, Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas,
is still not an heir of Engracia Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of
Manungas. In fact, Diosdado is a debtor of the estate and would have no interest in preserving its
value. There is no reason to appoint him as its special administrator. The trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in appointing Diosdado as special administrator of the Estate of
Manungas. The CA correctly set aside the November 4, 2002 Order of the RTC.

[ No. 99]
SUNTAY VS. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was
survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate

grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including
petitioner Emilio III, all by Federicos and Cristinas only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I),
who predeceased his parents.
after Cristinas death, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos,
Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristinas estate. Federico
filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabels petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel
had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the
latter as a result of Isabels parents marriage being declared null and void.
ndaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedents estate on
his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed
an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging
that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and
manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
ISSUE: WHO BETWEEN EMILIO AND ISABEL IS BETTER QUALFIED TO ACT AS
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEDENT ESTATE
RULING: ISABEL
The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent
is the prospective administrators interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration which
Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment
of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer

the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an
order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedents estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other
candidate.

[No. 100]
THELMA M. ARANAS vs. TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M.
ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO
G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014

FACTS:
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado,
Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M.
Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin L. Mercado
and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of
Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.
Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the
appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate. The RTC granted the petition
considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his
death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only personal properties" worth P6,675,435.25 in
all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20; furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry
valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30
shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P22,708.25.
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993, 3
supporting her inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir
Realty shares of stock; 4 the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407 Mervir
Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; 5 and the certificate of stock issued
on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth P30,000.00.
Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory. The
RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be
examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory. Thelma
opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on the
inventory.
The RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory
submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included. The RTC denied the
administratrix's motion for approval of inventory and orders the said administratrix to re-do the
inventory of properties which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S.

Mercado. The RTC also directed the administratrix to render an account of her administration of
the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession.
Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order
of March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in
Badian, Cebu, had already been sold to Mervir Realty,
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision insofar as the inclusion of the inclusion of
parcels of land known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square
meters subject matter of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment dated February 17, 1989 and January
10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding
that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in
Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
RULING: No. The CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was
unwarranted and erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES
and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued
on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB
entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve
the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.
RATIO:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator,
but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all heirs of the
decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired. Its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the
estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the
inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
Under Section 6 (a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to
serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory
of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of
administration pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three

months. Within three (3) months after his appointment every
executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory
and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased
which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or more of
the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and
personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the properties
must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her possession as the
administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of
their being in the possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate
of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the
executor or the administrator, and in malting a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the
estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate." Hence, the RTC that presides
over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to
be included or excluded from the inventory in the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for
in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges enjoy ample discretionary
powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action taken
by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion." As long as the
RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the
regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special
and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do
regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory
of properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may
be still revised. As the Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement
of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of
ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title
to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties,
not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the

administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court
exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and
convenience.
The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the
question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice
to final determination of ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired,
then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction extends
to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.
The inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important
purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061
of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita
herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he (or she) may have
received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that
any advancement by the decedent on the legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by
the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon
shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby expanded
the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to
the inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties
donated or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.
The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the
inventory of estate properties was well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted with circumspection, and proceeded
under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the possession of the
administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC
commits no patent grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasijudicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge,
tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical
manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

[ No. 101]
Amelia P. Arellano, rep. by her duly appointed guardians, Agnes P. Arellano and Nona P.
Arellano
vs.
Francisco Pascual and Miguel Pascual

G.R. No. 189776

15 December 2010
FACTS
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely:
petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters, Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes)
and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual.
Respondents filed a petition for "Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of
Administration alleging, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa
Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the
validity of which donation respondents assailed, "may be considered as an advance legitime" of
petitioner. Respondents nephew Victor was, as they prayed for, appointed as Administrator of
the estate.
The donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner which respondents assailed but
which they, in any event, posited that it "may be considered as an advance legitime" to petitioner,
the trial court, acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of
the donation. Provisionally passing, however, upon the question of title to the donated property
only for the purpose of determining whether it formed part of the decedents estate, the probate
court found the Deed of Donation valid in light of the presumption of validity of notarized
documents. It thus went on to hold that it is subject to collation following Article 1061 of the
New Civil Code.
The probate court thereafter partitioned the properties of the intestate estate and disposing,
among others, that the subject property be part of the estate of Angel N. Pascual, and that it be
subject to collation.
An appeal to the Court of Appeals was made, questioning the order of the trial court to include
the property subject of the donation as part of the advance inheritance of the petitioner and the
appellate court sustained the findings of the trial court as to the collation of the said parcel of
land.
ISSUES
Whether or not the property donated to the appellant Amelia Pascual Arellano is part of the estate
of Angel N. Pascual and if should be subject to collation.
RULING
No. The term collation has two distinct concepts: first, it is mere mathematical operation by the
addition of the value of donations made by the testator to the value of the hereditary estate. The
second is that it is the return to the hereditary estate of property disposed of by lucrative title by
the testator during his lifetime.

The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is
possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding legitime, so that inofficious donations
may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes
being to determine the legitime and the free portion, if there is no compulsory heir, there is no
legitime to be safeguarded.
The decedent not having left any compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the
legitime and the free portion. Therefore, if there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be
safeguard.
The decedent then is at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his
siblings-collateral relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is
deemed as donation made to a stranger chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There
being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to collation.

[ No. 102]
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168692 December 13, 2010
FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL TAYCO,
Petitioners,

-versusHEIRS OF CONCEPCION TAYCO-FLORES, namely: LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE F. BESA,

MONELE FLORES, PERLA FLORES, RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO FLORES,
PURISIMA FLORES, andFELIPE FLORES,
Respondents.
PERALTA, J:
FACTS:
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado, their children,
petitioner Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco inherited the
following parcels of land.
Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco and Consolacion executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of
Sale of Shares, transferring their shares on the abovementioned properties to their sister
Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was notarized and, on March 16, 1991,
Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco executed the Confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land.
Consolacion Tayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores died on
January 14, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case for nullity of documents and
partition with damages with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares
and the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null and void; thus,
he is still entitled to his original shares in the parcels of land. According to him, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement was executed at that time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in
need of money and wanted the properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the
mortgage did not push through and that he requested his sister to cancel the said Deed, to which
the latter ensured that the same document had no effect. However, he further claimed that
without his knowledge and consent, her sisters Concepcion and Consolacion executed another
document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to
have the tax declarations and certificates of title covering those three parcels of land transferred
in the name of Concepcion. He also alleged that he came to know of the said facts only when he
had the property surveyed for the purpose of partition and some of the heirs of Concepcion
objected to the said survey.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Francisco Tayco. In ruling that the assailed
documents were null and void, the RTC ratiocinated that the extrajudicial settlement is a
simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner of the
properties, so that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral for a prospective loan
and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did not materialize,
hence, the document had no more effect. Consequently, according to the trial court, since the first
document was simulated and had no force and effect, the second document had no more purpose
and basis.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of RTC. In reversing the trial court's findings,
the CA reasoned out that the genuineness and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was

not disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized. It added that the recital of the
provisions of the said document is clear that it is an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
deceased Diega Regalado and that petitioner and his sister Consolacion confirmed the sale of
their shares to Concepcion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of extrajudicial settlement is a simulated document which makes
it null and void.
RULING:
YES.
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it a public
document that can bind third parties. However, this formal requirement appears to be superseded
by the substantive provision of the Civil Code that states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the coownership, he expresses his intention to put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs. Partition
among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right
over the property regardless of the form it takes.
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law
does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out
to be a foolish or unwise investment. However, in the construction or interpretation of an
instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. If the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the contract appears to be contrary to the evident
intentions of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. The denomination given by the
parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of the contents.
In this particular case, the trial court, based on its appreciation of the pieces of evidence
presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the signatories was contrary to the questioned
document's content and denomination.
Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final conclusion as to the nullity of the
document in question, correctly discussed the lack of consideration in so far as that part of the
document which embodies the confirmation of the sale of shares of siblings Francisco and
Consolacion to Concepcion. Thus:

The consideration of P50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq. meters real
property in Kalibo, Aklan even way back in 1972 is definitely way below the
market value. Even if we take into consideration the filial love between siblings
(Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 233), still, the difference between the market value then
and the purchase price is very great. Even for a market value of P1,000.00, a
consideration ofP50.00 only plus filial love would still be greatly disproportionate.
Certainly, the 1/3 share of plaintiff exceedsP1,000.00. The filial love between
siblings may affect the discrepancy only if the difference between the market value
over the selling price is slight. (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that Exhibit A is
merely a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores is
the owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her to use the same as
collateral for a prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not materialize or if it
did after the obligation thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null
and void and without effect. As the evidence disclosed that the intended loan with
any financial institution did not materialize, hence, immediately thereafter, the
document had no more effect.[24]

[ No. 103]
G.R. No. 192531

November 12, 2014

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC.
FACTS: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board
the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an
accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his
untimely death the following day. He was childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina
P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim
for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the said office denied her claim for the main reason that based on the records
submitted, The denial was appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC), which
affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch which neither ruled if petitioner would qualify
as beneficiary if proven the death of the adopter. Based on records, which SSS and ECC failed to
consider in their decisions, Cornelio, the adopter, died 3 years after John was adopted, who was
still a minor at that time.
Issue: Whether or not biological parents of the covered, but legally adopted employee
considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled to receive the benefits under the ECP
Held: Yes. Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from Johns death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely
demise during Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits
under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole
remaining beneficiary.
Basis: Section 20 of Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is
granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal
custody of the Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The
reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be
extinguished.
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 of the NCC in a
more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation.
Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense.
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents"

should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or
by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need
of support or assistance.

[ No. 104]
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 168692 December 13, 2010

FRANCISCO TAYCO, substituted by LUCRESIA TAYCO and NOEL TAYCO,

Petitioners,
-versusHEIRS OF CONCEPCION TAYCO-FLORES, namely: LUCELI F. DIAZ, RONELE F. BESA,
MONELE FLORES, PERLA FLORES, RUPERTO FLORES, WENCESLAO FLORES,
PURISIMA FLORES, andFELIPE FLORES,
Respondents.
PERALTA, J:
FACTS:
Upon the death of the spouses Fortunato Tayco and Diega Regalado, their children,
petitioner Francisco Tayco, Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco inherited the
following parcels of land.
Sometime in September of 1972, petitioner Francisco and Consolacion executed a Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of
Sale of Shares, transferring their shares on the abovementioned properties to their sister
Concepcion Tayco-Flores. The said document was notarized and, on March 16, 1991,
Concepcion Tayco-Flores and Consolacion Tayco executed the Confirmation of Quitclaim of
Shares in Three (3) Parcels of Land.
Consolacion Tayco died on December 25, 1996 and Concepcion Tayco-Flores died on
January 14, 1997. Thereafter, petitioner Francisco Tayco filed a case for nullity of documents and
partition with damages with the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan claiming that the Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Diega Regalado with Confirmation of Sale of Shares
and the Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land are null and void; thus,
he is still entitled to his original shares in the parcels of land. According to him, the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement was executed at that time, because Concepcion Tayco-Flores was in
need of money and wanted the properties to be mortgaged in a bank. He claimed that the
mortgage did not push through and that he requested his sister to cancel the said Deed, to which
the latter ensured that the same document had no effect. However, he further claimed that
without his knowledge and consent, her sisters Concepcion and Consolacion executed another
document entitled Confirmation of Quitclaim of Shares in three (3) Parcels of Land in order to
have the tax declarations and certificates of title covering those three parcels of land transferred
in the name of Concepcion. He also alleged that he came to know of the said facts only when he
had the property surveyed for the purpose of partition and some of the heirs of Concepcion
objected to the said survey.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Francisco Tayco. In ruling that the assailed
documents were null and void, the RTC ratiocinated that the extrajudicial settlement is a
simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores was the owner of the
properties, so that it would be easy for her to use the same as a collateral for a prospective loan
and as evidence disclosed that the intended loan with any financial institution did not materialize,
hence, the document had no more effect. Consequently, according to the trial court, since the first
document was simulated and had no force and effect, the second document had no more purpose
and basis.

Upon appeal, the CA reversed the ruling of RTC. In reversing the trial court's findings,
the CA reasoned out that the genuineness and due execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement was
not disputed and was duly signed by the parties and notarized. It added that the recital of the
provisions of the said document is clear that it is an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
deceased Diega Regalado and that petitioner and his sister Consolacion confirmed the sale of
their shares to Concepcion.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of extrajudicial settlement is a simulated document which makes
it null and void.
RULING:
YES.
Notarization of the deed of extrajudicial settlement has the effect of making it a public
document that can bind third parties. However, this formal requirement appears to be superseded
by the substantive provision of the Civil Code that states:
ART. 1082. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among
co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other
transaction.
By this provision, it appears that when a co-owner sells his inchoate right in the coownership, he expresses his intention to put an end to indivision among (his) co-heirs. Partition
among co-owners may thus be evidenced by the overt act of a co-owner of renouncing his right
over the property regardless of the form it takes.
An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the law
does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned out
to be a foolish or unwise investment. However, in the construction or interpretation of an
instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued. If the terms of a
contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal
meaning of its stipulations shall control. If the contract appears to be contrary to the evident
intentions of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. The denomination given by the
parties in their contract is not conclusive of the nature of the contents.
In this particular case, the trial court, based on its appreciation of the pieces of evidence
presented, rightfully concluded that the intent of the signatories was contrary to the questioned
document's content and denomination.
Furthermore, the trial court, before stating its final conclusion as to the nullity of the
document in question, correctly discussed the lack of consideration in so far as that part of the

document which embodies the confirmation of the sale of shares of siblings Francisco and
Consolacion to Concepcion. Thus:
The consideration of P50.00 for a 1/3 share of about 16,000 sq. meters real
property in Kalibo, Aklan even way back in 1972 is definitely way below the
market value. Even if we take into consideration the filial love between siblings
(Jocson v. CA, 170 SCRA 233), still, the difference between the market value then
and the purchase price is very great. Even for a market value of P1,000.00, a
consideration ofP50.00 only plus filial love would still be greatly disproportionate.
Certainly, the 1/3 share of plaintiff exceedsP1,000.00. The filial love between
siblings may affect the discrepancy only if the difference between the market value
over the selling price is slight. (ibid.). It would appear, therefore, that Exhibit A is
merely a simulated document to make it appear that Concepcion Tayco-Flores is
the owner of the properties so that it will be easy for her to use the same as
collateral for a prospective loan. Should the encumbrance not materialize or if it
did after the obligation thereunder has been paid, the document shall become null
and void and without effect. As the evidence disclosed that the intended loan with
any financial institution did not materialize, hence, immediately thereafter, the
document had no more effect.[24]

[ No. 105]
G. R. No. 171701
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
MA. IMELDA IMEE R. MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND BONGBONG R. MARCOS,
JR., et.al., and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO
FACTS:
Numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed. One of the civil cases filed
before the Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth. Pantranco
Employees Association-PTGWO (PEA-PTGWO), a union of Pantranco employees, moved to
intervene before the Sandiganbayan. There was an allegation that the trust funds in the account
of Pantranco North Express, Inc. (Pantranco) rightfully belonged to the Pantranco employees,
pursuant to the money judgment the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarded in
favor of the employees and against Pantranco. Thus, PEA-PTGWO contested the allegation of
petitioner that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten because, otherwise, these assets would be
returned to the government and not to the employees. Sandiganbayan ruled that siblings Imee
Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., the court noted that their involvement in the alleged
illegal activities was never established. Petitioner raises the same issues it raised in its Motion for
Reconsideration filed before the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Among other issues
RESPONDENTS IMEE, BONGBONG, AND IRENE MARCOS ARE COMPULSORY
HEIRS OF FORMER PRESIDENT MARCOS AND ARE EQUALLY OBLIGED TO
RENDER AN ACCOUNTING AND RETURN THE ALLEGED ILL-GOTTEN
WEALTH OF THE MARCOSES.
HELD:
Since the pending case before the Sandiganbayan survives the death of Ferdinand E.
Marcos, it is imperative therefore that the estate be duly represented. The purpose behind this
rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to a litigation who may be affected
by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is himself protected, as he continues to be
properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. The
court grant Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. and Imelda Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will
and testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos letters testamentary in solidum. Unless the
executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state their right to
defend or protect the estate or those properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control
or ownership, then they may not be dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before the
Sandiganbayan.

Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of the Marcos
properties upon the death of the President. The property rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted to another through the decedents death. [44] In
this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to transfer or dispose of the
properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the partition or
the distribution of the estate
The PEA-PTGWO Demurrer to Evidence was granted primarily as a consequence of the
prosecutions failure to establish that the assets of Pantranco were ill-gotten, as discussed earlier.
Thus, we find no error in the assailed Order of the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 6 December 2005
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. For the reasons stated herein, respondents Imelda
Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. shall be maintained as
defendants in Civil Case No. 0002 pending before the Sandiganbayan.

[ No.106]
G.R. No. 165748
September 14, 2011
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR.,
vs.
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA.
FACTS
Alfonso begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco,
Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of
Policronio are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos children and their descendants Alfonso and four
of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of
Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the
inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his
children.
Alfonso executed 4 Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of
Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of
Sale executed on Oct 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the
properties in dispute in this case. Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no
monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and
their produce.
Policronio died on Nov 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor
his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands. Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra
Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the 4 deeds of sale. Conrado,
Policronios eldest son, signed the Deed of EJP in behalf of his co-heirs.
They found the tax declarations in the name of Policronio covering the six parcels of
land. They obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on Oct 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of
Policronio. Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father as such, excluded
from the Partition, they sought to amicably settle the matter with the heirs of Alfonso.
The heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of
Possession, and Partition against the heirs of Alfonso before the Regional Trial Court. The Court
held that the sale was void. No consideration was involved in the sale. The Heirs of Policronio
only paid real estate taxes in 1996 and 1997. Policronio must have been aware that the transfer
was merely for taxation purposes because he did not subsequently take possession of the
properties even after the death of his father. The Deed of Extra Judicial Partition was declared
valid by the RTC as all the Heirs of Alfonso were represented and received equal shares and all
the requirements of a valid EJP were met. The Court of Appeals Modified the Ruling of the
lower court and ordered it to be remanded for trial.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Deed of Sale is valid, and whether or not the Extra Judicial Partition is
valid?

Whether or not there was a preterition?

HELD
First Issue
The Deed of Sale was not a fair and regular private transaction because it was absolutely
simulated. It was made only for tax purposes. Even Policronio did not disclose the sale to his
heirs. For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that
Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the 2K purchase price on the date of the signing of the
contract: Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable
consideration, the Regional Trial Court found that there was no money involved in the sale. As
the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21
years after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore,
the right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced.
The heirs of Policronio ratified the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition when Conrado took
possession of 1 of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his siblings. The Deed having been
ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus became enforceable and binding upon them.
Second Issue
Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at
bench, there is no will involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.

[ No. 107]
G.R. No. 189984
November 12, 2012
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON,
Respondents.
Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate
children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez
(Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs.
Before Enriques death, he executed a Last Will and Testament on August 10, 1996 and
constituted Richard as his executor and administrator. Richard filed a petition for the probate of
his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last
will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by
undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The said opposition was also
adopted by Victoria.
After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the
attesting witnesses, namely: Reynaldo Maneja; Romulo Monteiro; Ana Maria Lourdes Manalo
(Manalo); and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco).
The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the will on each
and every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and of one another.
Photographs of the incident were taken and presented during trial. Manalo further testified that
she was the one who prepared the drafts and revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the
will was made.
Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. Prior to
August 10, 1996, the latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and furnished him
the list of his properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance
with Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the
presence of one another, he translated the will which was written in English to Filipino and
added that Enrique was in good health and of sound mind at that time.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented its lone witness, Gregorio B. Paraon (Paraon),
Officer-in-Charge of the Notarial Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Manila. His
testimony centered mainly on their findings that Atty. Nolasco was not a notary public for the
City of Manila in 1996, which on cross examination was clarified after Paraon discovered that
Atty. Nolasco was commissioned as such for the years 1994 to 1997.
RTC: RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil
Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon
which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere

substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the
number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic
evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages
including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed
that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not
having been executed and attested in accordance with law.
CA: dismissed the appeal.
ISSUE: WON THE WILL SHOULD BE ALLOWED EVEN IF IT FAILED TO STATE THE
NUMBER OF PAGES OF THE WILL IN THE ATTESTATION CLAUSE.
HELD: THE WILL SHOULD BE DISALLOWED.
The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.9
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written"10 cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The
will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliund.11 On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of
Article 809, to wit:
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will
was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions
concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total number of
pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate
proceedings.12 (Emphasis supplied)

[NO. 108]
G.R. No. 137582

August 29, 2012

JOSE I. MEDINA, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE LATE ABUNDIO CASTAARES,
Represented by ANDRES CASTAARES, Respondents.
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS:
A parcel of coconut land was registered in the name of the deceased. Arles Castaares under Tax
Dec. No. 1107, [Parcel I]
A parcel of coconut, rice, unirrigated & cogon located at Goldbag, Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate,
registered in the name of Abundio Castaares, under Tax Dec. No. 1106 [Parcel II]
Parcel I was sold at public auction because the heirs of Andres failed to settle their account to
Petitioner Jose. Parcel I was awarded to petitioner Jose and Certificate of Sale was issued [1987].
In the final deed, parcel I was transferred to Wenceslao, represented by Jose.
Petitioner applied for the registration of lot, alleging that he is the owner in fee simple of such
land by virtue of Waiver of Rights and Interests and executed by Wenceslao in his favor.
Andres, brother of Arles and representing the heirs of the late Abundio, filed an opposition,
claiming that after the death of his father Abundio, the: [a] tax declarastion of the property was
cancelled and in its place , a tax declaration was issued in his favour; [b] During the lifetime of
his father and up to his deathm Andres had been in peaceful, open, notorious, public and adverse
possession of lot; [c] in 1998, petitioner through stealth and strategy, encroached and occupied
practically the entirety of property by encircling it with barbed wires. Then Andres testified that
upon Abundios death, the latter left his children a parcel of agricultural land of 18 hectares.
Andres also presented a sketch plan[Lot 224 and 2187 pls-7716, pointed out the alleged lot of
Arles is outside Lot 224 and lies to the south of Abundios lot, that petitioner fenced Line 2 to
line 8. The petitioner insisted that the lots contained in tax declaration No.1107 and 1106 are not
separate and distinct but refer to only one Lot, Lot 224. The lot in Tax Declaration No. 1107 is
denominated as Lot 224-A and is derived in tax Declaration. 1106 as certified by wife of as
Arles, Patricia. Petitioner likewise submitted a sketch plan to show the real location of lot
described in Tax Declaration 1107.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale to petitioner Jose is valid?
HELD: NO

The appellate court is correct in stating that there was no settlement of the estate of Abundio.
There is no showing that Lot 224 has already been partitioned despite the demise of Abundio. It
has been held that an heirs right of ownership over the properties of the decedent is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. This means that the
impending heir has yet no absolute dominion over any specific property in the decedents estate
that could be specifically levied upon and sold at public auction. Any encumbrance of attachment
over the heirs interests in the estate, therefore, remains a mere probability, and cannot
summarily be satisfied without the final distribution of the properties in the estate. Therefore, the
public auction sale of the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 is void because the
subject property is still covered by the Estate of Abundio, which up to now, remains
unpartitioned. Arles was not proven to be the owner of the lot under Tax Declaration No. 1107. It
may not be amiss to state that a tax declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership.
Against a mere tax declaration, respondents were able to present a more credible proof of
ownership over Lot 224 The Court of Appeals relied on the Certification issued by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) which certifies that Abundio, and now the heirs, is
the holder of a homestead application and an order for the issuance of patent had already been
issued as early as 7 July 1952.
In the instant case, it was clear that there has been an issuance of patent way back in 7 July 1952.
The only two acts left for the CENRO to do are to prepare the patent and to transmit it to the
Register of Deeds. As to whether these acts have already been complied with is not borne in the
records, but the fact remains that these acts are merely ministerial. Respondents have already
acquired vested rights to a patent which is equivalent to actual issuance of patent. They have
become owners of the land.
As evidence of ownership of land, a homestead patent prevails over a land tax declaration.

[No. 109]
PNB VS. JOSE GARCIA
Facts:Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent of his children executed SPAs authorizing
spouses Garcia to convey a property covered with TCT No. T-44422 to secure a loan from PNB
by way of mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB which were
inscribed in the title.
The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the said Amendment against spouses Garcia
and PNB alleging that the property was conjugal, being acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr.
to Ligaya and they became owners pro indivisio upon the death of Ligaya on 1987.
PNB contends that the subject property was registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described
in the as a widower.
During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996
authorizing Jose Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.

Issue: Whether the subject property was a conjugal or was acquired during marriage or thereafter.
Ruling: Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with Article 160 applies.
All properties acquired during marriage are conjugal and the registration of it in the name of one
spouse does not destroy the presumption that it is conjugal. What is material is the time when the
property was acquired.
The conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership upon the death of
Ligaya thus governed by Article 493 of Civil Code.
The effect of the mortgage with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, Jose Sr.
cannot mortgage the entire property.

[ No. 110]

Heirs of Lopez vs. DBP,

G.R. No. 193551, November 19, 2014
FACTS
1
2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Gregoria Lopez owned a 2,734-square-meter property in Bustos, Bulacan.

She died on March 19, 19226 and was survived by her three sons: Teodoro Lopez,
Francisco Lopez, and Carlos Lopez. Tax Declaration No. 613 was issued under the names
of Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos. Teodoro, Francisco, and Carlos died. Only Teodoro
was survived by children: Gregorio, Enrique, Simplicio, and Severino.
Petitioners in this case are Simplicio substituted by his daughter Eliza Lopez, and the
heirs of Gregorio and Severino. Enrique is deceased.
Petitioners discovered that on November 29, 1990, Enrique executed an affidavit of selfadjudication declaring himself to be Gregoria Lopezs only surviving heir, thereby
adjudicating upon himself the land in Bulacan. He sold the property to Marietta Yabut.
Petitioners demanded from Marietta the nullification of Enriques affidavit of selfadjudication and the deed of absolute sale. They also sought to redeem Enriques onefourth share. Marietta, who was already in possession of the property, refused.
Sometime in 1993, Marietta obtained a loan from Development Bank of the Philippines
(DBP) and mortgaged the property to DBP as security.
At the time of the loan, the property was covered by Tax Declaration No. 18727, with the
agreement that the land shall be brought under the Torrens system.
On July 26, 1993, an original certificate of title was issued in Mariettas name.
Marietta and DBP "executed a supplemental document dated 28 February 1995 placing
the subject [property] within the coverage of the mortgage."
Sometime between 1993 and 1994, petitioners filed a complaint and an amended
complaint with the Regional Trial Court for the annulment of document, recovery of
possession, and reconveyance of the property.
They prayed that judgment be rendered, ordering the annulment of Enriques affidavit of
self-adjudication, the deed of sale executed by Enrique and Marietta, and the deed of real
estate mortgage executed by Marietta in favor of DBP.
Petitioners also prayed for the reconveyance of their three-fourth share in the property,
their exercise of their right of redemption of Enriques one-fourth share, as well as
attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens at the back of the original
certificate of title.
Marietta failed to pay her loan to DBP.29 "DBP instituted foreclosure proceedings on
the . . . land."
It was "awarded the sale of the [property] as the highest bidder."31 "The Certificate of
Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds . . . on 11 September 1996."
Marietta failed to redeem the property. The title to the property was "consolidated in
favor of DBP."
RTC: ruled in favor of petitioners and found that the affidavit of self-adjudication and the
deed of absolute sale did not validly transfer to Marietta the title to the property. Enrique
could not transfer three-fourths of the property since this portion belonged to his co-heirs.
The Regional Trial Court ordered the nullification of Enriques affidavit of self-

adjudication, the sale of the three-fourth portion of the subject property in favor of
Marietta, the reconveyance of the three-fourth share of the property in favor of
petitioners, the nullification of the real estate mortgage executed in favor of DBP, and the
surrender of possession of the property to petitioners.
18 CA: reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court in the decision. It held that DBP
was a mortgagee in good faith. With the absence of any evidence to show that the DBP
was ever privy to the fraudulent execution of the late Enrique Lopez [sic] affidavit of
Adjudication over the subject land, the right of the former over the same must be
protected and respected by reason of public policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property was validly transferred to Marietta and, eventually, to DBP.
RULING:
NO, We have consistently upheld the principle that "no one can give what one does not have.
RATIO:
A seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own but has authority
to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can legally transfer.
Since Enriques right to the property was limited to his one-fourth share, he had no right to sell
the undivided portions that belonged to his siblings or their respective heirs. Any sale by one heir
of the rest of the property will not affect the rights of the other heirs who did not consent to the
sale. Such sale is void with respect to the shares of the other heirs.
Regardless of their agreement, Enrique could only convey to Marietta his undivided one-fourth
share of the property, and Marietta could only acquire that share. This is because Marietta
obtained her rights from Enrique who, in the first place, had no title or interest over the rest of
the property that he could convey.
This is despite Enriques execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication wherein he declared
himself to be the only surviving heir of Gregoria Lopez. The affidavit of self-adjudication is
invalid for the simple reason that it was false. At the time of its execution, Enriques siblings
were still alive and entitled to the three-fourth undivided share of the property. The affidavit of
self-adjudication did not have the effect of vesting upon Enrique ownership or rights to the
property.
The issuance of the original certificate of title in favor of Marietta does not cure Enriques lack
of title or authority to convey his co-owners portions of the property. Issuance of a certificate of
title is not a grant of title over petitioners undivided portions of the property.69 The physical
certificate of title does not vest in a person ownership or right over a property. It is merely an
evidence of such ownership or right.

Marietta could acquire valid title over the whole property if she were an innocent purchaser for
value. An innocent purchaser for value purchases a property without any notice of defect or
irregularity as to the right or interest of the seller. He or she is without notice that another person
holds claim to the property being purchased.
As a rule, an ordinary buyer may rely on the certificate of title issued in the name of the seller.
He or she need not look "beyond what appears on the face [of the certificate of title]." However,
the ordinary buyer will not be considered an innocent purchaser for value if there is anything on
the certificate of title that arouses suspicion, and the buyer failed to inquire or take steps to
ensure that there is no cloud on the title, right, or ownership of the property being sold.
Marietta cannot claim the protection accorded by law to innocent purchasers for value because
the circumstances do not make this available to her.
In this case, there was no certificate of title to rely on when she purchased the property from
Enrique. At the time of the sale, the property was still unregistered. What was available was only
a tax declaration issued under the name of "Heirs of Lopez."
"The defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where
registered land is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the
registered owner."76 It does not apply when the land is not yet registered with the Registry of
Deeds.
At the very least, the unregistered status of the property should have prompted Marietta to
inquire further as to Enriques right over the property. She did not. Hence, she was not an
innocent purchaser for value. She acquired no title over petitioners portions of the property.
The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 8, 2009 and its resolution dated August 16, 2010
are reversed and SET ASIDE.

[NO. 111]
Antipolo Ining
vs.
Leonardo R. Vega
G.R. No. 174727
12 August 2013
FACTS
Leon Roldan (Leon), married to Rafaela Menez (Rafaela), is the owner of a 3,120-square meter
parcel of land (subject property) in Kalibo, Aklan. Leon and Rafaela died without issue. Leon
was survived by his siblings Romana Roldan (Romana) and Gregoria Roldan Ining (Gregoria),
who are now both deceased.
Romana was survived by her daughter Anunciacion Vega and grandson, herein respondent
Leonardo R. Vega (Leonardo) (also both deceased). Leonardo in turn is survived by his wife
Lourdes and children Restonilo I. Vega, Crispulo M. Vega, Milbuena Vega-Restituto and Lenard
Vega, the substituted respondents. On the other hand, Gregoria was survived by her six children.
In short, herein petitioners, except for Ramon Tresvalles (Tresvalles) and Roberto Tajonera
(Tajonera), are Gregorias grandchildren or spouses thereof (Gregorias heirs). Tresvalles and
Tajonera are transferees of the said property.
In 1997, acting on the claim that one-half of subject property belonged to him as Romanas
surviving heir, Leonardo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan Civil Case
No. 5275 for partition, recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, against Gregorias
heirs. In their Answer with counterclaim, Gregorias heirs (through son Antipolo) claimed that
Leonardo had no cause of action against them; that they have become the sole owners of the
subject property through Lucimo Sr. who acquired the same in good faith by sale from Juan
Enriquez (Enriquez), who in turn acquired the same from Leon, and Leonardo was aware of this
fact.
The Regional Trial Court declared the subject lot to be the common property of the heirs of
Gregoria Roldan Ining and concluded that Leon never sold the property to Enriquez, and in turn,
Enriquez never sold the property to Lucimo Sr., hence, the subject property remained part of
Leons estate at the time of his death in 1962. It also dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription.
The Court of Appeals declared 1/2 portion of Lot 1786 as the share of the plaintiffs as
successors-in-interest of Romana Roldan and the other half of Lot 1786 as the share of the
defendants as successors-in-interest of Gregoria Roldan Ining. Second, it ruled that the3 trial
courts declaration of nullity of the April 4, 1943 and November 25, 1943 deeds of sale in favor
of Enriquez and Lucimo Sr., respectively, became final and was settled by petitioners failure to
appeal the same. Lastly, there was no prescription. Prescription began to run not from Leons
death in 1962, but from Lucimo Sr.s execution of the Affidavit of Ownership of Land in 1979,
which amounted to a repudiation of his co-ownership of the property with Leonardo. Applying
the fifth paragraph of Article 494 of the Civil Code, which provides that [n]o prescription shall

run in favor of a co- owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership,
ISSUE
Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the decision
of the trial court on the ground that Lucimo Francisco repudiated the co-ownership only on 09
February 1979.
RULING
No, the Court of Appeals is correct based the following reasons:
1
2
3
4

The finding that Leon did not sell the property to Lucimo Sr. had long been settled and
had become final for failure of petitioners to appeal. Thus, the property remained part of
Leons estate.
Leon died without issue; his heirs are his siblings Romana and Gregoria.
Gregorias and Romanas heirs are co-owners of the subject property. no prescription
shall run in favor of one of the co-heirs against the others so long as he expressly or
impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
For prescription to set in, the repudiation must be done by a co-owner. The CA held that
prescription began to run against Leonardo only in 1979 or even in 1980 when it has
been made sufficiently clear to him that Lucimo Sr. has renounced the co-ownership and
has claimed sole ownership over the property.

The CA thus concluded that the filing of Civil Case No. 5275 in 1997, or just under 20 years
counted from 1979, is clearly within the period prescribed under Article 1141. Lucimo Sr. is not
a co-owner of the property. Indeed, he is not an heir of Gregoria; he is merely Antipolos son-inlaw, being married to Antipolos daughter Teodora.
One who is merely related by affinity to the decedent does not inherit from the latter and cannot
become a co-owner of the decedents property. Consequently, he cannot effect a repudiation of
the co-ownership of the estate that was formed among the decedents heirs.

[NO.112]
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 188417, September 24, 2012
MILAGROS DE BELEN VDA. DE CABALU, MELITON CABALU, SPS. ANGELA
CABALU and. RODOLFO TALAVERA, and PATRICIO ABUS, petitioners,
vs.
SPS. RENATO TABU and DOLORES LAXAMANA, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Tarlac City, Branch II, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:
The property subject of the controversy is a 9,000 sq.m. lot situated in Mariwalo, Tarlac,
which was a portion of a property registered in the name of the late Faustina Maslum under TCT
No. 16776 with a total areaof 140,211 sq.m.
On December 8, 1941, Faustina died w/o any children. She left a holographic will, dated
July 27, 1939, assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces. The said
holographic will, however, was not probated. One of the heirs was the father of Domingo
Laxamana, Benjamin Laxamana, who died in 1960. On March 5, 1975, Domingo allegedly
executed a Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land disposing of his 9,000 sq.m. share of the
land to Laureano Cabalu.
On August 1, 1994, to give effect to the holographic will, the forced and legitimate heirs
of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition. The said deed imparted
9,000 sq.m. of the land covered by TCT No. 16776 to Domingo. Thereafter, on December 14,
1995, Domingo sold 4,500 sq.m. to his nephew, Eleazar Tabamo. On May 7, 1996, the
remaining 4,500 sq.m. was registered under his name covered by TCT No. 281353.
On August 4, 1996, Domingo passed away.
On October 8, 1996, two months after his death, Domingo purportedly executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale of TCT No. 281353 in favor of respondent Renato Tabu. The resultant transfer
of title was registered as TCT No. 286484. Subsequently, respondent spouses, subdivided the
said lot into two which resulted into TCT Nos. 291338 & 291339.
On January 15, 1999, respondent Dolores Laxamana-Tabu, together with Julieta TubilanLaxamana, Teresita Laxamana, Erlita Laxamana, & Gretel Laxamana, the heirs of Domingo,filed
an unlawful detainer action against Meliton Cabalu, Patricio Abus, Roger Talavera, Jesus Villar,
Marcos Perez, Arthur Dizon, & all persons claiming rights under them. The heirs claimed that
the defendants were merely allowed to occupy the subject lot by their late father, Domingo, but,
when asked to vacate the property, they refused to do so. The case was ruled in favor of
Domingos heirs & a writ of execution was subsequently issued.
On February 4, 2002, petitioners filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
Absolute Sale, Joint Affidavit of Nullity of TCT Nos. 291338 and 291339, Quieting of Title,
Reconveyance, Application for Restraining Order, Injunction and Damages against respondent
spouses before the RTC of Tarlac City.
The RTC dismissed the complaint as it found the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 5,
1975, null and void for lack of capacity to sell on the part of Domingo. Likewise, the Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996,covering the remaining 4,500 sq.m. of the subject property

was declared ineffective having been executed by Domingo two months after his death on
August 4, 1996.
Upon appeal, CA partially granted the same and affirmed with modifications RTC
decision. Although the CA found Domingo to be of sound mind at the time of the sale on March
5, 1975, it sustained the RTCs declaration of nullity of the sale on the ground that the deed of
sale was simulated. The CA further held that the RTC erred in canceling TCT No. 266583 in the
name of Domingo and in ordering the restoration of TCT No. 16770, registered in the name of
Faustina, toits former validity, Domingo being an undisputed heir of Faustina.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
1.)
2.)

WON the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land coveringthe 9,000 sq.m.
property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is
valid;
WON the Deed of Sale, dated October 8,1996, covering the 4,500 square meter
portion of the 9,000 square meter property, executed by Domingo in favor of
Renato Tabu, is null and void.

RULING:
1.)

No. It is not valid.

It is well to note that both the RTC and the CA found that the evidence established that
the March 5, 1975 Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land executed by Domingo in favor of
Laureano Cabalu was a fictitious and simulated document.
RTC and later the CA had ruled that the sale, dated March 5, 1975, had the earmarks of a
simulated deed, hence, the presumption was already rebutted. Verily and as aptly noted by the
respondent spouses, such presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the facts proven and
already established in the records of this case.
Even on the assumption that the March 5, 1975 deed was not simulated, still the sale
cannot be deemed valid because, at that time, Domingo was not yet the owner of the
property. There is no dispute that the original and registered owner of the subject property
covered by TCT No. 16776, from which the subject 9,000 square meter lot came from, was
Faustina, who during her lifetime had executed a will,dated July 27, 1939. In the said will, the
name of Benjamin, father of Domingo, appeared as one of the heirs. Thus, and as correctly found
by the RTC, even if Benjamin died sometime in 1960, Domingo in 1975 could not yet validly
dispose of the whole or even a portion thereof for the reason that he was not the sole heir of
Benjamin, as his mother only died sometime in 1980.
Besides, under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, No contract may be entered into upon
future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law. Paragraph 2 of Article 1347,
characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law applies when the
following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of the

contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the
object, an expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.
In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustinas will was not yet probated; the
object of the contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his
father from the state of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein.
Domingo became the owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution
of the Deedof Extrajudicial Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000
square meter lot was adjudicated to him. The CA, therefore, did not err in declaring the March 5,
1975 Deed of Sale null and void.
Domingos status as an heir of Faustina by right of representation being undisputed, the
RTC should have maintained the validity of TCT No. 266583 covering the 9,000 square meter
subject property. As correctly concluded by the CA, this served as the inheritance of Domingo
from Faustina.
2.)
Yes. It is null and void.
Regarding the deed of sale covering the remaining 4,500 square meters of the subject
property executed in favor of Renato Tabu, it is evidently null and void. The document itself,
the Deed of Absolute Sale, dated October 8, 1996, readily shows that it was executed on August
4, 1996 more than two months after the death of Domingo. Contracting parties must be juristic
entities at the time of the consummation of the contract. Stated otherwise, to form a valid and
legal agreement it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable of
being contracted with. Hence, if any one party toa supposed contract was already dead at the
time of its execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null
and void by reason of its having been made after the death of the party who appears as one
of the contracting parties therein. The death of a person terminates contractual capacity.
The contract being null and void, the sale to Renato Tabu produced no legal effects
and transmitted no rights whatsoever. Consequently, TCT No. 286484 issued to Tabu by virtue
of the October 8, 1996 Deed of Sale, as well as its derivative titles, TCT Nos. 291338 and
291339, both registered in the name of Rena to Tabu, married to Dolores Laxamana, are likewise
void.

[NO. 113]
HEIRS OF SPS. MAGLASANG VS. MANILA BANKING CORPORATION (2013)
FACTS;Spouses Flaviano and Salud Maglasang (Sps.Maglasang) obtained a credit line
from respondent ( manila banking Corporation) in the amount of P350,000.00 which was
secured by a real estate mortgage executed over seven of their properties located in Ormoc
City and the Municipality of Kananga, Province of Leyte.Flaviano died intestate . Letter of
Adminsitartion was granted to Edgar, one of the surviving children. In view of the issuance
of letters of administration, the probate court issued a Notice to Creditors. In this light,
respondent proceeded to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage covering the Sps.
Maglasangs properties and emerged as the highest bidder at the public auction for the
amount of P350,000.00. There, however, remained a deficiency on Sps. Maglasangs
obligation to respondent. Respondent filed a suit to recover the deficiency amount. RTC
decided in favor of the bank. Such decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs award of the deficiency
amount in favor of respondent.
HELD: Yes. Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct,
independent and mutually exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the
mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor
as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary
claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at anytime before it is
barred by prescription without right to file a claim for any deficiency
Anent the third remedy, it must be mentioned that the same includes the option of
extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage under Act No. 3135,as availed of by respondent in
this case. However, the plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the
creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate
Respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgage of the properties
previously belonging to Sps. Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of
the third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first option of directly
filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners assert, since it merely notified. The probate
court of the outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano and that it was

currently restructuring the account. Thus, having unequivocally opted to exercise the third
option of extra-judicial foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now precluded
from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as earlier discussed.

[NO.114]
Mendoza v Delos Santos

Facts:
The properties subject in the instant case are three parcels of land located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan
are presently in the name of respondent Julia Delos Santos (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on the
other hand, is also in the name of respondent but co- owned by Victoria Pantaleon, who bought
one-half of the property from petitioner Maria Mendoza and her siblings.

Petitioners are grandchildren of Placido Mendoza (Placido) and Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Petitioners alleged that the properties were part of Placido and Domingas properties that were
subject of an oral partition and subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel. After Exequiels death, it
passed on to his spouse Leonor and only daughter, Gregoria. After Leonors death, her share
went to Gregoria. In 1992, Gregoria died intestate and without issue. They claimed that after
Gregorias death, respondent, who is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all these properties
as the sole surviving heir of Leonor and Gregoria. Hence, petitioners claim that the properties
should have been reserved by respondent in their behalf and must now revert back to them,
applying Article 891 of the Civil Code on reserva troncal.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: granted their action for Recovery of Possession by Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of
TCT and Reconveyance.
(2) CA: reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint filed by petitioners.
CA also denied their motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES ARE NOT RESERVABLE PROPERTIES, COMING AS THEY DO FROM THE
FAMILY LINE OF THE PETITIONERS MENDOZAS.
B. THE HONORABLE [CA] GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

PETITIONERS MENDOZAS DO NOT HAVE A RIGHT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES

BY VIRTUE OF THE LAW ON RESERVA TRONCAL.

APPLICABLE LAW:

The principle of reserva troncal is provided in Article 891 of the Civil Code:
Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve
such property as he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and belong to the line from which said property came. (Emphasis ours)

RULING:
No, CA is correct.
I. Reserva troncal is not applicable.
Julia, who now holds the properties in dispute, is not the other ascendant within the purview of
Article 891 of the Civil Code
Reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of a reservable property
to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which the property originally came, and
avoid its being dissipated into and by the relatives of the inheriting ascendant.

It should be pointed out that the ownership of the properties should be reckoned only from
Exequiels as he is the ascendant from where the first transmission occurred, or from whom
Gregoria inherited the properties in dispute. The law does not go farther than such
ascendant/brother/sister in determining the lineal character of the property. It was also immaterial

for the CA to determine whether Exequiel predeceased Placido and Dominga or whether
Gregoria predeceased Exequiel. What is pertinent is that Exequiel owned the properties and he is
the ascendant from whom the properties in dispute originally came. Gregoria, on the other hand,
is the descendant who received the properties from Exequiel by gratuitous title.
Article 891 simply requires that the property should have been acquired by the descendant or
prepositus from an ascendant by gratuitous or lucrative title. A transmission is gratuitous or by
gratuitous title when the recipient does not give anything in return.18 At risk of being repetitious,
what was clearly established in this case is that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel
(ascendant). After his death, Gregoria (descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as
inheritance.
Article 891 provides that the person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (also
known as the reservor/reservista) of the descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias
ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias collateral relative.

II. Petitioners cannot be considered reservees/reservatarios as they are not relatives within the
third degree of Gregoria from whom the properties came. The person from whom the degree
should be reckoned is the descendant/prepositusthe one at the end of the line from which the
property came and upon whom the property last revolved by descent. It is Gregoria in this case.
Petitioners are Gregorias fourth degree relatives, being her first cousins. First cousins of the
prepositus are fourth degree relatives and are not reservees or reservatarios.
They cannot even claim representation of their predecessors Antonio and Valentin as Article 891
grants a personal right of reservation only to the relatives up to the third degree from whom the
reservable properties came. The only recognized exemption is in the case of nephews and nieces
of the prepositus, who have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are
the brothers/sisters of the prepositus and relatives within the third degree.

[NO.115]
G.R. No. 153736
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEE and their
Children, namely: NICANOR S. TUMBOKON, JR., et.al.
vs. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM
FACTS:
The land planted to rice, corn, and coconuts was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespee
(Alejandra), who had had two marriages. The first marriage was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom
she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose
Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married Primo Legaspi.
Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the
son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor Miralles; hence, Crisanto
Miralles was Alejandras grandson. The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became
controversial after Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee (petitioners) asserted their
right in it by virtue of their purchase of it from Cresenciana Inog, who had supposedly acquired it
by purchase from Victor Miralles. The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee filed a
criminal complaint for qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum
and others, charging them with stealing coconut fruits from the land subject of the present case.
Prior to the CAs rendition of its decision in the criminal case, the petitioners commenced this suit
for recovery of ownership and possession of real property with damages against the respondents
in the CFI. CA reversed the decision, petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR affirming the decision of the CFI of
Aklan in Criminal Case No. 2269 had the effect of res judicata on the issue of ownership of the
land involved in Civil Case No. 240, considering that such land was the same land involved in
Criminal Case No. 2269.
HELD:
The petition has no merit. The CA correctly found that the petitioners claim of ownership could
not be legally and factually sustained. The petitioners adduced no competent evidence to
establish that Victor Miralles, the transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners
immediate predecessor in interest) had any legal right in the first place to transfer ownership. He
was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law (as the husband of Ciriaca, one
of Alejandras two daughters) A decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a
part of the decedents estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887. With Victor
Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an heir of Ciriaca, the transfer of
the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was ineffectual. As a consequence, Cresenciana Inog did
not legally acquire the land, and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to the petitioners.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision rendered on May
15, 2001 by the Court of Appeals is affirmed
[NO. 116]
G.R. No. 187056
September 20, 2010
JARABINI G. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
ASUNCION G. FERRER, substituted by her heirs, VICENTE, PILAR, ANGELITO,
FELIXBERTO, JR., all surnamed G. FERRER, and MIGUELA FERRER ALTEZA,
Respondents.
FACTS
There was a donation by the spouses to their children and granddaughter captioned as
Donation Mortis Causa, stating that it is irrevocable. It had no attestation clause, and had only
two (2) witnesses. The donees accepted the donation. After the death of one of the donors, the
donation was submitted to probate but the Regional Trial Court made a ruling to the effect that it
should be considered, despite of the caption, a donation inter vivos due to its irrevocability. The
Court of Appeals, on appeal, ruled it to be one of mortis causa and since it did not comply with
the formalities of a will, it is void.
ISSUE
Was there a Donation inter vivos or Donation Mortis Causa?
HELD
The deed is a Donation Inter Vivos.
The designation that it is a Donation Mortis Causa is not controlling. If a donation by its
terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
The irrevocability is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis
causa, where revocability is precisely the essence of the act.
A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics: It conveys no title or
ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same
thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership and control of the property while alive;
That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose
of the properties conveyed; and
Since the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee. Since the
donation in this case was one made inter vivos, it was immediately operative and final. The
reason is that such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of

the donees acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the absolute owner of
the property donated.