1973 Constitution

In January 1975, a petition for prohibition was filed to seek the nullification
of some Presidential Decrees issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos.
It was alleged that Marcos does not hold any legal office nor possess any
lawful authority under either the 1935 Constitution or the 1973
Constitution and therefore has no authority to issue the questioned
proclamations, decrees and orders.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Marcos government is a lawful government.
HELD: Yes. First of, this is actually a quo warranto proceedings and
Benigno Aquino, Jr. et al, have no legal personality to sue because they
have no claim to the office of the president. Only the Solicitor General or
the person who asserts title to the same office can legally file such a quo
warranto petition.
On the issue at bar, the Supreme Court affirmed the validity of Martial Law
Proclamation No. 1081 issued on September 22, 1972 by President Marcos
because there was no arbitrariness in the issuance of said proclamation
pursuant to the 1935 Constitution; that the factual bases (the
circumstances of lawlessness then present) had not disappeared but had
even been exacerbated; that the question as to the validity of the Martial
Law proclamation has been foreclosed by Section 3(2) of Article XVII of the
1973 Constitution.
Under the (1973) Constitution, the President, if he so desires; can
continue in office beyond 1973. While his term of office under the 1935
Constitution should have terminated on December 30, 1973, by the
general referendum of July 27-28, 1973, the sovereign people expressly
authorized him to continue in office even beyond 1973 under the 1973
Constitution (which was validly ratified on January 17, 1973 by the
sovereign people) in order to finish the reforms he initiated under Martial
Law; and as aforestated, as this was the decision of the people, in whom
sovereignty resides . . . and all government authority emanates . . ., it is
therefore beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. The logical consequence
therefore is that President Marcos is a de jure President of the Republic
of the Philippine

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Shemberg Biotech Corporation and Benson Dakay
GR No. 162291 (August 11, 2010)
Villarama Jr, J.
Bar Subject:
Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Quick Facts:
Respondent Shemberg Biotech Corporation (SBC), a domestic corporation which manufactures
carrageenan from seaweeds, filed a petition for the approval of its rehabilitation plan and
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver before the RTC. The RTC issued a stay order and
petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) filed its opposition to SBC's petition.
After initial hearings, RTC issued the assailed Order which gave due course to SBC' petition.
RTC found that SBC complied with the conditions necessary. It was also satisfied of the merit of
the petition and noted that SBC's business appears viable since it has a market for its product.
A sufficient breathing spell, accdg to the RTC may help SBC settle its debts. The RTC further
said that it will reflect on the issue raised by SBC's creditors that the rehabilitation plan is not
feasible, upon submission by the rehabilitation receiver of its recommendation.
BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence the present petition.
1.
WON BPI's prayer that the petition for rehabilitation be ordered dismissed and
terminated be granted. NO
2.
Ratio: To dismiss the petition for rehabilitation would be to reverse improperly the final
course of that petition; the petition was granted by the RTC and was affirmed with finality, and
the plan is now being implemented. In fact, BPI did not ask the CA to terminate the
rehabilitation proceedings. Aside from being another new issue, its resolution involves factual
matters such as: (1) whether there was failure to achieve the desired targets or goals as set
forth in the rehabilitation plan; (2) whether there was failure of the debtor (SBC) to perform its
obligations under the plan; (3) whether the rehabilitation plan may no longer be implemented
in accordance with its terms, conditions, restrictions or assumptions; or (4) whether there was
successful implementation of the rehabilitation plan. The Court is not at liberty to consider
these factual matters for the first time.

Carbonilla vs Board of Airlines Representative

The Facts:
The facts, as gathered from the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
The Bureau of Customs5 issued Customs Administrative Order No. 1-2005 (CAO 12005) amending
CAO 7-92.6 The Department of Finance7 approved CAO 1-2005 on 9 February 2006.
CAO 7-92 and
CAO 1-2005 were promulgated pursuant to Section 35068 in relation to Section 6089 of
the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP).Petitioners Office of the President, et al.
alleged that prior to the amendment of CAO 7-92, the BOC created on 23 April 2002 a
committee to review the overtime pay of Customs personnel in Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) and to propose its adjustment from the exchange rate of P25
to US$1 to the then exchange rate of P55 to US$1. The Office of the President, et al.
alleged that for a period of more than two years from the creation of the committee,
several meetings were conducted with the agencies concerned, including respondent
Board of Airlines Representatives (BAR), to discuss the proposed rate adjustment that
would be embodied in an Amendatory Customs Administrative Order.
On the other hand, BAR alleged that it learned of the proposed increase in the overtime
rates only sometime in 2004 and only through unofficial reports.

On 23 August 2004, BAR wrote a letter addressed to Edgardo L. De Leon, Chief,

Bonded Warehouse Division, BOC-NAIA, informing the latter of its objection to the
proposed increase in the overtime rates.
BAR further requested for a meeting to discuss the matter.
BAR wrote the Secretary of Finance on 31 January 2005 and 21 February 2005
reiterating its concerns against the issuance of CAO 1-2005. In a letter dated 3 March
2005, the Acting District Collector of BOC informed BAR that the Secretary of Finance
already approved CAO 1-2005 on 9 February 2005. As such, the increase in the
overtime rates became effective on 16 March 2005. BAR still requested for an audience
with the Secretary of Finance which was granted on 12 October 2005.
The BOC then sent a letter to BARs member airlines demanding payment of overtime
services to BOC personnel in compliance with CAO 1-2005. The BARs member airlines
refused and manifested their intention to file a petition with the Commissioner of
Customs and/or the Secretary of Finance to suspend the implementation of CAO 12005.
In a letter dated 31 August 2006, Undersecretary Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr. (Usec.
Mendoza), Legal and Revenue Operations Group, Department of Finance informed
BAR, through its Chairman Felix J.
Cruz (Cruz) that they find no valid ground to disturb the validity of CAO 1-2005, much
less to suspend its implementation or effectivity and that its implementation effective 16
March 2005 is legally proper.
In separate letters both dated 4 December 2006,Cruz requested the Office of the
President and the Office of the Executive Secretary to review the decision of Usec.
Mendoza. Cruz manifested the objection of the International Airlines operating in the
Philippines to CAO 1-2005
The Decision of the Office of the President
In a Decision 13 dated 12 March 2007, the Office of the President denied the appeal of
BAR and
affirmed the Decision of the Department of Finance.
The Office of the President ruled that the BOC was merely exercising its rule-making or
quasi-legislative
power when it issued CAO 1-2005. The Office of the President ruled that since CAO 12005 was issued
in the exercise of BOCs rule-making or quasi-legislative power, its validity and
constitutionality may only
be assailed through a direct action before the regular courts.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals further ruled that it has the power to resolve the constitutional
issue raised against
CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005. The Court of Appeals ruled that Section 8, Article IX(B) of
the Constitution prohibits an appointive public officer or employee from receiving
additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Section 3506 of the

TCCP only authorized payment of additional compensation for overtime work, and thus,
the payment of traveling and meal allowances under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005 are
unconstitutional and could not be enforced against BAR members.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and
sufficient standard tests to the extent that it attempted to cover BAR members through
CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the phrase other persons served did not provide for
descriptive terms and conditions that might be completely understood by the BOC. The
Court of Appeals ruled that devoid of common distinguishable characteristic, aircraft
owners and operators should not have been lumped together with importers and
shippers. The Court of Appeals also ruled that Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the
sufficient standard test because it does not contain adequate guidelines or limitations
needed to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority.
The Issue:
1. Whether or not Section 3506 of the TCCP failed the completeness and sufficient
standard tests?
The Ruling of this Court
The Court has ruled:
Section 3506 of the TCCP provides:Section 3506. Assignment of Customs Employees to
Overtime Work. - Customs employees may be assigned by a Collector to do overtime
work at rates fixed by the Commissioner of Customs when the service rendered is to be
paid by the importers, shippers or other persons served. The rates to be fixed shall not
be less than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.
The term other persons served refers to all other persons served by the BOC
employees. Airline companies, aircraft owners, and operators are among other persons
served by the BOC employees. As pointed out by the OSG, the processing of embarking
and disembarking from aircrafts of passengers, as well as their baggages and cargoes,
forms part of the BOC functions. BOC employees who serve beyond the regular office
hours are entitled to overtime pay for the services they render. Congress deemed it
proper that the payment of overtime services shall be shouldered by the other persons
served by the BOC, that is, the airline companies. This is a policy decision on the part of
Congress that is within its discretion to determine. Such determination by Congress is
not subject to judicial review.
Section 3506 of the TCCP does not fail the completeness and sufficient standard
tests .Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it. The second test requires adequate guidelines or limitations in
the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Section 3506
of the TCCP complied with these requirements. The law is complete in itself that it
leaves nothing more for the BOC to do: it gives authority to the Collector to assign
customs employees to do overtime work; the Commissioner of Customs fixes the rates;

and it provides that the payments shall be made by the importers, shippers or other
persons served. Section 3506 also fixed the standard to be followed by the
Commissioner of Customs when it provides that the rates shall not be less than that
prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise.Contrary to the ruling of
the Court of Appeals, BOC employees rendering overtime services are not receiving
double compensation for the overtime pay, travel and meal allowances provided for
under CAO 7-92 and CAO 1-2005. Section 3506 provides that the rates shall not be less
than that prescribed by law to be paid to employees of private enterprise. The overtime
pay, travel and meal allowances are payment for additional work rendered after regular
office hours and do not constitute double compensation prohibited under Section 8,
Article IX(B) of the 1987 Constitution41 as they are in fact authorized by law or Section
3506 of the TCCP.

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET AL., Respondents.
SERENO,J.:
FACTS:
Respondent CIBAC party-list is a multi-sectoral party registered under
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7941, otherwise known as the Party- List System Act.
As stated in its constitution and bylaws, the platform of CIBAC is to fight graft
and corruption and to promote ethical conduct in the countrys public service.
Under the leadership of the National Council, its highest policymaking and
governing body, the party participated in the 2001, 2004, and 2007 elections.
On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent
CIBAC, submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in
the Party-List System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to
be the partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another
Manifestation6 was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona CruzGonzales and Virginia Jose as the partys vice-president and secretarygeneral, respectively.
On 15 January 2010, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 87447 giving due
course to CIBACs Manifestation, WITHOUT PREJUDICE the determination
which of the two factions of the registered party-list/coalitions/sectoral
organizations which filed two (2) manifestations of intent to participate is the
official representative of said party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations.
On 19 January 2010, respondents, led by President and Chairperson

Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted the Certificate of Nomination of

CIBAC to the COMELEC Law Department. The nomination was certified by
Villanueva and Virginia S. Jose. On 26 March 2010, Pia Derla submitted a
second Certificate of Nomination, which included petitioners Luis Lokin and
Teresita Planas as party-list nominees. Derla affixed to the certification her
signature as acting secretary-general of CIBAC.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was
unauthorized, respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge
From The Records And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the
Certificate filed by Derla. Respondents contended that Derla had
misrepresented herself as acting secretary-general, when she was not even
a member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of Nomination and other documents
she submitted were unauthorized by the party and therefore invalid; and that it
was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the Certificate of Nomination
on its behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the
Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the
records, and declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC.
Upon Motion for Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the
COMELEC en banc affirmed the Divisions findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64
and 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys
Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable
by special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction; and
2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification
and recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC
party-list.
HELD: As earlier stated, this Court denies the petition for being filed
outside the requisite period. The review by this Court of judgments and
final orders of the COMELEC is governed specifically by Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, which states:
REMEDIAL LAW: review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of
the COMELEC and the COA

Sec. 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the review of judgments and final orders
or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 2. Mode of review. A judgment or final order or resolution of the
Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit may be brought by
the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except
as hereinafter provided.
The exception referred to in Section 2 of this Rule refers precisely to the
immediately succeeding provision, Section 3 thereof, which provides for the
allowable period within which to file petitions for certiorari from judgments of
both the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. Thus, while Rule 64 refers
to the same remedy of certiorari as the general rule in Rule 65, they cannot
be equated, as they provide for different reglementary periods. Rule 65
provides for a period of 60 days from notice of judgment sought to be assailed
in the Supreme Court, while Section 3 expressly provides for only 30 days,
viz:
SEC. 3. Time to file petition.The petition shall be filed within thirty (30) days
from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed.
The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said judgment or final
order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the motion is denied, the
aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which
shall not be less than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of
denial.
Petitioner received a copy of the first assailed Resolution on 12 July 2010.
Upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners on 15 July 2010, the
COMELEC en banc issued the second assailed Resolution on 31 August
2010. This per curiam Resolution was received by petitioners on 1 September
2010.16 Thus, pursuant to Section 3 above, deducting the three days it took
petitioners to file the Motion for Reconsideration, they had a remaining period
of 27 days or until 28 September 2010 within which to file the Petition for
Certiorari with this Court.
However, petitioners filed the present Petition only on 1 October 2010, clearly
outside the required period.
POLITICAL LAW: COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes
In the 2010 case Atienza v. Commission on Elections, it was expressly settled
that the COMELEC possessed the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as
a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to enforce

election laws and register political parties. The Court therein cited Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections and Palmares v. Commission on Elections, which
uniformly upheld the COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes:
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already
been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also
declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on
its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register
political parties.
ELECTION LAW: party-list system law
Furthermore, matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives,
as well as their individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System
Law. Sections 8 and 9 thereof state:
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party,
organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five
(45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given
their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any
candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an
elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have
been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or
withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the
name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated
in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned.
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the

election.
By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the
COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives
and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC
promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of PartyList Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of party-list
nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that
the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s,
the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active
participation of the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list
group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such
other positive actions on the part of the nominee/sshowing his/her adherence
to the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list
group/ organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not
only an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide
member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the
foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity of
this resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the list
of nominees.
Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc.
The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting
secretary-general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting
evidence. Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla
was a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party
to submit its Certificate of Nomination.
RAZON VS TAGITIS

FACTS:
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the
Senior Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship
Programme, was last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an
IDB scholar, Tagitis arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007
from a seminar in Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension
House. Tagitis asked Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following
day to Zamboanga. When Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer
around. The receptionist related that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in
the afternoon and even left his room key with the desk. Kunnong looked for Tagitis
and even sent a text message to the latters Manila-based secretary who did not
know of Tagitis whereabouts and activities either; she advised Kunnong to simply
wait.
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor
of Muslim studies and Tagitis fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station. On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a
sworn affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis
disappearance.
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), Mary Jean Tagitis filed a Petition for
the Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P.
Arcilla.The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding
General, Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police
(PNP); Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group
(CIDG); Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency
Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao, Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael,
Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force Comet.
Mary Jean said in her statement that she approached some of her co-employees with
the Land Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help
from some of their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the
whereabouts of her husband. All of her efforts did not produce any positive results
except the information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified
that Engr. Tagitis is in the hands of the uniformed men. According to reliable
information she received, subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody of police intelligence
operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the
different terrorist groups particularly the Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.
She then filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato and
in Jolo, seeking their help to find her husband, but was told of an intriguing tale by
the police that her husband was not missing but was with another woman having
good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the refusal of the PNP to help
and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband.
Heeding an advise of one police officer, she went to the different police headquarters
namely Police Headquarters in Cotabato City, Davao City, Zamboanga City and
eventually in the National Headquarters in Camp Crame in Quezon City but her
efforts produced no positive results. These trips exhausted all of her resources which
pressed her to ask for financial help from friends and relatives.
She has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and
under the circumstances, she has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to

protect and get the release of her husband, Engr. Morced Tagitis, from the illegal
clutches of his captors, their intelligence operatives and the like which are in total
violation of the subjects human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of
a WRIT OF AMPARO.
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of
Amparo, set the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to
file their verified return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners
denied any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis alleged abduction. They argued
that the allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of
action against them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based
on hearsay evidence. In addition, they all claimed that they exhausted all means,
particularly taking pro-active measures to investigate, search and locate Tagitis and
to apprehend the persons responsible for his disappearance.
THE CA RULING
On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision confirming that the disappearance of
Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. The CA held that "raw
reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasims subsequent and belated retraction of his statement
that the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of
speculation" police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of
Tagitis. He had no previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the
bounds of any trust regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB
scholarship program ever came forward to complain that he or she did not get his or
her stipend. The CA also found no basis for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying
to escape from the clutches of his second wife," on the basis of the respondents
testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many wives under the Muslim
faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced his first wife in
order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for ransom by
the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis disappearance,
since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no
acknowledgement of Tagitis abduction or demand for payment of ransom the usual
modus operandi of these terrorist groups.
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to
Tagitis and his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief
Avelino I. Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and
PACER Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts
to protect the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide
monthly reports of their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the
petition against the then respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and
Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that
was involved.
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA
denied the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be extended to Engr.
Morced Tagitis.

RULING:
The disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis is classified as an enforced disappearance,
thus the privilege of the Writ of Amparo applies.
Under the UN Declaration enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention,
abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence
of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by
concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such
a person outside the protection of the law." Under this definition, the elements that
constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold:
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate
of the disappeared person;
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law.
There was no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The
direct evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House
after depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of
again. The undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned the petitioner,
Tagitis colleagues and even the police authorities is that Tagistis disappeared under
mysterious circumstances and was never seen again.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among
others (in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent,
and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals,
as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any
report;(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission.
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every
detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victims rights. As in any other
initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting
the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition,
however, this requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the
proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be
able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually
acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because
these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of specificity, detail and
precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the Amparo Rule is to
make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the constitutional
rights to life, liberty and security.

To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique
Amparo situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it
contains the details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while
presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the victims rights to life, liberty
and security through State or private party action. The petition should likewise be
read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts, to determine
if the required elements namely, of the disappearance, the State or private action,
and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security are
present.
The properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleaders knowledge about Tagitis
disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this disappearance, the
failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information about his
whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the petition
cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting
affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary
nature of the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition,
the Amparo Rule incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the
annotation that these can be used as the affiants direct testimony. This requirement,
however, should not be read as an absolute one that necessarily leads to the
dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in this case, the petitioner
has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting a verified petition
sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn statement
that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to attach
the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs.
Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February
18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this
point, the petition cannot be faulted.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted
notice in Adolf Hitlers Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7,
1941. The Third Reichs Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at
persons in occupied territories "endangering German security"; they were
transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In order to
maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials
from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons.
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two
categories, and 855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972
until 1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were
found dead. During former President Corazon C. Aquinos term, 820 people were
reported to have disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this
number, 407 remain missing, 108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The
number of enforced disappearances dropped during former President Fidel V. Ramos
term when only 87 cases were reported, while the three-year term of former
President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases. KARAPATAN, a local nongovernmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008, the records show that
there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under incumbent
President Gloria M. Arroyos administration. The Commission on Human Rights
records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to
1993. Of this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead,
and 76 still have undetermined status.Currently, the United Nations Working Group

on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced

or involuntary disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November
30, 2008.
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof."We note that although the writ
specifically covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor
penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the
Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially
considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance:
Justice Puno stated that, as the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the
component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special
laws.
Although the Courts power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide
can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set
the procedural standards and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on
actual or threatened violations of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial
intervention can make a difference even if only procedurally in a situation when
the very same investigating public authorities may have had a hand in the
threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
The burden for the public authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure
and investigation are undertaken under pain of indirect contempt from this Court
when governmental efforts are less than what the individual situations require. The
second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and
his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our orders and directives
relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated until the
extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the
disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the
proper case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
During the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (in Paris, France on February 6, 2007, "enforced disappearance" is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of
liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts
of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the
law.
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.
Duque III, we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law

through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation

method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law
is deemed to have the force of domestic law.
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the
State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the
1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order and security,
the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is
rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights
especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the
government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings
or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and
bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The duty to investigate must be
undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced
Disappearance
The unique evidentiary difficulties presented by enforced disappearance cases; these
difficulties form part of the setting that the implementation of the Amparo Rule shall
encounter. These difficulties largely arise because the State itself the party whose
involvement is alleged investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in
other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
perpetrators. In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are,
these witnesses are usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the
disappearance out of fear for their own lives.
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a
distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny
that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. "Deniability" is central to the policy
of enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it
easier to escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victims human
rights.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
The remedy of the writ of amparo provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a
summary proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate
reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt
requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not
at all novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the
Rule on Examination of a Child Witness is expressly recognized as an
exception to the hearsay rule. This Rule allows the admission of the
hearsay testimony of a child describing any act or attempted act of sexual

abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to certain

prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party.
SAGUISAG VS EXEC SEC

EDCA
G.R. No. 212426, January 12, 2016
The petitions question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation
Agreement (EDCA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America
(U.S.). Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into EDCA with the U.S.,claiming that the instrument
violated multiple constitutional provisions.In reply, respondents argue that petitioners lack
standing to bring the suit. To support the legality of their actions, respondents invoke the 1987
Constitution, treaties, and judicial precedents.

Whether the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities

Whether the provisions under EDCA are consistent with the Constitution, as well as
with existing laws and treaties

In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President's prerogative to do whatever is legal and
necessary for Philippine defense interests.
The President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities or (b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.
The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of a executive agreement or a
treaty. No court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive agreement over
a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls squarely within Article
VIII, Section 25.
The term "executive agreement" is "a term wandering alone in the Constitution, bereft of
provenance and an unidentified constitutional mystery." It must not go beyond the parameters,
limitations, and standards set by the law and/or treaty that the former purports to
implement and must not unduly expand the international obligation expressly mentioned or
necessarily implied in the law or treaty.
The executive agreement must be consistent with the Constitution, as well as with existing
laws and treaties.
In light of the President's choice to enter into EDCA in the form of an executive
agreement, respondents carry the burden of proving that it is a mere implementation of

existing laws and treaties concurred in by the Senate. EDCA must thus be carefully
dissected to ascertain if it remains within the legal parameters of a valid executive
agreement. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose, and framework of the MDT and the
VFA. OSG emphasizes that EDCA can be in the form of an executive agreement, since it merely
involves "adjustments in detail" in the implementation of the MDT and the VFA.
There are existing treaties between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred
in by the Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under
Section 25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, respondent emphasizes that EDCA
need not be transmitted to the Senate.
The construction technique of verba legis is not inapplicable just because a provision has a
specific historical context. I The phrase being construed is "shall not be allowed in the
Philippines" and not the preceding one referring to "the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America concerning Military
Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.". Without reference to these factors, a reader
would not understand those terms. However, for the phrase "shall not be allowed in the
Philippines," there is no need for such reference. The law is clear. No less than the Senate
understood this when it ratified the VFA.
The President may generally enter into executive agreements subject to limitations defined
by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by the
Senate.
The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without Senate
concurrence is already well-established in this jurisdiction That power has been alluded to in our
present and past Constitutions, in various statutes, in Supreme Court decisions, and during the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.1
Inherent power of the President to enter into agreements with other states, including the
prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not require further Senate
concurrence1
This distinctive feature was recognized as early as in Eastern Sea
Trading (1961), viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of
the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the
need of
a vote
by
the
Senate or
by
Congress.

Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII, All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

The President had the choice to enter into EDCA by way of an executive agreement or a
treaty.
legally binding international agreements were being entered into by countries in forms other than
a treaty. At the same time, it is clear that they were also keen to preserve the concept of
"executive agreements" and the right of the President to enter into such agreements.
- no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering, on a given subject, into a treaty or an
executive agreement as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in
the choice of the form of agreement is the parties' intent and desire to craft an international
agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests.
- Constitution does not classify any subject, like that involving political issues, to be in the
form of, and ratified as, a treaty
This Court stated in Lim v. Executive Secretary: Thus, EDCA can be in the form of an
executive agreement, since it merely involves "adjustments in detail" in the
implementation of the MDT and the VFA. It points out that there are existing treaties
between the Philippines and the U.S. that have already been concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and have thereby met the requirements of the Constitution under Section
25. Because of the status of these prior agreements, respondent emphasizes that EDCA
need not be transmitted to the Senate.
Therefore, the President may generally enter into executive agreements subject to
limitations defined by the Constitution and may be in furtherance of a treaty already
concurred in by the Senate.
The duty to faithfully execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power and is
intimately related to the other executive functions. These functions include the faithful
execution of the law in autonomous regions the right to prosecute crimes the
implementation of transportation projects the duty to ensure compliance with treaties,
executive agreements and executive orders the authority to deport undesirable aliens the
conferment of national awards under the President's jurisdiction and the overall administration
and control of the executive department. These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a
President cannot function with crippled hands, but must be capable of securing the rule of law.
The Philippines will need friends. Who they are, and what form the friendships will take,
are for the President to decide. The only restriction is what the Constitution itself expressly
prohibits. It appears that this overarching concern for balancing constitutional requirements
against the dictates of necessity was what led to EDCA.
As it is, EDCA is not constitutionally infirm. As an executive agreement, it remains
consistent with existing laws and treaties that it purports to implement.