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043 6-5 PDF

The document compares the core and Shapley value solutions concepts in cooperative game theory using an example of a 3-player game representing a security council. In the game, player 1 is a permanent member with veto power and players 2 and 3 are temporary members. The core allocates the entire payoff to player 1, while the Shapley value splits the payoff between the players based on their marginal contributions to different coalitions. The document then discusses how the Shapley value is calculated in general for cooperative games.

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Jon Himes
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76 views21 pages

043 6-5 PDF

The document compares the core and Shapley value solutions concepts in cooperative game theory using an example of a 3-player game representing a security council. In the game, player 1 is a permanent member with veto power and players 2 and 3 are temporary members. The core allocates the entire payoff to player 1, while the Shapley value splits the payoff between the players based on their marginal contributions to different coalitions. The document then discusses how the Shapley value is calculated in general for cooperative games.

Uploaded by

Jon Himes
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an


Example
Game Theory Course:
Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


UN security council: 15 members.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


UN security council: 15 members.

5 permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK, US

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


UN security council: 15 members.

5 permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK, US

10 temporary members

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


UN security council: 15 members.

5 permanent members: China, France, Russia, UK, US

10 temporary members

5 permanent members can veto resolutions.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


UN security council: represent it as a cooperative game.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


UN security council: represent it as a cooperative game.

China, France, Russia, UK, US are labeled {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

v(S) = 1 if {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} S and #S 8,

v(S) = 0 otherwise.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


Lets start with a three-player game that has a similar structure:

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


Lets start with a three-player game that has a similar structure:

1 permanent member with a veto and 2 temporary members

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


Lets start with a three-player game that has a similar structure:

1 permanent member with a veto and 2 temporary members

v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2,

v(S) = 0 otherwise.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.

Core: x1 + x2 1, x1 + x3 1, x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, xi 0.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.

Core: x1 + x2 1, x1 + x3 1, x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, xi 0.

Core: x1 = 1, x2 = 0, x3 = 0.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.
Shapley

Valuei =

1
N!

[
]
|S|!(|N
|

|S|

1)!
v(S

{i})

v(S)
.
SN \{i}

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.
Shapley

Valuei =

1
N!

[
]
|S|!(|N
|

|S|

1)!
v(S

{i})

v(S)
.
SN \{i}

1s value: v({1, 2, 3}) v({2, 3}) = 1 weighted by 2/6,


v({1, 2}) v({2}) = 1 weighted by 1/6, v({1, 3}) v({3}) = 1
weighted by 1/6

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.
Shapley

Valuei =

1
N!

[
]
|S|!(|N
|

|S|

1)!
v(S

{i})

v(S)
.
SN \{i}

1s value: v({1, 2, 3}) v({2, 3}) = 1 weighted by 2/6,


v({1, 2}) v({2}) = 1 weighted by 1/6, v({1, 3}) v({3}) = 1
weighted by 1/6

2s value: v({1, 2}) v({1}) = 1, weighted by 1/6

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.
Shapley

Valuei =

1
N!

[
]
|S|!(|N
|

|S|

1)!
v(S

{i})

v(S)
.
SN \{i}

1s value: v({1, 2, 3}) v({2, 3}) = 1 weighted by 2/6,


v({1, 2}) v({2}) = 1 weighted by 1/6, v({1, 3}) v({3}) = 1
weighted by 1/6

2s value: v({1, 2}) v({1}) = 1, weighted by 1/6

3s value: v({1, 3}) v({1}) = 1, weighted by 1/6

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Compare Core and Shapley Value in an Example


v(S) = 1 if 1 S and #S 2, v(S) = 0 otherwise.
Shapley

Valuei =

1
N!

[
]
|S|!(|N
|

|S|

1)!
v(S

{i})

v(S)
.
SN \{i}

1s value: v({1, 2, 3}) v({2, 3}) = 1 weighted by 2/6,


v({1, 2}) v({2}) = 1 weighted by 1/6, v({1, 3}) v({3}) = 1
weighted by 1/6

2s value: v({1, 2}) v({1}) = 1, weighted by 1/6

3s value: v({1, 3}) v({1}) = 1, weighted by 1/6

Shapley Value: x1 = 2/3, x2 = 1/6, x3 = 1/6.

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

A way to the Shapley Value:

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

Cooperative Games
Model complex multilateral bargaining and coalition formation,

without specifying the particulars of a normal or extensive form


Core: Based on coalitional threats - each coalition must get at

least what it can generate alone


Shapley Value: based on marginal contributions: what does each

player contribute to each possible coalition.


Other solutions...

Game Theory Course: Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Comparing the Core and Shapley Value in an Example

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