Legacies and Devices

Art. 924. All things and rights which are within the commerce of man be bequeathed or
devised. (865a)

Art. 925. A testator may charge with legacies and devises not only his compulsory heirs but
also the legatees and devisees.

The latter shall be liable for the charge only to the extent of the value of the legacy or the
devise received by them. The compulsory heirs shall not be liable for the charge beyond the
amount of the free portion given them. (858a)

Art. 926. When the testator charges one of the heirs with a legacy or devise, he alone shall
be bound.

Should he not charge anyone in particular, all shall be liable in the same proportion in which
they may inherit. (859)

Art. 927. If two or more heirs take possession of the estate, they shall be solidarily liable for
the loss or destruction of a thing devised or bequeathed, even though only one of them
should have been negligent. (n)

Art. 928. The heir who is bound to deliver the legacy or devise shall be liable in case of
eviction, if the thing is indeterminate and is indicated only by its kind. (860)

Art. 929. If the testator, heir, or legatee owns only a part of, or an interest in the thing
bequeathed, the legacy or devise shall be understood limited to such part or interest, unless
the testator expressly declares that he gives the thing in its entirety. (864a)

Art. 930. The legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator
erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not
belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title,
the disposition shall take effect. (862a)

Art. 931. If the testator orders that a thing belonging to another be acquired in order that it
be given to a legatee or devisee, the heir upon whom the obligation is imposed or the estate
must acquire it and give the same to the legatee or devisee; but if the owner of the thing
refuses to alienate the same, or demands an excessive price therefor, the heir or the estate
shall only be obliged to give the just value of the thing. (861a)

Art. 932. The legacy or devise of a thing which at the time of the execution of the will already
belonged to the legatee or devisee shall be ineffective, even though another person may
have some interest therein.

If the testator expressly orders that the thing be freed from such interest or encumbrance,
the legacy or devise shall be valid to that extent. (866a)

Art. 933. If the thing bequeathed belonged to the legatee or devisee at the time of the
execution of the will, the legacy or devise shall be without effect, even though it may have
subsequently alienated by him.
If the legatee or devisee acquires it gratuitously after such time, he can claim nothing by
virtue of the legacy or devise; but if it has been acquired by onerous title he can demand
reimbursement from the heir or the estate. (878a)

Art. 934. If the testator should bequeath or devise something pledged or mortgaged to
secure a recoverable debt before the execution of the will, the estate is obliged to pay the
debt, unless the contrary intention appears.

The same rule applies when the thing is pledged or mortgaged after the execution of the will.

Any other charge, perpetual or temporary, with which the thing bequeathed is burdened,
passes with it to the legatee or devisee. (867a)

Art. 935. The legacy of a credit against a third person or of the remission or release of a debt
of the legatee shall be effective only as regards that part of the credit or debt existing at the
time of the death of the testator.

In the first case, the estate shall comply with the legacy by assigning to the legatee all rights
of action it may have against the debtor. In the second case, by giving the legatee an
acquittance, should he request one.

In both cases, the legacy shall comprise all interests on the credit or debt which may be due
the testator at the time of his death. (870a)

Art. 936. The legacy referred to in the preceding article shall lapse if the testator, after having
made it, should bring an action against the debtor for the payment of his debt, even if such
payment should not have been effected at the time of his death.

The legacy to the debtor of the thing pledged by him is understood to discharge only the
right of pledge. (871)

Art. 937. A generic legacy of release or remission of debts comprises those existing at the
time of the execution of the will, but not subsequent ones. (872)

Art. 938. A legacy or devise made to a creditor shall not be applied to his credit, unless the
testator so expressly declares.

In the latter case, the creditor shall have the right to collect the excess, if any, of the credit or
of the legacy or devise. (837a)

Art. 939. If the testator orders the payment of what he believes he owes but does not in fact
owe, the disposition shall be considered as not written. If as regards a specified debt more
than the amount thereof is ordered paid, the excess is not due, unless a contrary intention
appears.

The foregoing provisions are without prejudice to the fulfillment of natural obligations. (n)

Art. 940. In alternative legacies or devises, the choice is presumed to be left to the heir upon
whom the obligation to give the legacy or devise may be imposed, or the executor or
administrator of the estate if no particular heir is so obliged.
If the heir, legatee or devisee, who may have been given the choice, dies before making it,
this right shall pass to the respective heirs.

Once made, the choice is irrevocable.

In the alternative legacies or devises, except as herein provided, the provisions of this Code
regulating obligations of the same kind shall be observed, save such modifications as may
appear from the intention expressed by the testator. (874a)

Art. 941. A legacy of generic personal property shall be valid even if there be no things of the
same kind in the estate.

A devise of indeterminate real property shall be valid only if there be immovable property of
its kind in the estate.

The right of choice shall belong to the executor or administrator who shall comply with the
legacy by the delivery of a thing which is neither of inferior nor of superior quality. (875a)

Art. 942. Whenever the testator expressly leaves the right of choice to the heir, or to the
legatee or devisee, the former may give or the latter may choose whichever he may prefer.
(876a)

Art. 943. If the heir, legatee or devisee cannot make the choice, in case it has been granted
him, his right shall pass to his heirs; but a choice once made shall be irrevocable. (877a)

Art. 944. A legacy for education lasts until the legatee is of age, or beyond the age of
majority in order that the legatee may finish some professional, vocational or general course,
provided he pursues his course diligently.

A legacy for support lasts during the lifetime of the legatee, if the testator has not otherwise
provided.

If the testator has not fixed the amount of such legacies, it shall be fixed in accordance with
the social standing and the circumstances of the legatee and the value of the estate.

If the testator or during his lifetime used to give the legatee a certain sum of money or other
things by way of support, the same amount shall be deemed bequeathed, unless it be
markedly disproportionate to the value of the estate. (879a)

Art. 945. If a periodical pension, or a certain annual, monthly, or weekly amount is

bequeathed, the legatee may petition the court for the first installment upon the death of the
testator, and for the following ones which shall be due at the beginning of each period; such
payment shall not be returned, even though the legatee should die before the expiration of
the period which has commenced. (880a)

Art. 946. If the thing bequeathed should be subject to a usufruct, the legatee or devisee shall
respect such right until it is legally extinguished. (868a)

Art. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devises
from the death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs. (881a)
Art. 948. If the legacy or device is of a specific and determinate thing pertaining to the
testator, the legatee or devisee acquires the ownership thereof upon the death of the
testator, as well as any growing fruits, or unborn offspring of animals, or uncollected income;
but not the income which was due and unpaid before the latter's death.

From the moment of the testator's death, the thing bequeathed shall be at the risk of the
legatee or devisee, who shall, therefore, bear its loss or deterioration, and shall be benefited
by its increase or improvement, without prejudice to the responsibility of the executor or
administrator. (882a)

Art. 949. If the bequest should not be of a specific and determinate thing, but is generic or of
quantity, its fruits and interests from the time of the death of the testator shall pertain to the
legatee or devisee if the testator has expressly so ordered. (884a)

Art. 950. If the estate should not be sufficient to cover all the legacies or devises, their
payment shall be made in the following order:

(1) Remuneratory legacies or devises;

(2) Legacies or devises declared by the testator to be preferential;

(3) Legacies for support;

(4) Legacies for education;

(5) Legacies or devises of a specific, determinate thing which forms a part of the estate;

(6) All others pro rata. (887a)

Art. 951. The thing bequeathed shall be delivered with all its accessories and accessories and
in the condition in which it may be upon the death of the testator. (883a)

Art. 952. The heir, charged with a legacy or devise, or the executor or administrator of the
estate, must deliver the very thing bequeathed if he is able to do so and cannot discharge
this obligation by paying its value.

Legacies of money must be paid in cash, even though the heir or the estate may not have
any.

The expenses necessary for the delivery of the thing bequeathed shall be for the account of
the heir or the estate, but without prejudice to the legitime. (886a)

Art. 953. The legatee or devisee cannot take possession of the thing bequeathed upon his
own authority, but shall request its delivery and possession of the heir charged with the
legacy or devise, or of the executor or administrator of the estate should he be authorized by
the court to deliver it. (885a)

Art. 954. The legatee or devisee cannot accept a part of the legacy or devise and repudiate
the other, if the latter be onerous.
Should he die before having accepted the legacy or devise, leaving several heirs, some of the
latter may accept and the others may repudiate the share respectively belonging to them in
the legacy or devise. (889a)

Art. 955. The legatee or devisee of two legacies or devises, one of which is onerous, cannot
renounce the onerous one and accept the other. If both are onerous or gratuitous, he shall be
free to accept or renounce both, or to renounce either. But if the testator intended that the
two legacies or devises should be inseparable from each other, the legatee or devisee must
either accept or renounce both.

Any compulsory heir who is at the same time a legatee or devisee may waive the inheritance
and accept the legacy or devise, or renounce the latter and accept the former, or waive or
accept both. (890a)

Art. 956. If the legatee or devisee cannot or is unwilling to accept the legacy or devise, or if
the legacy or devise for any reason should become ineffective, it shall be merged into the
mass of the estate, except in cases of substitution and of the right of accretion. (888a)

Art. 957. The legacy or devise shall be without effect:

(1) If the testator transforms the thing bequeathed in such a manner that it does not retain
either the form or the denomination it had;

(2) If the testator by any title or for any cause alienates the thing bequeathed or any part
thereof, it being understood that in the latter case the legacy or devise shall be without effect
only with respect to the part thus alienated. If after the alienation the thing should again
belong to the testator, even if it be by reason of nullity of the contract, the legacy or devise
shall not thereafter be valid, unless the reacquisition shall have been effected by virtue of the
exercise of the right of repurchase;

(3) If the thing bequeathed is totally lost during the lifetime of the testator, or after his
death without the heir's fault. Nevertheless, the person obliged to pay the legacy or devise
shall be liable for eviction if the thing bequeathed should not have been determinate as to its
kind, in accordance with the provisions of Article 928. (869a)

Art. 958. A mistake as to the name of the thing bequeathed or devised, is of no consequence,
if it is possible to identify the thing which the testator intended to bequeath or devise. (n)

Art. 959. A disposition made in general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be
understood to be in favor of those nearest in degree. (751)

LEGAL OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION

Art. 902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are transmitted
upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. (843a)

Art. 903. The legitime of the parents who have an illegitimate child, when such child leaves
neither legitimate descendants, nor a surviving spouse, nor illegitimate children, is one-half
of the hereditary estate of such illegitimate child. If only legitimate or illegitimate children are
left, the parents are not entitled to any legitime whatsoever. If only the widow or widower
survives with parents of the illegitimate child, the legitime of the parents is one-fourth of the
hereditary estate of the child, and that of the surviving spouse also one-fourth of the estate.
(n)

Art. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has subsequently lost its
validity;

(2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to
the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property
of which the testator has not disposed;

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen or is not
fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the inheritance, there being no
substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided in this
Code. (912a)

Art. 961. In default of testamentary heirs, the law vests the inheritance, in accordance with
the rules hereinafter set forth, in the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of the deceased, in
the surviving spouse, and in the State. (913a)

Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones,
saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit in equal shares, subject to the provisions of article
1006 with respect to relatives of the full and half blood, and of Article 987, paragraph 2,
concerning division between the paternal and maternal lines. (912a)

Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited. (942a)

Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one whom
the person represented would have succeeded. (n)

Art. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in
the ascending.

In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether
they be of the full or half blood. (925)

Art. 973. In order that representation may take place, it is necessary that the representative
himself be capable of succeeding the decedent. (n)

Art. 974. Whenever there is succession by representation, the division of the estate shall be
made per stirpes, in such manner that the representative or representatives shall not inherit
more than what the person they represent would inherit, if he were living or could inherit.
(926a)

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased survive, they shall
inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions. (927)

Art. 976. A person may represent him whose inheritance he has renounced. (928a)

Art. 977. Heirs who repudiate their share may not be represented.

Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation,
and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him
shall be divided among the latter in equal portions. (933)

Art. 983. If illegitimate children survive with legitimate children, the shares of the former shall
be in the proportions prescribed by Article 895. (n)

Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his
parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs. (n)

SUBSECTION 2. - Ascending Direct Line

Art. 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his parents and
ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives. (935a)

Art. 986. The father and mother, if living, shall inherit in equal shares.

Should one only of them survive, he or she shall succeed to the entire estate of the child.
(936)

Art. 987. In default of the father and mother, the ascendants nearest in degree shall inherit.

Should there be more than one of equal degree belonging to the same line they shall divide
the inheritance per capita; should they be of different lines but of equal degree, one-half shall
go to the paternal and the other half to the maternal ascendants. In each line the division
shall be made per capita. (937)

SUBSECTION 3. - Illegitimate Children

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children
shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. (939a)

Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive descendants of another
illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall succeed in their own right and the latter by
right of representation. (940a)

Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles to illegitimate children
shall be transmitted upon their death to their descendants, who shall inherit by right of
representation from their deceased grandparent. (941a)
Art. 991. If legitimate ascendants are left, the illegitimate children shall divide the inheritance
with them, taking one-half of the estate, whatever be the number of the ascendants or of the
illegitimate children. (942-841a)

Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)

Art. 993. If an illegitimate child should die without issue, either legitimate or illegitimate, his
father or mother shall succeed to his entire estate; and if the child's filiation is duly proved as
to both parents, who are both living, they shall inherit from him share and share alike. (944)

Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or
her surviving spouse who shall be entitled to the entire estate.

If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or
he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other half. (945a)

SUBSECTION 4. - Surviving Spouse

Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, and illegitimate children
and their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit
the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
should there be any, under article 1001. (946a)

Art. 996. If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving
spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the children. (834a)

Art. 997. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate parents or ascendants, the
surviving spouse shall be entitled to one-half of the estate, and the legitimate parents or
ascendants to the other half. (836a)

Art. 998. If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their
descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half. (n)

Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their descendants
and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow
or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child. (n)

Art. 1000. If legitimate ascendants, the surviving spouse, and illegitimate children are left,
the ascendants shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the other half shall be
divided between the surviving spouse and the illegitimate children so that such widow or
widower shall have one-fourth of the estate, and the illegitimate children the other fourth.
(841a)

Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower,
the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half. (953, 837a)
Art. 1002. In case of a legal separation, if the surviving spouse gave cause for the separation,
he or she shall not have any of the rights granted in the preceding articles. (n)

SUBSECTION 5. - Collateral Relatives

Art. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles. (946a)

Art. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit
in equal shares. (947)

Art. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the
children of the descendant's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per
capita, and the latter per stirpes. (948)

Art. 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and
sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. (949)

Art. 1007. In case brothers and sisters of the half blood, some on the father's and some on
the mother's side, are the only survivors, all shall inherit in equal shares without distinction
as to the origin of the property. (950)

Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per
stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for the brothers and sisters of the full blood.
(915)

Art. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters nor children of brothers or sisters, the
other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.

The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of
relationship by the whole blood. (954a)

Art. 1010. The right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of
relationship in the collateral line. (955a)

SUBSECTION 6. - The State

Art. 1011. In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the provisions of the
preceding Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate. (956a)

Art. 1012. In order that the State may take possession of the property mentioned in the
preceding article, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court must be observed. (958a)

Art. 1013. After the payment of debts and charges, the personal property shall be assigned to
the municipality or city where the deceased last resided in the Philippines, and the real estate
to the municipalities or cities, respectively, in which the same is situated.

If the deceased never resided in the Philippines, the whole estate shall be assigned to the
respective municipalities or cities where the same is located.
Such estate shall be for the benefit of public schools, and public charitable institutions and
centers, in such municipalities or cities. The court shall distribute the estate as the respective
needs of each beneficiary may warrant.

The court, at the instance of an interested party, or on its own motion, may order the
establishment of a permanent trust, so that only the income from the property shall be used.
(956a)

Art. 1014. If a person legally entitled to the estate of the deceased appears and files a claim
thereto with the court within five years from the date the property was delivered to the State,
such person shall be entitled to the possession of the same, or if sold the municipality or city
shall be accountable to him for such part of the proceeds as may not have been lawfully
spent. (n)

FERNANDEZ v DIMAIGBA
G.R. No. L-23638
REYES; October 12, 1967

NATURE
Petition for a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals

FACTS
- Ismaela Dimagiba submitted to the CFI a petition for the probate of the purported will of the
late Benedicta de los Reyes. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole heir of the estate of
the deceased.
- The petition was set for hearing, and in due time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and
Luisa Reyes and one month later, Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes,
all claiming to be heirs intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked.
Grounds advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix, estoppel
by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of conveyance of the
major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of the proponent in 1943 and 1944,
but which conveyances were finally set aside by this Supreme Court.
- CFI found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but deferred resolution on the
questions of estoppel and revocation.
- Fernandez and Reyes petitioned for reconsideration, and/or new trial, insisting that the
issues of estoppel and revocation be considered and resolved; the Court overruled the claim
that proponent was in estoppel to ask for the probate of the will, but "reserving unto the
parties the right to raise the issue of implied revocation at the opportune time."
- CFI appointed Ricardo Cruz as administrator for the sole purpose of submitting an inventory
of the estate.
- TC resolved against the oppositors and held the will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes
"unaffected and unrevoked by the deeds of sale." The oppositors elevated the case to the CA.
- CA held that the decree admitting the will to probate, had become final for lack of
opportune appeal; that the same was appealable independently of the issue of implied
revocation; that there had been no legal revocation by the execution of the 1943 and 1944
deeds of sale.

ISSUES
1. WON the decree of the CFI allowing the will to probate had become final for lack of appeal
2. WON the order of the CFI overruling the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had
likewise become final
3. WON the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly revoked by her execution
of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent .

HELD
1. YES. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning capacity of
the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of his last will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and enforceable or otherwise.
- There being no controversy that the probate decree of the Court below was not appealed on
time, the same had become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate courts may no longer
revoke said decree nor review the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus, the appeal
belatedly lodged against the decree was correctly dismissed.
2. NO. The presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public policy, being
primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which are entitled to respect
as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of disposition within legal limits.
- Evidence of it is the duty imposed on a custodian of a will to deliver the same to the Court,
and the fine and imprisonment prescribed for its violation (Revised Rule 75). It would be a
non sequitur to allow public policy to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not
the order overruling the allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is
patently unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
3. NO. The existence of any such change or departure from the original intent of the testatrix,
expressed in her 1930 testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the
subsequent alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself,
appellee Dimagiba.
- But even if Art 957 were applicable, the annulment of the conveyances would not
necessarily result in the revocation of the legacies, if we bear in mind that the findings made
in the decision decreeing the annulment of the subsequent 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale
were also that it was the moral influence, originating from their confidential relationship,
which was the only cause for the execution
 BELEN v BPI
G.R. No. L-14474

NATURE
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying appellant's petition
FACTS
- Benigno Diaz (DIAZ) executed a codicil on September 29, 1944. On November 7, 1944, he
died and the aforesaid codicil, together with the will, was admitted to probate in Special
Proceedings No. 894 of the same Court of First Instance of Manila.
- The proceedings for the administration of the estate of DIAZ were closed in 1950 and the
estate was thereafter put under the administration of BPI, as trustee for the benefit of the
legatees.
- Filomena Diaz (FILOMENA) then died in 1954, leaving two legitimate children, MILAGROS,
married, with 7 legitimate children, and ONESIMA, single.
- On March 19, 1958, ONESIMA filed a petition in Special Proceedings No. 9226, contending
that the amount that would have appertained to FILOMENA under the codicil should now be
divided equally between herself and MILAGROS, as the surviving children, to the exclusion of
the 7 legitimate children of MILAGROS.
- The court denied this petition. It said that after due consideration of the petition filed by
ONESIMA. The share of FILOMENA from the codicil does not and should not form part of her
estate. The aforesaid share of should be distributed not only between her children but also
among her other legitimate descendants which also includes her grandchildren, etc., and in
this connection. it is not amiss to observe that one may be a descendant and not yet not be
an heir, and vice versa, one may be an heir and yet not be a descendant.
- From this order ONESIMA appealed to this Court. She contends that the term "sus
descendeintes legitimos," as used in the codicil, should be interpreted to mean descendants
nearest in the degree to the original legatee FILOMENA, which are the two daughters.
ISSUE
WON the words "sus descendientes legitimos" refer conjointly to all the living descendant
(children and grandchildren) of the legatee as a class or only to the descendants nearest in
degree
HELD
NO
- In her argument, FILOMENA invokes Art. 959 of the CC, which says: A distribution made in
general terms in favor of the testator's relatives shall be understood as made in favor of
those nearest in degree. However, the argument fails to note that this article is specifically
limited in its application in cases where the beneficiaries are relatives of the testator, not
those of the legatee. In such an event, the law assumes that the testator intended to refer to
the rules of intestacy, in order to benefit the relatives closest to him based on the ratio legis
that among a testator's relative the closest are dearest.
- Obviously, this does not apply where the beneficiaries are relatives of another person (the
legatee) and not of the testator . There is no logical reason in this case to presume that the
testator intended to refer to the rules of intestacy, for he precisely made a testament and
provided substitutes for each legatee; nor can it be said that his affections would prefer the
nearest relatives of the legatee to those more distant, since he envisages all of them in a
group, and only as mere substitutes for a preferred beneficiary.
- The result of applying the "nearest relatives" rule of Article 959 is that the inheritance would
be limited to her children excluding the grandchildren altogether. This could hardly be the
intention of the testator who in the same clause 10 of his codicil speaks of his grandchildren
indicating clearly that he understood well that hijos and descendientes are not synonymous
terms.
- We conclude that in the absence of other indications of contrary intent, the proper rule to
apply in the instant case is that the testator, by designating a class or group of legatees,
intended all members thereof to succeed per capita. So that the original legacy to FILOMENA
should be equally divided among her surviving children and grandchidren.
Disposition The order appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant.
LEGITIME OR INTESTATE SUCCESSION

ROSALES v. ROSALES

NATURE

Petition for Review of 2 Orders of the CFI of Cebu.

FACTS

- Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2
children Magna and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox, and his widow Irenea, the petitioner. The estate of the deceased has an
estimated gross value of about P30,000.

- In the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order declaring the following
individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share of the
estate: Fortunato (husband), 1/4; Magna (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox (grandson), 1/4; and
Antonio (son), 1/4.
- Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the
late Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox. The trial court denied her plea. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

1. WON the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her
mother-in-law.

HELD

1. NO.

Ratio A surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his/her parent-in-law.

Reasoning Intestate or legal heirs are classified into 2 groups, namely, those who inherit by
their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. Restated, an intestate
heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided
for in the CC or by the right of representation provided for in Art 981 of the same law.

- The relevant provisions of the CC are Arts. 980, 981, 982 and 999. There is no provision
which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The
entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law
either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which
relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. If the
legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it
would have so provided in the Code.

Classification of intestate succession: intestate successors re classified into two:

1. Those who inherit by their own right;

2. Those who inherit by right of representation (Art. 981)

There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a a widow is an intestate heir of her
mother-in-law;

Art. 887 (961) refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
is a compulsory heir;

Surviving spouse is a third party in the estate of a parent-i-law;

The basis for right of representation is blood relationship;

Inchoate right is extinguished by death of an heir;

DELOS SANTOS V. DELA CRUZ, 37 SCRA 555(1971)

DOCTRINE: De los Santos illustrates the rule of proximity; i.e., the nearer relatives exclude
the more remote ones, except if the right of representation is applicable. Thus, in intestate
succession, the nephews and nieces shall exclude the grandniece, who in the specific
instance, is barred from exercising the right of representation.

FACTS: Gertrude de los Santos for specific performance against Maximino de la Cruz,
alleging that she and several co-heirs, including defendant, executed an extrajudicial
partition agreement over a portion of land and that the parties agreed to adjudicate 3 lots to
the defendant in addition to his share, on the condition that the defendant would undertake
the development of the estate, all expenses shall be defrayed from the proceeds of the sale
of the 3 lots.

1. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had no cause of action against him because the
agreement was void with respect to her, since the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia
de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and was included in the extrajudicial
partition agreement by mistake.
2. Defendants counterclaim alleged that since the plaintiff had sold her share in the
estate and that extrajudicial partition agreement being void as to the latter, he is
entitled to of the proceeds as his share by way of reversion.
3. The court held that the defendant, being a party to the extrajudicial partition
agreement, was stopped from raising in issue the right of the plaintiff to inherit from
the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence he must abide by the terms of the
agreement.
4. The parties admit that the owner of the subject matter of the extrajudicial
agreement was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died instestate on October 16, 1962; that
defendant is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff is a grandniece of Pelagia
de la Cruz, her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being niece of the decedent. Plaintiffs
mother died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing the decedent; and that the
purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the
estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.

ISSUE: WON plaintiff-apellee Gertrude de los Santos is a heir of the decedent.

HELD: No, plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, she

could not inherit from the latter by right of representation, much less could
plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.

Applying Art. 972 and Art. 962 of the Civil Code, the Court in Linarty y Pavia vs. Ugarte y
Itturalde said:

In and intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and cannot participate

with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more
distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right of representation does
not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters.

In the case at bar, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is the defendant-appellant. Necessarily,
plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.

The legal effect of plaintiff-appellee inclusion and participation in the extrajudicial

partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action did not confer
upon her the right to institute this action. The express purpose of the extrajudicial
partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the stipulation of facts, was to divide the
estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz and in the said agreement itself states that
plaintiff-appellee was participating in representation of her deceased mother.

It is apparent therefore that the parties were laboring under the erroneous belief that
plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being
such heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code.

Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased owner
and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really and lawfully such, to
the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to succeed the deceased, is null
and void. A fortiori, plaintiff-appelee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have
its terms enforced.

The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, she may
not be heard to assert estoppels against defendant-appellant. Estoppels cannot be predicated
on a void contract, or on acts which are prohibited by law or are against public policy.

Teotico vs Del Val

GR No. L18753, March 26, 1965

FACTS:

Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She executed a will
written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary Public by her and
the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for Rene Teotico who
was married to the testatrixs niece, Josefina Mortera. The usufruct of Marias interest in the
Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the ownership thereof was left in equal parts
to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted,
as sole and universal heir to all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by
will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val
Chan, claiming that she was an adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an
acknowledged natural child of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not
executed as required by law and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute
the will at the time of its execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of
fear.

ISSUE: WON defendant has right to intervene in this proceeding.

HELD:
It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding is that he must have an interest in the estate, will or in the property to be
affected by either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and be benefited by such as an
heir or one who has a claim against it as creditor. Under the terms of the will, defendant has
no right to intervene because she has no such interest in the estate either as heir, executor
or administrator because it did not appear therein any provision designating her as heir/
legatee in any portion of the estate. She could have acquired such right if she was a legal
heir of the deceased but she is not under the CIVIL CODE. Even if her allegations were true,
the law does not give her any right to succeed the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose
and Francisca because being an illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to
the legitimate relatives of her natural father and that relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents except only as expressly provided by law. As a consequence, she is an heir
of the adopter but not of the relatives of the adopter.

Hence, defendant has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir in the
probate proceeding.

DIAZ V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 150 SCRA 645 (1987)

DOCTRINE: This case illustrates the harsh effects of Article 992. As will be noted, the legitimate
collateral relative of the intestate was preferred over the illegitimate descendants. There was no
showing that between the grandmother and her illegitimate grandchildren, there was animosity.
It must likewise be noted that the deceased grandmother did not have any other descendants
other than the illegitimate children who were excluded from her inheritance.

Felisa is the niece of the decedent.

Petitioners are illegitimate grandchildren of the decedent

FACTS: The case is a review of the decision declaring Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole
legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. The present
controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
1. Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with
Felisa's mother Juliana were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti
and Petronila Asuncion.
2. Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of their union were born Felisa Pamuti and
another child who died during infancy
3. Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of Pascual Santero and the mother of
Pablo Santero
 4. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero and Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero
5. Pascual Santero died in 1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976
6. Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother Simona Santero
and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor children with Anselma Diaz and
two minor children with Felixberta Pacursa.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who
is a legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

HELD: No

Petitioners father is the legitimate child of the decedent; petitioners are illegitimate children;
thus:

ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the
same manner from the illegitimate child. (943a)

The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children

in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.

Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children, which
rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of these
illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate.

The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by
right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother."

"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992. Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an intervening
antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked down upon by
the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate child; the latter
considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin,
palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth,
by avoiding further ground of resentment."

While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate children, those
articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from
being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the
person to be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, may represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his
illegitimate descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his
legitimate descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier
imposed Article 992.

It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate children
and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word
"relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In the case
at bar, the only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo
Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa Pamuti Jardin to be
the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.

The Court view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive
sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he
further states that when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it
qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil
Code. Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense.

ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986 (1965)

DOCTRINE: As an exception to the general rule that the right of representation is available only
in the descending line, Art. 975 of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but
only in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are concerned.
When such nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they succeed to that portion which
their predeceased or incapacitated father or mother would have otherwise been entitled to
inherit. By right of representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two degrees
remote from the decedent. However, the prerequisite for the exercise of the right of
representation is that the nephews and nieces must concur with at least one uncle or aunt.
Otherwise, nephews and nieces will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the
decedent.

It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third degree
relatives, nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are
likewise relatives within the third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of
intestate succession which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order of
succession, whereas other collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts of the deceased, are
ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise of the right of representation is subject to the barrier between
the legitimate and illegitimate families under Article 992.
 In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice
Corona ruled that (u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces),
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.

Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the right of
representation is generally available only in the descending line, never in the ascending. In the
collateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with uncles
and/or aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation.

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter,
up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her
estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10)
years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared
presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate
among her heirs.
1. The deceased Melodia Feraris was survived only by collateral relatives, namely
Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedents father, Anacleto
Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,Conchita, and Juanito, all surname Ferraris, her
nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodias only brother of full blood,
Arturo Ferraris, who predeceased the decedent.
2. The trial court ruled that the children of the only predeceased brother of the
decedent, exclude the aunt of the same decedent for the reason that the former are
nearer in degree (2 degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by
right of representation, while the aunt is 3 degrees distant from the decedent, and
that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil
Code.
3. Petitioner-appellant contends that she is of equal degree of relationship as the
oppositors (3 degrees removed from the decedent) and that under 975 of the New
Civil Code, no right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew
of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former succeed
in their own right.

ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is
survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who
predeceased him or her?

HELD: The Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews
from the decedent (3 degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives
belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and hen descending
to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Also, nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e.. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as
provided by Art. 975.

The Court held that in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals (aunt and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Art. 1009,
the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.

Tolentino expressly states:

Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers
or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond
this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of
collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer
considered as relatives, for successional purposes.

Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court ruled that under the laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing
and qualified to succeed.

TOMAS CORPUS V. ADMINISTRATOR/EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF TEODORO

YANGCO, 85 SCRA 567 (1978)

DOCTRINE: Corpus illustrates an instance where a legitimate child is excluded from the
inheritance of an illegitimate relative.

FACTS: Teodoro Yangco died with a will. He left no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his
nearest relatives were: (a) his half-brother Luis Yangco; (b) half-sister Paz Yangco and wife of
Miguel Osorio; (c) children of his half-brother Ramon Corpus; and (d) Juanita Corpus; daughter
of his half-brother Jose Corpus

1. Teodoro was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles (widow of Tomas
Corpus). Before her marriage with Luis Rafael, Ramona had 5 children with Tomas, 2
of which were Pablo and Jose.
2. Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition was submitted but
this was opposed.
3. From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro, Juanita Corpus and the estate of
Luis R. Yangco appealed. A compromise agreement was entered into thereafter
4. Based on the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus signed a receipt acknowledging
that he received from the Yangco estate P2,000.
5. Tomas, as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus, filed an action to recover the supposed
share in Yangcos intestate estate. He alleged that the dispositions in Yangcos will
imposing perpetual prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under Art 785 Old
 Civil Code and that the 1949 partition is invalid and as such, the estate should be
distributed according to the rules of intestacy

ISSUE: WON Juanita Corpus, mother of Tomas, was a legal heir of Yangco

HELD: No.To determine Juanitas right to inherit, it is necessary to ascertain Yangcos filiation.
Luis Rafaels will states that Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate
child. On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed
to be legitimate following the principle of simper preasumitur pro matrimonio, that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into
a lawful marriage.

Since Teodoro was an acknowledged natural child (illegitimate) and Juanita was the legitimate
child of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus, petitioner-appellant Tomas has no cause of
action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary share of his mother in Yangcos estate.
Juanita was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal succession between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives.

Art 992 NCC provides that an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives
inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. This rule is based on the theory that
the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child. The law does not recognize the blood tie and
seeks to avoid further grounds of resentment.

Following the rule in Art 992, it was held that:

a. Legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child

b. The natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the estate
of the legitimate grandfather
c. The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a
legitimate brother of her natural mother.
CRESENCIANO LEONARDO V. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA CAILLES, 120 SCRA
890 (1983)

DOCTRINE: The filiation of a person may be looked into for the purpose of determining his
qualification to inherit from a deceased person. In Leonardo, the Court found after looking into
the birth certificate of the petitioner, that he is an illegitimate child and hence barred by Article
992 to claim a share in the inheritance of his great grandmother.

FACTS: Francisca Reyes died intestate in 1963. She was survived by 2 daughters, Maria and
Silvestra Cailles, and a grandson, Sotero Leonardo, the son of her daughter Pascuala who
predeceased her. Sotero died in 1944 while Silvestra died in 1949.

1. Petitioner Cresenciano Leonardo, claiming to be the son of Sotero, filed a complaint

seeking to:
a. Be declared one of the lawful heirs of deceased Francisca, entitled to share in
the estate of the deceased jointly with defendant Maria
b. Have the estate of Francisca partitioned between him and Maria
 2. Respondent Maria Cailles asserted exclusive ownership over the subject properties
and alleged that petitioner is an illegitimate child who cannot succeed by right of
representation
3. The trial court held in favor of petitioner. On appeal, CA reversed the trial court
decision and dismissed the complaint

ISSUE: WON petitioner has legal right to inherit by representation to Franciscas estate

HELD: No.

To determine petitioners successional rights to the decedents estate, his filiation must first
be ascertained. Petitioner failed to prove his filiation; the name of the child described in the
birth certificate presented as evidence, is not that of the plaintiff but a certain Alfredo
Leonardo who was born on September 13, 1938 to Sotero Leonardo and Soccoro Timbol.
Other than his bare allegations, plaintiff did not submit any durable evidence showing that
Alfredo Leonardo mentioned in the birth certificate is no other than he himself.

Even if it is true that petitioner is a child of Sotero, he still cannot, by right of representation,
claim a share of the estate left by the deceased Francisca considering that he was born
outside of wedlock as shown by the fact that when he was born, his alleged putative father
and mother were not yet married; and his alleged fathers first marriage was still subsisting.
As such, petitioner would be an illegitimate child who has no right to inherit ab intestato
from the legitimate children and relatives of his father, like the deceased Francisca.

ABELLANA-BACAYO V. FERRARIS-BORROMEO, 14 SCRA 986 (1965)

DOCTRINE: As an exception to the general rule that the right of representation is available only
in the descending line, Art. 975 of the Civil Code permits representation in the collateral line (but
only in intestate succession) insofar as nephews and nieces of the decedent are concerned.
When such nephews and nieces inherit by representation, they succeed to that portion which
their predeceased or incapacitated father or mother would have otherwise been entitled to
inherit. By right of representation, these nephews and nieces shall be deemed to be two degrees
remote from the decedent. However, the prerequisite for the exercise of the right of
representation is that the nephews and nieces must concur with at least one uncle or aunt.
Otherwise, nephews and nieces will inherit in their own right as third degree relatives of the
decedent.

It must also be noted that even when they inherit in their own right as third degree
relatives, nephews and nieces are preferred over the uncles and aunts of the decedent (who are
likewise relatives within the third degree of the decedent). This is because of the order of
intestate succession which ranks brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces fourth in the order of
succession, whereas other collateral relatives, including uncles and aunts of the deceased, are
ranked fifth. Finally, the exercise of the right of representation is subject to the barrier between
the legitimate and illegitimate families under Article 992.
 In the more recent case of Delgado vda. de la Rosa v Heirs of Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian [G.R. No. 155733, 27 January 2006 (480 SCRA 334)], the Supreme Court through Justice
Corona ruled that (u)nder Article 972 of the New Civil Code, the right of representation in the
collateral line takes place only in favor of children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces),
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.

Likewise, in the case of Bagugu v Piedad, Justice Vitug clarified that the right of
representation is generally available only in the descending line, never in the ascending. In the
collateral line, the right is limited to children of brothers and sisters who concur with uncles
and/or aunts. No other collateral relative can benefit from the right of representation.

FACTS: Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944. Thereafter,
up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary settlement of her
estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still unknown. More than ten (10)
years having elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared
presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession and distributing her estate
among her heirs.
1. The deceased Melodia Feraris was survived only by collateral relatives, namely
Filomena Abellana de Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedents father, Anacleto
Ferraris; and by Gaudencia, Catalina,Conchita, and Juanito, all surname Ferraris, her
nieces and nephew, who were the children of Melodias only brother of full blood,
Arturo Ferraris, who predeceased the decedent.
2. The trial court ruled that the children of the only predeceased brother of the
decedent, exclude the aunt of the same decedent for the reason that the former are
nearer in degree (2 degrees) than the latter since nieces and nephews succeed by
right of representation, while the aunt is 3 degrees distant from the decedent, and
that other collateral relatives are excluded by brothers or sisters or children of
brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with article 1009 of the New Civil
Code.
3. Petitioner-appellant contends that she is of equal degree of relationship as the
oppositors (3 degrees removed from the decedent) and that under 975 of the New
Civil Code, no right of representation could take place when the nieces and nephew
of the decedent do not concur with an uncle or aunt, but rather the former succeed
in their own right.

ISSUE: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a deceased person when he or she is
survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt and the children of a brother who
predeceased him or her?

HELD: The Court held that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews
from the decedent (3 degrees) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives
belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and hen descending
to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Also, nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation (i.e.. per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as
provided by Art. 975.

The Court held that in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all
other collaterals (aunt and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. Under Art. 1009,
the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the
other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.

Tolentino expressly states:

Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in intestate
succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children of brothers
or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth degree. Beyond
this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the succession of
collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth degree are no longer
considered as relatives, for successional purposes.

Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should be
understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives exclude the
farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no right of
representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court ruled that under the laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing
and qualified to succeed.

BICOMONG v ALMANZA

NATURE

Appeal from decision of CFI Manila

FACTS

Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda and they had 3 children (Perpetua, Igmedia
andIgnacio). When Sisenanda died, Simeon remarried to Silvestra and they had 2 children
(Felipaand Maura). The plaintiffs are the grandchildren of Simeon with his children in his first
marriage. Respondents are the heirs of the children of Simeon in his second marriage. The
subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5 parcels of land which she
inherited from Silvestra Glorioso. There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs, the Tolentinos,
and Francisca Bagsic, for their shares in the properties of Maura Bagsic. When Maura Bagsic
died, the properties passed on to Cristeta Almanza, who also died without division of the
properties. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Almanzas appealed to
CA. It was contended that since Maura died ahead of Felipa, the latter succeeded to Mauras
estate, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. They said the relatives nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones. The plaintiffs claim that Felipa died ahead of Maura

SIMEON BAGSIC and SISENANDRA BARCENAS (died) (first marriage)

 o Perpetua (died)
Gaudencio Bicomong
Felicidad Bicomong
Salome Bicomong
Gervacio Bicomong
o Igmedia (died)
Dionisio Tolentino
Maria Tolentino
Petra Tolentino
o Ignacio (died)
Francisca Bagsic
SIMEON BAGSIC (died) and SILVESTRA GLORIOSO (died) (second marriage)
o Felipa (died) and Geronimo Almanza
Cristeta Almanza (died) and Engracio Manese
o Maura (died)
- The subject matter is the half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in 5 parcels of land w/c she
inherited from Silvestra Glorioso.

- There are 3 sets of plaintiffs: the Bicomongs. The Tolentinos, and Francisca Bagsic, for their
shares in the properties of Maura Bagsic.

- When Maura Bagsic died, the properties passed on to Cristeta Almanza, who also died
without division of the properties.

- Trial court rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs.

- Almanzas appealed to CA. It was contended that since Maura died ahead of Felipa, Felipa
succeeded to Mauras estate, to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. They said the relatives
nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones.

- The plaintiffs claim that Felipa died ahead of Maura.

- CA certified case to SC.

ISSUE/S

WON Maura is succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of nephews and nieces of half blood

HELD

NO.

- In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse,

collateral relatives succeed to the entire estate of deceased.

- Since Maura died intestate and her husband and her ascendants died ahead of her, she is
succeded by surviving collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and
the children of her brother and sisters of half blood, in accordance with Art 975 of New Civil
Code.

- The nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces
alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with
brothers or sisters of the deceased.

- The contention that Maura should be succeeded by Felipa to the exclusion of the nephews
and nieces of half blood is erroneous. As it was shown, Felipa predeceased her sister Maura.

No. In the absence of descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse,

collateral relatives succeed to the entire estate of deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic,
child of the 2nd marriage in which her share is in dispute, died intestate without an issue, and
her husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, sheis succeeded by the surviving
collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the 10 children of her
brother and 2 sisters of half blood in accordance with the provision o fArt. 975 of the New
Civil Code .By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to
inherit in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Article 975
makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal or paternal
line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole or
half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews
and 2 sisters of half blood.(19) In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay, et. al vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (G.R. No. 183053, June 16, 2010)

Bicomong vs Almanza

(Note: This is a case of half-blood nephews and nieces claiming from the estate of a half-blood aunt.
Greens vs Yellows; all those in white are dead.)

Guerrero, J.

Facts:
 Simeon Bagsic was married twice.

His first marriage was to Sisenanda Barcenas with whom he had 3 children: Perpetua, Igmedia
and Ignacio. Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of Simeon Bagsic.

His second marriage was to Silvestria Glorioso with whom he had 2 children: Felipa and Maura.
Silvestria and Simeon both died.

From first marriage:

o Ignacio Bagsic died and leaving plaintiff Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia
Bagsic also died survived by plaintiffs Dionisio, Maria and Petra, all Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died survived by the plaintiffs Gaudencio, Felicidad, Salome, and
Gervacio, all Bicomong.

From second marriage:

o Maura Bagsic died leaving no heir. Felipa Bagsic married Geronimo Almanza. She
died and was survived by her husband defendant Geronimo Almanza, her daughter
Cristeta Almanza. Cristeta died survived by her husband defendant Engracio Manese.
The subject matter of the complaint concerns the one-half undivided share of Maura Bagsic in
five (5) parcels of land which she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso
(second marriage).

After the death of Maura, the subject properties were administered by her niece Cristeta. The
plaintiffs requested the partition of the properties but Cristeta convinced them to wait until the
expenses for Mauras illness and burial have been paid. After all the debts have been paid,
Cristeta agreed to the request but she died before the partition was effected.

The possession and administration of the properties were left to Cristetas father and Cristetas
husband, defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio Manese, respectively. Defendant
Geronimo Almanza died and was substituted by Florentino Cartena.

The grandchildren from the first marriage brought suit for the recovery of their lawful shares in
the properties left by Maura Bagsic.

The trail court found for the plaintiffs awarding them 10/24 share on the five parcels of land.
(Guys, the case says there are 10 half-nephews/nieces but only 8 were named. Sorry.)

Engracio Manese did not appeal so the ruling became final as to him. Florentino Cartena,
substitute of Geronimo Almanza appealed to the CA. The CA referred the case to the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether or not the heirs of the half blood brothers and sisters are able to inherit from the estate left
by a half-sister.

Held: Yes. They inherit in their own right and not by representation.

Articles 975, 1006 and 1008 are applicable in this case.

By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit in their own right.
Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per stirpes) unless concurring
with brothers or sisters of the deceased."

Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile deceased survive, they shall
inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they
alone survive, they shall inherit in equal portions."

Felipa, the full-blood sister predeceased the decedent Maura which means that only nephews and nieces
are claiming inheritance in this case. In Art 975, the sole niece of whole blood (Cristeta) of the deceased
does not exclude the ten nephews and nieces of half blood.

The only difference between the whole and half blood relatives is in the amount of their shares provided in
Arts 1006 and 1008:

Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters
of the half blood, the former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter.

Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per
stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood