c o m m e n ta r y

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Regional Dynamics and Chinas Geopolitical Ambitions
BY LO U IS R I T ZI N G ER

Published: August 5, 2015

The Chinese plan to invest $46 billion dollars in India. Indeed, this strategic triangle has been
Pakistan to strengthen the China-Pakistan Economic the greatest impetus for Beijing and Islamabads
Corridor (CPEC), announced by President Xi Jinping all-weather friendship, which extends to the
during his April visit to Islamabad, is remarkable for diplomatic, economic, and military realms. China
its size and scope. The plan has the goal of providing has proved to be a reliable alternative for Pakistan
a direct link between the Pakistani port at Gwadar to the United States in providing military assistance,
and the city of Kashgar in Chinas Xinjiang Uyghur including support for its nuclear program. The two
Autonomous Region, and has sparked a flurry of states have collaborated on major infrastructure
commentary. The size of the plan far exceeds total projects in Pakistan in the past, including Gwadar
U.S. aid to Pakistan since 2002 and dwarfs Pakistans Port and the Karakoram Highwayboth of which will
generally paltry FDI figures. The decision by China to play essential roles in the proposed economic corridor.
make such a high-profile investment in its long-time The Pakistan-China relationship, for all its rhetoric,
partner is indicative not only of the enduring regional is also increasingly uneven. For instance, while
dynamics that have compelled the two countries China is the number one source of imports to and
alliance but also of Chinas increasingly global number two destination of exports from Pakistan,
ambitions. While the details of the CPEC have been trade with Pakistan accounts for a negligible portion
discussed and debated at length, the geopolitical factors of the Chinese economy. The gap between the two
underpinning Chinas decision to invest so heavily in countries extends to popular perceptions: while an
its troubled neighbor merit further examination.

The All-Weather Friendship LOUIS RITZINGER was a Bridge Award Fellow with the
Political and Security Affairs group at the National Bureau
Close relations between China and Pakistan are of Asian Research. He holds an MA in Conflict Resolution
certainly nothing new and are generally framed from Georgetown University.
in terms of the two countries mutual rivalry with
 NBR Commentary August 5, 2015

overwhelming majority of Pakistanis view China both at home and abroad, while strengthening its
favorably (in part, at least, the result of relentless struggling ally.
government campaigns extolling the strength of Chinas second interest in the CPEC is its potential
the two countries friendship), Chinese tend to view to diversify energy trade routes to and from the Middle
Pakistan with far greater ambivalence. Finally, while East. In recent years, China has worked hard to develop
Pakistan remains stubbornly fixated on India and linkages to the energy-rich Central Asian states as a
mired in internal strife, China is a growing world way to reduce its dependence on imports through the
power with correspondingly global ambitions. This last Indian Ocean and South China Sea, regions where a
dynamic is particularly important in understanding strong U.S. naval presence could allow for blockades at
the motivations and goals of the CPEC project. choke points, such as the Strait of Malacca, in the event
of a confrontation between the two powers. The CPEC
intends to make full use of the Chinese-constructed
Project Goals
and operated Gwadar Port, situated along the Strait of
The motivations behind Chinas promised Hormuz in Pakistans western Baluchistan Province,
investment in Pakistan are primarily threefold, in as the access point by which energy shipments could
order of global relevance: providing economic support arrive and be sent through Pakistan via proposed
to a long-time ally and strategic hedge, facilitating pipelines, thus bypassing easily disrupted shipping
trade, and building linkages to the west by which lanes. The famed Karakoram Highway, linking
China can expand its influence. Pakistan and China via the Karakoram mountain
Chinas most parochial motivation for the CPEC range, is also scheduled to be upgraded. In addition,
is to provide economic support to a flagging ally China has agreed to pay for the Pakistani portion of the
struggling with internal instability. Pakistan and oft-delayed Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline. Indeed,
China, as mentioned, have historically viewed each the promise of a Chinese-built economic corridor
other as balances vis--vis their shared rival, India. likely played a central role in Islamabads decision to
Now, with the United States explicitly turning its avoid antagonizing its energy-rich western neighbor
attention toward India to counter Chinese regional by remaining out of the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen,
influence, and with Indias economy primed to despite a history of close military ties to Riyadh.
grow, it is logical that Beijing would seek to apply These reasons alone, however, do not justify such a
a formidable counterweight. Pakistans previously massive investment in a single country facing as many
announced purchase of eight submarines from China challenges as Pakistan. Chinas geopolitical goals are
is a more overt manifestation of this dynamic. The increasingly global, expanding beyond its immediate
plans emphasis on energy projects, to which $37 neighborhood, and the decision to announce its
billion is said to be devoted, is particularly pertinent massive investment in the CPEC is a clear indication
for Pakistan, which has been struggling with an acute that Beijing views Pakistan as an important partner
energy crisis for much of the past decade. Moreover, in meeting its ambitious economic and political goals.
China has real cause to be concerned about Pakistans China views its investment in Pakistan, particularly
susceptibility to terrorism and insurgency. Elements its goal of a rail corridor between the two countries,
of Chinas own Muslim Uyghur insurgency in its as the flagship project of its One Belt, One Road
westernmost Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region initiative. This initiative seeks to link Chinas economic
are reportedly tied to extremist networks in Pakistan partners in Southeast Asia to Europe by means of
and use the countrys lawless western regions as a base overland and maritime trade routes, including key
of operations. Beijing hopes that a massive economic Middle East energy resources and emerging African
infusion will promote economic growth and stability markets. Pakistan, by virtue of its status as a long-term

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ally and its geographic position linking western China extremist networks present an enormously challenging
to sea routes through the Middle East, Africa, and, security environment. Pakistans early commitment
perhaps most importantly, Europe, could serve as to establish a 12,000-man security force to protect
a central crossroads for Beijings expanding global Chinese workers is an indication of the seriousness
ambitions. The potential for Gwadar to be used in of the challenge. An attack on Chinese civilians by
support of future Chinese naval operations is also very militants with links to Pakistan could throw a wrench
real, although the nature of this usage is the source in diplomatic relations, as it has in the past.
of ongoing debate. Regardless, when viewed in the That being said, even if many of the proposed projects
context of Chinas broader strategic aims, it is clear are not completed (which is probable), the impact
that the ambitions behind the CPEC go far beyond on Pakistan is likely to be significant$46 billion
strengthening bilateral ties. is an enormous figure. More importantly for U.S.
policymakers, however, is the message that the proposal
sends regarding the sincerity of Chinas intentions to
Implications and Recommendations
utilize Pakistan as a means by which to expand its
The Chinese plan to invest an enormous $46 billion global influence. This obviously presents challenges
into the planned CPEC clearly has implications for for the United Stateschallenges that are best met by
U.S. policymakers, particularly when viewed in light continuing to engage with regional partners (including
of Beijings apparent long-term strategic objectives. India) and allies, while reaffirming commitments to
That being said, it is important that decision-makers bolster the U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific.
understand that a plan of this scale inevitably faces Improving U.S. relations with Iran, particularly
equally significant obstacles, not least of which are now that a nuclear accord has been reached, could
Pakistans own deteriorating security environment and be an important element in promoting regional
complex domestic political dynamics. Furthermore, stability, while building linkages across the South
the evolving regional landscape presents U.S. strategists Asian subcontinent. As mentioned, China has already
with opportunities, as well as challenges, to ensure that announced an agreement to build a natural gas pipeline
our interests remain protected. from Iran to Pakistan, and Washington would be wise
For all of their fanfare, the announced investment to engage with Tehran to work toward expanding
projects face significant hurdles, including a fractured energy trade between Iran, Pakistan, and India.
Pakistani political environment, in which an apparent Promoting energy linkages between South and Central
change in the CPEC route has already sparked protests Asia, in addition to the stalled Trans-Afghanistan
from local and provincial leaders in Pakistans pipeline, can be an important step toward reducing
underdeveloped western provinces of Baluchistan Central Asian reliance on Russian and Chinese
and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Given both countries markets by providing alternative markets for the
penchants for opacity, corruption appears to be an regions energy exports. Opening diplomatic channels
inevitable challenge. Additionally, the fact that Chinese in the region will also be vital to ensuring long-term
companies, employing primarily Chinese workers, stability in Afghanistanan interest Beijing shares.
will carry out many of the projects may only serve to Chinas potential to play a role in facilitating dialogue
increase political resistance. While navigating political between the Afghan Government and the Taliban
turmoil is not particularly unusual in a development was on display in recent reported meetings between
context, the ongoing insurgency in Baluchistan, where representatives of the two parties in Urumqi.
separatists have targeted Chinese workers in the
past, and Pakistans continuing struggle with Islamic

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Finally, although U.S. policymakers should not

simply accept platitudes regarding shared U.S.-China
interests at face value (as has been demonstrated,
Chinese interests go far beyond Pakistans stability
and economic growth), this does not mean that
diplomats and defense officials should not explore
areas of trilateral cooperation, including in the field
of counterterrorism. The United States, however,
must not be seen as complicit in the unjust and
counterproductive marginalization and oppression
of Chinas and Pakistans respective Uyghur and
Baluch minorities.
Chinas planned investment in Pakistan is motivated
by an array of factors, including strengthening a
useful regional ally and building advantageous
trade routes that bypass potentially hostile waters.
Most importantly, however, is Pakistans utility in
furthering Chinas growing power ambitions. For U.S.
policymakers, this will require further rebalancing to
the Asia-Pacific, solidifying old alliances and building
new partnerships, while finding creative methods to
build regional linkages that support U.S. interests.

The views expressed are those of the author.

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