Vinuya Vs.

Romulo
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office
of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.

Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization
registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape
by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the
Philippines. But officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to
espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against
them; and (b) compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals.

Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war
were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations
Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a
Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former
comfort women. Over the next five years, these were implemented by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.

ISSUE:

WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is wellestablished that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government,
and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to
judicial inquiry or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.

But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However,
the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.
In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of
the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.

The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which
prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other
officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be
inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan,
thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the
Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy
judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed.

From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such
an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our
consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests
of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are
sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a
claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade
a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its
subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his
behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects,
respect for the rules of international law.

Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection
by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is
asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their
rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law and do
not affect the position internationally.

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this
analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty
to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained
the status of jus cogens.

The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a
whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view
of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in
their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.

The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are
considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and
can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v

Duque III
Facts:
Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) of E.O. 51 (Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk
Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under the Freedom Constitution on
Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give
effect to Art 11 of the Intl Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes(ICBMS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly(WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted
severe resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In
2006, the DOH issued the assailed RIRR.
Issue:
Sub-Issue: W/N the pertinent intl agreements entered into by the Phil are part of the law of
the land and may be implemented by DOH through the RIRR. If yes, W/N the RIRR is in
accord
with
intl
agreements

MAIN: W/N the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by
promulgating the RIRR.
Held:
Sub-issue:
Yes for ICBMS. Under 1987 Consti, intl law can become domestic law by transformation (thru
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation) or incorporation (mere constitutional
declaration i.e treaties) The ICBMS and WHA resolutions were not treaties as they have not
been concurred by 2/3 of all members of the Senate as required under Sec, 21, Art 8.

However, the ICBMS had been transformed into domestic law through a local legislation such
as the Milk Code. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of ICBMS.
No for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions
pertinent WHA resolutions are customary intl law that may be deemed part of the law of the
land. For an intl rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such
rule is being followed by states because they consider it as obligatory to comply with such
rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although signed by most of the member states,
were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states. Unlike the ICBMS
whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the WHA
Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months,
breastfeeding up to 24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes)
have not been adopted as domestic law nor are they followed in our country as well. The
Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions
may be classified as SOFT LAW non-binding norms, principles and practices that influence
state behavior. Soft law is not part of intl law.
Main issue:
Yes. Some parts of the RIRR were not in consonance with the Milk Code such as Sec. 4(f)
->advertising, promotions of formula are prohibited,
Sec 11 -> prohibitions for advertising breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children uo to 24 months
And Sec 46 -> sanctions for advertising .
These provisions are declared null and void. The DOH and respondents are prohibited from
implementing said provisions.

Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1.
Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2.
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore,
they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources
property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1.

Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2.
The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation,
and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of
succeeding generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the
rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the
end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the
present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm
and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.

MMDA v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (Environmental Law)

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
GR No. 171947-48
December 18, 2008
FACTS:
The complaint by the residents alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree
No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code and that ALL defendants (public
officials) must be jointly and/or solidarily liable and collectively ordered to clean up Manila
Bay and to restore its water quality to class B, waters fit for swimming, diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
ISSUES:

(1) WON Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality
and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to
the cleanup of specific pollution incidents;
(2) WON petitioners be compel led by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila
Bay.
APPLICABLE LAWS:
PD 1152 Philippine Environmental Code Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality. Where
the quality of water has deteriorated t o a degree where it s state will adversely
affect its best u sage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures
as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards. Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain , remove and clean - up water pollution
incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government
agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and
expenses incurred in said operation shall be charged against the persons and/ or entities
responsible for such pollution.
HELD:
(1) Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought
to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even
in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. Section 17
& 20 are of general application and are not for specific pollution incidents only. The fact that
the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well -nigh
impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
(2) The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus. While the
implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done
is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. Under what other
judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus , the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference.
NOTE: This continuing mandamus is no longer applicable, since this is institutionalized in
the rules of procedure for environmental cases.
20 days Temporary restraining order

IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819
April 8, 2014
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said
Act. The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
1.
2.

The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products.

3.

The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.

4.

The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.

5.

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.

6.

The RH Law violates the right to free speech.

7.

The RH Law is void-for-vagueness in violation of the due process clause of the

Constitution.

8.

The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of ones family protected by the
Constitution

9.
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the
controversy.
1.

Power of Judicial Review

2.

Actual Case or Controversy

3.

Facial Challenge

4.

Locus Standi

5.

Declaratory Relief

6.
One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for
violating the:
1.

Right to life

2.

Right to health

3.

Freedom of religion and right to free speech

4.

Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)

5.

Freedom of expression and academic freedom

6.

Due process clause

7.

Equal protection clause

8.

Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1.

Actual Case or Controversy

2.

Facial Challenge

3.

Locus Standi

4.

Declaratory Relief

5.

One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy
that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision
of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not
merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts. Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or performed
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege
the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged
action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of the act complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one
that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but
also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the
press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of
the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to ones freedom of
expression, as they are modes which ones thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that the rule on standing is
a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the
matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.
One Subject-One Title: The one title-one subject rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied
with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute
seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope
and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule so as not to cripple or

impede legislation. The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a
law must not be so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading,
either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act.
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a
law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it
is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view:
Under this view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize
it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But
certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be
recognized. Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to
retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law;
and (2) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL
1.

Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is
a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper
hearing and evidence. However, they agreed that individual Members could express
their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It
shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning
of conception according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at
fertilization. Medical sources also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) conception to refer to the moment of
fertilization and (b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they
did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the
union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that similarly take action before
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to
prevent the Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret
this otherwise. The RH Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using
the word or in defining abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce abortion and induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the
meaning of abortifacient by using the term primarily. Recognizing as abortifacients only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mothers womb
or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mothers womb
(Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of contraceptives that may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the
IRR (Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term primarily, must be struck down.
2.

The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place,
the Court believes adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are
made available to the public. In fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the
DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall

be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual
distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered mandatory only
after these devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA.
Congress cannot determine that contraceptives are safe, legal, non-abortificient and
effective.
3.

The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation
in support of modern RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right
or wrong according to ones dogma or belief. However, the Court has the authority to
determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.
The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the
policies of any one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other
groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution or the Establishment Clause.
This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus, establishes a state
religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH Law
even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the
petitioners.
4.

Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the
consent of the spouse undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes
into martial privacy and autonomy and goes against the constitutional safeguards for the
family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of the Constitution
mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the
right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation
of policies and programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual
decision-making, and endanger the institutions of marriage and the family.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already
a parent or has had a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which states: The natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government. In addition, the portion of Section
23(a)(ii) which reads in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or legal guardian
or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in
cases where what is involved is non-surgical procedures.
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning
services. Parents are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in
this situation and may assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-threatening procedures.
5.

The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education. Although educators might raise their objection to their participation in the RH
education program, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before
it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has
not yet formulated a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children with the use of the term primary. The right of parents in
upbringing their youth is superior to that of the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR
supplement (rather than supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest
groups in developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program
will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
6.

The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the
definitions of several terms as observed by the petitioners are not vague.
The definition of private health care service provider must be seen in relation to Section
4(n) of the RH Law which defines a public health service provider. The private health care
institution cited under Section 7 should be seen as synonymous to private health care
service provider.
The terms service and methods are also broad enough to include providing of
information and rendering of medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern family planning methods (as
provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines incorrect information. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)
(1), the terms incorrect and knowingly connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on
reproductive health.
7.

To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the governments RH program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article
XIII of the Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to
provide medical care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of
the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to
have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education
8.

The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health
care service providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to
involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably
imbued with public interest that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Second, Section 17
only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do
otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs
do not allow them to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise
PROCEDURAL

1.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out

the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions present a
justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also
a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or
medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague
violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be
heard on the matter now.
2.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to
cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious
freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is
simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction,
is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights
mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to
take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass
constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no
actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people.
3.

Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an asapplied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi
requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional
issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a
procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,
voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly
injured by the operation of a law or any other government act.
The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set
aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and
moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle
that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed.
4.

Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs,
the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

5.

The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual
analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both reproductive health and
responsible parenthood are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to
control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH
Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all
persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions for
themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the
demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between reproductive health and responsible parenthood
which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving sustainable human development as
stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally
sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by
a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and
b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage access to modem
methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless
of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to
refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is
conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24
thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health
program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier primarily in
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.

THE HOLY SEE VS DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:
This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land, Lot 5-A,located in the
Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila andregistered in the name of petitioner. Said Lot5-A
is contiguous toLots5-B and 5-Dregistered in the name of the Philippine RealtyCorporation
(PRC). The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup,through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting
as agent to the sellers.Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private
respondent,Starbright Enterprises. The squatters refused to vacate the lots soldto private
respondent so a dispute arose as to who of the parties hasthe responsibility of evicting and
clearing the land of squattersoccurred. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale
bypetitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and DevelopmentCorporation
(Tropicana).Private respondent filed a complaint forannulment of the sale of the
three parcels of land, and specificperformance and damages against petitioner, represented
by thePapal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., the
PRC and Tropicana.
ISSUE:
WON (whether or not) the petitioner Holy See is immune from suit.
HELD:
YES. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged inthe activity in the
regular course of business. If the foreign state is notengaged regularly in a business or
trade, the particular act ortransaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in
pursuit ofa sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jureimperii especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.Lot5-Awas acquired by petitioner as a donation
from the Archdiocese ofManila. The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but
forthe use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place ofresidence of the Papal
Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign toacquire property, real or personal, in a receiving
state, necessary forthe creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognizedin
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In Article31(a) of the Convention, a
diplomatic envoy is granted immunity fromthe civil and administrative jurisdiction of the
receiving state over anyreal action relating to private immovable property situated inthe
territory of the receiving state which the envo yholds on behalf ofthe sending state for the
purposes of the mission. If this immunity isprovided for a diplomatic envoy, with all the more
reason shouldimmunity be recognized as regards the sovereign itself, which in thiscase is
the Holy See.
SALIENT POINTS:
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, accordingto the Supreme Court:
(a) Classical or absolute theory

a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in thecourts of another

sovereign; and (b) Restrictive theory

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT, et.
al., Respondents
.G.R. No. 206510
September 16, 2014
PONENTE: Villarama
TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit
FACTS:
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy.
In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port
of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.
On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013
after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no
reports of leaking fuel or oil.
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to
affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS
Guardian.
3.
Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.
1.
2.

HELD:
First issue: YES.
Petitioners have legal standing
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.
Specifically, it is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the act being challenged, and calls for
more than just a generalized grievance. However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the public right of citizens
to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. We declared that the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil
and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind

and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such

right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.
Second issue: YES.
The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of
the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The
alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the
TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US
itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court
over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the
position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in
violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter
within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity
from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an
exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and
regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters internal
waters and the territorial sea.
In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue
to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith
which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.
Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for noncommercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warships unauthorized entry into
our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in
which the above provisions may apply.
But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter
of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
traditional uses of the oceans as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered
on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers

the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind, pointing out that such has
nothing to do with its the US acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.
The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpios view that non-membership in the
UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal
State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear
international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding
which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our longtime ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the countrys efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the
damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply
with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and
preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this
Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into
account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond
dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the
jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latters territorial sea, the flag
States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the
laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages
caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for noncommercial purposes under Article 31.
Third issue: NO.
The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.
The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver
of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which
have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate
civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an
environmental law.