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18-04-2013

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Master of Military Studies Research Paper

September 2012 - April 2013

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Modifications To Optimize The AH-1Z Human Machine Interface

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6. AUTHOR(S)

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Hamilton, Chad P., Major, USMC

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7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

USMC Command and Staff College

Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134-5068
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14. ABSTRACT

The AH-1Z provides the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Commander with a capable attack helicopter to utilize
in the joint warfighting environment. Increasing its capability on the battlefield by increasing aircrew situational
awareness and minimizing the risk associated with operating in degraded visual environment are essential to instill
confidence in the commander. Marine Helicopter Light Attack (HMLA) squadrons are in the process of transitioning to
the AH-1Z Viper from its predecessor, the AH-1W Super Cobra. The AH-1Z provides aircrew with an enormous
capability shift in terms of how information is provided to the operator by providing a cockpit that is under-glass.
Mechanical flight instruments have yielded to digital flight displays that have increased the amount of information that is
presented to aircrew at any one time. This increase in information capability has increased systems functionality in the
aircraft. With an increase in the functionality comes an increase in task load for aircrew unless the human machine
interface (HMI) is streamlined. Without a streamlined or optimized HMI aircrew situational awareness is degraded
because of an excessive mental workload. The HMI should be optimized to afford aircrew the appropriate situational
awareness in all operating environments. It should be designed to maximize aircrew efficiency, effectiveness, and safety
by providing at-a-glance information critical to mission success and safe employment of the aircraft. In order to
accomplish this, a complete workload study of tasks performed by aircrew in the AH-1Z must be completed in the near
future in order to understand design flaws and guide future design and integration of increased capability. Additionally,
employment of material solutions to provide aircrew with the appropriate situational awareness under all operating
conditions is detrimental to the safety of the aircrew and aircraft. Finally, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of
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the aircrew through enhanced situational awareness that supports mission accomplishment is crucial.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

AH-1Z; Situational Awareness; Cognitive load; Human Factors; Human Machine Interface

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Marine Corps University / Command and Staff College
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United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College
Marine Corps University
2076 South Street
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Modifications to Optimize the AH-lZ Human Machine Interface

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

Major Chad P. Hamilton, USMC

AY12-13

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ii

Executive Summary
Title: Modifications to Optimize the AH-1Z Human Machine Interface
Author: Major Chad P. Hamilton
Thesis: Aircrew situational awareness in the AH-1Z can be improved by optimizing the human
machine interface (HMI) to reduce mental workload and increase effectiveness, efficiency, and
safety.
Discussion: Situational awareness is a key component in aviation. The H-1 Upgrade Program was
designed to provide an upgraded light attack capability to the Marine Corps. The aging UH-1N was
replaced by the UH-1Y and the AH-1W was replaced by the AH-1Z. Due to the commonality
considering the HMI in the upgrades aircraft the AH-1Z will be used for analysis. The Marine Corps
premier attack helicopter, the AH-1Z Viper completed successful Operational Evaluation in the
spring of 2010 and was deemed initially operationally capable on 24 February 2011. Currently
Marine Helicopter Light Attack squadrons are in the process of transitioning to the AH-1Z from its
predecessor, the AH-1W Super Cobra. One of the largest changes between the AH-1Z and AH-1W,
besides design changes in the airframe structure, is that the AH-1Z offers an information processing
capability far greater than that of the AH-1W, simply because it has evolved to provide digitally
displayed information through incorporation of an integrated avionics system (IAS). The AH-1Z
provides aircrew with an enormous capability shift in terms of how information is provided to the
operator by providing a cockpit that is under-glass. Mechanical flight instruments have yielded to
digital flight displays that have increased the amount of information that is presented to aircrew at
any one time. Also, overall capability afforded to the operator has increased through functionality.
This increase in information capability has increased systems functionality in the aircraft. With an
increase in the functionality comes an increase in task load for aircrew unless the HMI is streamlined.
Without a streamlined or optimized HMI aircrew situational awareness is degraded because of an
excessive mental workload. Additionally, the HMI should be optimized to afford aircrew the
appropriate situational awareness in all operating environments. Finally it should be designed to
maximize aircrew efficiency, effectiveness, and safety by providing at-a-glance information critical
to mission success and safe employment of the aircraft. With an increase in capability it would only
follow that the AH-1Z HMI take advantage of new technologies to incorporate solutions to reduce
aircrew mental workload, increase effectiveness and efficiency of aircrew, and increase safety.
Conclusion: The AH-1Z provides the MAGTF Commander with a capable attack helicopter to utilize
in the joint warfighting environment. Increasing its capability on the battlefield by way of the aircrew
and minimizing the risk during a degraded visual environment are essential to instill confidence in
the commander. In order to accomplish this, a complete workload study of tasks performed by
aircrew in the AH-1Z must be completed in the near future in order to understand design flaws and
guide future design and integration of increased capability. Additionally, employment of material
solutions to provide aircrew with the appropriate situational awareness under all operating conditions
is detrimental to the safety of the aircrew and aircraft. Finally, increasing the effectiveness and
efficiency of the aircrew through enhanced situational awareness that supports mission
accomplishment is crucial.

iii

DISCLAIMER
THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE
VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY
OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD
INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.
QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR
ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

iv

Illustrations

Figure 1.

Page
Collective HOCAS Switches28

Figure 2.

Cyclic HOCAS Switches..29

Figure 3.

AH-1Z Forward and Aft Crew Stations....30

Figure 4.

HMSD Symbology....31

Figure 5.

Mission Grip Layout.32

Figure 6.

DoD-HFACS Model.................33

Figure 7.

Endsleys Model of Situational Awareness..34

Table of Contents
Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.ii
DISCLAIMERiii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS..iv
PREFACE...vi
INTRODUCTION...1
AH-1Z Overview..3
HMSD, Mission Grip, and HOCAS Overview.5
HUMAN ERROR AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS.6
REDUCING AIRCREW MENTAL WORKLOAD...9
Colorized Display12
Low-Cost Individual Simulation Trainer....15
EXPLOITING INCREASED CAPABILITY17
Selectable Earth/Aircraft Reference Heading tape.17
Virtual targets/waypoints/threats18
HMSD Picture in Picture18
SAFETY20
HMSD Synthetic Vision21
Mission Grip and HOCAS Redesign.22
CONCLUSION.23
BIBLIOGRAPHY.26
NOTES..35

vi

Preface
This report was written primarily to fill the requirements of the Marine Corps Command
and Staff Master of Military Studies program. I was previously involved in developmental and
operational testing and evaluation of the AH-1W and AH-1Z at Naval Air Weapons Station
(NAWS), China Lake. I was a member of the AH-1Z Operational Test Team which was formed
to determine if the AH-1Z was operationally effective and suitable. As a pilot transitioning from
the AH-1W to the AH-1Z, I was amazed at the technological leap that was made between the
two aircraft. At the same time it was clear that this increase has an impact to aircrew situational
awareness simply because of the sheer volume of information available. Material and nonmaterial solutions offered in this paper to adjust how information is controlled and presented are
a look at what is possible. That being said, the intent of this paper is not to suggest that these
designs are the only relevant options to improve aircrew situational awareness. However, the
intent is to provide an understanding of how aircraft functionality and display design effects
situational awareness and how situational awareness can be improved through the human
machine interface.
I would like to take an opportunity to acknowledge LtCol Victor Argobright, Major Rory
Feely, and Mr. Robert Portilla for their expert advice, willingness to provide detailed
information, and contributions to the H-1 community. Finally, I would like to thank Dr. Matthew
Flynn at Marine Corps Universitys Command and Staff College for his guidance in execution of
this project.

The shift from mechanical aircraft power and performance flight instruments to a digital
cockpit with instrumentation under glass over the last two decades has brought vast challenges
to the man / machine interface and opened the door to constantly increasing capabilities. The
paper map and mechanical flight instruments are essentially a thing of the past. Much of the
literature surrounding the AH-1Z professes increased capability and operator situational
awareness (SA) superior to that of its predecessor, the AH-1W. However, an increase in
capability has the potential to increase the mental workload of the operator because of the
amount of information available, and an increase in task and/or procedure complexity if the
interface between aircrew systems and aircrew is not optimized. With a flood of performance,
mission, and environmental information constantly available, aircrew can easily be prone to
information saturation that produces a high cognitive tax resulting in decreased SA. To avoid
task saturation the human machine interface (HMI) between the operator and the aircraft must be
streamlined to create a complete picture of performance and position in a three dimensional
environment while demanding the least amount of cognitive load and control manipulation for
task execution. Increasing SA through HMI optimization in the AH-1Z is essential to increasing
aircrew effectiveness, efficiency, and safety.
The purpose of this paper is to examine potential solutions to streamline the HMI in the
AH-1Z to provide the operator with increased SA by reducing cognitive load and providing
aircrew appropriate SA information to increase effectiveness, efficiency, and safety.
Incorporation of solutions to reduce operator cognitive load, decrease the potential of task
saturation, exploit the ability of capability growth inherent to a platform that provides integrated
information processing, and remedy flight operations in a degraded visual environment (DVE)
are critical to operations now and in the future. A secondary purpose is to trigger an all-

encompassing aircraft workload study to further identify shortfalls in the AH-1Z HMI design in
regards to situational awareness. To accomplish this end the paper is broken down into an
overview of the aircraft, key elements of the AH-1Z HMI, a discussion on the relevance of SA in
HMI design, and three main sections that introduce solutions to optimize the AH-1Z HMI. Each
section provides an overview of its relevance towards advancing SA in the AH-1Z and offers
two design solutions and recommendations to improve the AH-1Z HMI to increase SA. Section
One is focused on reducing aircrew mental workload through design improvements to the
Helmet Mounted Sight and Display (HMSD) symbology for faster cognition. Furthermore, it
provides the introduction of a low-cost trainer (simulation) as a solution to freeing up cognitive
capacity through practice of aircraft functionality and procedures. Section Two centers on
exploiting the aircrafts increased capability in terms of growth potential from past designs and
provides three HMI solutions: a selectable earth/aircraft referenced heading tape for display in
the HMSD, an ability to display virtual targets and waypoints in the HMSD, and a picture in
picture capability within the HMSD field of view (FOV). The third section is dedicated to
enhancing safety by providing an HMI solution to enhance SA in a DVE and a call for mission
grip and hands on collective and stick (HOCAS) redesign. This structure best advances the view
that improvement to the AH-1Z HMI should be made even in times of potentially staunch
financial duress.
The body of work utilized for this paper relies heavily on my personal experience as an
AH-1Z pilot involved in both Developmental and Operational Test and Evaluation and the
experience of other AH-1Z aircrew. There is a significant body of literature concerning cognitive
load, automaticity, skills acquisition, and perceptual motor skills that support the importance of
providing improved situational awareness to the aircrew through the HMI design and

overcoming preconditions that lead to unsafe acts. Other research includes reports and
information obtained from the H-1 Weapons Systems Support Activity (WSSA) Integrated
Product Team (IPT), Naval Air Systems Command (NASC) Air Combat Electronic Program
Office (PMA-209), and NASC H-1 Program Office (PMA-276). It is also necessary to review
preconditions and acts described in the DoD-HFACS and how they relate to SA in the aviation
domain and provide a broad overview of the AH-1Z and key components that support its HMI.
In doing so the analysis is grounded in experience and theory. Ultimately, this paper is driving
towards enhancing aircrew SA in the AH-1Z while simultaneously stimulating an allencompassing aircrew workload study of the AH-1Z. Only through understanding the aircrew
workload in the AH-1Z and how it impacts SA, and providing solutions to the HMI to bolster
SA, can the H-1 community design systems to reduce the potential of human error.
AH-1Z Overview
The AH-1Z provides the Marine Corps a rotary wing attack capability and is employed
by the marine helicopter light attack squadrons (HMLA) to conduct offensive air support (OAS),
utility support, assault support escort, and airborne supporting arms coordination during day or
night under all weather conditions in support of expeditionary, joint, or combined operations. 1
The Bell Helicopter AH-1Z (Viper) attack helicopter is the replacement for the AH-1W (Super
Cobra) and underwent successful Operational Test (OT) in the spring of 2010.
The AH1Z is an armed, tactical helicopter manufactured by Bell Helicopter Textron.
Tandem seating is provided for a forward (FWD) and aft crewmember. This helicopter is
capable of operating from prepared or unprepared areas, from amphibious shipping,
other floating bases and austere shore bases, day or night, and in visual meteorological
conditions (VMC) or instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) [sic]. 2
The significance of the aircraft is that it provides the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF)
Commander with an organic and critical rotary wing battlefield capability.

The AH-1Z incorporates an integrated avionics system (IAS) [T]hat interfaces the
helicopters glass cockpits and provides the capability...to communicate, navigate, process and
present data, manage crew station systems, detect and counter threats, acquire and track targets,
employ guided and unguided munitions, provide various sensor input... 3 The IAS utilizes two
synchronized mission computers that provide information processing and control. The mission
computers are essentially the brain of the aircraft. The forward (FWD) and aft (AFT) crew
stations each contain a crew management system (CMS) that provides for the interface between
aircrew and aircraft systems and avionics and consists of display systems, a keyboard for data
input, and HOCAS switches (Figures 1 and 2). A mission grip is also provided in each cockpit to
control aircraft systems. Aircraft displays for both crew stations consist of two multi-function
displays (MFD), a dual function display (DFD), and a keyboard display unit (KDU) which allow
aircrew to monitor, manage, and operate aircraft systems (Figure 3). 4
Increasing the aircrafts processing capability, in theory, provides an enhanced rotary
wing platform to the Marine Corps. While the aircraft now has the capacity to process mass
amounts of information the information is useless unless it can be translated and correctly
interpreted by aircrew. The flood of information the aircraft provides has the potential to
negatively tax aircrew and impact their SA, creating a dilemma in determining what information
is most critical, when. Aircrew must then use that information to apply procedure while staying
ahead of the aircraft and situation. The brain can think but is limited in execution. A necessity for
the execution of aircraft functionality while simultaneously gaining and maintaining SA is a
streamlined or optimized HMI.

HMSD, HOCAS, and Mission Grip Overview

The AH-1Z incorporates a Helmet Mounted System Display (HMSD). It consists of the
Optimized TopOwl Version II (OTO V2) helmet and helmet mounted display (HMD) to provide
a heads-up display of aircraft power and performance information to the aircrew. An HMD is a
display which projects video imagery symbolic and/or alphanumeric information on a medium
into one or both eyes of the crewmember. 5 It is a see through display that provides virtual
information overlaid on the visual scene allowing the pilot to remain heads up (Figure 4). There
are two different display modules: a day display module (DDM) and a night display module
(NDM). In effect the HMSD provides the operator the ability to monitor aircraft performance
and position, and conduct targeting while simultaneously monitoring the environment external to
the aircraft. While valuable information is provided to the operator through the use of the HMSD
it is in need of optimization to increase aircrew situational awareness.
The mission grip in the AH-1Z is part of the crew station management system and
consists of a hand held controller with 13 switches that perform 36 functions. The mission grip
provides a critical interface between aircrew and the aircraft and provides the aircrew the
capability to target, deliver ordnance, and manipulate and generate waypoints for navigation and
targeting. Functionality is expected to grow in future aircraft software builds. A full list of
mission grip switches and functionality is listed in figure 5.
The HOCAS allows the crewmember at the controls to select functions without removing
hands from the controls. 6 Collective and cyclic head switches and functionality are listed in
figures 1 and 2. Using the HOCAS, aircrew can complete 50 functions through the use of 17
switches. This is a vast amount of functionality that needs to be committed to the muscle
memory of aircrew.

HOCAS and mission grip switches are divided up between three surfaces (collective
head, cyclic head, and mission grip). The switches are in close proximity to one another. Some of
the switches perform benign functions while others provide more critical, irreversible ones. The
point is that aircrew can rapidly find themselves in a dilemma if the wrong switch is utilized.
The HMSD in the AH-1Z was designed to provide a heads up display to aircrew to
increase situational awareness and reduce heads down time. The inconsistency with other
displays concerning how information is presented in terms of character color creates a situation
where aircrew must learn, decode, and differentiate between data that is displayed in the cockpit
to data that is displayed through the HMSD creating a potential cognitive load dilemma.
Additionally, the HMSD must include increased technological advancements in display design
and synthetic vision that are detrimental to facilitating a true heads up capability and provide a
solution to the number one killer in rotary wing aviation DVE. Examination of the mission grip
and HOCAS will focus primarily on redesign limited to a discussion of functionality required
to make them complete hands on interfaces. Also, investigation of a low-cost simulation based
on Serious Games (SG) is introduced to bridge the gap between preparation and execution and
create automaticity of task execution.
These are aspects of the HMI that require exploitation to reduce cognitive load and
increase mission efficiency and effectiveness and increase safety. Once this is accomplished,
increased SA to aircrew operating the AH-1Z will be achieved.

Situational Awareness
Human error is a causal factor in Naval aviation mishaps 80-90% of the time and present
in 50-60% of all Naval aviation mishaps making it the greatest single mishap hazard. 7 The
Department of Defense Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (DoD-HFACS)

(Figure 6) is a taxonomy designed to identify hazards and risks and describes four main tiers of
failures or conditions: acts, preconditions, supervision, and organizational influences. 8 By
examining the breakdown of acts and preconditions into their components it is clear that most of
the elements involved can be directly attributed to a loss of SA. A high level of aircrew SA is
critical in aviation and directly impacts every aspect of aircrew skill, perception, and decision
making. It is important that aircraft system design supports these acts in order to overcome
preconditions that may degrade SA. Providing an effective human machine interface, or the way
in which the aircrew interacts with the aircraft and its systems through controls and displays, to
target certain preconditions is the key to enhancing aircrew SA.
Gaining and maintaining SA is essential to aircrew to operate their aircraft efficiently,
effectively, and safely. There are volumes of research and numerous articles written on the topic
of SA. Dr. Mica Endsley is a foremost expert in the study of SA. Endsley is recognized as a
pioneer and world leader in the study and application of situation awareness in advanced
systems...and has authored over 200 articles and reports on SA. 9 She describes SA as an
internal mental model of the current flight environment and defines it as, perception of the
elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. 10 Aircrew must continuously fight
to gain and maintain a high level of SA during every second of flight to make appropriate
decisions. To effectively make calculated decisions and act based on those decisions aircrew
must be competent in operating their aircraft; understand flight rules, procedures, and tactics; and
have a constant, current picture of the state of the aircraft and environment. 11 The continuous
flood of information available to aircrew at any one time makes gaining and maintaining SA an

extremely daunting task. Once aircrew get behind the SA power curve it is difficult to recover
the required SA to effectively do business.
Endsley breaks SA into three levels: Level one perceiving critical factors in the
environment, Level two - understanding what those factors mean when integrated into the
aircrews goals, and Level three understanding what will happen with the system in the near
future. 12 Using these three levels as a base she provides a model that effectively describes how
situational awareness is affected by internal and external factors (individual and task/system
factors) and how those factors impact decision making and performance. The performance of
actions then feeds back into the state of the environment and back into the levels of SA,
essentially completing a cycle that describes how SA is gained, maintained, and effected (Figure
7).
The DoD-HFAC taxonomy falls short in that it does not provide a direct link between
preconditions and acts (decisions) to determine how or if SA impacts decision making in cases
involving human error. The preconditions portion of the taxonomy reflects the system/task and
individual factors in Endsleys model. A clear link between SA and decision making is
observable when considering Endsleys model. It also demonstrates that decision making
impacts how individual factors and system/task factors relate to SA in the overall decision
making and performance of acts. While the DoD-HFAC does not provide a depiction of how SA
impacts human error it provides preconditions for an act that are similar to the task/system and
individual factors in Endsleys model. During an investigation of an aviation mishap the
investigating authority must attempt to first and foremost determine if the mishap was due to a
mechanical failure or if an individual committed or failed to commit an act. The investigator then
must further classify the act as an error or violation. If it was determined that the act was an

error, the error must be further categorized. The three errors attributed to an unsafe act are skill
based errors, judgment or decision making error, and misperception errors. Once an error is
determined the investigator must consider if any preconditions inspired the act. 13 These
preconditions; environmental factors, individual factors, and personal factors, are broken down
further into factors that reflect and support Endsleys model of SA.
By examining both models a link between SA and human error is evident. Through
system design some of the preconditions such as the technological issues, perceptual issues, and
cognitive issues can be remedied to provide enhanced SA, minimizing the potential for a mishap.
A high level of situational awareness can be achieved by designing systems to reduce mental
workload, increase effectiveness and efficiency, and increase safety. Endsleys research expertly
shows how SA is impacted by preconditions and how preconditions effect decision making and
acts. By understanding this information, we can better understand how to impact SA through
situational design.

Section 1: Reducing Aircrew Mental Workload through

Design and Practice to Improve SA
How much information is too much information? Is more information displayed
appropriately to achieve a broader picture desirable? What information should be displayed in
order to yield timely and effective decisions? Does skill level and experience in performing
specific tasks relate to information overload or saturation? All of these questions are relevant
concerning the increased technology of controls and displays in the Marine Corps AH-1Z.
During a standard flight aircrew can expect to view, hear, and digest information from
four different displays at-a-glance, two radios, an aural alert system, the seat-of-the-pants feel,

10

and the external environment simultaneously. Recognizing the current situation and acting
accordingly can become problematic when conducting complex tasks to affect multiple aircraft
systems. Reducing aircrew mental workload is essential to overcome potential information
overload or saturation that creates a negative impact on aircrew SA causing the aircrew to get
behind the power curve.
Excessive mental workload can be caused by time pressures and task complexity. Time
pressures are generally derived from the external environment, whereas task complexity is
inherent to the HMI between the aircrew and aircraft. A limited workload study of the AH-1Z
funded by PMA-276 provides a comprehensive explanation of how task complexity can lead to
an excessive mental workload:

Task complexity can arise from demands of sensory input (attending to visual or auditory
stimuli), cognitive operations (remembering, transforming, translating, calculating, etc.), or
response generation (e.g., movements of the hands, speech, etc.), or any combination of
these three types of activities. This type of mental workload can be increased by a poorlydesigned user interface. For example, a poorly-designed control-display relationship can
make it difficult to point a sensor directly at an object of interest, leading to increased errors
and increased workload. Similarly, a poorly-designed graphical user interface (GUI) with
inconsistent labeling and non-intuitive icons can lead to increased errors (incorrect
selections), increased task performance time, and increased workload. 14
An excessive mental workload is similar to cognitive overload; which is the amount of cognitive or
mental activity that the working memory is processing at any one time. 15
Dr. John Sweller is a Professor of education at the University of New South Wales and
the developer of the cognitive load theory. He argues,
[T]he cognitive load theory attempts to account for outcomes of the limitations of the
human information-processing system for the design of instructional procedures and
learning and that the human mind is made up of a working memory with limited
capacity, and a long-term memory without capacity. One of the functions of the long term

11

memory is to store automatized schemata [which are] complex, cognitive constructs

that permit the learners to categorize information in simple, easily retrievable units. 16
Once information is absorbed by the long-term memory automaticity is achieved. The main point
of the theory is that through practice the cognitive tax that comes with task completion is less
because the task becomes automatized. 17
Automaticity is essentially committing information to long term memory so that the
retrieval of that information is automatic. Automatic processing of information is ..fast,
autonomous, effortless, and unavailable to conscious awareness in that it can occur without
attention. 18 An automatic cognitive retrieval of information and task execution increases
situational awareness since the mind is then free to process other information.
Automaticity can be applied to mental tasks triggered by stimuli (retrieving and
processing information). Shiffrin and Schneider offer a dual process theory that demonstrates
that there are two different types of information processing: automatic detection and controlled
search. They argue that controlled search requires more time and is highly demanding on
attention capacity, and strongly dependent on information load, whereas automatic detection is
well learned, resides in the long-term memory, is demanding on attention only when triggered,
and is unaffected by load. 19 Applying this theory to visual stimuli one can deduce that presenting
the aircrew visual information that triggers an automatic response is more favorable than
displaying information that requires a controlled response. Information that initially provides a
controlled response can be committed to long term memory through practice making it feasible
to display inconsistent information among display mediums, however, the mental load increases
when trying to respond to the same information that is displayed differently and simultaneously.
Automaticity can also be applied to skills acquisition. Fitts and Posner break down
complex skills learning into three phases: Cognitive- an understanding of the knowledge

12

required to perform a skill, Associative an understanding of procedure, and Autonomousperformance of tasks automatically. 20 This theory implies that a learner has some base level
of knowledge that can be applied to procedural tasks and that over time and through practice the
conduct of the complex skill is automatic. Research conducted by Ciaverelli, Platte, and Powers
synthesized the relationship between perceptual motor learning (Fitts and Posner) and cognitive
learning, that follows a similar phased progression (Anderson), and reasons that the typical
learner transitions from state of knowledge about a subject or skill, to a state of rule application,
and finally the learner progresses to a level of automaticity or skilled task performance that is
executed with minimum conscious monitoring or interruption. 21 This is how experts understand
how cognitive load affects SA and how the problems with it can be overcome. Currently there is
limited means available to H-1 aircrew to practice or hone complex skills as it relates to nonflying pilot complex skills.
A high task complexity and subjection to massive amounts of information is inherent to
flying a highly capable military aircraft. However, the cognitive or mental workload of the aircrew
can be minimized through intuitive display design and providing a measure for aircrew to commit
task performance and procedure to memory. Colorization of display symbology in the AH-1Z is for
the most part intuitive; however, it is inconsistent between the MFDs and HMSD and there is
currently limited means available to achieve automaticity of complex tasks associated with the
mission grip.
Colorized HMSD
Creating consistency in sensory stimuli through a display that uses intuitive color
schemes to encode information is essential to reducing objective mental workload and
reinforcing conscious automaticity to increase SA. Human beings use color as part of the process
in attempting to define, understand, and interpret information. Green, red, and yellow (amber)

13

hues are often associated with safety status in United States culture. 22 These hues in particular
offer meaning to U.S. citizens in everyday life (e.g., stoplights). The OTO HMD display
technology relies upon a monochromatic depiction of information in the display color schemes.
Providing color to a heads up display provides the operator the ability to understand how the
aircraft is performing, the position of the aircraft, and the operating environment at-a-glance and
is consistent with other aircraft displays.
The HMSD in the AH-1Z does provide visual performance instrument indications other
than numbers to define where the aircraft is within the operating limitation in the form of
temporal flashing to cue the operator that a limitation is being reached. While this is effective to
streamline information interpretation it is limited in its application. Using color to display
information in the HMSD DDM would increase SA to the operator and reduce information
saturation, therefore, increasing operator efficiency and effectiveness. The National Aeronautics
and Space Administrations (NASA) Color Usage Research Lab created a hierarchy of color
usage guidelines states that To succeed in using an information interface the user must find the
needed information, read it, and understand it. 23 Finding graphically displayed information
should be accomplished with little cognitive effort under all operating conditions. 24The AH-1Z
HMD provides the operator with the information regardless of the use of a monochromatic
design or a design that incorporates specific hues. Reading and understanding the information is
where color differentiation comes into play.
The information must be presented to the operator in a manner which it can be found and
read, and the colors utilized shall allow the user to understand the information with little
cognitive effort and minimum risk of error under all operational conditions. 25 Understanding
the information presented through the display is critical to interpreting the performance and

14

position of the aircraft, environment, and what, if any, operator corrections or inputs to the
aircraft or systems are necessary to affect the situation. The monochromatic nature of the HMD
however, does not provide a colorized breakout of warnings and cautions. Colorizing display
information beyond a single color provides an at-a-glance capability to the aircrew, reducing the
time required to interpret information and maintain a continuous scan of the display and
environment with little cognitive effort. This is not limited to warnings and cautions concerning
aircraft position and performance indications already incorporated into the display. Colorizing
HMD information is also applicable to any information used to relay safety of flight information.
One issue that comes to light from using color schemes in digital displays is that color
should be used sparingly to retain its meaning. 26 Using the same color scheme to relay different
meaning throughout aircraft systems could increase cognitive workload. Although the proposed
color schemes are used in encoding other systems information an information decoding dilemma
for the operator is not created because the systems that use these hues use them to describe a
safety condition. The proposed colors are then easily interpreted because of how they have
manifested themselves in U.S. culture.
Another factor of importance using color to encode information in the AH-1Z HMD is
consistency with other cockpit displays. Performance instruments displayed on the AH-1Z MultiFunction Displays (MFD) are color coded for green, red, and yellow (amber). Green indicates
that aircraft systems are within operating limits (normal operating limits), yellow indicates that
the aircraft is approaching operating limitations (caution range), and red relays that operating
limitations have been exceeded. Weapons status is also colorized within aircraft MFDs. When a
weapon is selected and the aircraft is placed in the stand-by (STBY) position the weapon
selected for front or rear seat pilot is reflected in yellow (caution, weapon selected) when the

15

aircraft is in an ARM state (ready to fire) the selected weapon indication is red. One of the
guidelines developed by the NASA Color Research Lab to using color where discrimination and
identification are critical is to use color coding consistently across displays and pages. 27 This is
recommended to avoid increases in cognitive effort because the operator must remember
different information encoding schemes in different contexts. This is a valuable design element
that aids in combating information saturation. The aircraft MFDs make effective use of colors to
encode information and the HMSD should as well to provide consistency in information
interpretation to the aircrew. By using a recognized color scheme consistently the aircrew
cognitive process is streamlined and information is understood rapidly.
Low-Cost Individual Simulation
A capability to reinforce skills acquisition to achieve specific tasks utilizing mission grip
or HOCAS functionality in the AH-1Z other than in the aircraft or simulator is missing. With
looming defense budget cuts that are sure to affect squadron flight hour programs coupled with a
lack of AH-1Z simulators there is limited means available to reinforce automaticity of task
execution for aviators that are new to the platform. The AH-1Z Training and Readiness Manual
outlines requirements that aviators must meet to progress in the AH-1Z syllabus. There is no a
single sortie in the AH-1Z Training and Readiness (T&R) manual that specifically focuses on
mission grip utilization. Instead certain tasks and procedures are integrated into the broader
scope of the sortie. After all, the mission grip and the HOCAS are part of the HMI in which the
operator interacts with the aircraft to accomplish an objective and not the focus of aircrew
training. However, this becomes problematic if aircrew are not proficient in utilization of
mission grip functionality prior to execution of a sortie, and contributes to an excessive mental
workload if they have to stumble through mission grip or HOCAS functions to complete time

16

critical tasks. It also decreases situational awareness since the incompetency in execution of tasks
or procedure will demand the aircrews complete attention. Currently, there are only two
simulators to source eight HMLA squadrons (one to source five squadrons on the west coast and
one to source three squadrons on the east coast.) There is an existing gap between operator
preparation and conducting a flight event in either the simulator or aircraft. A measure of
effectiveness and individual performance as it relates to mission grip and HOCAS utilization is
also not available other than overall performance in a specific flight event.
A low-cost trainer is essential to bridge the gap between flight preparations for syllabus
events and provide a means of measuring individual performance and progression in task
application through the use of the mission grip and HOCAS to enhance automaticity of skills.
The low-cost trainer concept would serve to increase skills acquisition through simulation and
provide a means to measure performance. The concept would incorporate an interactive Serious
Game (SG) that hosted specific scenarios requiring specific actions via a mock-up of the mission
grip or HOCAS by the operator. The link between prep and execution hinges on this tool that
greatly improves and reinforces perceptual and psycho motor skills.
SGs provide a level of entertainment while teaching and reinforcing critical perceptual
motor skills as well as procedural skills. Essentially, SGs use the artistic medium of games to
deliver a message, teach a lesson, or provide an experience. 28 The low-cost trainer concept
could consist of a computer and monitor with a mock-up of controls or utilize any current
gaming system. SGs can extend the value of training films and books by allowing the player to
not only learn, but also to demonstrate and apply what he or she has learned. 29 Through
repetition, and introduction to specific scenarios and objectives the cognitive and motor skills
required for performing specific tasks are solidified through objective achievement and measures

17

of individual performance provided. Practice is essential to honing skills required in the

execution of complex tasks and Practice environments can greatly decrease the time to
achieving mastery level, and they are necessary even for the acquisition of procedural
knowledge. 30 Through practice it is more likely that aircrew will achieve the mastery level and
reach a stage of automaticity concerning skill. Ultimately, this provides increased SA by freeing
up critical information processing capability while simultaneously increasing effectiveness and
efficiency in task execution. These games could be utilized to expose new pilots to a plethora of
tactical scenarios; introduce tactics, techniques, and procedures; accomplish learning objectives;
and above all automatize mission grip and HOCAS utilization to execute procedures.

Section 2: Exploiting Increased Capability

The AH-1Z was designed with increased capability in mind and offers the ability of
integrated growth which was not available in its predecessor, the AH-1W. Through software,
increased capability can be incorporated into system design, and increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of the aircrew by increasing SA. As previously stated, the HMSD provides a heads-up
capability to aircrew, and allows them to simultaneously monitor certain performance and
position indications while maximizing a scan outside the aircraft. As aircraft software continues
to update and provide increased capability to the aircrew the HMSD should as well. HMSD
design should reflect the increased capabilities of the aircraft and expand what tasks can be
performed heads-up. These solutions should be incorporated in the HMI to provide SA that
previously was completely absent in the HMSD.
Selectable Earth/Aircraft Reference Heading tape
The HMSD provides the operator a digital heading tape at the top of the display that
presents current aircraft heading. Even when the pilot looks off-axis from aircraft heading the

18

present aircraft heading is displayed instead of the heading the aircrew is actually looking
towards. This is problematic in an attack aircraft platform during targeting, target hand-offs to
other aircraft, and maneuvering to arrive within a prescribed final attack heading. In order to
achieve these tasks the operator must scan inside the cockpit to determine their relation to a
specific point in space by referencing the moving map display. This can lead to errors while
attempting to locate an object, determining relative bearing to an object, and maneuvering the
aircraft correctly into a final attack heading directed during close air support fire mission. With
an earth referenced heading tape the aircrew would have the ability to reference bearing to and
from a specific point without maneuvering the aircraft to a nose-on position. An aircraft
referenced heading tape is still desirable during certain situations such as when operating in the
take-off and landing environment. The aircrew requires the ability to switch between an earth or
aircraft referenced heading tape to increase situational awareness depending on the situation.
Virtual targets/waypoints/threats
The heading tape displayed in the HMSD also provides the operator with cueing to the
next waypoint or target, depending upon what is selected. What it does not provide is a visual
indication of where that target or waypoint is located in the three dimensional environment and
only provides cueing to what point is selected as the TO point. In order to display other
waypoint or target information in the HMSD the operator must utilize hard key functionality on
the MFDs to select a new TO point. Increasing the capability of the HMSD to support virtual
waypoint and target depictions in the field of view (FOV), congruent to their position in the
external environment reduces heads down time and increases SA. Also, the amount of time
required to determine aircraft relation to a point in space is decreased therefore decreasing
information interpretation and mental workload.

19

Picture in Picture (PIP)

The HMSD in the AH-Z currently does not have the ability to display a sensor picture
within the display FOV. Typically the non-flying pilot is manipulating the Target Sighting
System (TSS) and the flying pilot is focused, of course, on flying the aircraft. The flying pilot
can view what the TSS is looking at through one of their two MFDs. However, in order to view
the page the operator must look inside the cockpit to interpret the environment in which the TSS
is looking, or the environment that the non-flying pilot is targeting. The HMSD does provide a
reference symbol that the operator can use to determine where the TSS line of sight (LOS),
however, it does not provide a capability to assist or monitor targeting heads-up. Dedicating a
portion of the HMSD FOV to integrating a picture in picture (PIP) capability or virtual
environment is essential to flying pilot SA. Projecting the TSS forward looking infrared (FLIR)
picture or future DVE solution picture in the background of the HMSD would allow the flying
pilot to remain heads up while interpreting the environment that the TSS is surveying.
A PIP capability in the HMSD FOV would allow the flying pilot to simultaneously
monitor the external environment while maintain situational awareness during targeting, aid the
non-flying pilot in target or object detection, recognition, and identification, and reference FLIR
imagery during DVE operations and terrain flight (TERF). PIP increases SA by allowing the
flying pilot to maintain an outside scan during the tasks listed and increases efficiency and
effectiveness by shedding the transition of attention inside and outside of the cockpit. Also, the
potential of a dual heads-down situation where both the flying and nonflying pilot are looking
into the aircraft and not monitoring the external environment is avoided adding an increased
element of safety.

20

Section 3: Enhanced Safety

The big three in terms of aviation are aviate, navigate, and communicate. These three
items make their way into every flight brief to remind aviators of the most important items to
focus on in the event of an emergency. These three elements are critical during every phase of
flight and during all operating conditions.
The AH-1Z supports expeditionary operations and operations ashore, both day and night,
during VMC and IMC conditions from improved or unprepared surfaces. Operating in all types
of conditions includes operating in a DVE. A DVE is one where the visual scene is degraded
because of night time operations or operations were obscurants such as sand, snow, smoke, fog,
or haze a present which may induce spatial disorientation or perception issues and a loss of
situational awareness potentially affecting both aviation and navigation. A DVE that is inherent
to rotary wing platforms, brown out or whiteout, is caused by downwash created by the turning
rotor system and can cause the disruption of obscurants that can severely degrade or restrict
aircrew visual reference during landing or takeoff creating causing loss of SA and spatial
disorientation because of a lack of visual cues. Spatial disorientation is the situation occurring
when the aviator fails to sense correctly the position, motion, or attitude of his aircraft or of
himself within the fixed coordinate system provided by the surface of the earth and the
gravitational vertical. 31 Spatial disorientation during critical phases of flight such as takeoff,
landing, and nap of the earth (NOE) flight can have disastrous results. A DVE clearly creates a
situation ripe for an aviation mishap. The AH-1Z currently does not possess a material solution
to DVE operations.
Similarly, communication is a key ingredient to safety of flight. It is essential to every
aspect of operations and is critical to all aspects of the flight. The inability to communicate

21

effectively during time critical situations can have multiple disastrous results that may affect
aircrew autonomous to the aircraft, other aircraft, or elements operating on the ground. It can
result in mishaps, lost targeting opportunities, or potential fratricide. The AH-1Z already has an
effective communication system; however, communication can be stifled during critical
moments because of the current HMI.
HMSD Synthetic Vision
During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
(OEF) from 2001 to 2009 there were 375 rotor craft loses with 496 fatalities. Of those loses 79
percent were attributed to loss of situational awareness and other human factors. The primary
causal factors were CFIT and brown out. 32 An Urgent Universal Needs Statement (UUNS)
forwarded by HMLA-469 October 12, 2012 details this capability gap by citing that,
Currently, Marine Corps helicopters operate without systems to assist in avoiding
obstacles during takeoff, enroute and landing when operating in Degraded Visual
Environment (DVE) conditions. Consequently, more than half of combat helicopter
fatalities and loss of aircraft have occurred during brown-out landings or Controlled
Flight into Terrain (CFIT). This is a problem common to all helicopters and tilt rotor
aircraft. In DVE situations, aircrew may lose the ability to recognize obstacles (such as
terrain or high-tension power lines) in the flight path of the aircraft. There are numerous
occurrences where aircrew flew a fully functional helicopter into terrain or obstacles
during combat operations in DVE situations resulting in loss of life and equipment. 33
The UUNS effectively argues the necessity to procure a DVE operating capability in the
AH-1Z that utilizes current aircraft systems in concert with new systems designed to provide a
synthetic vision of the external environment, a terrain and collision avoidance technology, and
mature automatic flight control system capable of assisting DVE during the takeoff, landing, and
enroute phases of flight. Of primary importance to this portion of the paper is the benefit of
integrating synthetic vision into the HMSD.

22

There are currently examples of a sensor fused synthetic vision that effectively create a
three dimensional picture of the external environment taking advantage of the IR and millimeter
wave portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. When a material synthetic vision solution is
provided for the AH-1Z it is critical that it be displayable in the HMSD. A sensor fused image of
the three dimensional scene in line with aircraft vector, overlaid by selectable symbol sets
(HMSD declutter modes dependent upon current phase of flight) would vastly increase aircrew
SA in a DVE. Selectable symbols sets would vary from current HMSD symbology and could be
selectable through declutter functionality that already exists for the HMSD. A synthetic vision
symbol set would incorporate intuitively displayed aircraft state parameters such as
acceleration, velocity and orientationsuch as: velocity vector and acceleration cue in the
horizontal plane; an acceleration cue in the vertical axis; and a flight path vector. 34 This
functionality would allow the aircrew to see through obscurants, detect obstacles to flight
during DVE operations.
Mission Grip and HOCAS
Issues regarding safety and survivability are present with the current mission grip design
and HOCAS communication and a countermeasure dispensing capability. When employing the
mission grip the soul source of communication for the non-flying pilot is a foot switch. The AH1Z has two radios that the operator can use to communicate. The Cockpit Communication
System (CCS) is the control for switching between radio one and two when using the foot
switch. Once a radio is selected on the CCS the operator depresses the foot switch and talks. In
order to switch between the two radios the operator is required to take his hand off of the mission
grip. This becomes a safety of flight issue if the non-flying pilot observes a situation that is
critical to other aircraft in the flight or area or personnel on the ground reaction time to warn
other members is excessive. Similarly, the Counter Measures Dispensing Switch is independent

23

of the mission grip and in order for the operator to manually dispense expendables they must
remove their hand away from the mission grip. This is time consuming in a critical environment,
especially at night where the operator is required to use tactile feel to find the dispensing switch.
The HOCAS switchology presents an issue along the same lines; however, the flying
pilot does have the capability to talk and dispense flares without removing their hands from the
controls while flying. The problem is that the flying pilot cannot dispense flares and talk
simultaneously because of the location of the switches. This is critical to survivability and safety.
The first step in evasive maneuvers for launch of an infrared surface-to-air missile / air-to-air
missile against the aircraft is to dispense flares (countermeasures) while simultaneously making a
FLARES, FLARES, FLARES call to notify the flight of the threat. 35
Mission grip and HOCAS redesign was investigated in an informal design review
conducted by PMAs-209 and 276 with the involvement of fleet and test community AH-1Z
pilots. The redesign effort cited communications, survivability, and future growth as issues that
required exploration. 36These same issues were also raised in the AH-1Z OT final test report.
Other pilots have complained about the ergonomics of the mission grip and HOCAS themselves.
The problem with this is that there will always be pilots who do not like the ergonomics no
matter what the design is. In a mission grip or HOCAS redesign the focus of effort should be
determined on what tasks the aircrew is required to execute and exact a design were the aircrew
does not have to remove their hands from the controls to complete tasks. 37 With the exception
of utilizing hard and soft keys to interface with the MFDs there are other tasks that could be
incorporated or made available to the mission grip

24

Conclusion / Implications
The AH-1Z provides aircrew with an enormous capability shift in terms of how
information is provided to the operator by providing a cockpit that is under-glass. Mechanical
flight instruments have yielded to digital flight displays that have increased the amount of
information that is presented to the aircrew at any one time. Also, overall capability afforded to
the operator has increased through functionality. This increase in information capability has
enhanced systems functionality in the aircraft. With an increase in functionality comes an
increase in task load for aircrew and a decrease in aircrew SA unless the HMI is streamlined.
Currently, the HMI in the AH-1Z is not optimized to enhance SA. Advanced technology
has provided capabilities to the aviation community limited only to money and the imagination.
However, with this increase in capability the design of the HMI must be streamlined in order to
avoid an excessive mental work load or levy a huge cognitive tax on aircrew receiving,
interpreting, and acting upon information. Similarly, HMI design must also support task
accomplishment in that the design and method of learning how to manipulate the design through
the task execution does not induce an excessive mental workload upon aircrew. Exploiting
increased capability will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the AH-1Z as a warfighting
means in the joint environment. Integration of material solutions that provide enhanced safety to
aircrew and the aircraft to combat the number one killer of rotary wing aircraft are available and
must be applied to the AH-1Z. Although a limited work load study of the AH-1Z has been
performed, an all-encompassing study must be performed to realize design flaws and apply
appropriate design to future implementation.
The Marine Corps must seek to improve the effectiveness and efficiency, and
safety of the AH-1Z platform and aircrew through increased SA to provide a highly capable

25

aircraft to enhance the joint warfighting effort. Yet, solutions to streamline or optimize the HMI
are really the tip of the iceberg. There are many other concepts that are applicable to the AH-1Z
and are exploited by other joint operations. The bottom line is that AH-1Z, and the missions it
performs, is critical to the MAGTF commanders warfighting capability. The AH-1Z provides
the MAGTF commander with a capable attack helicopter to utilize in the joint warfighting
environment. Increasing its capability on the battlefield by targeting aircrew SA, exploiting
growth potential, and minimizing the risk during a DVE are essential to instill confidence in the
commander in this air asset. If a platform is consistently ineffective in performing its mission
essential tasks, or suffers a high mishap rate while performing those tasks, the commanders
options to employ that platform become limited. Providing the commander with a platform that
consistently meets or exceeds mission requirements increases their confidence, and provides
another capability for the commander to consider during planning.

26

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27

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28

Collective HOCAS Switches

Figure 1.
Referenced from the 2010 AH-1Z NATOPS

29

Cyclic HOCAS Switches

~
4

'-

,'r

....,.
SWITCH NUMBER

1. W?NSEL

2. HMO sa.

..

COD

FUNCTION

SWITCH POSrTION

Fo<watd

~lect gun

Aft

~lect Helfire mi:e.:sile

l.gft

~lect rockets. bombs. or

Right

~lect AIM-

flares.

9 rrissie

Cent="f pc:ess:

Oe--~led

FO<Watd

Increase symbol brightne--....s.'conltast

Aft

Deotease symbol brighl~l

l.&ft

5vmbology Mode Select, toggkz. between Normal Mode or

Blank All Mode &ymboJoqy

al

Right

Cycles thru SIJCCe'"...sive decluH:=r levels - 0 . 1. 2. 3. 4

Cent~ pee-~

Activate bores9"' and boresigf'i c:tecking

3. CGE{UNCG:

Cent~ pee-~

Cage/uncage air-to-air mi:ssie

4. WPI'I FIR:

Press

r-nselected ~

5. OUICKDRW

Press

Slew gunfU~ missile to HMSO line-of-Sght

6. FRCTRIM

Fwd/AfL'Ufu'Rlghl

AcfJI.lS{ forwatd. aft and lateral trim

raease of Force Ttrn

7. TRIM REl.

Press

Momentary

8. SCASREI.

Press

Disengages al AFCS functionr. and SCAS channels

9. HOVER

1 ~t

Pre-...s

Places hover a;cs graphic on RT page

2"' p,..

Marks pre--~ pooiion vlith a bolt on hO\'er aid graphic

3ro:pte.GS

Re-,.,ets pre--~ pooiion box on hover aid graphic

Figure 2.
Referenced from the 2010 AH-1Z NATOPS

30

AH-1Z Forward and Aft Crew Stations

Figure 3.
Referenced from the 2010 AH-1Z NATOPS

31

HMSD in Normal Mode Declutter 0

Figure 4.
Referenced from the 2010 AH-1Z NATOPS

32

Mission Grip Switches

~ ~.

D
lt. CO~SEL

NAME
~'-b-"1.1# Ac.o.~h ;tv:~ Srui<

TlXk IClr..ot &le~

POSITION

uo

Aiii'I P~O::Irlt{ll

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=-

~ e"'...O!I CII!!eM WQ!'. o1JI:! ~~~ l

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........

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33

DoD HFACS Model

Figure 6.
Referenced from U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Human Factors and Classification System: A
Mishap Investigation and Data Analysis Tool, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, January 2005).

34

Model of Situational Awareness

Figure 7.
From Endsley 1995c. in Mica R. Endsley, Situation Awareness in Aviation Systems, In the Human

Factors Handbook, ed. D.J. Garland, J.A. Wise, and V.D. Hopkin (Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1999), 257-276.

35

Notes:
1

Air NTTP 3-22.3-AH-1W.Tactical Employment Manua, Combat Aircraft Fundamentals AH-1W, July 2007.
Naval Air Systems Command (PMA-276), NATOPS Flight Manual Navy Model AH-1Z Helicopter, (Patuxent
River, MD: Chief of Naval Operations Under the Direction of Commander Naval air Systems Command, January
2010), 1-1.
3
Naval Air Systems Command (PMA-276), H-1 Program AH-1Z and UH-1Y, issue 1, 2012-2013, (Patuxent
River, MD: PMA-276), 6, http://www.bellhelicopter.com/MungoBlobs/160/549/Bell_H1_OverviewBook,0.pdf.
4
2010 AH-1Z NATOPS, 2-1
5
U.S. Department of Defense, Military Intefrace Standard 1787B: Military Standard Aircraft Display Symbology.
(USAF MIL-STD-1787B, April 1996), 3.
6
AH-1Z NATOPS Flight Manual, 2-6.
7
U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Human Factors and Classification System: A Mishap
Investigation and Data Analysis Tool, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, January 2005), 2.
8
DoD HFACS, 4
9
SA Technologies homepage referenced February 05, 2013 at http://www.satechnologies.com/people/
10
Mica R. Endsley, Situation Awareness in Aviation Systems, In the Human Factors Handbook, ed. D.J.
Garland, J.A. Wise, and V.D. Hopkin (Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1999), 257-276.
11
Endsley, 258
12
Endsley, 258
13
DoD HFACS, 13
14
NAWC-AD Patuxent River NAS, Assessment of Crew Workload Reduction for the H-1 Upgrade Program (Draft)
(Carrollton, GA: Lowell Scientific Enterprises, 2005), 11.
15
Conny Malamed, What is Cognitive Load, The elearning Coach (blog) January 13, 2013,
http://theelearningcoach.com/learning/what-is-cognitive-load/
16
Herre van Oostendorp ed., Cognition in a Digital World, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.,
2003), 5.
17
Herre van Oostendorp, 5.
18
G.D. Logan, Automaticity, resources, and memory: Theoretical controversies and practical implications.
Human Factors, 3,D, (1988):583-598, in Mica R. Endsley,Toward a Theory of Situation Awareness in Dynamic
SystemsHuman Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 37, no.1, (1995): 45,
http://www.cse.buffalo.edu/~peter/refs/DataFusion%5E~Learning/endsley_1995.pdf
19
Richard M. Shiffrin, Walter A. Schneider, Controlled and Automatic Human Information Processing:
II. Perceptual Learning, Automatic Attending, and a General Theory, Phsychological Review 84, no. 2 (March
1977): 127.
20
P.M. Fitts and M.I Posner , Human Performance,(Belmont, CA: Brooks-Cole, 1967) referenced in Anthony
Ciavarelli, William L. Platte, and Johnny J. Powers, Teaching and Assessing Complex Skills in Simulation
With Application to Rifle Marksmanship Training, for Interservice /Industry Training, Simulation, and Education
Conference (I/ITSEC) 2009, Paper No. 9086, 2, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a535072.pdf
21
Anthony Ciavarelli, William L. Platte, and Johnny J. Powers, Teaching and Assessing Complex Skills in
Simulation With Application to Rifle Marksmanship Training, for Interservice /Industry Training, Simulation, and
Education Conference (I/ITSEC) 2009, Paper No. 9086, 3, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a535072.pdf
22
Clarence E. Rash, Michael B. Russo, Tomasz R. Letowski, Elmar T. Schmeisser, ed., Helmet-Mounted Display:
Sensation, Perception and Cognition Issues, (Fort Rucker, AL: U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory,
2009), 357.
23
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Color Usage Research Lab, Heirarchy of Color Guidelines,
accessed 28 December 2012, http://alexlogan.com/nasa/GuidelinesHierarchy.html
24
NASA Color Usage Research Lab
25
NASA Color Usage Research Lab
26
Rash, Russo, Letowski, Schmeisser, ed, 357.
27
Rash, Russo, Letowski, Schmeisser, ed, 357
28
David R. Michael, Serious Games: Games That Educate, Train, and Inform, (Boston, MA : Thomson Course
Technology PTR, 2006), 36, 42..
29
David R. Michael, Serious Games: Games That Educate, Train, and Inform, (Boston, MA : Thomson Course
Technology PTR, 2006), 36.
2

36

30

Clark Aldrich, The Complete Guide to Simulations and Serious Games : How the Most Valuable Content will be
Created in the Age Beyond Gutenberg to Google,(San Fransisco: Pfeifer, 2009), 4.
31
David L. Key, Analysis of Army Helicopter Pilot Error Mishap Data and the Implications for Handling
Qualities, (Twenty Fifth European Rotorcraft Forum Paper, September 1999), L4-4, referenced 1 January 2013 at
http://www.aero.polimi.it/~rolando/bacheca/imprimatur/Pilot_Error_Analysis.pdf
32
Mark Couch, Dennis Lindell, Study of Rotorcraft Safety and Survivability, accessed 1 Jan 2013,
www.vtol.org/B17CF690-F5FE-11E0-89190050568D0042.
33
Rory Feely, Degraded Visual Environment Solutions, (III MEF Universal Urgent Needs Statement submitted by
Marine Helicopter Light Attack Squadron 469, October 2012), 3.
34
III MEF UUNS October 2012, 4
35
Air NTTP 3-22.5-RWTACSOP TACTICAL POCKET GUIDE USMC Rotary Wing Tactical Standard
Operating Procedures, November 2006.
36
AH-1Z Aircrew, (Discussion of New Functions and Current Problems) Interviewed by Robert Portilla, October
31, 2011.
37
Major Rory Feely (HMLA 469 Operations Officer and former HX-21 Test Pilot), in discussion with the author,
December 2012.