The word ‘philosophy’ as well as the con- juring expression ‘Indian philosophy’ has Meant different things to different people— endeavours and activities, old and new, grave and frivolous, edifying and banal, esoteric and exoteric. In this book, the author has chosen deliberately a very domi- nant trend of the classical (Sanskrit) philo- sophical literature as his subject of study, The age of the material used here demands both philological scholarship and philoso. Phical amplification. Classical pramana. SGstras usually deal with the theory of know]. edge, the nature of inference and language, and the related questions of ontology and semantics. Several important concepts and theories have been singled out for critical analysis and clarification in modern terms So that the results may, be intelligible to modernstudents of both Sanskrit and philo. Sophy. It is also hoped that such attempt will kindle the enthusiasm of young scho. lars in the field and inspire them to proceeq in this comparatively new area of research, and explore into further and more interest. NE Possibilities, ISBN: 81-208-0008-7 Rs, 169LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND REALITY An Introduction to Indian Philosophical StudiesLOGIC, LANGUAGE AND REALITY An Introduction to Indian Philosophical Studies BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL MOTILAL BANARSIDASS DELHI VARANASI PATNA MADRAS.© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Head Office: Bungalow Road, Delhi 110 007 Branches: Chowk, Varanasi 221 001 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800004 6, Appar Swamy Koil Street, Mylapore, Madras 600004 First Edition: Delhi, 1985 ISBN; 81-208-0008-7 Printed in India by Shantilal Jain at Shri Jainendra Press, A-45 Naraina, Phase I, New Delhi 110028 and published by Narendra Prakash Jain for Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 110007.“ * = FOR « TAMAL AND ANVITA ‘ * > 7 w 4 Le yeCONTENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER ONE: LoGic AND DIALECTIC IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL INDIA 1 1.1 Ancient Indian Logic and the Question of Greek Influence t Rules of Dialectic and Debate 2) Argument and Pseudo-Argument (Nydya and Nydyabhasa) 23 1.4 The Early Nyaya Theory of Inference (Nyayasiitra 1.1.5) 29 1.5 Pseudo-Reason (Hetvabhasa) 42 1.6 What Do We Infer? 58 1.7. The ‘Triple-Character’ of Reason 68 CHAPTER TWo: PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC IN NAVYANYAYA 76 2.1 Empty Terms 16 2.2 Reference and Existence 85 2.3. The Navyanyaya Logic of Property and Location 112 2.4 The Problem of ‘Universal Properties’ (kevalanvayin) 128 2.5 Inference and Concomitance (vyapti) 140 2.6 Double Negation in Navyanyaya 145 2.7. The ‘Difference’ of Difference 155 2.8 Definition and Classification 164 2.9 Definition, Differentiation and Essence 176 CuapTer THREE: PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND PERCEPTION 203 3.1 Awareness and Knowledge 203 215 3.2. Perceiving and Misperceiving 3.3 Knowing the External World 228 3.4 Memory 262viii Contents Cuaprer Four: ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 268 4.1 Three Rival Ontologies: Nyaya, Buddhism and Jainism 268 4.2 Causality 284 4.3. Substance (Jainism and Vaisesika) 294 4.4 Seven Ways of Non-Absolutism (Saptabhaiigi) 301 4.5 ‘Emptiness’ and ‘Many-sidedness’ 314 4.6 Avidya in Buddhism, Yoga and Nyaya 319 4.7. The Enigmas of Buddhism: Alayavijfiana, Dulkha and Nirvana 333 4.8 Transmigration and the Moral Enigma of Karma 351 Cuapter Five: INTERACTION OF GRAMMAR AND PHILosoPHY 372 5.1 The Doctrine of Karana 372 5.2 Substance and Quality in Sanskrit Grammatical Theory 378 5.3 Grammatical Categories: A Navyanyaya Appraisal 389 5.4 The Notion of the Sentence (vakya) 398 5.5 Grammaticality and Meaningfulness 416 SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 431 439 INDEXINTRODUCTION This is a book on Indian philosophy. Its aim is to combine the discipline of philosophy with that of philological research. It is not, however, concerned primarily with historical research. The book deals with the problems of Indian philosophy—pro- blems which are necessarily philosophical, in the sense of being logical, epistemological, ontological and soteriological. All the problems discussed here are interconnected in some way or other, and it is reasonable to expect that a systematic account of classical Indian philosophy will emerge from a discussion of such topics. The book is meant for philosophers along with those interested in Sanskrit, Indian Studies and what may be called a global approach to the study of philosophy. I have begun with the logical theories of ancient and medieval India. ‘Logic’ is used in this context to mean the study of inference-patterns, rules of debate, points of controversy, sophistical arguments etc. Some may object to our use of the term ‘logic’ in this rather broad sense. In using this term, however, I have been guided by other recognized experts in the field. Thus, I.M. Bochenski has remark- ed in his History of Formal Logic: «Formal logic (Wyaya-sastra) developed in India, as in Greece, from the methodology of discussion. Such a methodology was already systematically constructed in the second century B.c. The first ideas which can be said to be formal-logical occur indeed as early as the VaiSesika-sitra (first century A.p.), but the history of Indian formal logic properly begins with the Nydya-siitra (edited in the second century A.p.). This ‘logical’ stra ($0 charac- terized by its very name) was the foundation of Indian logical thought.” (p. 417) Problems of inference lead to the discussion of philosophical logic. Historically, the early Nyaya in India was succeeded byx Introduction what we call Navya-nydya in the 12th-13th century a.p. Philo- sophers of this period were involved in the discussion of such problems as empty terms, reference-failure, double negation, concomitance, definition, classification and essences. All these issues constitute the second chapter here. Logical theories of the above kind developed in the background of a theory of knowledge. Medieval philosophers of India (of such schools as Nydaya, Buddhist, Jaina and Mimamsaka) had made extensive study of the problem of knowledge. [have given only a very brief account of it in the third chapter. As I discuss these issues more extensively in another forthcoming book, Perception (Oxford University Press), I have only presented a sketch of the Indian theory of knowledge here. Several peculiari- ties of the Indian notion of knowledge and inference have been noted in this connection. ‘The problem of knowledge leads to the question of what is known. Chapter Four deals with ontological problems. I have tried to present them in a somewhat new, non- ‘aditional, way. [have tried to bring together the three rival traditions: Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. F. Kafka once said: “The scriptures are unalterable and the comments often enough merely express the commentator’s bewilderment.” My new attempt may therefore be taken to be an expression of my own ‘bewilderment’. The discussion here inevitably leads to the discussion of such broader questions as soteriology, the meaning and goal of human lifeand the problem of suffering, alayavijfidna, soul and karma. I have tried, within a very brief space, to present the provisional answers given tosuch questions by the classical Indian philosophers. In the last chapter, I deal with the interrelation of grammar and philosophy in India. This is a significant character of classi- cal Indian philosophy. The grammarians used to have consider- fable influence upon the philosophers. Some grammarians (c.g., Bhartrhari) were well-known as philosophers. India was fortunate to have Panini and the PAniniyas. I have tried to give some examples to show how the insights of the grammarians were combined with the problems of the philosophy of language. In India, philosophy of language formed partof a comprehensive theory of knowledge, i.e., theory of pramdnas, for one of theIntroduction xi i of knowing what is the case is to rightly understand Follo: 's said by an expert and trust-worthy person (ta). Indie tS _this Tine, the philosophers of knowledge in classical Of hag stablished a connection between the traditional problems With ease and thosein the philosophy of language. I conclude a afew comments on modality seminally involved in the tion of compatibility (yogyara) and grammaticality of linguistic expressions. In several places, I have repeated one very general theme, of Which the different issues discussed in this book provide only different illustrations. The theme is the question of the relevance of Sanskritic study in the context of modern philosophical Tesearch. The importance of the study of the Sanskrit Philosophical texts in modern context can hardly be overempha- Sized, specially when even among the professional philosophers, Students and research-workers of India today, study of Indian Philosophy, in the way I conceive it here, has been much neglect- ed and largely forgotten. In support, I wish to quote from the writing of an erudite Indian pandit who was, in my humble pinion, also a creative philosopher of our country. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghavi recommended openly “a non-partisan, histori- cal-comparative study” of any Sanskrit philosophical text, and wrote in his Preface to Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics (1961): “I became firmly convinced that the study of any philosophical system inevitably demands certain pre-requisites and that these prerequisites include a fairly accurate understanding of the historical inter-relationship obtaining between the various philosophical systems of India.” Panditji’s Preface should be read by all young scholars of our country, specially by those who wish to work on any system of Indian philosophy. I was myself deeply influenced by these comments of Panditji, when I started, about twenty years ago, my own research in Indian philosophy. One may add, however, to Panditji’s comment that a reasonably clear understanding of modern (largely Western) philosophical problems should also be included among the ‘prerequisites’. In writing this book, I have incorporated, either partly or wholly, several articles written over the last twenty years andxii Introduction published in various anthologies, festschrifts and commemora- tion volumes. As they are by and large unavailable and as they fit very well with the main argument of this book, I have included their revised and sometimes re-written versions here. On the whole, however, this is anew book, which aspires to be an in- formative introduction to Indian philosophical problems— problems that were discussed in the classical period. Some portions of this book bear unmistakably the “vestiges” of my “Indian” English style. I make this remark in awareness of the fact that scholars in India as well as in other non-English speaking countries have used such a style for a pretty long time. In recognition of this fact, one well known Dutch scholar, C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze (whose own English, by the way, was perfect) made an elaborate comment which is worth quoting: “An additional remark on the linguistic appearance of this book should be made here. Contrary to what at a first glance may seem to be the case, this book is not in English. It has been written in a lingua franca of the Western world of the middle of the twentieth century, which by some is mistakenly called English, particularly as far as its vocabulary and syntax are concerned.” (p. xii, Preface) The remark has obviously been made facetiously. I wish to add simply that my hesitation has been overcome only by my awareness of the fact that the category of readers addressed to in this book has largely come to expect a style like this from Indian writers, specially those who deal with Sanskritic material, In preparing this manuscript I have been considerably helped by my former student, Mr. P.K. Sen of Calcutta University, as well as by my wife, Karabi. I wish to thank both of them here,CHAPTER ONE LOGIC IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL INDIA $1.1: ANCIENT INDIAN LoGic AND THE QUESTION OF GREEK INFLUENCE Unlike the Arabic tradition in Philosophy, Indian philosophic tradition was never directly or indirectly influenced by either Aristotle’s writings or Aristotelianism. Yet there is an “uncom- fortable” affinity between many problems discussed by Aristotle (and Greek philosophers in general) and those discussed by the Classical Indian thinkers. In Greek writings we hear about the “ Example I 1. There is fire on this mountain. 2. For, there is smoke there. 3. Smoke goes with fire always (or, in all cases, or in. all places) : witness, kitchen®. 4. This is also a case of smoke. 5. Therefore, there is fire there (on the mountain). We can call this to be a positive demonstration where an affirmative thesis is established. The Nydyasiitra provides also for a negative demonstration, where a negative thesis is reached as the conclusion. I shall illustrate it with the help of Uddyota- kara, ignoring Vatsyayana’s rather mistaken interpretation’. One may consuit E. Solomon's Indian Dialectics, Ahmedabad, for the historical materials relevant to such a study. *For Bhadrabahu, see Vidyabhasana as well as E. Solomon. “Lam taking the liberty of interpreting this step as embodying a universal proposition with an example. This is generally recommended by traditional (Sanskrit) scholarship. And I believe this to be an essential part of the nyaya in the Nydya-Sitras. ‘Vatsyayana’s statement of the negative example is inaccurate and misleading in many places.6 Logic, Language and Reality Example II 1. This body is not without a soul. 2. For, this body is not without life. 3. Lack of a soul goes always, etc., with lack of life, wit- ness : a piece of rock. 4. This is not so (not without life). 5. Therefore, this is not without a soul. To underline the essential form of these arguments, we may represent them schematically as follows : I 1. A (or, A applies here). 2. Because B (or, B applies here) . 3. B goes with A always, or in all cases, or in all places; witness case C. 4, It is a case of B. 5. Therefore, it is a case of A. I Not A (or, A does not apply here). Because not B (or, B does not apply here). A goes with B always, etc., witness C. It is not so (not a case of B). Therefore, it is not a case of A. yeeyr It is easy to see that both I and II (i.e. both examples) can be transformed to fit into Aristotle’s first figure and, thus, I can be mapped into Barbara and II into Celarent. But, such transformations, though certainly permissible and legitimate, disregard certain important and specific characters of the model of arguments examined by the Indian logicians. Let me point out at least two significant features of the Indian model, features that would not be immediately visible in their mappings in the Aristotelian system, Barbara, and Celarent, First, instead of presenting the thesis or conclusion inthe usual subject-predicate form, I have presented it, following the Indian tradition, in what may be called a ‘property-location’ form. The theory is operating mainly with the predicate and the reason, i.e., the major term and the middle term in Aristotle’s termino- logy. The role of the so-called minor term, if there is anyLogic in Ancient and Medieval India T such role here at all, is quite different (see F. Staal), The major term or the ‘predicate’ (sadhya) is being used here to apply to a (particular) case or a (particular) place on the ground that the middle term or the ‘reason’ (heft) so applies. This claim is being supported in the ‘third’ step by underlining and exemplifying the invariable togetherness of the ‘reason’ with the ‘predicate’, In the second case, the ‘predicate’ is being used not to apply toa case on the ground that the ‘reason’ does not apply. And this is supported in the third step by underlining and exemplifying the invariable togetherness of the lack of the “predicate” with the lack of the ‘reason’. The so-called minor term is introduced here only by such expressions as ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘in this case’ or ‘in this place’. But the mapped images of the two examples in Barbara and Celarent would be read as follows : All Sare F This (M) is S Therefore, this (M) is F (where S=smoking things, F=things with fire, ‘ M-=the mountain). I No Lis S This (B) is L - This (B) is not S (where L = Living things, S= soulless, B= body). This brings us to the second major contrast. The thesis/con- clusion in the Nydyasitra demonstration is what is called a singular proposition, which is distinct from both the universal (using such quantifiers as “all” or “each”) and the particular (using “some”) proposition. In Aristotle’s system, however, the conclusion is either a universal proposition (‘A’ or ‘E’) or a particular one (using some’). The singular propositions are assimilated into either positive or negative universals, ‘A’ or ‘E’, so that the syllogistic rules may work. In the early ian Logic”, Journal of Indian 3See F. Staal, “The Concept of Pakga in In Philosophy, August, 1973.8 Logic, Language and Reality Indian system, however, the conclusion is given, more often than not, in a singular demonstrative form, such as, “This is A” or “There is 4 here/there”. Even a universal proposition, such as, “All noises are temporary” or “Noise is temporary” is assimilated into a singular form by such rephrasings as : “There is temporariness in noise.” or “There is temporariness in whatever has noiseness,” or “Temporariness goes with noiseness always (in all cases).”” Thus, it is that when we focus our attention upon such details and contrasts, the idea of Aristotle’s influence upon the Indian theory of logic seems highly improbable. In fact, we can almost becertain and would refute such a hypothesis, when we consider the complete lack of any evidence of any of Aristotle’s work being translated into an Indian language (Sanskrit, Pali or Prakrit) of that time. Besides, while various views are meticu- lously referred to, there has not been even an indirect reference to any Greek view in any of the texts. Although my conclusion about the influence of Aristotle on ancient Indian logic or philosophy is negative, I have a positive view about the question of relevance and usefulness of the study of Aristotle for the study of the history of ancient Indian logic and dialectic. It is true that these two traditions, both ancient, are independent of each other. But, because of this independent development, study and understanding of the one is bound to illuminate understanding of the other. Besides, it seems to be widely recognized now that the study of the history of ancient philosophy can be combined with the first-hand study of phi- losophical problems and questions, to the advantage of progress in both enquiries (as Professor Bambrough bas argued in his Preface to New Essays on Plato and Aristotle). In this context, I wisth to add that it is also time to realize that the study of ancient Indian philosophy, where similar philosophical problems have been examined and studied with great interest in precision and analysis, may also be relevant and advantageous in asimilar way. *Bambrough, J.B., New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, London (Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1965.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 9 §1.2 : Rute or DiALectic AND DEBATE have chosen the term ‘dialectic’ to refer to the art of philo- sophic disputation in ancient India, as this was obviously the Indian counterpart of the Greek art of discussion or logical controversy. Philosophical thoughts in ancient times filtered through the art of disputation and this was as much true of ancient Greece as it was of ancient India. But as in the case of many other concepts, the concept of Indian dialectic has only a ‘family resemblance’ with the notion of dialectic found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Let me first explain the Indian concept of philosophic debate, and the kind of argu- ments I shall be calling ‘dialecti . During the sramana (post-Upanisadic) period of Indian philosophy, the intellectual climate was brisk, critical and controversial. Topics that came under fire were not only the organized religion and ritualism of Vedic orthodoxy, but also the established social codes and moral norms, as well as the knowledge-claims regarding the final destiny of man. In such an environment, debate—by which I mean controversy, question~ and-answer, and discussion—was the order of the day. No subject was considered too sacred for criticism and refutation. These debates sometimes degenerated, as it must, into wrangl- ing and bitter verbal fights. That might have been the reason for the Buddha in the Nikdyas to tell his pupils to avoid fruitless debates. It was, however, not very easy in those days to avoid debates. That is why, in the Upayalydaya, one of the early Buddhist debate manuals, the author first raises the objection that one should not enter into a debate with others (v@do na kartavyah) and argues elaborately that it is necessary to enter into a debate if one has to have any hope to maintain, defend and propagate one’s own religious and philosophic convictions*. Not only that, ordinary people may be misled by a crafty debater into immoral and false beli Therefore, some professional training in the art of debate is essential for a philosopher. Manuals for the professional debate must have been written for different schools for training the debater in the types of {Dighanikaya, 1.33, °Upayahrdaya, p.3,in G. Tucci’s Pre-Dignaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Batoda, Oriental Institute, 1929.10 Logic, Language and Reality debate, types of arguments, tricky devices of debate and the checks or grounds for censure or defeat. The canons of Buddhism and Jainism contain frequent references to many technical terms of the art of disputation. Texts like Kathavastu (at the Buddhist council at c, 255 B.C.) reportabout the various topics for debate for the Buddhist monks as well as the various ways of debating. Early manuals for debate, however, are not extant. We have some crystallized versions of them, probably from two distinct sources, in such texts as Upayahrdaya, Asaiga’s Yogacarabhiumi, Caraka, and ydyasiitras. In giving a brief exposition on the rules and procedures of debate, I shall follow the Nydyasiitras, because the discussion here appears to be more systematic than others. Originally, it seems to me, debate was a respectable vocation and a natural expectation when two philosophers metin a friendly session. Thus Janaka, the philosopher-king of the Brhadaran- yaka Upanisad, asked Yajfiavalkya, who went to him one morning, “What is on your mind today, Yajiiavalkya? Do you wish to receive cattle as gift? or, do you wish to havea philosophic discussion with me on subtle matters?” Yajfiavalkya teplied, “Ihave come wishing both.” And then followed a friendly debate between them. The quality of the debate obviously depended upon the debaters or participants. Naga- sena, the Buddhist monk, made the following comment, probably facetiously, on the types of debate in reply to King Milinda’s questions®: Milinda : Reverend Sir, will you debate with me again ? Nagasena : If your Majesty will debate as a scholar, yes, but if you will debate as a king, no. M. How is it then that scholars debate ? N. When the scholars debate one with the other, your Majesty, there is summing up and unravelling, there is also defeat, and yet the scholars do not get angry at it. Thus do the scholars debate, your Majesty. M. And how do the kings debate ? N. When the kings debate, your Majesty, they state a 3See Brhadaranvaka Upanizad, 4th Adhyaya, Ist Brahmana 2Milinda-panho, 2.6.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India iL proposition, and if anyone differs from them, they order his punishment saying, “Inflict punishment upon him.” Thus, your Majesty, do the kings debate. The Jaina canon, Sthdndiiga, refers to four types of refuta- tion ina “tricky” debate, First, there is the trick of confound- ing the opponent by using verbiage and thereby.trying to give him a ‘run-around’ (ypaka-hetw)!, Second, there is the direct refutation with a valid reason by confounding one’s trick (sthapaka-hetu). Obviously, the first kind can be countered with the second. Third, there is the argument based upon equivocation (vyarisaka-het). This can be countered by the fourth kind, called /usaka, by exploiting the means of equivoca- tion and thereby confounding the opponent. Socrates seems to have referred to this type of broad division of the debate procedure, as he mentions to Meno: (Meno 75 c-d)?: “if my questioner were one of the clever, disputatious, and quarrelsome kind, I should say to him, “You have heard my answer. If it is wrong, it is for you to take up the argu- ment and refute it’. However, when friendly people, like you and me, want to converse with each other, one’s reply miust be milder and more conducive to discussion. By that I mean that it must not only be true, but must employ terms with which the questioner admits he is familiar.” The debate between “friendly people”, as Socrates calls it, does not seem very different from the kind of debate which Caraka described as sandhiiya sambhasa ‘debate among fellow- scholars who are friends’, And this is to be contrasted with what Socrates described as a debate with a disputatious person. In Caraka’s terminology, this is the other kind of debate which is actually a verbal fight (vigraha) . Caraka broadly divides debates into two types*. The first is held with a fellow-scholar and in a spirit of co-operation (sandhaya sambhasa), but the second in a spirit of opposition and hostility (vigrhya). Caraka gives an elaborate description 4B,A. Solomon, Indian Dialectics, Vol. 1, Ahmedabad, p. 514. 2Plato, Collected Dialogues (Eds. Hamilton and Cains). 8Caraka-Sankité (ed. Yadava Sarma, Bombay, Nitnaya Sagar, 1933), p.303!T.12 Logic, Language and Reality about what must be done by a debater before accepting to enter a debate, viz., examination of the strength of the oppo- nent, the level of knowledge of the jury and the audience ete. It is humorously described how if the opponent or the audience is stupid, one can ensure victory by “a bag of tricks”. This is obviously with reference to the hostile debate. Caraka further divides the hostile debate into Jalpa and vitanda. In jalpa, both sides establish their position with reason and try to refute each other, &.g., one side maintains, “There is rebirth,” while the other “There is no rebirth,” and each side adduces reason to Support as well as to controvert the other. In vitanda, one tries to censure the other without establishing anything. Nyayasiitra uses the same terms in slightly different senses, as we shall see presently, The Nayayasiitra classification of debate was more systematic and hence carried more authority in philosophical circles. The name for philosophic debate in Nyayasiitra is Katha, literally, speech, discussion. It notes three kinds of debate, vada, jalpa, vitandd. The first kind corresponds to the friendly and congenial debate in Caraka (sandhaya sambhasa). It must have the following characteristics: (1) There should be a thesis and a counter-thesis mutually opposing each other. Such a situation arises when mutually incompatible attributes are ascribed to the same locus (cf., ekadhi- ‘arana, in Vatsyayana). Uddyotakara further qualifies it by saying that such contradictory attributions are to be made with regard to the same locus at the same time and neither should be taken, for the purpose of the debate, to be finally decided. (2) Proving, ie, establishing, and disproving either of the theses, should be based upon evidence (pramédna) and argument (tarka). (3) Each side should mention the standard five steps in the demonstration of one’s reasoning. (Definition of these five steps are given elsewhere in the Ny@ydsittra; sce § 1.1). (4) The reasoning should not entail contradiction with any tenet, or accepted doctrine. This debate is usually to be held between the teacher and the students or between friends, where each participant is a seeker after truth (tattvabubhutsu). ANyayasiitras 1.2.1-3,Logie in Ancient and Medieval India 13 One may wonder whether in this type of debate there may arise any censure or defeat-situation, for, surely it is not the nature of a seeker after truth to humiliate somebody with defeat. But remember what Nagasena said to Milinda. There will be defeat or censure (nigraka) but no animosity, for it will bea fair game. The detection of a faulty reason is also recog- nized asa ground for defeat as Nydyasiitra 5.232 informs. Since there will be refutation (disproving) of the untenable thesis, it will entail a “defeat-situation’, though based solely on sound evidence and argument. Besides, the third and the fourth characteristics indicate that there may be censure based on some additional grounds. Censure arises also when the debater fails to mention exactly all the five steps, i.e., mentions either less (in which case, it is a censure called ‘insufficient’, hina), or more (in which case, it is a censure called ‘redundant’, adhika). The fourth characteristic, according to Uddyotakara, refers to the possibility of a censure based upon falsification of an accepted doctrine ‘apasiddhanta’. The second type of debate, jalpa, is held between equals, ice., two rival parties, and the explicit goal here is victory (vijaya) which may not necessarily coincide with the establishment of truth. Here we come to the discussion of ‘tricky’ debates that Thave alluded to earlier, According to Uddyotakara, this debate will share only the first two characteristics of the first type, but not the last two. For, the last two characteristics imply that only certain types of censure are applicable here, not all the other types. The jalpa debate will include, apart from the first two, the following : (.3) Proving and rebuttal are based upon equivocation (chala), false parity of reasoning (jar?) and censure of all kinds. It may be pointed out that equivocation and false or unwarranted parities can neither prove nor disprove anything, Uddyotakara concedes the point and says that the debater uses these tricks anyway, when he is unable to defend himself or censure the opponent on fair grounds. Since victory is the goal, such tricks are allowed according to the rules of the game, so to say. The onus ison the opponent to stop him or to “call his bluff’. The Nydyasitra lists. three varieties of 1Uddyotakara, under Nydyasiitra 1,2,1-3.14 Logic, Language and Reality equivocation, and twenty-four varieties of rejoinder based upon parity of reasoning (jati)—(twenty in the Upayahydaya). ‘The ways of censuring a debate are given in the Nydyasiitra as twenty-two. In other words, it notes that in twenty-two ways a debate might be brought to a close with a decision where one side wins and the other side loses. The debate is thus turned into a game and the soundness of the reason by itself cannot ensure victory, for, as ina game, the strategy of the debater becomes an important factor. Udayana says that the debater loses as soon as he shows his incompetence, i.c., he acts ina way that indicates his confusion?. Uddyotakara points out that even when the debater uses a sound reason he may not win, for, he may very well be confronted witha sophistical rejoinder, and being so confronted if he fails to assert his sound reason with confidence, he will lose’. Most of the twenty-two varieties of “checks” in the game of debate are, however, reasons of common sense. For example, starting a debate to prove a thesis, one cannot, in course of the debate, abandon the thesis or contradict it (cf. pratijiia- hani or pratijfid-virodha). Nor can one be evasive (cf. viksepa), or, approve a contrary view (cf. matanyjfia). But the most serious offence would be to use some unsound or fallacious reason. For, if that is detected, the debater immediately loses (cf., hetvabhasa). The third type of debate, vitand@, is more controversial in nature and, it seems to me, philosophically more interesting. It is said to be characterized by the lack of proving the counter- thesis. In other words, the debater here is engaged simply in the rebuttal of a position but does not give the opponent a chance to attack his own position. Some have thought, how- ever, that this is, therefore, not a ‘fair’ game. Some even have maintained that since refutation (disanamdatra) is the sole purpose of this type of debate, the debater may claim not to have any position or belief in anything. This was, obviously, the way out for the sceptics, or the sceptic-sophists, or the sceptic-Buddhists (Madhyamikas), the sceptic-monists, or even the sceptic-materialists (Carvaka). 1Udayana, pp. 627-628 (Nydyadarsana, A. Thakut’s edn.). 2Ibid., pp. 624-625.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 15 This raises two related questions. First, is it possible to enter into a debate, without believing in anything, only for the sake of rebuttal? Second, even if it is possible, what value would it have, or what purpose (prayojana) would it serve, save victory, when such rebuttal is done by the questionable tricks established in jalpa, i.e. the second type of debate ? In other words, what lasting value can we attach to a refutation that is based solely upon either equivocation or (false) parity of reasoning or both? The first question is more fundamental, and I shall have to revert to it on another oceasion. I shall briefly comment on it following Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara after I have dealt with the second question. Regarding the second question, it was noted thata debater cannot simply refute the opponent by bluffs or tricks, unless of course he is allowed by the opponent to get away with it. Butit so happens that some equivocations or reasoning based on parities, are the hardest things to recognize. It is conceivable that sometimes the debater is not trying to be presenting an unsound reasoning in refutation. Using modern jargons, we may call it a linguistic snare or a philosophic puzzle. I can cite at least two of the rejoinders based on parity (the last two in the Jati list), nityasama and karyasama, which, under one interpreta- tion, may generate genuine philosophic puzzles, rather than being tricky arguments for refutation. The Naiyayikas were not always very happy in support ing the jalpa debate as serving any good purpose. Nydyasiitra 4.2.50 says enigmatically that the second or the third type of debate is meant for the protection of one’s learning when the learner is apparently a young beginner so as not to be swept away by some tricky debater into believing the false doctrine. Sometimes it is emphasized that they render some negative benefit in the sense that by studying those tricky devices one can be on guard and_ not be easily defeated by such tricks, for, if the debater can uncover the trick of the opponent he wins. In any case, in the Buddhist tradition, Dharmakirti (in Vadanyaya) explicitly denounces such tricks, and he has every treason to do so'. But as I have already noted that sometimes philosophers use arguments, which are seemingly plausible and *Dharmakirti, Vadanyaya, (ed. Dwarikadas Sastri), Varanasi, 1972.16 Logic, Language and Reality it takes another equally gifted philosopher to uncover that such and such arguments were based on an (unconscious) equivocation or parity of reasoning. We need not necessarily suspect that the philosopber in question was deliberately trying to trick us. The third type of debate, vitanda, has evoked much criticism. If the goal here is also victory, as in the second type, then it is felt that this victory is earned not only through trick but also by motiveless malignity. Vatsyayana argues that a debater in this case cannot be entirely withouta motive. One may point out that since the debater (vaitandika) does not establish a position here, it is possible that he does not have a position to defend. But can there be any debater without a position ? Can there be any person who does not believe in anything ? In fact, according to Vatsyayana, the third type of debate can easily be put to an end by asking the debater what his position is or what he proposes for debating. If he says something, then he has a position to defend and should be asked to do so. If he declines, he should forfeit his right to debate. If he says simply that he proposes (motive) to refute the opponent then also he concedes a position, viz., refutation of the opponent. In any case, he can be shown in this way that he cannot conceivably participate in the third type of debate when he concedes a position of his own, However, it is by no means absolutely clear why a debater in the third case cannot consistently maintain that he only wants to refute the opponent and that the onus of proving anything lies with the opponent, not with him. In fact, many respectable philo- sophers would opt out for refutation only of rival views and avoid proving anything, since either a) they are truly sceptics and would like to suspend judgement, or b) their truths are self-evident and hence require no proof. In fact, itis not necessary that a debater in the third type of debate is always looking for victory as the goal and using tricky devices. It is conceivable that his business is also to find out or seek after truth. In other words, we may not be dealing here with a charlatan in each case, but a genuine seeker after truth, Noticing this possibility, some Gauda Naiyayikas, such as Sindtani, talk about a four-fold classification of debate, a) vada, b) vada-vitanda, ©) jalpa and d) jalpa-vitanda, the first two being for the honest seekers after truth, and the last twoLogic in Ancient and Medieval India 17 for the proud people who intend to defeat others. Tricky devices are allowable, therefore, only in the last two and not in the first two. In fact, vdda-vitayda, an honest and fair debate aimed at the refutation only of the opponent's thesis, is philosophically a more fruitful and powerful concept and certainly it has its adherents. Specially, in case of the sceptics or the sceptic- mystics, adebate of this nature is positively helpful. For, if scepticism has to be feasibly maintained at all, the debater must only refute the position that is Positively offered and cannot defend any position. We may add that scepticism itself can neither be formulated, nor can it be defended, as a position in this sense. The debater has to allow his opponent to formulate his position before he can proceed to refute it. Is not the negation ofa position another position? If the proposition p is refuted, does it not amount to the defence of not-p? This was actually the import of the criticisms made of vitanda by Vatsyayana and Uddyotakara. But the sceptic- debater after refuting p will only proceed, under the circum- stances (i.¢., being faced with such a question), to refute not-p. This will probably imply that p and not-p do not exhaust the possibilities, and that might mean in turn that the law of excluded middle does not apply here. But notice that the law of con- tradiction as it was understood in the Indian context is not violated here. For it is possible for p and not-p to be both false. It is only when both are held to be true that the law of. contradiction is violated. Or we can say, if one position is proven to be true, the other is, thereby rendered false, but not if one is proven to be false, the other would be true. Alternatively, we may hold that the refutation of a position need not amount to commitment to the ‘negation’ of the proposition involved. Refutation of this debater may be taken as an ‘illocutionary’ negation as distinct from a ‘propositional’ negation.? For example, Safijaya, being asked about after- life, said: “Ido not say there is an after-life”. This can be represented in the manner of Searle: ~F (e) 1Udayana, op. cit., p. 620. Searle, J.R., Speech Acts, p. 32-33.18 Logic, Language and Reality This is an illocutionary negation and should be distinguished _ from the propositional denials: “There is no after-life”. F(~?) It would be clearly a mistake, as Searle has argued, to blur the distinction between the two. In the same vein, Saijaya may be allowed to say: “I do not say that there is an after-life,” ~ (ax) (x is F), and “TI do not say there is no after-life”’. ~b ~(aa) @ is F) Here the second would not be contradictory to the first. Notice that the first is of the form ~ t-(q), while the second, ~ !~(~q). Consider the following hypothetical debate modelled after the first verse of Nagarjuna. 1. Isa thing (bhava) produced from itself ? la. No. 2. Is it produced from something other than itself ? 2a. No. 3. Is it produced from both itself and the other ? 3a. No. 4, Isit produced from neither or nothing ? (this is equivalent to: Is it not produced at all?) 4a. No. . It is clear that in this formulation, at least, 1 and 2 are not contradictories, for, it is possible fora thing to be produced partly from itself and partly from others. Hence 3 is a possible formulation, which is not exhausted by the rejection of 1 and 2. Now, the question arises: have we exhausted all the possi- bilities of, say, production from something or other, by the three rejections 1a, 2a, and 3a? If we have, then the fourth position will have to be a rejection of the production itself. Nagarjuna, however, asks us, by 4a, to reject this position too. This raises the problem about the subject that we are talking about here. If refutation of the refutation of production amounts to produc- tion, then we are back in the game, i.e., with one of the three 1Madhyamakasastra, verse 1 (verse 3 in P.L, Vaidya’s edn.)Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 19, alternatives, 1,2 or 3, But they have already been rejected. Therefore, it would be argued that the rejection in 4a, the rejec- tion of the rejection of production, should not be construed, at east in Nagarjunian sense of rejection, as a position affirming production. This can be taken to be a special case of the general point we are discussing here. The rejection of a position need not always amount to a counter-position. If this is agreed, then it is quite feasible for a debater to conduct an honest (non-tricky) form of debate consisting of refutation or rejection only. Such a debate can be called a vada-vitanda. In fact, the aim of the debater in this case is to reduce the opponent’s position to absurdities. In spite of what I have argued here it is clear that not all the Buddhists were happy about vitayd@. Dharmakirti clearly rejects any other form of debate except vdda.t And we may imagine that in this rejection he probably followed Vasubandhu and Dignaga. Udayana first refers to the variety called vdda-vitanda, an honest form of debate consisting of refutation only, and then argues that this would be an impossibility. He reasons as follows: A debater who is also a seeker after truth (as he should be if he is participating in a vada) can hardly remain content with refutation only. For, if he simply refutes the opponent's reason, truth is not determined thereby. Because determination of the truth depends upon some means (sadhana). If, however, he does not refute the opponent’s reason, truth remains equally undetermined, since doubt regarding its falsification has not so far been removed. If he does not even care for the opponent's reason, he cannot be said to be determining truth at all. At all events, determination of truth cannot be done simply by refutation. In any case, Udayana’s® criticism missed the point that I have already made. Truth may be either self-evident or indetermin- able, according to a debater, in which case he does not need a reason to prove it, or determine it. Sriharsa has elaborately criticized this argument of Udayana in his Kapdanakhanda- khadyas 1Dharmakirti, Vadanyaya, p. 69-71. 2Udayana, op. cit., p. 620. See the introductory section of Khandanakhandakhadya, See also20 Logic, Language and Reality _. This classification of debate into the one for seeking after truth and the other for victory is reminiscent of Plato’s way of contrasting what he called ‘dialectic’ with ‘eristic’ or the art of quarrelling. It is clearly indicated in Plato that the aim of the procedure he sometimes calls ‘eristic’ is to win the argument, whereas the aim of ‘dialectic’ is to discover truth (Robinson). The dialogue that is illustrated in Euthydemus may remind one of the jalpa or vigrhya kathd in the Indian tradition. The debater cares nothing for truth, but uses any and every device that pro- vides the appearance of winning an argument. The word vigraha in Sanskrit means ‘a fight’ and the description of jalpa indicates that it was a sort of verbal fight. The appropriate picture for ‘eristic’ in Plato was a verbal fight. The art of dialectic became a technique in the hand of Aristotle who undertook to write a handbook of dialectic, Topics. The character of dialectic was turned into a dubious game of debate, an exercise for the muscles of intellect. The Topics of Aristotle, therefore, resembles, atleast in the above sense, the virdda-Sastras of ancient India. But, perhaps, this is too broad a generalization. ‘Let me qualify it, Aristotle deals with dialectic in the Topics and what he calls ‘syllogism’ in the Analytics. One of the distinctions is underlined by him as follows: a question is treated ‘in accordance with opinion’ in the work on dialectic, and ‘in accordance with truth’ in the work on syllogism. Under syllogism, ‘Aristotle studies mainly inferences based upon class-inclusion. But in a broader sense, syllogism, for Aristotle, stands for any argument in which, after certain propositions have been assumed, there necessarily results a proposition other than the assumptions but because of the assumptions. Using this notion of syllogism, Aristotle says that every dialectical argument is either a syllogism or an epagoge (Topics I, 12). The general characterization of epagoge is that it approaches the universal from the particular (although other varieties are also recognized), and this is reminiscent of induction of later times. Aristotle says that the debater must admit an epagoge supported by instances unless he can produce a negative instance.* P. Granofi’s Philosophy and Argument in Late Vedanta, B.K. Matilal’s The Logical IMlurination of Indian Mysticism (Oxford, 1977). 4Robinson, R. Plato's Earlier Dialectic, p. 85. ®Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis, 165 b.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 2 The most pervasive form of refutation practised by Socrates is called elenchus. An elenchus, according to R. Robinson’, is, in the narrower sense, a form of cross-examination or refutation. In the wider sense it means examining a person’s statement by asking him questions and then further questions in the hope that the person giving answer will finally feel that he must agree to a position that entails the falsehood of his original assertion. The Platonic idea of an elenchus, the one that he approved, was a contest in which both sides openly recognize that the questioner was trying to refute and the answerer was trying not to be refuted.* If the Socratic elenchus was a purely destructive instrument, as it seems to be the case, then it was almost the mirror-image of the vitanda type of debate. In the jalpa type, the questioner is trying not only to refute but, as we have seen, also to establish the contrary position, and the answerer is also trying to defend his position as well as refute the counter- position. Plato, however, in his middle and later dialogues, transforms, perhaps unconsciously, as Robinson has argued’, the destructive tool of Socrates, the elenchus, into his own new constructive instrument of dialectic, In other words, he harnesses the tool of his teacher to constructive purposes, thereby incorporating it into the larger whole which he calls dialectic. M. Kneale has remarked that perhaps Plato himself was confused in this matter. But even this modified form of elenchus would hardly resemble jalpa, for jalpa can hardly be said to be a road to truth or science. Jalpa is explicitly stated to be for victory, and it may be argued that in some cases achievement of victory and establishment of truth may coincide with each other. But still jalpa can hardly approximate the dialectic in its Platonic sense, for, Plato emphatically declares dialectic to be the noblest as well as the most useful method. The specific nature of the Platonic dialectic, however, remains ‘ever elusive to a reader of Plato. He recommends the dialectical method with great enthusiasm. In the Republic (533 B), it is said that dialectic seeks ‘what each thing is’, the abiding element Robinson, op. cit., p. 7. *bid., p. 19. SIbid., p. 83. 4Kneale, W. and Kneale, M. The Development of Logic, p. 9.2 Logic, Language and Reality in the thing. It is a search for definitions. In fact, dialectic is hardly distinguishable in Plato from the very intellectual type of philosophic activity that rejects the manifold changing appear- ances, the mundane things of this world, and searches for the changeless essences or forms. He did not, however, distinguish, as we do now, between methodology and metaphysics. A perfect dialectician was, for Plato, an inspired philosopher. Platonic dialectic seems to be vaguely reminiscent of Vatsyayana’s comment about the methodology of a sdstra, which says that it progresses through naming, defining or characterizing and examining. Aristotle, however, cleared some mist that surrounded the notion of Platonic dialectic, by transforming it into a technique that could be learnt by itself. Dialectic is such a technique. It is, according to both Aristotle and Plato, unrestricted in its application, But, while for Plato it is essentially a scientific activity, for Aristotle its lack of restriction is an indication of its unscientific character.1 Aristotle rejects the Platonic con- tention that dialectic involves search for definitions. For him, it isthe study of technique of argument from non-evident premises. Thus Aristotle believed to be covering also dialectical arguments when he was giving an account of syllogistic. In the Topics, he gave rules for conducting debate (i.c., the disputatious debate by means of valid arguments). But in De Sophisticus Elenchus which is considered to be an appendix to the Topics, he gives rules for detecting (as well as inventing) invalid arguments and in this respect it resembles the Vada manuals of the ancient Indians where the method of invention and detection of invalid arguments are talked about. It has, however, been argued by J.D.G Evans, against the prevailing opinion of modern commentators on Aristotle, that it is a mistake to represent the Topics as a manual of instruction on how to win a debate at all costs, or even to regard it as first draft on the Analytics.2 The Topics, according to Evans, is sui generis, and here Aristotle elects to treat such concepts as intelligibility in their full complexity. 4Bvans, J.D.G. Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic, p. 50. * Ibid, p. 94.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 23 §1.3: ARGUMENT AND Pstup0-ARGUMENT (Nyava anp NyAyABHAsa) It is, perhaps, Vatsyayana who first uses the expression nydyd- bhasa, as an opposite term to nydya. The word ‘nyaya’ carries a specialized sense in philosophical treatises. It is difficult to find in the English Language a synonym which willfully convey the meaning expressed by the term nyaya in Indian Philosophy. Vatsyayana brings out the sense in the following way. ‘Nyaya’, in his opinion, is the examination (i.c., apprehension of an object) with the help of all pramanas.! The etymological meaning (niin niyate prapyate vivaksitarthasiddhir anena—by which the desired end or object is attained, ie., to say, is understood) also contributes to such an explanation. The real sense of the word is anundana or inference expressed fully in a verbal form, i.e., what goes by the name pararthdnumana, In case of parartha- numdana which is constituted by the five-membered inference- schema (which we have already discussed in the first two sections), one must take recourse to all the four pramanas in some form or other. In the first member, pratij assertion, we are helped in some way by Sabda pramaua or verbal testimony. The second member, het or reason, presents a skeleton form of anumdna or inference. Percep- tion performs the main function so far as the third member, udéharana or example, is concerned. The fourth member, upanaya or application bears some sort of distant similarity with the implication of upamédna or comparison. Thus, all the pramdzas become helpful in an inference meant for the other, i.e., parar- thdnumana, which is better known as nydya. Uddyotakara explains the word evidently in this sense. Vacaspati, however, indulges ina bit of twisted explanation of the lines of Vatsyayana. According to him, nydya is examining or testing the object addu- ced as the hetu or reason of the inference. It is inference itself which puts the hetw to test. Thus, nydya is pararthanumana. But we may humbly submit that this explanation of Vacaspati does not appear to be quite satisfactory, in view of the fact that it takes a roundabout way of unfolding the meaning. Pramanair arthapariksanam nydya)—Nydya-Bhasya under Nydya-Si tra 111.24 Logic, Language and Reality One of the best ways to explain definitely what is denoted by the term nyaya is to distinguish it from what is known as nyaya- bhasa, or pseudo-inference. In ultimate scrutiny nyaya stands for those inferences as rest upon, i.e., are not at variance with, perception and verbal or scriptural testimony.! In this manner Vatsyayana tries to introduce a distinction between nyaya and nyayabhasa. Thus, inferences, the results of which do not agree with what is obtained from perception, or verbal (scriptural) tentimony are treated as _nyayabhasas (or pseudo- inference? From this it is clear that nyayabhasa or pseudo- inference is of two types : one that is liable to be frustrated by perception and the other by verbal testimony (@gama). The example of the first type is to be sought in the following : fire is not-hot, as it is created, such as a pot. This argument resembles an inference in all its external features. Hence, one may take it as a nydya, but on scrutiny it is found to Possess simply outward and superficial resemblances. So the inferential knowledge thus derived is rejected in no time by just the opposite judgment derived from the perception of fire that it is hot. Thus, it is not nyaya in the strict sense of the term but nydyabhasa. In other words, here perception opposes inference. How is the inference opposed here ? Let us understand the Position more clearly. Uddyotakara answers that this is 2 wrong application of inference to an improper case. The case under enquiry (i.¢., not-hot-ness of fire) is not at all a case for infer- ence. It disqualifies itself as the stronger proof (perception) carries just the opposite conviction, e.g., fire is hot. Uddyota- kara says, perception here bafiles inference.? Here another point may also arise. The hetu, viz. createdness (krtakatvay suffers here from another serious defect. It is non-concomitant with the sadhya. But this defect, e.g-, non-concomitance cannot be proved until and unless we first take recourse to perception of particular instances. And when perception proves just the opposite, e.g., the absence of the sddhya in the locus, it is use- less to look for other defects, if any. 1 Pratyaksagamasritamanumanam, sanviksa—Ibid. 2 Yat punaranumdnam pratyaksdgamaviruddham nydyabhasah sak—Ibid. 5Yasmin visaye erat prayujyate sa pratyaksendpahrtah—Nyaya-Varttika, on above.Logie in Ancient and Medieval India 25 The Buddhist logician, in Nyayapravesa, gives a different example in a context almost similar to this. According to him, ‘sound is inaudible, since it is created, such as pot’ may be taken to be an inference which perception opposes. He really contends that here the thesis ‘sound is inaudible’ is inconsistent with perception. But Uddyotakara retorts that audibility is not an object of perception. Audibility is but a relation existing between the ear-organ and sound. But the ear-organ itself being etherial (cf. gagana) by nature, is beyond the reach of percep- tion, Now, a relation (sambandha) becomes perceptible, if both the relata (sambandhin) ave perceptible. Here neither the ear- organ nor sound are perceptible. Hence, the said relation is imperceptible. Kumérila says, ‘know-ability’ by the ear is not perceptible.' Thus, the absence of sddiya, e.g., audibility (Sravanata) not being an object of perception, it is improper to say here that perception opposes inference. The example of the second type is supplied by the following : The skull of the corpse is pure, as it is a limb (of a corpse), such as the conch-shell. Such an inference is invalidated by the scriptural testimony. Manusmyti and such sacred texts ‘speak of the human skull as impure. Thus, it isan example of nydya- bhdsa. Let us make it more clear, What is the exact sense of the word purity in this inference? Evidently, it implies the absence of demerit on the part of those who touch the object under question, Now, what is the authority to decide whether the person who touches it, incurs demerit or not? If the autho- rity of the Vedas or Revealed Texts is accepted, then such an inference cannot stand scrutiny. Because Manusmyti, which owes its authority ultimately to the Vedas, gives the opposite verdict. Here, the conch-shell is treated as pure on the authority of the Vedas. When its authority is accepted in one case, it cannot be rejected in another case of the same issue. Thus, with due reverence to the Vedic authority, we are to accept the conch- shell as pure and the skull of the corpse as impure. Hence, the said inference is rendered invalid. When all these are stated, a question naturally arises. What should be the position when an inference is opposed by (1) ‘na hi sravanata ndma pratyaksenavagamyate—Sloka-Varttika of Kumiatila, Anumana, verse 60.26 Logic, Language and Reality another inference or by (2) comparison (upamiana) ? Will these be the cases of nyayabhdsa ? If so, why does not Vatsyayana refer to them ? The second problem can be easily resolved. When comparison opposes an inference, it becomes a nyaya- bhasa of the second type, inasmuch as that inference is in reality opposed by sabda pramana or verbal testimony which lies at_ the bottom of all cases of upamdna (comparison). So far as the first case is concerned, Uddyotakara says that two opposing inferences of an independent nature are practically impossible to be drawn about the same subject. In such a case, both the rival reasons (hetus) are of equal strength, and hence suffer from the serious defect known as satpratipaksatva (i.e, having rival reason). So, none of them produces any inference. They cancel each other. The question of nydyabhasa (pseudo- inference), therefore, does not arise at all. Vacaspati, however, is inclined to admit another type of nyayabhasa, where inference opposes another inference. Accord- ing to him, where there are two inferences, one of them depending upon the other, in that case if the dependent inference is opposed by the other upon which it depends, the dependent inference becomes a nydyabhdsa. This may be adduced as the third type of nyayabhdsa. For example, an inference like ‘God is not the creator’ would depend upon a prior inference by which the existence of God is proved. Now, by that very prior inference, just the opposite of the second inference, i.e., “God is the creator’ is also proved. Hence, the second inference loses its force and becomes a nyayabhasa. Lastly, the relation between nyayabhdsa and hetvabhdsa’ (bad or defective reason or defects of the reason) is an interesting point to be noted in this connection. In all cases of nydyabhasa, the hetu or reason suffers from a serious defect, ¢.g., badha or kalatyayapadesa, so as to mar the essence of the inference, Abadhitatva or non-opposition is one of the five essential marks of a real hetu. The five essential marks of a (sound) hetw are : paksa-sattwa, sapaksa-sattva, vipaksasattva, asat-pratiapaksatva and abadhitatea. If a hetw lacks any one of them, then, according to the Naiyayikas, it becomesa hetvabhasa. In this case, therefore, the hetu itself becomes a hetvabhdsa or defective reason. This ISee section § 1.5 below.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 27 defect is contained in the foregone determination of the absence of sddhya in the locus or subject (paksa). This disqualifies the paksa to be a real paksa of an inference. The Vaisesikas, however, regard this as a defect of the paksa itself. In their opinion, a hetu possesses three essential marks, e.g. paksasativa, svapaksasattva, and vipaksdsattva, and not five, as stated by the leading Naiyayikas. The Vaisesikas, in this case, would agree with the Buddhists. The Navya Naiyayikas make no special mention of the term nydyabhasa, most probably because they regard it as redundant to coin anew technical term in addition to the five hetva- bhasas which are enough to coverall the cases of false infer- ences. Thus, we see that the term nyayabhdsa though mentioned by Vatsyayana (perhaps, not with such seriousness. as his commentators intended) by way of giving a popular definition of what is known as nyaya, illustrated, elaborately dealt with and commented upon by his followers, viz., Uddyotakara, Vacaspati and Udayana, has been completely ignored by other systems as well as by the new School of Nyaya. One of the important characteristics of Indian Logic is that it seldom develops the sort of doctrines which we class as ‘Formal’. Formal validity in argument was perhaps looked upon by the Indian logicians as not of much importance. So, formal- ism in logic does not find here much scope for development. This can be illustrated in many ways taking examples from the books of Indian logic. The doctrine of nyayabhdsa as an opposite term of nydya is also a case in point where we may have the advantage to look to the Indian attitude towards formal validity. The examples like ‘fire is not-hot, as it is created, such as a pot’, may be formally valid, so far as the Indian form of argument is concerned. It may be submitted that the relation of universal concomitance between sadhya and hetu, an essential requisite for valid inference, is not established here, since all created things are not not-hot, But Naiyayikas will say that an awareness of such a relation (be it valid or invalid) is not impossible here, since the persons inferring may experience their co-existence in some instance or instances (as illustrated by the case of a pot in the said example). In the absence of any contradictory experi- ence, this awareness, for all practical purposes, is sufficient for28 Logic, Language and Reality the desired inference to follow. So, enquiry into this line to prove invalidity of the argument will not be much helpful. The Naiyayika maintains that the conclusion, which such argument Teads to, is contradicted directly by the experience of fire which gives the contradictory judgment, fire is hot. From the formal point of view, the two propositions ‘fire is hot? and ‘fire is not-hot’ are contradictory propositions, and hence, both of them cannot be true at the same time. Thus, the truth of the one entails the falsity of the other. Hence, truth of the first being well established by the direct experience of fire, the purpose of the said inference (which is nothing but to prove the truth of the contradictory proposition) is vitiated. So, if we infer at all that the opposite is the case, it will not be a real inference but a pseudo-inference, to all intents and purposes. A Pseudo-argument, therefore, is one that goes against the funda- mental requirement of rationality, consistency or coherence. Our conscious beliefs must cohere or be consistent with one another. We may construct an argument, a sound one or an unsound one, in support of a proposition or belief. But if that belief or proposition does not cohere with other accepted beliefs, if it mili- tates against some well-established and sound belief, then, without further investigation into the soundness or unsoundness of that argument, Nyaya would declare it as a pseudo-argument. There may be an implicit logical fault in the argument itself, but that fault need not be brought out to the surface in order to discard the argument as a pseudo-argument, .We may note that we are concerned here with the constructed argument in favour of some thesis or belief which runs counter to some of the well-established, and least contested beliefs. This is different from the case where two arguments (inferences) are constructed (adduced) in support of two theses which are con- tradictory to each other. In the second case, both arguments (inferences) are to be considered as inconclusive. But, they would not be the instances of pseudo-argument in the above sense. The latter case is technically called the case of sat-pratipaksa— ‘a thesis with a counter thesis’. There may be cases when both the thesis and thecounter thesis are supported by SOUND argu- ments (though not necessarily by formally valid, deductive arguments), and in such cases, it would beimpossible to. reach a decision one way or the other. Hence, ‘having such a_ counterLogic in Ancient and Medieval India > thesis’ is regarded as a logical defect of an argument, because the case would be inconclusive. §1.4: Tue Earty NyAya THEORY OF INFERENCE (Nydyasitira 1.1.5) Nyayasiitra 1.1.5 is very difficult to explain. We find here a threefold classification of inference. The problem arises, because the terms used to name the three types of inference are ambiguous and the sitra does not mention any examples to clarify the principle of this threefold division, Many other logicians of that period mentioned and exemplified this threefold classification. A careful study reveals that they were all related in some way or other. The examples found in the Carakasamhita seem to be. illustrat- ing the Nyaya theory of inference. Nydyasiitras 2.1.37-38 also discuss the points mentioned in Nyayasitra 1.1.5. A satisfactory explanation of these two siitras (2.1.37-38)! is needed for having a correct interpretation of Vatsyayana’s commentary here seems to be confusing. The threefold classifica- tion (in Nyayasiitra 1.1.5) was probably based upon the, principle of threefold division of time—past, present and futur The structural arrangement of the Nydyasiitras also justifies this point. Another possibility is that pirvavat refers to inference based on causal relation, sesavat to the method of exhaustion (parisesa), and sdmanyatodysta to inference based on non-causal relations. When the theory of inference (amuadna) was first systematized in India, two slightly different accounts of inference were found in the tradition. The first account suggested a twofold classi- n of inference, and was upheld by the Vaisesika and the Mimamsa schools. The second account spoke of a threefold classification of inference, and was recorded in the Nyaya, in some Buddhist texts, and in Caraka. Nydyasira 1.1.5 mentions the three types of inference as pirvavat, Sesavat and saindnyato- drsta. These terms themselves are ambiguous, and as far back as 1This numbering has been accepted in the reading of MM. Phanibhusana Tarkavagis. Sce his Nydya-darsana, Bangiya Sahitya Parishat Series 63, Calcutta ; 1939. In Ganganatha Jha’s reading, the last two sitras are numbered 2.1,38 and 2.1.39. Poona Oriental Series No. 59, Poona : 1939.30 Logic, Language and Reality Vatsyayana, alternative explanations about them were offered. Moreover, Ny@yasiitra 1.1.5 gave only the names, and no examples, of these three types. It is unfortunate that no single series of interpretations offered by the earlier commentators, such as Vatsyayana, is consistent and that those offered by the later commentators, such as Uddyotakara and Jayanta, while sometimes consistent, also give the impression of being twisted, far-fetched, and anachronistic. I shall attempt to show what might have been the Siitrakara’s understanding of this threefold division and to furnish reason- able and satisfactory examples of the three types without stretching our imagination too far. We may begin by giving a synopsis of the different interpre- tations already suggested by the ancients, I avoid the question of the exact dates of these authors. Their chronology is approxi- mately as follows: Upayahrdaya (UH) or Prayoga-sara', Vatsyi- yana (Vat), Ts’ing-mu (a comm. on the Milamadhyamikakarika), Gaudapada, the Pasupata School, Uddyotakara (Udd)!, Jayanta, and Bhasarvajfia.$ UH. (a) pirvavat=‘as before’ : From previous knowledge of some special mark (like six fingers, etc.,) of a particular child, to infer later that this is the same man (grown-up child) from that mark. (b) Sesavat = ‘the rest will be alike’: From the salty taste of one drop of sea-waterto infer that all other drops will be salty too. (Inference through sampling?) (c) sdmanyatodysta : Displacement of ordinary bodies isseen to be due to their movements. Therefore, the celestial bodies, such as the planets and the moon, move, because they areseen to be displaced, 1See G. Tucci, Pre-Digndga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series Vol. XLIX, Baroda, 1929. My friend Prof. Hattori informs me that a better translation of the Chinese title would be Prayoga-sara (as suggested by Frauwallner). 2bid. ie Satras with the Paficarthabhdsya of Kaundinya, ed. by R. ‘Ananta Krishna Sastri, Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. CXLUI, Trivan- drum : 1940, p. 7. 4Uddyotakara, Nydyavarttikam, Benares, 1915. SJayanta, Nydyamanjari, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares, 1895, And Bhasarvajiia, Nydyabhisaya, Svami Yogindrananda, Varanasi, 1968.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 31 UH A. General example of inference given before the threefold classification. Seeing fire with smoke before, one infers fire from smoke later. (pirvavat? See below.) Vat I Pirvavat : From cause to effect: It will rain, because there is a cloud. ) Sesavat : From effect.to cause: It has rained, because the river is full and flowing swiftly. sdményatodrsta : Same as UH (c). This unfortunate example was criticized and even ridiculed by Uddyo- takara and Vacaspati. It was declared by them to be a variety of Sesavat. This is also identical with ‘abara’s example of sdmdnyatodystasambandha. Vat II (a) Same as UH A. piirvavat=‘as before’: To infer fire from smoke. (b) ‘sesa—the remainder’: Inference by elimination of alternatives : Premise: Sound is either D or G or K But Sound is not D because of X, and not K because of Y. Conclusion: Therefore, Sound is G. This inference is based upon a more developed logical principle. But, perhaps, the Sitrakdra did not have this in mind. (c) Another interpretation of the term saméanyatodrsta. Example : Desire, etc., are qualities (gua) and a quality inheres in a substance as its locus. There- fore, the substance where desire, etc., inhere is the . self. This was also criticized by Uddyotakara who pointed out that in this type too, an implicit use of the principle of elimination is made to prove the substance in question to be the self. ‘Ts’ing-mu (a) Same as UH A./Vat II (a). (b) Similar to UH (b) : One grain of rice iscooked. Therefore, all other grains of rice(in the same pot) are cooked. (c) Same as UH(c). Alt.’ example: Same as Vat II (c). Gaudapada: (a) Same as Vat I (a).32 Logic, Language and Reality (b) Same as UH (b). (c) Same as Vat II (c). The Pasupata school: (a) & (c) Same as UH (a) and (c) (6) To infer the whole cow from seeing only the horns, etc. (essential parts). An interesting form of knowledge (whole from part ?), Kanada used this example in three places of the Vaisesika Sitra. Udd I Threefold division: anvayin, vyatirekin and anvaya- vyatirekin. The terms piirvavai, etc., are not used. paksa=subject=the place or the property-locus where the sadhya is intended to beinferred. Sapaksa =homologue = entities, apart from the subject, where the sadhya is known to occur. vipaksa=heterologue =entities where the sadhya is known to be absent. (a) No heterologue: Sound is impermanent, because it is produced: (when it is an inference of those who believe everything to be impermanent). (b) No homologue: The living body is not soulless, for, otherwise it would be lifeless. (Comparable with a negative conclusion from at least one universal negative premise— Celarent or EAE in Aristotelian system. Also, avita inference in the Sarhkhya system) The example is slightly defective. The later school (Navya-Nydya) gives a better example. (©) Having both homologue and heterologue: Usual form of inference: Sound is impermanent, ete. This certainly indicates logical advances of a later period. Gatigeéa accepted this threefold classifica- tion. (For this as well as for a brief exposition of Digndga’s “wheel of reasons”, see below § 2.4.) Udd IL), (b), and (c) : Same as Udd I (a), (b) & (c). But some very far-fetched explanations of the terms pirvavat, etc., are suggested so as to cover the above cases. Saémanyatodrsta is analysed in two ways: sdmanyatah + dysfa and saméanyatah+. adrsta. Udd III, (a) & (b): Same as Vat I (a) & (b). A difficulty inLogic in Ancient and Medieval India 33 inferring the effect from the cause is pointed out, but is also explained away in order to defend Vatsyayana. (© To infera from b where aand b are not causally related: There is water nearby, because wild geese are present. This is a new example. Udd IV. ‘Threefold’ means that the hetu must have the three characteristics mentioned in Vaisesika sittra 3.1.10-11 (GOS-136). (a) prasiddha=The hetu occurs in the subject. (b) sat=The hetu occurs in the homologue. (©) asandigdha=The hetu does not occur in the heterologue, Jayanta I (a) & (b) : Same as Vat I (a) & (b). (©) Similar, in principle, to Udd II (c). The actual example is perhaps, better : To infer the nature of the taste of a kapittha fruit, from seeing its colour. Jayanta II (a) & (b): Same as Vat II(a) & (b). The suffix ‘Vati’ in pitrvavat, etc., means ‘like’. (©) Sdmanyatodrsta refers to the case where there is samanyato vydpti, and the sadhya is not perceivable. Example: We have sense-organs, because we have sense-perceptions which are acts, and all acts must have instruments. Gayanta admits that fesavat and samanyato- drsta are closely related, but he also contends that the principle involved in each case is different, while the examples might be similar.) Bhasarvajfia I (a) Piirva=cause. Hence, infer cause from effect. (b) Sesa = ‘remainder’ = effect. Hence, infer effect from cause. (c) Non-causal connection. Infer a specific taste (ofa fruit) from a specific smell. IL, (a), (b), (©) same as Udd I. It seems to me that none of these interpretations fully represents. the position of the Sitrakara on the threefold classification. Of what the Sitrakara had in mind we can only make an intelligent guess. Such a guess should, of course, be based upon.34 Logic, Language and Reality some textual or other evidence. While making such a guess I shall assume that at least some siitras in the beginning of Chapter 1, Ahnika 1, and some of those of Chapter 2, Ahnika 1 are related to each other, since they seem to develop some coherent theories.? In particular, it seems that sitras 2.1.37 and 2.1.38 refer back to the same threefold classification of infer- ence that is mentioned in 1.1.5, Thus, my minimal assumption will be that at least sittras 1.1.5, 2.1.37 and 2.1.38 were intended to present a single theory of inference based on a threefold classification. When these sitras are studied and understood together, the threefold classification, it séems to me, appears neither silly nor unsatisfactory. The structure of these sitras also indicates that they were developing the same theory of inference. Siitra 1.1.5 states that inference, which is always preceded by perception, can be of three types : piirvavat, Sesavat and sa@manyatodrsta. Nyaya- Sitra 2.1.37 raises an objection that inference is nota valid means of knowledge (pramana) , and assigns three reasons to the three types, in order to show that individual examples of these three types are wrong or unsound. Nydya-Siitra 2.1.38 answers this objection by furnishing three correct types, in order to show that the charge of unsoundness in each case can be satisfactorily explained away. Vatsyayana has explained these siitras in a similar manner, although he has made, it seems to me, some blunders, Sitra 2.1.37 mentions the following three reasons related to the supposed three examples: (1) rodha= obstruction (See Vat I fesavat). The river may be full because of some obstruction in its course, and not because of rain, in which case the inference con- cerned will be false. (2) upaghata=demolition or dispersal (See Vat I pirvavat), It may be that the clouds are dispersed (by the wind), *That the Nyayastras resulted from various strata was already stated by Haraprasada Sastri in J. A. $. B., 1905. Tucci has proposed that we distin. guish the section dedicated to “the pure vada rules” from the section which is more or less “polemical”. See Tucci (note 1 in p. 29 of Pre-Dignaga Texts on Buddhist Logic), p.xxiv of Introduction. Since Chapter 1, Ahnika 1, does not exactly deal with the “pure” vada rules (but only Ahnika 2 does 0), [suggest that this need not be taken along with the vada-section.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 35 in which case the said inference will be false. Vatsya- yana, however, mentions a slightly different example here : It will rain, because the ants are carrying their eggs. Thereupon he interprets upaghata as ‘destruction’ : It may be that the nests of the ants have been destroyed and they are moving to a safer place in which case the inference of rain will be false. 3) sddrfya=similarity. Vatsyayana suggests a completely different example here: There is a peacock, because its voice is heard. He explains ‘similarity’ as follows: The above inference will be false, if one is duped by the similar voice of a man imitating a peacock. The respective answers given in siitra 2.1.38 are as follows : (4) eckadesa=partial case. The fullness and other appear- ances of the river (viz., swift current, etc.) due to previous rain (in the upper region) agree with the fullness and other appearances of the river due to the blocking of its course (in some lower region) only partially and not wholly. (5) trdsa=fear. When the nests of ants are destroyed, only afew ants are affected by fear and the movement of these ants is haphazard. But, when rain is imminent, all ants move carrying their eggs in a systematic and unperturbed fashion. (6) sadrsya=similarity. Similarity implies difference also. 1Was it “‘hrdsa” instead of “trasa”"? The script “ér” @ is similar to he &. Ife it were “hrasa” (= “decrease”) we need not consider the carrying of eggs ‘by the ants as the reason (/efu), but just can take the accumulation of clouds as the supposed cause of future rain and its decrease to account for the possible failure of rain. Even Vatsyayana, to whom the ant-example is due, neither mentions the word “érdsa” nor does he paraphrase it. He only notes : “pipilikdprayasyandasaiicare bhavisyati vrstir ity anumiyate, na kasaicid iti.” Ganganatha Jha translates as follows : “when one infers ‘coming rain’, he does so from the fact that whole hosts of ants are running about (calmly and peacefully) with their eggs,—and not only a few ants..." (See his Transla~ tion, note 1 in p. 29 of the book, p.166). Could “kasdicid” be a paraphrasing of “hrdsa” (=*decrease, ie., numerical decrease”)? Anyway, there is nothing in Vatsyayana’s expression, which could possibly refer to “trasa” i.e, feat. But in the absence of any textual evidence in favor, this line of conjecture, perhaps, should better be avoided, and the reading should be taken as “irdsa". For difficultiés connected with ‘the ant-example, see also Ganganatha Jha, p. 164, the second foot-note.36 Logic, Language and Reality Hence, the mistaking of one entity for another due to. similarity can be corrected when their difference is discerned. In short, siitra 2.1.38 contends that there is a discernible difference between the series of instances mentioned by the objector in sitra 2.1.37 and the series of instances originally adduced as valid types of inference. The above explanation given by me mainly follows that of Vatsyayana with some variations already indicated. What is more curious to note here is this. From the explanation that he gives, Vatsyayana seems to think that the Sitrakara has reversed the order of his threefold division given in sitra 1.1.5, so that the first-mentioned cause (either in 2.1.37 or 2.1.38) is to be related to the example of Sesavat and the cause mentioned next (either in 2.1.37 or in 2.1.38) is to be -related to the example of piirvavat. Vatsyayana, however, does not explicitly point out this anomaly. Now, this breaking of the order seems to me to be a false interpretation. Rather, the order here may lead us to a correct formulation of the examples of the three types. My guess about the principle of the threefold classification ofthe Siitrakdra and their examples isa very simple one. The terms ‘piirva’ and ‘Sesa’ can be taken to mean, among other things, temporal stages. Thus, pirvavat might mean ‘that which is related to the preceding (parva) event’ (compare Uddyotakara: “piirvam asyasti iti pirvavat”.. The term ‘Sesavat’ being contrasted with ‘parvavat? might mean, accordingly, ‘that which is related to alater (sesa) or future event’ (cf., Ses0 ’sydsti iti Sesavat). Thus, Suggestion I (a) pirvavat: To infer the past event from the present: It has rained, because the river is full, etc. Same as Vat I Sesavat. Compare with (1) & (4) above. (b) Sesavat: To infer the future event from the. present: It will rain, because there is cloud, or because the ants are carrying eggs. Same as Vat I pirvavat. Compare now with (2) & (5) above. (©) samanyatodysta : Where both the events are. 1Uddyotakara, p. 49, line 18.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 37 present events, but one is perceived and the other is inferred. Examples: There is fire, because there is smoke. (Same as UH A. and Vat iI pirvavat. Or, There is water, because there are wild geese: Same as Udd III sémanyatodrsta. Or, Itis raining, because the peacocks are crying. Is this the actual example which Vatsyayana had in mind when commenting on siitra 2.1.37, and not the example suggested by Uddyotakara (which I have noted in Udd IIL a, b) ? Ganganatha Jha’s note may be consulted in this connection.* The term sdmanyatodysta can be explained in the light of these examples in the following manner: The joint presence of the two objects or events has been observed (perceived) before, but in the case under consideration, though both are present, only one event is perceived by the person who thereby infers the other. In such a general sense, this might include other examples of samanyatodysta given above. The expression “similarity” in sittra 2.1.37 can, accordingly, be interpreted as follows: Instead of seeing the smoke one may mistake a similar object, viz., water-vapour, dust, etc., for smoke, or instead of hearing the peacock’s voice, one may hear a similar voice, and, thus, the inference of fire or the inference of rain will be wrong. Since the notion of causal connection has been associated with the theory of inference from a very early period (cf, Vaisesika-sitra 9.18; GOS-136,)2 we might suggest another alternative but not an altogether different interpretation. (This is exactly what Bhasarvajiia I suggests.) Suggestion II (a) parva =prior event, i.e., the cause: To infer the cause from the effect. Example: Same as Sug. I (a), Vat I. (b) Sesa=posterior event, ie., the effect: To infer the effect from the cause. Example: Same as Sug. I (b)/Vat I. A$ce G. Jha, (note 1 in p. 29 of the book) p. 165, footnote. 2 follow here the numbering of Candrananda. See Vaisesika-sittra, ed. by ‘Muni Sri Jambuvijayaji, Gaekwad’s Oriental Series 136, Baroda, 1961.38 Logic, Language and Reality (©) Where the two objects are not causally related. Example : Same as Udd III samanyatodrsta. There is admittedly some strength in this interpretation. Except for their perpetuating Vatsyayana’s confusion of pirvavat and Sesavat, commentators like Uddyotakara and Jayanta indirectly Support this line of interpretation. However, I am inclined to believe that in the tradition of the threefold classification, the notion of causal connection was not predominant, although it must be admitted that the evidence of Caraka goes against my inclination (see below). Moreover, ‘considering the fact that inference through sampling was also a primitive form of correct inference, the word “sesa” in “Sesavat” can be happily explained if we accept the interpretation of Prayogasara and Ts’ing-mu (See UH (b) & Ts’ing-mu (b)). To sum up, the following points might be considered : First, the examples given in Suggestion I or II seem to suit well the three objections raised in siztra 2.1.37 as well as the three answers mentioned in stra 2.1.38, and no breaking of the order is necessary. Vatsyayana’s explanation implies the breaking of the order which seems to be highly improbable, For similar reasons, the Prayogasdra example of sesavat cannot, be accepted as that of the Sitrakara, because siitra 2.1.37 or 2.1.38 cannot, in that case, be explained. Second, immediately after examining the definition of inference in siitras 2.1.37-38, the Siitrakdra proceeds to consider whether it makes sense philosophically to talk of the three. fold division of Time, viz., past, present and future, or more particularly, whether the notion of present is distinguishable from the notion of past and future (¢f., 2. 1. 39-43). This would have been irrelevant unless the threefold classification of infer- ence called, at least implicitly, for such a distinction of three time-stages. In nyaya terminology the discussion of the pioblem of three time-stages is related to the discussion of the ‘mination of the theory of inference by upodghata saigati ©’ yasahga saigati® For similar reasons, I think, the *See Ingalls, Materials for the Study of Navya-Nydya Logic, Harvard Univer sity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 80. For a comprehensive discussion ‘on the notion of saigati, see Gadadhart-comm. on Tattvacintamanididhiti, Pp. 4-12,Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 39 examination of the doctrine of avayavin (whole) follows (in siitras 2.1.33-36) almost as a part of the examination of the theory of perception, Thus, our guess-work will be supported if we credit the compiler of the second chapter, at least, with the understanding of the position of the Sitrakéra (if he was a different person) regarding this threefold classification of inference. Third, some of the remarks of Uddyotakara seem to lend support, but only indirectly, to the interpretations suggested above (specially Sug. II) Compare :“...but what is pirvavat here ? Is it the effect or the cause ? If it is analysed as ‘parvam asyasti’ then pirvavat means the effect. But, then, it contra- dicts the interpretation that it refers to the inference of effect from the cause”. Although this is mentioned as the objector’s view (piirva- paksa), a view which Uddyotakara is contending against, the remark at least shows that the interpretation of pirvavat as referring to the inference of the cause from the effect is a plausible one. Regarding the above, I only suggest that this is also a possible and a reasonable interpretation. But since Vatsyayana has confused pirvavat and Sesavat, a confusion which is attested by his rather odd explanation of siitra 2.1.37, Uddyotakara has tried to defend him by a twisted interpreta- tion, Fourth, Vatsyayana’s concluding remark under siitra 1.1.5 can be said to lend some indirect support to our suggested inter- pretations (specially Sug. I). Compare : “‘sad-visayam pratya~ ksam, sad-asad-visayam c@numdnam,...asac ca khalv atitam andgatam ceti.”? | would interpret this, not entirely in disagreement with the commentators, as follows :_ Perception grasps objects which are present, and inference grasps objects which are present (sat) as well as not present (a-sat, ive, the past and the future objects)....‘A-sat’ is what is past and what has not yet happened (i.c., might happen in the future). Vatsyayana is apparently reporting here a view which distinguishes perception and inference according to their objects, Asparvavad ity uktam kim punar atra pirvavat}kim karyam uta karanam, yadt purvam asydstiti pirvavat karyam plrvavat prapnotijiatas ca karayen a karyanumanam iti vyaghatah,” —Uddyotakara, p. 49, 2¢ompare with Ganganatha’ Jha’s translation (note 1 in p. 29 of the book) p. 28.40 Logic, Language and Reality a view which he obviously Supports. What he seems to miss here, however, is to connect this view about the objects of inference with the theory of its threefold classification. Last but not the least, the Carakasamhita (which is probably Contemporary with the earlier stratum of the Nydyasiitrast) Tecords, in fact, three types of inference (Siitrasthava, Chapter XI; verses 13-14). Caraka’s remark, “pratyaksa-pireakam trivi- dham trikdlam canumiyate” sounds as though it were stating almost the same theory as that found in Nydyasiitra 1.1.5, viz., “tat-piirvakam trividham anumdanam, etc.” Caraka’s examples are: (a) past (cause) from the Present (effect) : sexual intercourse from pregnancy, (0) future (effect) from the present (cause): future fruition from the seed. (©) present from present: hidden (nirgiidha) fire from smoke. Some remarks: The term sémanyatodysta is rather a confusing one. This term seems to have been already in use much earlier than the Sitrakara, Kanida seems to have used this term to denote a particular type of inference,? Pragastapada, following him, used it in his twofold classification. Sabara also used this term with slight variation (cf, samanyatodrsta-sambandha) in the Mimathsa tradition. Sabara’s example is also identical with Vat I (c) or UH (c). It is difficult, at the Present state of our knowledge, to learn what the term originally stood for. It might just have meant the unsophisticated but often correct inferences based on analogy and previous experience. Or, it might have meant the type of inference Kanada used to show that sound (Sabda) being a guna or quality proves the existence of akaia (the sky or the physical space) as a substance (i.e., inference by elimination of alternatives; compare Vat I (b) and (c) above). But, anyway, at the time of the Siitrakara, its meaning was vague, so that the Siitrakara might be said to have redefined the term and used it for the third type of inference as noted above (Sug. I &If). It isan inference through non-causal relation, i.e., mere association. *See on this point A.K. Warder, “The Date of Bhimaha”, Journal of Oriental Research, Vol. XXVI, pp. 94-95. 2Compare Vaigesika-sittras. 2.1.16, 3.2.6. Cf. Vaisesika-sitra 2.1.24-25 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 136).Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 41 The term “Sesa” might not havea temporal significance. Thus, the example of UH (b) is, perhaps, more fundamental. But I suggest that the Sitrakara might have contrasted the term with “pirva” (which obviously has a temporal significance), and hence, there has been what is called a change of meaning through context (prakarana). Vat (II) (b) has also some claim to be regarded as sesavat, because this type of inference is also old, since Kanada used it several times in his siitras. After writing this, I have read an article by G. Oberhammer It is gratifying to see that in many areas both of us have come to basically the same conclusions. There are two points, how- ever, where we disagree, Oberhammer, if I understand him correctly, wants to take “sdmanyatodysta” to be a description of the general nature (definition ?) of inference and not as the name of the third type of inference (p. 70-81). My first objection to this interpretation is that it leaves the word “trividham’ unexplained, since the third type isneither named nor exemplified. My second objection is that the definition (Jaksana) usually precedes division (vibhdga) and does not follow it. Thus, when “tat-piirvakam” gives the definition of inference, it is unlikely that the siitrakara will again describe the general nature of inference at the end of the siitra without mentioning the third type of inference. Secondly, the concluding remarks of Oberhammer seem to suggest that Vysagana’s twofold classification of inference into samanyato drsta and visesato drsta (the first being subdivided into pirvavat and Sesavat) was due to the influence of the Nyayasiitra. But, actually, Vrsagana brought the two different traditions (twofold classification and threefold classification) together and had the philosophical insight to see that they were forming only parts of the whole picture. I do not think that the siitrakara was aware of the fact that he belonged to the particular *Sce G. Oberhammer : “Zur Deutung Von Nydyasitram 1.1.5” in Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde Siid—und Ostasiens, 10 (1966). Some portion of this section was prepared for presentation at the South Asia Section of XXVII International Congress of Orientalists, at Ann Arbor, Michigan (USA) on August 18, 1967. For a far richer material on the description of the theory of inference in ancient Indian texts see Nancy Schuster’s Paper “Inference in the Vaisesika-Satras,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol 1, 1972, pp. 34-395. Some portions here pre-date Mrs. Schusters’ paper.42 Logic, Language and Reality tradition where only sdmédnyato drsta inference was recognized. He should rather be regarded as describing the tradition of three- fold classification of inference based on the temporal signi- ficance as I have already indicated. As I have already said, my interpretation is a guess-work. It is, at best, an intelligent guess. And, I think, all the later commentators including Vatsyayana were doing the same thing, i.e., making intelligent guesses, while trying to interpret these three terms. The interpretation suggested above takes into con- sideration certain historical as well as textual facts which the other interpretations seem to have ignored. This is all that can be said in favour of the above interpretation (viz., Sugges- tion Tand Il). § 1.5 : Pseupo-REASON (Hetvabhdasa) In Section 1.3, I have already said that while the Buddhist as well as the Vaisesika mentions three essential characteristics or marks of an inferential reason of evidence, i.e., hetu, the early Nyaya thinks that the hetw should have five, instead of three, essential marks in order to be able to generate infallible infer- ences. The dispute is usually referred to as one between trirfpa and paiicariipa (threefold versus fivefold inference-generating condition). The term ‘hetw’ is not easy to translate. I shall use ‘reason’ or ‘evidence’ interchangeably to render ‘hefu’ into English, although I am aware that ‘evidence’ may havea much wider application. (Perhaps, any pramana, properly understood, would be an evidence.) For ‘hetvabhdsa’ I shall use ‘pseudo- reason’. Modern writers, being partly misled by their acquain- tance with the Western logical terminology, use ‘fallacy’ to refer to the defect that a reason or evidence may have—the defect that would incapacitate the reason. In other words, if a reason has one of these defects (cf., hetu-dosa), it is rendered useless, for, it would then not be potent enough to give rise to the desired inference. Since old habit dies hard, I shall use ‘fallacy’ some- times in this context, while I would assign to it the sense just described. ‘The five marks are : 1. The reason (evidence) must be present in the case under consideration (called paksa, the subject-locus). iyLogic in Ancient and Medieval India 43 2. It must be present in another case similar to the case under consideration (called sapaksa, the homologue, the agreeing case). 3. It must not be present in cases dissimilar to the case under consideration, i.e., cases where the inferable property (the predicate-property) is not present. 4. It must be such that the proposition it tries to establish should not be contradicted by another already established truth, 5. It must be such that there should not be another evidence Or reason establishing the opposite thesis, to counter~ balance the thesis it tries to establish. 4 and 5 are called in Sanskrit : abadhitatva and asatpratipa- ksitva, 1,2 and 3 are the same as the ‘three marks’ of the Buddhist. Some Naiydyikas even argued that the three terms in Nyayasiitra 1.1.5, piirvavat, Sesavat and sémanyato’drsta, actually referred to the first ‘three marks’ of the heru. [piirva=paksa, Sesa=sapaksa and sémanyato adrsta=vipakse sdmanyena adysta] - The same view further maintains that the word “ca” in the siitra 1.1.5, indicates the additional two marks, 4 and 5. But, as Bhasarvajfia has said, this is a far-fetched and tortuous inter- pretation (cf., kasta-kalpand, pp. 191-92). Those who regard the five marks as essential face the criticism that 4 and 5 aré rather context-dependent and not directly con- cerned with the soundness of the reason (or hett) itself. Those who regard the ‘three marks’ as essential face a further criticism. For, it may be argued that under a reasonable interpretation, 2 and 3 would be equivalent and hence, either of them would be redundant. I. would discuss this controversy in section 1.7. Let me dwell here on the general idea about what makes a hetu a defective hetu, a pseudo-reason. Nydyasitra 1.2.4 mentions five types of pseudo-reason. Siitras 1.2.5-1.2.9 try to explain (define) them, but their mean- ings still remain obscure. I shall try to follow Vatsyayana here. The first type of pseudo-reason is, perhaps, the least controversial one. It is called sa-vyabhicdra ‘a deviating reason’ or we may call it an inconclusive reason. Vatsyayana’s example is : Sound is eternal because it is intangible.“4 Logic, Language and Reality It is explained : A pot is an entity that is tangible (can be touched) and it is seen to be non-eternal. Sound is not tangible in the same way. Therefore, (one may argue) sound is eternal because it is intangible. (Answer :) In the example, tangibility and eternality are not grasped as being connected by way of being the reason (or evidence) and what is to be proven (sddhya). For example, an atom has touch and it is eternal. When the soul, etc., are examples, the (purported) reason bears resemblance with the example and hence purports to prove the s@dhya (the desired property, eternality). But the reason, intangibility, deviates from the property, eternality. For a cognitive episode is intangible as well as non-eternal. Since the (purported) reason deviates from the (desired) property in both examples (atoms and cognitive events), it is not a (proper) reason, for the definition does not apply- Eternality and temporality are two mutually exclusive oppo- sites. If a reason belongs to one or the other (not both), it is non-deviating. Violation of this rule generates an inconclusive pseudo-reason, for it belongs to both. Thisis only a clumsy way of stating the principle that a pro- perty in order to be adequate to prove the presence of another Property in the same location must belong only to the cases where the second property is seen to belong, and should not belong to a case where the second property is scen to be absent. ‘The pseudo-reason viruddha is enigmatically defined in NS 1.2.6. Most probably, it meant something very different from what the later tradition in nyaya understood as viruddha. If we keep ourselves within the bounds of Nydyasiitra and Bhasya, we have to explain it as an ‘incoherent’ pseudo-reason. NS 1.2.6 siddhantam abhyupetya tad-virodht viruddhak “An. incoherent reason is one which contradicts what has already been conceded as a tenet.” Vatsyayana gives an example which tries to show that the Samkhya doctrine of change in the midst of permanence (cf., the sat-karyavada) is incoherent, for the reason adduced therein contradicts what has already been accepted in the system. The so-called ‘mistimed’ pseudo-reason (kdltita), the fifth in_ Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 45 the list, remains as another enigma of the old school. The basic idea was probably that the proper formulation of what we are going to prove (i.e., the proposition to be proved) would be enough to show that it cannot be proved. Hence, the adducing of the reason would not even be necessary. It would be mistimed. I shall now give a detailed analysis of Vatsyayana’s comments on the other two pseudo-reasons ; sadhyasama and prakarana~ sama. Since H.N. Randle wrote a somewhat pioneering work on these issues Indian Logic in the Early Schools, Oxford, 1930), I shall examine some remarks made by Randle in this connection. Scholars have usually translated the term sddhyasama occurring in early Sanskrit philosophical texts as petitio principii. Curiously enough, H.N. Randle used ‘petitio principii’ to translate prakaranasama, one of the five defects of inference mentioned in the Nydyasiitra.1 While commenting on sddhyasama, however, Randle remarked : This clearly resembles the preceding fallacy (prakaranasama) in being a kind of begging the question: and this kinship with the previous fallacy is, no doubt, indicated by the word ‘and’ with which the present siitra commences.? Randle expressed also a word of caution regarding the use of ‘s@dhyasama’ in the Madhyamika texts. Professor K. Bhatta~ charya in his recent note® shows that Randle’s misgivings about the interpretation of s@dhyasama in the Madhyamika texts were right. It is also to be noted that the usual translation of sadhya- sama in the Nyaya context as petit principii (which even Randle seems to have suggested) is not only imprecise but also incorrect. Sadhyasama, like petitio principii, is a defect in the argument and, hence, can be better explainedin thecontext of an argument. First, we must be clear about what we understand by petitio principii as well as what we understand by a defect or a logical fallacy. It is better to clarify here the notion of fallacy. Let us define a fallacy as an invalid or unsound form of argument. An argumentor reasoning involves a transition from a Nyayasittra 1.2.4, *Randle, p. 197. *See K. Bhattacharya’s article in Journal of Indian Philosophy (1974), pp. 225-230.46 Logic, Language and Reality set of premises or some evidence to aconclusion. A false belief is not called a fallacy, since it does not involve an argument. From a practical point of view, however, ‘fallacy’ is very often used in a much extended sense. Traditionally, any mistake or confu- sion in the context of an argument or proof is called a fallacy. Thus, apart from fallacies that can be called ‘formal’ because of their relation with some formal logical system, there are fallacies in non-deductive inferences, as well as fallacies in philosophic arguments or discourses. The ‘non-formal’ fallacies are called fallacies actually in the extended sense. It is to be noted that an argument with such a ‘non-formal’ fallacy could be wrong, though it may be formally valid. A petitio principii is a fallacy in the’ extended sense noted above. It denotes an argument that ‘begs the question’-—an argument that uses the conclusion to be arrived at as one of the premises. What we call ‘arguing in a circle’ is also a petitio principii. We argue in a circle when we defend a statement by another statement and when asked to defend the second state- ment we defend it by the first statement. A petitio principii, it is to be noted, can be a formally valid argument. A conclusion can very well be entailed by a set of premises that happens to include the conclusion itself. Thus, arguing in a circle can be formally valid! A petitio principii, therefore, is very different from a fallacy like (say) the illicit minor in the traditional theory of categorical syllogism based upon what is called ‘the distribution of terms’. An illicit minor is said to occur when the ‘minor term’, i.e., the subject of the conclusion, is distributed in the conclusion (in other words, the conclusion is an A or E proposition) but not in the minor premise. In short, it is a fallacy, since it violates a formal rule of categorical syllogism. It is also instructive to note Aristotle’s comment on petitio principii: Petitio principii falls within the class of failure to prove the thesis to be proved; but this may happen in several ways. One may not reason syllogistically at all, or one may use premises no better known than the conclusion, or logically posterior to it, None of these constitutes petitio principii> 1Aristotle, Prior Analytics 64 28-32, p. 143.Logic in Ancient and Medieval India 47 I shall later come back to the detailed comments of Aristotle on petitio principii. With the above as a prelude, let us now investigate the meaning of the term sadhyasama in early Nyaya texts. Nydyasiitra 1.2.8 says : sddhyavisistak sadhyatvat sadhyasamah. Randle translates : (And) a reason which is indistinguishable from probandum in respect of having to be proved is called the reason which is ‘identical with the probandum.® I suggest the following translation : A reason that is non-distinguished from what is to be proved is called sddhyasama (=one having the same predicament as that of what is to be proved) because it (itself) needs to be proved. Now let us follow Vatsyayana’s explanation of this siitra.® The proposition to be proved is : Shadow is a substance.4 The reason is that it moves. This reason is not distinguished from the proposition to be proved, It is in the same_predica- ment with what is to be proved because it itself needs to be proved. (To explain :) This reason is itself unestablished (unproved) and, hence, should be established as true (proved) just as the proposition to be proved is supposed to be. One has to decide (establish) the following : Whether a shadow, like a man, moves, or whether what is apprehended is a series of non-presence of light arising out of a series of succes- sive coverings as the covering substance moves. (In fact) the non-presence of those portions of light that are cut off (covered) by the moving substance is continuously apprehended. ‘Covering’ means the rejection of its (the light’s) approach (to some place). Randle reads a ‘ca’ (—‘and’) in the sitra, but no ‘ca’ is present in G. Jha’s reading. See Jha’s edition, p. 63. *Randle, p. 197. For the reason explained in note 1 in p. 47 of the book, T have put ‘and’ in parentheses. 3 Vatsyayana, pp. 63-64. ‘The term sddhya in this context stands for the entire proposition to be proved. And likewise the term heru means the proposition used as a premise of the argument,48 Logic, Language and Reality Vatsyayana’s explanation of sddhyasama, as will be clear from the above, enjoys the benefit of both worlds. While it is suitable asa defect of inference as it was in the siitra, it also contains the seed of the later theory by which sa@dhyasama can be turned into a well-entrenched fallacy, viz., the svarapasiddha of the later Nyaya. The earlier theory of inference in the Nyaya tradition was something like the following. An inference was treated as a transition from one statement or cognition to another statement, or cognition with the implicit help of an implication-rule, The first statement (premise) was called a hetu ‘reason’, and the second statement was called a sadhya ‘proposition to be proved’. We can illustrate the process as follows : Hetu ‘treason’ :—a shadow moves. Sadhya ‘what is to be proved’: a shadow is a substance. The required implication-rule : Having motion implies being a substance. In the explicit statement of ‘steps’ in the argument (which is technically called nydyavakya or avayava, or the so-called nyaya syllogism), the third ‘step’ is called udaharana ‘exemplification’, which consists in the statement of the implication-rule along with an instantiation of it;i.e., an actual ‘example’ (=

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