Planas vs.

Commission on Elections 
[GR L-35925, 22 January 1973]; also Sanidad vs. Comelec [GR L-35929], Roxas vs. Comelec [GR L-35940], Monteclaro vs. Comelec [GR L-35941], Ordonez vs.
National Treasurer of the Philippines [GR L-35942], Tan vs. Comelec [GR L-35948], Diokno vs. Comelec [GR L-35953], Jimenez vs. Comelec [GR L-35961], Gonzales
vs. Comelec [GR L-35965], and Hidalgo vs. Comelec [GR L-35979] 
Second Division, Concepcion (J): 3 concur, 3 concur in separate opinions, 1 concurs as recapitulated, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 2 filed separate opinions

Facts: On 16 March 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution 2, which was amended by Resolution 4 of said body, adopted on 17 June 1969, calling a
Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines. Said Resolution 2, as amended, was implemented by RA 6132, approved on 24 August 1970,
pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to said Convention was held on 10 November 1970, and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform
its functions on 1 June 971. While the Convention was in session on 21 September 1972, the President issued Proclamation 1081 placing the entire Philippines under
Martial Law. On 29 November 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The next day, 30 November 1972, the
President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines
proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor," as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution on 15 January 1973. Soon after, or on 7 December 1972, Charito Planas filed, with the Supreme Court, Case GR L-35925, against the Commission on
Elections, the Treasurer of the Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said "respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree 73, in any manner,
until further orders of the Court," upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree "has no force and effect as law because the calling of such plebiscite, the setting
of guidelines for the conduct of the same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of public funds for
the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress," and "there is no proper submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for 15 January
1973, there being no freedom of speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof." Substantially identical actions
were filed. Meanwhile, or on 17 December 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation 1081, for the purpose of free and
open debate on the Proposed Constitution. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the Proposed
Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until 7 January 1973, when General Order 20 was issued, directing "that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on 15
January 1973, be postponed until further notice." Said General Order 20, moreover, "suspended in the meantime" the "order of 17 December 1972, temporarily suspending
the effects of Proclamation 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution." In view of the events relative to the postponement of the plebiscite,
the Court deemed it fit to refrain, for the time being, from deciding the cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which said plebiscite would be held were known
or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935 Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on 22 January 1973, and since the main
objection to Presidential Decree 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds therefor, which Congress
unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by the President — reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders
of Congress and the Commission on Elections — the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases. In the afternoon of 12 January 1973, Vidal
Tan, et. al. [GR L-35948] filed an "urgent motion," praying that said case be decided "as soon as possible, preferably not later than 15 January 1973." It was alleged in said
motion, "that the President subsequently announced the issuance of Presidential Decree 86 organizing the so-called Citizens Assemblies, to be consulted on certain public
questions; and that thereafter it was later announced that 'the Assemblies will be asked if they favor or oppose — [1] The New Society; [2] Reforms instituted under Martial
Law; [3] The holding of a plebiscite on the proposed new Constitution and when (the tentative new date given following the postponement of the plebiscite from the
original date of January 15 are February 19 and March 5); [4] The opening of the regular session slated on January 22 in accordance with the existing Constitution despite
Martial Law."

Issue [1]: Whether the Court has authority to pass upon the validity of Presidential Decree 73.

Held [1]: Presidential Decree 73 purports to have the force and effect of a legislation, so that the issue on the validity thereof is manifestly a justiciable one, on the
authority, not only of a long list of cases in which the Court has passed upon the constitutionality of statutes and/or acts of the Executive, 1 but, also, of no less than that of
Subdivision (1) of Section 2, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution, which expressly provides for the authority of the Supreme Court to review cases involving said issue.

Issue [2]: Whether the President has the authority to issue PD 73 to submit to the People the Constitution proposed by the Convention.

Held [2]: As regards the authority of the President to issue Presidential Decree 73, "submitting to the Filipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating funds therefor," it is unnecessary, for the time being, to
pass upon such question, because the plebiscite ordained in said Decree has been postponed. In any event, should the plebiscite be scheduled to be held at any time later, the
proper parties may then file such action as the circumstances may justify.

Issue [3]: Whether martial law per se affects the validity of a submission to the people for ratification of specific proposals for amendment of the Constitution.

Held [3]: The matter is one intimately and necessarily related to the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 of the President of the Philippines. This question has not been
explicitly raised, however, in any of the cases under consideration, said cases having been filed before the issuance of such Proclamation, although the petitioners in L-
35948 maintain that the issue on the referral of the Proposed Constitution to the Citizens' Assemblies may be deemed and was raised in their Supplemental Motion of
January 15, 1973. At any rate, said question has not been adequately argued by the parties in any of these cases, and it would not be proper to resolve such a transcendental
question without the most thorough discussion possible under the circumstances. In fairness to the petitioners in L-35948 and considering the surrounding circumstances,
that instead of dismissing the case as moot and academic, said petitioners should be given a reasonable period of time within which to move in the premises.

Held (totality): Recapitulating the views expressed by the Members of the Court, the result is this: (1) There is unanimity on the justiciable nature of the issue on the
legality of Presidential Decree 73. (2) On the validity of the decree itself, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Esguerra and Concepcion, or 6 Members of the
Court, are of the opinion that the issue has become moot and academic, whereas Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio voted to uphold the validity of said Decree. (3) On
the authority of the 1971 Constitutional Convention to pass the proposed Constitution or to incorporate therein the provisions contested by the petitioners in L-35948,
Justice Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee and Esguerra opine that the issue has become moot and academic. Justice Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Concepcion
have voted to uphold the authority of the Convention. (4) Justice Fernando, likewise, expressed the view that the 1971 Constitutional Convention had authority to continue
in the performance of its functions despite the proclamation of Martial Law. In effect, Justices Barredo, Makasiar and Antonio hold the same view. (5) On the question
whether the proclamation of Martial Law affected the proper submission of the proposed Constitution to a plebiscite, insofar as the freedom essential therefor is concerned,
Justice Fernando is of the opinion that there is a repugnancy between the election contemplated under Art. XV of the 1935 Constitution and the existence of Martial Law,
and would, therefore, grant the petitions were they not moot and academic. Justices Barredo, Antonio and Esguerra are of the opinion that that issue involves question of
fact which cannot be predetermined, and that Martial Law per se does not necessarily preclude the factual possibility of adequate freedom for the purposes contemplated.
(6) On Presidential Proclamation No. 1102, the following views were expressed: [a] Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Concepcion
are of the opinion that question of validity of said Proclamation has not been properly raised before the Court, which, accordingly, should not pass upon such question. [b]
Justice Barredo holds that the issue on the constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1102 has been submitted to and should be determined by the Court, and that the "purported
ratification of the Proposed Constitution based on the referendum among Citizens' Assemblies falls short of being in strict conformity with the requirements of Article XV
of the 1935 Constitution," but that such unfortunate drawback notwithstanding, "considering all other related relevant circumstances, the new Constitution is legally
recognizable and should he recognized as legitimately in force." [c] Justice Zaldivar maintains unqualifiedly that the Proposed Constitution has not been ratified in
accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, and that, accordingly, it has no force and effect whatsoever. [d] Justice Antonio feels "that the Court is not competent
to act" on the issue whether the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by the people or not, "in the absence of any judicially discoverable and manageable standards,"
since the issue "poses a question of fact." (7) On the question whether or not these cases should be dismissed, Justices Makalintal, Castro Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra voted in the affirmative, for the reasons set forth in their respective opinions. Justices Fernando, Teehankee and the writer similarly voted, except as regards Case
No. L-35948 as to which they voted to grant to the petitioners therein a reasonable period of time within which to file appropriate pleadings should they wish to contest the
legality of Presidential Proclamation 1102. Justice Zaldivar favors the granting of said period to the petitioners in said Case No. L-35948 for the purpose, but he believes, in
effect, that the Court should go farther and decide on the merits everyone of the cases under consideration. Wherefore, all of the cases are dismissed, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections 

[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976]; also Guzman vs. Comelec [GR L-44684], and Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections [GR L-44714]
En Banc, Martin (J): 1 concurs in result, 4 concur in separate opinions, 2 dissent in separate opinions, 2 filed separate opinions

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens
Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related
decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of
voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree
1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions
to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the
convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim
legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced
L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October
16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031,
insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that
under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments
to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as
L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election."
Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the
Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the
interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of
transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional
Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in
Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory
Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly.
The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973,
at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July
1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27
February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and
delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum
of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power
bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National
Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the
nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional
content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of
any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has
nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Occena vs. Commission on Elections 

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404] 
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further
than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the present petitions were promulgated and filed,
respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,
dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could
even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect.
With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but
must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated
by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches
but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal of a
suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest
case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

Tolentino vs. Commission on Elections 

[GR 148334, 21 January 2004] 

En Banc, Carpio (J): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion to which 3 join

Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (“Senator

Guingona”) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Following Senator

Guingona’s confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed Resolution 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution 84 called on COMELEC to

fill the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be

elected in that election. Resolution 84 further provided that the “Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of

former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.,” which ends on 30 June 2004. On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the provinces but one

(Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution 01-005 also provided that “the first

twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto T.

Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President.” Ralph Recto (“Recto”) and Gregorio Honasan (“Honasan”) ranked 12th and 13th, respectively, in Resolution 01-005. On

20 June 2001, Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the petition for prohibition, impleading only COMELEC as respondent. Tolentino and

Mojica sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special

election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, Tolentino and Mojica prayed for the nullification of Resolution 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such

effect. Tolentino and Mojica contend that COMELEC issued Resolution 01-005 without jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled

in the special election as required under Section 2 of RA 6645; (2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy whether they seek

election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required under Section 73 of BP 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to specify in the Voters Information Sheet

the candidates seeking election under the special or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of RA 6646. Tolentino and Mojica add

that because of these omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the 14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that “there were

no two separate Senate elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of term.” Tolentino and Mojica sought the issuance of a

temporary restraining order during the pendency of their petition. Without issuing any restraining order, the Supreme Court required COMELEC to Comment on the

petition. Honasan questioned Tolentino’s and Mojica's standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers and voters because they do not claim that COMELEC illegally

disbursed public funds; nor claim that they sustained personal injury because of the issuance of Resolutions 01-005 and 01-006.

Issue: Whether Tolentino and Mojica have standing to litigate.

Held: “Legal standing” or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the

challenged governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily “sharpens the presentation of issues,” relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court

settle only actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or

threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be

redressed by a favorable action. Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the present petition. In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the

validity of the special election on 14 May 2001, Tolentino and Mojica assert a harm classified as a “generalized grievance.” This generalized grievance is shared in

substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have Tolentino and Mojica alleged, in their capacity as

taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the special election held on 14 May 2001 “tax money [was] ‘x x x extracted and spent in

violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power’ or that there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money

[was] deflected to any improper purpose.” On the other hand, the Court has relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion to give due course to voters’
suits involving the right of suffrage. The Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount

interest is involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of

transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure.

The Court accords the same treatment to Tolentino and Mojica in the present case in their capacity as voters since they raise important issues involving their right of

suffrage, considering that the issue raised in the petition is likely to arise again.

Gonzales vs. Comelec

FACTS:
 Petitioners Gonzales and PHILCONSA filed separate petitions. A petition assailing the constitutionality of the RA No. 4913 and for prohibition with preliminary
injunction to restrain COMELEC from implementing or complying with the said law. PHILCONSA also assails the Resolution by both houses No. 1 and 3 of March 16,
1967.
RA No. 4913 to be effective on June 17, 1967 is an act submitting to Filipino people for approval the amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines proposed by the
Congress in R. B. H. No. 1 and 3, adopted on March 16, 1967. This act fixes the date and manner of election for the proposed amendments to be voted upon by the people,
and appropriates funds for said election. On the otherhand, Resolution by Both Houses No. 1 and 3 two amendments to the Constitution: 1) to mend Sec. 5 of Art. VI, by
increasing the maximum membership of the House of Representatives from 120 to 180, apportioning 160 of the said 180 seats and eliminating the provision that Congress
shall by law make an apportionment within 3 years after the return of every enumeration; 2) to amend Sec. 16 of Art. VI by allowing Senators and Representatives to be
delegates to a constitutional convention without forfeiting their seats.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT RA No. 4913 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
WHETHER OR NOT R. B. H. Nos. 1 AND 3 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION.
DECISION: Petitions DENIED. The constitutionality of RA No. 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 is upheld.
RATIO DECIDENDI: The determination of conditions under which the proposed amendments shall be submitted to the people is concededly a matter which falls within
the legislative sphere.
          The petitioners merely attacks the wisdom of the action taken by Congress – not the authority to take it. One seeming purpose thereof is to permit Members of
Congress to run for election as delegates to the Constitutional Convention and participate in the proceedings therein, without forfeiting their seats in Congress. Whether or
not this should be done is a political question, not subject to review by the courts of justice.