As appeared in PBE December 2008 www.powderbulk.

com

Designing your dust collection system to meet

NFPA standards Part I

Gary Q. Johnson Workplace Exposure Solutions

tion differ from those for the published data for the
same material, producing different combustible dust re-
About 40 percent of combustible dust explosions re- sults. The only way to determine your dusts combustibil-
ported in the US and Europe over the last 25 years ity is to have a qualified laboratory run explosion tests on a
have involved dust collectors. Dust collection sys- representative sample of the dust. Then, to meet NFPA re-
tems are now a primary focus of inspections re- quirements, youll need to commission a hazard analysis
quired by OSHAs National Emphasis Program on of your dust collection system to document that its design
safely handling combustible dusts.1 OSHA also has mitigates the explosion risk posed by your dust. (For more
information, see reference 4.)
the authority to enforce National Fire Protection As-
sociation (NFPA) standards for preventing or pro-
tecting against dust explosions. This two-part article Some dust explosion basics
focuses on how you can design your dust collection The five elements required for a dust explosion can be pic-
systems dust collector, ductwork, and exhaust fan tured as a pentagon, as shown in Figure 1. The three ele-
to meet the intent of these NFPA requirements. Part ments labeled in black are those in the familiar fire
II will appear in January. triangle: fuel (combustible dust), an ignition source, and

Figure 1

Dust explosion pentagon

T
he explosion hazards posed by dusts commonly han-
dled in bulk solids plants can be surprising. In fact, Ignition
most natural or synthetic organic dusts and some source
metal dusts can explode under the right conditions. You can
find a limited list of combustible dusts and their explosion
data in the appendix to the NFPA standard focusing on dust Confinement
explosion hazards, NFPA 68: Standard on Explosion Pro- Dust dispersion of dust cloud
at or greater
tection by Deflagration Venting (2007),2 and in Rolf K. Eck- than dusts MEC
in equipment
hoffs book Dust Explosions in the Process Industries.3 or building

While such published data can give you some idea of your
dusts explosion hazards, using this data for designing ex-
plosion prevention or protection equipment for your dust Fuel Oxygen
isnt recommended. Your processing conditions and your (combustible
dust)
dusts characteristics such as its particle size distribu-
oxygen. For a dust explosion, two more elements (labeled vention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufactur-
in red) are required: dust dispersion at or greater than the ing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate
dusts minimum explosible concentration (the lowest dust Solids (2006).2 First, the conveying air velocity must be
concentration that will propagate a combustible dust defla- adequate throughout the duct. Second, at points where two
gration or explosion; MEC) and confinement of the dust airstreams merge, the duct sections must join in a way that
cloud within equipment or a building. maintains this velocity.

Put simply, a dust explosion occurs when an ignition If your plant handles a combustible dust, a visiting OSHA
source touches a dust cloud with a concentration at or inspector will ask whether the conveying air velocity
greater than the dusts MEC. A dust cloud with this con- through your dust collection system is adequate and
centration can result when a layer of dust thicker than 132 will ask you to prove it. Why is this velocity important?
inch on equipment, piping, overhead conduit, or similar Keeping the conveying air velocity in every part of the duct
components is pushed into the air by some event, such as within a reasonable range will prevent two problems: Too
the pressure wave from a relief devices operation. When low an air velocity will cause the dust to drop out of the air
an ignition source such as a spark or the flame front and build up inside the duct, and, depending on the dusts
from an equipment explosion touches the cloud, the characteristics, too high an air velocity will waste energy,
dust can explode with devastating impact, as evidenced by erode the duct, or, if the dust is moist or sticky, cause the
the fatal results of the sugar refinery explosion in Georgia dust to smear on the duct wall.
last February. To mitigate your dust collection systems
explosion risk, you need to focus on preventing dust accu-
mulation in the system, preventing ignition, and providing
explosion prevention or protection at the collector all
covered by NFPA standards. If your plant handles a combustible dust, a visiting
OSHA inspector will ask whether the conveying air
Even when a dust collector is equipped with an explosion velocity through your dust collection system is
vent that works properly, the ductwork in the dust collec- adequate and will ask you to prove it.
tion system can propagate a collector dust explosion
throughout a process area. An investigation into one such
case revealed that a contributing factor was the ignition
and explosion of dust that had accumulated in the duct- A conveying air velocity between 3,500 and 4,000 fpm
work because of the systems inadequate conveying veloc- (17.5 and 20 m/s) is a reasonable starting point for design-
ity. 5 Another contributing factor was the lack of ing your system. Then, based on supporting data about
flame-front-isolation devices in the collectors dirty-air your application, you can speed or slow the conveying air
inlet and the clean-air outlet for recirculating air to the to the systems optimal velocity. For instance, if your sys-
building. Such devices could have prevented the flame tem handles an extremely fine, lightweight material that
front in the collector from entering the inlet duct and re-en- wont clump together, like cotton dust, you can slow the
tering the building through the outlet duct. velocity to 3,000 fpm; if you handle a very heavy material,
like lead dust, you may need to increase the velocity to
In this case as in many others, following the requirements 4,500 to 5,000 fpm. For guidance in determining the opti-
in NFPA standards for mitigating explosion risks in a dust mal velocity for your application, see Table 5-1 in the
collection system could have prevented the dust explosion American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hy-
from propagating beyond the dust collector. In the follow- gienists Industrial Ventilation: A Manual of Recom-
ing sections, well look at how you can design your dust mended Practice for Design (26th edition, 2007),6 which
collection system to meet the NFPA standards. Informa- lists minimum duct design air velocities for many dusts.
tion covers preventing dust accumulation in ductwork,
eliminating ignition sources, and using explosion preven- How duct sections are joined in your system also affects
tion and protection methods at the collector. [Editors the conveying air velocity. If incorrectly designed, the
note: Capture hood design, another important factor in de- point where ducts join to merge two airstreams can slow
signing a safe dust collection system, is beyond this arti- the air velocity, in turn causing the dust to drop out and ac-
cles scope; for more information, see the later section cumulate in the duct. You can prevent this problem by con-
For further reading or contact the author.] necting each branch duct to a 15-degree tapered expansion
on the main duct, which enlarges the main duct diameter
to a size appropriate for the merged airstreams. A related
Preventing dust accumulation in ductwork problem is that dust particles can drop out of the airstream
To prevent dust from accumulating in your dust collection when a branch duct joins the main duct at too great an
systems ductwork and becoming fuel for an explosion, angle. The momentum of the conveyed dust particles
you must design all ducts in the system with two principles causes them to want to move in a straight line, so when one
in mind, as described in NFPA 654: Standard for the Pre- duct joins another at a sharp angle, the particles have to
change direction and slow down. Avoid this problem by larges from 8 to 9 inches, and the downstream main duct,
designing the branch duct entry with no more than a 30- C, is 9 inches in diameter. Before the blank flange was in-
degree angle to the main duct. stalled, the systems design airflow met the air velocity re-
quirements at A (4,200 fpm [1,500-cfm airflow]), B
(3,900 fpm [350-cfm airflow]), and C (4,100 fpm [1,850-
Failing to practice these duct design principles can lead to cfm airflow]). But with A blanked off, the required air ve-
any of several problems that produce a slower-than-re- locity through the 4-inch-diameter duct (B) is now 3,900
quired conveying air velocity in your ducts. Following are fpm (350-cfm airflow). The exhaust fan might be able to
some visual clues that indicate the air velocity in the ducts pull an airflow of no more than 600 cfm through B and C,
isnt high enough to prevent dust from dropping out of the which would drop the air velocity at C from the required
air. Under each clue, ways to remedy the problem and get 4,100 fpm to 270 fpm.
adequate conveying air velocity though the ducts are de-
scribed.
Solutions: Two solutions are possible: You can replace all
the duct between B and the systems dust collector with
Clue 1: Main duct diameter doesnt enlarge after branch smaller duct to achieve an adequate conveying velocity.
junctions. In Figure 2a, two 8-inch-diameter branch ducts Or, as a much cheaper alternative, you can remove the
join an 8-inch-diameter main duct, and the main ducts blank flange and replace it with an orifice plate that deliv-
downstream diameter is the same after each junction. At ers 1,500-cfm airflow at the systems available static pres-
A, before the first branch junction, the 4,200-fpm air ve- sure; the orifice plate has a hole at its center thats sized to
locity required to convey the dust is reasonable and can be meet the systems airflow and pressure drop requirements.
achieved by the systems design airflow of 1,500 cfm. But
because the duct diameter doesnt enlarge after the branch
junctions, the required air velocity increases exponen- Clue 3: Poor duct junctions dont maintain conveying ve-
tially: Its 8,400 fpm at B, after the first branch junction, locity. Lets look at two examples of this problem. In the
which would require a 3,000-cfm airflow, and its 16,800 first, shown in Figure 2c, an 8-inch-diameter duct section
fpm at C, after the second junction, which would require a abruptly joins a 20-inch-diameter section. At the systems
4,500-cfm airflow. However, 5,500 fpm is the practical 1,400-cfm design airflow, the conveying air velocity is
upper limit for air velocity in system ductwork. To meet 4,000 fpm in the 8-inch section, but it drops abruptly to 650
the velocity requirements in this duct arrangement, the fpm in the 20-inch section, which will cause the dust to drop
system would require a major upgrade of the exhaust fan out of the air. Solution: In this case, the solution is to replace
and electric power, which is impractical. the 20-inch duct section with 8-inch duct. The duct diameter
should stay at 8 inches until the next branch junction; after
that junction, the duct should be enlarged to maintain the air
Solution: The more economical solution is to enlarge the velocity, following the rule of thumb under Clue 1.
downstream duct. This will solve the problem that results
from not upgrading the exhaust fan that is, that C gets
most of the airflow, B gets some, and A gets very little. To Another poor duct junction is shown in Figure 2d. Here, an
ensure that the ducts diameter is large enough after a 8-inch-diameter branch duct, A, joins an 8-inch-diameter
branch duct joins it, follow this rule of thumb: The sum of main duct at a 90-degree angle, forming a T junction. The
the areas of the upstream branch ducts should roughly systems 1,400-cfm design airflow can produce the re-
equal the area of the downstream duct. Based on the equa- quired 4,000-fpm conveying air velocity through A and
tion duct area = (diameter/2)2, this rule can be re- and section B upstream from the junction without a prob-
stated as: the sum of the squares of the upstream branch lem. But section C downstream from the junction would
duct diameters should roughly approximate the square of require 8,000 fpm (at an airflow of 2,800 cfm) to convey
the downstream main duct diameter. Thus, at B: the dust through the duct and past the T junction. Meeting
this impossibly high air velocity requirement would de-
82 + 82 = 128 112 or 121
mand an unreasonably high fan energy, and the duct at
so the main duct diameter at B should be changed to 11 both B and C would probably plug with dust. Solution: In
inches. Then, at C, two solutions are possible: this case, replacing the T junction with a 30-degree Y junc-
112 + 82 = 185 132 or 169 tion that enlarges to a downstream diameter of 11 inches
(again following the rule of thumb in Clue 1) will maintain
112 + 82 = 185 142 or 196
the systems 4,000-fpm conveying air velocity.
so the main duct diameter at C should be changed to 13 or
14 inches, depending on your applications conveying ve-
locity requirements. Clue 4: Ductwork includes too much flexible hose. In
Figure 2e, flexible hose has been used in place of metal
duct as a quick way to connect two duct sections. How-
Clue 2: Main duct is blanked off. In Figure 2b, an 8-inch- ever, dust builds up more easily on the hoses corrugated
diameter main duct, A, is blanked off. A 4-inch-diameter inside surface than on smooth metal duct. The hoses inter-
branch duct, B, joins the main duct at a Y junction that en- nal resistance also is more than twice that of smooth metal
duct, so with the hose bends acting as elbows, the hoses vide the speed necessary to overcome this additional air-
equivalent length is much greater than its actual length. flow resistance, and the result is low air velocity that
The systems exhaust fan may not be large enough to pro- causes dust to drop out of the air and plug the ducts.

Figure 2

Visual clues to duct problems that cause dust accumulation

a. Main duct diameter doesnt enlarge after branch junctions d. Branch duct joins main duct at T junction

A C
B B
C

Branch
junctions 30-degree
T junction
Y junction

e. Ductwork includes too much flexible hose

b. Main duct is blanked off

Blank
flange
8 inches
A
C B 4 inches
9 inches

c. Smaller-diameter duct abruptly joins larger-diameter duct

f. Duct blast gate isnt locked in position

20 inches Blast gate

in unlocked
position

A
8 inches
Solution: Replace the flexible hose with sections of metal per minute divided by the square feet of filter media sur-
duct that are clamped together. You should use flexible face area) for your dust collector, properly starting up the
hose in the system only with equipment that must move, collector when the new filters are installed will provide the
such as connecting metal duct to the capture hood for a best long-term performance. Once the new filters are in-
loss-in-weight feeder that rests on load cells; see NFPA
654 for more information.
Figure 3
Clue 5: Duct blast gate isnt locked in position. Blast
gates in ducts add artificial airflow resistance to balance Effect on airflow of high pressure drop
the airflow in individual duct branches. For each blast gate, across the filter media
only one position is correct to balance the airflow in all
Design High pressure
branches. In Figure 2f, the blast gate has been adjusted to static pressure drop shifts
send more airflow into this branch, which steals airflow fan operation
from other branches. curve to left

Static pressure (in inches water column)

System
11 operating
Solution: Set this and other duct blast gates to meet the sys- point
tems design airflow and then lock the gates in place. You
can avoid this problem altogether by designing the dust Design static
pressure
collection system for the correct airflow balance without to move air
using blast gates, which is called balance by design. 7 from longest
duct branch to
baghouse inlet
Clue 6: The pressure drop across the filter media is Exhaust fan
higher than the design pressure drop. Figure 3 shows the operation
airflow resistance increasing in a baghouse dust collection
system in which the pressure drop across the bag filter
media exceeds the design pressure drop. (Pressure drop, or Q2 Q1
differential pressure, is the difference in the static pres- Airflow (in actual cubic feet per minute)
sures measured on the clean and dirty sides of the dust col-
lector; the more dust collected on the filters, the higher the
pressure drop will be.) In Figure 3, the design pressure
drop across the bag filters is the systems design static stalled, you should also condition them (also called pre-
pressure (11 inches water column) minus the static pres- coating or seeding) before your dust collection system
sure required to move the air from the longest branch duct goes back online; this will build up an initial dust cake on
to the baghouse inlet (7 inches), which equals 4 inches the media that resists blinding and prevents high pressure
water column. The line Q1 represents the design airflow drop. (For more information, see reference 7.) With older
the fan should deliver, with the lines top white portion rep- filters, increasing the cleaning frequency or replacing the
resenting the design pressure drop though the media. But filters more often can control the pressure drop across the
Q2 represents the airflow the fan actually delivers, which is media. Another solution is to replace your filters with ones
lower than the design level because the actual pressure that have a larger surface area to better handle your dust-
drop through the media (shown by the lines white portion) laden airflow.
exceeds the design level, increasing airflow resistance.
Clue 7: Dust cloud is first sign of trouble. Figure 4 shows a
The system exhaust fans operating curve shows how dust cloud surrounding a vibrating conveyor that delivers
much air the fan can move (airflow, represented by the hor- powder to a sifter; the cloud has developed because the cap-
izontal axis) at different static pressures (on the vertical ture hood over the equipment isnt drawing the dust-laden
axis). As you can see, this curve shifts to the left of the sys- air into the dust collection system. The dust cloud a po-
tem operating point showing that the fan delivers less tential explosion hazard could be the result of duct plug-
airflow than the system requires because the higher ging, filter blinding, or other problems, any of which could
pressure drop has increased the airflow resistance across reduce airflow through the system. Unfortunately, this dust
the system. Because the fan cant deliver the required air- cloud is the first sign of trouble because the dust collection
flow, the conveying air velocity in the ductwork slows and system pressure, airflow, and other data arent monitored.
leads to more dust dropping out in the ducts.
Solution: You need to make routine measurements of sta-
Solutions: The solution to high pressure drop across the tic pressure and airflow at appropriate points in the dust
media depends on your application. Assuming youve se- collection system, as well as measure each capture hoods
lected the right air-to-cloth ratio (the airflow in cubic feet face velocity (the air velocity at the inlet opening). Such
system monitoring will reveal any changes in pressure, air-
flow, or face velocity from the systems baseline perfor-
mance data. By helping you spot such changes early, mon- Figure 4
itoring allows you to catch a small problem before it can
create a hazardous dust cloud in your process area. Lack of system monitoring makes dust
cloud first sign of trouble
What is baseline performance data? Its documented
proof of your dust collection systems performance at
startup (or after any significant system modification),
which demonstrates that the system can deliver the design
airflow at every capture hood or other dust-controlled
opening. This is one of the requirements of NFPA 91:
Standard for Exhaust Systems for Air Conveying of Va-
pors, Gases, Mists, and Noncombustible Particulate
Solids (2004)2, which is incorporated by reference into
NFPA 654. In addition to verifying the system design, the
baseline data provides a reference point for system moni-
toring. Baseline data documentation is powerful evidence
to show an OSHA inspector that your system has adequate
conveying velocities. The design documentation you 5. Investigation Report: Combustible Dust Hazard Study, Report 2006-
should keep on file includes the system schematic, a table H-1, US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
listing locations and dimensions of air-balancing devices November 2006 (www.chemsafety.gov).
(such as blast gates), the as-built systems static pressure 6. Available from American Conference of Governmental Industrial
balance calculations for sizing the exhaust fan, and the de- Hygienists, 1330 Kemper Meadow Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45240;
513-742-6163, fax 513-742-3355 (www.acgih.org, [email protected]).
sign bases and specifications for system equipment. (For
7. Ed Ravert, Precoating new filters for better airflow, longer filter
more information, see reference 8.) Turning the baseline life, Powder and Bulk Engineering, October 2006, pages 27-33; see
performance data over to the operators once the system is For further reading for information on purchasing a copy of this
online allows them to use the data to monitor system per- article.
formance and keep the system working over the long term. 8. Gary Q. Johnson, Dust control system design: Allowing for your
range of process conditions and establishing baseline performance
values, Powder and Bulk Engineering, October 2005, pages 39-48;
In some cases, comparing this baseline data to current op- see For further reading for information on purchasing a copy of this
article.
erating data may help you determine that the original sys-
tem design can no longer handle your applications
changed field conditions and requirements. In this case,
youll have to redesign the system to meet the new require-
ments. Several situations requiring you to test the dust col-
lection system to demonstrate that it works as designed are For further reading
listed in NFPA 91. PBE
Find more information on designing dust collection sys-
tems and preventing dust explosions in articles listed
under Dust collection and dust control and Safety in
Next month: In Part II, sections will cover how to eliminate Powder and Bulk Engineerings comprehensive article
ignition sources in the system and how to use explosion pre- index (later in this issue and at PBEs Web site, www
vention and protection methods at the collector. A final sec- .powderbulk.com) and in books available on the Web site
tion will explain how to meet additional NFPA requirements. at the PBE Bookstore. You can also purchase copies of
past PBE articles at www.powderbulk.com.

References
1. The OSHA National Emphasis Program (NEP) directive on safely
handling combustible dusts is available at http://www.osha.gov
/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_03-00-008.pdf.
2. Available from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 1
Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471; 800-244-3555, fax
617-770-0700 (www.nfpa.org).
Gary Q. Johnson is principal consultant with Workplace
3. Rolf K. Eckhoff, Dust Explosions in the Process Industries, Elsevier
Publishing, third edition, 2003; available from the PBE Bookstore at
Exposure Solutions, 7172 Willowood Drive, Cincinnati,
www.powderbulk.com. OH 45241; phone/fax 513-777-4626 (gary@workexpo
4. Lee Morgan and Terry Supine, Five ways the new explosion venting soln.com, www.workexposoln.com). He holds a masters
requirements for dust collectors affect you, Powder and Bulk degree in business administration from the University of
Engineering, July 2008, pages 42-49; see For further reading for Scranton, Scranton, Pa., and a bachelors degree in chemi-
information on purchasing a copy of this article.
cal engineering from Ohio State University in Columbus.
As appeared in PBE January 2009 www.powderbulk.com

Designing your dust collection system to meet

NFPA standards Part II

Gary Q. Johnson Workplace Exposure Solutions

cludes selecting filters with integral grounding straps that

provide a grounding path between the filter and the
About 40 percent of combustible dust explosions re- tubesheet, which also must be grounded. Component ma-
ported in the US and Europe over the last 25 years terials must be conductive, as well. Dont select duct made
have involved dust collectors. Dust collection sys- of plastic, which is nonconductive. If your ductwork in-
tems are now a primary focus of inspections re- cludes flexible hose, the hose should be molded with
quired by OSHAs National Emphasis Program on grounding wires, and you must clamp these wires to the
safely handling combustible dusts.1 OSHA also has upstream and downstream metal ducts to ground the hose.
Examples of how to ground typical system components
the authority to enforce National Fire Protection As- are shown in Figure 1.
sociation (NFPA) standards for preventing or pro-
tecting against dust explosions. This two-part article
focuses on how you can design your dust collection The grounding wires on various components should be
visible to operators so they can quickly check that the
systems dust collector, ductwork, and exhaust fan grounding is in place. Operators should also routinely
to meet the intent of these NFPA requirements. Part check the resistance to ground in the wires to ensure that
I (December) covered dust explosion basics and how its less than 106 ohms. You can find more information on
to prevent dust accumulation in system ductwork; how to use grounding to minimize these electrostatic haz-
Part II covers how to eliminate ignition sources in ards in NFPA 77: Recommended Practice on Static Elec-
the system, how to use explosion prevention and tricity (2007).2
protection methods at the collector, and how to meet
additional NFPA requirements. Selecting electrical components for your hazardous area
classification. Youll also need to choose electrical compo-
nents for your dust collection system that are certified for
Eliminating ignition sources use in your hazardous location, as detailed in NFPA 499:
Grounding the system equipment, selecting electrical Recommended Practice for the Classification of Com-
components for your hazardous area classification, and bustible Dusts and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for
protecting the exhaust fan are all ways to eliminate igni- Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas (2008).2
tion sources in your dust collection system. In the US, this certification is provided by Underwriter Lab-
oratories and Factory Mutual. The type of hazardous protec-
tion your electrical components must have such as being
Grounding equipment. To prevent a static electrical dis- dust-ignition-proof or mounted in dust-tight enclosures
charge from providing an ignition source for a dust explo- depends on the explosion risk in your systems location, and
sion, you must ground the dust collector and its these hazardous locations are rated by classes, divisions, and
components, the ductwork, the exhaust fan, and other sys- groups. Hazardous locations with combustible dust are
tem components to dissipate static electricity. This in- Class II. In Class II, Division I, locations, the dust is present
during normal conditions, and in Class II, Division 2, loca- explosion prevention or protection method, including
tions, the dust is present only in abnormal conditions, such venting, suppression, isolation, and others. Explosion
as a system breakdown. The additional group subclassifica- venting is covered in NFPA 68: Standard on Explosion
tion depends on the type of dust in the surrounding environ- Protection by Deflagration Venting (2007), and suppres-
ment: for example, Group E is for metal dusts, Group F is sion, isolation, and other methods are covered in NFPA 69:

Figure 1

Grounding system components to eliminate ignition sources

Ground clean-air plenum,

tubesheet, and dirty-air plenum

Photo courtesy of J.O.A. North America, Charlotte, N.C.

Use filters grounded
to tubesheet

Duct grounding
wires clearly
visible to
operators
Ground exhaust fan
and fan motor
Ground each section Ground
of conductive duct dust collector

for carbonaceous dusts, and Group G is for all other dusts. Standard on Explosion Protection Systems (2008).2 You
To determine the right hazardous area classification for your can see a dust collector equipped with various explosion
systems electrical components, consider your dust type, prevention and protection devices in Figure 2.
dust quantity, whether the systems dust collector is inside
or outside, and related factors. Of the several ways to meet NFPA 68 requirements for pro-
Protecting the exhaust fan. If your exhaust fan fails me- tecting your dust collector from an explosion, explosion
chanically, the fan impeller can shift and rub or hit the venting is the most common. NFPA 68 venting require-
housing. A spark from such metal-to-metal contact has ments are described in detail in the PBE article Five ways
enough energy to ignite a combustible dust. To avoid this the new explosion venting requirements for dust collectors
hazard, you should do two things: First, place the exhaust affect you.3 As the article states: The purpose of explo-
fan on the dust collectors clean side, where it cant contact sion venting is to save lives, not property. A well-designed
dust under normal conditions, as detailed in NFPA 654: explosion vent functions as a weak element in the equip-
Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions ments pressure envelope, relieving internal combustion
from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of pressure to keep the collector from blowing up into pieces.
Combustible Particulate Solids (2006).2 Second, train and ...Typically, the collector is located outside and designed to
equip your operators to practice good dust collector main- vent away from buildings and populated locations. Addi-
tenance so they can spot filter leaks early and replace the tional venting information in the article highlights NFPA
affected filters before dust can escape the system. One tool 68 areas that have changed or are of most importance to
available from multiple suppliers for helping the operators bulk solids processors, including the performance-based
spot filter leaks before they cause a problem is a filter-leak design option and sizing vents and discharge ducts.
detection system; the system uses an inductive or tribo-
electric probe inserted into the system ductwork to sense If your dust collector is indoors and cant be vented outside
particles escaped from a leaking filter. through an exterior wall or ceiling, you must equip it with
an explosion prevention method, such as a suppression
system, that can prevent a dust explosion from propagat-
Using explosion prevention and protection methods ing to connected equipment. You can use any of several
at the collector systems described in NFPA 69. One common example is a
To meet NFPA requirements for protecting your dust col- chemical suppression system, which senses a developing
lector from a dust explosion, you must use one (or more) explosion in the dust collector and rapidly injects a chemi-
cal powder into the developing fireball to stop the flame lates cleaned air to the workplace. Placed on the dust col-
front; this can be a useful retrofit for a collector located in- lectors clean-air side between the fan and collector or
doors and too far from an outside wall to allow explosion after the fan, the float valve works like a ball check valve

Figure 2

Dust collector equipped with explosion prevention and protection devices

Explosion vent Flame-front

with deflector plate diverter on
collectors
dirty-air side

Photo courtesy of J.O.A. North America, Charlotte, N.C.

Float valve to
protect exhaust fan
or ventilation system
for recirculating
cleaned air

venting. Another suppression system injects a hot-water that is, its pushed shut by the pressure and airflow
mist into the collector to stop the flame front from travel- changes caused by an explosion in the collector.
ing to upstream equipment. For a dust collection system
thats part of a closed-circuit process, you may consider an Meeting additional NFPA requirements
explosion prevention method that uses nitrogen to inert the
According to our industrys current interpretation of the
dust collection system; using nitrogen inerting in a closed-
NFPA standards covering dust collection system design,
circuit application minimizes nitrogen consumption,
you dont have to update equipment in your system each
which otherwise would be prohibitively expensive.
time a particular standard is updated unless your locations
authority having jurisdiction (an organization, office, or
NFPA 69 also describes methods for isolating upstream individual responsible for enforcing the requirements of a
and downstream equipment from an explosion in the dust code or standard [NFPA 68]) decides otherwise. How-
collector. One common example is a flame-front diverter, ever, the standards require you to follow certain proce-
which is an explosion vent in the duct (Figure 2). The di- dures related to maintenance, housekeeping, explosion
verter is typically placed at the dust collectors dirty-air protection, and managing system changes, and you must
inlet when the collector is located near the dust collection implement the procedures retroactively.
systems exhaust fan and ductwork. When an explosion
occurs in the collector, the flame-front diverters vent Here are some of the key retroactive requirements in
opens and releases the explosion to the atmosphere, thus NFPA 68, 69, and 654:
isolating other equipment from the flame front. Another You must provide both initial training and refresher train-
isolation device is a high-speed isolation valve, which is ing to employees on the established operating and main-
located in the dirty-air duct and wired to an explosion de- tenance procedures for your dust collection system and
tector in the collector. The valves location on the duct is explosion prevention and protection equipment.
far enough from the explosion detector to allow the detec-
tor to respond to an explosion and close the valve before You must provide housekeeping and cleaning for the dust
the flame front can reach upstream equipment. A float collection system and surrounding area using procedures
valve (Figure 2) is another isolation device that protects (such as vacuum cleaning) that minimize dust-cloud gen-
the exhaust fan or the ventilation equipment that recircu- eration and at a frequency that minimizes dust accumula-
 tion in your workplace. The portable vacuum cleaners References
you use must meet Class II hazardous location require- 1. The OSHA National Emphasis Program (NEP) directive on safely
ments when operated in a combustible dust hazard area. handling combustible dusts is available at http://www.osha.gov
/OshDoc/Directive_pdf/CPL_03-00-008.pdf.
You must ensure that all dust collection system compo- 2. Available from National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), 1
nents are conductive, bonded (to protect workers from Batterymarch Park, Quincy, MA 02169-7471; 800-244-3555, fax
electric shock), and grounded to a resistance of less than 617-770-0700 (www.nfpa.org).
106 ohms. 3. Lee Morgan and Terry Supine, Five ways the new explosion venting
requirements for dust collectors affect you, Powder and Bulk
You must inspect, test, and maintain the dust collection Engineering, July 2008, pages 42-49; see For further reading for
system and its explosion prevention and protection information on purchasing a copy of this article.
equipment according to the manufacturers recommen-
dations. You also must keep records of these inspections
and tests and sign off on them. For further reading
You need to establish change management procedures Find more information on designing dust collection sys-
for the dust collection system and its explosion preven- tems and preventing dust explosions in articles listed
tion and protection equipment and address related tech- under Dust collection and dust control and Safety in
nical issues before making any system changes; after a Powder and Bulk Engineerings comprehensive article
system change, you must update the systems design index (later in this issue and at PBEs Web site,
documentation to reflect the change. www.powderbulk.com) and in books available on the Web
site at the PBE Bookstore. You can also purchase copies of
past PBE articles at www.powderbulk.com.
Also be aware that if equipment in your dust collection sys-
tem has changed or the dust collected by your system has
changed since you initially tested the dust for combustible
properties and conducted a hazard analysis of your system, Gary Q. Johnson is principal consultant with Workplace
you must revisit the hazard analysis to see if you need to Exposure Solutions, 7172 Willowood Drive, Cincinnati,
change any of the systems explosion risk mitigation strate- OH 45241; phone/fax 513-777-4626 (gary@work
gies, such as explosion vent size and location. Dont forget exposoln.com, www.workexposoln.com). He holds a mas-
that NFPA requires that you keep the hazard analysis up to ters degree in business administration from the University
date for the life of the process it protects and that you review of Scranton, Scranton, Pa., and a bachelors degree in
and update the analysis at least once every 5 years. PBE chemical engineering from Ohio State University in
Columbus.
 115

A publication of

CHEMICAL ENGINEERINGTRANSACTIONS
The Italian Association
VOL. 31, 2013 of Chemical Engineering
Online at: www.aidic.it/cet
Guest Editors: Eddy De Rademaeker, Bruno Fabiano, Simberto Senni Buratti
Copyright 2013, AIDIC ServiziS.r.l.,
ISBN 978-88-95608-22-8; ISSN 1974-9791

Dust Explosion Quantitative Risk Management for

Nontraditional Dusts
Md Nur Hossain*a, Paul R. Amyottea, Faisal I. Khanb, Meftah A. Abuswera,
Trygve Skjoldc, Luke S. Morrisond
a
Process Engineering & Applied Science, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada
b
Process Engineering, Memorial University, St. Johns, NL, Canada
c
Research and Development, GexCon AS, Bergen, Norway
d
Professional Loss Control, Fredericton, NB, Canada
[email protected]

The current paper describes an approach for dust explosion quantitative risk management of the following
nontraditional particulate fuel systems: (i) nanomaterials having particles with dimensions between 1 and
100 nm, (ii) flocculent (fibrous) materials characterized by a length-to-diameter ratio rather than a particle
diameter, and (iii) hybrid mixtures consisting of a combustible dust and a flammable gas (or a combustible
dust wetted with a flammable solvent). Experimental results are considered as input to a quantitative risk
management framework so as to provide a comprehensive procedure to analyze, assess and control the
likelihood and consequences of explosions of nontraditional dusts. Using concepts drawn from previous
studies, the framework consists of three main components: (i) a new combined safety management
protocol, (ii) use of the CFD (computational fluid dynamics) software DESC (Dust Explosion Simulation
Code) and FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) to determine explosion consequences and likelihood, respectively,
and (iii) application of the hierarchy of controls (inherent, engineered and procedural safety) to achieve
residual risk reduction.

1. Introduction
Dust explosion risk reduction has been the subject of intensive research for several decades. There
remains, however, a strong need for continued research on dust explosions especially for dusts that may
be termed nontraditional when compared with the more common and often-tested micron-size, spherical
particles comprising a single-fuel powder (Worsfold et al., 2012). The specific fuel/air systems studied here
fall in three nontraditional categories as follows: (i) micron- and nano-size titanium powders, (ii) flocculent
polyamide 6.6 and polyester, and (iii) hybrid mixtures of lactose and microcrystalline cellulose dusts
admixed with methanol, ethanol and isopropanol solvents. Relevant industrial applications are the handling
of metallic nano-powders, fabric and textile processing, and pharmaceutical manufacturing, respectively.
A generalized Quantitative Risk Management Framework (QRMF) for dust explosions has been modified
in the current work to integrate the above three nontraditional categories of dust explosions. The
modifications were developed through a synthesis of experimental findings and a comprehensive literature
review. Use of the QRMF for the three nontraditional fuel/air systems is proceeding in parallel, with each
system being considered from the key perspectives of hazard characterization, risk (consequence and
likelihood) assessment, and residual risk control (along with other aspects of the quantitative risk
management sequence). Here we present a summary of hazard characterization findings and residual risk
control measures for the nanomaterials, flocculent materials and hybrid mixtures being studied, along with
a representative look at consequence assessment for flocculent materials and likelihood assessment for
nanomaterials.
 116

2. Quantitative risk management

2.1 Fundamentals and framework
Quantitative Risk Management (QRM) has gained extensive recognition as a powerful tool to identify and
assess significant sources of risk and measure the effectiveness of different risk controls. Shell (1995)
views this technique as a systematic approach to identify hazards and potentially hazardous events, and to
estimate the likelihood and consequences of hazards to people, property, process and the environment.
The generalized framework shown in Figure 1 (Abuswer et al., 2012) has been adapted to the three
aforementioned nontraditional categories of particulate fuel/air systems (with modifications especially in
the stages of risk assessment and consideration of risk control measures).

Management Activities Steps

Identify and characterize dust explosibility parameters

(e.g. Pmax, KSt, MEC, MIE, MIT, etc.); use other Identify
engineering tools as may be appropriate (e.g. Dow Fire Hazards
Quantitative
and Explosion Index).
Risk
Assessment
Develop potential dust explosion scenarios, and
quantitatively assess likelihood (probability) of occurrence Understand
as well as severity of consequences. Fault tree analysis Hazards
and computational fluid dynamics are available tools for
such assessment.

Avoid or eliminate dust hazards by Avoid Hazards

design measures.
Inherent
Safety Minimize, substitute or moderate to Reduce
Principles reduce severity of dust hazards. Severity
Dust/Hybrid
Mixture Simplify process or plant to reduce
Reduce
Explosion likelihood of dust hazards occurring.
Likelihood
Prevention/
Mitigation
Use distance or sections of plant itself to
Framework
segregate/protect people and emergency systems from Segregate
Principles
effects of dust hazards.
Use safeguards that do not need Apply Passive
initiation and have high availability Safeguards
Engineered and reliability.
Safety
Use active safeguards, but note that Apply Active
these depend on timely hazard Safeguards
detection and initiation.

Use operator and maintenance

Apply
procedures, but note that these
Procedural Procedural
should be a last resort, especially for
Safety Safeguards
control and mitigation.

Use findings of hazard assessment to estimate risks, and Apply

Residual Residual Risk
Risk target important inherent/segregation/add-on/procedural
safeguards until risks are tolerable. Management of Reduction
Control Measures
change procedures are an important consideration.

Figure 1: Generalized risk management framework for dust explosions

 117

2.2 Hazard characterization

Hazard characterization has been undertaken as a first step to identify and evaluate the nature, magnitude
and probability of risks associated with the nontraditional dusts and their anticipated application in
handling, weighing, blending, spraying, machining, sanding, drilling, cleaning, etc. Various explosibility
parameters, including maximum explosion pressure (Pmax), size-normalized maximum rate of pressure rise
(KSt), minimum explosible concentration (MEC), minimum ignition energy (MIE), and minimum ignition
temperature (MIT), have been determined using standardized equipment and standardized test methods.
The first two of these parameters (Pmax and KSt) are related to explosion severity while the latter three
(MEC, MIE and MIT) provide information on explosion likelihood.
2.2.1 Nanomaterials
A large specific surface area, the possibility of particle agglomeration, and enhanced surface reactivity are
some distinct properties of nanomaterials that need to be considered in hazard characterization. It is well-
known for micron-size dusts that as particle size decreases, both explosion severity and explosion
likelihood increase; the situation is not as straightforward for nanomaterials. In the titanium explosibility
tests conducted here (Boilard et al., 2012), it was determined that micron-size explosion severity could not
be directly compared with that for nano-titanium due to pre-ignition of the nano-dust in the explosion
chamber (i.e., with no external ignition source present). The likelihood of explosion occurrence was
observed to increase significantly with a particle size decrease from the micron- to the nano- range as
evidenced during MIE and MIT testing (Boilard et al., 2012). Potential exposure of workers and the
environment, and potential release during production, handling and processing of nanomaterials, must
therefore be emphasized in conducting risk studies. Pre- or self-ignition and lack of explosion inerting are
experimental findings that must be accounted for in hazard/risk characterization of titanium nano-dust
explosions.
2.2.2 Flocculent materials
Flocculent materials (or flock) are non-spherical and cannot be easily characterized by a singular measure
such as particle diameter; these materials are better described in terms of their length-to-diameter ratio
(Worsfold et al., 2012). Explosibility testing in the current work (Iarossi et al., 2012) demonstrated that fine
flock (smaller dtex and shorter length) generally yield higher explosion pressures and rates of pressure
rise, and are more easily ignitable by electric spark, than larger flock sizes. The parameter dtex or decitex
is a unit of measure for the linear density of fibers. It is equivalent to the mass in g per 10,000 m of a single
filament, and can be converted to a particle diameter. The relevance here is that industrial flocking
processes often involve size reduction and further manipulation as well as the presence of energetic
ignition sources.
2.2.3 Hybrid mixtures
The effects of flammable solvent admixture to a combustible dust (thus forming a hybrid mixture) depend
on several factors, including the burning velocity of the solvent and the proximity of the solvent
concentration to its lower flammability limit (Amyotte et al., 2010). In the current work (Amyotte et al.,
2012), pre-wetting of microcrystalline cellulose (MCC) and lactose with solvent (methanol, ethanol and
isopropanol) had a measurable effect on each explosibility parameter (Pmax, KSt, MEC, MIE and MIT). The
influence was generally an enhancement of the particular parameter (e.g., increase in KSt, decrease in
MIE, etc.) as anticipated; the only exception was Pmax for MCC which displayed a slight decrease with
solvent admixture. Additionally, while the effect of solvent admixture to MCC was generally distinguishable
for the different solvents, that was not the case for lactose. Pre-wetting of lactose with each of the three
solvents resulted in similar values of Pmax, KSt and MIE. Enhanced ease of ignition and severity of
consequences therefore occur with solvent admixture to a given fuel dust. In the case of hybrid mixtures,
explosion prevention and mitigation measures based on the dust component alone are inadequate.
2.3 Risk assessment
2.3.1 Severity of consequences
One of the available methodologies to evaluate the severity of different dust explosion scenarios is
computational fluid dynamics (CFD); the most comprehensive software currently available for simulating
dust explosions is DESC Dust Explosion Simulation Code (Skjold, 2007). DESC requires physical and
thermodynamic properties along with standardized (20-L) explosion test results as input data to the
combustion model. At the time of writing, computational work with DESC has been initiated using the
above-referenced flocculent experimental data (Iarossi et al., 2012) for polyamide 6.6 and polyester (both,
3
dtex 1.7 and length 0.5 mm) with central ignition and a dust concentration of 500 g/m . The 20-L simulation
results for polyamide 6.6 and polyester dust (Figures 2(a) and 2 (c), respectively) were in good agreement
 118

with the corresponding experimental results (as expected). As shown in Figures 2(b) and 2(d), the peak
overpressure in a 1-m3 chamber is similar to the 20-L case for each fuel dust, but with a longer time to
attainment of Pmax. Polyester (Figures 2(c) and 2 (d)) is seen to take less time to reach its maximum
pressure than polyamide 6.6 (Figures 2(a) and 2(b)) because of the higher experimental rate of pressure
rise for polyester (Iarossi et al., 2012). Work is ongoing to extend the flocculent material simulations to
industrial-scale geometries, and to investigate the applicability of DESC to other nontraditional particulate
fuel/air systems.

(a) (b)

(c) (d)

Figure 2: DESC simulation of polyamide 6.6 (dtex 1.7 and length 0.5 mm) explosions in (a) a 20-L
3
spherical chamber and (b) a 1-m spherical chamber; similarly for polyester (dtex 1.7 and length 0.5 mm)
3
explosions in (c) a 20-L spherical chamber and (d) a 1-m spherical chamber

2.3.2 Likelihood of occurrence

Fault tree analysis (FTA) is being employed to quantify the likelihood of occurrence of nontraditional dust
explosions. Relex (Reliability Excellence) software has been used as the FTA tool to determine the
occurrence of probable events by means of a series of logic gates. In Figure 3, an example is given of a
qualitative fault-tree diagram for explosion of a nano-dust (e.g., titanium), which has been established by
modifying the generalized dust explosion fault tree developed by Abuswer et al. (2012). Key features of
Figure 3 include the possibilities of self-ignition, particle agglomeration and inerting inadequacies. Ongoing
work includes further development of the fault-tree logic for nanomaterials, as well as modifications to the
generalized dust explosion fault tree (Abuswer et al., 2012) to accommodate flocculent materials and
hybrid mixtures.
2.4 Residual risk control
Within the concept of the hierarchy of risk controls (or safety measures), inherent safety is the most
effective means of risk reduction and therefore sits at the top of the hierarchy followed in order of
decreasing effectiveness by passive engineered safety, active engineered safety, and finally procedural
safety (Amyotte et al., 2011). In this section, illustrative examples of control measures are given for the
prevention and mitigation of explosions of nontraditional dusts. A goal currently being pursued is
preparation of a comprehensive, hierarchy-based compilation of such measures for nanomaterials,
flocculent materials and hybrid mixtures drawing on findings from experimentation and modeling
simulations as well as the process safety literature.
 119

2.4.1 Nanomaterials
Coating of particles with a less hazardous substance is a possible approach to manage the risk of a given
nanomaterial (Williams et al., 2010); this is an example of inherent safety. Surface modification, change-of-
form and other approaches to alter the physical state of nanoparticles could also be acceptable safety
measures in nano-risk reduction. Control of hazards at their source with containment is a possible
engineering safety measure for nano-dust explosions (Williams et al., 2010). Isolation of workers, local
ventilation, specially designed dust collectors, and process changes are some other engineering/
procedural controls to manage the risk of dust explosions associated with nanoparticles. Inerting with
admixed solids could be applied to avoid pre-ignition and associated risks. Moreover, discharge control
measures, special organizational measures, and personal protective equipment designed for nano-dusts
are further important safety measures for nanomaterials.

Figure 3: FTA diagram for nano-dust explosions

2.4.2 Flocculent materials

Fine flocculent materials are more hazardous and easily ignitable than larger ones. Thus, length and
diameter optimization are required to control the associated risks. Another safety measure is to modify the
flocking process and use a flameless venting technique as indicated by von Pidoll (2002). As flocculent
materials are often manufactured using an electrostatic flocking process, the hazard of ignition from a high
voltage discharge and subsequent explosion must not be ignored. Appropriate electrical equipment should
be used in locations that are hazardous because of the presence of easily ignitable fibrous materials.
Good housekeeping of flock in facilities that produce them is essential to avoid dust explosions.
 120

2.4.3 Hybrid mixtures

Utilizing every precaution during and after the transfer of powders into flammable solvents is very much
needed to provide a safer process for transferring powder regardless of the characteristics of the powder
and solvents. Substituting a less hazardous solvent (an application of inherent safety principles) can
reduce the risk in a workplace that handles combustible dusts and flammable solvents. For example, our
recent experiments have demonstrated that ethanol and isopropanol may provide a safer environment
than methanol as a pre-wetting medium for MCC (microcrystalline cellulose) on the basis of both likelihood
of occurrence and severity of consequences (Amyotte et al., 2013). Engineering controls can also be
helpful to mitigate risks associated with hybrid mixtures. These measures include installation of local
ventilation hoods, enclosures around work processes (e.g., fume hoods, glove boxes, and other safety
cabinets), and using closed systems to transfer solvents from storage containers to process vessels during
mixing.

3. Conclusion
The concepts of a modified risk management framework presented in this paper have been established to
assess and manage the risks of nontraditional dust explosions in relevant industrial applications involving
metallic nano-powders, flocculent textile materials, and pharmaceutical base powders and solvents.
Quantitative analysis of explosion likelihood and consequences, as well as implementation of the hierarchy
of safety controls, can provide guidance and establish measures to prevent and mitigate nontraditional
dust explosions. Appropriate case studies as well as validation of the abovementioned comprehensive
framework have been planned for further analysis of various aspects of nontraditional dust explosions.

Acknowledgement
The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council (NSERC) of Canada in the form of a strategic grant.

References
Abuswer M., Amyotte P., Khan F., 2012, A quantitative risk management framework for dust and hybrid
mixture explosions, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, DOI: 10.1016/j.jlp.2011.08.
010.
Amyotte P.R., 2011, Are classical process safety concepts relevant to nanotechnology applications?
Journal of Physics: Conference Series (Nanosafe2010: International Conference on Safe Production
and Use of Nanomaterials) 304, 012071.
Amyotte P., Lindsay M., Domaratzki R., Marchand N., Di Benedetto A., Russo P., 2010, Prevention and
mitigation of dust and hybrid mixture explosions, Process Safety Progress 29, 17-21.
Amyotte P., Khan F., Boilard S., Iarossi I., Cloney C., Dastidar A., Eckhoff R., Marmo L., Ripley R., 2012,
Explosibility of nontraditional dusts: experimental and modeling challenges, Hazards XXIII, IChemE,
Southport, UK (November 12-15, 2012), pp. 83-90.
Amyotte P.R., Dastidar A.G., Khan F.I., Eckhoff R.K., Hossain M.N., Symington K., Boilard V., Abuswer M.,
2013, Influence of liquid and vapourized solvents on explosibility of pharmaceutical excipient dusts,
th
Accepted for 9 Global Congress on Process Safety, San Antonio, TX, USA.
Boilard S.P., Amyotte P.R., Khan F.I., Dastidar A.G., Eckhoff R.K., 2012, Explosibility of micron- and nano-
size titanium powders, Paper No. 009, Proceedings of Ninth International Symposium on Hazards,
Prevention, and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions, Krakow, Poland (July 22-27, 2012).
Iarossi I., Amyotte P.R., Khan F.I., Marmo L., Dastidar A.G., Eckhoff R.K., 2012, Explosibility parameters
of polyamide and polyester fibers, Paper No. 004, Proceedings of Ninth International Symposium on
Hazards, Prevention, and Mitigation of Industrial Explosions, Krakow, Poland (July 22-27, 2012).
Shell, 1995, Quantitative Risk Assessment, vol. 3. Shell International Exploration and Production B.V., The
Hague, The Netherlands.
Skjold, T., 2007, Review of the DESC project, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 20,
291-302.
von Pidoll U., 2002, Avoidance of the ignition of textile fiber/air mixtures during the electrostatic flocking
process, IEEE Transactions on Industry Applications 38, 401-405.
Williams A.R., Kulinowski M.K., White R., Louis G., 2010, Risk characterization for nanotechnology, Risk
Analysis, 30, 1671-1679.
Worsfold S.M., Amyotte P.R., Khan F.I., Dastidar A.G., Eckhoff R.K., 2012, Review of the explosibility of
nontraditional dusts, Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, 51, 7651-7655.
Risk Logic Inc. Page 1 of 5

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September 2012: Explosion Protection Systems for Combustible

Dusts
Processing, handling and storing of combustible dusts within enclosed equipment (i.e., mixers,
blenders, mills, separators, cutting tools, holding bins, dust collectors, cyclones, etc.) can easily
create an explosive atmosphere that could be ignited by tramp metal, static electricity, burning/hot
dust particles or some other means. The resulting explosion could lead to a large property loss and
subsequent interruption to production that could be devastating to your business. This does not take
into account the possibility of subsequent dust explosions if there is poor housekeeping and fugitive
dust accumulations in the building housing the subject equipment, which could be catastrophic.

For the purposes of this article, we are going to specifically address the equipment explosion hazard.
The fire protection engineering industry treats all equipment that handles combustible dusts as
having a dust explosion hazard. The first recommendation is locate all such equipment outdoors. If
this is not practical, then it is recommended to eliminate the explosion hazard or to mitigate the
explosion hazard.

Elimination of an equipment explosion hazard through inerting or liquid misting is not easily
accomplished in many cases and explosion hazard mitigation features are then recommended for the
equipment/system design. These typically involve the use of explosion venting, suppression,
containment, or vacuum operation. In many situations involving a complex system/arrangement (i.e.,
storage, handling and conveyance system with several bins, vessels and lengths of ductwork), a
combination of these may be required for best protection. The most common methods of equipment
explosion hazard mitigation are venting and suppression.

Explosion venting is a passive safety approach and is usually the first choice. When dealing with a
vessel, it may be easiest to locate it next to an exterior wall and vent the explosion to the outdoors via
a short vent duct; however, this may not be practical for existing installations surrounded by other
important process and manufacturing equipment. An alternative would be to vent the explosion to
the surrounding area indoors through an explosion quench pipe, again if practical. Vents should be
sized based on the properties of the dust being handled/collected and the design strength of the
equipment/vessel involved. Vent sizes and properties should be designed in accordance with NFPA
68, Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting, or FM Global Standards (using by
FM Global DustCalc software if you are an insured of FM Global).

It is recommended to provide explosion suppression for high valued equipment, equipment that
exposes high valued processes, or equipment that has frequent explosions, when explosion venting,
pressure containment, or inerting is impractical or cannot be provided. It should be noted that
explosion suppression systems are generally less reliable than explosion venting or explosion
resistant construction.

Explosion suppression relies on detecting the start of an explosion and delivering an extinguishing
agent as quickly as possible (within milliseconds) to quench the explosion and reduce the maximum
explosion pressure to a substantially lower amount. The lower pressure is called the reduced
explosion pressure (or suppressed pressure), which must be lower than the vessel design strength for
an explosion to be successfully suppressed.

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Risk Logic Inc. Page 2 of 5

System Design:

The first step in the design of an effective explosion suppression system for a specific application or
piece of equipment is to quantify the potential explosion hazard. The minimum required information
is as follows:

1. Dust explosibility parameters (burning velocity, auto-ignition temperature, maximum explosion

pressure and the maximum rate of pressure rise)
2. The vessel geometry and volume
3. The maximum pressure that the vessel is designed to withstand (To prevent permanent equipment
damage, the pressure experienced during a suppressed deflagration (Pred) should not exceed two-
thirds of the equipment yield strength (stress). The suppression system alone can produce pressures
of 0.13-0.2 bar (2 - 3 psi), which may exceed the design strength of some equipment such as dust
collectors. This must be considered in the design process.)
4. Process parameters such as pressure and temperature
5. Process conditions - in particular the amount of turbulence

As recommended by FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-17, Explosion Protection
Systems, use caution when installing explosion suppression systems on enclosures larger than those
used in the verification testing of the suppression systems. It is technically possible to suppress
explosions in vessels with volumes of up to 1,000 cu. m (35,300 cu. ft). In practice, dust explosions
have been successfully suppressed in vessel sizes of 0.2 cu. m (7.1 cu. ft) up to 250 cu. m (8,825 cu.
ft). The appropriate system should be selected and designed as noted above.

In addition, do not install explosion suppression systems where ST3 dusts (Kst > 300; e.g.,
aluminum) are used unless proven by full-scale tests. In general, ST3 dusts cannot be effectively
suppressed due to their extremely fast rate of pressure rise.

System Components:

An explosion suppression system is typically comprised of explosion detectors, a suppressant

delivery system, and a control and monitoring unit.

Detectors - to be effective, the detector chosen must be capable of recognizing the existence of an
explosion very early after ignition. There are three types of detectors: thermoelectric, optical and
pressure.

For dust explosion hazards, use pressure detectors; thermoelectric sensors (activated by direct heat
transfer from hot gases) and optical detectors should not be used since they only work effectively if
located close to the heat source.
Pressure detectors continuously measure pressure and monitor the rate of pressure rise and threshold
pressure.
To minimize false trips of the explosion suppression system, it is recommended to position two
detectors in two planes (i.e., cross-zoned). This is especially important for pressure detectors.
In general, locate pressure detectors a maximum distance of 20 ft. from the suspected ignition source
(s).
Wire detectors actuating explosion suppression systems to a Class A initiating device circuit, as
defined by NFPA.

Suppressant Material - the suitability of a particular extinguishing agent for a given application
should be determined by explosion suppression tests.

Control/Monitoring Systems - control systems detect changes in the explosion sensor output or
mechanical condition; they determine whether a hazard exists, and activate the suppressors
accordingly.

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Risk Logic Inc. Page 3 of 5

The control system should be interlocked to shut down the equipment involved (safely) upon
detector activation and should prevent the process equipment from restarting without re-arming the
suppression system.
Monitor the electrical system of the detector and suppressor activation circuits at a constantly
attended location. Any component failure should sound an alarm and automatically shut down the
process.
Provide a standby battery that engages automatically when the electrical power fails.
Install the control system in a safe, dust-free area or within enclosures approved for explosive
atmospheres.
De-activate the control system, shut down the process and purge any combustible dusts before
entering the vessel or performing any activity that could accidentally trip the suppression system.

Explosion Isolation Systems:

Explosion suppression is usually ineffective in interconnected vessels; hence, explosion isolation

systems should be provided between two pieces of connected equipment (e.g., connected via process
piping or ductwork) to prevent fire or explosion propagation whenever one or both of the
interconnected pieces is protected using an explosion suppression system.

Explosion isolation is a means of preventing flame front and ignition (primarily through the use of
mechanical valves or chemical suppressants) from being conveyed past a predefined point (i.e., to
other process equipment through ducting or piping). The detection and control functions are identical
to explosion suppression. Examples of explosion isolation are as follows:

Chemical Explosion Blocking Systems:

These systems are typically used with explosion suppression systems. A chemical blocking system
should be activated by optical or pressure detectors at the same time as an explosion suppression
system. These systems are generally activated using the same control equipment as the explosion
suppression system, but they can also be installed/activated separately.

In general, gaseous clean agents and dry chemical powders (based on ammonium phosphate) are
used as suppressants. As with explosion suppression systems, the vessel or ductwork should be
designed to withstand the expected local pressure that would result from the blocking system.

Discharge duration, quantity of suppressant discharged, location of discharge point, flame

propagation velocity and operating flow rates must all be considered in the design of a blocking
system. Processes with high flow rates and/or large primary vessels may not be suitable for chemical
explosion blocking systems.

Flame Arrestors:

A flame arrestor is a device that prevents the transmission of a flame through a flammable gas/air
mixture by quenching the flame on the surfaces of a series of small passages (or heat sinks) through
which the flame must pass. The emerging gases are sufficiently cooled to prevent re-ignition. The
arrestor must be placed in the flame path between the source of ignition and the system to be
protected.

Deflagration and detonation arrestors should be used in accordance with their approval/listing. These
types of arrestors are not interchangeable (i.e., do not use in-line arrestors as end-of-line and vice
versa) and must be used in the proper arrangement. The vendor or manufacturer should supply the
necessary details regarding the specific arrestor.

Inspect arrestors at least annually, and after each incident in which they have functioned.

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Risk Logic Inc. Page 4 of 5

Flame Front Diverters:

The flame front diverter (also known as explosion diverters, back-blast dampers, back-flash
interrupters or backflow preventers) incorporates the need to vent deflagration pressures with the
need to direct the flame front in such a way that it does not ignite material in the process
downstream. The main advantages are low initial cost and maintenance costs.

Flame front diverters that are either commercially manufactured and distributed, or fabricated in-
house according to design guidelines from VDI (Germany) are acceptable (see FM Global Property
Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and
Fires, for guidelines). Using prefabricated rupture disks for the rupture membrane will eliminate the
need to test or calculate the rupture pressure.

Do not use explosion diverters in air streams that have a significant loading of abrasive dust. Such
dust would eventually erode through the pressure relieving diverter cover.

Fast-Acting or Rapid-Action Valve:

An explosion isolation valve such as a fast-acting valve provides a mechanical barrier against the
flame front of an explosion. The intent is to isolate the explosion and protect the area beyond the
valve. The valve must be activated upon detection of the explosion. An explosion suppression
system or explosion venting is required on the ignition side of the valve because, when the isolation
valve closes, the ducting or vessels are subject to over-pressurization. The primary advantage of this
isolation method is the certainty of preventing flame propagation to other equipment or processes.

The distance between the valve and the explosion detection device should be far enough to allow the
valve to fully close before the arrival of the flame front. The valve should be activated
simultaneously with the explosion suppression system (by using pressure detection).

System Advantages and Disadvantages:

Some advantages of explosion suppression systems are:

They stop an explosion before the developing pressure can damage the process equipment
They control any ensuing fire and reduce flame front propagation to other process equipment
They do not vent flame or other material, therefore are useful when toxic and other hazardous
materials are being handled, equipment is located indoors, or venting exposes personnel to discharge
of pressure and combustion products
They are maintained in an active condition with continuous electrical supervision of components

Some disadvantages of explosion suppression systems are:

Design and installation of systems is expensive

Refilling and resetting of the system after a discharge is expensive
Maintenance requirements (recommended quarterly inspections/tests and regular visual inspections
of detector ports and discharge pipes) are much more involved than for conventional venting systems
Use in low strength enclosures or equipment is limited because suppressed pressure or even system
discharge pressure alone may exceed vessel strength. Vessels therefore may need to be constructed
or reinforced to withstand the increased pressure resulting from a suppressed explosion and from the
discharge of the suppression system itself.

If you would like further information regarding explosion protection systems for combustible dusts,
please contact Risk Logic Inc.

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Risk Logic Inc. Page 5 of 5

References:

NFPA 68, Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting

NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-17, Explosion Protection Systems

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible
Dust Explosions and Fires

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Explosive atmospheres
risk assessment:
a case study

Ing. MURE' Salvina

salvina.mure@aria. to.it
The case study is related to the risk assessment
performed to fullfill ATEX regulations in a food industry.
The plant produces food stabilizers, ingredients, starches
and gums.
The raw materials arrive to the plant as powders,
contained in bags. The powders pass through hoppers to
be homogenized and sieves and then they are mixed
together and packed.
In each step of the manufacturing the movement of the
powders can generate potential explosive atmosphere ...

HOW TO EVALUATE THE EXPLOSION HAZARDS

AND REDUCE IT?
The risk assessment was carried out in accordance with
Italian law no. 81 of Apr. 9th, 2008 "Attuazione dell'articolo 1
della legge 3 agosto 2007, n. 123, in materia di tutela della
salute e della sicurezza nei luoghi di lavord' Title XI
"Protection against explosive atmosphere" hereunder shown
as D.Lgs. n. 81/08.
In accordance with what it is stated in attachment XLIX of
D.Lgs. n. 81/08, for the classification of areas and working
places, we refer to the following technical rules:
CEI EN 60079-10-1 (CEI 31-87) "Explosive atmosphere -
Part 10 - 1: Hazardous Area Classification and Contro! of
Ignition Sources for Flammable Gases and Vapours" and
CEI guide 31-35 and modifications;
CEI EN 61241-10 (CEI 31-66) Electrical apparatus for use
in the presence of combustible dust Part 10:
Classification of areas where combustible dusts are or may
be present and CEI guide 31-36 and modifications.
For hazard analysis and risk assessment together with prevention
and protection measures, we refer to the following rules:
EN 1127-1:2011 Explosive atmospheres. Explosion prevention
and protection. Basic concepts and methodology - specifies
generai design and construction methods to help designers and
manufacturers in achieving explosion safety in the design of
equipment, protective systems and components;
CEI CLC/TR 50404:2003 "Electrostatics - Code of practice for
the avoidance of hazards due to static electricity";
UNI EN 13463-1:2009 "Non-electrical equipment for use in
potentially explosive atmospheres. Basic method and
requirements"

The italian laws above mentioned derive from EU

directives and uptake international standards
In order to proceed with the explosion risk assessment, it's necessary to
collect data about the facilities of the plant, the productive process, the
presence of suction systems, and above ali the characteristics of the raw
materials that produce the explosive atmosphere.
For the purposes of this document, the main terms and definition are
illustrated below:
Lower Explosive Limit (LEL): the lowest concentration (percentage)
of a gas or a vapor in air capable of producing a flash of fire in
presence of an ignition source (are, flame, heat). The term is
considered to be the same as the lower flammable limit (LFL). At a
concentration in air lower than the LEL are gas mixtures are "too
le an" t o burn. Methane gas has a LEL of S0/o. If the atmosphere has
less than S0/o methane, an explosion cannot occur even if a source of
ignition is present.
Minimum ignition temperature of an explosive atmosphere: the
lowest temperature of a hot surface that will cause a dust cloud, rather
than a dust layer, to ignite and propagate flame.
 Explosion Index (Kst): explosive property measured in the laboratory
to quantify the severity of a dust explosion. The Kst value is calculated
as the equivalent pressure in a 1 m 3 sphere from the cube law (Kst
value = cube root of volume x explosion pressure rise). The ST class
is based on the Kst value as follows:
=
ST class O - Kst value O
ST class 1 - Kst value less than 200 bar m/ sec
ST class 2 - Kst value between 200 and 300 bar m/ sec
ST class 3 - Kst value greater than 300 bar m/ sec;
Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE): minimum amount of energy
required to ignite a combustible vapor, gas or dust cloud.
 In the following table, a list of the substances
.
1S shown with their
characteristics.

N a me of substances Minimum lgnition Glowing Lower Maximum Bulk Average

temperarture temperature Explosive explosion Density size
Limi t pressure
c c m3 bar m
AGAR l 25 > 1000 380
,, Il

CARRAGEENAN l 430 125 700 75

CELLULOSE l CMC >999 360 autoignition 170 60 400-600 75-125
CELLULOSE l HPMC 1 144 25-50 370 40-50 7,6
CELLULOSE l MC < 300 380 autoignition 170 30 200
CELLULOSE l MC 1 80-160 29-110 >175 330-450 30 6-10

EMULSIFIER l DATEM 1 116 20 280 7,83 520 150

EMULSIFIER l LACTEM 950 150

EMULSIFIER l MDG 40 1 71 15-30 300 30 6,7 900 150

EMULSIFIER l MDG 90 (kerry) 1 152 <10 280 <10 8,5 530 100-150

1 71 120 380 60 8,1 700-800 90

1 72 >10 500 6,9 700-800 90
MALTODEXTRIN 1 160 20-100 380 30 7,8 425-600 100-150
NOVATION 4600 2 202 60 240 320 30 10 500 10
PECTIN l HM 1 0-200 > 300 > 250 (layer) 30-300 6-10 40-150
POLIDEXTROSE 1 150 40 420 95 8 250

PROTEIN l ANI MAL l GELATINE A >1000 > 500 300-700 75-180

PROTEIN l ANI MAL l MILK l WHEY 44oc self ing te m p 25 glm3 650-800

PROTEIN l ANI MAL l MILK l WHEY 60 1 39 440 30 glm3 7.0 < 1000

SALTS l CITRATE 1 21 >500 3.7 49

STARCH l MODIFIED l HOT SWELLING
1 150 100 420 60 650-800 75
l WAXY MAIZE E-1422
STARCH l NATIVE l COLO SWELLING l
1 114 >100 >470 30 8.7 650-800 75
WAXYRICE
SUGAR l FRUCTOSE 1 150 10 360 30 8 780-880 200
SUGAR l GLUCOSE 1 63 350 30-60 5.5 620 100
>420
SUGAR l SUCROSE 1 172 10-25 680
490 (layer)

SWEETENERS l SUCRALOSE 400 390 16,5

XANTHAN 1 84 >1000 7.6 650-850 180

With reference to the used raw materials, it is required the evaluation
of the explodibility characteristics of each typology of powder:

Name: Novation 4600

LEL (g /m3): 30
Average size (pm): 10
Absolute density (kg/m3): 500
Layer ignition temperature T Smm ("C): 240
Cloud ignition temperature Tcl ("C): 320
Humidity (%): 6,2
Mass humidity content (%): 6,2
Explosion overpressure (bar): 10
Kst (bar x m/s): 202
Explodibility class: St 2
MIE(mf):60
Conductivity: No
 The explosion risk assessment requires 5 different steps:

1. Identification of explosion hazard and estimation of

probability of occurrence of a hazardous explosive
atmosphere;
2. Identification of ignition hazards and determination of the
likelihood of occurrence of potential ignition sources;
3. Estimation of the possible effects of an explosion in case
of ignition;
4. Evaluation of the risk and whether the intended level of
protection has been achieved;
5. Consideration of the measures to reduce the risks.
The explosion risk assessment is evaluated by using a
methodology with semi-quantitative indicators.

The analytical evaluation of risk can be determined in

generai accordance with the following formula:

R=P*C*D

w h ere:
R is the risk,
P is the hazard factor, that is the probability of
existence of the hazard,
C is the contact factor, that is the probability that the
hazard can cause damage,
D is the damage factor, that is the entity of
any damage that might occur.
STEP 1. Identification of explosion hazardous and determination
of occurrence of a hazardous explosive atmosphere
The probability of occurrence of a hazardous explosive atmosphere
is evaluated through Area Classification methods, according to EN
60079-10-1 and 61241-10. The correlation between hazard factor P
and area classification is represented in the following table:

Hazardous Area Description P Index

Zona 0/20 An area in which an explosive gas/ dust 3

atmosphere in air is continuously present
or present for long periods or frequently

Zona 1/21 An area in which an explosive gas/ dust 2

atmosphere in air is likely to occur in
normal operation

Zona 2/22 An area in which an explosive gas/ dust 1

atmosphere in air is not likely to occur in
normal operation and if it occurs it will
exist only for a short time

Zona NE An area in which an explosive gas/ dust o

atmosphere in air never occurs

O, 1,2 for gas, vapour

20,21,22 for dust
STEP 2. Identification of ignition hazards and determination of
the likelihood of occurrence of potential ignition sources

Then for each hazardous zone, it shali be determined which

types of ignition sources are possible. The significance of ali
ignition sources that could come into contact with the
explosive atmosphere shali be assessed.
The ignition effectiveness of ali the ignition sources shali the
be compared with the ignition properties of flammable
substances:
Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE),
Minimum ignition temperature of an explosive
atmosphere,
Minimum ignition temperature of a dust layer.
This step shali result in a complete list of the effective
ignition sources for each hazardous zone. Mterward the
likelihood of occurrence of the potential ignition sources
shali be assessed, taking also into account those that can be
introduced e.g. by maintenance and cleaning activities.
The possible ignition sources to be taken into account are:

- Hot surfaces
- Flames and hot gases
- Mechanically generated sparks
- Electrical apparatus
- Stray electric currents, cathodic corrosion protection
- Static electricity
- Lightning
- Radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic waves from 104 Hz to 3 *
1011Hz
- Electromagnetic waves from 3*1011 Hz to 3 * 1015 Hz
- lonizing radiation
- Ultrasonics
- Adiabatic compression and shock waves
- Exothermic reactions, including self - ignition of dusts.
The correlation between the factor C and likelihood of occurrence
of effective ignition sources is represented in the following table:

Presence Description C Index

Always Sources of ignition which can occur 3

continuosly or frequently

Sometimes Sources of ignition which can occur in 2

rare situations

Rarely Sources of ignition which can occur in 1

very rare situations

Never Sources of ignition which can occur never o

STEP 3. Estimation of the possible effects of an explosion
To estimate the possible effects of an explosion the following shall be
considered, e.g.:
- Flames and hot gases;
- Thermal radiation;
- Pressure waves;
- Flying debris;
- Hazardous releases of materials.

The consequences of the above are related to the:

- Chemical and physical properties of the flammable substances;
- Quantity and confinement of the explosive atmosphere;
- Geometry of the surroundings taking into account obstacles;
- Strength of enclosure and supporting structures;
- Protective equipment worn by the endangered personnel;
- Physical properties of the endangered objects.
The correlation between factor D and the parameters used to
evaluate the possible effects of explosion is represented in the
following tables:

Hazardous Area Description D Index

Zona 0/20 An area in which an explosive 3

gas/ dust atmosphere in air is
continuously present or present for
long periods or frequently

Zona 1/21 An area in which an explosive 2

gas/ dust atmosphere in air is likely to
occur in normal operation

Zona 2/22 An area in which an explosive 1

gas/ dust atmosphere in air is not
likely to occur in normal operation
and if it occurs it will exist only for a
short time

Zona NE An area in which an an explosive o

gas/ dust atmosphere in air never
occurs

0,1,2 for gas, vapour

20,21,22 for dust
D Index will be added to the indexes in the table below (D'):

lndex
Parameters
0,00 0,25 0,50
l
Workers presence {W p) ever Occasionai Continuous

Dust explosion index (KST) s 200 bar* m/s 200 < KsTS 300 bar* m/s > 300 bar*m/s

Gas explosion index (Kd s 500 bar* m/s 500 < ~ s 1.000 bar*m/s > 1.000 bar*m/s

Cloud volume (Vz) < 10 dm 3 10 s Vz < 100 dm 3 2100 dm 3

l
Dust layer depth ('-d) ssmm 5 < ~...cts 50 mm 250mm

l
Cloud Confinement (Cc) ot confined Partly confined Completely confined

D'= D+ WP + KsT + Vz + Ld +Cc (dust)

D'= D+ WP + ~ + Vz +Cc (gas)
STEP 4. Evaluation of the risk and whether the intended level of
protection has been achieved

Another table, similar to the previous one, allows to determine the

indexes of elements of the risk to be added to the product P * C * D '.
lndex
l
Parameters
o 1 2

Workers presence (Wp) ever Occasionai Continuous

Dust explosion index (KsT) s 200 ba r*m/s 200 < KsTS 300 bar*m/s > 300 bar*m/s

Gas explosion index (~) s 500 bar*m/s 500 < ~ s 1.000 bar*m/s > 1.000 bar*m/s

Cloud volume (Vz) < 10 dm 3 10 s Vz < 100 dm! ~ 100 dm 3

Dust layer depth (4) SSmm 5 <le! s 50 mm ~SOmm

Clo ud Co nf inement (Cc) ot confined Partly confined Completely confined

Ultimately, therefore, the risk of explosion R is determined as

follows:
R = (P*C*D') + WP + KgT + Vz + Ld +Cc (dust)
R = (P*C*D')+ WP + ~ + Vz + Cc(gas)
The classification of risk levels is determined by risk R calculated
with the formula above.
In the table below are the hazard classes and their descriptions.

Risk Value R Rischio Description Measures

ldentify and implement

The probability of an explosive atmospheres is high, there are
immediate and urgent measures
effective ignition sources and the exposure level is high, so with
to prevent and contrai exposure
considerable damage to persons and property.
to risk.
The probability of propagation of the explosion is to be considered
The assessment will be repeated
significant
late r.
The exposure is significant, it is
The probability of the presence of explosive atmospheres is limited
necessary to bring improvements
and there may be effective ignition sources. In case of explosion, the
to the protection and decrease
exposure level is moderate, then with moderate damage to persons
the risk.
and property.
The maintenance of compliance
The probability of propagation of the explosion is to be considered
rets with the employer and
limited.
person in charge.
The probability of presence of an explosive atmosphere is extremely
limited, as well as the presence of effective ignition sources. The Will be considered for risk
exposure level is low, so with limited damage to persons and reduction measures on the basis
property. of an assessment ALARP (As Low
he probability of propagation of the explosion is to be considered As Reasonably Practicable)
extremely limited.
The presence of an explosive atmosphere is almost impossible or
there are no ignition sources effectively. The level of exposure is
negligible, so there are no damages to persons or property. No further action is necessary
The probability of propagation of the explosion is considered
negligible.
STEP 5. Consideration of the measures to reduce the risks

The necessity of having an explosive atmosphere together with on effective

ignition source, lead immediately to the basic principles for the reduction of
risks:

a) Prevention:
avoid or reduce explosive atmospheres; this objective can mainly be
achieved by modifying either the concentration of the flammable
substance to a value outside the explosion range or the concentration
of oxygen to a value below the limiting oxygen concentration (LOC);
avoid any possible effective ignition source;

h) Protection:
halting the explosion and/ or limiting the range to a sufficient level by
protection methods, e.g. isolation, venting, suppression and
containment; in contrast to the two measures described above, here the
occurrence of an explosion is accepted.
Area classification
Sources of release in
Production unit (dust):
- A,BeC
Natural gas line (gas)
Charging trucks unit (gas)

Production unitA
The basic elements for establishing the hazardous zone types are:
1. the source of release - a point or location !rom which a
gas/liquid/dust may be released into the atmosphere so that an
explosive atmosphere could be formed;
2. the grade of release - there three basic grades of release, as listed
below in order of decreasing frequency and likelihood of the
explosive atmosphere being present: continuous, primary and
secondary grade.

I t is necessary, first of ali, t o de termine the grade of release in

accordance with the definitions, by establishing the likely frequency
and duration of the release.
Having established the grade of the release, it is necessary to
determine the release rate and other factors, which may influence the
type and extent of the zone.
In the following table the area classification results for line A are
shown:
 Product line A
Source of release Grade of release Zone Note
Internai: 20
HopperTCl Primary Loading with suction system always activated
External: 22, extension area 1,05 m
Internai, dirty side: 20
Filter GVl Secondary Internai, dea n side: 22
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
Internai : 20 The only source of release could be the door that is always closed . During cleaning
Sieve SVl Secondary
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area) operations, the sieve is electrically disconnected and suction system is activated.
Internai : 20
Storage tank Sl Secondary The only source of release could be a drap door that is always closed
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
Internai : 20
Connection Sl-SAl Secondary The connection is continuous.
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
Internai, dirty side: 20 The filter has no sources of release. When the maintenance is performed, ad hoc
Filter GV2 Secondary Internai, dea n side: 22 operating instruction has adopted in order to avoid the formation of clouds
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area) potentially explosive.
Internai : 20 The only source of release could be the door, but when it is opened the mixer is
Mixer SAl Secondary
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area) electrically disconnected and suction system is activated .
Internai : 20
Connection SA1-S2 Secondary The connection is continuous.
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
Internai, dirty side: 20 The filter has no sources of release. When the maintenance is performed, ad hoc
Filter GVS Secondary Internai, dea n side: 22 operating instruction has adopted in order to avoid the formation of clouds
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area) potentially explosive.
The only source of release could be a drap door that is opened only during cleaning
Internai : 20
Storage tank S2 Secondary and maintenance operations. In these cases, the storage tank is electrically
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
disconnected and suction system is activated .
Internai : 20
Storage tank S3 Secondary The only source of release could be a drap door that is always closed
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
Internai : 20
Connection S3-SV2 Secondary The connection is continuous.
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
Internai, dirty side: 20 The filter has no sources of release. When the maintenance is performed, ad hoc
Filter GV3 Secondary Internai, clean side: 22 operating instruction has adopted in order to avoid the formation of clouds
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area) potentially explosive.

Internai : 20 The only source of release could be the door that is always closed . During cleaning
Sieve SV2 Secondary
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area) operations, the sieve is electrically disconnected and suction system is activated .
The only source of release could be a drap door that is opened only during cleaning
Internai : 20
Storage tank S4 Secondary and maintenance operations. In these cases, the storage tank is electrically
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
disconnected and suction system is activated.
Internai : 20
Packaging Secondary Closed room.
External: 2NE (Non hazardous area)
 Hopper and typical
equipment: suction system,
shelf for bags, ecc.

Area classification for hopper

Internai: 20 /
,.-
External: 22, extension area, a= 1,05 m /
~~~~~~~~~~~~
 Air
i l l

Dust/ Air
This a scheme of cartridge
filter. In Hopper fter GV1,
the dust collected is sent to
the production line

Area classification for fter

 Ignition sources analysis
In order to analyze the potential ignition sources, it is necessary to refer to the technical
documentation of equipments, containing also the risk analysis and, in particular, the
ignition sources analysis, that the manufacturer must do in normal condition (NC), rare
malfunction (RM) and very rare malfunction (RMF), according to CE Declaration of
Conformity (Machinery Directive 2006).
The following table shown part of ignition sources analysis for hopper:

Ho erTCl
gnition sources Presence Effictive
Reasons Reasons
(EN 1127-1) (Yes/No) (Yes/No)
Not present. The temperature conclitions inside and outside of
o the hopper are of an order of magnitude lower than the ignitionNever
temperature of the dust treated.
The hopper is subject to perioclic maintenance
quarterly.
However, one can not exclude the presence of high temperature The source of initiation occurs in case of failure (eg
Never
surfaces for the moving parts due to friction in case of failure. seizure of a bearing), but with the adequate
maintenance such event is not relevant, which is
deemed no t effective for the source of ignition.
The possible presence of flames and hot gases could be due to
lames and ho ho t work during maintenance operations.
No Never
ases However, it excludes this occurrence beacuse "Hot work permit"
procedure are adopted.
Possible mechanical sparks may be generateci outside due to the
use of unsuitable tools. In this regard, we adopt suitable tools
o Never
will be drawn up and operating procedure for this purpose.

In normal condition, it is excluded the friction

Can not be excluded that the friction of the moving parts and
Sometimes between metal parts. In case of failure, can not be
spark generating heat, as the speed of the same is greater than 1
excluded that event, and having regard to the
m/ s (paragraph 6.4.3 of the UNI EN 13463-1:2009).
speed, the source of ignition may be effective.
Estimation of the possible effects of an explosion
Taking into account the parameters for Cloud volume Vz and
Cloud confinament Cc, the Indices of damage D was calculate.
The main results are shown in the following table:
Vz Cc
Source of release Zone D D'
Cloud volume [dm 3 ] Cloud confinament
358 PartlyConfined
Internai: 20 3 5
(0,5) (0,25)
>100 Not Confined
External : 22 l 2
(0,5) (O)
N.P. Completely Confined
Sieve SVl Internai: 20 3 5
(0,5) (0,5)
46 Completely Confined
Connection 51-SAl Internai : 20 3 5
(0,25) (0,5)
1200 Completely Confined
MixerSAl Internai: 20 3 5
(0,5) (0,5)
131 Completely Confined
Connection SAl-52 Internai : 20 3 5
(0,5) (0,5)
1349 Completely Confined
Storage tank 52 Internai : 20 3 5
(0,5) (0,5)
39 Completely Confined
Connection S3-SV2 Internai: 20 3 5
(0,25) (0,5)
N.P. Completely Confined
Sieve SV2 Internai : 20 3 5
l (0,5) (0,5)
Evaluation of the risk

The results of risks for each equipment are shown tn th
following table:
Product line A
Cc
Vz
Equipment Zone p c D' Clou d Risk
Cloud volume
confmamen
Internal: 20 3 2 5 2 1 High (35)
HopperTC1
External: 22 1 2 2 2 o Basso (8)
Internal: 20 3 2 5 2 2 High (36)
Sieve SV1
External: 2NE Negligible

Connection S1- Internal: 20 3 3 5 1 2 High (50)

SA1 External: 2NE Negligible
Internal: 20 3 2 5 2 2 High (36)
Mixer SA1
External: 2NE Negligible

Connection SA1- Internal: 20 3 3 5 2 2 High (51)

S2 External: 2NE Negligible
Internal: 20 3 2 5 2 2 High (36)
Storage tank S2
External: 2NE Negligible

Connection S3- Internal: 20 3 3 5 1 2 High (50)

SV2 External: 2NE Negligible
Internal: 20 3 2 5 2 2 High (36)
Sieve SV2
External: 2NE Negligible
Identification of prevention and protection measures

If ignition hazards are possible and the specific measures cannot be

implemented, the equipment, and the protective systems and
components shall be designed and constructed in such a way as to limit
the effects of an explosion to a safe level.

Such measures could be:

Explosion resistant design, see EN 14460;
Explosion venting, see EN 14797;
Explosion suppression, see EN 14373;
Explosion isolation, see EN 15089, EN ISO 16852.

These measures generally refer to the m1t1gation of hazardous effects

from explosions inside equipment, protective systems and components.
 Identification of prevention and protection measures

In the following table, the main prevention and protection measures

ide n tifi ed are shown:

Equipment Preventive measures Protection measures Residua! risk

Panels explosion venting
Inverter to reduce the
HopperTCl speed of moving parts Negligible
un der the 1 m/ s.
Periodic inspection of
moving parts in order to
lnstallation of suitable
detect signs of wear and
systems for suppression
deformation. In order to Low
and explosion venting of
avoid cracks and
combustion gases
delamination of metal
parts.
Replacement the
Connection S1-
connection with one m Negligible
SA1
conductive material.
Conclusion

The risk assessment approach described taken into account the main
requirement steps indicated by EN 1127:1 standard and by law no. 81 of
Apr. 9th, 2008; moreover, this approach allows to quantify the effectiveness
of prevention and protection measures in order to reduce the risk.

The main difficulty of this analysis is to have the technical documentation,

especially when the equipment are installed before the Machinery
Directive. In this case, on-site visits with the technical staff should be
made.

The results of this analysis should be included in the Document of

Explosion Protection, mandatory for Italian and European law.

A similar approach can also be used for workplaces where there may be
flammable gases, vapors and flammable liquid.
Dust Explosion Fundamentals: Ignition Criteria and Pressure
Development
Robert Zalosh
Firexplo
Wellesley, MA 02481

Basic Concepts
The five ingredients required for a dust explosion are:
Combustible particulates sufficiently small to burn rapidly when ignited
A suspended cloud of these combustible particulates at a concentration above the
Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC)
Confinement of the dust cloud by an enclosure or partial enclosure
Oxygen concentration greater than the Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC) for the
suspended dust cloud
Delayed ignition source of adequate energy or temperature to ignite the suspended cloud.
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has had several definitions of combustible
dusts over the years. The current definition in NFPA 654 is a combustible particulate solid that
presents a fire or deflagration hazard when suspended in air or some other oxidizing medium
over a range of concentrations, regardless of particle size or shape. Previous editions of NFPA
654 and the 2004 edition of the NFPA Glossary of Terms define a combustible dust as any
finely divided solid material that is 420 microns or smaller in diameter (material passing a U.S.
No. 40 Standard Sieve) and presents a fire or explosion hazard when dispersed in air. The
reason for the revision is that many combustible fiber segments, flat platelets, and agglomerates
do not readily pass through a No. 40 sieve, but they can be dispersed to form a combustible dust
cloud.
In practice, questions of combustibility as well as particle size often arise when evaluating the
potential explosion hazard of marginally small particles or mixtures of combustible and
noncombustible particulates. Many laboratories doing dust explosibility tests have developed
dust explosibility screening tests, also called Go/No Go tests, to deal with these questions.
Chapter 4 of the CCPS Guidelines for Safe Handling of Powders and Bulk Solids describes some
of these tests. The ASTM E27.05 Subcommittee is currently working on a revision to the
ASTM E1226-05 Standard Test Method for Pressure and Rate of Pressure Rise for Combustible
Dusts to provide a standardized Go/No Go test for potentially combustible particulates.

MEC values are determined in the U.S. per the ASTM E1515 test procedure involving tests with
various dust concentrations and a pyrotechnic igniter in a 20-liter sphere. The MEC corresponds
to the smallest concentration that produces a pressure at least twice as large as the initial pressure
at ignition. Eckhoff (2003) reports that MEC values are not very sensitive to particle diameter for
diameters less than about 60 m, but increase significantly with increasing diameter above this
approximate threshold. The majority of the materials listed in Eckhoff Table A.1 (2003) have MEC
values in the range 30 to 125 g/m3. These concentrations are sufficiently high that a 2 m thick cloud can
prevent seeing a 25 watt bulb on the other side of the cloud (Eckhoff, 2003, p.9).
The confinement needed for a dust explosion is usually from the process equipment or storage
vessel for the powder or dust. In the case of fugitive dust released from equipment and
containers, the room or building itself can represent the confinement. Often, the dust cloud
occupies only a fraction of the equipment or building volume, and the resulting explosion hazard
is called a partial volume deflagration hazard. Pressures produced from partial volume
deflagrations and the corresponding deflagration venting design bases are described in NFPA 68.
Example applications include dust collectors and spray driers.
LOC values for combustible dusts are also determined via tests in a 20-liter vessel, and the
ASTM E27 Technical Committee is drafting an ASTM standard for LOC values. LOC values
for various combustible powders and dusts listed in NFPA 69 Table C.1(b) are mostly in the
range 9 v% to 12 v% O2. Paragraph 7.7.2.5 of NFPA 69 requires that the oxygen concentration
for an inerted process system should be less than the measured LOC by at least 2 volume percent
for systems in which the oxygen concentration is continually monitored and no greater than 60%
of the LOC if the oxygen concentration is not monitored.

Ignition Criteria
Hot Temperatures
One hot temperature ignition scenario entails a dust cloud accidentally entering a hot oven or
furnace. This occurred in the CTA Acoustics phenolic resin dust explosion incident investigated
by the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2005). The resin dust cloud in that incident was
generated during cleaning of fugitive dust from the area around the oven.

The minimum dust cloud oven ignition temperature is determined by oven tests described in
ASTM E1491. These include a vertical oven called the Godbert-Greenwald furnace and a
horizontal oven called the BAM furnace. BAM furnace minimum Auto-Ignition Temperatures
(AITs) are usually 20oC to 60oC lower than the corresponding dust cloud ignition temperatures
measured in the Godbert-Greenwald furnace. Most of the Godbert-Greenwald dust cloud
ignition temperatures listed in Eckhoffs Table A.1 are in the range 420oC to 660oC.
When the high temperature is on a hot surface of limited area, the required surface ignition
temperature is higher than the standard furnace tests. Figure 1 shows some test data for surface
areas in the range 20 mm2 to 1000 mm2, and comparison with the BAM furnace data.
 Figure 1 Hot surface ignition temperature versus surface area (Eckhoff Figure 5.25)
Examples of hot surface ignitions in dust explosion incidents include overheated failed bearings
and driers. Clearly, the former would require a surface temperature much higher than the
ignition temperature measured in the standard oven tests, but the latter might require a lower
temperature than the standardized tests because of the possibility of a dust layer remaining in the
drier for a long time. An aerated cell test described by Abbot (1990) and the CCPS Guidelines
reference (2005) has been developed for drier hot layer ignition scenarios. The aerated cell test
produces an exotherm onset temperature at which oxidation reactions leading to layer fires first
occur. Most of the exotherm onset data reported by Abbot (1990) were in the range 125oC to
175oC. These temperatures are lower than the dust layer minimum hot surface ignition
temperatures measured in the more common tests conducted in ambient air (ASTM E2021).

Burning Embers and Agglomerates

Smoldering or flaming particulate embers or agglomerates (also called smoldering nests) are
often produced by frictional heating, e.g. during sanding or cutting, by local heating associated
with hot work on equipment and ducts containing dust deposits, by powder accumulations on
drier walls, and by small heat sources, e.g. a portable lamp, accidentally embedded in a
particulate pile . If the hot embers or agglomerates remain stationary in a larger pile of
combustible particulates, a larger fire can develop. On the other hand, if the
embers/agglomerates are exposed to combustible dust cloud in an enclosure (perhaps a
silo/hopper being filled), there is a potential for the ignition of a dust explosion.
Tabulations of ignition sources involved in 426 German dust explosions from 1965 to 1985
(Eckhoff, 2003, Tables 1.6 and 1.7) indicate that smoldering nests were the most prevalent cause
of those dust explosions in silos (28%), and in dryers (29%), and the second most frequent
ignition source in dust collector explosions (11%). Zalosh et al. (2005) describe one dust
explosion incident in which the hot nest was caused by some bolts falling into a hammermill
used for pharmaceuticals production. More recent research (Gummer and Lunn, 2003) has
shown that the ignitions in most of these reported incidents were probably due to flaming, rather
than smoldering nests/agglomerates since the only dust cloud material that could be ignited by
smoldering agglomerates banked up in a 10 cm diameter tray was sulfur, which has an
exceptionally low AIT (280-370 oC). Previous experiments cited by Gummer and Lunn
indicated that a minimum agglomerate burning area of 75 cm2 and a minimum burning
temperature of 900 oC were required to ignite dust clouds with AITs below 600 oC.
The occurrence of agglomerate smoldering versus flaming combustion and versus self-
extinguishment depends on the amount of air access and the coherence of the agglomerate.
Burning agglomerate transport experiments reviewed by Gummer and Lunn (2003) , showed that
glowing agglomerates could be transported large distances through otherwise empty piping with
air transport velocities of 10 and 20 m/s, but the glowing was extinguished rapidly when non-
burning dust was added to the flow. The glowing particles were not able to ignite the flowing
dust even though the dust concentration was above the MEC. Other tests showed that burning
nests did not ignite fine sawdust in the transport duct, but did ignite the sawdust cloud when it
reached the filter media dust collector at the end of the duct.
Several vendors provide so-called spark/ember detection and extinguishing systems to prevent
ignitions by burning agglomerates transported through ducting. Optical detectors sense the
radiant energy from the burning embers or agglomerates, and the control module triggers water
spray through nozzles situated at an appropriate distance downstream of the detector. Annex C
of NFPA 654 describes these systems.

Self-Heating
Certain particulate materials are prone to self-heating that can potentially lead to spontaneous
ignition. The predominant chemical reaction is low level oxidation. Examples of materials that
can self-heat by oxidation at relatively low temperatures include ABS resin powder, activated
carbon, coal (particularly Powder River Basin coal), and various chemical intermediates.
Materials such as freshly manufactured/dried wood chips, anhydrous calcium hypochlorite, and
hops are subject to self-heating by moisture absorption/condensation. Organic peroxides and
other potentially unstable chemicals can self-heat by exothermic decomposition. Various
agricultural materials, such as bagasse and soybeans, start self-heating by microbiological
processes. In many of these and other materials, multiple self-heating mechanisms overlap and it
is difficult to distinguish the dominant mechanism at a given temperature.
Self-heating is typically manifested as smoldering in the interior of a large storage pile of
particulates or in an accumulated layer in a dryer. If the smoldering particulates in the pile or
dryer are subsequently disturbed and exposed to air, the smoldering can evolve into flaming.
When the flaming nest or agglomerate is then transported to a hopper or dust collector, it can
ignite the suspended dust cloud as discussed in the preceding section.
Various laboratory tests have been developed to determine self-heating onset temperatures for
different sample sizes and configurations. These include particulate basket tests in an isothermal
oven, heated air flow tests with a slow rate of air temperature rise, and material in a package test
to determine the Self-Accelerating Decomposition Temperature. Application of laboratory self-
heating data to plant conditions requires use of appropriate volume scaling methods described in
handbook references including Babrauskas (2003), the CCPS Guidelines (2005), and Gray
(2002). In addition to showing how the self-heating onset temperature decreases with increasing
size of the particulate pile or layer, the scaling relationships also can be used to assess how the
expected time-to-ignition increases with the pile or layer size. The combination of laboratory
data and the scaling equations can then be used to establish appropriate plant level precautions to
prevent self-heating and spontaneous ignition.
Impact/Friction
Impact and frictional heating during combustible powder processing and during
maintenance/repairs involving cutting and grinding have been responsible for igniting many dust
explosions. Grinders, hammermills, and other size reduction equipment are particularly prone to
ignitions during operation. Blenders with rotating element tip speeds greater than 1 m/s are also
vulnerable to this scenario. Tramp metal stuck in a screw conveyor or a particle classifier
represents another frictional ignition scenario.

The vulnerability of a combustible dust to impact/friction ignition is characterized in terms of the

material spark Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) and cloud Auto-Ignition Temperature (AIT).
Testing to measure MIE values is described in ASTM E2019. Figure 2 shows the relationship
between MIE and AIT values to determine which dusts can be ignited by impact or frictional
contact between steel surfaces. For example, a dust with an MIE of 10 J should be immune to
steel-steel frictional or impact ignitions as long as its AIT is greater than 275 oC. Dusts with
lower MIE values but have larger AIT values still may not be prone to steel impact or frictional
ignitions per Figure 2. Eckhoff (2003) cautions that simple MIE versus AIT correlations cannot
be applicable to steel grinding and impact conditions that may be very different from the
experiments leading to Figure 2 and similar plots. Babrauskas (2003) presented data on the
minimum frictional force needed to ignite various dust clouds.

Figure 2 Boundaries for steel surface frictional and impact ignition of dust clouds (from Babrauskas, 2003)
One common friction ignition scenario is a blender with a rotating helical screw impeller. Jaeger
(2001) provided guidance on how the mixing speed and blender fill level can be used to control
frictional ignition hazards. He states that there is a negligible chance of ignition when the fill
level is greater than 70%, no matter what the impeller tip speed is. When the tip speed is greater
than 10 m/s and the fill level is less than 70%, there is a high probability of dust cloud ignition.
At tip speeds between 1 m/s and 10 m/s and fill levels less than 70%, Jaeger provides a MIE
versus AIT relationship analogous to that in Figure 2, to show which combustible dusts can be
blended without any likelihood of ignition.
Single impact spark ignition experiments described by Eckhoff (2003) have shown that the
probability of igniting a corn starch dust cloud increased with increasing impact energy, and that
it also depended on the impact velocity. Lower speed impacts produced a much greater
probability of ignition than higher speed impacts for a given impact energy. The metal
combinations involved in the impact also play an important role in the probability of ignition.
Steel-steel impacts and aluminum-steel impacts did not ignite corn starch dust clouds, whereas
titanium impacts against rusty steel did ignite dusts with MIE values below roughly 10 mJ. The
titanium-rusty steel impacts produced thermite reaction sparks, while the aluminum-rusty steel
impacts did not.

Electrical Equipment
Electrical equipment and wiring can potentially ignition dust clouds by sparks, arcs, or heated
surfaces. Dust Ignitionproof equipment is enclosed in a manner that excludes dusts and does not
permit arcs, sparks, or heat otherwise generated or liberated inside of the enclosure to cause
ignition of exterior accumulations or atmospheric suspensions of a specified dust on or in the
vicinity of the enclosure. UL 1203 describes the design, fabrication, and testing required to
certify electrical equipment as Dust Ignitionproof.
When electrical equipment and wiring is used in locations in which combustible dusts can be
present, there is a need to establish the Class II hazardous location classification of the area. Per
NFPA 70, a Class II Division 1 location is one in which combustible dust is in the air under
normal operating conditions in quantities to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures, or where
mechanical failure or abnormal operation of machinery or equipment might cause such explosive
or ignatible mixtures to be produced, and might also provide a source of ignition through
simultaneous failure of electrical equipment (NFPA 70 definition). There are three possible
conditions for the existence of a Class II Division 2 location. The first condition is a location in
which combustible dust due to abnormal operations may be present in the air in quantities
sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures. The second and third conditions refer to
dust accumulations that could be either suspended or ignited during equipment malfunctions or
abnormal operations. Class II locations are further classified as Group E, F, or G depending on
the type of dust material. NFPA 499 provides guidance and examples for the assignment of
appropriate Class II Division 1 and 2 classifications for combustible powder and dust processing
and handling operations.
NFPA 70 Article 500.7 permits Dust Ignitionproof electrical equipment in Class II Division 1
and 2 areas. Similarly, intrinsically safe electrical equipment (in which all circuits cannot
produce a spark or thermal effect capable of igniting a dust cloud per UL 913) is also allowed in
these areas. Dusttight equipment is permitted in Class II Division 2 areas. Article 502 of NFPA
70 describes the types of acceptable wiring in Class II Division 1 and 2 locations. Threaded
metal conduit together with dusttight boxes and fittings is one acceptable method commonly
used. The use of electrical sealing putty at boundaries of Class II areas is also described in
Article 502.

Electrostatic Discharges
Electrostatic discharges occur are preceded by charge accumulation on insulated surfaces,
ungrounded conductors (including human bodies), or particulate materials with high resistivities.
The subsequent electrostatic discharge is only an ignition threat if it is sufficiently energetic in
comparison to the Minimum Ignition Energy of the pertinent dust cloud. Different types of
electrostatic discharges have correspondingly different maximum discharge energy capacities as
listed in Table 1.
 Table 1 Types of Electrostatic Discharge
Type of Discharge Maximum Energy1 (mJ) Examples
Corona 0.1 Wires, Type D Bulk Bags
Brush 1-3 Flexible boots and socks
Bulking Brush 1 - 10 Piles of powders with resistivities > 109
-m in hopper or silo
Propagating Brush 1000 - 3000 Boots, plastic pipe or duct
Spark > 10,000 Ungrounded conductor, e.g. baghouse
cage, or person, e.g. packager
1. Maximum energies are from Figure 5.3.1 of NFPA 77-2006.
Since combustible dust MIE values are substantially greater than 0.1 mJ, corona discharges are
not an ignition threat. In fact, Type D bulk bags are deliberately designed and fabricated to
safely dissipate accumulated charges via corona discharges. A recent study by Glor and
Schwenzfeuer (2005) has shown that brush discharges were not able to ignite clouds of dusts
with MIE values less than 1 mJ, thus correcting a different impression obtained from earlier
studies. Since brush discharges do ignite flammable vapors, they are an ignition threat for hybrid
dust-vapor mixtures such as occur in processes with flammable solvents.
The most hazardous situation for a bulking brush discharge ignition is filling a hopper with a
high resistance material combination of large particles with diameters over 1 mm together with
fines with a MIE less than 10 mJ. Some of the dusts listed in Eckhoffs Table A.1 (2003) with
MIE values less than 10 mJ include certain wood dusts (with 39 weight % < 20 m), naphthalene
with a median diameter of 95 m, zinc stearate with a 13 m median diameter, and toner with
median diameter of 23 m and less. Transport and processing of these easily ignitable dusts
require special precautions to prevent brush and bulking brush discharges. Precautions provided
in NFPA 77 Chapter 9 and in Brittons (1999) chapter 6 are especially important for these dusts.
A propagating brush discharge can occur when a charged non-conductor is in direct contact with
a conductive surface, such as a metal surface coated with a plastic film or a layer of high
resistivity powder (Glor, 2005). The Propagating brush discharge occurs when the surface
charge density is sufficiently large to cause electrostatic breakdown at the nonconductor surface.
Streamers carry the surface charge to a central region where it intensifies as shown in Figure 4.
Propagating brush discharges can ignite dusts with MIE values less than about 3 J.

Figure 3 Propagating brush discharge (from Britton, 1999)

Sparks are the most energetic type of electrostatic discharge. Spark prevention requires rigorous
grounding and bonding of conductive objects such as duct sections and connections to hoppers.
FM Global Data Sheet 5-8 also recommends maintaining humidity levels at 60% to 70% as
another spark prevention measure.

Pressure Development in Dust Deflagrations

Pressures in Single Enclosures
Deflagration pressures resulting from an ignition in process equipment depend on the dust
material, particle size distribution, and concentration distribution within the enclosure, and the
size and location of equipment openings that allow the burning and unburned dust to be vented.
If there were no openings in the equipment, the deflagration pressure would correspond to the
pressures measured in ASTM E1226 tests. Since these pressures are greater than 2 bar gauge,
even at concentrations near the MEC, most process equipment cannot withstand the closed vessel
deflagration pressure. Pressures at the worst-case dust concentration often range from 7 to 10
bar. Therefore, NFPA 654 paragraph 7.1.2.1 requires process equipment with an explosion
hazard to be equipped with one of six specified alternative methods of explosion protection.

The most commonly used dust explosion protection method is deflagration venting. The
effectiveness of deflagration vents depends on the level of turbulence in the process vessel and
the vessel size and shape as well as the vent design and the dust characteristics cited above.
NFPA 68 Chapter 7 provides dust deflagration design requirements.

Deflagrations Involving Interconnected Equipment

When process vessels are connected by pipe and ducting, a dust explosion ignited in one vessel
can often propagate into the interconnected vessels. Pressures produced in the interconnected
vessels can be significantly greater than the pressure that would be experienced in isolated
vessels. The reason for the enhanced deflagration pressure in a totally enclosed system is that
the initiating explosion pressurizes the interconnected vessels, so that the deflagration that
eventually occurs when the flame reaches the dust cloud in the other vessels starts at a higher
initial pressure. This effect is called pressure piling. Lunn et al. (1996) conducted
interconnected vessel tests with coal dust and toner that had Pmax values of 7.7 bar g and 7.1 bar
g, respectively, in single closed vessel tests. When the explosions were initiated in a 20 m3
vessel and allowed to propagate via a 25 cm diameter pipe into a 4 m3 vessel with a dust cloud,
the measured pressures were 16 to 20 bar g, i.e. more than twice the Pmax values.

Inter-vessel deflagration propagation and pressure piling does not always occur. Lunn et al.
(1996) did not observe deflagration propagation in tests with a 15 cm diameter pipe, and later
vented explosion tests using a pipe with a sharp 90 degree elbow produced pressure enhancement
in only one of many tests conducted (Skjold, 2007). However, when the deflagration does
propagate into the interconnected vessels, the jet flame ignition of the dust cloud in the second
vessel produces a much more rapid rate of burning and associated pressure rise. The more rapid
burning and pressure rise can render explosion venting or explosion suppression systems
ineffective in the second vessel. Hence, there is often a need for explosion isolation systems to
supplement the installed explosion protection for an individual vessel. NFPA 69 provides the
requirements for various types of passive and active explosion isolation systems.
Secondary Dust Explosions
Most of the casualties from dust explosions occur when the initiating explosion within some
equipment or enclosure breaches the equipment/enclosure and causes a secondary explosion in
the surrounding building. The secondary explosion occurs when dust deposits on exposed
surfaces in the building are lifted by the blast wave emanating from the breached
equipment/enclosure, and then are ignited by the flame vented from the breached
equipment/enclosure. Figure 4 shows a dust cloud formed when an air blast wave propagated
over a corn starch layer in experiments conducted by Scherpa (2002). Air blast velocities of 12
to 48 m/s lifted 13% to 44% of the deposited cornstarch.

Figure 4. Corn starch dust cloud produced from air blast over dust layer (from Scherpa, 2002)
These secondary dust explosions are particularly devastating because they produce large burning
dust clouds and pressures beyond the strength of most buildings. The two critical prevention
measures are the installation of effective explosion protection for the combustible powder/dust
processing and handling equipment (including explosion isolation), and minimizing combustible
dust layer accumulations on equipment and building surfaces. NFPA 654 provides requirements
for maximum allowable dust layer thicknesses and surface areas with dust accumulations. Some
of the other papers at this Symposium offer guidance on how different types of industrial
facilities are attempting to meet these requirements, and possibly improve them.

References
Abbot, J. Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Dryers, Institute Chem Engrs, 1990.
ASTM E1226-05, Standard Test Method for Pressure and Rate of Pressure Rise for
Combustible Dusts, American Society for Testing and Materials, 2005.
ASTM E1491-06, Standard Test Method for Minimum Autoignition Temperature of Dust Clouds,
American Society for Testing and Materials, 2006.
ASTM E1515-07, Standard Test Method for Minimum Explosible Concentrations of Combustible
Dusts, American Society for Testing and Materials, 2007.
ASTM E 2019-03 Standard Test Method for Minimum Ignition Energy of a Dust Cloud in Air,
American Society for Testing and Materials, 2003.
ASTM E 2021-01 Standard Test for Hot Surface Ignition Temperature of Dust Layers, American
Society for Testing and Materials, 2001.
Babrauskas, V., Ignition Handbook, Fire Science Publishers, 2003.
Britton, L., Avoiding Static Ignition Hazards in Chemical Operations, AIChE CCPS, 1999.
CCPS, Guidelines for Safe Handling of Powders and Bulk Solids, AIChE Center for Chemical
Process Safety, 2005.
CSB, 2005. Investigation Report. Combustible Dust Fire and Explosions, CTA Acoustics, Inc., Chemical
Safety Board, February 2005.
Eckhoff, R., Dust Explosions in the Process Industries, 3rd Edition, Gulf Professional Publishing, 2003.
Gray, B., Spontaneous Combustion and Self-Heating, SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection
Engineering, 3rd Edition, pp. 2-211-228, SFPE, NFPA, 2002.
Glor, M., Electrostatic Ignition Hazards in the Process Industries, J. of Electrostatics, v 63, pp.
447-453, 2005.
Glor, M. and Schwenzfeuer, K., Direct Ignition Tests with Brush Discharges, J. of
Electrostatics, v 63, pp. 463-468, 2005.
Gummer, J. and Lunn, G., Ignitions of Explosive Dust Clouds by Smouldering and Flaming
Agglomerates, J. of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, v. 16, pp 27-32, 2003.
Jaeger, N., Safety strategy against potential hazards due to the handling of powders in a
blending unit, J. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, v. 14, pp 139-151, 2001.
Lunn, G., Holbrow, P., Andrews, S., and Gummer, J., Dust explosions in totally enclosed
interconnected vessel systems, J. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, v. 9, pp. 45-
58, 1996.
NFPA 68, Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting, National Fire Protection
Association, 2007.
NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems, 2008.
NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, National Fire Protection Association, 2008.
NFPA 77, Recommended Practice on Static Electricity, 2007.
NFPA 499, Recommended Practice for the Classification of Combustible Dusts and of
Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas,
National Fire Protection Association, 2008.
NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing,
Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, National Fire Protection
Association, 2006.
Scherpa, T., Secondary Dust Cloud Formation from an Initiating Blast Wave, WPI M.S.
Thesis, 2002.
Skjold, T., "Review of the DESC project," Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries v.
20: 291-302, 2007.
UL 913, Standard for Safety, Intrinsically Safe Apparatus and Associated Apparatus for Use in
Class I, II, and III, Division 1, Hazardous (Classified) Locations, Underwriters
Laboratories, 1997.
UL 1203, Explosionproof and Dust-Ignitionproof Electrical Equipment for Hazardous
(Classified) Locations, Underwriters Laboratories, 1994.
Zalosh, R., Grossel, S., Kahn, R., and Sliva, D., Safely Handle Powdered Solids, Chemical
Engineering Progress, v. 101, pp. 23-30, 2005.
 Combustible Dust
Hazard Recognition
an Insurers View

Henry L Febo Jr., PE

FM Global
Engineering Standards
Senior Engineering Technical Specialist, AVP

Prepared for presentation at the

Fire Protection Research Foundation Dust Symposium
Kansas City, MO
October 20 - 21, 2010
Visit Frequency
Basic visits annually
Special visits by request/as needed

Visit Protocol
FM Global data sheets
Target hazards depending on occupancy
How do we target hazards?
INDUSTRY TYPE Number
Woodworking 64
Food 26
Metals 18
Chemical/Pharmaceutical 14
Pulp/Paper 12
Mineral 11
Utility 7
Plastics 5
Rubber 5
Various 4
EQUIPMENT TOTAL 166
How do we target hazards?
EQUIPMENT TYPE Number Gross Loss %
Dust Collector 67 12
Impact Equipment 22 11
Boiler 11 18
Storage Silo 8 4
Processing Equipment 7 2
Conveyor 5 3
Oven/Dryer 8 40
Grain Elevator 4 2
Spray Dryer 4 1
Various 30 7
EQUIPMENT TOTAL 166 100
Dust - questions to answer
Is there a combustible dust in use or created?
raw materials
intermediates
products
What is a Combustible Dust?
Organic material
Plastics, wood, solid fuels,
starch, flour, grain
Unoxidized metal
Aluminum, silicon
Other oxidizable materials
Zinc stearate, sulfur, iron
sulfides (pyrites)
What is a Combustible Dust?
500 microns (1/50th inch) or smaller
different materials have different size threshold
usually range of particle sizes
larger (non-explosible) particles stay mixed: helps
inert mixture
fines segregation = increased hazard
Might not burn in pile or solid form
Solid form combustibility = certain dust explosibility
What is a Combustible Dust?

48% < 500 22% < 500

K = 80 K=0
What is a Combustible Dust?
Dust - questions to answer
Any processes that could create dust?
Milling, grinding, shaking, pneumatic transfer

Where are the dusts handled or processed?

Mixed occupancy area
Cutoff
Suitable construction
Dust - questions to answer
Are operations involving combustible dust
properly designed?
Inside or out
Buildings or equipment
Protected against dust explosion and fire
Important to operations
Collect information to analyze
Dust - questions to answer
Any new or planned operations or process
involving combustible dust or changes to an
existing one?

Is there a management of change process to

prevent a change of conditions (increase or add
hazard)?
Dust - questions to answer
Are there areas containing fugitive dusts?
Elevated surfaces
Concealed spaces
Eliminate by fixing leaks
Control by housekeeping (temporary)
Favorable construction

Is there a fugitive dust control (inspection) program?

Records & accountability
Dust - questions to answer
Is there an adequate ignition source control policy?
Hot work
Smoking
Contractors
Proper electrical equipment
Dust - questions to answer
Is there a suitable preventive maintenance program?
Prevent maloperation creating an ignition source
Process equipment
Auxiliary systems
Protection systems
Consequences of failure
Building design
36 losses where a factor
Inadequate (11) average loss US$ 13.3 M
Adequate (25) average loss US$ 0.9 M
Consequences of failure
Housekeeping
78 losses where a factor
Unsatisfactory (29) average loss US$ 1.9 M
Satisfactory (49) average loss US$ 0.5 M
Dust protection guidelines
FM Global data sheet 7-73 Dust Collectors and
Collection Systems

FM Global data sheet 7-76 Prevention and Mitigation

of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fire

Free for download at www.fmglobal.com

DS 7-76 Combustible Dusts
General
Room/building explosion hazards
Equipment explosion hazards
Dust collectors and cyclones (also DS 7-73)
Connecting ducts
Silos
Bucket elevators
Spray dryers (also DS 6-9)
Raw grain handling (also DS 7-75)
Explosion vent design methodology
Vent sizing solutions developed on the basis of
modeling results + experimental validation
Significant improvements over prior guidelines
Packaged in an easy-to-use program (DustCalc)
Database of dust properties
Built-in NFPA 68, EN 14491, VDI 3673 comparison
Summary
Have a strong company policy regarding combustible
dust safety

Identify areas where combustible dust hazards exist

Control fugitive dust

Are the design features appropriate for the hazard?

GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

Application of a short cut risk analysis methodology for analyzing dust

explosion hazards

Kees van Wingerden

GexCon AS
Fantoftvegen 38, Bergen, Norway
[email protected]

Geir Pedersen
GexCon AS

Scott Davis
GexCon US Inc

Keywords: Risk analysis, dust explosion, preventive measures, protective measures

Abstract

In this paper a semi-quantitative short-cut risk analysis method (SCRAM) is presented, allowing
for the assessment of dust explosion hazards. The method is first described and two application
examples are presented.

SCRAM is based on semi-quantitative descriptions of both the likelihood of dust explosions

occurring and the consequences of such explosions. The likelihood of dust explosions occurring
is based on the ignition probability and the probability of flammable dust clouds arising. While
all possible ignition sources are reviewed, the most important ones include open flames,
mechanical sparks, hot surfaces, electric equipment, smoldering combustion (self-ignition) and
electrostatic sparks and discharges. Apart from the machinery, the ignitibility and explosibility of
the dust will also play an important role.

The consequences of dust explosions are described as consequences for personnel and
consequences for equipment. The method reviews the consequences of both primary and
secondary events. Factors determining the consequences of dust explosions include the how
frequently personnel are present, the equipment strength, housekeeping and implemented
consequence-reducing measures. Both the likelihood of dust explosions and consequences are
described by classes ranging from low probabilities and limited local damage, to high probability
of occurrence and catastrophic damage. Acceptance criteria are based on the likelihood and
consequence of the events.

The method allows for optimal choice of adequate preventive and protective measures.

To demonstrate the method an application of the method is presented: a milk powder production
facility.

Note: Do not add page numbers. Do not refer to page numbers when referencing different portions of the
paper
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1. Introduction

Dust explosions are a continuous threat in companies producing flammable powders and dust as
final and intermediate products. Sad recent examples include the serious accidents in Kinston,
North Carolina in 2003 (killing 6), Savannah, Georgia in 2008 (killing 14), and one year later the
explosion in a coal silo injuring 7 in Oak Creek, Wisconsin (2009). These serious accidents are
accompanied by many smaller dust explosion accidents in industry causing limited damage and
minor or no injuries. Some of them could however have led to more serious consequences.

Dust explosion risks prevailing in industrial facilities are dependent on a large variety of factors
that include process parameters, such as pressure and temperature, as well as equipment
properties, such as the presence of moving elements, the mechanical strength of such dust
handling equipment, dust explosion characteristics, and mitigating measures taken including
housekeeping and protective measures such as explosion venting.

In this document a semi-quantitative short-cut risk analysis method (SCRAM) is presented,

allowing for the assessment of dust explosion risks and choosing adequate preventive and
protective measures. The performance of an analysis as described here would make industry
aware of the most hazardous areas in their facilities and associated consequences in case of an
explosion.

The method is described and an application example presented. The example demonstrates the
strength of the method and the support it offers to industry for choosing appropriate risk
mitigating measures.

2. Description of the short-cut risk analysis method

This chapter describes the methodology used to determine the risk for dust explosions in
industrial facilities. The risk for a dust explosion is the product of the probability of a dust
explosion occurring and the consequences of the dust explosion. The consequences can be
divided in primary consequences such as failure of the piece of equipment in which the dust
explosion occurs and secondary consequences such as a an ensuing fire and secondary
explosions in connected equipment or in the working area due to whirling up and subsequent
ignition of dust layers there.

2.1 Estimating the probability of an explosion occurring

For a dust explosion to occur a flammable atmosphere must be present and simultaneously a
sufficiently strong ignition source. The dust concentration in this atmosphere must exceed a
certain limits, typically 30 g/m3, and the particle size distribution must be sufficiently small. Dust
with particle size distribution from 10 to 40 micron and dust concentration range from 250 to
1500 g/m3 have shown to ignite easiest and produce the most severe explosions. Finer dust
might produce more severe explosions if the dispersion process has enough force to break up the
agglomerates and produce a dust cloud consisting of primary particles.
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

To be able to quantify the probability for the occurrence of an explosive atmosphere, properties
of the combustible material should be considered, together with how likely it is that the
combustible material will be mixed with air.
The probability of a specific ignition source being able to ignite the explosive atmosphere is
considered based on different criteria, such as the energy released by the ignition source, the
period in which this energy is supplied, the surface temperature of the ignition source and its
size. For mechanically generated sparks, collision speed, friction, contact time and physical
properties of the colliding materials are included.

Whether an ignition source is capable of igniting an explosive atmosphere depends on several

properties of the atmosphere, for instance the fuel concentration and the turbulence level and the
ignition properties of the explosive atmosphere (normally described by the minimum ignition
energy and minimum ignition temperature).

The factors mentioned above are considered individually and form the basis for estimating how
often an explosion can occur. It is not possible to give the exact frequencies for an explosion. In
a risk analysis the probability for an explosive atmosphere and the probability for an ignition
source are ranged from I to V, where I has the lowest probability and V has the highest
probability. Each range (I, II, III, IV and V) describes a range in probability or frequency.

The probability of an explosion occurring depends on the probability of the presence of an

effective ignition source and the probability of having an explosive atmosphere. The probability
of an explosion will be the product of these two probabilities (as long as the two are generated
independent from each other). Definitions and explanations of the values used are described
below.

The probability for a secondary event depends on the probability for the primary event and is
normally lower than that of the primary event.

2.2 Estimating the consequences of an explosion

The consequence for personnel (Dp) and equipment (De) is estimated based on the expected
effect of the explosion. This is estimated based on expected damage caused by the heat, pressure
or loose items after the definitions given below. The consequence for personnel and equipment
from an explosion depends on the explosion pressure and the heat intensity from the explosion.
Pressure build-up in enclosed units might cause the units to rupture resulting in heat radiation
from flames, dispersion of pressure waves and flying objects.
The strength of an explosion depends on several factors, for example the initial conditions of the
dust cloud, including the fuel concentration, initial turbulence and the position of the ignition
source. The properties of the combustible material are also important, including chemical
composition. The properties of the explosive atmosphere will change over time hence, the time
of the explosion is important for the explosion propagation.
Flames propagating out from a ruptured vessel release heat that might injure personnel or cause
damage to equipment. The convective heat transfer during an explosion causes the most severe
burns. Burns/damage might be the result if personnel or equipment are in direct contact with the
explosion flame.
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2.3 Definitions
The probability or the frequency of an explosion occurring and the potential consequences is
estimated from I to V, as described previously. The definition and description of the different
values are given below.

Table 1 Definition of the probability and consequence for explosions under normal
operation

Probability of the formation of an explosive atmosphere

Range, Da Description
I Very unlikely
II Unlikely
III Somewhat likely
IV Likely
V Very likely
Probability of the formation of an effective ignition source
Range Di Description
I Very unlikely
II Unlikely
III Somewhat likely
IV Likely
V Very likely
Probability for an explosion to occur
Range De Description Definition
I Very unlikely < 1/ 10000 per year
II Unlikely > 1/10000 per year < 1/100
year
III Somewhat > 1/100 < 1/10 per year
likely
IV Likely > 1/10 year < 1 per year
V Very likely > 1 per year

Consequence for personnel and equipment

Range Dp De Description Definition
I Personnel No injury.
Equipment Marginal damage to process units. Process shut down.
II Personnel Limited injury.
Equipment Damage to process unit (<$ 20, 000).
III Personnel Personnel injury.
Equipment Process unit collapse and possible damage to corresponding units (> $ 20, 000; <
$ 200, 000).
IV Personnel Serious personnel injury, possible loss of life.
Equipment Significant damage to several process units (> $200, 000; < $2, 000 000).
V Personnel Loss of one or several lives.
Equipment Plant fully damaged (> $2, 000 000).
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

2.4 Estimating the explosion risk

The explosion risk is the product of the probability of an explosion occurring and its
consequences. In the present risk analysis a qualitative risk evaluation is completed for each
process unit. The risk level for explosions can be estimated from the matrix given in Figure 1
below, based on the probability and consequence, as described in the above section, and after the
definitions in Table 1 also above. The risk level increases from E to A.

V C B A A A

IV D C B A A
Consequence

III E D C B A

II E E D C B

I E E E D C

I II III IV V

Probability

Figure 1 Risk matrix

2.5 Acceptance criteria

The risk level and the recommended acceptance criteria are selected and based on the
probability for human and economical loss according to Table 1 above. The selected criteria are
given in Table 2 below. It should be emphasized that these acceptance criteria are a proposal
only and may be chosen differently.
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 2 Risk level definitions and recommended acceptance criteria

Risk level Acceptance criteria Recommended action

A Very high Unacceptable Risk reducing measures must be implemented

B High Unacceptable Risk reducing measures must be implemented

C Medium Medium Risk reducing measures should be implemented

D Low Acceptable Risk reducing measures can be implemented

E Very low Acceptable Risk reducing measures are not required

In the application example given in this document, the estimations of probabilities and
consequences are summarized in tables. These tables also include estimations of ignition source
probability and an estimate of the risk of secondary incidents/events.
Below, explanations to the different parts of the tables are given.

Table 3 Example of table summarizing the assessment of probability and

consequences of a dust explosion in a process unit.

Process Probability Probability of ignition Probability

unit of
Electric and Flames of
flammable Equipment
Hot electrostatic Mechanical and
(electric and explosion
atmosphere mechanical)
surfaces sparks and sparks smoldering
Example discharges combustion

IV II I I I I II

EXPOSURE TO EXPLOSION

PRIMARY EXPLOSION

Probability (injury/damage) Consequence Risk

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

I II III III E D

SECONDARY INCIDENTS (inclusive explosions)

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

I I V V C C
Comments:
EXAMPLE
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Process unit: The process unit the analysis applies to.

Probability: The estimated explosion probability. The probability of an explosion is the

product of the probability for an explosive atmosphere and effective
ignition source.

Consequence: The consequences for an event considering both personal injuries and
damage to equipment. Both primary and secondary consequences are given.
Definitions for explosion related probability, (and consequences) are given
in the above section.

Risk: The product of probability and consequence. Both the risk of primary and
secondary events is estimated. See Table 2 for acceptance criteria.

Ignition source: Probability for occurrence of the five most common ignition sources are
given.

3. Application example: a spray dryer installation for milk powder

To demonstrate the method an analysis performed for a spray dryer installation used for drying
milk powder (see Figure 2) is presented. The total height of the spray dryer is 15 m, the height of
the cylindrical part is 6.3 m supported by a conical part (angle 60). To move dried powder out of
the conical part a pneumatic hammer has been provide. The temperature of the hot air to dry the
milk slurry is 200 C. The temperature of the air leaving the dryer is 90 C. Based on air and
product throughput the average dust concentration in the dryer would be 30 g/m3. The dried
powder collected in the cone of the spray dryer is transferred into a fluidized bed for further
drying or cooling. The powder taken along with the air flow out of the dryer is removed from the
air by cyclones and a bag filter. Also the air from the fluidized bed is cleaned in cyclones and the
bag filter. The dust collected in the cyclones is returned to the fluidized bed by pneumatic
transport.
The described spray dryer installation has not been provided/equipped with any special
preventive or protective measures. The installation is located inside a building. Personnel is
around the installation only occasionally for inspection reasons.

3.1 Analysis
The analysis has been performed for the dryer only.
To perform the risk analysis the explosion properties of milk powder need to be known.
Although it is strongly preferred to have these properties determined for the milk powder in
question the present study was performed using literature data. This may lead to
overconservative preventive and protective measures resulting from the analysis since one would
normally base oneself on the most conservative values of published data. On the other hand an
underestimate of the hazards may also be possible, especially for dusts where only a limited set
of explosion properties is available. For milk powder the use of literature data is acceptable since
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

there is a rather big number of well-described data available which are not varying much. The
data found for milk powder are presented in Table 4 (from Beck et al, 1997).

Table 4 Explosion properties of milk powder (Beck et al., 1997)

Explosion property Value
Maximum explosion pressure Pmax (bar) 6-7
Dust explosion constant KSt (bar.m/s) 80-130
Minimum ignition energy (MIE) (mJ) > 50
Minimum ignition temperature (MIT) (C) 450-600
Lower explosion limit (LEL) (g/m3) 60-150

Figure 2 Analyzed milk powder spray dryer installation

In addition to the properties presented in Table 4 it is known that milk powder stored in bulk
might self-ignite when exposed to a higher temperature over a longer period. Tests show that
storage at a temperature of 80-90 C during a period exceeding 20 hours results in self-ignition
(Le Maillard reaction).

Hazards identification
Under normal operating conditions the average dust concentration in the dryer is below the lower
explosion concentration. Locally in the cone however one can expect that flammable
concentrations can be reached though being it intermittently. An initial local explosion could
however whirl up dust present on the cone walls causing a stronger secondary explosion (Siwek
et al., 2004). Potential ignition sources include mechanical sparks due to the rotating spraying
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

wheel in the top of the dryer coming loose and hitting the wall of the dryer (In the light of the
minimum ignition temperature and minimum ignition energy of milk powder this ignition source
is most likely not able to cause ignition) and self-heating of layers of milk powder. The latter
would especially be possible if the rotating spraying wheel, in case of an anomaly, is distributing
the milk slurry against the walls of the cylindrical part of the dryer. The hot drying air could
cause the resulting milk powder cake to self-ignite. The smoldering material could come loose
and fall into the cone of the dryer, causing either ignition of a flammable dust cloud there or
whirl up dust and causing this to ignite.
The probability of the latter is relatively high and based on historical evidence an explosion
should be expected with a frequency of between 10-1 and 10-2 per year (probability class III).
Here it is assumed that the ignition source also causes the dust cloud (a smoldering cake of milk
powder falling into the cone of the dryer).
A final ignition source could be an explosion occurring in other parts of the drying installation
running back into the dryer. This ignition source, although very realistic, is not considered here
since in a full risk analysis of the spray dryer installation it has to be considered in the analysis of
the other pieces of equipment of the installation. In this document it is assumed that sufficient
preventive and protective measures are taken to prevent this from happening, i.e. the likelihood
of this ignition source occurring is assumed to be sufficiently low.
The consequence of the explosion is most likely the failure of the dryer (explosion tests reported
by Siwek et al. (2004) show that pressure up to 1 bar are possible; it should be mentioned
however that these tests were performed under conservative conditions) potentially injuring
personnel or even causing fatalities if in the vicinity of the dryer at that very moment
(consequence classes III and IV respectively). Moreover there is a possibility that the explosion
propagates into the fluid bed or the cyclones and into the bag filter (secondary incident). This
probability is however lower than the probability of an explosion (probability class II). The
consequences are however more severe: loss of the plant (consequence class IV) and most likely
loss of one or several lives (consequence class V).
The analysis is summarized in Table 5. The table also determines the risk based on the various
probabilities and associated consequences.
Risk evaluation
The results of the analysis of the spray dryer as summarized in Table 5. The Table shows that the
risks are either medium (implying that risk reducing measures should be implemented) or high
(implying risk reducing measures must be implemented). Hence two alternatives are
investigated: one where a single preventive measure is introduced reducing the probability of
explosions and a second one where this preventive measure is combined with protective
measures.

3.2 New analysis investigating the introduction of preventive measures

To reduce the probability of explosions from occurring it is proposed to introduce a carbon
monoxide-detection system. Smoldering results in the generation of carbon monoxide (CO) due
to incomplete combustion. A CO-detection system could warn the operator on ongoing
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

smoldering before a hazardous situation arises (Steenbergen et al, 2007). Including this
preventive measure a new analysis has been performed of the explosion risks of the spray dryer.

Table 5 Summarizing the probabilities and consequences of primary and secondary

events in the spray dryer and the associated risks for personnel and equipment.

Process Probability Probability of ignition Probability

unit of
Electric and of
flammable Equipment
Hot electrostatic Mechanical
Flame and
(electric and smoldering explosion
Spray atmosphere mechanical)
surfaces sparks and sparks
combustion
discharges
dryer
V I I I I III III

EXPOSURE TO EXPLOSION

PRIMARY EXPLOSION

Probability (injury/damage) Consequence Risk

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

II III IV III C C

SECONDARY INCIDENTS (inclusive explosions)

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

II II V IV B C
Comments:

Hazard identification
The introduction of a CO-detection system will reduce the probability of an explosion. An early
detection of smoldering combustion is assumed to reduce the probability of explosions by at least
a factor of 10 implying a probability of explosions of class II. The probability of equipment be
damaged and personnel being affected will be reduced accordingly both for primary and
secondary incidents. The consequences are however still similar. This results in risks as
summarized in Table 6.

Risk evaluation
Table 6 shows that risks have been reduced by introducing a CO-detection system compared to
Table 5 presenting the original risks without any preventive or protective measure. The
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 6 Summarizing the probabilities and consequences of primary and secondary

events in the spray dryer and the associated risks for personnel and equipment after
implementation of a CO-detection system.

Process Probability Probability of ignition Probability

unit of
Electric and of
flammable Equipment
Hot electrostatic Mechanical
Flame and
(electric and smoldering explosion
Spray atmosphere mechanical)
surfaces sparks and sparks
combustion
discharges
dryer
V I I I I II II

EXPOSURE TO EXPLOSION

PRIMARY EXPLOSION

Probability (injury/damage) Consequence Risk

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

II II IV III C D

SECONDARY INCIDENTS (inclusive explosions)

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

I I V IV C D
Comments: A CO-detection system has been included.

remaining risks for personnel which are described as medium according to the acceptance
criteria proposed in Table 2 should be addressed by introducing further risk reducing measures.
A described in section 3.1 an additional analysis is presented where the preventive measure of
CO-detection is combined with protective measures. A combination of explosion venting and
explosion isolation by extinguishing barriers between the dryer and fluidized bed and the dryer
and the cyclones is investigated.

3.3 New analysis investigating the introduction of preventive measures in combination with
protective measures
Reducing the probability of an explosion by introducing CO-detection still leaves personnel
exposed to a medium risk. Hence additional protective measures are proposed. The effects of
introducing a combination of explosion venting and explosion isolation (extinguishing barriers)
have been investigated.
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

Hazard identification
The probability of explosions assuming an early detection of smoldering combustion is still as
described in section 3.2 equivalent to a probability class II. The consequences of possible
explosions are however reduced considerably. Assuming use of appropriate venting devices,
sufficient venting surface and taking into account the effect of vent ducts (which are necessary
since the spray dryer is installed inside a building) and adequate installation distances for the
extinguishing barriers (containing sufficient extinguishing powder to extinguish flames) the risk
of explosion in the spray dryer can be reduced considerably. The consequences of an explosion
are now reduced to limited or no damage both for the primary and secondary events
(consequence class I).

Risk evaluation
Introducing explosion protective measures as described reduces the risks both for the equipment
and personnel to acceptable levels. The reduction of consequences to consequence class I
(replacement of vent panels and refilling of extinguishing barriers (neglecting the costs of loss of
some produced milk powder)) results in risk levels E implying that no further measures would be
necessary. Results of the analysis have been presented in Table 7.

4. Conclusions

A semi-quantitative short-cut risk analysis method (SCRAM) has been presented, allowing for
the assessment of dust explosion risks and choosing adequate preventive and protective
measures. The performance of such an analysis makes industry aware of the most hazardous
areas in their facilities and associated consequences in case of an explosion.

The application example demonstrates the strength of the method and the support it offers to
industry for choosing appropriate risk mitigating measures.
GCPS 2010 __________________________________________________________________________

Table 7 Summarizing the probabilities and consequences of primary and secondary

events in the spray dryer and the associated risks for personnel and equipment after
implementation of a CO-detection system in combination with explosion venting and
explosion isolation towards fluidized bed and cyclones.

Process Probability Probability of ignition Probability

unit of
Electric and of
flammable Equipment
Hot electrostatic Mechanical
Flame and
(electric and smoldering explosion
Spray atmosphere mechanical)
surfaces sparks and sparks
combustion
discharges
dryer
V I I I I II II

EXPOSURE TO EXPLOSION

PRIMARY EXPLOSION

Probability (injury/damage) Consequence Risk

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

II II I I E E

SECONDARY INCIDENTS (inclusive explosions)

Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment Personnel Equipment

I I I I E E
Comments: A CO-detection system has been included combined with explosion venting
and isolation.

5. References
Beck H., Glinke N.and Mohlman C., BIA-Report: Combustion and explosion characteristics of
dust, HVBG, Berufsgenossenschaftliches Institut fr Arbeitssicherheit BIA 13/97, 1997.
Siwek, R., van Wingerden, K., Hansen, O.R., Sutter, G., Schwartzbach, Chr., Ginger, G., &
Meili, R., Dust explosion venting and suppression of conventional spray driers. Eleventh
International Symposium on Loss Prevention, Prague, May 31 June 3, 2004.
Steenbergen, A.E., Van Houwelingen, G. and Straatsma, J., System for early detection of fire in
a spray drier, International Journal of Dairy Technology, 44, no. 3, pp. 76-79, 2007.
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the basics of
dust-explosion protection
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Powders or dust like substances are processed or are byproducts of the production process in

many industries.

Whether the dust is useful (e.g. for the production of plastics, pigments or pharmaceuticals)

or waste, a large majority of dustlike substances pose the danger of fire or possibly even

explosions. Eighty percent of all industrial dusts are combustible, and even a dust layer of 1 mm

in a closed room is sufficient to result an explosion when the dust is swirled up and ignited.

These facts, combined with the fact that those affected are not sufficiently aware of the danger

(in contrast to the hazard of gas explosions) underlines the importance of preventing dust

explosions. This brochure is intended to help you analyse the risk of a dust explosion in your

facilities and to take the suitable technical and organisational steps to minimise this risk.

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contents
1 Dust as a Risk Factor 4

2 Definitions and Characteristics 6

3 Legal Basis and Standards 10

44 Dust Explosion Protection Measures 12

55 Classification of Dust Explosion Hazardous Areas into Zones 14

66 Dust Types of Protection 16

77 Equipment Selection 22

88 Installation and Maintenance 28

9 Product Overview 30

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dust-explosion protection
1 dust as a risk factor
4

1. Dust as a Risk Factor cess continues, and under some conditions

chain reactions such as these sweep through entire
As with flammable liquids and the explosive buildings or facilities, destroying them.
gas/air mixtures that result from them, certain
conditions must be fulfilled to ignite a mixture of As is the case with gases, there are various
dust and air by an effective ignition source ignition sources for dusts, such as sparks from
and thus trigger an explosion. No explosion can electrical or mechanical processes, arcs,
occur if one of the following is not present: open flames, electrostatic discharges, electro-
combustible dust, air, ignition source. magnetic waves and others.

Dust explosions have a different process of Figure 2 shows the results of statistical studies in
propagation than gas explosions and can in some North America, which examined the distribution
cases be much more devastating. If a gas/air of the ignition sources that caused dust explosions.
mixture is ignited, the force of the resulting ex- It shows that mechanically produced sparks
plosion causes the gas cloud to dissipate were responsible in almost one third of the cases.
rapidly and thus dilutes the gas/air mixture to a Add to that the 13 % of explosions caused by open
concentration lower than that necessary for further fire and welding, and it becomes obvious that
combustion. Thus, if no further gas is added, the many people are not aware of the danger of dust
explosion is over after several milliseconds. explosions. Figure 3 shows that a wide variety
of industries are affected, including branches of the
Figure 1: Explosion Risk Triangle
food and wood processing industries, paper and
plastics materials production, pharmaceuticals
production and others.

The data given above are confirmed by German

property insurers, who state that on average
there is one dust explosion per day in the Federal
Republic of Germany. Approximately one fourth
of these are caused by dust from food products or
animal feed.

With combustible dusts it is different. If, for

example, a draft of air swirls up a layer of dust in
a small area, the dust, along with oxygen, forms
a combustible dust/air mixture. If this mixture is
ignited by an ignition source, an explosion is
caused. The force of the resulting explosion swirls
up more dust, which is in turn ignited. This pro-

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Figure 2: Ignition Sources of Dust Explosions

Figure 3: Types of Dusts Involved in Dust Explosions

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dust-explosion protection
2 definitions and characteristics
6

2. Definitions and Characteristics In Table 2, the important characteristics determining

the explosion process of dust are listed. It is
What does the word dust really mean? necessary to assess your technical procedures in
The European Standard EN 50281-1-1 defines it view of potential ignition sources, volume of
like this: explosive dust atmosphere, operating temperature,
Dust consists of small solid particles in the etc. Subsequently, the potential for a dust explosion
atmosphere which settle due to their own weight, under the current conditions must be evaluated.
but which remain suspended in air for a time (this
includes dust and grit, as defined in ISO 4225). The most important terms in dust explosion pro-
tection are listed in Table 1 along with their
definitions. In Table 3, the characteristics of some
materials from the various product groups are
given. These technical safety characteristics have
been determined under standard conditions in
the laboratory. As a rule, conditions are in practice
less likely to lead to an explosion, so that the
figures are less alarming.

Be aware that a general term, such as flour dust,

can lead to false assessments. Wheat flour
has different technical safety characteristics than
rye flour, for example.

Table 1: Definitions in Dust Explosion Protection

Term Definition Remarks

Explosive Dust Mixture with air, under atmospheric conditions, of flammable The condition is that the process
Atmosphere substances in form of dust or fibers in which, after ignition, ends only after one reactant has
combustion spreads throughout the unconsumed mixture been entirely consumed.
(IEV 426-02-4).

Atmospheric Range of pressure between 0.8 and 1.1 bar

Conditions Temperature range between -20C and + 60C

Hazardous Explosive atmosphere in hazardous amount. The presence A thickness of a dust layer less
Explosive of a hazardous explosive atmosphere must be assumed if than 1 mm on the floor of a normal
Atmosphere ignition causes an exothermal reaction that endangers people, room is sufficient to cause a
domestic animals and property. hazardous explosive atmosphere.

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Table 2: Explosion Characteristics

Characteristic Definition/Description Remarks

Size of particle Dust particles larger than 400 m are not explosive. Depending on friction, the transportation and processing of
Dust particles are explosive when they measure less coarse dust result in the formation of fine dust.
than 400 m and up to 20 m

Explosion limits As with gases, dust is explosive within certain These characteristics vary widely throughout the entire range.
concentration limits: Extreme dusts can form an explosive mixture in concentrations of
lower explosion limit: approx. 2060 g/m 3 air less than 15 g/m 3.
upper explosion limit: approx. 26 kg/m 3 air

Maximum explo- In enclosed containers of simple design, combustible dust In exceptional cases, such as with light metal dusts, explosive
sion pressure can reach an explosive pressure between 6 and 10 bar. pressure of up to 20 bar may develop.

KSt -value This is a classifying value expressing the shattering power This figure is the basis for calculating pressure relief areas.
of the combustion. Nummerically, it is equal to the value for
the maximum rate of explosion pressure rise during explosion
of a dust/air mixture in a 1 m 3 vessel.

Moisture The moisture of a dust is a significant factor with regard to its

ignitions and explosive behaviour. Although no exact limits ex-
ist, it is known that a higher moisture content requires a higher
ignition energy and impedes the formation of dust swirls.

Minimum igni- Lowest engery which is sufficient to effect ignition of Not every spark is capable of causing ignition. The decisive factor is
tion energy Emin the most easily ignitable explosive dust atmosphere under whether sufficient energy is introduced into the dust/air mixture to
speciefied test conditons ( EN 13237). initiate a self-substaining combustion of the entire mixture.
A modified Hartmann tube (Figure 5) is used to determine the minimum
ignition energy.

Ignition The lowest temperature of a hot inner wall of a furnace The shape of the vessel in which the ignition temperature is deter-
temperature of at which ignition occurs in a dust cloud in air contained mined has proved to be especially critical. It may be assumed that
a dust cloud Tic therein (EN 50281-2-1). ignition on differently shaped surfaces is, in practice, only possible
at much higher temperatures. In the case of dust from food products
and animal feed, this figure is between 410 and 500 degrees C,
depending on type.

Ignition The lowest temperature of a hot surface on which a This temperature describes the ignition behaviour of thin dust layers.
temperature of ignition occurs in a dust layer of specified thickness If the layer is thicker, or if the ignition source is completely inundated
a dust layer Til on a hot surface (EN 50281-2-1). by dust, the thermal insulation provided by the dust layer increases,
resulting in quite different, sometimes significantly lower temperatures,
which could trigger an exothermal reaction. Experiments have shown
that the ignition temperature decreases nearly linearly with an in-
crease in the layer thickness. The ignition temperature of a dust layer
is sometimes considerably lower than the ignition temperature of a
mixture of the same dust in air. The maximum permissible surface
temperature for electrical equipment may be higher, depending on the
dusts thermal conductivitiy. Unnoticed glowing spots can exist un-
noticed for long periods in thick layers of dust and can, if the dust is
swirled up, become effective ignition sources.

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dust-explosion protection
2 definitions and characteristics
8

Thus it is impossible to provide generally valid

characteristics for a particular kind of dust. There
are wide variations for identical dusts. Depending
on conditions, limit values often cannot be
determined exactly; nor then, can the risk of ex-
Table 3: Examples of Explosion Characteristics for Dusts
plosion. The minimum ignition energy can also
Substance Tic [C] Til [C] Emin [mJ] min [mJ]
vary to a large extent. In Table 3, the limit values
Wood 410 200 100 6 for several products are listed; that is, values
that border on the hazardous. In rare cases, the
Brown Coal 380 225 5
dust/air mixture in question can also be ignited at
Coal 500 240 1000 13 considerably lower energies.

PVC 530 340 5 <1

Note that it is not possible to directly infer the
Aluminium 560 270 5 <1 minimum ignition temperature from the minimum
ignition energy, and vice versa.
Sulphur 240 250 10 5

Table 2 includes detailed commentary on the

Lycopodium 410
characteristics for dusts.

Functional Description of a Modified

Hartmann Tube (Figure 5):
Figure 4: Determining a Dusts Minimum Ignition Energy Not every spark is capable of ignition. The deciding
factor is whether the energy added to the mixture
is sufficient to initiate self-sustaining combustion
of the entire mixture. The modified Hartmann
tube is used as a qualitative test apparatus for the
minimum ignition energy. At the base of the tube
is an atomising cone which is employed to swirl a
defined quantity of the dust being investigated.
A compressed air blast of 7 bar swirls the dust in
the glass cylinder and the resulting mixture is then
ignited by a spark created between two electrodes.

A test is considered to be positive if the indication

instrument shows a deflection of the hinged
cover or, if a dust fire occurs (even if the hinged
cover is not moved).

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Figure 5: Modified Hartmann Tube

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3 legal basis and standards
10

3. Legal Basis and Standards

In the most important industrial countries,

regulations and standards covering explosion
protection in areas exposed to dust hazard were
established early on. In the USA, standards
have existed since 1929, in Germany since 1976.

However, it was a comparatively long time before

the first international regulations at IEC level
Table 4: Dust Explosion Protection Standards appeared 1993. Work on these commenced in
IEC EN
the mid-70s, but the protective techniques used
in the different countries were so different that it
General requirements 61241-0 prEN 61241-0
was very difficult to establish common standards.
Type of protection tD 61241-1 50281-1-1 The IEC 61241:1993 series of standards was still
(61241-1-1) in future based on the two zone concept.
EN 61241-1

Before the new European directives for explosion

Selection and installation 61241-14 50281-1-2
(61241-1-2) in future protection (94/9/EC and 1999/92/EC) came into
EN 61241-14 force, explosion protection regulations in Europe
existed at the national level, based on the tow
Inspection and maintenance 61241-17 prEN 61241-17
zone concept.
Testing methods:
> Min. ignition temperature 61241-20-1 50281-2-1 In Germany the two zones were defined: Zone 10
(61241-2-1) and Zone 11, in Great Britan: Zone Z and Zone Y.
> Electrical resistivity 61241-20-2 61241-2-2 In Germany a special certification of design was
of a dust layer (61241-2-2) (50281-2-2) not required.
> Min. ignition energy 61241-20-3 50281-2-3
(61241-2-3) in future at CEN Although the special risk posed by dust explosions
> Lower explosion limit 61241-2-4 50281-2-4 has long been known, due to devastating
in future at CEN accidents in coal mines, the problem received
widespread attention in Germany only after
Classification of areas 61241-10 50281-3
61241-3
the flour dust explosion that completely destroyed
the Rolands Mill in Bremen in 1978.
Protection by pressurization 61241-2
pD (61241-4)

Protection by intrinsic safety 61241-11

iD

Protection by encapsulation 61241-18

mD

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After this, in Germany a certificate of conformity Table 5: Comparison of Old IEC 61241 Standards and New Suggestion
for electrical equipment to be used in Zone 10
Number of Proposed Subject Planned
became a legal requirement, based on the VDE Current Standard New Number Date
standard. VDE 0170/0171, Part 13 developed by
following the action of IEC. Based on this standard, IEC 61241-1-1 IEC 61241-0 General requirements 2003

BVS (German Testlaboratory and Certification Body)

IEC 61241-1 Protection by enclosures tD 2003
and now EXAM have been certifying electronic
devices for use in Zone 10 since 1980, in IEC 61241-1-2 IEC 61241-14 Selection & installation 2003
co-operation with legal authorities and the PTB.
IEC 61241-2-1 IEC 61241-20-1 Test methods 2005

Directive 94/9/EC provided a new regulation IEC 61241-2-2 IEC 61241-20-2 Test methods 2005
for explosion protection in Europe. This directive
formulates the requirements to be fulfilled by IEC 61241-2-3 IEC 61241-20-3 Test methods 2005

manufacturers of electrical and no electrical IEC 61241-3 IEC 61241-10 Classification of areas 2003
equipment. The Explosion Protection Regulation of
December 1996 (Explosionsschutzverordnung) IEC 61241-4 IEC 61241-2 Protection by pressurization pD 2005
transfers this directive into German law. In Annex I,
IEC 61241-5 IEC 61241-11 Protection by intrinsic safety iD 2002
Directive 94/9/EC mentions, in the course of an
explanation of Equipment Group 2, only the danger IEC 61241-18 Protection by encapsulation mD 2004
presented by an explosive atmosphere consisting
IEC 61241-17 Inspection & maintenance
of a dust/air mixture, which does not seem to in-
clude dust deposits. The special risk presented by IEC 61241-19 Repair & overhaul
these dust deposits as a source of release is only
taken into account in the zone classification
insofar as other circumstances, such as a swirling
up of the dust by air currents, could cause an 99/92/EC. As part of the consolidation of
explosive atmosphere. standards dealing with dust and gas, the goal at
the IEC level is to adapt the numbering of the
The questions of proper use are addressed by dust standards to the IEC 60079 standard series
Directive 1999/92/EC. The current treatment of (Table 5). This plan is laudable, because it
dust explosion protection in Directive 1999/92/EC would create analogous standards for gas and
is not very comprehensive and is limited to dust explosion protection.
a simple definition of zones and a reference to
deposits of combustible dust.

CENELEC, the European Committee for Electro-

technical Standardization, has developed
Standards EN 50281-1-1 and EN 50281-1-2 in
parrallel with IEC 61241 and based on it. These
standards make use of the 3-zone concept
as set out in European Directives 94/9/EC and

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12

4. Dust Explosion Protection Measures 4.2 Preventive Explosion Protection by Avoiding

Effective Ignition Sources
4.1 Preventive (Primary) Explosion Protection
by Avoiding an Explosive Atmosphere This measure prevents the hazardous explosive
atmosphere from being ignited. This can be
The complexity of the processes that can lead to achieved by:
a dust explosion means that it is extremely > Analysing potential ignition sources
difficult to assess the actual risks in dealing with > Determining the necessary extent of protective
explosive dust/air mixtures. This makes explosion measures
prevention measures especially important. > Using suitable equipment
These are generally considered to mean avoiding
or limiting the amount of a hazardous explosive For this reason, measures against a possible
atmosphere. One possibility is to reduce the ignition of a present explosive atmosphere are
concentration of the combustible substance to used. A precondition is that the workflow process
values below the lower explosion limit (see in question be assessed in adequate detail for
Table 2), such as by mixing it with non-combustible any possible ignition sources.
products. Another option is to prevent the
release of combustible substances or at least to The nature of the protective measures used and
limit it. Both of these measures can be effectively the level of safety required depend on the
supported by thorough and regular housekeeping hazardous zone in question. The probability of the
and by implementing suitable construction existence of an explosive dust atmosphere and
measures (see p. 15). If release cannot be avoided, the zone classification of hazardous areas derived
the surrounding air with its oxygen can be from it are important factors for deciding what
replaced as a potential reactant by a non- protective measures are necessary (see Section 5).
combustible gas such as nitrogen (inertisation).

However, high operational costs mean that

this method is limited to a small number of special
applications. If these measures cannot be
provided at a justfiable cost, there are other effec-
tive options of explosion protection available.

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4.3 Constructional Explosion Protection this ejection process from the relief apertures
associated with the explosion pressure relief
Constructional explosion protection is a method of also contains burnt and unburnt combustible
avoiding the hazardous effects of explosions substances. It must always be checked whether
and/or of limiting the effects of an explosion to a the consequences of the explosion in the loca-
safe level by the use of: tion in question can be controlled.

> Explosion-resistant design limits an > Explosion suppression

explosion to the inside of pressure-resistant This process is generally used in vessels and
vessels or pressure-shockresistant vessels production equipment for which an explosion
which, however, also means that connected pressure exceeding the explosion pressure
equipment such as tubes/pipes and decoupling resistance of the system in question is predicted.
measures must meet the same conditions. The explosion is suppressed in its initial
Explosion-pressure resistant vessels or stages, before a hazardous rise in pressure can
apparatus are those that can withstand many take place. To accomplish this, an extinguishing
times the expected explosion pressure without agent is used in the protected area within
being permanently deformed. fractions of a second of the explosion being
Explosion-pressure shockresistant vessels detected. For the suppression of an explosion
or apparatus are constructed so that they can (use of extinguishing agent) it is mandatory that
withstand the expected explosion pressure the explosion be detected promptly. In the
without breaking; however, permanent defor- case of explosions that begin slowly, the initial
mations may be a result. In this case, then, the pressure rise is not sufficient for its timely
robustness of the material may be brought identification. Additional measures such
closer to its limits. as optical flame detectors or supplementary
pressure detectors may be necessary.
> Explosion relief (defined pressure relief by
means of bursting discs, venting panels or > Explosion barriers (prevention of explosion
explosion doors, etc.) This measure is intended propagation, explosion decoupling).
to prevent the build-up of excessively high Isolation as an explosion protection measure
explosion pressure in the interior of vessels by allows the explosion to reach full force, but
the timely release through defined openings. prevents it from propagation into other, unpro-
This measure addresses only the effects of the tected parts of the system. This is accomplished
explosion, and can be implemented without by mechanical barriers which immediately
additional control mechanisms. As soon as the block connecting routes, or by a chemical ex-
static response ejection process from the tinguishing barrier.
protected apparatus into the surrounding area
begins. Apart from the flame and shock wave,

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14

5. Classification of Dust Explosion Hazardous

Areas into Zones

Table 6: Zone Definitions

The classification into zones has proved its
effectiveness in gas atmospheres for years. The
Zone 20 A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of com-
definition of zones agreed on throughout Europe in
bustible dust in air is present continuously, or for long periods or frequently.
NOTE: In general these conditions, when they occur, arise inside containers, accordance with Directive 99/92/EC applies only
pipes and vessels etc. to swirled-up dust. Accumulations and deposits of
combustible dust must be taken into consideration
Zone 21 A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible
dust in air is likely to occur in normal operation occasionally.
as well, like all other factors that could lead to
NOTE: This zone can include, among others, areas in the immediate vincinity the creation of an explosive atmosphere.
of e.g. powder filling and emptying points and areas where dust layers occur
and are likely in normal operation to give rise to an explosive concentration of
Dust deposits are seen merely as a source of
combustible dust in a mixture with air.
release for an explosive atmosphere.
Zone 22 A place in which explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible
dust in air is not likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does, will Among other sources, EN 50281-3 (Classification
persist for a short period only.
of areas where combustible dusts are or may be
NOTE: This zone can include, among others, areas in the vincinity of
equipment, protective systems, and components containing dust, from which present) can provide help with the classification.
dust can escape from leaks and from dust deposits (e.g. milling rooms, in
which dust escapes from the mills and then settles). In Table 6 and Table 7, zone classification and zone
definitions are once again given, as well as the
connection between the zones and the equipment
categories of Directive 94/9/EC.

Table 7: Zone Concept and Impacts of Directives 94 / 9 / EC and 1999 /92 / EC

Presence No Effective Ignition Equip. Category Certification

of Hazardous Sources Present in Accordance Required
Explosive Atmo- with 94/9/EC for Electrical
sphere D (Dust) Equipment

Zone 20 Continuously, Normal operations Category 1D yes

long-term or and rare equipment
frequently malfunction and on
the occurence of two
independent faults

Zone 21 Occasionally Normal operations Category 2D yes

and frequently
occuring equipment
malfunctions

Zone 22 Rare and short Normal operations Category 3D no

period (manufacture's
declaration)

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Classification According to Housekeeping Table 8: Housekeeping and Explosion Hazard

of Working Place Level of Thickness of Duration of Presence Fire or
Housekeeping Dust Layer of a Dust Layer Explosion Risk
High cleanliness of working area is very important
good zero or not present none
in dust explosion protection, as in contrast negligible
to gases a series of releases that are individually
under the explosion limit can lead to a hazardous fair not negligible shorter than the none
length of 1 shift
accumulation of dust (see also 4.1, Preventive
(Primary) Explosion Protection). poor not negligible longer than the fire hazard and
length of 1 shift Zone 22 if clouds
The Directive 99/92/EC and specially the Guide of are created

this Directive, paragraph 3.1.4.1 refer to obligatory

cleanliness standards.

In the new version of the Standard Classification Figure 6: Example of the Classification into Dust Explosion Hazardous Areas
of areas where combustible dusts are or may be According to IEC 61241-10

present according to IEC 61241-10 and

Zone 20 Inside the hopper of
EN 50281-3, the degree of housekeeping is
quantified and included in the classification of
22 a bag emptying station

Zone 21 Immediate surround-

the areas (Table 8). ings (radius of 1 m)
21 around the manhole
20 Zone 22 Area outside Zone 21
due to accumulatios
of dust

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6. Types of Dust Explosion Protection > Dust-protected enclosure

An enclosure which the ingress of dust is not
The goal of explosion protection is to prevent totally prevented, but does not enter to interfere
excessive temperatures and energies in the form with the safe sufficient quantities to operation
of sparks, arcs and so forth in an equipment. of the equipment. Dust shall not accumulate in a
position within the enclosure where it is liable
Currently four types of dust ignition protection to cause an ignition hazard (IP 5X).
exist (see Table 9):
The material used for the enclosure is central
6.1 Type of Protection tD significant. It must be subjected to specific
material tests. Despite the ageing process under-
In Europe, this is generally regarded to be the most gone by the material and the expected mechanical
important method for power engineering equipment. stresses, the enclosure must ensure the required
dust protection.
EN 50281-1-1 defines the type of protection Possible materials are:
for electrical equipment: Protection by Enclosure. > Metals (such as coated steel, stainless steel,
Two degrees of dust protection are defined for light metal)
dust explosion protection: > Glass (for enclosure parts, eg. inspection
1. Dust-tight: for the use of equipment in Zone 20, windows)
Zone 21 areas and even in Zone 22 areas, in the > Moulded plastic
case of the presence of conductive dust.
2. Dust-protected: for the use of equipment in Metals used for this purpose may have to be sub-
Zone 22 areas, in the case of the presence of jected to an impact test at low temperatures,
non-conductive dust. as some metals (light metals) have less favourable
mechanical stress at low temperatures than
The type of protection "tD" requires the limitation at higher ones.
of the surface temperature of the enclosure and
the limitation of dust ingress into the enclosure In addition, light metal may contain a maximum
(dust-tight and dust-protected enclosures): of 6 % magnesium, as it otherwise tends to form
sparks upon impact with materials such as rusty
> Dust-tight enclosure iron. Glass must withstand a thermal shocktest
An enclosure which prevents the ingress of all without cracks or without such extensive damage
observable dust particles (IP 6X). that it breaks during a subsequent impact test.
This means that a safe area is established
inside the enclosure. Please note that as com-
bustible dust particles are approx. 20 to 40 m
in size and thus below the gap of flameproof
joints required by EN 50018 for flameproof
enclosures. Flameproof enclosures are not in
themselves dust-tight and must be separately
tested and certified according to this condition.

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6.1.1 Enclosures of Moulded Materials material to become brittle which would eliminate
the required IP protection.
Thermal Endurance
Plastic materials must certainly fulfil the most For electrical equipment of Category 3D, it is
complex requirements. For electrical equipments sufficient for the material to have a TI at least 10 K
of Categories 1D and 2D, the temperature index higher than the temperature at the hottest point
TI must be known, according to EN 50281. This of the enclosure. Proof of a continuous operating
figure allows conclusions about the long-term temperature (COT) which fulfils the same
mechanical performance of moulded materials to requirement as the TI is also sufficient. No thermal
be drawn. The temperature index corresponds to endurance test is carried out in this case.
the 20,000-h point on the thermal endurance
graph without loss of flexing strenght or tenside
strenght excluding 50 %. This figure must be
20 K higher than the temperature at the hottest
point of the enclosure. In addition, the moulded
material must be proven to have sufficient
thermal resistance for the intended application.
Enclosures or parts of enclosures made of moulded
materials for electrical equipment from the
Categories 1D and 2D must be subjected
to thermal endurance tests according to EN 50014
(artificial ageing). The ageing process caused by
extreme temperatures must not cause the moulded

Table 9: Types of Protection for Use in the Presence of Combustible Dust in the Current Standards

Symbol Principle Type of Protection Current Status at IEC Future Status at IEC Status at CLC

tD IP-enclosure IEC 61241-1-1 IEC 61241-0 EN 50281-1-1

(tightness and IEC 61241-1
IP6X/5X
temperature limitation)

pD Pressurization IEC 61241-4 IEC 61241-2

+p (2001-03)

iD Intrinsic safety 31H/171/CDV IEC 61241-11

I < MIC
TG

mD Encapsulation 31H/153/CDV IEC 61241-18

(moulded compound)

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Seals
Type of protection protection by enclosures
depends on the elastomeric seals used. These are
evaluated in accordance with Annex B3.3 of
EN 50014. This is an ageing test using specially
shaped test objects (ISO 48/ ISO 1818) which tests
the increase in hardness of the material. This
figure must not exceed 20 % difference between
Table 10: Summary of Requirements for Electrical Equipment the initial and the final figure. Materials that
Requirements: Cat. 1 + 2 Zone 20+21 Cat. 3 Zone 22 have hardened to a greater degree may lose their
No dust infiltration in enclosure IP6X IP5X
sealing properties.

No dust infiltration IP6X IP5X Static electricity

at cable entries
An electrostatic discharge is a very effective
Propagating brush discharges Insulation resistance 10 9 ignition source. When moulded materials is used
must be avoided Breakdown voltage 4 kV for enclosures, the outer surface must be
Thickness of insulation 8 mm prevented from becoming charged. Otherwise, one
Laser radiation (in accordance with 5 mW/mm2 continually
of the following types of discharge will occur:
EN 50281-1-1) 0.1 mJ/mm2 impulses > Spark discharge
This type of discharges takes place between
Ultrasonic (in accordance with 0.1 W/cm2 / 10 MHz continuous grounded and ungrounded components and is
EN 50281-1-1) 2 mJ/cm2 puls
0.1 W/cm2 average
able to ignite all gases and vapours, and almost
all dust atmospheres.
External connection for as in e as in n > Brush discharge
equipotential bonding
This type of discharge is a special form of the
Plugs, sockets and connectors Separation with no voltage applied except up corona discharge. Pipes, elbows, screws, and
to 10 A, 250 V; here IP6X sufficient for tools may serve as electrodes at the maximum
separation; dust must not fall into opening field strength. This type of discharge represents
no risk to most dusts, but caution is advised
Luminaires Light source with cover, lock or warning
label; no low power sodium lamps with regard to gases and vapours.
> Propagating brush discharge
Clearance and creepage IEC 60664 IEC 60664 This is a discharge of a chargeable material
distance of connecting parts
with a low layer thickness (< 8 mm) on a substrate
Certification required yes no with adequate conductive.

Label: CE compliance according

to Directive 94 /9 /EC

Conformity to standards

Surface temp. in C, T C T C
(not temperature class)

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An example: Moulded materials in the pipes of Table 11: Summary of the Requirements for Rotating Electrical Machines,
pneumatic conveyor systems initially receives a Type of Protection tD
strong electrostatic charge from friction on the Requirements Cat. 2 Zone 21 Cat. 3 Zone 22
inside. This charge produces an influence-charge on
Dust tightness of enclosure IP6X IP5X
the external surface, which is coated with plastic
material and covered dust. This double layer of Magnesium content in enclosure material 6% 6%
charge may contain large amounts of energy. If
Thermal properties of non-metallic as in e as in n
one short-circuits both sides of the doubly charged enclosure materials
layer, all the stored energy is violently discharged.
This causes brightly lit discharge channels to Insulation resistance of enclosure, 10 9 10 9
fan guards
form on the surface of the plastic material. This
discharge may contain several joules of energy, so Insulation resistance of the fan wheel 10 9 10 9
that nearly all gases and vapours and the majority at all speeds
of dusts will be ignited. However, propagating
External connection for as in e as in n
brush discharges are relatively rare in practice.
equipotential bonding

The following measures can prevent this type of Dust tightness of entries IP6X IP5X
discharge process such as these :
Degree of protection of the external fan as in e as in e
> Adjusting the surface resistance to 10 9 and
grounding the plastic material. Protective cover for V1 (air inlet on top) as in e
> Limiting the breakdown voltage of the non-
Fan and cover construction and mounting as in e as in e /n
conductive material to 4 kV.
> Avoiding thicknesses < 8 mm for the non-conduc- Clearances in ventilation system as in e
tive material.
> Limiting isolated capacities to < 10 pF. Magnesium content in the material 6% 6%
of the fan
> Increasing humidity to > 65 % in order to reduce
the insulation resistance of non-conductive Clearance and creepage IEC 60664 IEC 60664
materials. distances of connecting parts

Certification by notified body required yes no

CE conformity

Conformity to standards

Surface temperature in C T C T C
(not temperature class)

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Mechanical Stability Cable Glands

For equipment from Categories 1D and 2D, Power supply and instrumentation cables
mechanical tests are carried out in accordance are connected to the explosion-protected electrical
with EN 50014. The enclosures must withstand an equipment. The cable entries must be in
impact energy of 7 joules. accordance with Annex B of EN 50014. This means
that the certified Increased safety cable glands
If the enclosure contains light transmitting parts, for hazardous areas may be used. It must be noted,
they are subjected (without basket guard) to a test however, that the Ex e cable entries require IP 54,
with 4 joules or (with basket guard) to one with whereas for dust explosion protection, equipments
2 joules. from Categories 1D and 2D require IP 6X and
devices from Category 3D IP 5X. In addition, test
Tests such as these are to be carried out after of increase in hardness is required (see Seals).
thermal shock resistance test at a temperature This verification can be provided by the
10 to 15 K higher than the maximum operating tests mentioned here or by data sheets from the
temperature and 5 to 10 K below the lowest gasket manufacturer.
operating temperature.
6.2 Protection by Pressurization pD
After the mechanical stability test, the degree
of protection IP according to Table 10 has to be This type of protection, based on Pressurized
fulfilled. apparatus p, could become important in the
protection of switch cabinets in hazardous areas,
In the case of portable electrical equipment, for example. Equipment of the type pD can
a drop test in accordance with EN 50014 must also only be used in Zone 21 and Zone 22 (not in Zone
be carried out. 20). The purging phase required for gas explosion
protection is not permitted for dust explosion
protection, as the swirling up of deposited dust
Table 12: Requirements on Failure of Pressurization
could produce a hazardous explosive atmosphere.
Section 4.3 of the standard explicitly requires
Type of apparatus in the enclosure
that before the pressurization system is switched
Zone operational ignition source no ignition source in normal operation
on, the interior of the equipment be cleaned and
20 pD not applicable pD not applicable all dust that accumulated there after switching off
the external ventilation be removed.
21 Switching off as in 7.5.1.1 Warning as in 7.5.1.2

22 Warning as in 7.5.1.2 Internal pressurization not required The measures to be taken when the pressurization
equipment fails are graduated according to
zone and the presence of operational ignition
sources (see Table 12).

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6.3 Intrinsic Safety iD > Temperature limits on all outer surfaces

of apparatus or their parts whose power limits
The current draft (CD) largely corresponds to the exceed the operational limits required in
4th edition of IEC 60079-11: 1999 for gas IEC 61241-11. The surface may consist of an
explosion protected apparatus with type of pro- enclosure or an encapsulation.
tection Intrinsic safety i.
Work is continuing on the standard for the intrinsic
The final version should refer for the most part safety iD ignition protection type, therefore
to the directly valid sections of Standard we refer the reader to current articles in our Ex-
IEC 60079-11 without repeating the text of this Magazine.
standard. This is what is to be expected in
practice when the design of iD apparatus is 6.4 Encapsulation mD
derived from existing and already tested
intrinsically safe apparatus. The dust type of protection mD in accordance
with IEC 61241-18 is to be based primarily on type
The preliminary translation of the introduction of protection m according to IEC 60079-18,
to the future standard IEC 61241-11 mentions the which is currently being revised.
following basic requirements:
> Electrical circuits must fulfil the requirements Further proceedings on the draft of IEC 61241-18
of Group IIB from IEC 60079-11, in order to will therefore be determined by the development
prevent ignitable sparks. of the new IEC 60079-18.
> Normally, degree of protection IP 6 X or encap-
sulation is required to ensure that clearances
and creepage distances are not effected.
> Power limitation for equipment or their parts
that are not proteced by an enclosure or
encapsulation (e.g. for non-insulated sensors).
This is the intended to prevent that a dust
layer ignites due to a direct transfer of power by
conductive dust and to prevent ignition due to
heat on the surface of components.

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dust-explosion protection
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22

7. Equipment Selection The Essential Health and Safety Requirements

from Directive 94/9/EC deal with the problem of
After assessment of the installation and dust deposits in Annex II, Paragraph 1.2.4. In
its possible risk, the user should consider the addition to requiring the removal of dust layers,
following criteria when selecting electrical this states that the surface temperature of
equipment: equipment and equipment parts be well below
> Determination of the equipment category in the ignition temperature of the dust layer.
accordance with the hazardous zone. An accumulation of heat must be expected and
> Assessment of the properties of existing dust. should be countered with using temperature
> Maximum permissible surface temperature of limitation. Dust accumulations should, if possible,
the equipment, taking into consideration be limited or avoided entirely. For the equipment
the type of dust, the ignition temperature of manufacturer, this means the equipment must be
the dust cloud and, if dust deposits cannot be produced in such a way that dust deposits do not
excluded, the ignition temperature of the arise and/or the equipment is easy to clean.
dust layer.
> EN 50281-1-2 deals wih the selection
The selection of the equipment category can of electrical equipment and specifies that
be carried out as described in Table 13. This independent of classification into zones, the
defines the design of the enclosure in accordance possibility of the equipment being covered
with the requirements of Clause 4,5 and 6 of or completely submerged by dust must be taken
EN 50281-1-1. The dust-tightness tested using the into consideration, unless this situation can
procedure described in EN 60529 for Category 1D, be avoided.
must be taken into account. > EN 50281 does not currently regulate the
question of how dust deposits on electrical
equipment influence the safety level. For equip-
ment from Category 3D, there is no requisite
consideration of possible faults. This would
mean that equipment from Category 3D would
be subject to a thermal assessment in ex-
treme cases when totally submerged in dust
however that common faults need not be
Table 13: Selection of Dust Explosion Protected Apparatus
taken into consideration.
Type of Dust Zone 20 Zone 21 Zone 22

conductive Category 1D Category 1D Category 1D Zone 21 presents a similar problem. Is the

Temperature limitation or 2D or 2D inside of containers in which combustible dust is
when excessive deposits
stored also a part of this zone? The situation
can be present
is clearer in the case of Zone 20, as due to the
non-conductive Category 1D Category 1D Category 1D, definition complete sumerging of the equipment
Temperature limitation or 2D 2D or 3D must be taken into account.
when excessive deposits
can be precent

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Figure 7: Correlation between the Maximum Permissible Surface Temperature and the Thickness of Dust Layers

The self-ignition of dust deposits is a critical other areas by way of transportation facilities.
problem. These processes are often caused by During this process, the flames swirl up unburned
exothermal reactions involving oxygen from dust, which in turn takes deposited dust with it.
the surrounding air. It could be a chemical reaction A sudden change in the volume of the dust cloud
(oxidation), a physical reaction (adsorbtion) or a as it enters a larger room (e.g. a silo) can produce
decomposition process (mainly in the case of a hazardous explosive atmosphere. The flames
organic dusts). Self-ignition is determined of the cause ignition.
temperature of the surrounding area, of the
geometric factors and of the volume of the dust. The ignition temperature of a dust layer is
The reaction heat produced during decomposition determined using the method from EN 50281-1-2.
of materials can produce carbonisation gas, which The determination of the maximum surface
in turn can lead to an explosive gas/air mixture. temperature that an electrical apparatus can
achieve must be done by the manufacturer, with
Not every case of dust ignition necessarily leads any possible faults taken into consideration.
to an explosion. Dusts with low rate of pressure Temperature limitation measures should be used
rise may first of all be a dust fire. Under certain to counter these faults (electrical/thermal fuse).
conditions, an explosion may occur, often in The maximum surface temperature is measured
a completely different location than the ignition. as specified in Clause 10 of EN 50281-1-1.
The fire can spread from the place of origin to

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Figure 8: Determining the Maximum Surface Temperature When determining the maximum permissible
TL Under a Dust Layer of Thickness L in mm surface temperature (in relation to the
surrounding dust), two figures should be noted:
1. Maximum permissible surface temperature
when a dust cloud is present (calculation in
L accordance with 6.1 of EN 50281-1-2).
L The ignition temperature of the dust cloud must
be taken into account.
2. Maximum permissible surface temperature
when a dust layer is present. When making
the determination, one must take the ignition
L L temperature of a dust layer (which is dependent
on the thickness of the dust layer) into account:
> For dust deposits up to 5 mm thick, the
calculation must be made in accordance with
L 6.2.1 of EN 50281-1-2.
> For dust deposits > 5 mm -- 50 mm, the curves
in Figure 7 may be applied.
The redutions in temperature plotted here were
determined empirically for dust layers of up
to 50 mm on top of electrical equipment. The
curves take into account both the reduction,
specific to dusts, of the ignition temperature
with increasing layer thickness, and also an ex-
pected increase of the temperature of the
electronic apparatus, due to the reduction of the
heat flow. In addition, the curves include the
usual safety reduction of 75 K.
Here it must be stated explicitly that this does
not take into account an electrical apparatus
submerged completely in dust.
> Determining a surface temperature for
dust deposits > 50 mm: According to the
currently valid requirements in Clause 6.3 of
EN 50281-1-1, if dust deposits of excessive
thickness are present, the equipment in
question must be tested in a laboratory using
the relevant dust (see Annex A of the above-
mentioned standard).

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In the future, manufacturers will have the option, The following verification from 1 and 2 must
during the type testing, of determining a surface be made by the user!
temperature TL under a deposit of thickness
L (orientated toward the thickness of the layer The maximum permissible surface temperature,
during actual use), which may be stated on in relation to the ignition temperature of a dust
labels (Figure 8). Section 5.2 of IEC 61241-0 cloud Tic and/or the ignition temperature of a
states: In addition to the maximum surface dust layer Til of the surrounding dust is determined
temperature TL required in 5.1, the maximum as follows:
surface temperature may be stated for a given 1. Maximum permissible surface temperature in
depth of layer, TL, of dust surrounding all sides case of dust clouds Tmax = 2/3 Tic
of the apparatus, unless otherwise specified 2. Maximum permissible surface temperature in
in the documentation, and marked according to case of dust layers (5 mm thickness)
29.2(8). For the determination of the temperature Tmax = Til 75 K
TL, 23.4.5.2 requires: the electrical
apparatus to be tested shall be mounted and Example: flour
surrounded by a layer depth "L" as stated by the Tic 380C and Til 300C
manufacturers specification. The measurement Tmax (1) = 2/3 x 380C = 253C
for the maximum surface temperature shall Tmax (2) = 300C 75 K = 225C
be made using a dust having a thermal con-
ductivity of no more than 0.003 kcal/m C h. Accordingly, the surface temperature of the
The user must take note of Clause 6.3.3.4 of electrical equipment in this particular case must
the installation standard 61241-14: Where the not exceed the value of 225C; this must be
apparatus is marked TL for a layer depth the guaranteed by the manufacturer (see Determi-
ignition temperature of the combustible dust, at nation of the Maximum Surface Temperature
a layer depth L, must be applied in place of T5 mm. above).

Figure 9: Explosion Protected Luminaire 6600 Series for Use in Zone 21 (Category 2D) and Zone 22 (Category 3D).

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dust-explosion protection
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26

Radiation-Emitting Equipment Plugs and Sockets, Plug Connectors

Optical radiation is a peripheral phenomenon in In Zone 20, plugs and sockets are not permitted.
the field of dust explosion protection. The first In Zone 21 and Zone 22, for electrical equipment
factor to be considered when determining the limit from Categories 2D and 3D, the following require-
value is: How high is the power density? ments apply:
> Plugs and sockets shall either be interlocked
If the power density is 0.1 W/cm 2, no further mechanically, or electrically, or otherwise
assessment is necessary. Pulse-shaped signals are designed so that they can not be separated
assessed according to the energy density. In when the contacts are energized or in such a
addition, however, the energy density as an average way that they can only be separated when the
of the pulse-pause ratio must be taken into power is off, or
account. Besides this, an assessment of possible > In accordance with 9.2 of EN 50014, plug
faults is to be carried out in order not to exceed the connectors must be fixed together by special
limit values for equipment from Categories 1D fasteners and a warning label affixed to them:
and 2D. The figure for the pulse-pause ratio, which DO NOT SEPARATE WHEN ENERGIZED.
is the basis of the calculation, is particulary im-
portant. Radiation in the optical range (especially Supplementary Requirements
if it is focussed) may ignite the dust/air mixture. EN 50281-1-1 contains several supplementary
Laser radiation can cause ignition from a requirements for specific electrical equipment
great distance, even when it is not focussed. from Category 2D which must be taken into
account. Here are some important examples:
Limit values to be ensured: > Rotating electrical machines, such as shaft
> Power density 5 mW/mm2 for driven external fans used for cooling, must be
continuous wave lasers surrounded by a fan hood.
> Pulse energy density 0.1 mJ/mm2 for > Switch gear with contacts immersed in flam-
pulsed lasers mable dielectrics is not permitted. Enclosures
must be locked with isolators or labeled with a
In the case of ultrasonic transmitting warning lable:DO NOT OPEN WHEN ENERGIZED,
(e.g. sensors), a large percentage of the energy if contactors or other remote-controlled com-
emitted by the ultrasonic transducer is absorbed ponents are included in them. If a disconnector
by dust. This causes heating of the dust particles, is built-in, it must disconnect all poles and be
which in extreme cases even reach the ignition set up so that its contact position is visible, or
temperature. Limit values to be observed: their position is reliably indicated. Any interlock
> Power density 0.1 W/cm2 between such disconnector and the cover
> Pulse energy density 2m J/cm2 or door shall only permit the door to be opened
when the separation of the disconnector
contacts are effective.

Additional internal supplementary enclosures

for parts which remain energized when the
enclosure is opened.

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> Fuses: unopenable when energized, or

warning label as for switch gears.
> Luminaires: lamps containing free metallic
sodium (e.g. low-pressure lamps according to Table 14: Contents of Operating Instructions
EN 60192) are not permitted. According to EN 50281-1-1

> Putting into service

Connecting Components
As in gas explosion protected areas, electrical > Use
equipment is connected to the outer power circuit
> Assembling and dismantling
using terminals.
> Maintenance
The equipment can also be connected using
a cable that is fixed integrated. Apparatus with > Installation

fixed connected cables are an exception when > Electrical characteristics

only one end of the cable is permanently
connected. These devices must be labeled with > Specific conditions
the symbol X.
The user must be given instructions for the
unattached end of the cable (e.g. within Zone 21, Table 15: Marking of Equipment
the free cable end must be plugged into an EN according to EN 50281-1-1
apparatus of Category 2D).
> Name and address of manufacturer
(trademark)
Operating Instructions and Marking
Table 15 shows the marking for electrical equipment > Series and type identification

in accordance with EN 50281 and Directive

> Serial number
94/9/EC. Data relevant to explosion protection,
such as equipment group, category and maximum > Electrical characteristics
surface temperature should be displayed as
> Maximum surface temp.T
shown in the following example: II 2 D T 135 C.
>
No classification of dusts into temperature
> Equipment Group, in this case II
classes is planned. Unlike gases, dusts require a
margin of safety between surface temperature and > D for dust
ignition temperature of a dust cloud and a
dust layer. > Category

> Testing laboratory and certification number

Each equipment has a set of operating (year/Id. number.)
instructions which must contain the elements
shown in Table 14. > Year of manufacture

>

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dust-explosion protection
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8. Installation and Maintenance Cabel installation

> Cables must be placed so that they cannot
The protective measures described in Section 4 become electrostatically charged by moving dust
alone are not sufficient to prevent an explosion. (friction effect).
Installation carried out according to requirements, > Cables runs shall be arranged insofar possible
punctual, correct and consistent maintenance that no large dust deposits can be collected.
are all crucial for maintaining safe operations Sufficient access for cleaning must be possible.
(EN 50281-1-2). > If possible, cables shall not pass through areas
with potentially explosive dust atmosphere if
During installation, the manufacturers they are not connected to this area.
operation conditions in the operating instructions > If dust layers form on cables, preventing free air
must be followed carefully. circulation, a reduction of the current carrying
capacity of the cable shall be considered.
8.1 Installation of Cables This applies especially to dusts with a low
ignition temperature.
Selection of Cables > If cables pass through walls or other structures,
In general, the common types of cables are this must be done so as to prevent the passage
permitted, if they are installed into screwed, solid, or collection of combustible dust.
drawn or steamed welded conduits. Cables whose > For transportable electrical equipment, a
construction ensure that they are dustproof and suitable cable type must be used. For these
suitable for mechanical stress may also be used. purposes, often a suitable connection box must
Examples are: be placed between the moving and fixed
> Cables with thermoplastic or elastomeric wire cable routing.
insulation, screened or armoured cable and an > If metal conduit is used, care should be taken
outer sheath of PVC (poly-vinylchloride), PCP to ensure that there is no possibility of
(polychloroprene rubber), or a similar material. cabel damage at the connecting points, that the
> Cables with a seamless aluminium sheath with connecting points are dustproof, that the im-
or without armouring. permeability of the connected equipment is not
> Mineral-insulated cables with metal sheath. reduced, that the connecting points are included
Note: These cables and wires may have to in the potential equalisation.
be operated below their rated valuues to limit the
surface temperature from exceeding the
required values.
> When cables are externally provided with
protection, or when there is no danger of me-
chanical damage, cables with thermoplastic
or elastomeric insulation and a sheath of PVC,
PCP, or a similar material are permitted.

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Cable Glands 8.3 Documentation

The requirements for the entries into dust
explosion protected equipment from Categories 1D EN 50281-1-2, 10.3:
and 2D are almost identical with those for a gas Plans of each site shall be maintained to show
explosion protected glands, type of protection the following:
Increased safety. Both must be in compliance > The classification and extent of the
with Annex B of EN 50014. hazardous areas; the information shall include
the zoning and maximum layer thickness, if
The only differences are in the degree of greater than 5 mm.
protection and in approval: > Records of the types and marking details of
> Dust-Ex: IP 6X, certification for Zone 20 and/or protected apparatus and sufficient information
Zone 21 to enable them to be maintained properly.
> EEx e: IP 54, certification for Zone 1 and Zone 2 > Types, routes and details of wiring system.

Cable glands must be assembled and mounted so This task is in conformity with the requirement
that they do not compromise the equipments dust of the Directive 99/92/EC, which obligates
tightness. They can also be permanently the employer to draw up an explosion protection
connected to the equipment, in which case they document. The content of the document
are certified together with the equipment. should indicate:
> The explosion risk have been determined
8.2 Maintenance and Servicing and assessed.
> Adequate measures will be taken.
In addition to the protective measures already > Work equipment and warning device are
taken, an organisational plan must be drawn up design, operated and maintained with due
for the installation. regard for safety.
> Cleaning, removal of dust deposits. > Provisions to ensure that the equipment is
> Inspection and maintenance of equipment and used correctly.
protective systems.
> Testing of earthing, especially for the
parts of the equipment that could become
electrostatically charged.

These measures serve firstly to reduce the risk

of explosion and secondly to ensure the effective-
ness of the constructional protective measures.

The inspection and maintenance of electrical

apparatus for use in combustible dust shall only be
carried out by personnel who are familiar with
the concept of protection. (EN 50281-1-2:1998, 12.1)

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dust-explosion protection
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30

Some Examples of
9. Product Overview
Dust Explosion
Protected Products
R. STAHL has a fully certified product range for
ECOLUX 6608 dust hazardous areas in your installation.
Emergency Luminaire
We take dust explosion protection just as seriously
as gas explosion protection. We can offer you a
specially adapted solution for almost every
Optical Beacon 6161
Traffic Light 6091
application. At a minimum, all dust explosion
protection products comply with the regulations of
Group 3D; that is, they can be used in Zone 22
(non-conductive dusts).

The following equipment series and systems are

certified for both Zone 21 and Zone 22:
Control System
Series 8040 > Luminaire Series 6600 and 6608,
Lighting and Heating Panel Compact Luminaire 6100 and 6108
Series 8146 > Tank Inspection Light 6122 and
Optical Beacon 6161
> Traffic Light 6091
> Control System ConSig 8040
Switch- and
> Position Switches 8060 and 8070
Distribution Board > Junction and Terminal Boxes Series 8118
CUBEx > Control Panel and Terminal Boxes Series 8146
and 8125
> Ex d Enclosure System CUBEx
> Safety Barriers INTRINSPAK
> Isolators Series IS pac
Safety Barriers > Remote I/O System I.S.1
INTRINSPAK > SolConeX Plugs and Sockets
EX i Isolators IS pac

Remote I/O System I.S.1

Plugs and Sockets
SolConeX

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Your Safety Our Reality

If your installation is faced with the risk of a dust

explosion, R. STAHL offers the expertise you need.

R. STAHL has decades of experience in the field of

electrical explosion protection.

We will be glad to help you solve your safety

problems. In addition to a comprehensive range of
electrical equipment, we offer you expert advice
and training in the dust explosion protection field.

Get in touch with us.

You will find a downloadable list of our dust

explosion protection products in PDF form at :

www.dust-ex.stahl.de

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www.visuell.de

R. STAHL
Am Bahnhof 30, 74638 Waldenburg, Germany
Phone +49 7942 943-0
Fax +49 7942 943-4333

www.stahl.de

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S-PB-dustex-01-en-05/2008 Printed in the Federal Republic of Germany