New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

New Zealand
Defence
Doctrine
NZDDP-D
(Third Edition)
 Introduction

New Zealand Defence Doctrine (NZDDP-D)

(Third Edition)

The New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication Doctrine, (3rd Edition) (NZDDP-D) is issued for use by the New Zealand
Defence Force and is effective forthwith for guidance in defence doctrine.

R.R. JONES
Lieutenant General
Chief of Defence Force
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
Wellington

June 2012

CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

The information within this publication is Crown copyright.

No material or information contained in this publication should be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or
transmitted in any form outside New Zealand Defence Force establishments, except as authorised in writing by the
New Zealand Defence Force.

The information may be released by the New Zealand Defence Force to a recipient Defence Force for defence
purposes only. It may be disclosed only within the recipient Defence Force, except as otherwise authorised by the
New Zealand Defence Force.

New Zealand Defence Force 2012

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) i

Introduction

Authorisation

Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force is responsible for publishing doctrine publications and maintaining a hierarchy
of such publications. Users wishing to quote New Zealand doctrine publications as reference material in other work
should confirm with the New Zealand Defence Force Deputy Director Doctrine whether the particular publication and
amendment state remain extant. Comments on factual accuracy or proposals for amendment should also be directed to
the Deputy Director Doctrine at:

The Doctrine Cell

Capability Branch
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force
Defence House
212 Aitken St
Private Bag
Wellington
New Zealand

Telephone: +64 4 496 0477

Facsimile: +64 4 496 0699
Internet: http://www.nzdf.mil.nz
NZDF Intranet: http://doctrine

CUSTODIAN
Chief of Defence Force
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force

ii New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Introduction

Preface

Scope

The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) has a unique culture that is underpinned by the shared values of courage,
commitment, comradeship, and integrity. These cultural values are the tenets from which the NZDF builds an
organisation that is united, professionally trained, competent, appropriately equipped, and capable of serving the
interests of New Zealand, confronting the security challenges of the future, and meeting the requirements of the New
Zealand Government. This culture provides the foundation for New Zealands unique approach to the conduct of military
operations.

In the performance of its military duties, the NZDF has been involved in activities across the full spectrum of operations
in all corners of the world. Historically, New Zealands involvement in operations has always been as part of a coalition
framework, alongside nations and organisations with similar interests to New Zealand. These past experiences and the
influence of defence partners have helped shape New Zealands approach to the conduct of military operations.

Purpose

The NZDF articulates its philosophical approach to the conduct of military operations through military doctrine.
New Zealand Defence Doctrine (NZDDP-D) is the capstone doctrine publication that introduces the philosophical concept
of military doctrine and its application by the NZDF. As the capstone document, NZDDP-D sits at the pinnacle of the
NZDFs hierarchy of doctrine publications.

Although NZDDP-D focuses primarily on the doctrinal components of New Zealands military strategy, it conveys the
nature of the New Zealand approach to military activity at all levels. New Zealands military doctrine is formulated and
based on our own national experiences of making strategy and conducting military operations. Whilst authoritative,
NZDDP-D conveys broad principles that require judgement in their application, according to situational imperatives.
Doctrine is not mandatory dogma to be applied in all circumstances; that is simply not the NZDFs way of doing business.

Application

This publication is primarily intended for NZDF commanders and staff at all levels.

Structure

NZDDP-D is divided into seven chapters.

Chapter 1 New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine provides an understanding of the main features of
New Zealands strategic policy that supports its security interests, and how the NZDF contributes to the achievement of
New Zealands strategic policy objectives. It also discusses the role, utility, and levels of military doctrine.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) iii

Introduction

Chapter 2 Levels of Military Operations provides an overview of the three levels of military operations strategic,
operational, and tactical and how these levels overlap. Intertwined with these three levels is the hierarchy of
operations. This hierarchy provides a clear understanding of the building blocks of military operations.
Chapter 3 The Context of Military Operations provides an understanding of the nature of war and conflict. It further
discusses war, types of warfare, the range of security events, and the need to operate using a comprehensive
approach in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.
Chapter 4 The New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets identifies and explains the essential elements of
NZDF military operations. These essential elements, defined as the NZDFs operational tenets, are fundamental to the
conduct of military operations and permeate down through New Zealand military doctrine.
Chapter 5 Components of Fighting Power identifies that the essence of warfighting is underpinned by the three
components of fighting power that may be applied in war and in stability and support operations. These components
are: conceptual, moral, and physical.
Chapter 6 The Broader Utility of Fighting Power suggests that while it is the ability to engage in warfighting activities
that provides the NZDF with its raison dtre, the NZDF can be employed on a wide variety of activities across the
spectrum of military operations. For many of these operations the NZDF will require its combat potential, but some will
be more benign, including those mounted to improve the living conditions of those subject to natural or humanitarian
disaster.
Chapter 7 Generating Warfighting Capacity describes the six components of capability and the importance of
preparedness and reserves in generating military capability.

Linkages
NZDDP-00.1 Command and Control in the New Zealand Defence Force
NZDDP-1.0 Personnel
NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations
NZDDP-5.0 Joint Operations Planning

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 Introduction

Acknowledgements

The New Zealand Defence Force acknowledges its intellectual debt in preparing this publication to a number of overseas
military doctrinal publications, including the following.

ADDP-D Foundations of Military Doctrine, 2nd edition, July 2005, Australian Defence Headquarters, Canberra,
Australia
AJP-01(D) Allied Joint Doctrine, December 2010, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Brussels, Belgium
JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 3rd edition, August 2008, Ministry of Defence, London, United Kingdom
JP-1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, March 2009, Department of Defense, Washington DC,
United States

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) v

Introduction

Contents

 Page

Title i
Authorisation ii
Preface iii
Acknowledgements v
Contents v
List of Illustrations viii
Executive Summary x

Chapter 1: New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine 1

Introduction 3
The Legal Basis of the New Zealand Defence Force: The Defence Act 3
The Relationship between Policy and Military Doctrine 3
New Zealand Defence Policy 4
Employment of National Power 6
The Role of Military Doctrine 7
The New Zealand Military Culture 10
The New Zealand Defence Force Values 11
Conclusion 11

Chapter 2: Levels of Military Operations 13

Introduction 15
Levels of Military Operations 15
The Significance of the Levels of Military Operations 17

Chapter 3: The Context of Military Operations 19

Introduction 21
The Structure and Characteristics of Conflict 21
The Range of Security Events 27
New Zealand Application 28
Military Responses 32

Chapter 4: New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets 33

Introduction 35
The Warfighting Ethos 35
The Joint Effect 36
The Principles of War 36
The Manoeuvrist Approach 41
Command Philosophy 41

vi New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

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Contents

 Page

Chapter 4: New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets (Cont.)

Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism 44
Summarising New Zealands Approach to the Conduct of Military Operations 45

Chapter 5: Components of Fighting Power 47

Introduction 49
The Conceptual Component 49
The Moral Component 51
The Physical Component 52

Chapter 6: The Broader Utility of Fighting Power 55

Introduction 57
Identifying Crisis and Stability 57
New Zealands Involvement 57
Conflict Prevention 58
Enforcement Action 58
Managing Confrontation 58
Humanitarian Operations 59
The Essentials of Crisis Management 60
Domestic Tasks 61

Chapter 7: Generating Warfighting Capacity 63

Introduction 65
Components of Capability 65
Preparedness 67
Reserve Forces 67

Glossary 69
Terms and Definitions 69
Acronyms and Abbreviations 75

Index 76

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) vii

Introduction

List of Illustrations

Figure Page
1-1 The Government of the day determines the national security interests that shape defence policy. 4
1-2 Defence policy 4
1-3 The qualities of our personnel shape the culture of the wider New Zealand military. 10

2-1 Levels of military operations 15

2-2 The so-called strategic corporal concept is where tactical activities may have strategic significance. 17

3-1 The range of security events 27

3-2 Combat operations are military operations where the use or threatened use of force is essential to
mission success. 29
3-3 In crisis management, the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent upon a
common sense of purpose, resolve, mutual understanding, collaboration, and resourcing. 31

4-1 New Zealand Defence Force operational tenets 35

4-2 The New Zealand Defence Forces principles of war 36
4-3 Selection and maintenance of the aim is the overriding principle of war. 37
4-4 Offensive action is action by a military force to gain and maintain the initiative. 38
4-5 To achieve success on combat operations it is often necessary to concentrate superior force. 39
4-6 Logistics and administrative arrangements are crucial to success. 40
4-7 Boyds Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop. 41
4-8 Principles of mission command 42
4-9 Summary of the New Zealand Defence Forces operational tenets 45

5-1 The components of fighting power 49

5-2 The seven fundamental defence capabilities 50

6-1 There are times when it is necessary to deploy military assets to assist with disaster relief
or humanitarian assistance operations. 60
6-2 Agencies supported by the New Zealand Defence Force 61

7-1 The components of capability 65

7-2 Reserve forces are an integral component of the New Zealand Defence Force. 67

viii New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Introduction
Introduction

Executive Summary military operations. The national level covers the political
area both domestically and internationally and considers
the mobilisation of military and non-military resources
to meet the Governments national strategic aim. The
NZDF contributes to achieving the Governments
Chapter One: New Zealand Defence Policy strategic objectives by raising, training, and maintaining
and Military Doctrine
operationally prepared forces and carrying out
government-directed campaigns and operations. Military
Defence policy and foreign policy are a partnership strategy is the focus of Headquarters NZDF and the
aimed at securing New Zealands physical, economic, Ministry of Defence. The operational level is the level
social, and cultural wellbeing, and meeting our regional where campaigns and major operations are planned,
and global responsibilities. while the tactical level is where these campaigns and
operations take place through battles, engagements, and
New Zealand military strategy draws together defence actions.
policy and military strategic doctrine. An alternative way
of defining military strategy is to describe it as the bridge Operations consist of a number of tactical actions linked
linking policy and operational objectives. to achieve an objective. A series of operations aimed at
achieving strategic and operational objectives within a
The principal purpose of military doctrine is to provide given time and space is a campaign.
the armed forces with guidance for the conduct of
operations. The levels of military operations overlap and distinctions
can sometimes become grey. As there is never a
New Zealand military doctrine establishes guidelines on clear line between these levels, it is important that
how to best employ military power to achieve strategic commanders take this into consideration. Sometimes
objectives. Most joint operational-level New Zealand even the strategic and tactical levels overlap. It is
Defence Force (NZDF) joint doctrine is adopted from important that the risk to effective mission command is
foreign militaries on a case-by-case basis. managed when such an overlap occurs.

This publication, New Zealand Defence Doctrine The levels of military operations not only apply to war;
(NZDDP-D), is the highest level of joint doctrine. It they can also cover other forms of military operation such
focuses on the military-strategic level of war, but contains as humanitarian aid operations.
comment on both the strategic and operational levels.

NZDF personnel possess unique cultural values that

identify them as New Zealanders and influence Chapter Three: The Context of Military
New Zealand military doctrine and its application. Operations

Conflict on the moral plane exerts the greater and often

decisive influence on the conduct and outcome of
Chapter Two: Levels of Military Operations conflict.

There are three levels currently accepted as providing a New Zealand military doctrine is based on the
framework for command and analysis: the strategic level, recognition that the NZDF can be involved across a
consisting of the national- and military-strategic, the broad range of different security events and operations.
operational level, and the tactical level.
The mix of combat and stability and support operations
These three levels of war provide clear building blocks for requires clear definition in order that the role and

x New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Introduction
Introduction

potential tasks of NZDF personnel committed to an area Principles of War. The application of the principles of
of conflict, as well as the risks, are fully understood. war with judgement and common sense will facilitate
success; blatant disregard of them involves increased

Paradoxically, peace is ultimately sustained by, and risk and a proportionate increase in the likelihood of
failure.
dependent upon, the willingness of states to use force to
preserve it, as well as restore it when lost.
Manoeuvrist Approach. The manoeuvrist approach
is based on using the indirect approach to defeat
In todays society, the NZDF must take a comprehensive
the adversary. This approach seeks to negate the
approach. A comprehensive approach involves adversarys strategy through the intelligent and creative
responding to crises through coordinating the activities application of effects against the adversarys critical
of the military, other government departments, and, vulnerabilities and centre of gravity.
if applicable, international organisations and non-
governmental organisations. Command Philosophy. Mission command is a
philosophy of command that promotes effective decision
making, understanding, and responsibility towards a
In contrast to peace, conflict is a violent clash between
superior commanders intent and determination to take
opposing human wills, each group trying to impose their
plans through to a successful conclusion.
will on the other. War is both an escalation and evolution
of conflict, while warfare is the how of waging war. Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism. A flexible and
Warfare is unpredictable, often chaotic, and can change pragmatic attitude encourages imaginative and
rapidly.The NZDF delineates two types of warfare: innovative thinking and is the source of the type of
traditional warfare and irregular activity. initiative that generates success in military operations.

Chapter Four: New Zealand Defence Force Chapter Five: Components of Fighting
Operational Tenets Power

The six NZDF operational tenets for the conduct of The essence of warfighting is underpinned by the three

military operations across the full range of possible components of fighting power that may be applied
in war and in stability and support operations. These
security events are: a warfighting ethos, the joint effect,
components are: conceptual, moral, and physical.
the principles of war, the manoeuvrist approach, a
command philosophy, and inherent flexibility and
Conceptual Component. The conceptual component of
pragmatism. fighting power consists of the principles of war, doctrine,
and conceptual thinking.
Warfighting Ethos. A warfighting capability and ethos
allow the NZDF to more effectively conduct peace Moral Component. The moral component of fighting
support operations, deal with sudden changes in the power is about persuading our people to fight. It depends

level of hostilities encountered during operations, and on good morale and the conviction that our purpose
is morally and ethically sound. The moral component
enhance its force protection.
promotes an offensive spirit and a determination to
achieve the aim.
Joint Effect. Effective military operations at the strategic
and operational levels require military force elements Physical Component. The physical component of
from all Services to operate in an integrated fashion. fighting power is the physical means to fight. It has five
The integrated approach allows the value of a joint force elements: personnel, equipment, collective performance,
to become more than merely the sum of its parts. readiness, and sustainability.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) xi

 Introduction
Introduction

Chapter Six: The Broader Utility of Fighting for the NZDF within New Zealands range of security
Power events.

In possessing a warfighting capability, the NZDF is also

effectively structured and prepared to assist in a broader
Chapter Seven: Generating Warfighting
range of activities across the full range of security
Capacity
events. Many of these operations will require combat
potential, however, some will be more benign and involve
Resources available to the NZDF will always have limits.
improving conditions for those subject to natural or
The NZDF does not have a large military force-in-being.
humanitarian disasters. International relations can move
Instead, during times of extended peace, the NZDF
in either direction from peace to war and can be gradual
places importance on developing military capabilities to
or rapid. The trigger for movement in either direction can
meet significant defence contingencies. The Capability
take many forms and no two crises are identical.
Management Framework (CMF) provides the mechanism
to balance the demands for near-term tasks from a
In whatever capacity that New Zealand is involved,
capability baseline (preparedness) and also future
the four instruments of policy the diplomatic, the
capability (modernisation).
economic, the psychosocial, and the military are
employed in concert as the circumstances demand.
The components of capability are: personnel, research
and development, infrastructure, concepts, information
Todays challenges demand a comprehensive approach.
management, and equipment and supplies.
This involves coordinated action from a range of civil and
military actors and the coordination of New Zealands
NZDF preparedness is based on a capability baseline.
military and political instruments with other instruments
This capability baseline identifies the core individual and
of power. A comprehensive approach demands
collective military skills, capabilities, and proficiencies
collaborative processes, shared understanding,
required by the defence force for military operations.
and concerted action as essential enablers in crisis
prevention and resolution. The NZDFs commitment to
Reserve forces are an integral component of the NZDF
a comprehensive approach enables it to participate and because they provide, across crisis and capability
cooperate effectively in situations requiring the broader warning times, complementary or supplementary skills
application of NZDF fighting power. as individuals, small groups, and units. The Reserve
helps to maintain forces and has a critical role in
When a crisis occurs there will be a demanding set of increasing the NZDFs ability to sustain a surge for
shifting priorities and objectives. Crisis management operations.
at the higher levels must accommodate both political
and military imperatives. The Officials Committee
for Domestic and External Security (ODESC) has an
important role in crisis management and facilitates
a comprehensive approach in national crises or in
circumstances that affect New Zealands security.

The NZDF has the ability to deliver a range of services

in support of other government agencies. Multi-agency
operations and tasks is a term used to describe more
formal, pre-planned support to specific government
departments and agencies. Multi-agency operations and
tasks are becoming an increasingly significant function

xii New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Introduction

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) xiii

Chapter 1:

New Zealand Defence Policy

and Military Doctrine

1 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Contents

 Page
Chapter 1:
New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine 1
Introduction 3
The Legal Basis of the New Zealand Defence Force:
The Defence Act 3
The Relationship between Policy and
Military Doctrine  3
Policy  3
Military Doctrine  3
Relationship 3
New Zealand Defence Policy 4
Primary Mission of the
New Zealand Defence Force  4
New Zealand Defence Force
Operational Tasks 4
Application of National Power  5
Employment of National Power 6
The Role of Military Doctrine 7
Utility of Doctrine 7
Military Doctrine within New Zealands
Strategic Environment 8
New Zealand Military Doctrine  8
Doctrine Categories 9
New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine
Development 9
The New Zealand Military Culture 10
The New Zealand Defence Force Values 11
Conclusion 11

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 2

Chapter 1

Introduction the Governments judgement on what is necessary

and possible in pursuance of the national interest.
1.01 Every nation-state has fundamental and The national security interests express New Zealands
enduring security interests that it seeks to protect and national policy for the conduct of external affairs and
promote. This chapter outlines the main features of relations, and national security. Defence policy and
New Zealands strategic policy that support its security foreign policy are subsets of national policy. Defence
interests, and how the New Zealand Defence Force policy is expressed in NZDF Operational Tasks.
(NZDF) contributes to the achievement of New Zealands
strategic policy objectives.
1.06 Defence policy can be both fluid and
enduring. It must be capable of rapid review if strategic
1.02 This chapter also discusses the purpose of and
circumstances change. In response to the more stable
the relationship that exists between policy and military
and less dynamic features of the strategic environment,
doctrine and how military doctrine is used to protect
it may also take on an enduring quality of its own that
New Zealands security interests.
will have an influence on strategic thinking, including
the development of military strategic doctrine. In short,
policy can be described as a directive statement of what
The Legal Basis of the New Zealand is to be achieved.
Defence Force: The Defence Act

1.03 Under the Defence Act, New Zealands armed Military Doctrine
forces are raised and maintained for:

the defence of New Zealand, and any other area 1.07 Military doctrine has an important relationship
New Zealand is responsible for defending with defence policy. In contrast with the potentially fluid

the protection of New Zealands interests, whether in and changeable nature of policy, military doctrine is
New Zealand or elsewhere informed by fundamental lessons learned over time
about the ways in which military forces can be used
the contribution of forces under collective security
effectively in support of policy. Doctrine is more enduring
treaties, agreements, or arrangements
and less subject to change than policy, although it is by
the contribution of forces to, or for the purposes of,
no means rigid or inflexible.
the United Nations (UN), or in association with other
organisations or states and in accordance with the
principles of the Charter of the UN. 1.08 Military doctrine provides the framework for
the conduct of military operations. It is about how

1.04 The Act also allows the armed forces to be current military operations should be directed, mounted,

made available in New Zealand or elsewhere for the commanded, conducted, sustained, and recovered.

provision of assistance to the civil power in time of Therefore, it is neither solely about the past, nor is it
emergency and of any public services. about the medium- to longer-term future.

Relationship
The Relationship between Policy and
Military Doctrine
1.09 While not symbiotic, the relationship between
policy and doctrine is certainly very close. Although
Policy policy leads, it is also influenced and informed by
military doctrine. By leading, policys purpose is to state
1.05 Policy exists at a number of different levels. what is to be done and not done, not how to do it.
National policy is the nations response to the The how, both now and into the future, is the function
generally accepted strategic environment, reflecting of military doctrine.

3 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine

New Zealand Defence Policy Zone (EEZ), and to be able to take action to meet likely
contingencies in our strategic area of interest.
1.10 Enduring National Security Interests. The
Government of the day determines the national security
interests that shape defence policy. The NZDF, acting New Zealand Defence Force Operational
in a lead or supporting role, works in conjunction with Tasks
other government agencies and departments to achieve
the following national security interests:1 1.12 The NZDF Operational Tasks are extracted from
the stated national security interests and focus on the
a safe and secure New Zealand, including its borders
and approaches narrower defence-related aspects of those interests.
The NZDFs principal operational tasks are to:
a rules-based international order that respects
national sovereignty defend New Zealand sovereignty
a network of strong international linkages discharge our obligations as an ally of Australia
a sound global economy underpinned by open trade contribute to and, where necessary, lead peace and
routes. security operations in the South Pacific

make a credible contribution in support of peace and

Primary Mission of the New Zealand Defence security in the Asia-Pacific region
Force contribute to all-of-government efforts at home and
abroad in resource protection, disaster relief, and
1.11 The primary mission of the NZDF is to secure
humanitarian assistance
New Zealand against external threats, to protect our
participate in all-of-government efforts to monitor the
sovereign interests, including in the Exclusive Economic
international strategic environment

be prepared to respond to shifts and other

1
Government Defence White Paper, 2010. disjunctions in the strategic environment.

Figure 1-1: The Government of the day

determines the national security interests that
shape defence policy.

Figure 1-2: Defence policy

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 4

Chapter 1

Application of National Power 1.17 In some circumstances, military force may

be required to support the economic instrument,
1.13 National policy objectives are achieved through through embargo operations and naval cooperation
the coherent and effective application of all three and guidance for shipping, for example. Alternatively,
instruments of national power: diplomatic, economic, the reform of host nation military structures in a foreign
and military. country may foster other positive economic outcomes
abroad.

1.14 Diplomatic Instrument. The diplomatic

instrument of national power enables the achievement 1.18 Military Instrument. Military power is the
of New Zealands mainly foreign policy objectives ultimate instrument and expression of national power,
through diplomatic means. Successful diplomacy in circumstances ranging from deterrence and coercion
depends upon the power of persuasion, reinforced through to the deliberate application of force to
by the possibility of coercion, and enhanced by a neutralise a specific threat. It is the principal means of
combination of reputation and integrity, the skilful defence.
interplay of the military and economic instruments, and
effective communication. It is based on the nation-state 1.19 The military instrument is most effective when
system, but has evolved to incorporate other opinion- employed in conjunction with the other instruments
formers, power-brokers, and third parties. to achieve national objectives. Its use is not an
independent phenomenon, but the continuation of

1.15 The diplomatic instrument is in use constantly, policy by different means.2 The military instrument

including during conflict when the need to influence can, nonetheless, be decisive. For example, in difficult

allies and neutrals, as well as opponents, is as vital as negotiations with intractable opponents, diplomacy may

the application of military force. Defence diplomacy aims only be successful if backed up by the prospect of force.

to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist Indeed, the unique contribution of the military instrument

in the development of responsible, competent, and is to threaten or, where necessary, to apply force to
ensure the security of the nation, freedom from foreign
democratically accountable forces. It may also facilitate
oppression, and the promotion of national interests.
other NZDF military activity, by setting the conditions for
overseas basing, access or over-flight, and cooperation
with allies and partners. Diplomacy is enhanced by 1.20 However, the main strategic objectives and
NZDF staff in embassies, the provision of operational character of any campaign involving the NZDF are likely
military advice and assistance, the conduct of overseas to be largely political in nature, precluding an exclusively
training, and other influence activities. military solution to most conflict situations. Military utility
relies upon the ability and willingness to deploy forces
rapidly and effectively, and sustain them beyond national
1.16 Economic Instrument. Overseas investment,
boundaries and potentially worldwide. States with armed
international flows of capital and trade, and development
forces that lack the means of effectively projecting their
assistance provide scope for the exercise of economic
power on a global scale can exert only limited regional
influence. Economic power can provide a range of
influence. Generally, only a select few states are able
incentives, boycotts, tariffs, and sanctions to influence
to overcome the logistical difficulties inherent in the
decisions and affect behaviour. The potential impact
expeditionary deployment and operational direction of a
of such measures can, however, be diminished by
modern, technologically advanced military force.
the effects of economic integration and the political
sophistication of recipient countries. Their impact is also
complicated by the combination of public and private
influences, the operation of market forces, and the
complex relationships between global and national rates
of growth and economic activity. 2
Carl von Clausewitz letter, 22 December 1827.

5 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine

1.21 The application of force or the threat of its use 1.24 Individually, each instrument of power is limited
against elements seeking to erode security helps to in terms of its discrete influence and impact. In practice,
maintain the integrity and security of the international the diplomatic, economic, and military instruments
system. It also reassures populations and communities interact or conflict according to circumstance; ideally
that might otherwise be at risk. The extent to which they act together, unified behind a common purpose or
New Zealand can exert such influence depends on a goal. What constitutes an appropriate combination in
combination of appropriately manned, trained, and any given situation depends upon a full understanding
equipped forces. New Zealand maintains a balanced of the complexities of the strategic context and the
and credible range of military capabilities that are held at national policy objectives sought. At the same time, an
appropriate readiness levels. appropriate balance should be drawn between the use
of hard and soft power.
1.22 Information. Information enables the
application of all three instruments of national power. 1.25 Hard and Soft Power. Hard power is the threat
It is fundamental to the Governments approach to crisis or use of military or economic coercion to influence the
management, although the New Zealand position is that
behaviour or interests of states, groups, or individuals,
information does not form a separate instrument
to induce them to adopt a particular course of action
per se.3 The dissemination of information, in accordance
which they would not otherwise choose themselves. The
with a cross-government information strategy, enables
NZDFs warfighting capability is a source of hard power
diplomatic, economic, and military influence to be
and serves, in certain circumstances, as an effective
exerted in an effective and comprehensive way. At the
deterrent to potential opponents. Similar outcomes
same time, intelligence and information received across
may, however, be realised by means of alternative or
government shapes planning and execution at all levels.
complementary soft power.
Moreover, efficient management of information promotes
unity of effort and understanding, and provides the
opportunity to influence a range of audiences and 1.26 Soft power is the ability of a political body,

activities in a coherent manner. such as a state or combination of states, to attract and

persuade other political bodies through cultural and
ideological means or by encouraging emulation. The
ways in which soft power may be effective include:
Employment of National Power
culture when it is attractive to others
1.23 The geo-strategic balance of power between values when they are seen to be sincere in their
nations changes over time, owing to uneven rates of application
growth and variations in technology, demography, and
foreign policies when they are seen as legitimate
resources, which confer advantage on one society or
by others any of which may be reinforced with
another. States also determine their posture in relation
financial and material incentives.
to the way in which their elites and populations perceive
their position and status relative to other states within
the international community. These factors, as well as a 1.27 Popular culture and media are regularly

nations propensity for security and stability, determine identified as sources of soft power, as are the influence

the relative importance afforded to the employment of its of a dominant internationally used language, discreet

instruments of national power. sharing of privileged technical and commercial

information, and a particular set of normative behaviours.
In an information age, increased interconnectivity
enhances both the possibilities and the inclination for
cooperation. Within this context, attention is the vital

3
ground and the ability to share information and to be
Some other nations, such as the United States, treat information
as a discrete instrument of power. believed becomes an important source of influence.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 6

Chapter 1

1.28 A state may, therefore, obtain the outcomes 1.32 New Zealand military doctrine describes how
it wants without the explicit threat or prospect of more the NZDF conducts military activities, but does not
costly exchange because others admire its values, describe why. Doctrinal development is dynamic and
aspire to its prosperity or openness, and so follow is constantly reviewed for relevance in the context of
its example. The success of a state in deploying soft emerging factors that influence the way New Zealand
power also derives from its standing in the international intends to use military force. New Zealands military
community; significantly, however, soft power can doctrine is about how operations should be directed,

equally be exploited by multinational companies, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained, and

ideological movements, and other groups. recovered.

1.33 In addition to informing members of the NZDF

1.29 History has shown that soft power is generally
about military doctrine, this publication also serves to
slower, more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield
inform those who have a legitimate interest in the way
than hard power, although it is often cheaper and its
the NZDF conducts its business. NZDDP-D is also of
effects may be more enduring. The two may need to be
value to allies and potential coalition partners who will
used together. However, the power and effect of hard
benefit from an understanding of New Zealands military
power, especially the threat or actual use of force, have
doctrine, ethos, cultural values, and general approach to
a value and potency of their own, especially in times of
strategic and military issues.
severe instability or conflict.

Doctrine provides a military organisation

The Role of Military Doctrine with a common philosophy, a common
language, a common purpose, and a unity
of effort.
1.30 Military doctrine establishes guidelines on
how to best employ the military instrument of national General George H. Decker
Chief of Staff, United States Army
power to achieve strategic objectives. Military doctrine is 196062
defined as the fundamental principles by which military
forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is
authoritative, but requires judgement in application.4
Utility of Doctrine
These principles are extracted from the history of
skirmishes, battles, campaigns, and wars, and more
1.34 By describing the nature and characteristics
specifically, drawn from lessons learned in stalemates,
of current and immediate future military operations,
defeats, and victories. The principal purpose of military
doctrine contributes to the NZDFs ability to fight and
doctrine, therefore, is to provide the armed forces with
win. It does this by setting a common framework within
guidance for the conduct of operations. which to plan, train for, and conduct military operations.
Doctrine guides preparation for these operations in
1.31 Military doctrine helps planners and peacetime and describes the methods for successfully
commanders approach stressful, perilous, confusing, conducting military operations in the New Zealand
and unfamiliar situations with a clarity of thought that context. Doctrine also fundamentally shapes the way the
is based on rigorous analysis and comprehensive NZDF thinks about the use of the military instrument of
knowledge of hard-won lessons from human history and national power.

national military experience.

1.35 Doctrine builds cohesion through mutual
understanding. By guiding the application of military
force in operations, doctrine reduces the consequences
of indecision by informing responses to unpredictable
4
Joint Doctrine Publication (UK) JDP 0-01, British Defence
events. Doctrine allows confidence in decision making,
Doctrine 3rd Edition. brevity in communications, and acts as an enabler when

7 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine

choosing a course of action. Effective military doctrine 1.40 By possessing the ability to conduct warfighting
prevents confusion and reduces ambiguity in uncertain operations, the NZDF can conduct peace support
conditions. operations and stability and support operations
more effectively. Without the ability to respond to

1.36 In preparation for operations, doctrine an increasingly hostile environment approaching

provides a knowledge base for training assessment warfighting conditions, military forces have a diminished
of unit performance and provides a basis for further capability to conduct operations that require a credible
development of innovative conceptual thinking. and effective military presence, such as peacekeeping
or peace enforcement operations. Military forces lacking
such credibility are more likely to attract hostile and
Military Doctrine within New Zealands warlike actions from belligerents as a direct result of their
Strategic Environment inability to counter such threats.

1.37 New Zealands current strategic environment is

1.41 War is the greatest challenge to peace.
characterised by a growing number of non-conventional
Therefore the NZDF must train to win in war. In doing
security challenges that have implications for
so it also trains to conduct operations amongst the
New Zealands security interests. Defence forces have
populace. This enables the NZDF to conduct peace
traditionally trained for conventional military operations
support operations and stability and support operations
and the NZDF must still do so. The NZDF must also have
more effectively. Conversely, to forego preparedness
the flexibility and versatility to continue to contribute
for warfighting would undermine the NZDFs ability
to international efforts to counter asymmetric threats.
to conduct operations requiring a credible military
Challenges include containing the fallout from increasing
presence. Ultimately, this would endanger both the
intrastate conflict, responding to the breakdown of
mission and the service personnel called to perform it.
law and order in weak, failing, and failed states, and
countering transnational criminal activity, including
piracy and terrorism. 1.42 NZDF military doctrine reflects preparation
for warfighting with the ability to operate effectively in
the wider spectrum of military operations. It supports
1.38 New Zealands geo-strategic position and
the deliberate business of preparing military forces for
reliance upon international trade fundamentally
operations in a dynamic geo-strategic environment.
influences the way NZDF doctrine is written and applied.
Given New Zealands location, NZDF military
As a result, NZDF doctrine focuses upon our need to
doctrine focuses on our need to develop and sustain
develop and sustain expeditionary forces.
expeditionary forces. Ultimately, the maintenance
of a professional and effective military capability
1.39 Today, even situations that appear benign
employable throughout the conflict spectrum
have the potential to rapidly deteriorate into violence
provides options for current and future New Zealand
or intense warfighting at the operational or tactical
governments to support and defend peace and
levels. Similarly, modern conflicts tend to have a global
democracy.
dimension and are no longer necessarily defined by
geographic localities. Nor do belligerents seek to
avoid populated areas. Consequently, military forces, New Zealand Military Doctrine
other government agencies, or humanitarian agencies
involved in relatively benign activities can quickly 1.43 The development of sound military doctrine is
become embroiled in warfighting activities between, or as much to do with challenging conventional wisdom
against, belligerent parties.5 as it is with codifying established practice. Those in
command, at every level, have to rely on their judgement
and apply as much of what they have learned as
appropriate, departing from the established route when
5
See Chapter 3 for details on the spectrum of operations. circumstances demand it.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 8

Chapter 1

1.44 The NZDF positively encourages the judicious and procedures in the detail necessary to ensure
and innovative departure from its military doctrine when team effectiveness and interoperability. This level
that departure is well considered and implemented of doctrine is therefore highly prescriptive and not
by trained professionals. This allows commanders to usually open to interpretation. Given the safety
seize the initiative and adopt unorthodox or imaginative implications inherent in many aspects of procedural
courses of action as opportunities arise. doctrine, there is usually only one approved way of
applying tactics, techniques, and procedures.

1.45 Doctrine also embraces the NZDFs

organisational culture. This culture is undergoing a
New Zealand Defence Force Doctrine
paradigm shift from three discrete single-Services to a Development
jointly focused Defence Force. The NZDFs operational
focus is towards integrated joint operations with 1.47 Categories of Doctrine. There are two
synchronised operational- and tactical-level objectives. categories of doctrine providing guidance to the NZDF:
This cultural change realises the collective strength of joint doctrine and single-Service doctrine.
a joint approach, whilst retaining the strength of the
diversity of the three Services.
1.48 Joint Doctrine. This publication is the highest
level of joint doctrine. It focuses on the military strategic

Doctrine Categories level of war, but contains comment on both the

strategic and operational levels. NZDF joint doctrine

1.46 Doctrine may be divided into three categories at the operational level is contained in the hierarchy of

that shape its development and use. The three derived New Zealand defence doctrine publications

categories are: (NZDDPs), adopted foreign doctrine, and New Zealand

supplements.
Philosophical-Level Doctrine. Philosophical
doctrine explains the fundamental principles behind
1.49 Single-Service Doctrine. Some elements of
the employment of forces in military operations.
operational and tactical doctrine are, by their nature,
Philosophical doctrine also describes the basic
exclusively single-Service. They remain the responsibility
tenets under which forces operate. Based on
of the single-Services, but are consistent with joint
regional and sometimes global politico-military
doctrine.
environments, philosophical doctrine describes
the conditions that determine the Governments
options for the employment of force elements. It also 1.50 Sources of Doctrine. The NZDF employs
describes possible future environments within which doctrine that is developed by likely coalition partners,
a force may operate. thereby promoting interoperability. New Zealand

Application-Level Doctrine. Application-level doctrine is not normally developed unless:

doctrine explains how philosophical principles are government and/or defence policy dictates
applied. This doctrine encompasses guidance at there is a philosophical difference on the military
both the individual and collective levels for dealing operation or task
with differing circumstances in order to achieve specialised organisations or equipment drive a
mission success. Application-level doctrine contains requirement.
both extant, proven applications and newer,
emergent ideas that are yet to mature.
1.51 Adopting Doctrine. The NZDF only develops
Procedural-Level Doctrine. Procedural doctrine a select amount of joint doctrine. While most of this
describes the skill sets that are fundamental to derived doctrine is at the philosophical and application
the performance of set tasks by every individual levels, a small amount of procedural-level doctrine is
service person. It includes minor tactics, techniques, also developed. However, the majority of joint doctrine

9 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Policy and Military Doctrine

used by the NZDF is adopted from overseas militaries. New Zealands efforts from areas as diverse as the
Adoption of foreign joint doctrine publications is on a Solomon Islands, East Timor, and Afghanistan.
case-by-case basis. Single-Service tactical doctrine The neutrality and ability of NZDF personnel to work
is adopted at the discretion of the Service chiefs, with in an honest and collaborative manner has greatly
primacy of doctrine given to joint doctrine. improved cooperation.

1.53 NZDF personnel are from a mixture of cultures

The New Zealand Military Culture and backgrounds. The two warrior cultures of the
Maori and the British tend to dominate. There has
1.52 Any New Zealand approach to military
been a blending of the best of the British with the best
operations needs to maximise the qualities of our service
of the Maori to create the modern Kiwi soldier, sailor,
personnel. It is the qualities of our personnel that shape
and airman. The fundamental attributes that typify this
the military culture of the wider NZDF. With many of the
modern NZDF service person are:
current conflicts being a competition for the support
of the population, i.e. human-centric, the NZDF is independence
well placed to successfully undertake the full range of initiative
military operations. The characteristics and attitude of strong junior leadership
NZDF personnel, regardless of Service, coupled with
endurance
their ability to establish good relations with the local
population, enable them to mitigate many issues that conscientiousness

arise during operations. This has brought praise for adaptability.

Figure 1-3: The qualities of our personnel shape the culture of the wider New Zealand military.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 10

Chapter 1

The New Zealand Defence Force Values comradeship, and integrity. The resultant military
values form the foundation from which the NZDF builds
1.54 The NZDFs unique culture is underpinned by a an organisation that is united, professionally trained,
set of shared military values that identify its personnel as competent, and appropriately equipped. With this
New Zealanders. These values are: organisational and cultural basis, the NZDF becomes
capable of serving the interests of New Zealand,
courage
confronting the security challenges of the future,
commitment
and meeting the requirements of the New Zealand
comradeship Government. The NZDF culture and set of military
integrity. values provide the foundation for New Zealands unique
approach to the conduct of military operations.

Conclusion

1.55 The NZDF has a unique culture that is

underpinned by shared values of courage, commitment,

11 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Chapter 1

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 12

Chapter 2:

Levels of Military
Operations

13 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Contents

 Page
Chapter 2:
Levels of Military Operations 13
Introduction 15
Levels of Military Operations 15
Strategic Level 15
Operational Level 16
Tactical Level 16
The Operational Hierarchy 16

The Significance of the Levels of

Military Operations 17
Overlapping Levels of Military Operations  17

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 14

Chapter 2

Introduction 2.04 National Strategic Level. The national strategic

level refers to the political dimension of conflict at the
2.01 War and conflict in general occur at three macro level, both domestically and internationally,
levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. This chapter and the mobilisation of national military and non-
discusses these three levels and how they overlap. military resources to meet the Governments national
Intertwined with these three levels of war is the hierarchy strategic aim. The national strategic aim describes the
of operations. This hierarchy provides a understanding Governments declared aspiration or goal. In order to
of the building blocks of military operations, starting from achieve this aim a number of strategic objectives need
tactical actions through to national strategy. to be attained. The national strategic level pertains to
the full range of issues associated with the maintenance
of political independence and territorial integrity and
Levels of Military Operations the pursuit of wider national interests. It is about the
coordinated use of the three principal instruments of
2.02 Conflict and war are perceived as actions national power; the diplomatic, economic, and military
spanning three broad levels (depicted in Figure 2-1): instruments enabled by the effective collection and
strategic, operational, and tactical. While each level is dissemination of information. This invariably requires
definitive in broad terms, all levels are interrelated and it contributions from a number of government agencies.
is normal for conflict to be planned and prosecuted at all The national strategic level is as much concerned with
three levels concurrently. the avoidance of war as with its conduct. National
strategy is the collective responsibility of the
Prime Minister and Cabinet.
Strategic Level

2.03 The strategic level of military operations 2.05 Military Strategic Level. The military strategic
consists of two sub-levels: the national strategic level level is responsible for the military aspects of planning
and the military strategic level. and directing conflict. This level includes setting the

Figure 2-1: Levels of military operations

15 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Levels of Military Operations

military end-state and the broad military approach campaign end-state. This end-state is reached when
to its achievement, in order to support the national all the operational or campaign objectives have been
strategic aim. Military strategy is the military component attained. The operational level links military strategy
of national strategy. To achieve the stated strategic to tactics by establishing operational objectives and
objectives, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) end-states, initiating actions, and applying resources
makes a range of contributions: it raises, trains, and to ensure the success of the campaign or operation.

maintains operationally prepared forces for use by Operations could involve only NZDF force elements, or

the Government, and it carries out campaigns and be conducted in conjunction with other New Zealand
agencies/departments and/or the forces of other
operations in accordance with government direction.
countries. In the planning and conduct of campaigns
Military strategy is the primary focus of Headquarters
or major operations, operational art is practiced.
NZDF and the Ministry of Defence.
Operational art is the skilful employment of military
forces to attain strategic goals through the design,
Key Terms organisation, integration, and conduct of campaigns or
major operations.6
National Strategic Level

The national strategic level refers to the political Tactical Level

dimension of conflict at the macro level, both
domestically and internationally, and the 2.07 The tactical level is where battles,
mobilisation of national military and non-military
engagements, and actions that is, the execution of
resources to meet the Governments national
the operation or campaign actually take place. Tactics
strategic aim.
is the art of disposing maritime, land, air, and special
forces for battle or conflict, and logistics for direct
National Strategic Aim
support of those engaged in combat, to achieve success
The national strategic aim is the Governments in battle. It is what Carl von Clausewitz referred to as the
declared purpose in a situation. It is normally theory and use of military forces in combat.
expressed in terms of a future desired outcome.

Strategic Objectives The Operational Hierarchy

A strategic objective is a goal to be achieved by

2.08 The hierarchy of operations is depicted in
one or more of the instruments of national power in
Figure 2-1. In the hierarchy, the actions performed at the
order to meet the national strategic aim.
tactical and the sub-tactical levels are the fundamental
building blocks of concrete military activity. Broadly,
Military Strategic Level
actions generate effects, which is to say, a change in the
The military strategic level is responsible for the environment or situation. Tactical actions combine into
military aspects of planning and directing conflict. operations. An operation is a series of tactical actions,
This level includes setting the military end-state and such as battles and engagements, conducted by
the broad military approach to its achievement in combat forces of one or several Services, coordinated
order to support the national strategic aim. in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational
objectives in an operational area.7

Operational Level
6
See NZDDP-3.0 Joint Operations for a further explanation of
2.06 The operational level is the level of war at
operational art.
which campaigns and major operations are planned 7
The sequenced tactical actions can be described as the process
of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack,
and commanded. A campaign consists of a series
defence, and manoeuvres needed to gain the objective of any battle
of linked operations and is conducted to achieve a or campaign.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 16

Chapter 2

2.09 A series of operations aimed at achieving The Significance of the Levels of Military
strategic and operational objectives within a given time Operations
and space is a campaign. Planning for a campaign
is appropriate when contemplated simultaneous or
sequential military operations exceed the scope of a Overlapping Levels of Military Operations
single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the
most extensive joint operations in terms of time and 2.10 In practice, the levels of military operations
other resources. overlap and the distinctions between them will rarely be
clear. For example, planning at all levels of operations
Key Terms is very closely linked, interdependent, and often occurs
concurrently. Three important issues emerge about the
ways in which the three levels of operations interact.
Campaign
There is never any clear line drawn between them
A campaign is a series of related operations aimed
as they invariably overlap. Commanders need to
at achieving strategic and operational objectives
consider this factor, especially when establishing
within a given time and space.
the levels of command in which clear distinctions
reflecting divisions of responsibility need to be
Operation
drawn.
An operation is series of military actions or the
The levels were developed with war in mind,
carrying out of a strategic, tactical, Service, training,
although they can apply to all forms of military
or administrative military mission; the process of
operation, from warfighting to the most benign
carrying on combat, including movement, supply,
attack, defence, and manoeuvres needed to gain humanitarian aid operations.

the objectives of any battle or campaign. In some operations, for example peace support

Figure 2-2: The so-called strategic corporal concept is where tactical activities may have strategic significance.

17 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Levels of Military Operations

operations and during the management of complex the coherent application of force in different ways at
confrontations, action taken at the lowest tactical different levels in pursuit of strategic objectives. It is
level may need to be responsive to strategic decision quite possible, for example, to apply force offensively at
making, with the tactical outcome having immediate one level, while being defensive at another, both being
strategic significance (the strategic corporal entirely consistent with a campaigns ultimate objective
concept). This may lead to political and military (as shown in the following real-life example on Samoa
leaders at the strategic level wishing to directly
during World War One).
influence the lowest tactical level, missing out the
intermediate operational and higher tactical levels of
command. 2.12 While the strategic/tactical overlap may be
inevitable, given the nature of some operations it does

2.11 The levels of military operations provide a threaten the essential command and control structure

general framework for the command and control of and can undermine the principles of mission command.

operations and a useful tool for the analysis of politico- The risk to effective mission command can be managed
military activity before, during, and after the conduct of if such an overlap is anticipated and included as a factor
military operations. An understanding of them and during the planning stages. Informing political and
of their limitations is vital to a commander grasping military leaders at the strategic level on the requirements
the conduct of military operations. The levels of of mission command will aid effective implementation of
military operations also provide a means of achieving the NZDF command philosophy (see Chapter 6).

Real-Life Example Operational-Level Objective: Offence at the

request of the Imperial War Department,
Different Objectives at the Strategic and New Zealand invaded German Samoa. Escorted
Operational Levels of a Military Operation: by two Navy cruisers, HMS Philomel (at the time
New Zealand Expeditionary Force to German loaned to New Zealand as a training ship) escorted
Samoa, August 1914 1400 troops with the mission of occupying German
Samoa. New Zealand adopted an offensive
Strategic Threat: The German Pacific Fleet based objective at the operational level of military
at Tsingtao (China) threatened to project naval operations.
power deep into the South Pacific. Samoa, having
The strategic assessment of the situation and the
the only base south of the equator, was assessed
decision to commit operational forces to German
as a critical vulnerability to the German plan.
Samoa was justified with the arrival of German
Pacific Fleet vessels one week after New Zealands
Strategic-Level Objective: Defence the successful occupation. Pre-emptive offensive
British imperial concept was to limit German actions at the operational level denied the Germans
access into the South Pacific and retain logistic a firm base from which to project power into the
bases for shipping. New Zealands assessment South Pacific and threaten New Zealands interests.
concluded that the Germans could readily launch The Samoa example highlights how diverse, yet
attacks against the New Zealand coast that complimentary objectives can be set at the different
would in turn necessitate increased resources levels of military operations.
for coastal security. New Zealand adopted a
Source: The Samoa (N.Z.)
defensive objective at the strategic level of military
Expeditionary Force 19141915
operations. by Stephen John, Wellington,
Ferguson & Osborn Limited, 1924

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 18

Chapter 3:

The Context of Military

Operations

19 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Contents

 Page
Chapter 3:
The Context of Military Operations 19
Introduction 21
The Structure and Characteristics of Conflict 21
Physical and Moral Planes of Conflict 21
Peace 22
Conflict 23
War 23
Warfare 24
The Character of Warfare 24
Forms of Warfare 24
The Evolution of Warfare 26
Contemporary Influences in Warfare 26
The Future of Warfare 26
The Range of Security Events  27
New Zealand Application 28
Conflict Escalation 28

Combat Operations and Stability and Support

Operations 28

A Joint, Interagency, and

Multinational Context  29
The Need for a Comprehensive Approach 29
Military Responses 32
Conflict Resolution 32
Justifiable Action 32

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 20

Chapter 3

Introduction involving the application of armed force to impose

its will on an opponent. In terms of its structure and
3.01 The modern security environment is becoming characteristics, conflict is indistinguishable from war,
increasingly complex. This can be largely attributed the difference between the two lying in wars distinct
to the interrelationships and the degree of harmony political-strategic function and the decisive military
existing among or between individuals, groups, victory sought. Because of the intrinsic similarities of
societies, and states. While individuals may act for conflict and war, the following discussion of conflict
reasons of altruism, nations generally act in their own applies equally to war.
self-interest, including the pursuit of political, economic,
ideological, religious, and cultural objectives.
The manner in which a nation elects to
wage war is not inextricably related to the
3.02 When the self-interests of groups or nations are actual practice of war, but also reflects
in harmony, or at least pose no real or perceived threat the moral view of the society which it
represents.
to each other, there is peace. When they are not, and the
actions or policies of one are viewed as threatening the A History of Warfare
by John Keegan
vital interests of another, conflict arises. Conflict, unless
minimised, resolved, or contained, can quickly escalate
in nature and scope.
Physical and Moral Planes of Conflict
3.03 States affected by serious and continuous
3.06 Physical. Conflict exists on both physical and
internal conflict may find themselves on a path to
moral planes. Conflict on the physical plane includes
dissolution and potentially civil war. Within this context,
weapons, technology, force ratios, ground captured or
conflict may occur between legitimate governments and
lost, logistical matters, and economic, personnel, and
non-state organisations such as economic, ideological,
industrial factors. Of primary importance to the conduct
or religious terrorist groups. These non-state groups
of military operations on this plane are the materiel
traditionally rely upon asymmetric attacks that are
normally considered criminal, as opposed to military, support requirements for effecting manoeuvre, fire

acts. support, and force sustainment.

3.04 Conflict and war have the potential to increase 3.07 Moral. On the moral plane, conflict is a

in intensity and violence, affect third parties, and may contest and clash between opposing human wills. Its

involve dehumanising and genocidal undercurrents. characteristics are psychological in nature and centre

For this reason, every effort must be made to reduce on the desire and will of an opponent to fight or resist.

the causes of conflict and, where it has broken out, to Among nations, they include political leadership, popular

prevent its spread and escalation. The New Zealand feeling, unity of purpose, patriotism, ideology, and

Defence Force (NZDF) fulfils a vital role by possessing national character and beliefs. Within a military force,

the capability to engage in conflict, manage conflict, and the moral plane of conflict relates to force cohesion and

restore peace in an effective, disciplined, and morally the determination and will of individuals and task forces

legitimate manner. to achieve their mission. Conflict on the moral plane

encompasses combat leadership, moral justification,
discipline, training, motivation, perseverance, morale,
esprit de corps, and everything else that inspires military
The Structure and Characteristics of
Conflict personnel and provides them reasons to fight.

3.05 While conflict is a condition or state of the 3.08 Decisiveness of the Moral Plane. Because it is
security environment, it is also a physical activity human-centred, the moral plane exerts the greater and

21 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Context of Military Operations

often decisive influence on the conduct and outcome and understood, and by fostering in subordinates
of conflict. This is where the NZDFs operations can be initiative and independence in thought and action
enhanced through the quality of its personnel. Hence, also help to reduce uncertainty.
the development of cultural values and moral qualities, Actions and Reactions. Conflict manifests a
especially those pertaining to command, leadership, continuous series of actions, reactions, and
and the military ethos, will always be of paramount situational changes as the principles of war (see
importance in the NZDF. Chapter 6) are applied. New challenges and
difficulties continually arise, along with opportunities
3.09 Characteristics of Conflict. The clash and for exploitation. The tempo of operations will be
interaction of opposing human wills, together with dependent on the ability of a force to accelerate
the firepower and destructive capabilities of modern or decelerate its activities, including synchronising

weapons, gives conflict its violent dynamic and combat functions, to meet an ever-changing

produces environments and outcomes that are rarely situation.

predictable. There are four principal characteristics of Violence and Destruction. The waging of
conflict. conflict is an intrinsically violent and bloody affair
producing destruction, terror, suffering, and death
Friction. Friction is what makes the apparently easy
for combatants and non-combatants alike. The
difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible.8
means and weapons used in modern conflict are
During conflict, friction can exist on the moral plane
extremely lethal and diverse in nature, from the
in the form of personality clashes among leaders or
crudest of weapons to weapons of mass destruction.
indecisiveness of commanders; or it may exist on the
The diversity and lethality of weapons available to
physical plane in the form of breakdown of vehicles,
potential adversaries poses significant challenges to
loss of communications, navigational errors, difficult
commanders and leaders at all levels of operations.
ground, and bad weather. When such problems
are coupled with the interplay and hostile actions of
opponents who are at the same time attempting to
To be prepared for war is one of the most
impose their will, friction abounds and makes the effectual means of preserving peace.
conduct of military operations a difficult and complex
General George Washington,
undertaking. speech to Congress, 1790
Uncertainty. All actions during conflict occur in an
atmosphere of uncertainty. Despite revolutionary
advances in information processing and data
Peace
management, knowledge, information and
intelligence about an enemy or situation will remain 3.10 Among and within nations, peace is defined as
finite and subject to probabilities. The fog of war
the absence of violence direct or indirect, manifested
is real and pervasive, generating anxiety and often
or threatened. While peace and the peaceful resolution
restricting effective decision making. Uncertainty
of conflict are the desired norms, the reality is that peace
can be reduced by developing a climate of trust
is often a temporary condition. In order for peace to
between leaders and subordinates, and by applying
be enduring and genuine, it must be based on mutual
military judgement, experience, and intuition to
respect, shared interests, and common values.
situations. Uncertainty can be reduced by having
simple, flexible plans and good standing orders and
3.11 In the international arena, peace is often the
operating procedures. Ensuring that orders and the
result of one state manifesting a superior political will
intentions of commanders are clearly articulated
that is backed by a prevalence of force and is militarily
unchallenged by others. Peace can also result from
8
a balance of power and agreed political spheres
Carl Von Clausewitz, On War; translated from German by
O.J. Mattijis Jollies, New York, The Modern Library, 1943. of interest. In either case, despite the paradoxical

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 22

Chapter 3

implications, peace is ultimately sustained by, and The potential and conditions for war, at all levels and
dependent upon, the willingness of states to use force to intensities of armed conflict, exist at all times. They occur
preserve it, as well as to restore it when lost. within and between all societies and polities and simply
reflect the existence of incompatible goals, ambitions, or
perceptions among individuals, groups, or states.
Conflict

3.12 The essence of conflict is a violent clash 3.15 The global security environment can be shaped
between opposing human wills, each group trying to by a multitude of interactions that can precipitate the
impose its own will on the other. In interstate and even threat or actual use of violence. These interactions and
intrastate conflict, the means to impose your nations will influences can be:
on an adversary may include diplomatic, economic, and political
political mechanisms, as well as the application or threat economic
of violence by military force.
religious
societal
3.13 In an environment of conflict, military action is
one tool among several that may be used by a state or environmental.

group to impose their will. The desired goal or policy

objective should be obtained preferably by non-military 3.16 Peace and war cannot always be distinguished
means. However, if this is not possible without resorting absolutely. The resolution of complex contemporary
to force, the conflict has the potential to escalate in crises may involve a hybrid of conventional warfighting
intensity and scope. and irregular activity, as well as concurrent stabilisation
activity, all in the same theatre. Boundaries between
them may be blurred; they may change suddenly and
War very obviously, or more gradually over time.

All right-thinking people regard war as 3.17 War is used when the other instruments of
a dreadful evil and are pacifists at heart. national power that is, diplomacy and economics
Probably no one is more aware of the
horror, brutality and suffering endured supported by information are unable or considered
during war than a front line infantry inappropriate to achieve national security objectives or
soldier. He has first-hand knowledge. He
protect national interests. Nations may opt to conduct
would be the last to wish it upon his sons
or daughters, yet in his heart of hearts he sustained combat operations to achieve strategic aims.
knows that there are evils more intolerable These operations are categorised as war and can range
even than war. Those New Zealanders who
served in World War II find their reward in from small- to large-scale engagements and be either
still possessing a country in which freedom single- or joint-environment in nature.
is the birth-right of each new-born child,
and the young can grow and flourish in
an atmosphere untarnished by the spectre 3.18 War is a strategic-level political and military
of the fear, brutality and inhumanity condition involving the application of a nations military
practised in a totalitarian state.
and other resources against an enemy to achieve a
A Soldiers Story political end. The object purpose of war is the winning or
A Mediterranean Odyssey
restoration of peace, which meets the political conditions
by Pat Kane
or end-state set forth by the political leadership.

3.14 War is an instrument of policy, normally 3.19 War in the conventional sense is prosecuted
stimulated by fear, self-interest, or ideology, and is through strategy. It aims to defeat the enemys military
characterised by organised violence. War is used as a forces that support and sustain a political structure and
means to assert the will of a state, individual, or group. will to fight. It may also involve attacking the enemys

23 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Context of Military Operations

other instruments of national power (diplomatic and

economic) with military forces. When embarking on a Key Terms
policy of war, the political authority consciously decides
to achieve the desired end-state by military means.
War
The basic nature of war is immutable, although warfare
evolves constantly. War is the armed hostilities between two nations.
It aims to defeat the enemys military forces that
support and sustain the enemys political structure
3.20 New Zealand has consistently advocated that
and will to fight.
it will not use war as an extension of policy. In fact,
New Zealand formally renounced the use of war as an
Warfare
element of state policy when it signed the Pact of Paris in
1928 and again when it signed the Charter of the Warfare is the application of lethal force using
United Nations (UN) in 1945. New Zealand retains the a range of combat techniques and military
right to use armed force for individual or collective self- capabilities. It is the how of waging war.
defence and for the purposes of the UN.

The Character of Warfare

Warfare
3.23 The terms war and warfare are unsatisfactory
3.21 Warfare is the conduct of war. It is the how of
to describe all the many different facets of armed
waging war. In a nation-state, warfare is the domain of
conflict. War is bound by international law that regulates
the nations armed forces. Warfare reflects, amongst
the circumstances in which states may resort to the
other things, the culture, society, and political aspirations
use of armed force (jus ad bellum in accordance with
of belligerents and other interested parties. Warfare is an
the UN Charter) and regulates the way in which armed
inherently unpredictable, often chaotic, human activity.
force is actually used. Neither peace nor war, however,
Success will often depend upon asserting some form of
are absolute, nor are they necessarily opposites of each
order or dominance on a situation and overcoming the
other (being but different means of achieving the same
inherent frictions and consequences of military activity.
end). Instead they represent a continuum or notional
spectrum. No conflict is likely to be played out entirely
3.22 Warfare changes as rapidly as the means to
at a single point. Its prevalence, scale, and intensity may
wage war and the societies that wage war do; this is to
vary from war, through to inter- and intra-state conflict
say, nearly continuously.9 Understanding the changing
characterised by instability and chaos, to activities
nature of warfare provides the context in which wars are
to promote stability, and, ultimately, lasting peace in
fought. Context helps combatants make right choices
one form or another. Moreover, it may be unhelpful to
on such essential matters as force structure, force
describe efforts to counter irregular activity, for example,
preparation, the conduct of campaigns and operations,
as war, even though such circumstances may include
and rules of engagement.
armed conflict between state and non-state actors.

Forms of Warfare

3.24 The NZDF delineates two basic forms of

warfare, based on the strategic focal point of each form.
These basic forms are:
9
Historian John Keegan has offered that war is a universal
phenomenon whose form and scope is defined by the society that traditional warfare
wages it. The changing form and scope of warfare gives value to
delineating the distinction between war and warfare. irregular activity.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 24

Chapter 3

3.25 Traditional Warfare. Traditional warfare is a 3.29 Irregular Activity. The NZDF does not use
form of warfare characterised as a violent struggle the term irregular warfare to describe non-traditional
for domination between nation-states or coalitions warfare activities. Rather, the NZDF describes this form
and alliances of nation-states. This form is labelled as of conflict as irregular activity. While the term is a little
traditional because it has been the pre-eminent form cumbersome, it more accurately describes the range
of warfare in the West since the Peace of Westphalia of conflicts covered. Irregular activity can be defined as
(1648) reserved, for the nation-state alone, a monopoly the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups
on the legitimate use of force. The strategic purpose or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally
of traditional warfare is the imposition of our will on the motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to
adversary nation-state(s) and the avoidance of their will
governance and authority.11
being imposed upon us.

3.30 As such, it comprises criminality, disorder,

3.26 In the traditional warfare model, nation-states
insurgency, and terrorism. These activities are not
fight each other for reasons as varied as their national
mutually exclusive and will often coexist in the same
interests. Military operations in traditional warfare
environment, perhaps even alongside the regular threat
normally focus on an adversarys armed forces to
posed by a states armed forces. These threats are
ultimately influence the adversarys government. With
irregular by necessity because there is little chance
the increasingly rare exception of formally declared
of prevailing physically over conventional military forces,
war, traditional warfare typically involves force-on-force
irregular actors are forced to take asymmetric actions
military operations in which adversaries employ a variety
that have a strong political or psychological impact.
of conventional military capabilities against each other
In the struggle for power and control, irregular actors
in all physical domains and the information environment
(including cyberspace). seek to outlast and discredit their opponents in the
eyes of the population through a range of information
operations and actions that fall outside the boundaries
3.27 Typical mechanisms for victory in traditional
of regular, state-on-state warfare.
warfare include the defeat of an adversarys armed
forces, the destruction of an adversarys war-making
capacity, and/or the seizure or retention of territory. 3.31 Irregular activities are usually carried out by
Traditional warfare generally assumes that the people irregulars (groups or individuals that do not legitimately
indigenous to the operational area are not belligerents represent a state). They tend to live amongst, rather than
and will accept whatever political outcome the be isolated from, populations, and operate in complex
belligerent governments impose, arbitrate, or negotiate. terrain, such as urban areas or jungles. They have
an adaptive, polymorphous character that sees them

3.28 The traditional warfare model also transition with relative ease between different types of
encompasses non-state and proto-state actors who 10 irregular activity. They typically operate in ungoverned
adopt conventional military capabilities and methods spaces, yet have an international dimension because of
in service of traditional warfare victory mechanisms. modern communications technology.
Irregular forces, to include partisan and resistance
fighters in opposition to occupying conventional military 3.32 It is important to note that regular forces may
forces, are included in the traditional warfare formulation. also operate in an irregular manner, so as to destabilise
The near-term results of traditional warfare are often and defeat irregular actors. In the NZDF, this is primarily
evident, with the conflict ending in victory for one side the domain of the Special Operations Forces (SOF).
and defeat for the other, or in stalemate.

10 11
Examples of proto-state actors are national liberation movements Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine,
and pirates who control territory and resources and provide a Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence
degree of civil administration to the peoples they control. 2008, Swindon, UK.

25 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Context of Military Operations

3.33 Irregular activity has emerged as a major and Contemporary Influences in Warfare
pervasive form of conflict, although it is not historically
new. In fact the world is witnessing a tendency towards 3.36 Modern warfare is continually changing as
irregular forms of conflict. These include: technological developments transform the ways that

terrorism operations are conducted. The political environment,

whether domestic, regional, or global, in which
economic warfare (attacks on key infrastructure
operations are conducted is also changing continuously
systems to sabotage key industries and disrupt
over time. Changes in technology affect the capability
normal life)
of military systems and also the general conditions in
information warfare (corrupting or disabling key society under which operations are conducted. These
information databases and systems) societal conditions include the state of a societys
environmental warfare (the deliberate destruction transport, communications, health, and education
of, or damage to, eco-systems so as to sabotage systems, and also the role of the mass media.
economic activity, or degrade the environment).

The Future of Warfare

3.34 The operational environment has become
increasingly indistinct and increasingly urban. Civilians
3.37 With regard to conventional forms of warfare,
are more directly or indirectly involved or affected.
technological advances and other factors are expected
The distinctions between military and non-military
to transform conflict in ways that are almost impossible
forces, civilians, combatants, and non-combatants have
to predict. Technological developments will continually
become increasingly blurred.
enhance the speed, range, stealth, precision, lethality,
and flexibility of weapons across the whole range of

The Evolution of Warfare operations.

3.35 The evolution of warfare will continue to be Key Terms

unpredictable. Its prevalence, scale, and intensity
will change along the continuum of conflict from war,
Traditional Warfare
through inter- and intra-state conflict, and ultimately to
peace. The NZDF will confront a variety of situations This is a form of warfare characterized as a violent
and threats, both state and non-state, potentially struggle for domination between nation-states
or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. This
at the same time and in the same operating area.
form is labelled as traditional because it has been
Moreover, with increasingly complex problems faced
the pre-eminent form of warfare in the West since
by commanders, the relationships between cause the Peace of Westphalia (1648) reserved, for the
and effect are increasingly hard to predict. Therefore, nation-state alone, a monopoly on the legitimate
the way commanders frame complex problems is use of force.
becoming more important. Adversaries, both state and
non-state, are adapting fast to military strength and Irregular Activity
their preferred way of operating. Adversaries in regions
Irregular activity is the use or threat of force by
with multiple persistent systematic problems, using irregular forces, groups, or individuals, frequently
de-centralised command styles and an ability to exploit ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or
the clutter of heavily populated areas, are unlikely to prevent change as a challenge to governance
present themselves in sterile operating environments and authority. It comprises criminality, disorder,
for precision attack. Conflict is less likely to end in clear insurgency, and terrorism.
victory and it will be resilience and institutional agility,
as much as technological mastery, that will define the
NZDFs chances of success.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 26

Chapter 3

The Range of Security Events and the four elements of NZDF preparedness.12 The
diagram further illustrates where those security events
3.38 In the current global security environment, are placed against the level of threat, duration, and the

neither peace nor war exists in its purest extreme form. preparedness of NZDF forces.

There is an intricate and dynamic blend of cooperation, Events in the upper left quadrant are typically urgent
confrontation, and conflict between: and unconventional events which threaten
New Zealands sovereignty.
states
Events in the upper right quadrant are less urgent
groups and factions within states
and often do not directly threaten New Zealands
other state and non-state actors. sovereignty. They do, however, pose the greatest risk
to collective security.
3.39 This wide range of different situations between The events in the lower left quadrant are typically
war and peace are frequently labelled as tension, urgent but less threatening events which require the
crisis, hostilities, and conflict and the NZDF will be NZDF to provide aid to the civil powers.
required to conduct military campaigns or operations
within these environments.
12
Deployability is the capacity of a force to move to an operational
level of capability (OLOC) and to assemble for deployment
3.40 Figure 3-1 illustrates the broad range of these within a specified time. Readiness is the current proficiency and
effectiveness of a force defined against a directed level of capability
situations, called security events, where the Government (DLOC) and employment contexts. Combat viability is the in-theatre
may employ the NZDF. The border of the diagram ability of a force to achieve its military tasks using current resources.
Sustainability is the ability to support a designated force at operating
shows the relationship between the threats posed tempo throughout the duration of an operation.

Figure 3-1: The range of security events

27 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Context of Military Operations

The lower right quadrant encompasses events Combat Operations and Stability and Support
that are less urgent to New Zealand, but provide Operations
opportunities to contribute to global stability.
3.44 The requirement to conduct combat
operations and stability and support operations, often
New Zealand Application simultaneously, is one of the great dilemmas for armed
forces. The diverse nature of the security events requires
3.41 New Zealand military doctrine is based on the clear definition so the role, risks, and potential tasks of
recognition that the NZDF can participate in a number NZDF personnel committed to an area of conflict are

of concurrent operations ordered by the Government fully understood.

to deal with a number of security events. It further

recognises that our core business will remain defending 3.45 Combat Operations. In New Zealand doctrine,
New Zealand and its interests. The range of security combat operations are defined as military operations
events extends from assisting with emergency relief where the use or threatened use of force, including
to matters of national survival. It is underpinned by lethal force, is essential to impose will on an opponent or
the concept of likelihood versus consequence. As to accomplish a mission. The actual level of force used
a general guide, the security events to the left of the during combat operations will be determined by the
diagram are more likely, but their consequences are less tactical situation and by the rules of engagement.
catastrophic when compared to the consequences of
events to the right of the diagram. The reverse is true for 3.46 Stability and Support Operations. Stability
those events to the right of the diagram, where although and support operations impose security and control
they might be unlikely, the consequences may be over an area while employing military capabilities to
catastrophic for New Zealand. restore services and support civilian agencies. Stability
and support operations involve both coercive and
cooperative actions. They may occur before, during,
Conflict Escalation and after offensive and defensive combat operations,
or as the primary objective of a campaign. Stability and
3.42 Globally, some countries are enjoying relative support operations provide an environment in which
peace, while other countries are experiencing a state the other instruments of power diplomatic, and
of conflict or even war. The condition of peace is fairly economic can predominate, in cooperation with a
easily determined, however, conflict because it also lawful government. Stability and support operations may
encompasses threats of violence is a more subjective include combat as part of the overall stabilisation.
matter. The boundary between peace and conflict is
often blurred and frequently crossed. When peace
3.47 The current complex operating environment will
is threatened, it becomes vulnerable. At that stage, if
require forces to alternate with agility between combat
disputes cannot be resolved peaceably, or policy goals
operations and stability and support operations without
are pursued through a strategy of threat or coercion, warning, based on rapidly changing tactical situations.
conflict often results. At any given moment, some portions of a force may be
conducting combat operations, while others may be
3.43 Once a conflict escalates to a level involving engaged in stability and support operations. In addition,
armed force, diplomacy and negotiation become more combat operations always need to be conducted with
difficult. Moreover, one or both parties may consider that longer-term stability and support operations in mind. The
they have no alternative but to evolve the conflict to war NZDF must be appropriately trained and equipped to
in order to achieve their objectives. conduct both types of operations concurrently.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 28

Chapter 3

A Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Context

Key Terms
3.48 Todays complex security environment means

Combat Operations that operations undertaken by New Zealands military

forces will generally be in a joint, interagency, and
Military operations where the use or threatened multinational (JIM) context. The NZDF will contribute
use of force, including lethal force, is essential to
task-organised force elements to a wider coalition.
impose will on an opponent or to accomplish a
Coalition partners could include other armed forces,
mission.
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies,
and national and foreign government agencies.
Stability and Support Operations

Stability and support operations impose security

and control over an area while employing military The Need for a Comprehensive Approach
capabilities to restore services and support civilian
agencies. 3.49 When the NZDF is operating within a JIM
context there are potentially eleven other government

Figure 3-2: Combat operations are military operations where the use or threatened use of force is essential to
mission success.

29 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Context of Military Operations

agencies contributing to the NZDFs operational tasks.13 understanding and collaboration, and appropriate
All of these agencies also regularly call on the support resourcing. This is necessarily predicated by political
of the NZDF to achieve the objectives of their own agreement on the desired outcome.14 A future desired
operations. The relationship that the NZDF has with outcome is likely to involve aspects related to security,
these other departments and agencies forms part of the governance, and economic development. The
NZDFs commitment to a comprehensive approach, complexity or evolving nature of a crisis may preclude
which will continue to grow in importance. the desired outcome being defined. It may only be
possible to look ahead months and reframe the problem

3.50 Complex crises do not lend themselves in order to discover the necessary desired outcome.

to simple definition or analysis. Todays challenges

demand a comprehensive approach by the international 3.52 Political agreement on a desired outcome
community, including coordinated action from an is necessary for clarity on strategies and objectives.
appropriate range of civil and military actors, enabled However, complete agreement between different actors
by the orchestration, coordination, and de-confliction of may be difficult to achieve and, in that case, developing
New Zealands military and political instruments with the a shared vision or unity of purpose should be pursued.
other instruments of power. This needs to be a broader Creating the conditions to achieve a desired outcome
cooperation and planning in accordance with the requires active involvement from each of the instruments
principles and decisions of relevant senior of power. It also requires effective collaboration between
New Zealand bodies. Any New Zealand engagement in military and non-military actors, across both
a comprehensive approach to crisis management needs New Zealand government agencies and a broad range
to be focused at three levels. of multinational institutions, agencies, and organisations.

At both the national- and military-strategic levels, Although the implementation of this comprehensive

New Zealand agencies need to concentrate on approach may vary between the levels of operation,

building confidence and mutual understanding and from one crisis to another, a number of guiding

between international actors. principles apply.

At the operational level, the priority is to cooperate Proactive engagement is necessary between all
with other international actors in the overall planning actors, before and during a crisis.
for complex operations in which a large degree of Shared understanding, engendered through
civil-military interaction will be required. cooperative working, liaison, education, and a
At the theatre level, NZDF force commanders must common language, is vitally important.
be empowered to cooperate and coordinate with the Collaborative working, based upon mutual trust and
local host nation authorities and other international a willingness to cooperate, is valuable institutional
actors in the execution of operations. familiarity and information sharing are key.
Thinking should be focused on outcomes, ensuring
3.51 In the context of crisis management, the that all actors work towards a common goal and,
success of a comprehensive approach is dependent ideally, mutually agreed objectives, underpinned,
on a common sense of purpose and resolve, mutual even in the absence of unity of command, by unity of
purpose.

13
While not an exhaustive list of departments/agencies that the 3.53 Commitment to a comprehensive approach
NZDF has a working relationship with, the following New Zealand does not mean that the NZDF forgoes its warfighting
government agencies are those with which the NZDF shares
common outcomes: Ministry of Defence; Department of ethos or ability to conduct conventional military
Prime Minister and Cabinet; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade;
New Zealand Police; Ministry of Fisheries; New Zealand Customs
Service; Maritime New Zealand; New Zealand Security Intelligence
14
Service; Government Communications Security Bureau; and Defined as: a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with
Department of Internal AffairsMinistry of Civil Defence and political direction, reached through intervention or as a result of
Emergency Management. some other form of influence.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 30

Chapter 3

operations. Although applicable throughout the considerate planning is crucial, given that the NZDF will
continuum of conflict and crisis, a comprehensive likely be involved in operations led by other government
approach may not be applicable to every scenario in departments or agencies leaving the NZDF in a
which NZDF force elements are engaged. The degree supporting role only.
to which a comprehensive approach is applied will be
guided by situational imperatives such as the complexity,
Key Term
duration, and nature of the situation. Nevertheless,
the NZDF recognises that in an increasingly complex
Comprehensive Approach
modern security environment, effective defence
solutions are best achieved through the input of relevant An approach that responds effectively to complex
government departments/agencies and multinational crises by orchestrating, coordinating, and de-
institutions, agencies, and organisations with an interest conflicting the activities of the military, other
in a particular crisis. government departments, and, where possible,
international organisations and non-governmental
organisations.
3.54 Just as the levels of military operations overlap
and the distinctions between them blur, similarly levels
of government operations can also overlap under a
comprehensive approach. The need for careful and

Figure 3-3: In crisis management the success of a comprehensive approach is dependent upon a common sense of
purpose, resolve, mutual understanding, collaboration, and resourcing.

31 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Context of Military Operations

Military Responses resurgence of conflict, and to create the conditions for

successful longer-term development. The immediate
3.55 The range of security events model contribution by military forces, however, is likely to
(Figure 3-1) will always be open to interpretation with be to re-establish and maintain sufficient security for
regard to where a specific event, conflict, or security the local populace and civilian agencies to enable
situation features. However, its usefulness lies in being the stabilisation process to advance. This will involve
able to identify and associate appropriate military preventing or containing violence and protecting
responses for a particular security condition or conflict people and key institutions. There will then be a need to
situation. promote those (largely political) processes which lead to
lasting stability, through the development of host nation
3.56 Stability and support operations are very broad capacity, rule of law, and a robust civil society. The level
in scope and, for the NZDF, range from assistance of military activity required depends upon the context of
to the civil authorities within New Zealand, to peace the campaign and the ability of the other instruments of
enforcement operations overseas. Warfighting for the
power and non-governmental organisations to operate
NZDF, on the other hand, is the implementation of
with appropriate protection, despite perceived security
national strategy aimed at imposing will on an enemy
risks.
and achieving national policy objectives through
application of decisive military means.
Justifiable Action

Conflict Resolution
3.59 As New Zealand prides itself on being a
democratic member of the international community
3.57 The transition from combat operations to
and a good world citizen, it is imperative that the basis
stabilisation operations (to re-establish security, stability,
for any NZDF operation demonstrably complies with
and prosperity, underpinned by the rule of law) is hugely
important. It is likely to be characterised not by the the law. All operations must be conducted within a

achievement of specific end-states (such as absolute legal framework based upon international law, national

victory), but by incremental, conditions-based outcomes domestic law, and (where not excluded by international
(although they may reflect political direction to achieve law or any agreed modifications) host nation law. There
particular goals according to a rough timetable). The must also be clearly articulated rules of engagement.
mix of actors, and their respective motivations, will be
highly dynamic. Pursuing the gradual transition towards 3.60 Central to this framework will be a justification
stability, the NZDF is likely to support the activities of for the use of force. This may be, for example, a UN
other actors in protecting, strengthening, and restoring Security Council Resolution that provides the legal
civil society, governance, rule of law, and the economy.
authority for the operation and that will determine the
mission and the desired end-state. Alternatively, the
3.58 The long-term goal should be to resolve operation may be based on New Zealands inherent
the underlying tensions that led to the inception or right of individual or collective self-defence.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 32

Chapter 4:

New Zealand Defence Force

Operational Tenets

33 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Contents

 Page
Chapter 4:
New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets 33
Introduction 35
The Warfighting Ethos 35
The Joint Effect 36
The Principles of War 36
The Manoeuvrist Approach 41
Command Philosophy 41
The Command Dilemma 41
Mission Command 42
Summary 44
Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism 44

Summarising New Zealands Approach

to the Conduct of Military Operations 45

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 34

Chapter 4

Introduction military endeavour. It follows also that military doctrine

must have at its core a warfighting ethos.
4.01 All components of the New Zealand Defence
Force (NZDF), in harmony with other instruments of 4.04 Warfighting is about the deliberate application
national power, offer a range of ways and means of of lethal force, usually by two sides against each other,
enhancing operations. Each Service makes its unique but increasingly in more complex patterns. Because of
contribution to a joint force whilst retaining its individual the destructive nature of warfighting, those involved are
Service ethos. Maritime, land and air forces have forced to endure a constant threat to their lives and well
different but complementary attributes that are amplified being. They will themselves be attempting to create and
in their respective single-Service doctrine. amplify the same fear in the minds of their adversary.

4.02 This chapter identifies and explains the 4.05 The dynamic and destructive nature of
essential elements of NZDF military operations. These warfighting produces massive uncertainty, confusion,
essential elements, defined as NZDF operational tenets, chaos, and an inevitable abandonment of initial plans
are fundamental to the conduct of military operations for the conduct of the war. With both sides attempting
and permeate down through New Zealand military to gain the advantage, surprise and shock will be a
doctrine. constant drain on resources, both physical and mental.

4.06 Warfighting is likely to be demanding and

frightening for the individuals involved. Fear and
uncertainty are likely to be commonplace, even within
the minds of those most conditioned to cope with
its challenges. The bravest men and women may be
frightened; it is their ability to carry on despite their fears
that is the measure of their courage. Importantly, by its
very nature, military activity is about confronting risk and
managing it. It is emphatically never about avoiding risk;
the military profession is not one for those who are risk
averse.

4.07 A warfighting ethos provides the NZDF with the

Figure 4-1: New Zealand Defence Force vital moral and emotional capacity to cope with most of
operational tenets the circumstances it is likely to confront in operations
across the range of security events. It also prepares
public opinion for the possibility of casualties in pursuit
of a legitimate and justifiable cause, especially when that
The Warfighting Ethos cause is a matter of choice and not fundamental to
New Zealands own national strategic interests. The
4.03 The nature of military doctrine is a product of NZDF must develop and maintain a warfighting ethos
military imperatives. Those imperatives lead ultimately in order to succeed in combat, conduct effective peace
to the need to prepare for and, if necessary, to fight and support operations, provide force protection, and be
win in battle. The conduct of warfighting in support of able to respond to government requirements across a
national interests is the most important function military range of security events.
forces may have to perform. Every member of the NZDF
must be prepared to fight for whatever legitimate cause
the New Zealand Government is pursuing through

35 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets

The Joint Effect conduct of armed conflict. These principles are known
as the principles of war.
4.08 Effective military operations at the strategic and
operational levels require military force elements from 4.13 In planning for war and in executing that plan,
all Services to operate in an integrated fashion. The commanders and their staff at all levels need to consider
integrated approach allows the value of a joint force to these principles. The principles of war are not rigid laws,
become more than merely the sum of its component but provide guidance for the conduct of military action.
parts. When commanders and staff focus upon the The principles of war maintain relevance, applicability,
desired outcomes or effects required, and employ the and relative importance in spite of dramatic changes
appropriate means from two or more Services, it is over time in the methods, techniques, and weapons of
called generating the joint effect. war. The principles used by the NZDF are listed in
Figure 4-2.
4.09 Whilst applicable to all levels of military
operations, the joint effect is predominantly concerned
with the harmonisation of force elements at the
operational and tactical levels.
The Principles of Wa r

4.10 The joint effect can only be achieved when all

Selection and maintenance of the aim
components are working effectively and harmoniously
Maintenance of morale
with those from the other Services. Each Service makes
a unique contribution to a joint force whilst retaining its Offensive action
individual Service ethos. Maritime, land, and air forces Security
have different but complementary attributes that are
Surprise
amplified in maritime, land, and air power doctrine.
Concentration of force

Economy of effort
4.11 Operations are not joint simply because
forces from different Services and resources from Flexibility
other agencies and organisations operate in the same Cooperation
area. Operations are joint when there is cooperation
Sustainability
between single-Service force elements and/or other
government agencies. Effective command and control
Figure 4-2: The New Zealand Defence Forces
of joint operations depends upon commanders and staff principles of war
understanding the relative strengths and weaknesses
(both inherent and situational) of each military or non-
military component of the force, and how they may
4.14 The Selection and Maintenance of the Aim.
complement each other. This understanding, applied in
This principle is listed first because it is the overriding
the planning and execution of operations, allows NZDF
principle of war. In the conduct of war as a whole, and
force elements to achieve military objectives out of
in every operation within it, it is essential to select and
proportion to the resources applied.
clearly define the aim.

4.15 Each phase of the conflict and each separate

The Principles of War
campaign or operation are directed towards this
supreme aim, but will have a more limited aim, which
4.12 From an understanding of the nature and types
must be clearly defined, simple, and direct. Once the
of conflict, and humanitys experience of conflict, it is
aim is decided, all efforts are directed to its attainment
possible to derive certain basic principles about the

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 36

Chapter 4

until a changed situation calls for re-appreciation and the chosen aim. The selection and maintenance of the
potentially a new aim. aim is regarded as the master principle. The remaining
principles are not given in any particular order since their

4.16 In a complex and turbulent political relative importance varies according to the nature of the

environment, problems frequently arise due to the operation.

existence of multiple conflicting and changing aims.

It is not unusual to have different aims at the national 4.18 Maintenance of Morale. Success on operations
strategic, military strategic, operational, and tactical often depends more on morale than on material
levels of operations due to the varying nature, duration, advantages. Numbers, armaments, and physical
and scope of activities conducted at each level. When resources cannot compensate for lack of courage,
different aims are set at different levels of operations, it is cohesion, energy, determination, endurance, skill,
essential that a subordinate-level aim fully supports and and a warfighting ethos, which spring from a national
contributes to the attaining of the higher-level aim. determination to succeed. The development and
subsequent maintenance of the qualities of morale are

4.17 Complexities and uncertainties inherent within therefore essential to success in war.

modern military operations reinforce the need for a

clear articulation of the purpose of any military action. 4.19 Offensive Action. Offensive action is action
Every plan or action must be tested by its bearing on by a military force to gain and retain the initiative.

Figure 4-3: Selection and maintenance of the aim is the overriding principle of war.

37 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets

Offensive action is essential in most circumstances to On the contrary, with security provided for, unexpected
the achievement of operational objectives. Offensive developments are unlikely to interfere seriously with the
action enables commanders and their forces to exploit pursuit of a vigorous offensive. Security is often closely
opportunities which capitalise on adversary weaknesses, linked to the achievement of surprise.
and to seize and hold the initiative. It is the necessary
forerunner of success. It may be delayed, but until the 4.21 Surprise. Surprise is a most effective and

initiative is seized and the offensive taken, success is powerful influence on combat operations and its

unlikely. psychological effect is immense. Every endeavour is

made to surprise an adversary and to guard against
being surprised. By the use of surprise, results out of all
4.20 Security. A sufficient degree of security is
proportion to the efforts expended can be obtained and,
essential in order to obtain freedom of action to launch
in some operations when other factors are unfavourable,
a bold offensive in pursuit of the selected aim. This
surprise may be essential to success. Surprise can be
entails adequate protection of high value assets, sea
achieved strategically, operationally, tactically, or by
denial, and protection of information and communication
exploiting new materiel. The elements of surprise are:
systems that are vital to the nation or the defence forces.
Security does not, however, imply undue caution and secrecy

avoidance of all risks, for bold action is essential to concealment

success on operations approaching warfighting. deception

Figure 4-4: Offensive action is action by a military force to gain and maintain the initiative.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 38

Chapter 4

originality 4.23 Concentration of Force. To achieve success on

audacity combat operations, it is often necessary to concentrate
superior force, moral and material, to that of the
rapidity.
adversary at the decisive time and place. Concentration
does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but
4.22 The achievement of surprise is further
rather having them so disposed as to be able to unite to
increased through the application of targeted counter-
deliver the decisive blow when and where required, or
intelligence measures and techniques, including
to counter an adversarys threats. Concentration is more
secrecy, counter-surveillance, concealment, deception,
a matter of time than of space and has more to do
and other measures to destroy, neutralise, or deceive
with the effects it has, than on the massing of force for its
an adversarys intelligence gathering, surveillance,
own sake.
and intelligence dissemination capabilities. These
latter aspects are now often referred to as information
operations or command and control warfare. 4.24 Economy of Effort. Economy of effort implies
a balanced employment of forces and a judicious
expenditure of all resources with the object of achieving
Everything which the enemy least expects an effective concentration at the decisive time and place.
will succeed the best.
The principle of economy of effort acknowledges the
King Frederick II of Prussia need for a degree of redundancy in wartime to allow

Figure 4-5: To achieve success on combat operations it is often necessary to concentrate

superior force.

39 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets

for attrition. But it is opposed to a wasteful allocation of 4.26 Cooperation. Cooperation is based on team
resources that does not maximise the contribution of spirit and entails the coordination of all force elements to
those resources to the achievement or maintenance of achieve the maximum combined effort from the whole.

the aim. Wasteful allocation of resources increases the Above all, goodwill and the desire to cooperate are

cost of a military operation, and carries with it the danger essential at all levels. The increased interdependence
of the individual Services and their increasing mutual
of threatening the achievement of the aim.
dependence on the military forces of allies and potential
coalition partners has made cooperation between them
4.25 Flexibility. Modern operations demand a high
of vital importance in modern-day military operations.
degree of flexibility to enable pre-arranged plans to be It is frequently also necessary to cooperate closely with
altered to meet changing situations and unexpected other non-governmental agencies, many of which will
developments. Most importantly, the decision-making have aims and objectives quite different from those
process needs to be flexible. This entails good training, promulgated in the military plan.
organisation, discipline, and staff work. It also calls
for high degrees of physical mobility strategically, 4.27 Sustainability. The logistics and administrative
operationally, and tactically so that our forces can arrangements are invariably crucial to success. They
be concentrated rapidly and economically at decisive should be designed to give the commander maximum
places and times. freedom of action in carrying out the plan. The logistics

Figure 4-6: Logistics and administrative arrangements are crucial to success.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 40

Chapter 4

and administrative organisation should be kept as get inside an adversarys decision-making cycle (often
simple as possible with commanders having a degree described as Boyds OODA Loop see Figure 4-7),
of control over logistics and administration within and thus achieve a superior operational tempo. This
their sphere of command, corresponding to their involves presenting active or potential adversaries with
responsibilities for the operational plan. the need to make good decisions at a faster rate than
they are able to, so that increasingly inappropriate action
is taken, or none at all, thereby paralysing their ability to
The Manoeuvrist Approach react. Clearly, any degradation of the overall command
system that can be achieved by physical or non-physical
4.28 The manoeuvrist approach is based on using means accelerates the onset of decision paralysis.
an indirect method to defeat the adversarys will to fight.
The indirect method seeks to negate the adversarys
strategy through intelligent and creative application of One of the most valuable qualities of a
commander is a flair for putting himself in
effects against their critical vulnerabilities, although it the right place at the vital time!
also considers the adversary as intelligent and adaptive.
Field Marshal Viscount Slim
Consequently it is necessary for commanders to take
measures to protect their own strategy. The manoeuvrist
approach is multi-dimensional and involves capabilities
from different arms and Services across the different
environments.

4.29 The manoeuvrist approach aims to apply

strength against vulnerable critical capabilities that
support an adversarys centre of gravity. The emphasis
is on achieving the objective through dislocating and
disrupting an adversary by taking the initiative and
applying pressure at times and places the adversary
least expects. It calls for an attitude of mind in which
doing the unexpected and seeking originality is
combined with a ruthless determination to succeed.

Machines dont fight wars, people do, and

they use their minds.
Figure 4-7: Boyds Observe, Orient, Decide, and
Colonel John Boyd, Act loop
United States Air Force

4.30 Manoeuvrist thinking is applicable to all types Command Philosophy

of military operation. Such thinking offers the prospect of
rapid results or of results disproportionately greater than The Command Dilemma
the resources applied.
4.32 Modern commanders face a dilemma in where
4.31 A key characteristic of the manoeuvrist they should position themselves: either forward to
approach is NZDF commanders attaining decision provide physical leadership and gain detailed awareness
superiority by executing better decisions with more of the tactical situation, or further back where they can
agility than the adversary. This allows commanders to better command the whole force. The art of effective

41 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets

command requires commanders to crystallise what they 4.35 Commanders at all levels need to develop a
need to achieve, where and when the decisive events plan that will convey to subordinates what the objective
are likely to occur, and then position themselves to is, and how and by what means it is to be achieved.
influence them. Where distributed operations prevent The plan is the commanders own way of achieving
commanders from being physically co-located with all the tasks delegated by the superior and contains
of their forces, they should seek to position themselves details of how these will be achieved given the forces
at a communications focal point from where they can allocated. The plan also provides subordinates with a
best command their force. Notwithstanding, there is no clear indication of their own roles and the forces they
substitute for a commanders physical presence at the are allocated to achieve them, allowing them in turn to
right time and place to galvanise effort or to make timely produce their own plan and to determine for themselves
decisions based on first-hand understanding of the how best to achieve the allotted objectives.
situation. There are three means through which effective
command is exercised:
Mission Command
sound leadership
timely and effective decision-making
good control.

4.33 Modern communications present commanders

with two interconnected challenges. The first is the
risk of superior levels of command micro-managing
operations at lower levels. The second is too heavy a
reliance on communications, which has the effect of
undermining the longer-term ability of subordinates to
take the initiative. Subordinate initiative is fundamental
to the manoeuvrist approach. Equally important to Figure 4-8: Principles of mission command
the manoeuvrist approach is the need for a range of
disparate activities and force elements to be coordinated
to achieve effective systemic disruption of the adversary.
4.36 Mission command is a command philosophy
that emphasises responsiveness to superior direction,
4.34 The best response to these two opposing
whilst promoting decentralised command in order to
but closely related challenges is to strike a degree
enable subordinate freedom, speed of action, and
of balance in command and control. Such a balance
initiative. Fundamentally, mission command addresses
allows the initiative to be taken by subordinates, but
the essential balance between direction and delegation,
with superior commanders providing guidance and
the essence of which is captured in the earlier
support when appropriate. Given the immediate
description of the command dilemma. Under mission
impact that some tactical decisions can have on
command, the onus is on subordinate commanders
strategic outcomes, achieving the right balance is not
to fully understand their superiors intent and be able
always easy. Nevertheless, a balanced command and
to work cohesively and flexibly to support that intent.
control approach is a fundamentally important skill for
Mission command reinforces the manoeuvrist approach
commanders to develop. The key to this is mutual trust
and the achievement of the desired operational effect in
and confidence amongst commanders at all levels, so
the modern operational environment.
that subordinate commanders are empowered to use
their initiative when they are unable to get guidance from
their superior. 4.37 Mission command requires a style of command
that recognises four supporting principles:

timely and effective decision making

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 42

Chapter 4

a thorough understanding of a superior continual development. Progressive thinking should

commanders intentions be used to translate a higher commanders intent
clear responsibilities on the part of the subordinate to into lower-level objectives, and foster an outcome-
fulfil that intent driven approach. Mission command cannot function
without the unifying purpose of commanders intent.
the commanders determination to take the plan
through to a successful conclusion. Apply Wisely. Mission command does not
necessarily apply to all situations and to all

4.38 Elements of Mission Command. To execute personnel. Commanders have a right to be satisfied

effective mission command, commanders at all levels that subordinates not only understand their

should apply the following elements. intentions, but are also acting on them. This cannot
always be achieved by remote direction. The use of
A commander ensures that subordinates understand
orders groups, back-briefs before mission execution,
the commanders intentions, their own missions, and
and face-to-face communication during the conduct
the strategic, operational, and tactical context.
of operations not only develops trust and mutual
Subordinates are told what objective(s) they are to
understanding of the plan, but also strengthens
achieve and the reason why this is necessary.
collective and individual confidence, purpose, and
Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to resolve.
carry out their missions.
In particular, mission command may not be
A commander uses a minimum of control so as not compatible with, or acceptable to, some of our
to limit unnecessarily his subordinates freedom of potential coalition partners. Mission command
action. should be applied with particular care in a
Subordinates decide for themselves how best to multinational environment. Whilst over-direction may
achieve their missions. cause offence, too little direction may cause little
effect. Mission command has the status of a general
4.39 The NZDF approach to mission command rule, however, it should not preclude the very
stresses six key concepts that are used in the necessary element of active control.
application of mission command. Risk Aversion and Force Protection. Commanders
Learn through Practice. Mission command requires are responsible for the life and safety of the
practice during training for military operations members of the armed forces under their command.
in general, not just for a particular operation. Omitting to take adequate steps to protect them is
Questioning should be encouraged to provide insight a fundamental failure of command and will expose
by engaging experience and creativity. Programmed the commander to legal liability. Recognising
knowledge relies on published sources (including and working within constraints, including those
doctrine). Together, practice and programmed imposed by the law, is also a vital aspect of mission
knowledge permit learning as a form of self-acquired command. Warfighting involves risk-taking. Therefore
wisdom, which promotes and increases the capacity mission command should be used during peacetime,
to embrace change. with appropriate risk management measures, to
In order to practice mission command, sufficient develop decisiveness, moral courage, initiative, and
instruction and training should occur in a benign daring that can be easily translated into a warfighting
environment in which honest mistakes are accepted environment, while at the same time ensuring that
and discussed, and in which unorthodox solutions the moral, legal, and prudential requirements to
are not rejected. An active learning philosophy also ensure force protection are not neglected.
creates an atmosphere for individuals to make wider Remain Flexible and Adaptable. Mission command
contributions. must remain dynamic and agile. It should be applied
A deeper understanding of what constitutes flexibly, reflecting the understanding that doctrine
commanders intent should be the subject of itself is not immutable, and should be adapted for a

43 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Force Operational Tenets

particular campaign, operation, or situation. Summary

A commanders style of command must also
reflect the situation, including the capability and 4.40 A key strength of mission command is that
understanding of subordinate commanders. it encourages a style of command that promotes
The characteristics of persuasion, compulsion, decentralised command, freedom, speed of action, and
loyalty, and leadership by example combine to initiative. The philosophy of mission command fits hand-
create an individual command style, but the relative in-glove with the NZDFs organisational culture, cultural
proportion of each must be tempered to suit the values, and approach to the conduct of joint operations.
situation.
In exceptional circumstances, there will be fleeting
opportunities where commanders may have to Inherent Flexibility and Pragmatism
skip an echelon and reach down at least one level
of command. Historical evidence provides many 4.41 Perhaps not surprisingly, the final theme
examples of this: Napoleon, Rommel, and Patton is the duality of inherent flexibility and pragmatism.
all intervened at a decisive point and brought about Manoeuvrist operations require a conditioned and
startling tactical successes. Endorsement of such resilient attitude of mind developed through experience
action by a commander should not be seen as in training and, if possible, in practice. Manoeuvrist
an encouragement of micromanagement; it is a operations also require considerable thought and
technique that should be applied sparingly, based imagination in both planning and execution.
on higher strategic knowledge, to turn the tide in a
wavering operation or to seize the initiative where 4.42 Commanders must be conditioned to think
none was previously seen to exist. constantly of new ways of approaching an objective.
Delegation. The NZDFs mission command Imaginative and innovative thinking is ultimately what
philosophy is realised in the commanders generates success in military operations. To allow for
confidence in delegating responsibility to such thinking, New Zealand doctrine adopts a flexible
subordinates, and the professional discharge of and pragmatic approach in two ways.
those responsibilities of command by subordinates. It is constantly reviewed and reconsidered and, if
This is of particular importance in response to found wanting, is changed to reflect the developing
fleeting windows of opportunity during the conduct military environment.
of operations, and contingencies where no specific
More importantly, it allows for deviation. Dogma
direction has been given to the subordinate.
the resort of the idle and unimaginative mind is
Information Management. Recent advances in not recommended.
information systems can boost the effectiveness
of mission command through expanded and more
4.43 Doctrine is promulgated for guidance only,
efficient networking. However, too much information
not for slavish adherence. An intelligent and talented
can prove counter-productive, and care must be
commander faced with unique circumstances will always
taken to guard against trying to collect all possible
be better placed than the writer of doctrine to assess the
information to inform everyone about everything all
most appropriate way of achieving his objective.
the time. Conversely, without enough detail, staff
cannot provide effective advice to the commander.
The answer is in achieving an appropriate balance Nine tenths of tactics are certain and
and ensuring that sufficient useable information is taught in books; but the irrational tenth is
collected and passed to the appropriate personnel. like the kingfisher flashing across the pool
and that is the test of generals.

T.E. Lawrence

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 44

Chapter 4

4.44 The recognition of the requirement for to joint, integrated, and multinational operations is the
commanders to possess a flexible and pragmatic means by which New Zealands full range of defence
attitude eschews the formulaic and prescriptive in favour capabilities and attributes may be brought to bear by
of the unpredictable and surprising. The combination a commander to achieve the desired operational and
of flexibility and pragmatism is absolutely necessary to strategic outcomes.
successfully conduct modern military operations across
the spectrum. It is reflected in New Zealand doctrine by
4.47 In delivering the joint effect, NZDF elements
the simple expedient of avoiding obligatory prescriptive
are guided by the principles of war, the advantages
rules while encouraging a distinctive way of thinking
conferred by joint operations, and the imperative to
about military operations.
employ a manoeuvrist approach. For this approach to
be effective, the NZDF is reliant upon a philosophy of
command that allows commanders at all levels sufficient
Summarising New Zealands Approach to scope for determining how to achieve the desired
the Conduct of Military Operations end-state. Additionally, the flexible and pragmatic
application of the principles of war is fundamental to the
4.45 When combined with the NZDF culture and
manoeuvrist approach.
values, the six operational tenets represent the
New Zealand approach to military operations across the
range of security events. The operational tenets are not
mutually exclusive of each other; rather, they overlap
and rely upon each other to form an approach to military
success (see Figure 4-9).

4.46 Retention of a warfighting ethos is central to

cultivating and maintaining the means that facilitate
success in military activities across the range of security
events. Contributing effective military force elements

Figure 4-9: Summary of the New Zealand Defence Forces operational tenets

45 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Operational Art and Design

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 46

Chapter 5:

Components of Fighting
Power

47 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Contents

 Page
Chapter 5:
Components of Fighting Power 47
Introduction 49
The Conceptual Component 49
The Principles of War 49
Doctrine 49
Conceptual Thinking 50
The Moral Component 51
Motivation 51
Leadership 51
Management 52
The Physical Component 52
Personnel 52
Equipment 52
Integrated Performance 52
Readiness 53
Sustainability 53

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Chapter 5

Introduction The Principles of War

5.01 Warfighting defines armed forces ability to 5.04 The principles of war were discussed in
fight and achieve success in operations. The essence of Chapter 4. Their origins can be traced back to Sun
warfighting is underpinned by the three components of Tzu, were inherent in Carl von Clausewitzs writing,
fighting power that may be applied in both combat and and achieved their current form immediately after the
stability and support operations. These components are: Second World War. There is a degree of consistency
throughout previous iterations of the principles and, in
conceptual
their collective form, they remain applicable to this day.
moral The principles of war are the foundation upon which
physical. NZDF doctrine is based.

5.02 The interrelationship between each component Doctrine

is shown in Figure 5-1.
5.05 NZDF military doctrine uses the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) and other suitable foreign doctrine,
specifically those publications focused on joint and
combined operations. The New Zealand Government
is committed to a policy of Closer Defence Relations
with Australia. One aspect of this relationship is
interoperability through a similar doctrinal approach.
At the operational level, the NZDF tends to use ADF
and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) doctrinal
publications.

5.06 NZDF policy recognises that deployed force

elements will be required to undertake operations
as part of a multinational force. Historically, this has
been under the command of an Australian, British, or
American coalition partner. Standardisation agreements
and cooperation fora are important references in the
development of New Zealand military doctrine to ensure
interoperability, commonality, and standardisation with
Figure 5-1: The components of fighting power
these prospective coalition partners.15Accordingly,

The Conceptual Component 15

The principal standardisation agreements that the NZDF
participates in are: Air Force Air and Space Interoperability
5.03 The conceptual component provides the Council (ASIC); Army American, British, Canadian, Australian and
New Zealand (ABCA) Interoperability Program; Navy Australia,
thought processes needed to develop the ability to Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States agreement
fight. It comprises both lessons from the past and (AUSCANNZUKUS) Naval Command Control and Communications
Board; Defence Research and Development The Technical
thinking about how the New Zealand Defence Force Cooperation Program (TTCP); Command and Control Australia/
(NZDF) can best operate today and in the future. The New Zealand Command and Control Interoperability Board;
Logistics Australia/New Zealand Operational Logistics Working
conceptual component of fighting power consists of the Party; Communications Australia/New Zealand Communications
principles of war, doctrine, and conceptual thinking. It Forum; and Military Communications and Electronics
Combined Communications Electronics Board (CCEB). Other
is the combination of the principles of war and doctrine, joint multinational interoperability forums in which the NZDF
applied with imagination and initiative by commanders, participates are: the Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC);
the Quinquepartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC),
that provides the intellectual force driving the NZDFs
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Allied Joint Operations
fighting ability in current operations. Doctrine Working Group (AJODWG).

49 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Components of Fighting Power

Australian, British, American, and Canadian operational- acquisition, collation, processing, management, and
level doctrine provide a critical input into the NZDFs distribution of information.
military doctrine. A means to prepare forces for employment
essentially, all the activities needed to define,
resource, and deliver fighting power for operational
Conceptual Thinking
employment, within readiness criteria laid down in
policy. Service chiefs contribute to this capability by
5.07 There is a further essential element to
fulfilling the raise and train functions of their raise,
the conceptual component that assists with the
train, and maintain responsibilities.
development of warfighting into the future. It is
concerned with innovation and ideas for developing Measures and resources to project and recover, in a
future capabilities and better ways of operating in timely manner, a force that is appropriately packaged
a continually fluctuating strategic environment. The for the objective it is pursuing.
development of concepts for future operations is vital The means to protect and preserve NZDF force
for both force and doctrine development. Without elements, principally on operations. This involves
conceptual thinking and the complementary equipment, countering natural, human, and technological
the NZDF could not maintain a warfighting capability. threats.
In thinking about the future of warfare and the forces
The ability to sustain the force specifically, the
necessary to cope with its challenges, the NZDF uses a
maintenance of the necessary level of fighting
capability-based approach.
power required to achieve objectives. Service chiefs
contribute to this capability by fulfilling the inherent
5.08 The NZDF recognises that there are seven sustain function of their raise, train, and maintain
fundamental capabilities required to deliver warfighting responsibilities.
(see Figure 5-2).
All of the above capabilities are necessary in order to
A robust and responsive means of command the discharge the prime function, namely to operate by
authority for the direction, coordination, and control conducting military actions, primarily in combat.
of military forces. This includes movement, supply, attack, defence,
A process to inform the command namely the and manoeuvre.

Figure 5-2: The seven fundamental defence capabilities

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 50

Chapter 5

5.09 These fundamental defence capabilities are belief is linked to the individuals involvement in its
interrelated and supporting; none can be considered in pursuit. Involvement is a stronger source of motivation
isolation, and all are required in varying measure to meet for most people when they feel themselves to be a part
the requirements of government policy. A representation of a team, all members of which provide the others with
of this multi-dimensional interrelationship is shown in support.
Figure 5-2.

5.14 In military units, given the challenges inherent

in warfighting, the need is to go beyond mere team
The Moral Component
building. Military units need to develop genuine
comradeship that will endure despite the trauma that
Battles are won in the hearts of men. violence, injury, and death can bring. It is pride in
belonging, best described by the term esprit de corps
Field Marshal Montgomery
in relation to unit identity, but which at a higher level
includes a belief in patriotic duty.

5.10 Ultimately it is people that realise warfighting

ability. New Zealand has a highly skilled volunteer 5.15 Being highly motivated in peacetime is one
defence force with a history of excellence. The thing. To retain that motivation in the face of battle
strengths and expert skills of the Defence Force require requires a strong commitment to ones comrades, ones
time, effort, and resources in order to be developed, unit, ones country, and to the cause for which one is
maintained, and exploited to the nations advantage. fighting.
The moral component of fighting power is about creating
and sustaining our peoples will to fight and win. It
depends on good morale and the conviction that our Leadership
purpose is morally and ethically sound. These promote
an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the 5.16 Leadership is the principal element in the
aim. maintenance of morale. Without good leadership,
morale will undoubtedly crumble in the face of

5.11 There are many things that contribute to the adversity. All leaders must accept their responsibility for
moral component of fighting power: training, confidence maintaining morale and the fighting spirit of those under
in equipment, fair and firm discipline, self-respect, and their command.
a clear understanding of what is going on and what
is required. With all of those in place, there is clear 5.17 Military leadership is the projection of
potential for military success. To draw it out, however, personality and character to get subordinates to do what
requires motivation, leadership, and management. is required of them and to engender within them the
confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of
risk and responsibility.
Motivation

5.12 Motivation implies a determination for getting 5.18 Born leaders are rare, but leadership potential
things done. It derives from a personal commitment to can be developed by training, experience, study of the
an idea, a sense of purpose, and a feeling of belonging. methods of great leaders in the past, and knowledge
In many people, there is an instinctive desire to do what of military doctrine. Through these, individuals develop
is right and good. their own style of leadership and no two people will
necessarily lead in exactly the same way.

5.13 One means of generating motivation, therefore,

is to ensure that NZDF personnel believe in what they 5.19 Leadership starts with self-discipline. It is a
are doing. A sense of purpose is achieved when that continuous process throughout training and daily

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 Components of Fighting Power

life. Leaders promote this amongst their subordinates as NZDF-employed civilians and contractors. The
by decisive action, precept and example, advice, servicemen and servicewomen are highly trained and
encouragement and admonishment, and by giving skilled volunteers. They go through a rigorous selection
their subordinates every opportunity of contributing and initial training process that gives them an essential
to operational and tactical success. It is a truism grounding for the further professional development
that operational success provides the quickest and and collective training necessary to turn them into
most effective boost to morale for those at war, but effective combatants. NZDF personnel are highly
outstanding leadership will sustain high morale when all regarded internationally. Nevertheless, their skills need
other factors are against it. to be nurtured, developed, and retained. No matter
how successful they might have been in the past, their
effectiveness can easily be undermined by changing
Management economic, social, and political factors and by significant
shifts in the values of society as a whole.
5.20 Management is no substitute for leadership, but
is a vital element of the moral component nevertheless.
Management is about making the best use of resources. Equipment
It is an attribute of command that cant be overlooked
because it is fundamental to efficiency and relates to two 5.24 NZDF force elements can expect to deploy on
principles of war: economy of effort and sustainability. In operations with their existing inventory of equipment.
this sense, especially in relation to logistics, it also has a A fundamental part of maintaining warfighting capability
bearing on the physical component of fighting power. is the ability to field the most effective equipment/
systems. The NZDF procurement approach is to utilise
5.21 Management is regarded as an element of the military off-the-shelf (MOTS) when required, with the
moral component, because without good management ability to determine when commercial off-the-shelf
of resources and the provision of sufficient administrative (COTS) is appropriate. The aim of this procurement
support, the maintenance of morale and the motivation philosophy is to ensure correct investment in the
of the force would be rendered considerably more appropriate military technology necessary to maintain
difficult. The measure of good management is the ability comparable position and interoperability with our
to achieve the right balance neither overabundance partners and to defeat potential adversaries, whilst
nor a shortage of resources, either of which would maintaining a sufficient breadth of capabilities.
undermine the concentration of effort on the main
objective. 5.25 Ideally those in defence-related industries
should have a clear understanding of the New Zealand
approach to military operations in order that they can
The Physical Component better anticipate the NZDFs equipment needs.

5.22 The physical component of fighting power

is the physical means to fight. It has five elements: Integrated Performance
personnel, equipment, integrated performance,
readiness, and sustainability. The effective combination 5.26 An integrated performance is the end result

of these five elements is essential in order for the NZDF of individual and collective training across the NZDF.

to be deployed in good time and sustained to achieve This can only be achieved through an understanding of

the tasks assigned by the New Zealand Government. common doctrine, combined with collective training and
exercising to rehearse and sharpen the ability to apply
it. Commanders devise ways of ensuring that the forces
Personnel under their command are as prepared as possible for
the ultimate demands of warfighting. There can be no
5.23 Personnel in the NZDF comprise servicemen compromise on this, since the ability to deploy fully
and servicewomen, both regular and reserve, as well prepared for combat is at the core of warfighting.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 52

Chapter 5

Readiness an operation starts, events will generate further demands

on the force. It cannot be assumed that a campaign plan
5.27 The ability to deploy combines the physical will survive the first encounter with the enemy. This is
process of transit into an area of operations with the why the ability to sustain is so important a part of fighting
readiness to do so in as short a time as possible. By power.
their nature, crises occur unexpectedly. Timelines are
quite likely to be short. Government policy, through
Key Term
the NZDF Output Plan, lays down readiness criteria for
the force elements of the NZDF, in which priorities are
Fighting Power
listed and forces allocated differing response times. The
readiness details are themselves part of policy and not Fighting power consists of three interlinked
doctrine, but a commanders responsibility to meet them components: the conceptual, the moral, and the
is a doctrinal imperative. physical.

Sustainability

5.28 Sustaining military forces in war is as vital a

function as their ability to deliver firepower. As soon as

53 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The New Zealand Defence Force Operations Planning Process

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 54

Chapter 6:

The Broader Utility of

Fighting Power

55 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Contents

 Page
Chapter 6:
The Broader Utility of Fighting Power 55
Introduction 57
Identifying Crisis and Stability 57
New Zealands Involvement 57
Conflict Prevention 58
Enforcement Action 58
Managing Confrontation 58
Impartiality 59
Consent 59
Restraint in the Use of Force 59
Humanitarian Operations 59
The Essentials of Crisis Management 60
Domestic Tasks 61

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 56

Chapter 6

Introduction Chapter 3 implies an increasing amount of disagreement

and conflict as international relations move from
6.01 While it is the ability to engage in warfighting peace towards war. Movement can take place in either
activities that provides the New Zealand Defence Force direction and can be gradual or rapid. There can also be
(NZDF) with its raison dtre, the NZDF can be employed unpredictability, with movement first one way and then
on a variety of activities across the spectrum of military the other.
operations. For many of these operations the NZDF
will require its combat potential, but some will be more 6.06 In contrast, a relationship may remain in the
benign, including those mounted to improve the living same position for extended periods; in that case there
conditions of those subject to natural or humanitarian is a measure of stability. Stability is a relative construct,
disaster. however, and might be a cause for concern if it is
achieved at a position too close to war for comfort. That
6.02 In a moral and physical sense, warfighting said, two neighbouring states might have a fundamental
places the greatest demands on military forces, but is disagreement but their relationship may remain stable,
also the capability for which armed forces are trained and they may even be allies in other respects.
and equipped. Consequently, this publication focuses on
warfighting, as the capabilities developed for warfighting 6.07 Crisis comes when stability is lost and there is a
can also be applied, in an appropriate form, to a wide perceptible movement along the spectrum towards war
range of operations such as peace support operations, (movement the other way also represents instability, but
humanitarian and disaster relief, and more discrete tasks of a more benign nature). In working to prevent conflict,
such as non-combatant evacuation operations. attempts are made to move relations along the spectrum
towards peace.
6.03 The NZDF may be required to undertake some
emergency aid tasks and reconstruction to help restore 6.08 The trigger for movement in the direction of war
basic facilities for a suffering population, as well as can take many forms. No two crises are identical. Each
assisting with some policing roles to create a secure crisis needs to be dealt with in a unique manner with
and stable environment. The purpose of military force regards to the type of negotiations and arrangements
activity is to create conditions that allow other agencies set up to restore stability. In some cases it may be easier
to continue working towards restoring normality without to achieve stability by institutionalising disagreement
the need for a military presence. and establishing a framework for reducing its effects,
rather than wasting valuable effort trying to resolve the
6.04 Creating long-term dependency upon irresolvable.
NZDF force elements by the local population is
counterproductive to the strategic objective. Every effort 6.09 Military containment is a positive role for
has to be made to encourage civilian agencies to take defence forces, the aim of which is to achieve stability
over the various tasks as soon as possible. In order in terms of security, which will allow other political,
to achieve its part of the mission, the NZDF may have diplomatic, or economic efforts to move the disputing
to use varying levels of force. The end-state of military parties towards a lasting peaceful settlement.
withdrawal must always be borne in mind, and there
are a number of considerations that are important in
achieving it. New Zealands Involvement

6.10 The scope of security events model (Figure 3-1)

Identifying Crisis and Stability can be used to describe New Zealands relationships
with other nations. It also applies, however, to
6.05 The scope of security events discussed in relationships between other nations when New Zealand

57 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Broader Utility of Fighting Power

is merely an observer or possibly an independent economic, and military instruments may need to be
participant in the process of conflict prevention and introduced. This activity will inevitably involve several
resolution. Importantly, such situations can be truly government departments, coordinated through the
international (involving two or more nations) or they can Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC) to
involve internal conflicts and civil wars that also pose a ensure that New Zealand strategic decision-making and
threat to wider international stability. activities are coherent and properly orchestrated.

6.11 The New Zealand Government determines 6.15 Defence diplomacy activities (such as military
the manner in which New Zealand addresses its visits, exchanges of military information, and the
international relations and becomes involved in crisis provision of military education and training) are intended
resolution and the restoration of stability. If a decision to dispel hostility, build and maintain trust, and assist in
is made to employ the NZDF, it will most likely result the development of democratically accountable defence
in operations conducted with those other nations in forces.
multinational alliance or coalition arrangements, with
relationships of increasing complexity. In whatever
capacity New Zealand is involved, the three instruments Enforcement Action
of national power the diplomatic, the economic,
and the military, all supported by information are 6.16 Enforcement action is closest to war, in the
employed in concert as the circumstances demand. sense that the nature of the task will usually result in a
The military instrument is but one of the means at the recognised mandate to employ warfighting techniques

Governments disposal. to achieve the aim. Such operations are not driven
by the need for impartiality, because the mandate will
typically be aimed at coercing a particular nation or
6.12 The NZDFs commitment to a comprehensive
nations to adopt an explicit course of action.
approach enables it to participate more effectively in
situations that require the NZDF to work alongside the
6.17 The aim of enforcement action is likely to be
other instruments of national power. In particular, the
to impel the various parties to engage in negotiations
collaborative processes, shared understanding, and
towards a peace agreement, to deter them from taking
concerted action emphasised under a comprehensive
particular actions, or something similarly prescriptive.
approach are essential enablers in crisis prevention
This was certainly the case in relation to the deployment
and resolution. Commitment to a comprehensive
of a Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) frigate to the
approach thus helps the NZDF understand how it may
Persian Gulf to assist in the enforcement of
best support, and be supported by, other instruments of
United Nations (UN) sanctions against Iraq.
national power in achieving New Zealand Government
objectives.

Managing Confrontation

Conflict Prevention 6.18 Even with an agreement in place, defence

forces may still be needed to contain residual conflict
6.13 Prevention of conflict is vital to the maintenance between protagonists while other political, diplomatic,
of international stability and security. The primary or economic actions are taken to conclude a lasting
means of conflict prevention are diplomatic, including settlement of the dispute. The overriding consideration
circumstances in which diplomatic efforts are backed up in conducting peace support or stability and support
by the implicit threat to engage military force. operations in circumstances requiring military
containment, is that the military instrument is but one
6.14 As a potential crisis begins to take form, more component of the total effort required to achieve a
concerted efforts involving the full range of diplomatic, lasting peace.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 58

Chapter 6

6.19 Other elements that contribute to a lasting expected to act impartially and lawfully in the conduct of
peace include: operations to promote and enforce the mandate.

the people of the host nation and their government

civil administrators Consent
international organisations (including the UN and its
specialist agencies) 6.24 While there is generally a strategic-level
non-governmental organisations mandate for the conduct of operations and the presence
of armed forces, there may well be variance in the
commercial companies supporting operations and/or
degree of consent to that mandate at lower levels and
looking to assist with reconstruction projects.
in different locations. Military actions can be necessarily
robust at times, but the strategic outcomes associated
6.20 While all such organisations are vital, it is the
with the mandate should always be borne in mind.
military forces deployed into the affected area that
provide the ultimate power base. It is their ability to force
de-escalation and encourage or enforce compliance that Restraint in the Use of Force
ensures a stable security environment within which the
others can operate. 6.25 Excessive use of force is unlikely to aid in the
promotion of the strategic goals and be consistent with
6.21 Force must be used as part of an overall the mandate. The mandate may justify, or in fact require,
approach to confrontation management. The use of the use of appropriate force to achieve the objective.
warfighting techniques may be essential to ensure
security or compliance, but the aim will never be 6.26 The strategic consequences of the use of
destruction or the application of lethal force for its own force are a relevant and important consideration where
sake. When force is used, it is vital to regard it as a such force is employed by armed forces. A clear
tool to be used in support of broader confrontation understanding of the consequences of appropriate
management. The application of force will need to
levels of force for coercion and deterrence is essential.
be coordinated with other elements of confrontation
management in progress at the same time.

Humanitarian Operations
6.22 In the early stages, and while stabilising the
security situation, defence forces may be the only 6.27 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
organised group present. They need to be prepared to Operations. There will be occasions when it will be
initiate integrated campaign planning to include each appropriate to deploy military assets to assist in a
element as it arrives.16 foreign emergency or disaster relief operation, either
on a national basis or as part of an international effort.
In such operations, the NZDF will be deployed for
Impartiality
a specific task in an entirely benign posture (except
for essential force protection) and in support of the
6.23 Armed forces are expected to conduct
coordinating humanitarian agency. Examples of this
themselves within the parameters of the mandate
include the support to Indonesia in the aftermath of
underpinning and authorising an operation. This
the devastating 2004 Asian tsunami and the support to
effectively creates the strategic justification for the
presence of a military force. Such military forces are Samoa after the 2010 tsunami.

6.28 Humanitarian Assistance. The provision

16
A Theatre Integrated Campaign Plan (TICP) must incorporate
of humanitarian aid is principally a function of
cross-government objectives and activities and non-military
representatives will be critical in developing it. humanitarian and development agencies. There may be

59 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Broader Utility of Fighting Power

Figure 6-1: There are times when it is necessary to deploy military assets to assist with disaster relief or humanitarian
assistance operations.

circumstances, especially during conflict, when these fundamental dilemma. The military desire is for a clearly
agencies are unable to deliver such aid without support stated and hard objective as the basis for mission
from the military. Humanitarian assistance differs from planning. However, the essential fluidity of crises renders
that undertaken in disaster relief operations, in that: the identification of clear, firm, and enduring aims almost

the provision of humanitarian aid is not the primary impossible from a political point of view.

mission of the military commander

the force has not been deployed in support of a 6.30 As soon as any military operation commences,
humanitarian agency, but for the purpose of military the crisis agenda inevitably changes and political aims
operations and objectives develop afresh. This is particularly the
case in peace support operations and during fast
the military will hand over full responsibility for the
moving crises. In contrast, during longer term operations
humanitarian task to civilian agencies at the earliest
established to maintain stability, military aims will tend to
possible opportunity.
be clearer and better understood.

The Essentials of Crisis Management 6.31 Crisis management at the higher levels needs
to accommodate both political and military imperatives.
6.29 During a crisis, there will be a demanding The Officials Committee for Domestic and External
set of shifting priorities and objectives, and any crisis Security Coordination (ODESC) fulfils a critical role in
management organisation must be designed to this process. The Committee exercises oversight in
meet various essential criteria. The master principle respect of matters of intelligence, security, and crisis
of war, selection and maintenance of the aim, is of management. The Committee is tasked to ensure
crucial importance in this context, and the source of a that timely, relevant, and useful advice is provided

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 60

Chapter 6

by affected government agencies to Ministers of the Domestic Tasks

New Zealand Government (for example, through the
Cabinet Committee on Domestic and External Security 6.34 The NZDF has the capacity to deliver a
Coordination). range of services in support of other government
departments, the community, and foreign and defence
6.32 The ODESC framework is designed to facilitate policy objectives (see Figure 6-2). This support may
a comprehensive approach in a national crisis, or be provided by a combination of deployable force
in circumstances affecting New Zealands security. elements and non-deployable support or training units.
The intent is to monitor emerging threats, risks, and These operations are generally divided into government
vulnerabilities, and implement measures to control support operations and community support operations.
possible problems and manage potential consequences.
The ODESC is activated in the event of a major crisis 6.35 The term domestic tasks is used to describe
or security event affecting New Zealand or its critical both the formal, pre-planned support to specific
interests abroad. government departments and agencies, and the
unplanned emergency support in times of crisis.
6.33 NZDF involvement in the ODESC process is Domestic tasks are becoming an increasingly significant
normally limited to events affecting national security function for the NZDF within New Zealands range of
within New Zealands borders, such as counter- security events. Undertaking domestic tasks is a joint
terrorist operations. In almost all other national security activity and typically involves operations concerned with
situations, following ODESC deliberations, the NZDF the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone/maritime
provides advice and receives direction directly from environment and New Zealand territory, including border
the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Within this context, the patrol.
NZDF is responsible for formulation of advice to the
Government and, at its direction, implementation of a
crisis management strategy.

Figure 6-2: Agencies supported by the New Zealand Defence Force

61 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 The Broader Utility of Fighting Power

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 62

Chapter 7:

Generating Warfighting
Capacity

63 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Contents

 Page
Chapter 7:
Generating Warfighting Capacity 63
Introduction 65
Components of Capability 65
Infrastructure and Organisations 66
Concepts, Doctrine, and Collective Training 66
Equipment, Supplies and Services, and
Resources 66
Preparedness 67
Reserve Forces 67

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 64

Chapter 7

Introduction enable a military force to successfully achieve an

operational objective or task. In the NZDF, the elements
7.01 The New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) does by which the military capability of a force is measured
not maintain a large military force-in-being. In a period are preparedness and the components described by the
of extended peace, the NZDF places emphasis on the acronym PRICIE (see Figure 7-1).
important long-term task of investing in, and developing,
military capabilities to meet significant defence 7.03 Personnel. Operational capability is delivered
contingencies. The resources available to the NZDF through people, who are the sole component of
will always be limited, whether the task is preparing for capability with the intrinsic ability to generate value.
conflict or fulfilling peacetime commitments. The NZDF All other components remain inert potential, which
utilises the Capability Management Framework (CMF) must ultimately be leveraged by people. Paradoxically,
to provide the mechanism to balance the competing people are the most problematic element of capability
demands of generating capability for near-term to acquire, manage, change, and cease employing.
tasks from a capability baseline (preparedness) and Therefore, there is a need to identify:
developing future capability (modernisation). Balance
the number of personnel required to deliver, sustain,
is required because decisions to invest in one area will
support, command, and control the capability,
generally result in fewer resources for the other.
together with provision of associated administrative
support
the capability organisation structure
Components of Capability
the skills and competency profiles required to

7.02 Military capability is the ability to achieve a achieve the above

desired operational objective in a selected environment the recruiting implications

and to sustain that level of effort for a designated period. the training/retraining requirements
It is the combined effect that systems of inputs have in timely identification and management of personnel
helping to achieve a particular operational consequence. risk.
Military capability goes beyond just equipment. Rather,
it includes all necessary components that, together,
7.04 Research and Development. Research and
development (R&D) is the engine for change in the
continual modernisation of the NZDF. The NZDF must
be a smart buyer and user of technology to ensure that
it maximises the effectiveness of its limited assets, and
keeps them interoperable with other nations forces. It is
important the NZDF remain abreast of future technology
trends and how they will impact upon future capabilities
required. One avenue for this is through access to
international collaboration such as The Technical
Cooperation Programme (TTCP). Therefore, the NZDFs
R&D programme requires scientific and technical
support for the identification, assessment, acquisition,
use, and maintenance of, and improvements to, both
current and future capabilities. The Defence Technology
Agency (DTA) is the prime provider of R&D support to
the NZDF.

Figure 7-1: The components of capability

65 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Generating Warfighting Capacity

Infrastructure and Organisations subsequent information superiority cannot be

achieved without properly deployed and managed
7.05 Infrastructure. Infrastructure includes buildings, communications and information systems.
structures, property, plant equipment, and areas for Communications and information systems are an
training and other purposes exercise areas and firing essential part of military operations that provide
ranges, for example. Facilities include civil engineering commanders at all levels with the means to exercise
and utility works necessary to support capabilities, both command and control and disseminate vital information.
at the home station and at a deployed location. These They contribute to an increased situational awareness,
may be owned directly or leased. which in turn leads to better and quicker decision-
making (decision superiority). Information management

7.06 Organisations. Every NZDF unit needs to includes the systems system architecture, hardware,

ensure that it has the optimum number of personnel and software required to support the NZDFs

positions, the appropriate balance of competency and operational and non-operational activities.

skill sets, the correct structure to accomplish its tasks,

and adequate command and control arrangements.
Equipment, Supplies and Services, and
This approach provides the underpinning structure for Resources
the NZDF. At the Service level, consideration must be
given to developing flexible functional groupings that 7.11 Equipment. Equipment includes all major
can meet contingency personnel rotation requirements platforms and weapon systems including, but not limited
and continual force-improvement requirements. to: ships, armoured vehicles, aircraft, missile systems,
major electronic systems, and the myriad sub-items
required to operate and support these platforms and
Concepts, Doctrine, and Collective Training
systems.

7.07 Concepts. Concepts are the way in which we

believe the NZDF will operate in the medium- to long- 7.12 Supplies and Services. Supplies and services
term future. They have been developed in response to include the logistical and administrative support required
either changes in the strategic or security environment to uphold both deployed and non-deployed operational
or emerging technology. While they must still be tested, activities and non-operational activities.
they act as a potential guide to future capabilities.
7.13 Resources. Resources include the financial
7.08 Doctrine. As discussed in earlier chapters, and non-financial assets the NZDF requires to meet
doctrine provides the fundamental principles guiding operational and output commitments to the
the operations of military forces, or elements thereof, in New Zealand Government.
support of national objectives.

Key Term
7.09 Collective Training. Collective training applies
laterally across combined, joint, and single-Service
Military Capability
elements, and vertically down to unit levels. To enhance
performance, organisational elements must undertake Military capability is the ability to achieve a desired
a comprehensive and ongoing collective training operational objective in a selected environment,
and to sustain that effort for a designated period.
regime validated against the detailed preparedness
requirements derived from government guidance.

7.10 Information Management. On the modern

battlefield, effective information management and

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 66

Chapter 7

Preparedness 7.16 With the response time known, it is possible

to derive the level of capability that a military element
7.14 The operational level of capability (OLOC) is must be held at on a routine basis, and this is known as
the level that NZDF military forces need to have reached the directed level of capability (DLOC). It is this level of
in order to carry out their military tasks effectively. capability that the NZDF is funded to maintain during the
For a military element to be at its OLOC means that it financial year in order to provide the Government with
has the requisite preparedness state, specifically, the options for the commitment of military forces.
force element is ready, combat viable, deployable, and
sustainable. 7.17 Therefore, NZDF preparedness is based on a
capability baseline that determines the DLOC the NZDF
7.15 However, to hold military forces at OLOC on a needs to meet its commitments. Analysis of the strategic
routine basis is expensive and demanding on equipment environment informs NZDF decisions about the manner
readiness and personnel availability. Therefore, the in which resources are distributed to meet DLOC
likely time that a military element will have before it must requirements.
be deployed and start operations is determined and is
known as the response time. Within the response time,
the military element to be deployed must raise its level Reserve Forces
of capability to OLOC, thus saving the expense and
demands of routinely keeping it at that level. 7.18 Reserve forces are an integral component
of the NZDF because they provide across crisis

Figure 7-2: Reserve forces are an integral component of the New Zealand Defence Force.

67 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Generating Warfighting Capacity

and capability warning times complementary or

supplementary skills as individuals, small groups, and
units to sustain and surge. The Reserve helps to sustain
deployed forces by providing round-out, reinforcement,
and rotation elements. This will vary from individuals,
such as reservists held at high levels of readiness,
through to small groups, sub-units, and units. The
Reserve has a critical role to play in increasing the
NZDFs ability to sustain a surge for operations.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 68

Glossary

Glossary Capstone Doctrine (ADDP-D)

The single, foundational doctrine publication that sits

at the apex of the doctrine hierarchy, and from which
all other doctrine is derived.
Terms and Definitions
The references quoted in brackets in this glossary are Centre of Gravity (ADDP-D)
source documents. The source documents used are:
That characteristic, capability, or locality from which

AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions a military force, nation, or alliance derives its freedom
of action, strength, or will to fight at that level of
ADDP-D Foundations of Australian Military Doctrine conflict. The centre of gravity at each level of conflict
may consist of a number of key elements.
ADFP 04.1.1 (101) Australian Defence Force
Publication Glossary
Coercion (JDP 0-01)
AJP-01 (D) Allied Joint Doctrine
The use of force, or the threat of force to persuade
JDP 0-01 British Defence Doctrine, 3 edition
rd an opponent to adopt a certain pattern of behaviour,
against his wishes.
NZDDP-00.1 Command and Control in the
New Zealand Defence Force
Collective Security (ADDP-D)
NZDDP-4.0 Defence Logistics Where a group of sovereign states form a general
system of organisation designed to deal with peace
NZDF Output Plan 2011
as an indivisible entity, and therefore a threat to the
peace anywhere is of common concern to the entire
Administration (ADFP 04.1.1)
group of states, which must agree in advance both to
1. The management and execution of all military react to such a threat and how to react against it.
matters not included in tactics and strategy; primarily
in the fields of logistics and personnel management.
Combat Operations (JDP 0-01)

2. Internal management of units. Military operations where the use or threatened use
of force, including lethal force, is essential to impose
Armed Conflict (JDP 0-01) will on an opponent or to accomplish a mission.

Armed conflict is a situation in which violence or

military force is threatened or used. Generally, it is a Combined Operation (ADFP 04.1.1)
contest between two opposing sides, each seeking An operation conducted by forces of two or more
to impose its will on the other, however, intra-state allied nations acting together for the accomplishment
conflict may involve several factions. of a single mission.

Attrition (ADFP 04.1.1) Command (NZDDP-00.1)

The reduction of the effectiveness of a force caused The authority that a commander in a military Service
by loss of personnel and materiel. lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of his
rank or assignment. Command includes the authority
Campaign (ADFP 04.1.1) and responsibility for effectively using available
A controlled series of simultaneous or sequential resources and for planning the employment of,
operations designed to achieve an operational organising, directing, coordinating, and controlling
commanders objective, normally within a given time military forces for the accomplishment of assigned
or space. missions. It also includes responsibility for health,

69 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Glossary

welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned Doctrine (ADFP 04.1.1)

personnel.
Fundamental principles by which military forces or
elements thereof guide their actions in support of
Common Security (ADDP-D)
national objectives. It is authoritative, but requires
Where two or more sovereign states form a system judgment in application.
of international organisation designed to preserve
peace by reducing international tension, assisting End-State (ADFP 04.1.1)
transparency, and providing a forum where common
The set of desired conditions that will achieve the
security issues can be aired and discussed openly.
strategic objectives.

Comprehensive Approach (NZDF)

Fighting Power (AJP-01 (D))
An approach that responds effectively to complex
Fighting power is the result of the integration of three
crises by orchestrating, coordinating, and de-
interdependent components:
conflicting the activities of the military, other
government departments, and, where possible,
the conceptual component provides the
international organisations and non-governmental
knowledge to fight
organisations.
the moral component provides the will to fight
Conflict
the physical component provides the means to
See Armed Conflict. fight.

Conflict Prevention (NATO AAP-6 (2007)) Force Element (NZDF Output Plan 2011)
A peace support operation employing The force elements of the NZDF are the units which
complementary diplomatic, civil, and when directly contribute to the delivery of the NZDF
necessary military means, to monitor and identify outputs, and which may form part of an operational
the causes of conflict and take timely action to force, e.g., a frigate, an Orion detachment, or a
prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of Light Task Group. Force elements will be capable
hostilities. of undertaking a limited independent task, or
contributing to a Service, joint, or combined
See also: Peace Support Operations.
operation.

Control (NZDDP-00.1)
Insurgency (ADFP 04.1.1)
The authority exercised by a commander over
part of the activities of subordinate organisations, An organised movement aimed at the overthrow of

or other organisations not normally under his a constituted government through use of subversion

command, which encompasses the responsibility for and armed conflict.

implementing orders or directives. All or part of this

authority may be transferred or delegated. Intelligence (ADFP 04.1.1)

The product resulting from the processing of

Deterrence (ADFP 04.1.1)
information concerning foreign nations, hostile
The prevention from action by fear of the or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas
consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind of actual or potential operations. The term is also
brought about by the existence of a credible threat of applied to the activity that results in the product and
unacceptable counteraction. to the organisations engaged in such activity.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 70

Glossary

Interoperability (ADFP 04.1.1) 2. Employment of forces on the battlefield through

movement in combination with fire or fire potential,
The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide
to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the
services to, and accept services from, other systems,
enemy in order to accomplish the mission.
units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged
to enable them to operate effectively together.
Manoeuvrist Approach (JDP 0-01)

Irregular Activity (JDP 0-01) The manoeuvrist approach seeks to shatter the
enemys cohesion through a series of actions
Irregular activity is the use or threat of force by
orchestrated to a single purpose that creates a
irregular forces, groups, or individuals, frequently
ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with

prevent change as a challenge to governance which the enemy cannot cope. The manoeuvrist

and authority. It comprises criminality, disorder, approach focuses commanders at every level on

insurgency, and terrorism. exploiting enemy weaknesses, avoiding enemy

strength, and protecting friendly vulnerabilities.

Joint (ADFP 04.1.1)

Military Capability (NZDF)
Connotes activities, operations, organisations, etc.
in which elements of more than one Service of the Military capability is the ability to achieve a desired

same nation participate. operational objective in a selected environment, and

to sustain that level of effort for a designated period.
Joint Effect (NZDF)
Military Doctrine
The integrated approach that allows the value of a
joint force to become more than merely the sum of See Doctrine.
its components.
Military Strategy (ADFP 04.1.1)
Logistics (NZDDP-4.0) That component of national or multinational strategy,
The planning and carrying out of the movement and presenting the manner in which military power
maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive should be developed and applied to achieve national
sense, those aspects of military operations that deal objectives or those of a group of nations.
with:
Mission (ADFP 04.1.1)
design and development, acquisition, storage,
movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, 1. A clear, concise statement of the task of the

and disposal of materiel command and its purpose.

movement, evacuation, and hospitalisation of 2. One or more aircraft ordered to accomplish one
personnel particular task.

acquisition or construction, maintenance,

Mission Command (JDP 0-01)
operation, and disposal of facilities
A style of command that seeks to convey
acquisition or furnishing of services. understanding to subordinates about the intentions
of the higher commander and their place within
Manoeuvre (ADFP 04.1.1)
his plan, enabling them to carry out missions with
1. A movement to place ships or aircraft in a the maximum freedom of action and appropriate
position of advantage over the enemy. resources.

71 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Glossary

Mobilisation (ADFP 04.1.1) Operational Command (NZDDP-00.1)

1. The act of preparing for war or other The authority granted to a commander to specify
emergencies through assembling and organising missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to
national resources. deploy elements, to reassign forces, and to retain
or delegate operational control, tactical command,
2. The process by which the armed forces or part and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary.
of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or It does not of itself include responsibility for
other national emergency. This includes assembling administration or logistics.
and organising personnel, supplies, and materiel for
active military service. Operational Control (NZDDP-00.1)

The authority delegated to a commander to direct

Mobility (ADFP 04.1.1) forces assigned so that the commander may
A quality or capability of military forces that permits accomplish specific missions or tasks which are
them to move from place to place while retaining the usually limited by function, time, or location; to
ability to fulfil their primary mission. deploy elements concerned; and to retain or assign
tactical control of those elements. It does not
include authority to assign separate employment
National Security (ADFP 04.1.1)
of components of the elements concerned. Neither
The ability to preserve the nations physical integrity does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic
and territory; to maintain economic relations with the control.
rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its
nature, institutions, and governance from disruption Operational Level of War (ADFP 04.1.1)
from outside; and to control its borders.
The operational level of war is concerned with the
planning and conduct of campaigns. It is at this level
National Strategic Aim (JDP 0-01)
that military strategy is implemented by assigning
The Governments declared purpose in a situation. missions, tasks, and resources to tactical operations.
It is normally expressed in terms of a future desired
outcome. Peacebuilding (NZDF 2003)

A peace support operation employing

Operation (ADFP 04.1.1) complementary diplomatic, civil and when
1. A military action or the carrying out of a necessary military means, to address the

strategic, tactical, Service, training, or administrative underlying causes of conflict and the longer-term
needs of the people. It requires a commitment to a
military mission.
long-term process and may run concurrently with
2. The process of carrying on combat, including other types of peace support operations.
movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvres
See also: Peace Support Operations.
needed to gain the objectives of any battle or
campaign.
Peace Enforcement (NZDF 2003)

Operational Art (ADDP-D) A peace support operation conducted to maintain

a peace agreement where the level of consent
Operational art is the skilful employment of
and compliance is uncertain and the threat of
military forces to attain strategic goals through the
disruption is high. Military forces must be capable of
design, organisation, sequencing, and direction of
applying credible coercive force and must apply the
campaigns and major operations. Operational art provisions of the peace agreement impartially.
translates strategic into operational and ultimately
tactical actions. See also: Peace Support Operations.

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 72

Glossary

Peacekeeping (NZDF 2003) Stability and Support Operations (NZDDP-D)

A peace support operation following an agreement Operations that impose security and control over an
or ceasefire that has established a permissive area while employing military capabilities to restore
environment where the level of consent and services and support civilian agencies.
compliance is high and the threat of disruption is low.
The use of force by peacekeepers is normally limited Staff (ADDP-D)
to self-defence.
The body of military professionals who support a
See also: Peace Support Operations. commander in his or her estimation of a situation,
and in formulating and executing subsequent plans,
Peacemaking (NZDF 2003) orders, and activities.

A peace support operation conducted after the

Strategic Level of Conflict (ADFP 04.1.1)
initiation of a conflict to secure a ceasefire or
peaceful settlement that involves primarily diplomatic The strategic level of conflict is that level of war that
action supported, when necessary, by direct or is concerned with the art and science of employing
indirect use of military assets. national power.

See also: Peace Support Operations.

Strategic Objective (JDP 0-01)

Peace Support Operations (NZDF 2003) A goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of
national power in order to meet the national strategic
A generic term describing operations that impartially
aim.
make use of diplomatic, civil, and military means
to restore or maintain peace. They are operations
Strike (ADFP 04.1.1)
carried out under an appropriate mandate. Such
operations may include conflict prevention, An attack that is intended to inflict damage on, seize,
peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, or destroy an objective.
and peacebuilding.
Surveillance (ADFP 04.1.1)
Reserve Forces (ADFP 04.1.1)
The systematic observation of aerospace, surface
Personnel, units, or formations earmarked for or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things,
future use on mobilisation or against an operational by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other
requirement, or withheld from action at the beginning means.
of an engagement.
Tactical Level of Conflict (ADFP 04.1.1)
Security (ADFP 04.1.1)
The tactical level of conflict is concerned with the
1. Measures taken by a command to protect itself planning and conduct of battle and is characterised
from espionage, sabotage, subversion, observation, by the application of concentrated force and
annoyance, or surprise. offensive action to gain objectives.

2. A condition that results from the establishment

Tempo (JDP 0-01)
and maintenance of protective measures to ensure a
state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. The rate or rhythm of military activity relative to the
enemy, within tactical engagements and battles and
3. With respect to classified matter, it is the
between major operations.
condition that deters unauthorised persons from
attempting to gain access to official matters affecting
national security.

73 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Glossary

Terrorism (AAP-6) organisation and equipment; specifically, part of an

organisation.
The unlawful use or threatened use of force or
violence against individuals or property in an attempt 2. An organisation title of a subdivision of a group
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to in a task force.
achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.
3. A standard or basic quantity into which an item
Theatre (ADFP 04.1.1) of supply is divided, issued or used. In this meaning,
also called unit of issue.
A designated geographic area for which an
operational-level joint or combined commander
War (Concise Oxford Dictionary)
is appointed and in which a campaign or series
of major operations is conducted. A theatre may Armed hostilities between nations.
contain one or more joint force areas of operation.
Warfare (JDP 0-01)
Unit (ADFP 04.1.1) Warfare is the application of lethal force using a
1. Any military element whose structure is range of combat techniques and military capabilities.
prescribed by competent authority, such as a table of

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 74

Glossary

Acronyms and Abbreviations PRICIE Personnel, Research and

Development, Infrastructure and
ABCA American, British, Canadian, Organisations, Concepts, Doctrine,
Australian and New Zealand and Collective Training, Information
Interoperability Program Management, and Equipment,
Supplies and Services, and
ADDP Australian Defence Doctrine Resources
Publication
QCJWC Quinquepartite Combined Joint
ADF Australian Defence Force Warfare Conference

ADFP Australian Defence Force Publication R&D Research and Development

AJODWG NATO Allied Joint Operations RNZN Royal New Zealand Navy
Doctrine Working Group
SOF Special Operations Forces
ASIC Air and Space Interoperability
Council TICP Theatre Integrated Campaign Plan

AUSCANNZUKUS Australia, Canada, New Zealand, TTCP The Technical Cooperation Program
United Kingdom, United States
UN United Nations
Agreement Naval Command, Control
and Communications Board

BDD British Defence Doctrine

CCEB Combined Communications

Electronics Board

COTS Commercial Off-The-Shelf

DLOC Directed Level of Capability

DTA Defence Technology Agency

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

JIM Joint, Interagency, Multinational

MIC Multinational Interoperability Council

MOTS Military Off-The-Shelf

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation

NZDDP-D New Zealand Defence Doctrine

Publication - Doctrine

NZDF New Zealand Defence Force

ODESC Officials Committee for Domestic

and External Security Coordination

OLOC Operational Level of Capability

OODA Observe, Orient, Decide, Act

75 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Index

Index D (Cont.)
doctrine 3, 9, 44, 49, 66

C joint doctrine 9
campaign 16, 17 levels of 9
capability 66 relationship to policy 3
Capability Management Framework 65 role 7
components (PRICIE) 65 Service doctrine 9
fundamental defence capabilities 50 utility 8
levels of capability. Seeoperational level of capability domestic tasks 61
and directed level of capability

coalition 29, 49, 58 E

economic instrument of national power. Seenational
combat operations 28, 29 power
command dilemma 41 end-state 16, 24, 32, 57
components of fighting power. Seefighting power enforcement action 58
comprehensive approach 29, 30, 31, 58 equipment 52, 66
concepts 66
F
conflict 21, 23 fighting power 49, 53

characteristics 22 conceptual component 49, 50

escalation 28 moral component 51

physical and moral planes 22 physical component 52

prevention 58 flexibility 40, 43, 44

resolution 32 fog of war 22

criminality 25 force protection 43

crisis management 60 friction 22

culture 10, 11, 44

G
D government agencies 29, 30, 61

Defence Act 3
H
defence diplomacy 58 hard power 6, 7

delegation 44 humanitarian assistance 59

diplomatic instrument of national power. Seenational

I
power
information management 44, 66
directed level of capability (DLOC) 67
infrastructure 66
disaster relief 59
insurgency 25
disorder 25
integrated performance 52

interoperability 9, 49, 52

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 76

Index

I (Cont.) O
irregular activity 23, 25, 26 objective

irregular warfare. Seeirregular activity operational 16

J strategic 15, 16

joint effect, the 36, 45 Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security
(ODESC) 60
joint, interagency, multinational (JIM) 29
OODA loop 41
justifiable action 32, 51
operation 17
L
operational art 16
leadership 51
operational level of capability (OLOC) 67
legality. Seejustifiable action
operational tasks of the NZDF 4
levels of operations 15
operational tenets 35, 45
military strategic 16
operations. Seealso combat operations, stability and
national strategic 15, 16 support operations, peace support operations

operational 16 hierarchy 16

overlapping 17, 31 levels. Seelevels of operations

tactical 16
P
M peace 22, 23
management 52 peace support operations 8, 58
manoeuvrist approach 41, 45 personnel 52, 65
military instrument of national power. Seenational power
policy 3, 4, 23, 24
mission command 18, 42, 43, 44
pragmatism 44
mission of the NZDF 4
preparedness 65, 67
morale 37, 51
principles of war, the 36, 45
motivation 51
concentration of force 39
multi-agency operations and tasks. Seedomestic tasks
cooperation 40
N
economy of effort 39
national interests 3, 15
flexibility 40
national power 5
maintenance of morale 37
diplomatic instrument 5, 15
offensive action 37
economic instrument 5, 15
security 38
employment of 6
selection and maintenance of the aim 36
information enabler 6, 15
surprise 38
military instrument 5, 6, 15, 23, 30, 58
sustainability 40
national strategic aim 15, 16

non-governmental organisations 29, 32, 59

77 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 Index

R supplies and services 66

range of security events. See alsosecurity events sustainability 40, 53. Seealso preparedness
readiness 53. See preparedness
T
research and development 65 terrorism 25

Reserve forces 68 training 52

resources 39, 65, 66 collective training 66

risk 35, 38, 43

U
rules of engagement 28, 32 uncertainty 22

S United Nations 24, 32, 59

security events 27, 32, 57

V
self-defence 24, 32 values 11

soft power 6, 7
W
Special Operations Forces 25 war 8, 23, 24

stabilisation. Seestability and support operations warfare 24, 26

stability and support operations 8, 28, 29, 32, 58 economic warfare 26

strategic corporal concept 18 environmental warfare 26

strategic environment 8 information warfare 26

strategy irregular. Seeirregular activity

military 16 traditional 25, 26

national 15

Defence Doctrine (Third Edition) 78

Index

Notes

79 New Zealand Defence Doctrine Publication

 New Zealand Defence Doctrine NZDDP-D

Headquarters New Zealand

Defence Force 2012
www.nzdf.mil.nz