I.

RIGHT TO BAIL
PEOPLE VS DONATO
Habeas Corpus Right to Bail Rebellion
Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion.
He was charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together
with his co-accused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference
was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon
by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and
that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the
case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations
of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas.
But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato
approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing
the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is
estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when
he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that
he will be held in custody.
ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.
HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he
withdrew his petition for the issuance of the WoHC. The contention of
the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody and that the
same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His
waiver to such right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for
WoHC.

PEOPLE VS FORTES
Facts: Agripino Gine of Barangay Naburacan, Municipality of Matnog,
Province of Sorsogon, accompanied his 13-year old daughter,
Merelyn, to the police station of the said municipality to report a
rape committed against the latter by the accused. Following this,
the accused was apprehended and charged. A bond of P25000 was
granted for accuseds provisional release. The MCTC found him
guilty. An appeal to RTC was filed, the request for the fixing of bond
was denied. Now accused assails denial of bail on the ground that
the same amounted to an undue denial of his constitutional right to
bail.

Issue: Whether or Not the accuseds right to bail violated.

Held: No. It is clear from Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
as amended, that before conviction bail is either a matter of right or
of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. To that
extent the right is absolute. If the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be
denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. But
once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
also becomes a matter of right. If an accused who is charged with a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is convicted by the trial
court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is neither a matter
of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the part of
the court.
BAYLON VS SISON
Baylon v Judge Sison 243 SCRA 284 (1995)
application for bail on offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua/life imprisonment requires a hearing to give prosecution
the chance to present evidence on the guilt of the accused
Facts: Respondent judge is accused for malfeasance in granting bail
to the accused charged with double murder. Prosecution was not
given notice of at least 3 days before the scheduled hearing for bail
in violation of Rule 15, section 4 of the Rules of Court and the filing
of petition for bail has only 2 non-working day interval from the
schedule of the hearing. Moreover the prosecution also assails that
they were not given the chance to present evidence that strongly
prove the guilt of the accused. Respondent judge justifies not having
committed grave abuse of discretion since the prosecution did not
interpose objection with his orders and the lack of previous notice
was cured with the filing of motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge exercised abuse in
discretion in the grant of bail to the accused.
Held: The Supreme Court held that there was abuse in the discretion
of the judge in granting bail to the accused considering that the
motion for bail was filed on a Saturday and the hearing was
immediately conducted on Monday thereby depriving the
prosecution to make an opposition thereto and violating the 3-day
notice rule embodied in Rule 15, Sec. 4 of Rules of Court. It is a well
established rule of law that bail is not a matter of right and requires

a hearing where the accused is charged with an offense which is

punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Respondent judge should have carefully scrutinized the validity of
petition for bail before making an outright grant of this motion.
A guided legal principle in the right to bail includes:
. . The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present
evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is
weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is
strong. In other words, discretion must be exercised regularly,
legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is,
after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any
order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial
discretion but of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness.
MANOTOC VS CA
Facts:
Criminal complaints were filed by some clients of the Manotoc
Securities, Inc., to which petitioner Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. is a principal
stockholder, after the torrens title submitted to and accepted by the
same were suspected to be fake. The cases were assigned to
different trial courts. In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to
bail, with FGU Instance Corporation as Surety.
Petitioner then filed motion for permission to leave the country in
each trial courts stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the
United States, "relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.". His motion was denied thus he elevated his petition
to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner contends that having been
admitted to bail as a matter of right, the courts which granted him
bail could not prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to
travel.The same was denied hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
Issue:
Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally
released on bail, has an unrestricted right to travel?
Held:
Petitioner's contention is untenable. A court has the power to
prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This
is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the
security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make

himself available at all times whenever the court requires his

presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not
an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
states that The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the
interest of national security, public safety or public health. The
order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the said constitutional provision.
J. CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS
PEOPLE VS DRAMAYO
Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so
that he could not testify in the robbery case where he is an accused.
The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was
returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby.
Only Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder.
Hence the appeal
Issue: Whether or not the accuseds criminal liability proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
Held: Yes. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the
Presumption of innocence. So it must be, according to the
Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both appellants. Accusation
is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It
is incumbent on the prosecution demonstrate that culpability lies.
Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their
behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt be shown
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required then is moral certainty.
"By reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise,
but it is doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof
and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded
by the law to convict of any carnal charge but moral certainty is
required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof regular to constitute the offense."
The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise
on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence deserving of
the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply
demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to
their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof
that was offered by the prosecution. The principal contention raised

is thus clearly untenable. It must be stated likewise that while

squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases where
this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being
acquitted, the element of conspiracy likewise being allegedly
present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the offense
guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to
their capability.
DUMLAO VS COMELEC
Facts: A Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Restraining Order was filed by Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot and
Alfredo Salapantan Jr., in their own behalf and all others allegedly
similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of Batas
Pambansa 51, 52, and 53 for being Dumlao specifically questions
the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa (BP) 52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process
guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides that "In
addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XIIC of the Constitution and
disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby
declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in section 1 hereof. Any retired elective provincial, city
of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have
been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired." Dumlao
alleged that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against
him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely
arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation." For their part,
Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of Section 7 of BP 51,
which provides that "Unless sooner removed for cause, all local
elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term
of 6 years. which shall commence on the first Monday of March
1980"; Section 4 of BP 52, which provides that "any person who has
committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar
crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices
covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity
therein: provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the
aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact
and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a
civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be
prima facie evidence of such fact"; Section 1 and Section 6 of BP 52.
In addition to the said provisions, Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also
questioned the accreditation of some political parties by the
COMELEC, as authorized by BP 53, on the ground that it is contrary
to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a

"bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any
form of harassment and discrimination."
Issue: Whether Section 4, BP 52, which disqualifies elective
candidates who have been charged in civil and/or military tribunals,
is valid.
Held: Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is
not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the
constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is
disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect,
except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a
person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom
charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for
public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him
is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it
the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during
the term of the sentence. Although the filing of charges is
considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be
rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the
proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged
with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the
prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that
evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts
rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A
highly possible conflict of finding between two government bodies,
to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be
avoided. Furthermore, a
legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be
allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being infected
with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only
that
objectionable portion is mandated. The first paragraph of Section 4,
BP 52, on the other hand, is valid.
However, that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such
fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

TRILLANES VS PIMENTEL
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law.
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President and
key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that
evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged with coup dtat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four
years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before starting
his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as
senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with
the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not Trillanes case is different from that of the Jalosjos case
2.
Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow
him to work and serve his mandate as senator
3.
Whether or not there are enough precedents that allows for a liberal treatment of
detention prisoners who are held without bail
HELD:
No distinction between Trillanes case and that of Jalosjos case
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement in Jalosjos
that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement as
the functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from
the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
The Constitution provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of
guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions
apply equally to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion
perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of

imposable penalties, there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or

moral turpitude involved in the crime charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for
release on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial
court's judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment
of his right to provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right
to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense
applies equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like
Jalosjos. The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor
engage in any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in
detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his
mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to
office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies
pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that
he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by
the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the
Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by
the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the
people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the
hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with
the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of
one or a few of its members. x x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner
into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion
was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously

allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy
in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and
take his oath of office on June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands
of the trial court lest it be accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely
banks on these prior grants to him and insists on unending concessions and blanket
authorizations.

PEOPLE VS HOLGADO
Facts:
FriscoHolgadowaschargedintheCourtofFirstInstanceofRomblonwithslightillegal
detentionbecauseaccordingtotheinformation,beingaprivateperson,hedid"feloniouslyandwithout
justifiablemotive,kidnapanddetainoneArtemiaFabreaginthehouseofAnteroHolgadoforabout
eighthourstherebydeprivingsaidArtemiaFabreagofherpersonalliberty."On8May1948,theday
setforthetrial,Holgadopleadedguiltywithoutthebenefitofalawyer.Twodayslater,oron10May
1948,thetrialcourtrenderedjudgment,findingHolgadoguiltyandsentencinghimthepenaltyof
prisionmayorinitsmaximumdegreetoreclusiontemporalinthemediumdegree,asminimum,or10
yearsand1dayofprisionmayorto20years,withtheaccessorypenaltiesprovidedforbylaw,with
costs.Holgadoappealed.
Issue:
Whetherthedutiesrequiredofthetrialcourtwhentheaccusedhasnocounselwerecompliedwith.
Held:
Underthecircumstances,particularlythequalifiedpleagivenbytheaccused,whowasunaidedby
counsel,itwasnotprudent,tosaytheleast,forthetrialcourttorendersuchaseriousjudgmentfinding
theaccusedguiltyofacapitaloffense,andimposinguponhimsuchaheavypenaltyastenyearsand
onedayofprisionmayortotwentyyears,withoutabsolutelyanyevidencetodetermineandclarifythe
truefactsofthecase.UnderSection3,Rule112ofthetheRulesofCourt,whenadefendantappears
withoutattorney,thecourthasfourimportantdutiestocomplywith:(1)Itmustinformthedefendant
thatitishisrighttohaveattorneybeforebeingarraigned;(2)Aftergivinghimsuchinformationthe
courtmustaskhimifhedesirestheaidofanattorney;(3)Ifhedesiresandisunabletoemploy
attorney,thecourtmustassignattorneydeoficiotodefendhim;and(4)Iftheaccuseddesiresto
procureanattorneyofhisownthecourtmustgranthimareasonabletimetherefor.Notoneofthese
dutieshadbeencompliedwithbythetrialcourt.Therecorddisclosesthatsaidcourtdidnotinformthe
accusedofhisrighttohaveanattorneynordiditaskhimifhedesiredtheaidofone.Thetrialcourt
failedtoinquirewhetherornottheaccusedwastoemployanattorney,togranthimreasonabletimeto
procureoneortoassignanattorneydeoficio.Oneofthegreatprinciplesofjusticeguaranteedbyour
Constitutionisthat"nopersonshallbeheldtoanswerforacriminaloffensewithoutdueprocessof
law",andthatallaccused"shallenjoytherighttobeheardbyhimselfandcounsel."Incriminalcases
therecanbenofairhearingunlesstheaccusedbegivenanopportunitytobeheardbycounsel.The
righttobeheardwouldbeoflittleavailifitdoesnotincludetherighttobeheardbycounsel.Eventhe
mostintelligentoreducatedmanmayhavenoskillinthescienceofthelaw,particularlyintherulesof
procedure,and,withoutcounsel,hemaybeconvictednotbecauseheisguiltybutbecausehedoesnot
knowhowtoestablishhisinnocence.Andthiscanhappenmoreeasilytopersonswhoareignorantor
uneducated.Itisforthisreasonthattherighttobeassistedbycounselisdeemedsoimportantthatit
hasbecomeaconstitutionalrightanditissoimplementedthatunderourrulesofprocedureitisnot
enoughfortheCourttoappriseanaccusedofhisrighttohaveanattorney,itisnotenoughtoaskhim
whetherhedesirestheaidofanattorney,butitisessentialthatthecourtshouldassignonedeoficiofor
himifhesodesiresandheispoororgranthimareasonabletimetoprocureanattorneyofhisown.
Hence,thejudgmentappealedfromisreversedandthecaseisremandedtotheCourtbelowforanew
arraignmentandanewtrialaftertheaccusedisapprisedofhisrighttohaveandtobeassistedby
counsel.

PEOPLE VS AGBAYANI
Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter
and was found guilty of the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial
was filed before the court by the new counsel of the accused
assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused invoking the failure of the court to inform the accused of his
right to choose his own counsel and the violation of the appellants
right for a 2 day preparation for trial.
Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of the right to
have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment of
conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.
Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose
affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to
counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason
being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with
the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases,
and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an
affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that
unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively
proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to
counsel, it will be presumed that the accused was informed by the
court of such right.
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea
of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for
trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time. It must
be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only
when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error
and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived,
expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for
time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is
untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the appellant
was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to
cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he
is incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
AMION VS CHIONGSON
Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court
charging the respondent judge for ignorance of the law and
oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accusedappellant counsel de officio despite the appellants opposition

because he has his own counsel of choice in the person of Atty.

Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did not
appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty.
Lao Ong from the PAO to represent the accused stating on record
that his representation is without prejudice to the appearance of the
accused own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the
trial since the complainant already expressed frustration on the so
many postponement of the hearing.
Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel
of his own choice as asserted by the accused in the case at bar.
Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against
respondent judge devoid of merit. An examination of related
provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel, will
show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more
aptly and specifically to a person under investigation rather than
one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Accusedcomplainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and
constitutional right to due process as he was duly accorded all the
opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate
his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court
together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the
strategic machination of delaying the proceeding by the accused
that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel de officio by
the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy
disposition of a case and causes delay in the administration of justice.
CRUZ VS MIJARES REPORT
SORIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an
Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the
investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for
dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an
entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had
supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an
information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a
principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
(R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the investigation conducted by the petitioner
can be regarded as contract or transaction within the purview of
.RA.3019.

Held: R.A. 3019 Sec.3. Corrupt practices of public officers - In

addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any
public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: xxx b. Directly
or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share
percentage or benefit, for himself or for other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the Govt. and any other
party wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
The petitioner stated that the facts make out a case of direct bribery
under Art.210 of the RPC and not a violation of R.A. 3019 sec.3 (b).
The offense of direct bribery is not the offense charged and is not
included in the offense charged which is violation of R.A.3019 sec.3
(b).
The respondent claimed that, transaction as used hereof, is not
limited to commercial or business transaction, but includes all kinds
of transaction whether commercial, civil, or administrative in nature.
The court agrees with the petitioner. It is obvious that the
investigation conducted by the petitioner was neither a contract nor
transaction. A transaction like a contract is one which involves some
consideration as in credit transactions. And this element is absent in
the investigation conducted by the petitioner.
Judgment modified. Petitioner is guilty of direct bribery under
Art.210 of the RPC.
BORJA VS MENDOZA
Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of
Cebu. However, he was not arraigned. That not withstanding,
respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia and
rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged.
The case was appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu
presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the
failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was
also alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without
requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that
the decision should be annulled because there was no arraignment.
Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated
when he was not arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be

arraigned so that he may be informed as to why he was indicted and
what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a
showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full
opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. It is also not just
due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in the Rules
that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to
know the precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he
is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very
least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of
the state is mobilized against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital
aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent
Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be
heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that
the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence
imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of
an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the
requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of
respondent Judge Romulo R. Senining dated December 28, 1973,
finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries, is
nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge
Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the
aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set aside. The
case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of
the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and
observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the
arraignment of petitioner.
MATRIDO VS PEOPLE
PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman,
and a resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police
Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by
appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it
was too general and that the NBI had not complied with the
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The
pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the

appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July

24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee,
alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the
description on the serach warrant which says an undetermined
amount of marijuana, was too general and hence makes the
warrant void for vagueness.
HELD: SC held that the appellants contention, has no leg to stand
on. The constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of
description of the things to be seized is primarily meant to enable
the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the
properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing the
wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable
searches and seizures. What the Constitution seeks to avoid are
search warrants of broad or general characterization or sweeping
descriptions, which will authorize police officers to undertake a
fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not
required that technical precision of description be required,
particularly, where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, since the requirement of a
technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.