FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor

child, CHARLES CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA, petitioner, vs. LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOS VILLENA
BORBON, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Order[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 89, which dismissed motu proprio the petition of Ma.
Lourdes Eleosida to correct some entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles
Christian. The birth certificate shows, among others, that the child's full name is
Charles Christian Eleosida Borbon. He was born on May 24, 1992 to Ma. Lourdes
Barrientos Eleosida and Carlos Villena Borbon. The birth certificate also indicates that
the child's parents were married on January 10, 1985 in Batangas City.[2]

On January 30, 1997, petitioner Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correct the following entries in the
birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should be
changed to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank;
and third, the informant's name should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma.
Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition, petitioner alleged that she gave birth to
her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father, Carlos Borbon,
were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the
mother's surname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and
Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.[3]

On April 23, 1997, the trial court issued a notice of hearing stating:

Verified petition having been filed by petitioner Ma. Lourdes Barrientos Eleosida,
praying that the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of her minor child, Charles
Christian Eleosida Borbon, be changed and/or corrected, such that, his last name
BORBON be deleted and instead place therein the name ELEOSIDA, which is the
surname of his mother-petitioner; the entry "January 10, 1985 - Batangas City", be
likewise deleted, since the petitioner and respondent Carlos Villena Borbon, at the
time of the minor's birth were not legally married; and the surname BORBON of
petitioner Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon under the column Informant, be also deleted;

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that this petition is set for hearing on June 26, 1997 at
8:30 o'clock in the morning, in the Session Hall of this Court sitting at the Ground
Floor, Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, which is ordered published once a
week for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation and
published in Metro Manila, to be selected by raffle, at the expense of the petitioner, at
which date, time and place, the petitioner shall appear and prove her petition, in that
all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall also appear and
show cause why, if any, they have, the petition shall not be granted.

Let copies of this notice be furnished the petitioner, and together with copies of the
petition, respondent Carlos Villena Borbon; the Offices of the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City and the Solicitor General, who are given fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, within which to file
their opposition thereto, if any. In the event that the Solicitor General may not be able
to appear on the scheduled hearing, to designate the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
appear for and in behalf of the State.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued another order setting the date for the
presentation of evidence on July 23, 1997. It stated:

Considering that there is no opposition filed despite notice to the Solicitor General as
contained in the notice of hearing dated April 23, 1997 requiring that office to file
their opposition, if any, to the petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate
of minor child Charles Christian Eleosida, the petitioner will be allowed to present
compliance with the jurisdictional requirements and at the same time initially present
evidence on July 23, 1997, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. [5]

On August 25, 1997, the trial court motu proprio dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. It ruled:
It is an established jurisprudence that, only CLERICAL ERRORS OF A HARMLESS
AND INNOCUOUS NATURE like: misspelled name, occupation of the parents, etc.,
may be the subject of a judicial order (contemplated under Article 412 of the New
Civil Code), authorizing changes or corrections and: NOT as may affect the CIVIL
STATUS, NATIONALITY OR CITIZENSHIP OF THE PERSONS INVOLVED.

In the present case, it is very clear that the changes desired by the petitioner will
ultimately affect the CIVIL STATUS OF CHARLES CHRISTIAN, as she wants the
Court to direct the Civil Registrar of Quezon City to substitute her maiden name,
ELEOSIDA, with that of BORBON; to delete the information supplied in ITEM 12,
respecting the date and place of marriage of parents, on the ground that she was never
married to respondent CARLOS VILLENA BORBON and amend the information in
ITEM 14, respecting the name of the informant, from MA. LOURDES E. BORBON
to MA. LOURDES B. ELEOSIDA, and is indicative of petitioner's intention and
device to establish that CHARLES CHRISTIAN's civil status as ILLEGITIMATE.

With the petition's ultimate purpose on the part of petitioner to secure judicial order,
which would authorize a change in the civil status of CHARLES CHRISTIAN, this
Court, finds the action improper. The matters desired to be cancelled and/or changed
by petitioner cannot be considered falling under the ambit of the words clerical errors
of a harmless and innocuous nature.

WHEREFORE, for LACK OF MERIT, the petition is now MOTU PROPIO (sic)
dismissed.[6]

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising the issue of whether
corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil
Code, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors
to be corrected are substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and
innocuous nature.[7]

The Court required the respondents to comment on the petition. The Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation in Lieu of Comment. The OSG
submitted that even substantial errors in the civil registry may be corrected provided
that the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceeding. Thus it argued that even if the petition seeks the correction and eventual
change in the civil status of Charles Christian, the same can be ordered by the court as
long as all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified and represented.
[8]
Respondent Carlos Borbon, on the other hand, failed to submit his comment on the
petition despite several notices from this Court.Hence, on January 24, 2001, the Court
dispensed with the filing of respondent Borbon's comment and gave due course to the
petition.[9]

We find merit in the petition. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the
correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary.[10] This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia[11] where we held that even
substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established
under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been
fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly
weighed and considered. The Court further laid down the procedural requirements to
make the proceedings under Rule 108 adversary, thus:

The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties.--When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is

sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.--Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by
an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable
notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.--The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen
(15) days from notice, file his opposition thereto.
Thus, the persons who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the
cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are--(1) the civil registrar,
and (2) all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby.Upon the filing of the petition, it becomes the duty of the court to--(1) issue an
order fixing the time and place for the hearing of the petition, and (2) cause the order
for hearing to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province. The following are likewise entitled
to oppose the petition:--(1) the civil registrar, and (2) any person having or claiming
any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought.

If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction
and/or cancellation of entries in the record of birth even if filed and conducted under
Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as 'summary.'
xxx[12]

It is true in the case at bar that the changes sought to be made by petitioner are not
merely clerical or harmless errors but substantial ones as they would affect the status
of the marriage between petitioner and Carlos Borbon, as well as the legitimacy of
their son, Charles Christian. Changes of such nature, however, are now allowed under
Rule 108 in accordance with our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia provided that the
appropriate procedural requirements are complied with. The records show that upon
receipt of the petition, the trial court issued a notice of hearing setting the hearing on
June 26, 1997 at 8:30 in the morning at Room 118, Hall of Justice, Quezon City. The
trial court likewise ordered the publication of said notice once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation and its posting in selected
places in Metro Manila. The notice stated that the petitioner shall prove her petition
during said hearing and all other persons having or claiming any interest thereon shall
also appear and show if there is any reason why the petition should not be
granted. Respondents Carlos Villena Borbon, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
and the Solicitor General were all furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing
together with a copy of the petition. On June 26, 1997, the trial court issued a second
order giving the petitioner an opportunity to show compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements and to present evidence during the hearing set on July 23, 1997. The
foregoing satisfy all the requirements of Rule 108 to make it an adversary
proceeding. It was therefore an error for the trial court to dismiss the petition motu
proprio without allowing the petitioner to present evidence to support her petition and
all the other persons who have an interest over the matter to oppose the same.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED and the Order dated August
25, 1997 of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 89, subject of the petition at bar is set
aside. The case is REMANDED to the court a quo for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Ynares-Santiago, and Austria-Martinez,

JJ., concur.

EN BANC

MANILA ELECTRIC G.R. No. 184769

COMPANY, ALEXANDER S.
DEYTO and RUBEN A. Present:
SAPITULA,
Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,*
PERALTA,
versus BERSAMIN,
 DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.

ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, Promulgated:

Respondent. October 5, 2010
x - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the

evolving metes and bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke
the remedies available under such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter posted therein imputing
to her disloyalty to the company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it
investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?

Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an

administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).

On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering
Office of the Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at
which respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:

MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA

NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG
PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA
NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA
RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB.[1]
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO
linesmen. Informed about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the
Plaridel Station of the Philippine National Police.[2]

By Memorandum[3] dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of

MERALCOs Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to
MERALCOs Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18,
2008 in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats
directed against [her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly
compromise [her] safety and security.

Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A.

Sapitula, Vice-President and Head of MERALCOs Human Resource
Administration, appealed her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could
voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature
of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process. Citing the grueling travel from
her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and violation of the
provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this
wise:

xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have
intimated to me the nature of the alleged accusations and threats so
that at least I could have found out if these are credible or even
serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and
the way they were handled, it appears that the veracity of these
accusations and threats to be [ sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are
just mere jokes if they existed at all.

Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats
exist as the management apparently believe, then my transfer to an
unfamiliar place and environment which will make me a sitting duck
so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which is
contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus,
 it made me think twice on the rationale for managements initiated
transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to me that instead of the
management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and
effect of management action would be a punitive one.[4] (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her

transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised.

No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a

petition[5] for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.

By respondents allegation, petitioners unlawful act and omission consisting

of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information
about the alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning
threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in
life, liberty and security, correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for
the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the
following:

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in

relation to the report purportedly received by petitioners on the
alleged threat to her safety and security; the nature of such
data and the purpose for its collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of

such data or information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining

Order (TRO) enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO
Alabang Sector.
By Order[6] of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners
to file their verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial
court granted respondents application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on
the grounds that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in
order; and the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).[7]

By Decision[8] of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of
respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing
petitioners to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that
petitioners comply with the disclosures required.

The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ
of habeas data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and
political activists but also to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life
and security are jeopardized by petitioners refusal to provide her with information
or data on the reported threats to her person.

Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data[9] contending that 1) the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the case and cannot restrain MERALCOs prerogative as
employer to transfer the place of work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the
writ is outside the parameters expressly set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas
Data.[10]

Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is
clearly a labor dispute, petitioners argue that although ingeniously crafted as a
petition for habeas data, respondent is essentially questioning the

transfer of her place of work by her employer [11] and the terms and conditions of
her employment which arise from an employer-employee relationship over which
the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the Labor Code have
jurisdiction.

Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the
implementation of the Memorandum transferring respondents place of work which
is purely a management prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-
2003[12] expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs or injunctive writs in labor-
related cases.

Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas

Data directs the issuance of the writ only against public officials or employees, or
private individuals or entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
or information regarding an aggrieved partys person, family or home; and that
MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.

Respondents plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCOs

Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of
a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:

Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy

available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of
a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial

complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and
to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a
persons right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived
as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent
is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a
remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.[13]

Castillo v. Cruz[14] underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del

Rosario[15] that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support
of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. [16] Employment constitutes a
property right under the context of the due process clause of the Constitution. [17] It
is evident that respondents reservations on the real reasons for her transfer a
legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of ones employment are
what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction
over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to
privacy vis-a-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners
refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondents safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best
speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from
unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all. [18] And she
even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the real intent of
management] and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly concedes that
the issue is labor-related.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22,
2008 Decision of the Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is,
accordingly, DISMISSED.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice