Republic of the Philippines "Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of

SUPREME COURT public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
Manila permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the
Honorable Secretary of the Interior, and
EN BANC
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this
reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously
G.R. No. L-14078 March 7, 1919
recommended by the provincial governor."

RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs,

2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro
vs.
was approved by the Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.

3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued

D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff.
executive order No. 2 which says:
Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.

"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current

MALCOLM, J.:
series, has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History
(Worcester vs. Georgia [1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approve by the
American jurisprudence, began his opinion (relating to the status of an Indian) with words
Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on February 21, 1917.
which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made to introduce the present opinion
This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the deepest interest. The
legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the rights if "Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of
they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions of section 2145 of the revised
involved in the subject now to be considered. Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first,
in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan
to introduce the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians,"
Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
next to compare the status of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and,
lastly, to resolve the constitutional questions presented.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall
upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in
I. INTRODUCTION.
accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."

This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1
Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their
and the executive order of the governor of the same province copied in
liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos
Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to
is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
introduce civilized customs among them.
having run away form the reservation.

5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance
with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted
resolution No. 25 which is as follows:
6. That the undersigned has not information that Doroteo Dabalos is being
detained by the sheriff of Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759 of Act No. 2711.
resolution:
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the
advancement of the non-Christian people of Mindoro, which were shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial
all a failure, board. The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code. This,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
other measure is taken for the Mangyan work of this province, no
successful result will be obtained toward educating these people.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to obliged them to live in one
place in order to make a permanent settlement, SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christina upon sites selected by provincial
governor. With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non- authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct unoccupied public lands to be selected by him an approved by the provincial
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied board.
public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board.
In connection with the above-quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the
same Code, which read as follows:
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of
Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a place most convenient for the
Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. Any
non-Christian who shall refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a
provincial governor, pursuant to section two thousand one hundred and forty-
 five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by said governor The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have
shall upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days. the facilities of waters. lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry
and passageway of one league long, wherein the indios can have their live
stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The
genealogical tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would
read: Section 2077, Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of LAW IX.
various special provincial laws, notably of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the
Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.

Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS
will later be disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands.
PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
In order to put the phrase in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the
Government of the Philippine Islands with reference to the uncivilized elements of the
Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history of the attitude assumed by the With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated
authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the legislation on the in reducciones. Provided they shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries
subject. which they may have in the places left by them. We hereby order that no
change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the
lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit
II. HISTORY.
therefrom.

A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.

xxx xxx xxx

The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are
LAW XIII.
compiled in Book VI, Title III, in the following language.

THE SAME AS ABOVE.

LAW I.

THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING,

The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21,
VICEROY, OR COURT.
1551. Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on
September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November 10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of
the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578, No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right
to alter or to remove the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and
founded, without our express order or that of the viceroy, president, or the royal
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" COMMUNITIES).
district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the information to that en. And, because these claims are often made for private
evangelical law, and in order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby order that this law be
rites and ceremonies to the end that they may live in harmony and in a civilized always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and special attention, obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge
to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To or encomendero who should violate this law.
carry out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious
persons met at various times; the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of
LAW XV.
Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year one thousand five hundred
and forty-six all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve God
an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
in communities, and not to live in places divided and separated from one
another by sierras and mountains, wherein they are deprived of all spiritual and
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE
temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid of our ministers
"INDIOS."
and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are
obliged to give one another. Having realized that convenience of this
resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by different orders, have entrusted and We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be
ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with great care and an indio of the same reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there
moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with should be two mayors and two aldermen, also indios; and, even if the town be
their doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and four
inconveniences, so that those who would not presently settle and who would aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there
see the good treatment and the protection of those already in settlements should be not more than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually
would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they be elect nine others, in the presence of the priests , as is the practice in town
not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
been executed in the greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree
that the same be complied with in all the remaining parts of the Indies, and
the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner and form LAW XXI.
prescribed by the laws of this title.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on
xxx xxx xxx May 8, 1581. At Madrid, on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July
12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and December 17, 1646. For this
law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
LAW VIII.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS,
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS," AND MULATTOES.
1618.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to
THE "REDUCCTIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS live to live in the reducciones and towns and towns of the indios, because it
LAW. has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and associate with
the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers,
gamblers, and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them,
 the indios would leave their towns and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, live isolated and roaming about without forming a town nor a home; another,
and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their services, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered completely the
contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans shall be
blunders and vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and
reach with regard to their salvation, increase, and tranquillity. We hereby order missionaries of the provinces wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in
the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of the acts above- the work of having these races learn these rules. These rules shall have
mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys, executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
their powers and avail themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are
truly honest. As regards the mestizos and Indian and Chinese half-breeds
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from
(zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and who are to
now on, with all the means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking
inherit their houses and haciendas, they all not be affected by this law, it
of the census of the inhabitants of the towns or settlement already subdued,
appearing to be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the
and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment of local
Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230, 231.)
authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools,
and for the opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the regards the administrative organization of the said towns or settlements, that
condition of the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in this be finished before the first day of next July, so that at the beginning of the
"reducciones," is found in the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect the
January 14, 1881, reading as follows: remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two
years they shall not be obliged to render personal services other than those
previously indicated.
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a
territory recognized as an integral part of a nation should respect and obey the
laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is the duty to conscience and to 4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands
humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that might exist appropriate for cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move
in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the their dwelling-houses; and only in case of absolute necessity shall a new
nations which enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place most
may be acquired in those towns under the protection and vigilance afforded convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either
them by the same laws. of these cases, an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach
of the sound of the bell.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the
separation and isolation of the non-Christian races from the social life of the 5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be
civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer the commission of established an armed force composed precisely of native Christian, the
depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the organization and service of which shall be determined in a regulations based
representative of the Government of the, metropolis. upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).

It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied 6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns
themselves with this most important question, and that much has been understand all the rights and duties affecting them and the liberty which they
heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial of the missionary fathers have as to where and now they shall till their lands and sell the products
who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by
might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the the Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and
preaching employed to allure them have been insufficient to complete the work with the prohibition against these new towns as well as the others from
undertaken. Neither have the punishments imposed been sufficient in certain engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the rebellious indios, the
cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus giving and violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
customs of isolation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of territory of the rebellious indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond
things, taking into account the prestige which the country demands and the the said limits shall be detained and assigned governmentally wherever
inevitable duty which every government has in enforcing respect and convenient.
obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the territory
under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the
study of this serious question which involves important interests for civilization,
fraternity of the Catholic Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years
from the moral and material as well as the political standpoints. After hearing
from rendering personal labor.
the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities, ecclesiastics, and
missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the
unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the 9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued
Bishops of Jaro and Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the (aetas and mountains igorrots the following advantages in returns for their
Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos, Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity among their families; concession of
meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so indicated, I have good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they wish and in the
arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon
practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as effecting submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same
well as of the manner and the only form of accomplishing such a task. are not opposed to natural law; freedom to decide of their own accord as to
whether they want to be Christians or not; the establishment of missions and
families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and give them
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects,
security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the
I hereby promulgate the following:
exemption from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a
kind of tax) for twenty years; and lastly, that those who are governed by the
DECREE. local authorities as the ones who elect such officials under the direct charge of
the authorities of the province or district.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date,
to be governed by the common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this 10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the
decree which are bases upon the differences of instructions, of the customs, advantages offered, shall, in return, have the obligation of constituting their
and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a part of its new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools, and country roads which
territory. place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences,
when the latter do not have the good conditions of location and cultivations,
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races
which may be divided into three classes; one, which comprises those which
 and provided further the putting of families in a place so selected by them be exclusive legislative jurisdiction and authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine
authorized in the towns already constituted. Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It divided the Philippine Islands into
twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the Mountain Province,
Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-General
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the
of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the
tribes, that, disregarding the peace, protection, and advantages offered them,
territory which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the
continue in their rebellious attitude on the first of next April, committing from
Philippine Assembly, that is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law establish a bureau to
now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for the this
be known as the "Bureau of non-Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision
purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of
over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are represented in the Legislature by
the divisions of the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards
appointed senators and representatives( sec. 22).
(cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory of such tribes. On the expiration
of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and implements,
and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognized a dividing line between the
be repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall territory not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which Moros
immediately order a detachment of the military staff to study the zones where or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which is inhabited by Moros or other non-
such operations shall take place and everything conducive to the successful Christian tribes.
accomplishment of the same.
2. Statute law.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missioners, local authorities, and other
subordinates to my authorities, local authorities, and other subordinates to may
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the
authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid
Philippine Commission and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49
and cooperation to the said forces in all that is within the attributes and the
concerning the Province of Benguet and the Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; ;Act
scope of the authority of each.
no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the Character of the city of Manila; Act
No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro Province; Act No.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government Act;
provinces in the southern part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio charger;
preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied to them. and Act No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major
portion of these laws have been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 an
d1917.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-
Royal Patron, a council or permanent commission which shall attend to and
decide all the questions relative to the application of the foregoing regulations Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the
that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of provinces and priests primitive peoples. Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by
and missionaries. the United States Philippine Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 4111, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548, 549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145,
4568, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to
Sur, Isabela. Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua
the foregoing, in brining about due compliance with this decree, shall be
(Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring
promulgated by the respective official centers within their respective
to the Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol.
7, pp. 128-134.)
No. 547. AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE MANGUIANES IN THE
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
PROVINCE OF MINDORO.

Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission,
the best method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
that:

1. Organic law.
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in any form of municipal government, the provincial governor is authorized,
the Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing with these
later expressly approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and
of July 1, 1902. Portions of these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent badges of office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the
congressional legislation. One paragraph of particular interest should here be quoted, powers and duties thus prescribed shall not be in excess of those conferred
namely: upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred and eighty-seven
entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the
townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should
adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our
North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial
and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and contentment, governor is further authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the
surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. interest of law and order, to direct such Manguianes to take up their habitation
Such tribal governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the
regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall
should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and introduce civilized upon conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
customs.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an province to acquire the knowledge and experience necessary for successful
Organic Act for the Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to local popular government, and his supervision and control over them shall be
provide for a legislative body and, with this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the exercised to this end, an to the end that law and order and individual freedom
organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine Legislature, composed of the shall be maintained.
Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction over the
Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement
jurisdiction of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
of Manguianes has advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it
may be organized under the provisions of sections one to sixty-seven,
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a township,
Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the
 and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The
board. first section of this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article
applicable only in specially organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the
Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the
provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never seen fit to give all the powers of
passage of the same is hereby expedited in accordance with section two of 'An
local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the portion of the
Act prescribing the order of procedure by the Commission in the enactment of
Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
geographical description.

SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of
who are Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically
Enacted, December 4, 1902. recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422, Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)

All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act No. 1396 If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is
and 1397. The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general likewise inadquate. The reason it that the motive of the law relates not to a particular
language. In turn, Act No. 1397 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two people, because of their religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the
Administrative Codes retained the provisions in questions. whole intent of the law is predicated n the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.

These different laws, if they of the non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually
and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be followed for their advancement. introduce the term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of
the Interior who for so many years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the
difficulty of selecting an exact designation, speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples,
C. TERMINOLOGY. commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See Hearings before the Committee on the
Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third session on H.R. 18459, An
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms. Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future political status
of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands, pp.
346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Secretary.)
Commission.

The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These substantiated by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
words are to be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law.
They are also to be found in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a
Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No. 2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections
forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of 1917, reestablishing this 701 et seq, and sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act
Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned Acts Nos. No. 253 charged the Bureau of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations
127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551. with reference to non-Christian tribes . . . with special view to determining the most
practicable means for bringing about their advancement in civilization and material property
prosperity."
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been
the favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being
of a Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United
Administrative Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of States vs. Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect
1917; and in Acts Nos. 2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in of a tribal marriage in connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband
Act No. 1667 of the Philippine Commission. who surprises his wife in the act of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of
the following language:
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, . . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a
Administrative Code of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.) tribal marriage of so-called non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes,
celebrated within that province without compliance with the requisites
prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . . We hold also that the fact that the
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN." accused is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of
intelligence, uncultured and uneducated, should be taken into consideration as
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result a second marked extenuating circumstance.
in giving to it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the
Christian religion, and non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian Of much more moment is the uniform construction of execution officials who have been
religion. In partial corroboration of this view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the called upon to interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine
last Administrative Code and certain well-known authorities, as Zuiga, "Estadismo de las Commission, drafted much of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who
Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine Tribes and Languages," and Dr. had these people under his authority, was the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of
N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson, "The Philippine June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all governor of provinces, organized under
Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to 1898," the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later received recognition by the
vol. I. p. 107.) Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as follows:

Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people
what is its true meaning. who were originally non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are
children of persons who have been recently baptized are, for the purposes of
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
the provisions of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the
Philippine Assembly was recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these
or other non-Christian tribes. Again, the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the islands which are not advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable
authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the "territory not now represented in the designation which will fit all cases. The number of individual tribes is so great
Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and again, adopted acts making that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act. It was
certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited by Moros or finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most
other non-Christian tribes. satisfactory, but the real purpose of the Commission was not so much to
legislate for people having any particular religious belief as for those lacking
 sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be brought In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers
under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code. regarding cedula taxes due from members of non-Christian tribes when they
come in from the hills for the purposes of settling down and becoming
members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following clarification
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of
of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby
civilization to which the person baptized has attained at the time the act of
published for the information of all concerned:
baptism is performed. For practical purposes, therefore, you will give the
member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the doubt even
though they may recently have embraced Christianity. Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by
reason of the fact that they do not profess Christianity, but because of their
uncivilized mode of life and low state of development. All inhabitants of the
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain
Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may be divided
under the jurisdiction of regularly organized municipalities or what form of
into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
government shall be afforded to them should be the degree of civilization to
which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself accordingly.
Whenever any member of an non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized
mode of life, severs whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who
himself civilized community, belonging a member of the body politic, he thereby
concurs in the opinion above expressed and who will have the necessary
makes himself subject to precisely the same law that governs the other
instructions given to the governors of the provinces organized under the
members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches
Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as
from other members thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, delinquency period the same rule should apply to him as to persons arriving
has the following to say on the subject: from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the
expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case
may be, should be furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but pay the tax for former years.
while no other better classification has as yet been made the present
classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe the term carries the same
meaning as the expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of June In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining
30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than whether or not a man is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the
of religious denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious circumstance that he does or does not profess Christianity, nor even his
denomination will make the law invalid as against that Constitutional guaranty maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
of religious freedom. known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization
and connection or lack of connection with some civilized community. For this
reason so called "Remontados" and "Montescos" will be classed by this office
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the application of the Internal
of Internal Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
Manobos and the Aetas. Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are
on the point, who, by return indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of practically the same as those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized
Internal Revenue. This Construction of the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in non-Christina tribes.
circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as
follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
Very respectfully,
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the
payment of cedula taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted (Sgd.) ELLIS
this provision of law to mean not that persons who profess some form of CROMWELL,
Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all other person Collector of
are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal Internal
relations with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, Revenue,
and that all others, including Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc.,
are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities or towns, or in the country in
Approved:
a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a man's form
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
the cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized
manner or is associated with the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof
or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come up as to whether a Christian, The two circular above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue
maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a non- Regulations No. 1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal
Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one Revenue, and approved on April 16, 1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of
occasion a prominent Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is practically a transcript of Circular
exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was not a Christian. This Office, Letter No. 327.
however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians,
Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of
cedula taxes paid in this city are paid by men belonging to the nationalities
Constabulary request the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian
mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and other s are quite widely scattered throughout
who has been baptized by a minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these:
the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also exists in
"Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled to the privileges of a Christian? By
most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected
purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the law and does the
by this Office in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized
person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion of
people are subject to such taxes, and non-civilized people preserving their
Attorney-General Avancea, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out,
tribal relations are not subject thereto.
concludes:

(Sgd.) JNO. S.
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that is
HORD,
probable that the person in question remains a non-Christian, so that, in
Collector of
purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same make
Internal
themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least,
Revenue.
I advise you that these should be the constructions place upon the law until a
court shall hold otherwise.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No.
327, approved by the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
letter in part reads:
 With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in Government of the Philippines Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian
the provisions of the Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United
said phrase does not have its natural meaning which would include all non- States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can
Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or strangers, civilized or be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-Christian
tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as
the mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
"in a state of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United
States and the Indians may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the Congress to determine when and how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians
inhabitants of the Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as are always subject to the plenary authority of the United States.
distinguished from the common Filipinos which carry on a social and civilized
life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the religious beliefs of
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned,
the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
tells how the Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish
civilizing the neighboring Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on "This act
legislation employed to designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of
avowedly contemplates the preservation of the Indian nations as an object sought by the
the Philippines.
United States, and proposes to effect this object by civilizing and converting them from
hunters into agriculturists."
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077
and 2741 of Act No. 2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United
equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes of the Philippines, not only because
States vs. Kagama ([1886], 118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the
this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it its lateral meaning
United States Constitution which gives Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign
would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions base the
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The court then proceeds
religion of the individual.
to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the United States (a more
extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Worcester vs. Georgia, supra), as follows:
Barrows, then "Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population in the
Christian or Civilized Tribes, and non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States,
Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq). The present Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio
both before and since the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has
Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census now being taken is:
always been an anomalous one and of a complex character.
"Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical Dictionary
of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a sub-
division under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of
non-Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to American towards the Indians who were found here, the colonies before the
religion. Revolution and the States and the United States since, have recognized in the
Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and
established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive
itself, by which the Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other
officials, specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to
nations or peoples without the consent of this paramount authority. When a
religious belief, but, in a way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the
tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State or the United
Philippine Islands of a law grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from
States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which
settled communities.
this could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or
in other nations, to make such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the
E. THE MANGUIANES. Indians themselves these relation are equally difficult to define. They were, and
always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position when they
preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nation not a possessed of
The so-called non-Christians are in various state approaching civilization. The Philippine
the fall attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of
Census of 1903 divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or
regulating their internal and social relations, and thus far not brought under the
Mangyans) of Mindoro.
laws of the Union or of the State within whose limits they resided.

Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los
The opinion then continues:
nombres de Rozas de Filipinas, says:

It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress.
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer,"
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. The are
"pagan," "negro." It may be that the use of this word is applicable to a great
communities dependent on the United States. dependent largely for their daily
number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been applied only to certain
food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States,
inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
and receive from the no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employed in three
of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From
Filipino languages shows that the radical ngian had in all these languages a
their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing
sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending still exists and signifies
of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been
"ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed
always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court,
back into the interior by the modern invaders, in whose language they were
whenever the question has arisen . . . The power of the General Government
called the "ancients."
over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and diminished in
numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have among whom they dwell. it must exist in that government, because it never has
not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi- existed anywhere else, because the theater of its exercise is within the
nomadic people. They number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been denied,
desire for community life, and, as indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of
municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands [1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23,
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be
460.)
considered was whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that
Congress could prohibit the introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands
III. COMPARATIVE THE AMERICAN INDIANS. notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to statehood. The court looked to the reports
of the different superintendent charged with guarding their interests and founds that these
Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the government "like
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
adopted by the United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, 3. That n rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the
where subjected to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." Indian Territory, as the respondent has been directed to do.
And finally, we not the following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize
Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United
more fortunate white race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the
States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering
pursuit of happiness," so long as they obey the laws and do not trespass on
care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether
forbidden ground. And,
within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without
the limits of a state."
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and
in violation of the laws thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody,
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power
and it is so ordered.
of the courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has
always been deemed political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial
department of the government. (Matter of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to
[1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester vs. Georgia, supra; determine that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine
U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Islands, is a "person" within the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to
Roff vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone sue out a writ in the Philippine courts. (See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We
Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903], 187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; so decide.
Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs. Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S.,
286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29 Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case an the Rubi case are not exactly
[N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an Indian
identical. But even admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations
reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be
do exist in the United States, that Indians have been taken from different parts of the
necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property.
country and placed on these reservation, without any previous consultation as to their own
(U.S. vs. Thomas [1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation
for their own good and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn form
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this policy is for the
of judicial decisions. legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided upon,
the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps,
just as may forceful reasons exists for the segregation as existed for the segregation of the
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in
different Indian tribes in the United States.
the issuance of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No.
14891). This was a hearing upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier
General George Crook at the relation of Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged in substance that the relators
are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now located in the
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of
the whites, and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not
without aid or assistance from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, delegate this power to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine
and without being guilty of violating any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested Legislature has abdicated its authority and avoided its full responsibility.
and restrained of their liberty by order of the respondent, George Crook. The substance of
the return to the writ was that the relators are individual members of, and connected with,
the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a reservation situated some That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should
place within the limits of the Indian Territory had departed therefrom without permission be zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it
from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General of the has not bee violated in his instance.
Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to
their tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge
relators to be arrested on the Omaha Indian Territory. Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is
between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
by habeas corpus. The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid
the Government to arrest and hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs. Clinton County [1852], 1
to the Indian Territory from which it was alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard
question, the court reviewed the policy the Government had adopted in its dealing with the ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
friendly tribe of Poncase. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed for the official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate
government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse official thereof, to whom t has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of
with the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918], 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decision is to
power over the persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
such an extensive discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs
or not , need not be questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of
where existing, the exercise of the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as section 21454 of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon
follows: the provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head,
discretionary authority as to the execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United require the Secretary of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and
States, and has, therefore, the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a sixty acres by the relator out of the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and
federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases where he may be confined affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the United States Revised Statutes provided:
or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the
restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States. Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have the
management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations."
Justice Holmes said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the established practice of the Department, before saying that this language was not broad
military department of the Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of enough to warrant a regulation obviously made for the welfare of the rather helpless people
authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws therefore. concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted. The Indians have been treated as wards
of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has been exercised. In the
absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian Department."
(See also as corroborative authority, it any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204
U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and
U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232 U.S., 598.) in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints
to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any
other basis, organized society could not exist with safety to its members.
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to
Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be
the general rule. sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to
confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under
delegate legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here
the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person
conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial
to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of
governor and the provincial board.
the injury that may be done to others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with
which the individual may asserts the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of dispute the authority of any human government especially of any free
the province, are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in government existing under a written Constitution to interfere with the
the interest of law and order?" As officials charged with the administration of the province exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society
and the protection of its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members, the rights of the
the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great
a backward state? dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In
Jacobson vs. Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative
power by the Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and
the upright and honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION

Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his civilized community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The
unknown clients, says that "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid right to Liberty guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be
English, and in words as plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
segregation of 'non-Christians' and none other." The inevitable result, them, is that the law freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the
"constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to discriminate between individuals because of right of man to enjoy the faculties with which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject
their religious beliefs, and is, consequently, unconstitutional." only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. As enunciated in a long
array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the United States Supreme Court,
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable the Legislature Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to
must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then live an work where he will; to earn his livelihood by an lawful calling; to pursue any
excluded; religious equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this avocations, an for that purpose. to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary,
constitutional guaranty, and Q. E. D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel and essential to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief
free to discard the long continued meaning given to a common expression, especially as elements of the guaranty are the right to contract, the right to choose one's employment,
classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the court to what it should the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian" refers to
natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are
Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of ordinarily done by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall,
religious differences. 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829], 2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274;
Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs. Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)

The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly
instructions of to the Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no apparent. It is this: "Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty
law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or regulated by law." Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man
the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the Fourteenth Amendment to the can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the
United States Constitution and these provisions, it has been said "are universal in their individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common
application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises without
of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed
protection afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian. rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the
interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper
scope of the police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus: Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz [1914], 189 Al., 66.)

Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel
with the possession of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. Webster, in the course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United
94.) States Supreme Court, since a classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due
process of law" is, that "every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, an immunities
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized under the protection of the general rules which govern society." To constitute "due process
licentiousness that trespasses on right. That authorized licentiousness that of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where
civilization, which the savage never understood, and never can understand. much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to
Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome restraint; the more restraint on others particular cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a
to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that man is free who is stationary and blind sentinel of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority,
protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.) whether sanctioned by age and customs, or newly devised in the discretion of the
legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which regards and preserves these
principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one caught to desire and in not being (Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first,
forced to do what one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation;
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to ac third, that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class."
essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. (Field, J., in (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal to the United States
Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.) Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with
the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U. S., The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for
82.) its selection, the following:

The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken
by a statute which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable together to Tigbao, the Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made
basis and cannot be purely arbitrary in nature. a trip to the place. There he found that the site selected is a good one; that
creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests, construction of
buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later
work of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with
on.
enthusiastic interest after the first weeks which are necessarily a somewhat
trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly behaviour and habit
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE. of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the
period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely
justify its continuance and development.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the
United States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law
providing "That slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation.
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is Such was naturally to be expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his
quite possible that the Thirteenth Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the return to Manila, made the following statement to the press:
"jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in the Philippine. However this may be, the
Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary modifications, of sections 268 to
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those
271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the punishment for these
who prefer to live a nomadic life and evade the influence of
crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together wit their corollary, peonage, all denote
civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them
"a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906],
into political communities and to educate their children with the
203 U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been
object of making them useful citizens of this country. To permit
applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may
them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden to the
have been disguised. (Bailey vs. Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes
and make depredation, or if not they will be subject to involuntary
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
freedom. Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act
if section 2145 is to be held valid.
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-
Christian people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration "the advancement of
E. THE POLICE POWER. the non-Christian elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly
civilized Christian inhabitants." This is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this
moment is the farreaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its (a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic
weep, and that among its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the race are induced to leave their wild habitat and settle in organized
health, peace, morals, education, and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to communities.
increase the industries of the State, develop its resources and add to is wealth and
prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we are not interested in is
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health
the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
throughout the regions inhabited by the non-Christian people.

"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-
(c) The extention of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to
protection, and is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be
facilitate their development and the extention of government control.
that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to
the comfort, safety and welfare of society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873],
70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam (d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among
the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes of the law do not go non-Christians, to promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain
beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily amicable relations among them and with the Christian people.
interfere with the right of the individual.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to agriculture.
exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public
interest. "There can be not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine
( f ) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private
Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of
capital in, the fertile regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at the foundation of all republican
forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil., 580;
U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.) The Secretary adds:

With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued
deciding whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of among the non-Christian people. These people are being taught and guided to
the Administrative Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in improve their living conditions in order that they may fully appreciate the
enacting this section. If legally possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated. benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic habits are
being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized
settlements. They are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
Government to organize them politically into fixed and per manent
communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to aid
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse,
Tigbao reservation, it will be remembered, assigned as reasons fort the action, the educate their children, and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life
following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian with their civilized brothers. In short, they are being impressed with the
people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to economic,
was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized
following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in inhabitants of the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the
so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and
economic development and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his
Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the liberty without due process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have
Government towards the non-Christian people in the following unequivocal terms: a correct idea of what liberty is and do not practise liberty in a rightful way?

It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such
for advancement and liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian class of persons as to what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the
Filipinos and foster by all adequate means and in a systematical, rapid, and Government should not adopt any measures looking to the welfare and
complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this people
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery
permanent the mutual intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and
Christian and non-Christian elements populating the provinces of the noble sense.
Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper has been placed in the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them
wards of the Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these in the path of civilization. The latter measure was adopted as the one more in
unfortunates advance in the "habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the accord with humanity and with national conscience.
courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully formulated, and apparently working out for the
ultimate good of these people?
xxx xxx xxx

In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended
evident. Here, we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life,
more and more towards the education and civilization of such people and fitting
making depredations on their more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of
them to be citizens. The progress of those people under the tutelage of the
civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement of the Philippine Islands. What the
Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point to a day
Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to gather together the
which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of
children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals was in fine, to
what has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of
begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under
most of the backward people, shall we give up the noble work simply because
the bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with
a certain element, believing that their personal interests would be injured by
reference to the Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if
such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the
they are to be improved, that they be gathered together. On these few reservations there
Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after
live under restraint in some cases, and in other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the
expending sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the
uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes protection for the manguianes.
claws of ignorance and superstition, now willingly retire because there has
been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty that no
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow
that the axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave
civilized men are free, and they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, the Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and
indeed, they are citizens, with many but not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, making them useful citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of
indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt, nay
intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress of the State. challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.

In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao.
Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. There they are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They
Settlers in Mindoro must have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or are being made to understand that they object of the government is to organize
they will leave the country. It is no argument to say that such crimes are punished by the them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are being aided to
Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed after commission of the offense and not live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially
before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the resources of the great Islands of established for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that
Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be in a position to their advancement in civilization and material prosperity may be assured.
guarantee peace and order. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them slaves or put them
in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for
anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State.
Illiteracy and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself
from destruction must prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some
necessity is all convincing. other places under penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is
invited to the fact that this people, living a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not
have permanent individual property. They move from one place to another as
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving
about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, domain. Wandering from one place to another on the public lands, why can not
they (the manguianes) are engaged in the works of destruction burning and the government adopt a measure to concentrate them in a certain fixed place
destroying the forests and making illegal caigins thereon. Not bringing any on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests, what will territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner
ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of
and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a the purposes and objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to
heavy burden to the State and on account of their ignorance they will commit nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the mountains and follow a
crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be subjected to involuntary wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can not make them
servitude by those who may want to abuse them. live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them
politically will come to naught.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and
does not practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
do anything they will going from one place to another in the mountains,
burning and destroying forests and making illegal caigins thereon.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to
reach a general conclusion.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can
they allege that they are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where
he pleases. Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities ? To furnish an
xxx xxx xxx example from the Indian legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p.
141) Indian reservation. Those citizens certainly did not possess absolute freedom of moving consideration. Justice Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly
locomotion. Again the same law provided for the apprehension of marauding Indians. famous, said that "constitutional law, like other mortal contrivances, has to take some
Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and followed time and again chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final decision of the many grave
without question. questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should be with a
view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy,
and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and
that broad conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as
defenseless people confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is
are the other departments of the Government.
asked, would be the remedy of any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be
that the official into whose hands are given the enforcement of the law would have little or
not motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the presumption would all be that they We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does
would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and patriotically. If, indeed, not deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the
they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of removal in the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said
hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances. section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion
When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power,
oppression is called to the attention of the courts, it would seems that the Judiciary should somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the
not unnecessarily hamper the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose. Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
and liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the therefore, not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against
Government? It is a question which has assailed the very existence of government from the petitioners. So ordered.
beginning of time. Now purely an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by
force, it has been transferred to the peaceful forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Avancea, JJ., concur.
issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of government renders imperatives
a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course, on the necessities
of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the Legislature
and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a along
time to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.

The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of
economics and political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as
widespread belief in the amplest possible demonstration of governmental activity. The
courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to trial after the other two branches of the
government in this progressive march.

Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly
say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. it is, indeed, an unusual exercise
of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy.

Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the
degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own
good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has
not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of
the law, there exists a law ; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the
regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt,
would lead to the determination that section 2145 is valid. it the attitude which the courts
should assume towards the settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which
we are in full accord, Gambles vs. Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510)
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Tennessee writes:

We can seen objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really
new question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that
theory, when not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of
cases, or by the aid of analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting
solutions, that one is perceived to tip the scales which the court believes will best promote
the public welfare in its probable operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is
not a thing inflexible. No court is wise enough to forecast its influence in all possible
contingencies. Distinctions must be made from time to time as sound reason and a true
sense of justice may dictate."

Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-
Christians has been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has
been effective in the Philippines from early days to the present. The idea to unify the people
of the Philippines so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are
to be equal before the law, all must be approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines
is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must be populated, and its fertile regions must
be developed. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with
a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and
the good of the country.

Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine
Legislature, a coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered
case is toward non-interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the
 dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use
of the PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.

SEC. 6. Funding. The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be
sourced from the respective budgets of the concerned agencies.

[G.R. No. 127685. July 23, 1998] SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular
reports to the Office of the President, through the IACC, on the status of implementation of
BLAS F. OPLE, petitioner, vs. RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, HECTOR this undertaking.
VILLANUEVA, CIELITO HABITO, ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA, HEAD OF THE NATIONAL SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.
COMPUTER CENTER andCHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen
DECISION Hundred and Ninety-Six.

PUNO, J.: (SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"

The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
the shrinking of the right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against
"the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men."[1] Petitioner respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government
Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly order enjoining its implementation.
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights
sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion. Petitioner contends:

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as "A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
follows: REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO.
308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE,
"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
government instrumentalities; EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK
persons seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE
fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations; CONSTITUTION."[2]
Respondents counter-argue:
WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and
social security providing agencies and other government instrumentalities is required to A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A
achieve such a system; JUDICIAL REVIEW;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following: POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF CONGRESS;
SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A
decentralized Identification Reference System among the key basic services and social C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION
security providers is hereby established. REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE
CONCERNED AGENCIES;
SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee
(IACC) to draw-up the implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY. [3]
System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive Secretary, with the following as
members: We now resolve.

Head, Presidential Management Staff I

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the
Local Government standing to sue of the petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically,
Secretary, Department of Health respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing
Administrator, Government Service Insurance rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
System,
Administrator, Social Security System, Administrator, National Statistics Office Managing These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished
Director, National Computer Center. member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative
SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as power.[4] As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
secretariat to the IACC and as such shall provide administrative and technical support to petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
the IACC. GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.[5]

SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
the NSO shall serve as the common reference number to establish a linkage implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails
among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with the different Social A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for
Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents
Technology and in computer application designs of their respective systems. themselves have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the
rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the
SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
Secretary, in coordination with the National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead
[6]
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives
agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive tri-media information from the GSIS and the SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification
system.[7] All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will to implement A.O. No. recruitment, supervision and discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by
308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside government. [27]
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is
not a commendable stance as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative
principle and a fundamental right. Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized Identification
Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various contending
II state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr.
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of
administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the President to thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our
issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all- citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it
resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy. deals with a subject that should be covered by law.

Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the confers no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O.
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic
delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court. get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as
daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his
The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative privileges.Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no
power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal duty cannot stand.
them."[8] The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. [9] The grant of legislative Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[10] The legislative body possesses legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is
plenary power for all purposes of civil government.[11] Any power, deemed to be legislative contrary to the established approach defining the traditional limits of administrative
by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has legislation. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on
lodged it elsewhere.[12] In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or the public. It is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and
impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-
concern or common interest. [13] making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. not an independent source of power to make laws."[28]
[14]
The executive power is vested in the President.[15] It is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws.[16] It is the power of carrying the laws into practical III
operation and enforcing their due observance.[17]
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation because
the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and facially itviolates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let
employees of his department.[18] He has control over the executive department, bureaus alone."[29] In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,[30] the United States Supreme
and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the Court gave more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials. constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can be found within
[19]
Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising the the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,[31] viz:
enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to "Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from
discharge his duties effectively.[20] these guarantees that help give them life and substance x x x. Various guarantees create
zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the
orders as determined by proper governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to quartering of soldiers `in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is
fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the `right of the
his agents.[22] To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations. people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is: detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides: `The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.'"
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc,[32] we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a
promulgated in administrative orders."[23] constitutional right to privacy. Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique
Fernando, we held:
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the "xxx
law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the
legislative policy.[24] We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives
legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right
"incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a relationship lying within the zone of
principles of governance"[25] and "embodies changes in administrative structures and privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider implications
procedures designed to serve the people."[26] The Code is divided into seven (7) though.The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.
Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty and General Administration, Book II with the
Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the Office of the So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on the Constitutional Commissions, independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
Book VI on National Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. protection.The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: 'The concept of limited
These Books contain provisions on the organization, powers and general administration of government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions
administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual,
organization and functions of the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited
bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as guidelines for the exercise government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private
both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual--has become
increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological
 age --industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area of measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN is the
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support legitimate owner of the card or PIN.[48]
this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian
society.'" A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a
fingertip and turns the unique pattern therein into an individual number which is called a
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks[49] and becomes a means of
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution.[33] It is identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be
expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights: scanned every time service or access is provided. [50] Another method is the retinal scan.
Retinal scan technology employs optical technology to map the capillary pattern of the
"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger print.
upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as [51]
Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically
prescribed by law." analyzes the unique combination of substances excreted from the skin of people.[52] The
latest on the list of biometric achievements is the thermogram. Scientists have found that
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution pattern is
viz:[34] seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the
individual's personal "heat signature." [53]
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science
fictions are now science facts. Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various technologies in
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable noteworthy that A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place seek its coverage.Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not
groundless.
x x x.
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law not state whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for
be provided by law. development planning."[54] This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed
purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
x x x.
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other
than the identification of the individual through his PRN.
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors,
to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be
abridged.
underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual
must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of basic
Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."
services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded-- whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
Code provides that "[e]very person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The
of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts several acts more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another. [35] It also holds a public formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. [55] The data
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of
and liberties of another person,[36] and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.[56]
officer,[38] the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,[39] and trespass to dwelling.
[40]
Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[41] the
We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name,
Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act[42] and the Intellectual Property Code.[43] The Rules of
address and other basic personal information about the individual.[57] Even that hospitable
Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information. [44]
assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said order
does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.[58] Well to note, the computer linkage
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to
need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of
business with basic service and social security providers and other government the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty,
instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within
and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these the system.[59]
interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if
It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information
implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.
which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes.[60] The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned down his movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." information and circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for
"fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to searches and seizures.[61] The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics
biological facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data."[45] The term "biometrics" has and computer technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual
now evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide precise lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID, much less verify the
confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own correctness of the data encoded. [62] They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
physiological and behavioral characteristics. [46] A physiological characteristic is a Rights seeks to prevent.[63]
relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or
facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave
includes voice print, signature and keystroke.[47] Most biometric identification systems use a dossier on an individual and transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic
card or personal identification number (PIN) for initial identification. The biometric threats of the computer revolution.[64] The computer is capable of producing a
 comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for York could keep a centralized computer record of the names and addresses of all persons
varied purposes.[65] It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State
to date. Retrieval of stored data is simple. When information of a privileged character finds Controlled Substances Act of 1972 required physicians to identify patients obtaining
its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other data on the subject. prescription drugs enumerated in the statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but
[66]
Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the patients can be recorded
begins. in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were
patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication
Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would because of their fear that the computerized data may be readily available and open to
dismiss its danger to the right to privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize them as drug addicts. [80] The
countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be true to its role as the ultimate plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e, the
guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in
their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them. independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held
that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters is an aspect of
We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional
expectation of privacy with regard to the National ID and the use of biometrics violation. The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws
technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's expectation of designed to minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs. The patient-identification
privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made upon
an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as recommendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive
reasonable.[67] The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the hearings on the matter. Moreover, the statute was narrowly drawn and contained
expectation.[68] However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down the
practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. [69] The use procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It
of biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a enumerated who were authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of
reasonable expectation of privacy.[70] As technology advances, the level of reasonably the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view of these safeguards, the
expected privacy decreases.[71] The measure of protection granted by the reasonable infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. [72] The power. As we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.
security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file
but also on the advances in hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per
so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy, se against the use of computers to accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit
regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions. data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve the efficiency
which both government and private industry seek. Many information systems in different
The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. countries make use of the computer to facilitate important social objectives, such as better
Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. law enforcement, faster delivery of public services, more efficient management of credit and
308 gives the IACC virtually unfettered discretion to determine the metes and bounds of the insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of financial
ID System. activities.[81] Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by
making accurate and comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and
Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for make key decisions.[82] The benefits of the computer has revolutionized information
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act No. 591 penalizes the technology. It developed the internet,[83] introduced the concept of cyberspace[84] and the
disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may
and fine.[73] Republic Act No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records surf and search all kinds and classes of information from libraries and databases connected
and reports.[74] These laws, however,apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. to the net.
It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other government agencies
forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
is another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress. incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It
Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of merely requires that the law be narrowly focused[85] and a compelling interest justify such
privacy by using the rational relationship test.[75] He stressed that the purposes of A.O. intrusions.[86] Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-
No.308 are: (1) to streamline and speed defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order
up the implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason
duplication of services, and (3) generate population data for development planning. He for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy for the means
are rationally related to the end.[76] "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the
We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[77] we upheld the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control
constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to make an annual system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this
infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in private sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual-- has
public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.[78] technological age-- industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the
area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and
The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
not an administrative order. Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is totalitarian society."[87]
clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it was narrowly drawn to avoid
abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but, IV
it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold that
when the integrity of a fundamental right is at stake, this court will give the The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not society. The threats emanate from various sources-- governments, journalists, employers,
do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of
official duties. Nor is itenough for the authorities to prove that their act is not government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy
irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic
government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of services. Given the record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail
compelling state interests and that the law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile
preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose entire a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-
matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live
the least we can do is to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that
protected by the Constitution. because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget."[89] Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
The case of Whalen v. Roe[79] cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the
United States Supreme Court was presented with the question of whether the State of New right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.
 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on
void for being unconstitutional. any other date, without its previous publication.

SO ORDERED. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed
Republic of the Philippines out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the
SUPREME COURT Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Manila Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided. "
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
LORENZO M. TA;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners, deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could
vs. validly provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents. of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence,
Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of
RESOLUTION many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to
the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
CRUZ, J.: course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government.
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows: apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like
a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party,
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid
as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly
of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following questions:
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
3. What is meant by "publication"? Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
4. Where is the publication to be made? the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and
regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
5. When is the publication to be made? pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
Gazette. 2 concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties.
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was
a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public
did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely
Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, enforce.
under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances
intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5 wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this
rule but by the Local Government Code.
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
after such publication. whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to
withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it
should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to
arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by
the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers
of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come
out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to
give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a
mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required.
This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an
open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available
always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with
sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review
the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their
freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the
legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade
is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette,
to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.
 Chairman Clave himself and Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should be appointed to
the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's appointment to the said position should be
considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36,
Rollo).

In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Doctor
Republic of the Philippines Anzaldo's motion for reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she filed in this Court the instant
SUPREME COURT special civil action of certiorari.
Manila
What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential
SECOND DIVISION Executive Assistant Clave is that it is an implementation of Resolution No. 1178
dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil Service
G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982 Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.

FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner, In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service Commission,
vs. recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed Science Research Supervisor II in place of
JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and as Presidential Doctor Anzaldo.
Executive Assistant; JOSE A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of the Civil Service
Commission, and EULALIA L. VENZON, respondents. When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to
concur in the recommendation of the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that
Antonio P. Amistad for petitioner. he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he was concurring with himself
Artemio E. Valenton for private respondent. (p. 35, Rollo).
Madamba, Deza & Almario Law Offices for respondent .
Demegildo Laborte & Lazano Law Offices for respondent public officials. It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
AQUINO, J.: Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the
Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales Chromite Mining Co. vs.
This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the
heads the Medical Research Department in the Biological Research Center of the National decision of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming
Institute of Science and Technology (NIST). his own decision in a mining case as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered
with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of administrative justice.
Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive
Assistant Jacobo C. Clave dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment dated January Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that
5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor II and directing the appointment to that position of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as
Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon, 48. Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor
Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the
The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin President of the Philippines.
Kintanar, became Director of the Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar
recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor Anzaldo protested Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service
against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to Commission, who should be consulted by the Office of the President, should be a
be valid and meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). Because of that impasse, which the NIST person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide the appeal
Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not filled up. of the protestant in a contested appointment.

At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in
were holding similar positions in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist the Civil Service Commission who was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C.
Research Associate IV with an annual compensation of P12,013 per annum. Both were Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that absurd situation for, as
next-in-rank to the vacant position. held in the Zambales Chromite case, that would not be fair to the appellant.

Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the
Effective January 5, 1978, he appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position with appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon. The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in
compensation at P18,384 per annum. The appointment was approved by the Civil Service accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion in appointing Doctor Anzaldo to
Commission. the contested position.

Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment was Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy,
made after a thorough study and screening of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and University of the Philippines. She obtained from the Centro Escolar University the degree of
Venzon and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff Evaluation Committee that gave Master of Science in Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree of Doctor of Pharmacy.
88 points to Doctor Anzaldo and 61 points to Doctor Venzon (p. 78, Rollo).
Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical
Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed technologist and supervisor (unassembled).
to the Office of the President of the Philippines (pp. 139-40). The appeal was forwarded to
the NIST Anzaldo to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo). The appeal-protest was later sent She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served in that agency for about twenty-
to the Civil Service Commission. eight (28) years now. As already stated, in January, 1978, she was appointed to the
contested Position of Science Research Supervisor II. Her present salary as Science
Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo Research Supervisor II, now known as Senior Science Research Specialist, is P 30,624 per
recommended in Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be annum after she was given a merit increase by Doctor Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p.
appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in conflict with the 1978 259, Rollo).
appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service
Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo). On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of Santo
Tomas in 1957. She started working in the NIST in 1960. She has been working in that
The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the agency for more than twenty-one (21) years. Doctor Anzaldo is senior to her in point of
Philippines, Presidential Decree No. 807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which service.
provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall
consult the Civil Service Commission." Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the duties of
the contested position for more than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that
After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, position, her appointment should be upheld. Doctor Venzon's protest should be dismissed.
1980, Doctor Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated
earlier, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was concurrently Chairman of the Civil WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave dated March 20, 1980 is set aside, and
Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor Anzaldo's petitioner Anzaldo's promotional appointment to the contested position is declared valid. No
appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning costs.
SO ORDERED. This federal habeas corpus application involves the question whether Sheppard was
deprived of a fair trial in his state conviction for the second-degree murder of his wife
because of the trial judge's failure to protect Sheppard sufficiently from the massive,
pervasive and prejudicial publicity that attended his prosecution. [Footnote 1] The United
States District Court held that he was not afforded a fair trial, and granted the writ subject to
U.S. Supreme Court the State's right to put Sheppard to trial again, 231 F.Supp. 37 (D.C.S.D. Ohio 1964). The
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed by a divided vote, 346 F.2d 707 (1965). We
Sheppard v. Maxwell granted certiorari, 382 U.S. 916 (1965). We have concluded that Sheppard did not receive
No. 490 a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and,
Argued February 28, 1966 therefore, reverse the judgment.
Decided June 6, 1966
384 U.S. 333 Marilyn Sheppard, petitioner's pregnant wife, was bludgeoned to death in the upstairs
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS bedroom of their lakeshore
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Syllabus home in Bay Village, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland. On the day of the tragedy, July 4, 1954,
Sheppard pieced together for several local officials the following story: he and his wife had
Petitioner's wife was bludgeoned to death July 4, 1954. From the outset officials focused entertained neighborhood friends, the Aherns, on the previous evening at their home. After
suspicion on petitioner, who was arrested on a murder charge July 30 and indicted August dinner, they watched television in the living room. Sheppard became drowsy and dozed off
17. His trial began October 18 and terminated with his conviction December 21, 1954. to sleep on a couch. Later, Marilyn partially awoke him saying that she was going to bed.
During the entire pretrial period, virulent and incriminating publicity about petitioner and the The next thing he remembered, was hearing his wife cry out in the early morning hours. He
murder made the case notorious, and the news media frequently aired charges and hurried upstairs and, in the dim light from the hall, saw a "form" standing next to his wife's
countercharges besides those for which petitioner was tried. Three months before trial, he bed. A s he struggled with the "form," he was struck on the back of the neck and rendered
was examined for more than five hours without counsel in a televised three-day inquest unconscious. On regaining his senses, he found himself on the floor next to his wife's bed.
conducted before an audience of several hundred spectators in a gymnasium. Over three He rose, looked at her, took her pulse and "felt that she was gone." He then went to his
weeks before trial, the newspapers published the names and addresses of prospective son's room and found him unmolested. Hearing a noise, he hurried downstairs. He saw a
jurors causing them to receive letters and telephone calls about the case. The trial began "form" running out the door and pursued it to the lake shore. He grappled with it on the
two weeks before a hotly contested election at which the chief prosecutor and the trial judge beach, and again lost consciousness. Upon his recovery, he was lying face down with the
were candidates for judgeships. Newsmen were allowed to take over almost the entire lower portion of his body in the water. He returned to his home, checked the pulse on his
small courtroom, hounding petitioner and most of the participants. Twenty reporters were wife's neck, and "determined or thought that she was gone." [Footnote 2] He then went
assigned seats by the court within the bar and in close proximity to the jury and counsel, downstairs and called a neighbor, Mayor Houk of Bay Village. The Mayor and his wife came
precluding privacy between petitioner and his counsel. The movement of the reporters in over at once, found Sheppard slumped in an easy chair downstairs and asked, "What
the courtroom caused frequent confusion and disrupted the trial, and, in the corridors and happened?" Sheppard replied: "I don't know, but somebody ought to try to do something for
elsewhere in and around the courthouse, they were allowed free rein by the trial judge. A Marilyn." Mrs. Houk immediately went up to the bedroom. The Mayor told Sheppard, "Get
broadcasting station was assigned space next to the jury room. Before the jurors began hold of yourself. Can you tell me what happened?"
deliberations they were not sequestered, and had access to all news media, though the
court made "suggestions" and "requests" that the jurors not expose themselves to comment Sheppard then related the above-outlined events. After Mrs. Houk discovered the body, the
about the case. Though they were sequestered during the five days and four nights of their Mayor called the local police, Dr. Richard Sheppard, petitioner's brother, and the Aherns.
deliberations, the jurors were allowed to make inadequately supervised telephone calls The local police were the first to arrive. They, in turn, notified the Coroner and Cleveland
during that period. Pervasive publicity was given to the case throughout the trial, much of it police. Richard Sheppard then arrived, determined that Marilyn was dead, examined his
involving incriminating matter not introduced at the trial, and the jurors were thrust into the brother's injuries, and removed him to the nearby clinic operated by the Sheppard family.
role of celebrities. At least some of the publicity deluge reached the jurors. At the very [Footnote 3] When the Coroner, the Cleveland police and other officials arrived, the house
inception of the proceedings and later, the trial judge announced that neither he nor anyone and surrounding area were thoroughly searched, the rooms of the house were
else could restrict the prejudicial news accounts. Despite his awareness of the excessive photographed, and many persons, including the Houks and the Aherns, were interrogated.
pretrial publicity, the trial judge failed to take effective measures against the massive The Sheppard home and premises were taken into "protective custody," and remained so
publicity, which continued throughout the trial, or to take adequate steps to control the until after the trial. [Footnote 4]
conduct of the trial. The petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition contending that he did not
receive a fair trial. The District Court granted the writ. The Court of Appeals reversed. From the outset, officials focused suspicion on Sheppard. After a search of the house and
premises on the morning of the tragedy, Dr. Gerber, the Coroner, is reported -- and it is
Held: undenied -- to have tod his men, "Well, it is evident the doctor did this, so let's go get the
confession out of him." He proceeded to interrogate and examine Sheppard while the latter
1. The massive, pervasive, and prejudicial publicity attending petitioner's prosecution was under sedation in his hospital room. On the same occasion, the Coroner was given the
prevented him from receiving a fair trial consistent with the Due Process Clause of the clothes Sheppard wore at the time of the tragedy, together with the personal items in them.
Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 384 U. S. 349-363. Later that, afternoon Chief Eaton and two Cleveland police officers interrogated Sheppard
at some length, confronting him with evidence, and demanding explanations. Asked by
(a) Though freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the fair Officer Shotke to take a lie detector test, Sheppard said he would if it were reliable. Shotke
and orderly administration of justice, it must not be allowed to divert a trial from its purpose replied that it was "infallible," and "you might as well tell us all about it now." At the end of
of adjudicating controversies according to legal procedures based on evidence received the interrogation, Shotke told Sheppard: "I think you killed your wife." Still later in the same
only in open court. Pp. 384 U. S. 350-351. afternoon, a physician sent by the Coroner was permitted to make a detailed examination of
Sheppard. Until the Coroner's inquest on July 22, at which time he was subpoenaed,
(b) Identifiable prejudice to the accused need not be shown if, as in Estes v. Texas, 381 U. Sheppard made himself available for frequent and extended questioning without the
S. 532, and even more so in this case, the totality of the circumstances raises the presence of an attorney.
probability of prejudice. Pp. 384 U. S. 352-355.
On July 7, the day of Marilyn Sheppard's funeral, a newspaper story appeared in which
(c) The trial court failed to invoke procedures which would have guaranteed petitioner a fair Assistant County Attorney Mahon -- later the chief prosecutor of Sheppard -- sharply
trial, such as adopting stricter rules for use of the courtroom by newsmen as petitioner's criticized the refusal of the Sheppard family to permit his immediate questioning. From there
counsel requested, limiting their number, and more closely supervising their courtroom on, headline stories repeatedly stressed Sheppard's lack of cooperation with the police and
conduct. The court should also have insulated the witnesses; controlled the release of other officials. Under the headline "Testify Now In Death, Bay Doctor Is Ordered," one story
leads, information, and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and counsel; described a visit by Coroner Gerber and four police officers to the hospital on July 8. When
proscribed extrajudicial statements by any lawyer, witness, party, or court official divulging Sheppard insisted that his lawyer be present, the Coroner wrote out a subpoena and
prejudicial matters, and requested the appropriate city and county officials to regulate served it on him. Sheppard then agreed to submit to questioning without counsel, and the
release of information by their employees. Pp. 384 U. S. 358-362. subpoena was torn up. The officers questioned him for several hours. On July 9, Sheppard,
at the request of the Coroner, reenacted the tragedy at his home before the Coroner, police
2. The case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to release petitioner from officers, and a group of newsmen, who apparently were invited by the Coroner. The home
custody unless he is tried again within a reasonable time. P. 384 U. S. 363. was locked, so that Sheppard was obliged to wait outside until the Coroner arrived.
Sheppard's performance was reported in detail by the news media, along with photographs.
The newspapers also played up Sheppard's refusal to take a lie detector test and "the
346 F.2d 707, reversed and remanded.
protective ring" thrown up by his family. Front-page newspaper headlines announced on the
same day that "Doctor Balks At Lie Test; Retells Story." A column opposite that story
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
contained an "exclusive" interview with Sheppard headlined: "Loved My Wife, She Loved I
Me,' Sheppard Tells
Will Do Everything In My Power to Help Solve This Terrible
News Reporter." The next day, another headline story disclosed that Sheppard had "again
late yesterday refused to take a lie detector test," and quoted an Assistant County Attorney Murder.' -- Dr. Sam Sheppard." Headlines announced, inter alia, that: "Doctor Evidence is
as saying that, "at the end of a nine-hour questioning of Dr. Sheppard, I felt he was now Ready for Jury," "Corrigan Tactics Stall Quizzing," "Sheppard Gay Set' Is Revealed By
ruling [a test] out completely." But subsequent newspaper articles reported that the Coroner Houk," "Blood Is Found In Garage," "New Murder Evidence Is Found, Police Claim," "Dr.
was still pushing Sheppard for a lie detector test. More stories appeared when Sheppard Sam Faces Quiz At Jail On Marilyn's Fear Of Him." On August 18, an article appeared
would not allow authorities to inject him with "truth serum." [Footnote 5] under the headline "Dr. Sam Writes His Own Story." And reproduced across the entire front
page was a portion of the typed statement signed by Sheppard:
On the 20th, the "editorial artillery" opened fire with a front-page charge that somebody is
"getting away with murder." The editorial attributed the ineptness of the investigation to "I am not guilty of the murder of my wife, Marilyn. How could I, who have been trained to
"friendships, relationships, hired lawyers, a husband who ought to have been subjected help people and devoted my life to saving life, commit such a terrible and revolting crime?"
instantly to the same third-degree to which any other person under similar circumstances is
subjected. . . ." We do not detail the coverage further. There are five volumes filled with similar clippings
from each of the three Cleveland newspapers covering the period from the murder until
The following day, July 21, another page-one editorial was headed: "Why No Inquest? Do It Sheppard's conviction in December, 1954. The record includes no excerpts from newscasts
Now, Dr. Gerber." The Coroner called an inquest the same day, and subpoenaed Sheppard. on radio and television, but, since space was reserved in the courtroom for these media, we
It was staged the next day in a school gymnasium; the Coroner presided with the County assume that their coverage was equally large.
Prosecutor as his advisor and two detectives as bailiffs. In the front of the room was a long
table occupied by reporters, television and radio personnel, and broadcasting equipment. II
The hearing was broadcast with live microphones placed at the Coroner's seat and the
witness stand. A swarm of reporters and photographers attended. Sheppard was brought With this background, the case came on for trial two weeks before the November general
into the room by police who searched him in full view of several hundred spectators. election at which the chief prosecutor was a candidate for common pleas judge and the trial
Sheppard's counsel were present during the three-day inquest, but were not permitted to judge, Judge Blythin, was a candidate to succeed himself. Twenty-five days before the case
participate. was set, 75 veniremen were called as prospective jurors. All three Cleveland newspapers
published the names and addresses of the veniremen. As a consequence, anonymous
When Sheppard's chief counsel attempted to place some documents in the record, he was letters and telephone calls, as well as calls from friends, regarding the impending
forcibly ejected from the room by the Coroner, who received cheers, hugs, and kisses from prosecution were received by all of the prospective jurors. The selection of the jury began
ladies in the audience. Sheppard was questioned for five and one-half hours about his on October 18, 1954.
actions on the night of the murder, his married life, and a love affair with Susan Hayes.
[Footnote 6] At the end of the hearing, the Coroner announced that he "could" order The courtroom in which the trial was held measured 26 by 48 feet. A long temporary table
Sheppard held for the grand jury, but did not do so. was set up inside the bar, in back of the single counsel table. It ran the width of the
courtroom, parallel to the bar railing, with one end less than three feet from the jury box.
Throughout this period, the newspapers emphasized evidence that tended to incriminate Approximately 20 representatives of newspapers and wire services were assigned seats at
Sheppard and pointed out discrepancies in his statements to authorities. At the same time, this table by the court. Behind the bar railing there were four rows of benches. These seats
Sheppard made many public statements to the press, and wrote feature articles asserting were likewise assigned by the court for the entire trial. The first row was occupied by
his innocence. [Footnote 7] During the inquest on July 26, a headline in large type stated: representatives of television and radio stations, and the second and third rows by reporters
"Kerr [Captain of the Cleveland Police] Urges Sheppard's Arrest." In the story, Detective from out-of-town newspapers and magazines. One side of the last row, which
McArthur "disclosed that scientific tests at the Sheppard home have definitely established accommodated 14 people, was assigned to Sheppard's family, and the other to Marilyn's.
that the killer washed off a trail of blood from the murder bedroom to the downstairs The public was permitted to fill vacancies in this row on special passes only.
section," a circumstance casting doubt on Sheppard's accounts of the murder. No such Representatives of the news media also used all the rooms on the courtroom floor,
evidence was produced at trial. The newspapers also delved into Sheppard's personal life. including the room where cases were ordinarily called and assigned for trial. Private
Articles stressed his extramarital love affairs as a motive for the crime. The newspapers telephone lines and telegraphic equipment were installed in these rooms so that reports
portrayed Sheppard as a Lothario, fully explored his relationship with Susan Hayes, and from the trial could be speeded to the papers. Station WSRS was permitted to set up
named a number of other women who were allegedly involved with him. The testimony at broadcasting facilities on the third floor of the courthouse next door to the jury room, where
trial never showed that Sheppard had any illicit relationships besides the one with Susan the jury rested during recesses in the trial and deliberated. Newscasts were made from this
Hayes. room throughout the trial, and while the jury reached its verdict.

On July 28, an editorial entitled "Why Don't Police Quiz Top Suspect" demanded that On the sidewalk and steps in front of the courthouse, television and newsreel cameras were
Sheppard be taken to police headquarters. It described him in the following language: occasionally used to take motion pictures of the participants in the trial, including the jury
and the judge. Indeed, one television broadcast carried a staged interview of the judge as
"Now proved under oath to be a liar, still free to go about his business, shielded by his he entered the courthouse. In the corridors outside the courtroom, there was a host of
family, protected by a smart lawyer who has made monkeys of the police and authorities, photographers and television personnel with flash cameras, portable lights and motion
carrying a gun part of the time, left free to do whatever he pleases. . . ." picture cameras. This group photographed the prospective jurors during selection of the
jury. After the trial opened, the witnesses, counsel, and jurors were photographed and
A front-page editorial on July 30 asked: "Why Isn't Sam Sheppard in Jail?" It was later titled televised whenever they entered or left the courtroom. Sheppard was brought to the
"Quit Stalling -- Bring Him In." After calling Sheppard "the most unusual murder suspect courtroom about 10 minutes before each session began; he was surrounded by reporters
ever seen around these parts," the article said that, "[e]xcept for some superficial and extensively photographed for the newspapers and television. A rule of court prohibited
questioning during Coroner Sam Gerber's inquest, he has been scot-free of any official picture-taking in the courtroom during the actual sessions of the court, but no restraints
grilling. . . ." It asserted that he was "surrounded by an iron curtain of protection [and] were put on photographers during recesses, which were taken once each morning and
concealment." afternoon, with a longer period for lunch.

That night, at 10 o'clock, Sheppard was arrested at his father's home on a charge of All of these arrangements with the news media and their massive coverage of the trial
murder. He was taken to the Bay Village City Hall, where hundreds of people, newscasters, continued during the entire nine weeks of the trial. The courtroom remained crowded to
photographers and reporters were awaiting his arrival. He was immediately arraigned -- capacity with representatives of news media. Their movement in and out of the courtroom
having been denied a temporary delay to secure the presence of counsel -- and bound over often caused so much confusion that, despite the loudspeaker system installed in the
to the grand jury. courtroom, it was difficult for the witnesses and counsel to be heard. Furthermore, the
reporters clustered within the bar of the small courtroom made confidential talk among
The publicity then grew in intensity until his indictment on August 17. Typical of the Sheppard and his counsel almost impossible during the proceedings. They frequently had
coverage during this period is a front-page interview entitled: "DR. SAM: to leave the courtroom to obtain privacy. And many times when counsel wished to raise a
point with the judge out of the hearing of the jury, it was necessary to move to the judge's
I chambers. Even then, news media representatives so packed the judge's anteroom that
counsel could hardly return from the chambers to the courtroom. The reporters vied with
Wish There Was Something I Could Get Off My Chest -- but There Isn't.'" Unfavorable each other to find out what counsel and the judge had discussed, and often these matters
publicity included items such as a cartoon of the body of a sphinx with Sheppard's head later appeared in newspapers accessible to the jury.
and the legend below: "
The daily record of the proceedings was made available to the newspapers, and the perjurer and compared the episode to Alger Hiss' confrontation with Whittaker Chambers.
testimony of each witness was printed verbatim in the local editions, along with objections Though defense counsel asked the judge to question the jury to ascertain how many heard
of counsel, and rulings by the judge. Pictures of Sheppard, the judge, counsel, pertinent the broadcast, the court refused to do so. The judge also overruled the motion for
witnesses, and the jury often accompanied the daily newspaper and television accounts. At continuance based on the same ground, saying:
times, the newspapers published photographs of exhibits introduced at the trial, and the
rooms of Sheppard's house were featured, along with relevant testimony. "Well, I don't know, we can't stop people, in any event, listening to it. It is a matter of free
speech, and the court can't control everybody. . . . We are not going to harass the jury every
The jurors themselves were constantly exposed to the news media. Every juror except one morning. . . . I t is getting to the point where if we do it every morning, we are suspecting the
testified at voir dire to reading about the case in the Cleveland papers or to having heard jury. I have confidence in this jury. . . . "
broadcasts about it. Seven of the 12 jurors who rendered the verdict had one or more
Cleveland papers delivered in their home; the remaining jurors were not interrogated on the 6. On November 24, a story appeared under an eight-column headline: "Sam Called
point. Nor were there questions as to radios or television sets in the jurors' homes, but we A Jekyll-Hyde' By Marilyn, Cousin To Testify." It related that Marilyn had recently told friends
must assume that most of them owned such conveniences. As the selection of the jury that Sheppard was a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" character. No such testimony was ever
progressed, individual pictures of prospective members appeared daily. During the trial, produced at the trial. The story went on to announce:
pictures of the jury appeared over 40 times in the Cleveland papers alone. The court
permitted photographers to take pictures of the jury in the box, and individual pictures of the "The prosecution has a 'bombshell witness' on tap who will testify to Dr. Sam's display of
members in the jury room. One newspaper ran pictures of the jurors at the Sheppard home fiery temper -- countering the defense claim that the defendant is a gentle physician with an
when they went there to view the scene of the murder. Another paper featured the home life even disposition."
of an alternate juror. The day before the verdict was rendered -- while the jurors were at
lunch and sequestered by two bailiffs -- the jury was separated into two groups to pose for Defense counsel made motions for change of venue, continuance and mistrial, but they
photographs which appeared in the newspapers. were denied. No action was taken by the court.

III 7. When the trial was in its seventh week, Walter Winchell broadcast over WXEL television
and WJW radio that Carole Beasley, who was under arrest in New York City for robbery,
We now reach the conduct of the trial. While the intense publicity continued unabated, it is had stated that, as Sheppard's mistress, she had borne him a child. The defense asked that
sufficient to relate only the more flagrant episodes: the jury be queried on the broadcast. Two jurors admitted in open court that they had heard
it. The judge asked each: "Would that have any effect upon your judgment?" Both replied,
1. On October 9, 1954, nine days before the case went to trial, an editorial in one of the "No." This was accepted by the judge as sufficient; he merely asked the jury to "pay no
newspapers criticized defense counsel's random poll of people on the streets as to their attention whatever to that type of scavenging. . . . Let's confine ourselves to this courtroom,
opinion of Sheppard's guilt or innocence in an effort to use the resulting statistics to show if you please." In answer to the motion for mistrial, the judge said:
the necessity for change of venue. The article said the survey "smacks of mass jury
tampering," called on defense counsel to drop it, and stated that the bar association should "Well, even, so, Mr. Corrigan, how are you ever going to prevent those things, in any event?
do something about it. It characterized the poll as "nonjudicial, nonlegal, and nonsense." I don't justify them at all. I think it is outrageous, but in a sense, it is outrageous even if
The article was called to the attention of the court, but no action was taken. there were no trial here. The trial has nothing to do with it in the Court's mind, as far as its
outrage is concerned, but -- "
2. On the second day of voir dire examination, a debate was staged and broadcast live over
WHK radio. The participants, newspaper reporters, accused Sheppard's counsel of "Mr. CORRIGAN: I don't know what effect it had on the mind of any of these jurors, and I
throwing roadblocks in the way of the prosecution and asserted that Sheppard conceded can't find out unless inquiry is made."
his guilt by hiring a prominent criminal lawyer. Sheppard's counsel objected to this
broadcast and requested a continuance, but the judge denied the motion. When counsel "The COURT: How would you ever, in any jury, avoid that kind of a thing?"
asked the court to give some protection from such events, the judge replied that "WHK
doesn't have much coverage," and that 8. On December 9, while Sheppard was on the witness stand, he testified that he had been
mistreated by Cleveland detectives after his arrest. Although he was not at the trial, Captain
"[a]fter all, we are not trying this case by radio or in newspapers or any other means. We Kerr of the Homicide Bureau issued a press statement denying Sheppard's allegations
confine ourselves seriously to it in this courtroom, and do the very best we can." which appeared under the headline: "Bare-faced Liar,' Kerr Says of Sam." Captain Kerr
never appeared as a witness at the trial.
3. While the jury was being selected, a two-inch headline asked: "But Who Will Speak for
Marilyn?" The front-page story spoke of the "perfect face" of the accused. "Study that face 9. After the case was submitted to the jury, it was sequestered for its deliberations, which
as long as you want. Never will you get from it a hint of what might be the answer. . . ." The took five days and four nights. After the verdict, defense counsel ascertained that the jurors
two brothers of the accused were described as had been allowed to make telephone calls to their homes every day while they were
sequestered at the hotel. Although the telephones had been removed from the jurors'
"Prosperous, poised. His two sisters-in law. Smart, chic, well groomed. His elderly father. rooms, the jurors were permitted to use the phones in the bailiffs' rooms. The calls were
Courtly, reserved. A perfect type for the patriarch of a staunch clan." placed by the jurors themselves; no record was kept of the jurors who made calls, the
telephone numbers or the parties called. The bailiffs sat in the room where they could hear
The author then noted Marilyn Sheppard was "still off-stage," and that she was an only child only the jurors' end of the conversation. The court had not instructed the bailiffs to prevent
whose mother died when she was very young and whose father had no interest in the case. such calls. By a subsequent motion, defense counsel urged that this ground alone
But the author -- through quotes from Detective Chief James McArthur -- assured readers warranted a new trial, but the motion was overruled, and no evidence was taken on the
that the prosecution's exhibits would speak for Marilyn. "Her story," McArthur stated, "will question.
come into this courtroom through our witnesses." The article ends:
IV
"Then you realize how what and who is missing from the perfect setting will be supplied."
The principle that justice cannot survive behind walls of silence has long been reflected in
" How in the Big Case justice will be done." the "Anglo-American distrust for secret trials." In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257,

" Justice to Sam Sheppard." 333 U. S. 268 (1948). A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its function in this regard is
" And to Marilyn Sheppard." documented by an impressive record of service over several centuries. The press does not
simply publish information about trials, but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
4. As has been mentioned, the jury viewed the scene of the murder on the first day of the subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
trial. Hundreds of reporters, cameramen and onlookers were there, and one representative criticism. This Court has, therefore, been unwilling to place any direct limitations on the
of the news media was permitted to accompany the jury while it inspected the Sheppard freedom traditionally exercised by the news media for "[w]hat transpires in the courtroom is
home. The time of the jury's visit was revealed so far in advance that one of the public property." Craig v. Harney, 331 U. S. 367, 331 U. S. 374 (1947). The
newspapers was able to rent a helicopter and fly over the house taking pictures of the jurors
on their tour. "unqualified prohibitions laid down by the framers were intended to give to liberty of the
press . . . the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society."
5. On November 19, a Cleveland police officer gave testimony that tended to contradict
details in the written statement Sheppard made to the Cleveland police. Two days later, in a Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252, 314 U. S. 265 (1941). And where there was "no threat
broadcast heard over Station WHK in Cleveland, Robert Considine likened Sheppard to a or menace to the integrity of the trial," Craig v. Harney, supra, at 331 U. S. 377, we have
consistently required that the press have a free hand, even though we sometimes deplored where the publicity originated; nor was his jury sequestered. The Estes jury saw none of the
its sensationalism. television broadcasts from the courtroom. On the contrary, the Sheppard jurors were
subjected to newspaper, radio, and television coverage of the trial while not taking part in
But the Court has also pointed out that "[l]egal trials are not like elections, to be won the proceedings. They were allowed to go their separate ways outside of the courtroom,
through the use of the meeting-hall, the radio, and the newspaper." Bridges v. California, without adequate directions not to read or listen to anything concerning the case. The
supra, at 314 U. S. 271. And the Court has insisted that no one be punished for a crime judge's "admonitions" at the beginning of the trial are representative:
without "a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal free of prejudice, passion,
excitement, and tyrannical power." Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 309 U. S. 236-237 "I would suggest to you and caution you that you do not read any newspapers during the
(1940). progress of this trial, that you do not listen to radio comments, nor watch or listen to
television comments, insofar as this case is concerned. You will feel very much better as
"Freedom of discussion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential the trial proceeds. . . . I am sure that we shall all feel very much better if we do not indulge
requirement of the fair and orderly administration of justice." in any newspaper reading or listening to any comments whatever about the matter while the
case is in progress. After it is all over, you can read it all to your heart's content. . . ."
Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U. S. 331, 328 U. S. 347 (1946). But it must not be allowed to
divert the trial from the "very purpose of a court system . . . to adjudicate controversies, At intervals during the trial, the judge simply repeated his "suggestions" and "requests" that
both criminal and civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the courtroom according to legal the jurors not expose themselves to comment upon the case. Moreover, the jurors were
procedures." thrust into the role of celebrities by the judge's failure to insulate them from reporters and
photographers. See Estes v. Texas, supra, at 381 U. S. 545-546. The numerous pictures of
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 379 U. S. 583 (1965) (BLACK, J., dissenting). Among the jurors, with their addresses, which appeared in the newspapers before and during the
these "legal procedures" is the requirement that the jury's verdict be based on evidence trial itself exposed them to expressions of opinion from both cranks and friends. The fact
received in open court, not from outside sources. Thus, in Marshall v. United States, 360 U. that anonymous letters had been received by prospective jurors should have made the
S. 310 (1959), we set aside a federal conviction where the jurors were exposed, "through judge aware that this publicity seriously threatened the jurors' privacy.
news accounts," to information that was not admitted at trial. We held that the prejudice
from such material "may indeed be greater" than when it is part of the prosecution's The press coverage of the Estes trial was not nearly as massive and pervasive as the
evidence, "for it is then not tempered by protective procedures." At360 U. S. 313. At the attention given by the Cleveland newspapers and broadcasting stations to Sheppard's
same time, we did not consider dispositive the statement of each juror prosecution. [Footnote 8] Sheppard stood indicted for the murder of his wife; the State was
demanding the death penalty. For months, the virulent publicity about Sheppard and the
"that he would not be influenced by the news articles, that he could decide the case only on murder had made the case notorious. Charges and countercharges were aired in the news
the evidence of record, and that he felt no prejudice against petitioner as a result of the media besides those for which Sheppard was called to trial. In addition, only three months
articles." before trial, Sheppard was examined for more than five hours without counsel during a
three-day inquest which ended in a public brawl. The inquest was televised live from a high
At 360 U. S. 312. Likewise, in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), even though each juror school gymnasium seating hundreds of people. Furthermore, the trial began two weeks
indicated that he could render an impartial verdict despite exposure to prejudicial before a hotly contested election at which both Chief Prosecutor Mahon and Judge Blythin
newspaper articles, we set aside the conviction, holding: were candidates for judgeships. [Footnote 9]

"With his life at stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere While we cannot say that Sheppard was denied due process by the judge's refusal to take
undisturbed by so huge a wave of public passion. . . ." precautions against the influence of pretrial publicity alone, the court's later rulings must be
considered against the setting in which the trial was held. In light of this background, we
The undeviating rule of this Court was expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes over half a century believe that the arrangements made by the judge with the news media caused Sheppard to
ago in Patterson v. Colorado,205 U. S. 454, 205 U. S. 462 (1907): be deprived of that "judicial serenity and calm to which [he] was entitled." Estes v. Texas,
supra, at 381 U. S. 536. The fact is that bedlam reigned at the courthouse during the trial,
and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of the participants
"The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced
in the trial, especially Sheppard. At a temporary table within a few feet of the jury box and
only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of
counsel table sat some 20 reporters, staring at Sheppard and taking notes. The erection of
private talk or public print."
a press table for reporters inside the bar is unprecedented. The bar of the court is reserved
for counsel, providing them a safe place in which to keep papers and exhibits and to confer
Moreover, "the burden of showing essential unfairness . . . as a demonstrable
privately with client and co-counsel. It is designed to protect the witness and the jury from
reality," Adams v. United
any distractions, intrusions or influences, and to permit bench discussions of the judge's
rulings away from the hearing of the public and the jury. Having assigned almost all of the
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 317 U. S. 281 (1942), need not be undertaken when available seats in the courtroom to the news media, the judge lost his ability to supervise
television has exposed the community "repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of [the that environment. The movement of the reporters in and out of the courtroom caused
accused] personally confessing in detail to the crimes with which he was later to be frequent confusion and disruption of the trial. And the record reveals constant commotion
charged." Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723, 373 U. S. 726 (1963). In Turner v. within the bar. Moreover, the judge gave the throng of newsmen gathered in the corridors of
Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466 (1965), two key witnesses were deputy sheriffs who doubled as the courthouse absolute free rein. Participants in the trial, including the jury, were forced to
jury shepherds during the trial. The deputies swore that they had not talked to the jurors run a gauntlet of reporters and photographers each time they entered or left the courtroom.
about the case, but the Court nonetheless held that, The total lack of consideration for the privacy of the jury was demonstrated by the
assignment to a broadcasting station of space next to the jury room on the floor above the
"even if it could be assumed that the deputies never did discuss the case directly with any courtroom, as well as the fact that jurors were allowed to make telephone calls during their
members of the jury, it would be blinking reality not to recognize the extreme prejudice five-day deliberation.
inherent in this continual association. . . ."
VI
Only last Term, in Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 (1965), we set aside a conviction despite
the absence of any showing of prejudice. We said there: There can be no question about the nature of the publicity which surrounded Sheppard's
trial. We agree, as did the Court of Appeals, with the findings in Judge Bell's opinion for the
"It is true that, in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations, we require a Ohio Supreme Court:
showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times, a procedure
employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed "Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in this case in such a
inherently lacking in due process." manner as to intrigue and captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in
recent annals. Throughout the pre-indictment investigation, the subsequent legal
At 381 U. S. 542-543. And we cited with approval the language of MR. JUSTICE BLACK for skirmishes, and the nine-week trial, circulation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable
the Court in In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 349 U. S. 136 (1955), that "our system of law interest of the American public in the bizarre. . . . In this atmosphere of a 'Roman holiday'
has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his life."

V 165 Ohio St. at 294, 135 N.E.2d at 342. Indeed, every court that has considered this case,
save the court that tried it, has deplored the manner in which the news media inflamed and
It is clear that the totality of circumstances in this case also warrants such an approach. prejudiced the public. [Footnote 10]
Unlike Estes, Sheppard was not granted a change of venue to a locale away from
Much of the material printed or broadcast during the trial was never heard from the witness
Page 384 U. S. 353 stand, such as the charges that Sheppard had purposely impeded the murder investigation,
and must be guilty, since he had hired a prominent criminal lawyer; that Sheppard was a Defense counsel immediately brought to the court's attention the tremendous amount of
perjurer; that he had sexual relations with numerous women; that his slain wife had publicity in the Cleveland press that "misrepresented entirely the testimony" in the case.
characterized him as a "Jekyll-Hyde"; that he was "a bare-faced liar" because of his Under such circumstances, the judge should have at least warned the newspapers to check
testimony as to police treatment; and, finally, that a woman convict claimed Sheppard to be the accuracy of their accounts. And it is obvious that the judge should have further sought
the father of her illegitimate child. As the trial progressed, the newspapers summarized and to alleviate this problem by imposing control over the statements made to the news media
interpreted the evidence, devoting particular attention to the material that incriminated by counsel, witnesses, and especially the Coroner and police officers. The prosecution
Sheppard, and often drew unwarranted inferences from testimony. At one point, a front- repeatedly made evidence available to the news media which was never offered in the trial.
page picture of Mrs. Sheppard's blood-stained pillow was published after being "doctored" Much of the "evidence" disseminated in this fashion was clearly inadmissible. The exclusion
to show more clearly an alleged imprint of a surgical instrument. of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless when news media make it available to
the public. For example, the publicity about Sheppard's refusal to take a lie detector test
Nor is there doubt that this deluge of publicity reached at least some of the jury. On the only came directly from police officers and the Coroner. [Footnote 14] The story that Sheppard
occasion that the jury was queried, two jurors admitted in open court to hearing the highly had been called a "Jekyll-Hyde" personality by his wife was attributed to a prosecution
inflammatory charge that a prison inmate claimed Sheppard as the father of her illegitimate witness. No such testimony was given. The further report that there was "a bombshell
child. Despite the extent and nature of the publicity to which the jury was exposed during witness' on tap" who would testify as to Sheppard's "fiery temper" could only have
trial, the judge refused defense counsel's other requests that the jurors be asked whether emanated from the prosecution. Moreover, the newspapers described in detail clues that
they had read or heard specific prejudicial comment about the case, including the incidents had been found by the police, but not put into the record. [Footnote 15]
we have previously summarized. In these circumstances, we can assume that some of this
material reached members of the jury. See Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 The fact that many of the prejudicial news items can be traced to the prosecution as well as
N.E.2d 923 (1963). the defense aggravates the judge's failure to take any action. See Stroble v. California, 343
U. S. 181, 343 U. S. 201 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Effective control of these
VII sources -- concededly within the court's power -- might well have prevented the divulgence
of inaccurate information, rumors, and accusations that made up much of the inflammatory
The court's fundamental error is compounded by the holding that it lacked power to control publicity, at least after Sheppard's indictment.
the publicity about the trial. From the very inception of the proceedings, the judge
announced that neither he nor anyone else could restrict prejudicial news accounts. And he More specifically, the trial court might well have proscribed extrajudicial statements by any
reiterated this view on numerous occasions. Since he viewed the news media as his target, lawyer, party, witness, or court official which divulged prejudicial matters, such as the
the judge never considered other means that are often utilized to reduce the appearance of refusal of Sheppard to submit to interrogation or take any lie detector tests; any statement
prejudicial material and to protect the jury from outside influence. We conclude that these made by Sheppard to officials; the identity of prospective witnesses or their probable
procedures would have been sufficient to guarantee Sheppard a fair trial, and so do not testimony; any belief in guilt or innocence; or like statements concerning the merits of the
consider what sanctions might be available against a recalcitrant press, nor the charges of case. See State v. Van Duyne, 43 N.J. 369, 389, 204 A.2d 841, 852 (1964), in which the
bias now made against the state trial judge. [Footnote 11] court interpreted Canon 20 of the American Bar Association's Canons of Professional
Ethics to prohibit such statements.
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided, since the courtroom and
courthouse premises are subject to the control of the court. As we stressed in Estes, the Being advised of the great public interest in the case, the mass coverage of the press, and
presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the the potential prejudicial impact of publicity, the court could also have requested the
accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged. [Footnote 12] Bearing in mind the appropriate city and county officials to promulgate a regulation with respect to
massive pretrial publicity, the judge should have adopted stricter rules governing the use of dissemination of information about the case by their employees. [Footnote 16] In addition,
the courtroom by newsmen, as Sheppard's counsel requested. The number of reporters in reporters who wrote or broadcast prejudicial stories could have been warned as to the
the courtroom itself could have been limited at the first sign that their presence would impropriety of publishing material not introduced in the proceedings. The judge was put on
disrupt the trial. They certainly should not have been placed inside the bar. Furthermore, notice of such events by defense counsel's complaint about the WHK broadcast on the
the judge should have more closely regulated the conduct of newsmen in the courtroom. second day of trial. See p. 384 U. S. 346 supra. In this manner, Sheppard's right to a trial
For instance, the judge belatedly asked them not to handle and photograph trial exhibits free from outside interference would have been given added protection without
lying on the counsel table during recesses. corresponding curtailment of the news media. Had the judge, the other officers of the court,
and the police placed the interest of justice first, the news media would have soon learned
Secondly, the court should have insulated the witnesses. All of the newspapers and radio to be content with the task of reporting the case as it unfolded in the courtroom -- not pieced
stations apparently interviewed prospective witnesses at will, and in many instances together from extrajudicial statements.
disclosed their testimony. A typical example was the publication of numerous statements by
Susan Hayes, before her appearance in court, regarding her love affair with Sheppard. From the cases coming here, we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment on pending
Although the witnesses were barred from the courtroom during the trial, the full verbatim trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that the accused receive a
testimony was available to them in the press. This completely nullified the judge's trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern
imposition of the rule. See Estes v. Texas, supra, at 381 U. S. 547. communications and the difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the
jurors, the trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
Thirdly, the court should have made some effort to control the release of leads, information, weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make an
and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the counsel for both sides. Much independent evaluation of the circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the
of the information thus disclosed was inaccurate, leading to groundless rumors and press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a reasonable
confusion. [Footnote 13] That the judge was aware of his responsibility in this respect may likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge should continue
be seen from his warning to Steve Sheppard, the accused's brother, who had apparently the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county not so permeated with
made public statements in an attempt to discredit testimony for the prosecution. The judge publicity. In addition, sequestration of the jury was something the judge should have
made this statement in the presence of the jury: raised sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of
the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember that reversals are but
"Now, the Court wants to say a word. That he was told -- he has not read anything about it palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
at all -- but he was informed that Dr. Steve Sheppard, who inception. The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense,
Page 384 U. S. 360 the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of
the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration between counsel and
the press as to information affecting the fairness of a criminal trial is not only subject to
has been granted the privilege of remaining in the courtroom during the trial, has been
regulation, but is highly censurable, and worthy of disciplinary measures.
trying the case in the newspapers and making rather uncomplimentary comments about the
testimony of the witnesses for the State."
Since the state trial judge did not fulfill his duty to protect Sheppard from the inherently
prejudicial publicity which saturated the community and to control disruptive influences in
"Let it be now understood that, if Dr. Steve Sheppard wishes to use the newspapers to try
the courtroom, we must reverse the denial of the habeas petition. The case is remanded to
his case while we are trying it here, he will be barred from remaining in the courtroom
the District Court with instructions to issue the writ and order that Sheppard be released
during the progress of the trial if he is to be a witness in the case."
from custody unless the State puts him to its charges again within a reasonable time.
"The Court appreciates he cannot deny Steve Sheppard the right of free speech, but he can
It is so ordered.
deny him the . . . privilege of being in the courtroom if he wants to avail himself of that
method during the progress of the trial."
 Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion
for Production And Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the
following:

(a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and
stay of Hubert Webb in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995
(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A.
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner, Cabanayan, M.D.;
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of (c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of 7, 1991);
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, (d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the
PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE investigation;
AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents, LAURO VIZCONDE, intervenor. (e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;

G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995 (f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report
dated September 2, 1991 submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;
MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs. (g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of (other than the May 22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of agencies;
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL (h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Superintendent Rodolfo C. Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents.
(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their
G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995 respective positions and duties;

ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner, (j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the
Paraaque, Branch 258, HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of documents. It alleged it lost the original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch 259, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, compelled petitioner Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said sworn
PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr.,
AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of produced a copy of said original in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The original
Paraaque, Branch 274, respondents. was then submitted by petitioner Webb to the DOJ Panel together with his other evidence.
It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain from the NBI the copy of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request for its production.

PUNO, J.: Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the
crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the
Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, Philippines on October 27, 1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia
prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order and preliminary Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela
injunction to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest issued against petitioners by Francisco. 13 To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he
respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2) bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car while in the United States on said dates 14 and that
enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14,
case; and (3) dismiss said criminal case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused 1991. 15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert
therein. 1 Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among
others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United
From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Airlines Flight No. 808.
Investigation (NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging
petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other The other respondents Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony
persons, 2 with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice Boy" Lejano, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong submitted sworn
formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their complicity in the rape-killing
Zuo to conduct the preliminary investigation 3 of those charged with the rape and killing on of the Vizcondes. 16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong" Ventura failed to
June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; 4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, 5 and her file their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known
sister Anne Marie Jennifer 6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, address. 17In his sworn statement, petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the
Paraaque, Metro Manila. evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the morning of the following day, he was at the
residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was with him.
statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who
allegedly saw the commission of the crime; 7 (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to
former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila hold respondents for trial" and recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be
S. Gaviola; 8 (3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, filed against petitioners and their co-respondents, 18 On the same date, it filed the
1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight No. 808 bound for New York and who corresponding Information 19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional Trial
expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4) the Court of Paraaque. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to
sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the Branch 258 presided by respondent judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the
manner of how Biong investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar; 9 (5) the sworn respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the warrants of
statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited
sworn statements of Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. himself from the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his
The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and they showed that Carmela had employment with the NBI before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled to
nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19). 10 The genital Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest
examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa. 11 against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb
voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Bicutan,
Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave themselves up to the authorities State. 21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction.
after filing their petitions before us. Continuing accretions of case law reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino committed by the person sought to be arrested. 22 Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of
gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination reasonable caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. 24 The terms are
before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused legally synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the law such as a
its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street. 25 It ought to be emphasized
with homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances
during their preliminary investigation; and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information as an accused. knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of which all reasonable
men have an abundance.
We find the petitions bereft of merit.
Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused
I its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the
truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2)
22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They sworn statement, thus: 26
hammer on alleged material inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995
sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair xxx xxx xxx
as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn
statements of the witnesses for the NBI. statements of Alfaro:

We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question
112 provides that a preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded belief that a crime cognizable by the First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure in Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."
conducting a preliminary investigation, thus:
On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies
Sec. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or
information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She just said "on the
preliminary investigation having been first conducted in the following manner: following day I read in the newspaper that there were three persons who were killed . . ."

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two bodies on top of the
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of Carmela."
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The
said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.
Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of Carmela and
(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw tears on her eyes."
dismiss the same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to
the respondent, attaching thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house
documents. Within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-
affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall have the right to examine all other
First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more than a meter high."
evidence submitted by the complainant.
Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."
(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall
also be sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof
shall be furnished by him to the complainant. On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter- First Affidavit: She never entered the house.
affidavits within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on
the evidence presented by the complainant. Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty kitchen."

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which did not erode the credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.: 27
the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine. If the parties so desire, they may submit questions to the investigating xxx xxx xxx
officer which the latter may propound to the parties or witnesses concerned.
As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument
(f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer merely that she is a co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-conspirator
shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the may be taken as evidence to show the probability of the co-conspirator's participation in the
investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the commission of the crime (see People vs. Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).
respondent for trial.
Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would such a prior
respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only
certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally rarely documented by agreements in writing. Thus, conspiracy may be inferred from the
examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is reasonable ground to believe conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ." the several accused had acted in concert or in unison with each other, evincing a common
purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992], citations omitted;
The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).
the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature . . ." 20 An arrest without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two sworn
person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the statements. In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness accusing
therein petitioner for the slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though said witness failed He knew Freddie Webb because he often watched him then in a television show "Chicks to
to name Angelo in his affidavit which was executed five (5) months earlier. Granting, the Chicks." He observed that the man whom Freddie Webb referred to as his son, was of the
Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony is untrue, such circumstance is not same height as Freddie. The son referred to has fair complexion with no distinguishing
sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the witness. marks on his face. He (son of Webb) was then wearing a striped white jacket. When he and
his children were already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie anymore, but he noticed
On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his memorandum his son was seated at the front portion of the economy class. He never noticed Freddie
suggesting that the instant complaint "should not be decided within the month to give time Webb's son upon their arrival in San Francisco. He claims that, while watching the
to the NBI to coordinate with the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of Hubert television program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of Freddie Webb with her
Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based witnesses." lawyer being interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small built, with
a height of five feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for United States
In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the on March 9, 1991, he nurtured doubts because such description does not fit the physical
maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's traits of the son of Freddie, who left with him for United States on the same flight and date.
statements, among others. This is untenable. As held in Angelo:
Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with him for
There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the testimony of a almost three (3) years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four (4) years old.
witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously rejecting other parts which the court Their relationship started in February, 1991 until she broke up with him in September 1993.
may find incredible or dubious. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a rule of She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play mahjong at
law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally applicable. It is not a legal the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the back of the Paraaque Municipal Hall.
presumption either. It is merely a latinism describing the conclusion reached by a court in a
particular case after ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that the court At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the
deemed proper. Paraaque police told Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio room,
she was instructed to take him over and after somebody won the game, she followed Biong
In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations at the radio room where she overheard him uttering, "Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o
when she first executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o sige." When he put the phone down, Biong told
natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in her, "Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan, ikaw muna ang maupo" and then, he went
Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially specially so outside the canteen apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored
where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the yellow, arrived with a male passenger sitting at the backseat and parked near the canteen.
truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit. After it made some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat
As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they are beside the driver and then, they left. She was not able to recognize the male passenger
usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong came back at around 7:00 of the same
opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands and face, and took his
which transpired (People vs. Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the trash can. She asked him why he threw
Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed his handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy tae." She inquired what happened in BF
and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence submitted by the complainant Homes and he replied, "Putang inang mga batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."
indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of the imputed
offense. Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she observed him
doing something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy. Moments later,
We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of Galvan, another policeman of Paraaque, arrived and said, "Oy Biong, may tatlong patay
counsel 28 and consists of six (6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako." Biong went to
was planned and then executed by the petitioners. In addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who offered to accompany him and with whom she asked
supporting sworn statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former housemaids of permission to go with them. Before they proceeded to the place where the killings
the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and Lolita happened, she asked Biong if he knew the exact address and the latter immediately
Birrer, a paramour of Gerardo Biong. The Panel assayed their statements as follows: 29 responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was surprised because Galvan never told him the place
of the incident.
xxx xxx xxx
As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the housemaids to
According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29, contact the victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the barangay chairman and
1991, between 7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home inside his the president of the Homeowners Association. When all these persons were already in the
room with two male visitors. She knew it because she and her co-housemaid, Loany, were house, Biong started recording the wounds of the victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she
instructed by Hubert to bring them three glasses of juice. It was the last time she saw saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry box. Because she could not tolerate the foul odor,
Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that Hubert was in the United she and Capt. Bartolome went out of the room and proceeded to the dining area. On top of
States. the dining table, she saw the scattered contents of a shoulder bag. Moments later, Biong
came out from the room and proceeded to the front door to remove the chain lock; asked
While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served as a the keys from the housemaid and it was only then that the main door was opened. Biong
laundry woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa Rosales, that on noticed a stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go
June 30, 1991, she woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as what she used to do, she inside the servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they heard nothing
entered the rooms of the Webbs to get their clothes to be washed. As a matter of fact, in unusual. Using the handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the door panel.
that early morning, she entered Hubert's room and saw Hubert, who was only wearing his Bartolome then came out of the room and told Biong that he can hear the sound of the
pants, already awake and smoking while he was sitting on his bed. She picked up Hubert's glass being broken. At the garage, Biong also noticed same marks on the hood of the car.
scattered clothes and brought them together with the clothes of the other members of the
family to the laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she began washing the clothes of the On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with the
Webbs. As she was washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she noticed fresh bloodstains in Vizconde housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him remove
his shirt. After she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But feeling from his pocket the things she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit: calling cards,
uneasy, she decided to go up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was driver's license, ATM card, a crossed check worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring, bracelet,
doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small door going to Hubert's room and in that door necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry box inside the room of the Vizcondes.
there is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and his friends sniffing on These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong for P20,000.00 at a pawnshop in front of
something. She observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and from inside Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue, Paraaque. The next day, she saw Biong took
his room. from his locker at the Paraaque Police Station an imported brown leather jacket, which the
latter claimed to have been given to him by the person who called him up in the early
On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and came morning of June 30, 1991.
back at around 4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the secret door
of the house. It was the last time that she saw Hubert until she left the Webb family. Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in 1993. She
observed that Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of the Vizconde
On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in the case. In fact, when Biong and this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and brought him to the
morning, he was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then scheduled to take Paraaque Police Station, she was surprised that Biong halted the investigation when
the United Airlines Flight No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the airport's Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian
lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie Webb with a male companion. He greeted him talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and instructed Biong to bring Gatchalian to
and Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko ang anak ko papuntang Florida." him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the last thing she remembered regarding this case.
The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no
of petitioners. It ruled:30 less than the fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution
provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
of denial and alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
records, believes that they cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the complainant. cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily, of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place
alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of positive identification especially so where to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and relatives (People vs. Apolonia, 235
SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 and a long line of cases). The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect
to issuance of warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their
Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight requirements ought to be educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave
than the declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters (People vs. and Israel, thus: 32 "It is generally assumed that the same quantum of evidence is required
Carizo, 233 SCRA 687 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and becomes even more whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable cause to search. But
weaker when arrayed against the positive identification by the witness for the prosecution each requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances,
(People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]). and thus one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be
supported by substantial evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of
Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he being connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be
claimed was with him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than claiming searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person be implicated. By comparison, in
that he "was not and could not have been at or near the area of the Vizconde residence at arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the
the time of the alleged commission of the crime," respondent Lejano proffered no evidence person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that
to substantiate his claim of alibi. evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note,
our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure to be followed in the issuance of
xxx xxx xxx warrants of arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of Rule
112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi in the warrant for the arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing
form of documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when the incident search warrants is more defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:
occurred. We have carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence submitted by
respondent Webb in support of his absence from the country since March 9, 1991 to xxx xxx xxx
October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to exonerate him of the offense charged.
The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While respondent Webb may Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a California driver's license on probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the
June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not have been in the country on the dates judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in the allegation that respondent Webb may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be
personally bought a bicycle on June 30, 1991 in California in view of his positive seized.
identification by Alfaro and the two (2) househelps of the Webb family who testified that he
was here in the country on said dates. Additionally, the issuance of receipt evidencing the Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
purchase of a bicycle in California is no conclusive proof that the name appearing thereon personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under
was the actual buyer of the merchandise. oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the
DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the
petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that
likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence these Rules.
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States, 31 while probable cause We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search
demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . warrants in Soliven vs. Makasiar, 33 thus:
conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not
a pronouncement of guilt. xxx xxx xxx

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision
probable cause, we also hold that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory questions. The decision to call witnesses
for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigator and the Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
of trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence. In describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been adduced
to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary. The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers
II as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without is not an accurate interpretation.
conducting the required preliminary examination. Petitioners support their stance by
highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a matter of few What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
hours; (2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the trial court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
cause; and (4) that even Gerardo Biong who was included in the Information as a mere required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established
accessory had a "NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ Panel. Petitioners postulate that it doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents
was impossible to conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and evaluation of the submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
documents" on the part of said judges. issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him panel continued to conduct further proceedings, e.g. comparison of the photo-copies of the
in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause. submitted documents with the originals on July 17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The panel even
entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even announced that any party may submit
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on additional evidence before the resolution of the case. (p. 8, Petition) From the time the
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. panel declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995, twenty-
seven (27) days elapsed before the resolution was promulgated, and the information
Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the eventually filed in the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque on August 10, 1995. This
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should have conducted "searching notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the
examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against them. They also reject investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the
petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more
warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This
a warrant of arrest. directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent
haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27)
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) days, the petitioners were free to adduce and present additional evidence before the DOJ
sworn statements of Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Panel.
Birrer 35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital
and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel Report satisfied both judges Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct
that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we stress of the preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse
that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, resolution and filed the Information in court against them.
not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de
novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against
initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported them for rape with homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the
by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. The filing of said
merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of 1993, dated
to review and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:
they made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case. 36
Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases; Exceptions. No appeal may be taken from a resolution
Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno 37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor
predicated on the utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not finding probable cause except upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of
even the corpus delicti of the crime was established by the evidence of the prosecution in discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, no
that case. Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on record, we stressed the appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been arraigned. If the
necessity for the trial judge to make a further personal examination of the complainant and appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be
his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.
cause before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however,
rests on a different factual setting. As priorly discussed, the various types of evidence An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however,
extant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a finding of probable cause shall not hold the filing of the information in court.
against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime is a given fact. There is an eyewitness
account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also Sec. 2. When to appeal. The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days
disputed by sworn statements of their former maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the from receipt of the questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be
respondent judges to take the further step of examining ex parte the complainant and their interrupted only by the filing of a motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt
witnesses with searching questions. of the resolution and shall continue to run from the time the resolution denying the motion
shall have been received by the movant or his counsel. (Emphasis supplied)
III
Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court
Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and after the consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still
violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and exercise the right to seek a review of the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary
malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ Panel. They also assail the prejudicial of Justice.
publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering
We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the her alleged conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion
preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act
prove lack of probable cause against them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit
in the Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.: Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its
Section 10, which provides:
Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to
be heard. Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing xxx xxx xxx
in the initial hearing held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July 14, 1995; and
by filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime
27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply to the compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the and desires to a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act
Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" on July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following
"Comment and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-Affidavit" on July circumstances are present:
14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous letter-
requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel requesting the (a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the
latter to furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI concerning the petitioner's R.P.C. or its equivalent under special laws;
whereabouts during the material period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental
Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact, not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not (b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;
to issue subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a
"Petition for Injunction, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" with the Regional Trial Court, (c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
Branch 63 of Makati in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the first sworn committed;
statement of Alfaro for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court
dismissed the petition after Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first (d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;
sworn statement of Alfaro, without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2)
conflicting and inconsistent sworn statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached
(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and
hereto is a copy of the order of Judge Ruben A. Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated
July 28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."
(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the
preliminary investigation was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the
An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary
he may be a State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation
of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and impartial. 44 As this Court emphasized
requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused so in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, 45 "the right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a
Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non- substantive right." A preliminary investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted
inclusion in the criminal Complaint or Information, thus: so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any
material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand from their
xxx xxx xxx prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and
the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character,
Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. The certification of and hence, unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted
admission into the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the on the constitutional protection of due process which we rule to be operational even during
provincial or city prosecutor who is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE the preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is also implicit in section (3) (a) of
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and if included therein, to petition the court for Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn complaint,
his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State Witness. The court shall order the which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information. affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents . . ."

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other
prosecution for the offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all jurisdictions. In the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States
the rights and benefits provided under Section 8 hereof. Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, irrespective of
The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney
constitute ". . . an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the v. Holohan 47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of
power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness." perjured testimony to procure conviction violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence
The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 38which gives the court the prerogative to firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence in its
approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks possession. 48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady 49 "society wins not
appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors
function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In should not treat litigation like a game of poker where surprises can be sprung and where
truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government gain by guile is not punished.
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their
violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the favor, we are not prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995 could have resulted in the reasonable likelihood
smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is that the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause. To be sure, the NBI, on July 4,
not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting in the 1995, upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately,
and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. 39 Section 9 of Rule 119 does not petitioners, on July 28, 1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo
support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent Mercader in the course of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 951099. 50 As petitioners admit,
judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the power to discharge a state the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn statement as a part of
witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused. their evidence. 51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the DOJ Panel then still
The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement.
an inherent judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them
be beyond change by legislation designed to improve the administration of our justice despite the alleged material discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements
system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal reform laws to help government in of Alfaro. For reasons we have expounded, this finding of probable cause cannot be struck
its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of witnesses to down as done with grave abuse of discretion. 52 On the other hand, the FBI Report while
testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable cause
for fear of reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the finding of the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of evidence presented by the NBI.
investigation/prosecution of criminal complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal
complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency and/or lack of evidence. For a more Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to
effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a law protecting the prejudicial publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.
witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in
investigative bodies/courts." 40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
cannot therefore succeed. undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early
invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during investigation.
their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in
urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under preliminary investigation it constitutional law where the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the
deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not public's right to information, and an accused's right to a fair and impartial trial collide and
expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing where the balance should be struck
criminal proceeding. 41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to has divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on the side of liberty or on
move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material evidence in the side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance
possession of the prosecution.42 But these provisions apply after the filing of the Complaint of balance is a difficult act to follow.
or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist them to make
an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial. 43 In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided
and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high
however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable to protect his velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily
constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary investigation is not too early a diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right to due process of a bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even
potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to the principal actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their
determine the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a sympathizers have participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and
probable cause by itself subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the
diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 53 it
they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the was wisely held:
evidence of guilt is strong.
xxx xxx xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal
trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance
that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the
misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In addition, the
significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking
crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and
thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important
that society's criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States,
348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to
observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons
as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded that a presumption of openness
inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of justice, Cf., e.g.,
Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those
of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone
to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First Amendment
right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of
speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was
adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as
an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First
Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly
guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights.
The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment;
without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for centuries,
important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus,
in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., 54 we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced,
not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing
in the records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the
investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel.
Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of
the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the
DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State
Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in
determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their
26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not appear that they
considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties.
The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the
generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well
of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any
member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of
prejudicial publicity.

It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners
will now have to undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not
synonymous with guilt and while the light of publicity may be a good disinfectant of
unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right to fair trial. Without
imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating to
the case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile
criminal cases to control publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. 55 The Court
reminds judges that our ability to dispense impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in
every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent accused. More than
convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure
fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done and that is the only way
for the judiciary to get an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondents. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 case. In Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of
prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of
prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the
records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a
consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
G.R. Nos. 121039-45. October 18, 2001]
This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez,
having failed, in his motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MAYOR ANTONIO L.
the part of the trial judge. Not only that, accused-appellants case has been exhaustively
SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON,
and painstakingly reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown
ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.
by an iota of proof that the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by
publicity in affirming the sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. The charge of
RESOLUTION
conviction by publicity leveled by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand on.
MELO, J.:
As to the claim that witnesses Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility and that they were
sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent statements, the same is old hat, to say the
Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our January 25, 1999 decision, penned by least. It is hornbook doctrine in criminal jurisprudence that when the issue is one of
Justice Antonio M. Martinez, affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court and the
70 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court finding accused-appellants Mayor Antonio appellate courts will respect these findings considering that trial courts are in a better
Sanchez, George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
and Pepito Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and deportment and manner of testifying during the trial (People vs. Mendoza, 332 SCRA 485
additionally, ordering each of them to pay the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos [2000]). In the instant case, then Judge Harriet Demetriou found both Centeno and
(P700,000.00) to the heirs of the two victims as additional indemnity. While accused- Malabanan to have testified in a frank, spontaneous, and straightforward manner; and that
appellants Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed despite gruelling cross-examination by a battery of defense lawyers, their testimony never
their respective motions for reconsideration, it was only on December 6, 1999 that the wavered on the substantial matters in issue.
Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment thereto. And since Justice Martinez had
retired earlier on February 2, 1999, in accordance with A.M. No. 99-8-09 promulgated by
As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan, suffice it to
the Court on February 15, 2000, the motions for reconsideration filed by accused-appellants
say that the points raised have all been carefully and assiduously examined, not only by the
was assigned by raffle only on September 18, 2001 to herein ponente for study and
trial court but also by the Court itself, and that the inconsistencies were found to refer to
preparation of the appropriate action.
minor and collateral matters. It is well-settled that so long as the witnesses declarations
agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute
In his motion for reconsideration, Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial neither the witnesses credibility nor the verity of their testimony (People vs. Agomo-o, 334
and conviction by publicity and that the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio SCRA 279 [2000]). Accused-appellants have not shown in their motions for reconsideration
Malabanan presented by the prosecution are lacking in credibility. He likewise contends that new evidence to warrant disregard for the above-rule, nor have they shown that the Court
the testimony of his 13-year old daughter vis--vis his whereabouts on the night of the felony has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of weight and circumstance that
should have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of Centeno and would have materially affected the outcome of the case.
Malabanan. Lastly, Mayor Sanchez seeks the reconsideration of the amount of the
gargantuan damages awarded on the ground that the same have no factual and legal
Accused-appellant Sanchezs argument that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter, Ave
bases.
Marie Sanchez, as to his whereabouts on the night of the crime should be given full faith
and credence is likewise unavailing. While it is true that statements of children are accorded
In the same vein, accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit, in their great probative value, it is likewise true that alibi is the weakest defense an accused can
motion for reconsideration, maintain that prosecution witnesses Centeno and Malabanan concoct. Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, it deserves but
have been sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent statements allegedly pertaining to scant consideration (People vs. Waggay, 218 SCRA 742 [1993]). Moreover, accused-
material and crucial points of the events at issue. Not only that, they assert that appellant Sanchezs alibi cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the prosecution
independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecutions version of that he was at Erais Farm that fateful night. The alibis of accused-appellants Zoilo Ama,
events. Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit are even worse, not having been corroborated by any
other evidence.The assertions of these accused-appellants as to their innocence are thus
Preliminarily, it may be observed that, except for the issue of civil damages raised by Mayor entitled short shrift from this Court.
Sanchez, accused-appellants have not presented any issue new or different from that
which they had previously raised before the trial court and this Court. Moreover, the issues Accused-appellant Sanchezs asseverations as to the amount of damages awarded is,
they have raised have been discussed at length and passed upon by both the court a however, meritorious. The trial court awarded the Sarmenta family P50,000.00 as civil
quo and by this Court. Thus, on the charge that accused-appellant Sanchez is a victim of liability for the wrongful death of Eileen Sarmenta, P106,650.00 for the funeral expenses
trial and conviction by publicity, in our January 25, 1999 decision, citing People vs. they incurred, and P3,276,000.00 for the loss of Eileen Sarmentas earning capacity; or a
Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), we declared: total of P3,432,650.00 as actual damages. On the other hand, the Gomez family was
awarded by the trial court a total of P3,484,000.00 as actual damages, broken down as
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to follows: P50,000.00 for the wrongful death of Allan Gomez, P74,000.00 for the latters
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar funeral, and P3,360,000.00 for the loss of the latters earning capacity.
pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we
rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, Similarly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00 to the
responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a Sarmenta family and another P2,000,000.00 to the Gomez family as moral
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial damages. Lastly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the Sarmenta and
administration, especially in the criminal field The press does not simply publish information Gomez families the sum of P164,250.00 and 191,000.00, respectively, for litigation
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, expenses incurred.
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
The Court, in its decision dated January 25, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision of the lower
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere court. However, we also ordered each accused-appellant to pay the respective heirs of
fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez an additional indemnity of P350,000.00 each, stating
itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his that since each accused-appellant had been found guilty of seven counts of rape with
impartiality Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence homicide, jurisprudence dictated that for each count, each accused-appellant is liable for
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications civil indemnity of P50,000.00, or a total of P350,000.00.
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
Since the trial courts award of actual damages to the Gomez and Sarmenta families already
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due included civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, to order each accused-appellant to
to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the pay an additional P350,000.00 as civil indemnity would be double recovery of damages on
the part of the Gomez and Sarmenta families for the same act or omission. Thus, the Heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court must each be deducted from the amount
of actual damages due to the Gomez and Sarmenta families. = 2/3 (80-21) x (96,000 36,000)

As for funeral expenses, the Court had occasion to declare in People vs. Timon (281 SCRA = 39.353 x 60,000
577 [1997]) that burial expenses, which are by nature actual expenses must be
proved. Since no proof of burial expenses was ever presented in the instant case, its award = P2,361,180.00
will not be allowed. It is a settled rule that there must be proof that actual or compensatory
damages have been suffered and evidence of its actual amount (People vs. Nablo, 319 Heirs of Allan Gomez:
SCRA 784 [1999]). While the funeral expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family were
supported by the appropriate receipts, the same is not true for the funeral expenses = 2/3 (80-19) x (96,000 36,000)
incurred by the Gomez family. Not having been duly receipted, the amount of P74,000.00
awarded to the Gomez family as funeral expenses must, perforce, be deleted. However, as = 40.687 x 60,000
the heirs of Allan Gomez clearly incurred funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by way of nominal
damages should be awarded. This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been
= P2,441,220.00
violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification
(see People vs. Candare, 333 SCRA 338 [2000]).
As to the award of P2,000,000.00 each as moral damages to the Sarmenta and Gomez
families, these must also be reduced, the same being excessive. While the assessment of
The award of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00, representing the alleged loss of earning
moral damages is left to the discretion of the court according to the circumstances of each
capacity of Sarmenta and Gomez, respectively, also merit review. Eileen Sarmenta, at the
case (Article 2216, Civil Code), the purpose of moral damages is essentially indemnity or
time of her death, was a graduating student of the College of Agriculture of the University of
reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to
the Philippines at Los Baos (UPLB), majoring in Food and Nutrition for Large Animals. Allan
enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the
Gomez was likewise a senior student of the College of Agriculture of UPLB, majoring in
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
Beef Production. The trial court, using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, pegged
moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. In other
the life expectancy of Sarmenta, 21 years old at the time of her death, and Gomez, 19
words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the
years old at the time of his death, at 39.1 and 40.6 years, respectively. Believing that the
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the
victims would have earned a monthly salary of P15,000.00 and incurred living expenses of
suffering inflicted (Dela Serna vs. CA, 233 SCRA 325 [1994]). The intensity of the pain
P8,000.00 per month, the trial court awarded P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 as the
experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him
amount recoverable by the Sarmenta and Gomez families, respectively, for the loss of the
and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or the means of the offender. The death
earning capacity of Eileen and Allan.
caused by a beggar is felt by the parents of the victim as intensely as that caused by the
action of a wealthy family. The Court, in the exercise of its discretion, thus reduces the
While accused-appellant Sanchez contends that the awards of P3,276,000.00 and amount of moral damages awarded to the heirs of Eileen Gomez and Allan Sarmenta to
P3,360,000.00 are baseless in fact and law, no evidence having been adduced to prove P1,000,000.00 each. As to the award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses, the same is
that the victims had any actual income at the time of their demise, it is well-settled that to be reasonable and justified, this case having dragged on for over eight years.
compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of
injury or death, be gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellants for
of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money (People vs. Teehankee, supra). Likewise,
seven counts of rape with homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon
the fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence to support its claim for
them for each of said counts, with MODIFICATION that the accused be ordered to pay the
damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of the
heirs of the victims as follows:
same (People vs. Quilang, 312 SCRA 314 [1999]; People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690
[1999]). On the part of Eileen Sarmenta, her mother testified that Eileen had an offer for
employment from Monterey Farms. On the other hand, Allan Gomezs mother testified that To the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
her deceased son planned to work on a private farm after graduation.
1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
Moreover, in Cariaga et al. vs. LTB and Manila Railroad Co. (110 Phil. 346 [1960]), the
Court awarded compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity to Edgardo Cariaga, 2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
a 4th year medical student at UST, stating that while his scholastic record may not have
been first rate, it was, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have 3. Funeral expenses 106,650.00
finished the course, would have passed the board in due time, and that he could have
possibly earned as a medical practitioner the minimum monthly income of P300.00. 4. Loss of earning capacity 2,361,180.00

Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the countrys leading 5. Attorneys fees & litigation expenses 164,250.00
educational institution in agriculture. As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims
would have graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived them of ----------------------
their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are entitled to
compensation. Difficulty, however, arises in measuring the value of Sarmentas and Gomezs Total P 3,982,080.00
lost time and capacity to earn money in the future, both having been unemployed at the
time of death. While the law is clear that the deceased has a right to his own time which To the heirs of Allan Gomez:
right cannot be taken from him by a tortfeasor without compensation the law is also clear
that damages cannot be awarded on the speculation, passion, or guess of the judge or the 1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
witnesses.In this case, Eileen Sarmentas mother testified that for a new graduate of UPLB,
the basic salary was more or less P15,000.00 per month. Allan Gomezs mother, on the 2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
other hand, testified that her son could have easily gotten P10,000.00 to P15,000.00 per
month. Clearly, the testimony of said witnesses are speculative, insufficient to prove that in 3. Nominal damages 10,000.00
1993, Sarmenta and Gomez would have indeed earned P15,000.00 a month had they
managed to graduate. However, considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have
4. Loss of earning capacity 2,441,220.00
graduated in due time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to assume
that in 1993 they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All factors considered,
5. Attorneys fees & litigation expenses 191,000.00
the Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that the two would
have earned in 1993 at P8,000.00 per month (or P96,000.00/year) and their deductible
living and other incidental expenses at P3,000.00 per month (or P36,000.00/year). Hence, ----------------------
in accordance with the formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31
SCRA 511 [1970]), and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the loss of Total P 3,992,220.00
Sarmenta and Gomezs earning capacity is to be computed as follows:
SO ORDERED.
Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual Income Living Expenses)

where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 the age of the deceased)

 First. P.D. No. 1069[3] which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the
time when an extraditee shall be furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as
its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for extradition in the extradition
court, viz:

"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. -

(1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon
as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the day and
hour fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having
received the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the
[G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000] case or set another date for the hearing thereof.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, respondents. promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."

RESOLUTION It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be
answered by the extraditee.
PUNO, J.:
There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an
extraditee the right to demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the
On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the
extradition request from the US government and its supporting documents and to comment
petitioner to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting
thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a provision in
papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which to file his comment with
the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a
supporting evidence.[1]
"court cannot alter, amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great,
or dispense with any of its conditions and requirements or take away any qualification, or
On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He
integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general convenience, or
assails the decision on the following grounds:
substantial justice."[4]
"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and
Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in
of value which, if considered, would alter the result of the case, thus:
light of their intent. Nothing less than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
an extradition petition in court and a preliminary investigation. context and in light of its object and purpose."[5] (emphasis supplied) The preambular
paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its intent, viz:
II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of
fundamental fairness. "WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of
III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations;
objective.
WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is
IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine committed but also of any other state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it
Extradition Law is intended to prevent flight. saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon humanity at large, and it is in the
interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished;
V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government
and the rights of an individual. WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition
treaty with the Republic of Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other
VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and interested countries;
hearing may be dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.
x x x." (emphasis supplied)
VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch
necessitating notice and hearing. It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to
arrest the dramatic rise of international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug
VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has trafficking.Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the punishment of these crimes
encroached upon the constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should
branches of government. be the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by
any signatory state.
IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition
proceedings."[2] It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will
minimize if not prevent the escape of extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite
On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a probable extraditee under the
Jimenez, opposing petitioners Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for
his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation by
On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of petitioner Secretary of Justice, does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner
Action and Filing of Reply. Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a notice to flee must be
the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada and Note No. 34 from the Security deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes
Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private from the branch of our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that deserves the careful consideration of this Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that
petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August private respondents demand for advance notice can delay the summary process of
18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's June 7, 2000 Manifestation executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanying papers. The foresight
with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:
Maintenance of Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves
petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. "It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a
criminal trial at common law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in
The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such reasonable ground to suppose
right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding
government requires his surrender."[6] (emphasis supplied)
We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:
prosecution. Justice is best served when done without delay.
"PROVISIONAL ARREST
Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the
parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition Treaty as well as the general interpretation 1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person
of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with the sought pending presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional
Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, arrest may be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine
the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their Department of Justice and the United States Department of Justice.
negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight.[7] The reason for the rule is laid
down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,[8] where we stressed that a treaty is 2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:
a joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law a) a description of the person sought;
in the country."
b) the location of the person sought, if known;
Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of
Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private respondent a right to notice and hearing the offense;
during the evaluation stage of an extradition process.[9] This understanding of the treaty
is shared by the US government, the other party to the treaty. [10] This interpretation by d) a description of the laws violated;
the two governments cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the
Court to assume that both governments did not understand the terms of the treaty they
e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of
concluded.
conviction against the person sought; and
Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines
f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.
have expressed the same interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US
governments. Canadian[11] and Hongkong[12] authorities, thru appropriate note verbales
communicated to our Department of Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal language that it 3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application
is not an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition and the reasons for any denial.
papers during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a
convergence of views unless it is manifestly erroneous. 4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the
expiration of sixty (60) days from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive
Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the authority of the Requested State has not received the formal request for extradition and the
right to notice and hearing as required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied)
likening an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a
preliminary investigation. In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:

We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal "Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to
proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the the relevant treaty or convention and while the same remains in force, request for the
Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition made in
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. [13] His guilt or innocence will be accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused (b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of
cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still Investigation, Manila, either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.
undergoing evaluation.[14] As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:
(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf
"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards shall upon receipt of the request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of
that accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield an accused from extradition the accused from the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of the province or city
pursuant to a valid treaty."[15] having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the provisional arrest of the
accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of
There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings
involve a full-blown trial. [16] In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of (d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent has not received the request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of
standards.[17] In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires this Decree, the accused shall be released from custody." (emphasis supplied)
proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction [18] while a fugitive may be ordered extradited
"upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case." [19] Finally, unlike in a criminal case Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private
where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition respondent may be provisionally arrested only pending receipt of the request for
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the extradition.Our DFA has long received the extradition request from the United States and
final discretion to extradite him. [20] The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not
the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and requested for private respondents provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private
the demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to respondents liberty has passed. It is more imagined than real.
extradite.[21]
Nor can the threat to private respondents liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069,
As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in which provides:
an extradition proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process
safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the former. This we hold for the "Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of
procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a Notices.- (1) Immediately upon receipt of the petition, the presiding judge of the court shall,
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the petition on the
private interest that has been affected by governmental action."[22] The concept of due day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
process is flexible for "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding
kind of procedure."[23] judge that the immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best
serve the ends of justice. . .
Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to
notice and hearing considering the alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more (2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be
priceless than life."[24] The supposed threat to private respondents liberty is perceived to promptly served each upon the accused and the attorney having charge of the case."
come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which (emphasis supplied)
allow provisional arrest and temporary detention.
It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of
the accused pending the extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of
the extradition court upon filing of the petition for extradition. As the extradition process as the extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to
is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that a petition the execution stage depending on factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that
for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and hearing is a soft
respondents liberty is merely hypothetical. restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental
fairness should he decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United
Sixth. To be sure, private respondents plea for due process deserves serious consideration States. There is no denial of due process as long as fundamental fairness is assured
involving as it does his primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, a party.
collides with important state interests which cannot also be ignored for they serve
the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing of We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not
interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [25] The approach suffice to resolve the conflicting rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at
requires that we "take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests a rapid pace, propelled as it is by technological leaps in transportation and communication,
observable in a given situation or type of situation."[26] These interests usually consist in the we need to push further back our horizons and work with the rest of the civilized nations
exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the governments and move closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation
promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. [27] and amity with all nations." [35] In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of
peace and prosperity from these efforts.
In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondents claim to due
process predicated on Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law . . ." Without case at bar promulgated on January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by
a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized society the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the order issued by this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The Regional Trial
weight it deserves. Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case
No. 99-94684.
This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should
give more weight to our national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to SO ORDERED.
expedite the extradition to the United States of persons charged with violation of some of its
laws. Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive on
matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of
separation of powers.

Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its
evaluation stage, the nature of the right being claimed by the private
respondent is nebulousand the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is weak,
we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the
petitioner Secretary of Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." [28] Under our
constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines.
[29]
Executive power includes, among others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign
loans and the power to enter into treaties or international agreements. [30] The task of
safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department
which has the competence and authority to so act in the international arena. [31] It is
traditionally held that the President has power and even supremacy over the countrys
foreign relations.[32] The executive department is aptly accorded deference on matters of
foreign relations considering the Presidents most comprehensive and most confidential
information about the international scene of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic
and consular officials. His access to ultra-sensitive military intelligence data is also
unlimited.[33]The deference we give to the executive department is dictated by the principle
of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our democratic
government. It cannot be eroded without endangering our government.

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to
do it is to facilitate the extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our
government. More and more, crimes are becoming the concern of one world. Laws
involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest
purpose of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose
activities threaten the peace and progress of civilized countries. It is to the great interest of
the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its vulnerability to crimes,
especially transnational crimes.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is
not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all throughout
the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due process
requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of what is
due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent
to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss."[34] We have
explained why an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage
of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence
against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee to know the
basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal
petition for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the
evaluation stage of the extradition process to accommodate the more compelling interest
of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can be precipitated by
premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at
that stage of the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment
of a co-equal branch of the government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our
Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign relations. Needless to
state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted
 him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to
stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around
him. He got up, went to the microphone and shouted: Anggapuy nayan dia! (No one can
beat me here!). He returned to the Bishops chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded
and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. [7]

Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report
of a commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man,
accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at
the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife.
[G.R. No. 130487. June 19, 2000] Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the
ESTRADA, accused-appellant. confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the
DECISION knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the with each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant. The police
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. [1] We came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his
nullify the proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition. waist.[8] He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.

In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired
was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security a few minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic
guard. The Information reads: hemorrhage, stab wound.[9] He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just
below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following
findings:
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO
ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butchers knife, with intent to kill one EXTERNAL FINDINGS
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then 1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 x 1
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.
the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, 2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, x x . The edge of one side of the
thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive wound is sharp and pointed.
Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both
issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage and
prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of not INTERNAL FINDINGS
less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the
consequential damages. left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut.[10]
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Demurrer to Evidence. He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder
Dagupan City, Philippines, December 29, 1994.[2] because there was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was
unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-appellants hand with his
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellants counsel, the Public Attorneys nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his
Office, filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to defensive acts because he was of unsound mind.[11]
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital. It was alleged that accused-appellant could
not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; The Demurrer to Evidence was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the
that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the accused pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind; that after he made the first
Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment stab, he furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by
and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital.[3] the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted; and
the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded January 6, 1995.[12]
several questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and
answered by him intelligently, the court denied the motion that same day. [4] On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of
Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused-
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused- appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to
appellants behalf.[5] determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The
other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been
exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see
The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant
his family.[13]
Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy
on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado
Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail wardens
Sobremonte, the victims sister. The prosecution established the following facts: letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already
been determined; unless a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial
should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to determine whether
In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. Johns Cathedral, Dagupan City, the
accused-appellant was mentally ill or not. [14]
sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan
City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand
people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence.
his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing,
[15]
Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration.
a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped
beside the Bishops chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for
Bishops chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the accused-appellant filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and Examination. Appellants counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been
requested him to vacate the Bishops chair. Gripping the chairs armrest, accused-appellant exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and
replied in Pangasinese: No matter what will happen, I will not move out! Hearing this, cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and
Santillan moved away.[6] sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of
being attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out
Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. all his personal effects and waste matter and burned them inside the cell which again
Mararac went near accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishops chair. Accused- caused panic among the inmates. Appellants counsel prayed that his client be confined at
appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital.
accused-appellants hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped
[16]
Attached to the motion were two (2) letters.One, dated February 19, 1996, was from
the latters hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge
accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting informing him of appellants irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for
the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant. [17] The second
letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the Bukang An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid
Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was
by the president, secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or
appellants unusual behavior and requested that immediate action be taken against him to asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused
avoid future violent incidents in the jail.[18] does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution. [47]
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the
Demurrer to Evidence. The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
October 15, 1996.[19] committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
[48]
The accused must be so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent. [49] He
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a
testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, [20] a resident physician in the Department of complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.[50]
Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellants medical and clinical
records at the said hospital.[21] Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from Schizophrenic circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. [51] And the evidence on this point
Psychosis, Paranoid Typeschizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type; [22] and after four must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
(4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and mental condition. execution.[52]
[23]
The medical and clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy,
Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
referring accused-appellant for admission and treatment after a relapse of his violent evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that
behavior;[24] (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH; [25] (3) the consent slip of time.[53]Direct testimony is not required. [54] Neither are specific acts of derangement
appellants wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; [26] (4) the Patients Record; [27] (5) essential to establish insanity as a defense. [55] Circumstantial evidence, if clear and
the Consent for Discharge signed by appellants wife; [28] (6) the Summary and Discharges of convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A persons
appellant;[29] (7) appellants clinical case history;[30] (8) the admitting notes;[31] (9) Physicians thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine
Order Form;[32] (10) the Treatment Form/ medication sheet; [33]and (11) Nurses Notes.[34] whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind.[56]

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity
and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely
death, viz: discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit
of Crisanto Santillan[57] attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full
doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a
cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to sane person to go up to the altar and sit on the Bishops chair while the Bishop was
suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It
P50,000.00. goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from
the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all
The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the
P100,000.00 as moral damages. stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address
system, uttered words to the faithful which no rational person would have made. He then
SO ORDERED.[35] returned to the Bishops chair and sat there as if nothing happened.

In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors: Accused-appellants history of mental illness was brought to the courts attention on the day
I of the arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE arraignment on the ground that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea
CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12,
SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY. Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment.The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY thereof:
CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANTS PLEA OF INSANITY
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE. [36] (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
committed by him.[37] Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
the basis of criminal liability is human free will. [38] Man is essentially a moral creature with an
absolutely free will to choose between good and evil.[39] When he commits a felonious or (b) x x x.
criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, [40] i.e., with
freedom, intelligence and intent.[41] Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be
for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. [42] suffering from an unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination
mind[43] and that all acts are voluntary. [44] The moral and legal presumption under our law is of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement
that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. [45] This and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time
presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
which exempts the actor from criminal liability.[46] the process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge
nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto.[58]
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court.
ART. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability.The following are exempt from [59]
And the test to determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the
criminal liability: question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair
trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a
obtaining the permission of the same court. fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that
under a system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is
not necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit
advocate but himself.[60] In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accuseds present Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.
insanity or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is separate and distinct from his
criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a SO ORDERED.[79]
criminal trial concerns the defendants mental condition at the time of the crimes
commission. Present insanity is commonly referred to as competency to stand trial [61] and The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is
relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his
defendants present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. [62] In competency defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that effectively
cases, the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of the offense renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
which relates to a determination of his guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to stand intelligently thereto. It is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to
trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be found competent. fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made
Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones the trial.[63] intelligently. The plea of not guilty was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial court
because of his refusal to plead.[80]
In determining a defendants competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the
capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The
against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the
with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. specialized knowledge of determining the state of a persons mental health. To determine
[64]
This test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should
rule at common law.[65] Thus: have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the
latters history of mental illness.
[I]t is not enough for the x x x judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place,
and [has] some recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judges mind of
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so.
understandingand whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the
proceedings against him.[66] trial judge informing him of accused-appellants unusual behavior and requesting that he be
examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellants
sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to counsel filed a Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the Examination. Attached to this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of
trial and his relation to it. [67] The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and his Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway
counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters, [81] the judge ignored the
second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination. The records
have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. [68] are barren of any order disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered
accused-appellant to present his evidence. [82]
The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused,
rather than of the public. [69] It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused Dr. Gawidan testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid
disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. [70] To put a legally type, is a lifetime illness and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses.
incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional [83]
After accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the
rights to a fair trial[71]and due process of law;[72] and this has several reasons underlying it. hospital, not even for a check-up.[84]
[73]
For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent
defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-
relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of appellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he was suffering from
the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with mental illness.[85] This manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after
counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all
which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the the overwhelming indications of accused-appellants state of mind, the judge persisted in his
proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a
criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to
his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent death!
defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the
decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a mental
fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is examination.[86] The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an
essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological
participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an appreciation.[87] Thus, an intelligent determination of an accuseds capacity for rational
individual and his community and becomes an invective against an insensible object. understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental
Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical
which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be
defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of determined by the trial court. By this time, the accuseds abilities may be measured against
institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear the specific demands a trial will make upon him.[88]
against one who cannot comprehend its significance.[74]
If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it
The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests may have served a dual purpose [89] by determining both his competency to stand trial and
generally in the discretion of the trial court. [75] Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical
There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a reasonable doubt [76] or a bona fide findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of
doubt[77] as to defendants competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may the bases for the acquittal of the accused. [90] The crime in the instant case was committed
consider is evidence of the defendants irrational behavior, history of mental illness or way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding
behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellants mental condition at the time of
defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a the crimes commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity.
particular case.[78] [91]
Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellants competence to
stand trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate in his trial meaningfully.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
ground of accuseds mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant
questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:: of a fair trial. The trial courts negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due
process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified.
x x x It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked In People v. Serafica,[92] we ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and
questions on the accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was
when asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug. charged with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a
plea of guilty to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the accuseds
The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him. plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was not in full possession of
his mental faculties when he killed the victim; and thereby ordered that he be subjected to
the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated
commission of the crime.[93] attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such
violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil
Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and liabilities. (Italics in the original.)
sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the
conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his Dismissal of a criminal action does not foreclose institution of an administrative proceeding
competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings. against the same respondent, nor carry with it the relief from administrative liability. 6 Res
judicata did not set in because there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the
G.R. No. 170146 June 8, 2011 decision of the Ombudsman dismissing the criminal complaint cannot be considered a valid
and final judgment. On the criminal complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to
HON. WALDO Q. FLORES, in his capacity as Senior Deputy Executive Secretary in investigate and file the appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan.7
the Office of the President, HON. ARTHUR P. AUTEA, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Secretary in the Office of the President, and the PRESIDENTIAL ANTI- In the analogous case of Montemayor v. Bundalian, 8 this Court ruled:
GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC), Petitioners,
vs. Lastly, we cannot sustain petitioners stance that the dismissal of similar charges against
ATTY. ANTONIO F. MONTEMAYOR, Respondent. him before the Ombudsman rendered the administrative case against him before the
PCAGC moot and academic. To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate
RESOLUTION as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative
VILLARAMA, JR., J.: powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for
the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a
aside the October 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative
dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which found power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGCs investigation of petitioner
the respondent administratively liable for failure to declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at
Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars registered in his name, in bar. (Emphasis supplied.)
violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A. No.
6713. The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the Presidential Anti-Graft Respondent argues that it is the Ombudsman who has primary jurisdiction over the
Commission (PAGC), including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on administrative complaint filed against him. Notwithstanding the consolidation of the
respondent, with all accessory penalties. administrative offense (non-declaration in the SSAL) with the criminal complaints for
unexplained wealth (Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019) and also for perjury (Article 183, Revised
The motion is anchored on the following grounds: Penal Code, as amended) before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondents objection on
jurisdictional grounds cannot be sustained.
1. Respondent was subjected to two (2) administrative/criminal Investigations equivalently
resulting in violation of his constitutional right against "double jeopardy". Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution mandated the Ombudsman to act promptly
on complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the
2. Who to follow between conflicting decisions of two (2) government agencies involving the Government, or any subdivision, agency, instrumentality thereof, including government-
same facts and issues affecting the rights of the Respondent. owned or controlled corporations. Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is
empowered to conduct investigations on his own or upon complaint by any person when
such act appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers
3. Respondents constitutional right to due process was violated.
to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public officials and employees.
4. Penalties prescribed by the Honorable Court is too harsh and severe on the alleged
The investigative authority of the Ombudsman is defined in Section 15 of R.A. No. 6770:
offense committed/omitted.1
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
On the first ground, the Court finds it bereft of merit. Respondent asserts that since the
following powers, functions and duties:
PAGC charge involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL was already the subject
of investigation by the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-04-0568-LSC, along with the criminal
complaint for unexplained wealth, the former can no longer be pursued without violating the (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
rule on double jeopardy. of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
Double jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3)
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was
convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the
express consent of the accused. 2 We have held that none of these requisites applies where x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
the Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary investigation of the same criminal offense
against the respondent public officer.3 The dismissal of a case during preliminary Such jurisdiction over public officers and employees, however, is not exclusive.
investigation does not constitute double jeopardy, preliminary investigation not being part of
the trial.4 This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The
Ombudsman Act is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government
With respect to the second ground, respondent underscores the dismissal by the agencies, such as the PCGG and judges of municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial
Ombudsman of the criminal and administrative complaints against him, including the charge courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public
subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP. It is argued that the Office of the employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice.
Ombudsman as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6770, has Despite the passage of the Local Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, as against the PAGC concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local Sanggunians to
which is not a constitutional body but a mere creation of the OP. Under said law, it is the investigate complaints against local elective officials.9 (Emphasis supplied.)
Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government, such as herein respondent. Respondent who is a presidential appointee is under the disciplinary authority of the OP.
Executive Order No. 12 dated April 16, 2001 created the PAGC which was granted the
The argument is untenable. authority to investigate presidential and also non-presidential employees "who may have
acted in conspiracy or may have been involved with a presidential appointee or ranking
The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, officer mentioned x x x."10 On this score, we do not agree with respondent that the PAGC
administrative and criminal liabilities. We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan 5: should have deferred to the Ombudsman instead of proceeding with the administrative
complaint in view of the pendency of his petition for certiorari with the CA challenging the
PAGCs jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is a matter of law. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost
[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under
upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated.11
a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply
means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a
wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual,
It may be recalled that at the time respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit The dissent of Justice Bersamin assails the OPs complete reliance on the PAGCs findings
under the Ombudsmans Order dated March 19, 2004, the PAGC investigation had long and recommendation which "constituted a gross violation of administrative due process as
commenced and in fact, the PAGC issued an order directing respondent to file his counter- set forth in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations 17." Among others, it is required that
affidavit/verified answer as early as May 19, 2003. The rule is that initial acquisition of "[T]he tribunal or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of
jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its own the facts and the law of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
jurisdiction.12 Having already taken cognizance of the complaint against the respondent arriving at a decision". Justice Bersamin thus concludes that the OP should have itself
involving non-declaration in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL, the PAGC thus retained jurisdiction reviewed and appreciated the evidence presented and independently considered the facts
over respondents administrative case notwithstanding the subsequent filing of a and the law of the controversy." It was also pointed out that the OPs statement that the
supplemental complaint before the Ombudsman charging him with the same violation. respondents arguments in his Motion for Reconsideration With Motion For Leave To Admit
Explanation/Refutation of Complaint were a mere reiteration of matters previously
As to the third ground raised by respondent, we find no merit in his reiteration of the alleged considered, was "a patent untruth."
gross violation of his right to due process. Records bear out that he was given several
opportunities to answer the charge against him and present evidence on his defense, which We disagree.
he stubbornly ignored despite repeated warnings that his failure to submit the required
answer/counter-affidavit and position paper with supporting evidence shall be construed as The OP decision, after quoting verbatim the findings and recommendation of the PAGC,
waiver on his part of the right to do so. adopted the same with a brief statement preceding the dispositive portion:

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the recommendation of
ones side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as the PAGC and the legal premises as well as the factual findings that hold it together.
parties are given the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, the demands of Respondent failed to disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of
due process are sufficiently met.13 What is offensive to due process is the denial of the the prescription of the relevant provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He
opportunity to be heard.14 This Court has repeatedly stressed that parties who choose not was, to be sure, afforded ample opportunity to explain his failure, but he opted to let the
to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer charges against them cannot complain of a opportunity pass by.18
denial of due process.15 Having persisted in his refusal to file his pleadings and evidence
before the PAGC, respondent cannot validly claim that his right to due process was The relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above disquisition adopting fully the
violated. findings and recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating authority. It is rather the fact
that the OP is not a court but an administrative body determining the liability of respondent
In his dissenting opinion, my esteemed colleague, Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, concurred who was administratively charged, in the exercise of its disciplinary authority over
with the CAs finding that respondents right to due process was violated by the "unilateral presidential appointees.
investigation" conducted by the PAGC which did not furnish the respondent with a copy of
the "prejudicial PAGC resolution." The dissent also agreed with the CAs observation that In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, 19 this Court ruled that the rights of parties in an
there was a "rush" on the part of the PAGC to find the respondent guilty of the charge. This administrative proceedings are not violated by the brevity of the decision rendered by the
was supposedly manifested in the issuance by the PAGC of its resolution even without OP incorporating the findings and conclusions of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
taking into consideration any explanation and refutation of the charges that he might make, Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process has been
and even before the CA could finally resolve his suit to challenge the PAGCs jurisdiction to satisfied. Thus:
investigate him. On the other hand, the dissent proposed that the non-submission by
respondent of his counter-affidavit or verified answer as directed by the PAGC should not It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to
be taken against him. Respondents refusal was "not motivated by bad faith, considering his decisions rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar. Said section
firm belief that PAGC did not have jurisdiction to administratively or disciplinarily investigate applies only to decisions rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled
him." "Judiciary," and all of its provisions have particular concern only with respect to the judicial
branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to hold or even imply that decisions of
We do not share this view adopted by the dissent. executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige[d] to meet the requirements
under Section 14, Article VIII.
Records reveal that on August 26, 2003, the CA already rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 77285 dismissing respondents petition challenging the jurisdiction of the PAGC. The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the
Respondents motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA. Upon elevation to constitutional requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the landmark case of Ang
this Court via a petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 160443), the petition suffered the Tibay v. CIR, we laid down the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as
same fate. Under the First Divisions Resolution dated January 26, 2004, the petition was follows:
denied for failure of the petitioner (respondent) to show that the CA committed any
reversible error in the assailed decision and resolution. Said resolution became final and 1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit
executory on April 27, 2004. Thus, at the time respondent submitted his counter-affidavit evidence in support thereof.
before the Ombudsman on May 21, 2004, there was already a final resolution of his petition
challenging the PAGCs investigative authority. 2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.

On the other hand, the PAGC submitted to the OP its September 1, 2003 resolution finding 3) The decision must have something to support itself.
respondent guilty as charged and recommending that he be dismissed from the service,
after the expiration of the 60-day temporary restraining order issued on June 23, 2003 by 4) The evidence must be substantial.
the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 77285. The OP rendered its Decision adopting the PAGCs
findings and recommendation on March 23, 2004. As thus shown, a period of ten (10)
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
months had elapsed from the time respondent was directed to file his counter-affidavit or
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
verified answer to the administrative complaint filed against him, up to the rendition of the
OPs decision. It cannot therefore be said that the PAGC and OP proceeded with undue
haste in determining respondents administrative guilt. 6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision.
Still on respondents repeated claim that he was denied due process, it must be noted that
when respondent received a copy of the OP Decision dated March 23, 2004, his petition for
review filed in this Court assailing the CAs dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 77285 was already 7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a
denied under Resolution dated January 26, 2004. However, despite the denial of his manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
petition, respondent still refused to recognize PAGCs jurisdiction and continued to assail reason for the decision rendered.
the same before the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84254, a petition for review under Rule 43 from
the OPs March 23, 2004 Decision and May 13, 2004 Resolution. 16 In any event, As can be seen above, among these rights are "the decision must be rendered on the
respondent was served with a copy of the OP Decision, was able to seek reconsideration of evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
the said decision, and appeal the same to the CA. parties affected;" and that the decision be rendered "in such a manner that the parties to
the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
We also find nothing irregular in considering the investigation terminated and submitting the rendered." Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must express
case for resolution based on available evidence upon failure of the respondent to file his clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the
counter-affidavit or answer despite giving him ample opportunity to do so. This is allowed by administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that
the Rules of Procedure of the PAGC. The PAGC is also not required to furnish the sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due
respondent and complainant copy of its resolution. process requirement is satisfied.
At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct
and sufficient, and said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not
the product of willing concealment of its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed
Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB decision, and the parties adversely
affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to interpose an informed
appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.1avvphi1

xxxx

Accordingly, based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this
Court rules that the said Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both
administrative due process and Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The Office of the President did not violate petitioners right to due process when it rendered
its one-page Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including
petitioner, were well-informed as to how the Decision of the Office of the President was
arrived at, as well as the facts, the laws and the issues involved therein because the Office
of the President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the Decision of the
HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the
petitioner would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and
make a presentation of its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the
issues involved in its case.20 (Emphasis supplied.)

Since respondent repeatedly refused to answer the administrative charge against him
despite notice and warning by the PAGC, he submitted his evidence only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the OP, attaching the same to his motion for reconsideration.
That the OP denied the motion by sustaining the PAGCs findings without any separate
discussion of respondents arguments and belatedly submitted evidence only meant that
the OP found the same lacking in merit and insufficient to overturn its ruling on respondents
administrative liability.

On the fourth ground cited by the respondent, we maintain that the penalty of dismissal
from the service is justified as no acceptable explanation was given for the non-declaration
of the two expensive cars in his 2001 and 2002 SSAL.

Pursuant to Section 11, paragraph (b) of R.A. No. 6713, any violation of the law "proven in a
proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a
public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him."
Respondents deliberate attempt to evade the mandatory disclosure of all assets acquired
during the period covered was evident when he first claimed that the vehicles were lumped
under the entry "Machineries/Equipment" or still mortgaged, and later averred that these
were already sold by the end of the year covered and the proceeds already spent.

Under this scheme, respondent would have acquired as many assets never to be declared
at anytime. Such act erodes the function of requiring accuracy of entries in the SSAL which
must be a true and detailed statement. It undermines the SSAL as "the means to achieve
the policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the government" through
which "the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; [as] a valid
check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth." 21

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED WITH

FINALITY.

Let entry of judgment be made in due course.

SO ORDERED.

\
 Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:

1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;

2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;

3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;

G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989 4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner, 5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.

vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, respondents. said international carriers to serve the public with indispensable communication services,
such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner. full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.

Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the
then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive
Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of
REGALADO, J.: rates. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply
for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the
This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public utility services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
services of the petitioner Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT,
for short) which is the only one rendering such services in the Philippines. Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an
application 4 for authority to continue operating and maintaining the same facilities it has
The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing the
Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications Commission international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967,
(hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of the and to charge the current rates applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it
rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate and maintain the
percent (15%) with the reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates
constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power and a denial of therein applied for.
procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.
On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue
The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of operating its existing facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the
Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to establish, construct, rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date of said
maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select, station or order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for
stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." another six (6) months, or up to September 16, 1988.
Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such
ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals." petitioner for another six (6) months, counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the
petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen percent (15%) on
Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the following activities the present authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the
and established the following installations: following ground:

1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal. The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an
initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation Division of the Common Carriers Authorization
2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I Department of the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a REDUCTION in
provided direct satellite communication links with the Pacific Ocean Region (the United some of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in
States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China [PROC], New Zealand its further evaluation that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a
and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite. provisional authorization or in the final consideration of the case. 6

3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was established. PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons:
Pinugay II provided links with the Indian Ocean Region (major cities in Europe, Middle East,
Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries operating within the region) thru the Indian Ocean 1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates
INTELSAT satellite. for public service communications does not provide the necessary standards
constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna (Pinugay III) was established to particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC;
temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay I and then Pinugay II while they were being
refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or reserved antenna for possible 2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally
contingencies. conferred, the same was exercised in an unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in
that (a) the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued
5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust,
Field, Pampanga as a television receive-only earth station which provides the U.S. Military unreasonable and confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.
bases with a 24-hour television service.
I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546,
6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third standard "A" earth station providing for the creation of respondent NTC and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of
(Pinugay IV) to take over the links in Pinugay I due to obsolescence. 3 Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it
be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing
and adjudicatory powers. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue
By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for
delegation of legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the
the Philippines in the Agreement and the Operating Agreement relating to the International
order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member nations, as well as
quasi-judicial power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an
in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite
express conferment by the legislative body.
Organization (INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial
telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively established by various states in
line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the
United Nations.
Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is
Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
the exercise of the power therein conferred. Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are
We hold otherwise. not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of
liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in
ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside
delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends
when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as
rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may
prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive,
standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than
absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7 general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action
is entitled to notice and hearing. 11
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent
NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although
others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on
communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the
connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements
NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the
feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much
broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not far-fetched to assume that petitioner could
the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts
network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and
maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to petitioner's ratiocination
provisions of the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate- that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality
fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable of its service to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has
feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a to undertake and the financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the
valid delegation of legislative power. opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC
based its questioned order.
II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due
process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that
evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the
present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.
reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been shown
and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the
notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of
process. reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same
in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by
of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required, but where an the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of
order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is the Public Service Act which provides:
adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question
need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to respondent Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall
NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of
incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the
convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of data or information since contrary:
respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.
xxx xxx xxx
We find merit in petitioner's contention.
(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 9 we made a categorical followed thereafter by any public service; ...
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and
when it is legislative, thus: There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent
NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-
may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such
Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent,
upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation,
petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is
petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to required is evident in respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to continue operating its existing
same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by
words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi- them "under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit
judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. of this application, the Commission may modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of
Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10to wit: information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on
the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired
by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating,
opportunity to controvert. and renewing its machinery and equipment in order to keep up with the continuing charges
of the times and to maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the technological
Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It advances abroad. There projected undertakings were formulated on the premise that rates
becomes a final legislative act as to the period during which it has to remain in force are maintained at their present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof
pending the final determination of the case. 13 An order of respondent NTC prescribing may practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we concede the primacy of the
reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even public interest in an adequate and efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be
confiscatory, especially if the rates are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses equated with reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates assumes that the same is fair to
its just revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in effect final insofar as both the public utility and the consumer.
the revenue during the period covered by the order is concerned. Upon a showing,
therefore, that the order requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided
petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration of its nullity becomes therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified.
inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the hearing
and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public convenience
III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present
would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business. On controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly adjudicated with
the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its communications reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements herein.
satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right
therein. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated
State at any time without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner. September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94 is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary
While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such restraining order issued under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically
privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair and directed against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on
reasonable. petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby made permanent.

There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is SO ORDERED.
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so
requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a
showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common good.

The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public
utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or
clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right
of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power.
The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is
the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest,
first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation,
therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an
arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to
the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. 15

Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the
rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates
so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates which are
unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness
comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to
be oppressive. 16

What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business
judgment based upon the evidence 17 it is a question of fact calling for the exercise of
discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. 18 In determining
whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation,
requirements and opportunities of the utility. A method often employed in determining
reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public utility.
Competition is also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates since
a carrier is allowed to make such rates as are necessary to meet competition. 19

A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily
based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to
respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information without,
however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an attempt to
elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based
on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any elucidation on
what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said statements. Nor
did it deign to explain how the data reflected in the financial statements influenced its
decision to impose a rate reduction.

On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent
detriment to the public service, should the order of respondent NTC turn out to be
unreasonable and improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in
that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment on
the other end of the transmission arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation,
or refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major adjustment or
innovation on the business of petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the
sending end abroad has to be matched with the corresponding change in the receiving end
in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad has to be matched with the
corresponding change in the sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of
petitioner to meet the variegations demanded be technology could result in a deterioration
or total failure of the service of satellite communications.