NAMEI POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE

123 A. Mabini St. Mandaluyong City

DAMAGE STABILITY
(NA 7)

GODINEZ, KRISTINE CAMILLE C.

BSNAME 3A

ENGR. REYNALDO D. LUPAGUE

INSTRUCTOR

M/V Princess of the Stars

Name
Class and
Type
Owner
Operator
Port of
Registry
Route
Completed
In Service
Out of Service

MV Princess of the Stars

Cruise Ferry
Philippine Span Asia Carrier, Corp.
Sulpicio Lines
Philippines
Manila to Cebu City & v.v.
1984
May 1, 2001
June 21, 2008

Principal Particulars:
Tonnage
Length
Beam
Height
Decks
Installed
power

23,824
193
28
43
8
2

GT
m
m
m
Mitsubishi Diesel-Powered Pistol Engines

Propulsion
24 x 4 Controllable Pitch Propellers
Speed
21 knots
Capacity
2,876 passengers
Crew
976 crews
On June 21, 2008, the 23,824-ton ferry sailed from Manila at 8 a.m. on
a 22-hour trip to Cebu City, carrying 851 passengers, including 121
crewmen, 31 infants and 20 children, when it ran into an approaching
typhoon and keeled over. Only 32 survived the sinking, one of the
Philippines worst sea tragedies. The remains of 300 were later recovered,
but another 400 remained missing.
Despite storm warnings, the Philippine Coast Guard gave the vessel,
owned by Sulpicio Lines based in Cebu, clearance to depart. Sixteen hours
later, the ferry sent a distress message, saying it was experiencing engine
trouble off Sibuyan Island. There, it was engulfed by strong winds and
mountainous waves whipped by Typhoon Frank (International Name:
Fengshen), causing water to seep in and tilting the ship heavily to the left.
The order from the skipper, Capt. Florencio Marimon, to abandon ship came
too late, survivors later said.
A total of 135 civil cases have been lodged in courts in Manila and
Cebu by families of the victims against Sulpicio Lines, seeking damages
worth P1.04 billion for negligence and breach of contract of carriage,
according to the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) chief Persida Acosta.

According to the Board of Marine Inquiry (BMI) report, several factors

led to the high number of casualties and the sinking of the marine vessel:
1. Typhoon Frank

HIGHEST SIGNAL RAISED. Typhoon Frank has the highest Public Storm Warning Signal raised
when it traversed the country. (Photo from Wikipedia.)

From the time PAGASA announced it, Typhoon Frank (international

name Fengshen) already posed a real danger to any seasoned mariner.
Typhoon Frank continued to gain and sustain strength in the hours that
followed and therefore was a potential threat to any ship within the vicinity.
Considering the projected path of the typhoon which, at 4 pm of June
20, was located at Catbalogan the M/V Princess of the Stars would
definitely be near the typhoon by 80 nautical miles approximately at 6 am of
June 21 if it followed its pre-plotted course.
2. Commercial interest
The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) guidelines on the movement of
vessels during heavy weather in place since 1988 recommend that a ship
must never sail in the vicinity of the typhoons.
In 2007, the Philippine Inter-Island Ship-owners Association asked the
PCG to give the master or the ship-owners the responsibility and control of
movement of vessels during heavy weather to protect commercial interest.
In response to this, the PCG revised existing rules and issued Memorandum
Circular 04-07, which prescribes that the PCG Station Commander and the
operator/master of the ship should study the movement of the typhoon and
ensure that the vessel will not be in the area directly affected by any
typhoon signal or within the "danger sector".
The memorandum defined the "danger sector" as the area where the
typhoon may possibly pass from its last known point for the next 48 hours.
The triangular area plotted in the map above represents the radius for the
"danger sector" for Typhoon Frank at the time M/V Princess of the Stars was
allowed to set sail at around 8 pm on June 20, 2008.
Memorandum Circular 04-07 also says no vessel shall sail except to
take shelter if PSWS Number 3/PSWS Number 4 is hoisted within its point of
origin, the route, and point of destination. However, it allows ship owners or
captains to decide on movements of any craft or vessel if PSWS Number 1 is
hoisted within the vessel's point of origin, the route, and destination.
Every master or any person in charge of the vessel is required to
ensure that the latest weather bulletin is received and the track of the
typhoon is plotted on the weather chart aboard ship. In short, much of the

decision-making process is essentially left to the master of the ship, through

the recommendation of the PCG station commander before leaving the port.
3. Alternate route
The PCG has to issue a departure clearance to all ships set to sail.
Petty Officer 1 Felix Sardan, duty officer at the PCG, testified before the BMI
that on June 20, 2008, he conducted rounds to check the seaworthiness of
the vessel.
Knowing that a typhoon was coming, Sardan said he advised Captain
Florencio Marimon, captain of M/V Princess of the Stars, of the impending
harsh weather. Marimon then told Sardan that he would take an alternate
route, moving away from the storm. It would have taken the ship an
additional 6 hours if it had taken the alternate route as the route passes
around Negros and Southern Cebu. Sardan then reported to Commander
Erwin Balagas, Coast Guard station commander in Manila, Marimons
intention to use an alternate route. Thus, clearance to sail was granted.
It is important to note that under Memo Circular 04-07, Balagas, as
Coast Guard commander can recommend actions to the captain of the ship.
Given weather conditions in the alternate route, he did not recommend
cancellation of voyage. The PCG later accused the master of the ship,
Marimon, of not following the alternate route he submitted to PCG and to the
captain of the Cebu port on the evening of June 20, 2008.

4. Negligence by the master of the ship

In its ruling, the Board of Marine Inquiry said Captain Marimon, as the
master of the ship, should have exercised extraordinary diligence and good
seamanship in assessing weather conditions before having sailed to the eye
of the typhoon. It also said that, as a prudent mariner, Marimon had the
responsibility to ensure the safety of his crew, the operation of its vessel, and
the safety of its passengers. The report also stated that Marimon should
have postponed the travel until Typhoon Frank weakened.
The BMI noted that, on that same day, 4 commercial vessels cancelled
their trips and 3 other vessels took shelter.

Name of Vessel

Company

M/V Our Lady of

Good Voyage
M/V Superferry
19

Aboitiz Transport
System Corporation
Aboitiz Transport
System Corporation
Batangas Bay Carrier,
Inc.
Sulpicio Lines, Inc.
Seaford Shipping
Lines
Aleson Shipping Inc

M/T Bagungon
M/V Sulcon XII
M/V SF Star

Port of
Destination
Palawan
Cebu City

Action
Took shelter in
Balayan Bay
Took shelter in
Batangas Bay

MICT

Cancelled

Cebu

Cancelled

Iligan

Cancelled

M/V ACC-9
Zamboanga
Cancelled
M/V Nossa
Took shelter in
Senhora de
Negros Navigation
Cebu
Batangas Bay
Fatima
The BMI particularly took note that M/V Sulcon XII, another ship
Sulpicio Lines and also headed for Cebu, cancelled its trip while M/V Princess
of the Stars did not. As the weather worsened, Marimon could have also
taken shelter while he was in Sangley Point, Cavite at 8:52 pm of June 20.
5. Conversion to passenger vessel
It doesnt help that the ship was not originally built for passenger
accommodation. When the M/V Princess of the Stars first set sail in 1984, it
was not a commercial vessel. It was a purely cargo vessel. In 2004, the
vessel was modified for passenger accommodation and was granted by
MARINA the permit to transport people in 2005. In effect, it only functioned
as a passenger vessel for 4 years before it met its tragic end. This
modification is crucial, as the C-deck of the ship, which was modified for
passenger accommodation, contributed to the turning over of the ship. This
part of the deck contained a single staircase, which was closest to the
waters. This became the single exit point for passengers departing from the
ship when the abandon ship order was issued. Worse, as the passengers
flooded to this side of the ship, it shifted the stability of the vessel.
6. Life vests obsolete
In the course of investigation, BMI also found out that the life jackets in
the ship were obsolete and did not comply with requirements under the
Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). According to the International
Life Saving Appliance Code of 2010, these life vests must be able to float

within 5 seconds where the mouth is not submerged into water. According to
the report, the life vests were only usable in calm fresh water. Hence,
performance was not comparable when used in a very rough sea. Not
everyone had life vests to wear and there were reports from survivors that
life rafts, though adequate in number, were lashed too tightly that they could
not be unsealed.

Reaction/Recommendation:
There would be no casualties if they considered the safety of their
passengers. The captain is liable for the damage that occurred.

References:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MV_Princess_of_the_Stars
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/700180/justice-eludes-princess-of-the-starsvictims#ixzz4Rz2k0RL6
http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/issues/disasters/97429-disaster-mvprincess-stars-sulpicio-lines
Photos from:
www.allindiasamachar.com
http://www.philstar.com/nation/2016/06/23/1595863/romblon-townholds-mass-princess-stars-victims