September 2016

The Relationship between the Cure Violence Model and

Citywide Increases and Decreases in Killings in Chicago
(2000-2016)

The Cure Violence model for violence prevention is being utilized in more than 25 cities across eight countries
and has been demonstrated to be effective by multiple independent evaluations and other analyses, each showing
large reductions in shootings and killings. In Chicago, the Cure Violence model* has had an inconsistent level of
implementation with a large increase in funding in 2004 and three funding lapses in 2007-8, 2011-2, and 2015-6.
An analysis of the homicide and shooting trends in Chicago demonstrates that these changes in implementation
of the Cure Violence model corresponded in time and place with changes in the number of homicides
specifically with a 25% decrease in 2004 and large increases in 2007-8, 2011-2 and 2015-6. Additionally, when
funding was restored in 2008 and 2012, violence dropped to previous lower levels. In total, at six distinct points
the level of violence changed when Cure Violence implementation changed. This analysis, along with data on
effect sizes from independent evaluations, demonstrates that there is an inverse correlation between the level of
implementation of the Cure Violence model and the level of shootings and killings in Chicago. Further, it
suggests that expanding the Cure Violence model to all areas with high rates of lethal violence in Chicago could
dramatically reduce homicides to less than 350 per year and possibly less than 200.

* In Chicago the Cure Violence model is known by the name CeaseFire

Charles Ransford, Tina Johnson, Brent Decker, Mark Payne, and Gary Slutkin

August 2016 August 2

Background
The Cure Violence model for violence prevention, known in Chicago as CeaseFire, is a public health
approach to violence prevention that stops lethal violence before it occurs and stops its spread by
interrupting ongoing conflicts, working with the highest risk to change behavior related to violence,
and changing community norms (Slutkin 2015, Slutkin 2013, Ransford et al. 2013). This model is
based on proven public health techniques and is designed to have a community level effect, meaning that
it does not just change individuals but also changes the entire community outcome as measured by
shooting and killings. At some point, when the implementation of the model covers enough of the
areas of a city with substantially high rates of lethal violence, the program is expected to have an
effect on citywide levels of shootings and killings.

This report examines the implementation status of the Cure Violence program from 2000 to 2016
and compares it to the citywide trend in shooting and killing in Chicago. As shown in Figure #1
below, there have been four periods in the past 12 years where killings in Chicago have had a large
increases or decreases, and in each case this shift has coincided with a change in Cure Violence
implementation. In 2004, a tripling of the Cure Violence program coincided with a precipitous 25%
drop in killing. In 2008, 2012, and 2015-6, a large cut in Cure Violence coincided with large jumps
in killings. The chart shows a visually apparent connection in time between these trends. This
report will detail our analysis of the evidence in support of this connection.

CeaseFire Funding and Killings in Chicago
700 CeaseFire
tripled

CeaseFire
600 partially restored
CeaseFire
partially restored

500

400
Killings

CeaseFire CeaseFire
CeaseFire CeaseFire
expansion stopped partially interrupted
partially interrupted almost entirely
300 interrupted

200

100

ro 5

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

ed
1
19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

ct
je
-P
16
20

Data: Ocial Chicago Police Department data

Figure #1 The trend in homicides in Chicago has had four major changes since 1999, all of which coincided in time with major changes to the CeaseFire program.
In 2004, a tripling of CeaseFire coincided with a 25% drop in homicides. In 2008, 2012, and 2015 a partial shut down of CeaseFire coincided in time with a
large increase in homicides.

2

More importantly, this report will conclude by examining the potential effect that could be had by
expanding the Cure Violence method throughout the communities in Chicago with substantially
high rates of lethal violence. With a fully funded Cure Violence program working to supplement the
efforts of law enforcement and community organizations, it is projected that homicides could be
reduced to less than 350 per year and possibly much lower.

Effectiveness of Cure Violence Model

The effectiveness of the Cure Violence model lies in the innovative way in which it addresses
violence.i First, the model utilizes workers who have a unique ability to detect and peacefully
mediate conflicts within the community before they can turn violent. Evaluations have shown that
these workers have been up to 100% effective in preventing retaliations and that their work is
directly related to actual reductions in shootings and killings. Second, Cure Violence outreach
workers have the ability to identify and work with individuals at highest risk for involvement in
violence. The evaluation of the program in Chicago found that 84% of clients met the criteria for
being high risk and that overall clients were given meaningful assistance in areas such as finding a
job, treating drug abuse, and leaving a gang.

Cure Violence also implements a new angle in reducing violence by utilizing community messengers
to shift community norms related to the acceptability of the use of violence. These efforts include
community based responses to violence by the community, as well as special events such as rallies,
marches, community barbeques where anti-violence messages are propagated, and community
workshops and summits where high risk individuals are convened to discuss the use of violence.
Additionally, a public education campaign, which has been shown to effectively change other
behaviors such as smoking, is deployed to change group and community norms related to violence.
An evaluation of the implementation of Cure Violence in Baltimore found that the program was
effective in reducing the acceptability of the use of violence in its target communities, even among
those that were not active clients.

The Cure Violence model has been evaluated many times with many additional informal analyses,
each showing large reductions in violence. In Chicago, shootings dropped by 41% to 73% in
program communities.ii In Baltimore, homicides were reduced by up to 56% and shootings by up to
44%. In New York, the rate of gun violence was found to be 20% lower than comparison
neighborhoods after implementation of the program. The CDC funded Johns Hopkins study in
Baltimore showed many other positive effects as well, including a relationship between interruptions
and less homicides, an effect on norms related to use of firearms, and a positive effect in
neighboring communities of having the Cure Violence method operating next door. As shown in
Figure #2, the Cure Violence model has been evaluated many times with many additional informal
analyses, each showing large reductions in violence.

The following pages present the case for the connection between the level of implementation of
Cure Violence in Chicago and the citywide increases and decreases in killings. While not a
comparative analysis, the evidence presented suggests that fluctuations in the level of homicide were
at least partly a result of the level of Cure Violence implementation and that expanding the program
could substantially reduce killings across the city.

3

Figure #2 Cure Violence has had several independent evaluations as well as several other studies that have all demonstrated large reductions in violence across different
contexts.

Location Statistical Findings Reference and Data Source

Baltimore (USA) - Up to 56% reduction in killings 44% in shootings Webster et al. 2012
2007-present - Evidence of norm change Police data and surveys
Baltimore (USA) - 25% reduction in shootings across 5 sites (high of Webster 2016
2007-present 43% reduction) Police data
Baltimore (USA) - Improvement in 43% of the attitudes on violence Milam et al 2016
2007-present assessed Survey
Chicago (USA) - 41% to 73% reduction in killings Skogan et al. 2009
2000-present - 100% reduction in retaliations Police data
Chicago (USA) - 38% reduction in killings Henry et al. 2015
2000-present - 15% reduction in shootings Police data
Chicago (USA) - Treatment was half as likely to get reinjured as Salzman et al. unpublished
2000-present control Hospital data
Chicago (USA) - 48% reduction in shootings U of Chicago unpublished
2000-present Police data
New Orleans (USA) - 47% reduction in shooting rate - target pop. City of New Orleans 2016
2012-present - 85% reduction in retaliations/argument motive Progress Report
- 44% reduction in shooting re-injury Police and hospital data
New York City (USA) - 20% lower rates of shooting Picard-Fritsche et al. 2013
2010-presnt - >100 mediations involving >1,000 people Police data
New York City (USA) - 18% reduction in killings v. 69% increase in control Butts et al. 2015
2010-present - Reduction in norms accepting use of violence Police and hospital data
San Pedro Sula (Honduras) - 88% reduction in shootings and killing Ransford et al. 2016
2013-present - 1 site - 17 months without any shootings Site reported data
County of Kent (UK) - 51% reduction in overall violence Ransford et al. 2016
[Prison program] 2013 - 95% in group attacks Prison data
- 44% reduction in adjudications (discipline)
Cape Town (South Africa) - 23% lower homicides Ransford et al. 2016
2012-present - 33% lower attempted homicides Site reported data
- 14% lower serious assaults
Kansas City (USA) - 17.9% reduction in firearm killings Thompson et al 2013
2008-present Police data
Sadr City (Iraq) - Almost 1000 interruptions and over 14,000 people Site reported data
2008-2013 reached through outreach
Halifax (Canada) - No killings since implementation Ungar et al 2016
- Downward trend in shootings and violent crimes Police data and interviews
Juarez (Mexico) - 24.3% in killings 1st year, 13.1% in 2nd year Observatorio Ciudadano 2016
2014-present - Reduction in perceived number of disputes and Surveys & observatory data
conflicts among clients
Loiza (Puerto Rico) - 50% reduction in homicides Site reported data
2013-2015
Philadelphia (USA) - Significant reductions in shootings Roman et al. unpublished
Police data
Port Au Prince (Trinidad) - 67% in woundings and attempted murders Maguire et al. unpublished
- 33% in calls for persons armed with firearms Police data

4

2004 25% Drop in Homicide and Increase of CeaseFire Implementation in Chicago
In 2004, CeaseFire received funding from the state of Illinois that allowed it to rapidly expand,
approximately tripling in size from 5 to 15 communities and from 20 to 80 workers. This same
year, homicides dropped by an unprecedented 25% in Chicago. While CeaseFire was not covering a
large area of the city during this time, there is evidence that suggests that the program was a factor in
this large drop. First, the formal evaluation funded by the Department of Justice showed that the
CeaseFire program was having an effect on shootings and killings that was attributable to the
program at the neighborhood level during this year (Skogan et al., 2009).

Further suggestion of the effect of the CeaseFire

2004 CeaseFire Beats Had Larger Reduction in Homicide Rate
strategy is information from beats where
40
CeaseFire was most active and where decreases
35 Cea
seFi
re B
eats
outpaced the citys overall drop. For example in
30 the 11th police district, where CeaseFire was active
25 the longest and where efforts were substantially
Homicides Rate

Rest of Chica
go
20
increased, there was a 56% drop in homicides.
15
Also, beat 1413 in Logan Square, which had the
highest number of homicides (ten) of any beat in
10
the city in 2003 and where CeaseFire also had a
5
doubling of activity (from 4 workers to 8
0 workers), there were zero homicides in 2004.
2002 2003 2004
Overall, CeaseFire beats had a 47% reduction in
Figure #3 In 2004, Homicides dropped in CeaseFire beats by 47% and in
the rest of the city by 23%. homicides in 2004, nearly twice the level of
reduction citywide.iii

CeaseFire may not have been the only factor in the decline in homicides in 2004, but it is likely that
it was one of the important factors. Among the other factors, the efforts of the Chicago Police
Department are important to consider. An independent study of the Chicago Police Department
efforts in 2004 looked at many aspects of the Chicago Police Departments efforts including hot
spot policing, targeted deployment (including Special Operations Section and Targeted Response
Unit), and enhanced activities. No statistical evidence linking the police efforts to the reduction in
homicides in 2004 was found. Despite this lack of evidence, the researchers believed that a more
thorough analysis could show some effect (Rosenbaum and Stephens, 2005).

Another possible factor is the Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) program, which was active in two
Chicago districts during 2004. PSN, however, actually started in January 2003, and therefore would
not be temporally linked to a reduction unique to 2004. Additionally, PSN was limited to only two
police districts in 2004. This does not rule out PSN as a contributing factor and one analysis has
suggested that the program was effective in reducing homicides in two districts.iv

It is likely that CeaseFire, Chicago Police efforts, and PSN all played a role in decreasing homicides
to historic lows in Chicago in 2004. There are other possible factors as well, including displacement
that occurred due to the closing of some public housing and gentrification. However, the role of
CeaseFire in the 2004 reduction is hard to ignore given the increase from 5 to 15 communities and
from 20 to 80 workers at the same time as the reduction occurred. The other factors may have
played a role, but are not as correlated in time as the changes to the CeaseFire implementation.

2007-2008 - 1st Homicide Increase and Interruption of CeaseFire in Chicago

5

In September 2007, funding of CeaseFire was cut, temporarily shutting down the intervention in 15
sites.v Starting in the same month, September 2007, shootings in Chicago began to increase after a
long period of decline. From January to August of 2007, when CeaseFire was still active, shootings
decreased by 155 and homicides by 11 compared to the same period in 2006. Beginning in
September 2007, however, shootings began to increase, and continued to increases consistently over
the next year with 11 of the next 12 months having an increase over the preceding year. After 12
months, shootings had increased by 416 additional victims and homicides increased by 37 victims.

As shown in Figure #4, the loss of funding had a drastic effect on the number of CeaseFire workers
and clients. Prior to the interruption in funding, from January to August of 2007, there was an
average of 61 CeaseFire outreach workers helping 529 highest risk participants.vi In September
2007, the number of outreach workers dropped from 61 to 4, and then rose slightly to an average of
15 workers per month over the next year. The number of highest risk participants fell from 529 to 0
for several months before the remaining outreach workers were slowly able to build back their
caseloads to just over 100 participants. As a result, more than 400 individuals who were trying to get
their lives on a better path found themselves dropped from the program and left without assistance
from CeaseFire. Several of the participants who were dropped are known to have been killed in that
period of increasing violence.vii

In addition to reducing the number of outreach workers, CeaseFire also laid off nearly two-thirds of
its violence interrupters, viii the workers tasked with meditating potentially fatal conflicts. From
January to August of 2007, 343 high-risk conflicts that were otherwise thought likely to result in a
shooting were instead mediated by CeaseFire workers, an average of 49 per month. After the
funding interruption, the number of high-risk conflicts mediated dropped to an average of 21 per
month. These conflict mediations are a major element of the Cure Violence model and have been
shown to play a major role in its effectiveness. The evaluation of CeaseFire in Chicago showed that
CeaseFire mediated interruptions were up to 100% effective in preventing retaliations homicides and
the evaluation of Baltimore confirmed a relationship between interruptions and reductions in
homicides.

In addition to the decrease in CeaseFire implementation and the increasing shootings beginning in
the same month, the geographic location of the increases in violence during this period further ties
this increase to the CeaseFire reductions. Fully 351 of the 416 additional shootings in Chicago over
the 12 months following September 2007 occurred in the districts where the CeaseFire intervention
had been removed; 82 of the shootings happened in the specific CeaseFire beats that were shut
down. Regarding homicides, the districts that had a program shut down had 41 additional
homicides, with the remainder of the city actually having a reduction in homicides. The specific
CeaseFire beats that were shut down had a subsequent increase of 18 additional homicides a year
after the shut down.

6


2007-2008 Cut in CeaseFire Coincides with Increase in Shootings
Workers/Clients
180 180/
1800
350 250
160 160/
1600

250 150
140 Shootings Increase 140/
1400
(by 416)

150 120/
120 50
1200

Shootings Decreasing 100/

100
-50 (by 155) -50
1000

7
80 80/800
-150 -150

60 60/600

-250
Number of CF Outreach Workers & Clients

-250
40 40/400
CeaseFire Intervention Interrupted
CeaseFire Active
-350 16 Communities -350

Change in Shootings (aggregated and compared to previous year)

20 65 Outreach Workers 20/200
588 Clients

-4500 -450
0%

Ju

M
M

Ja
Ja

Ju
N
D

Ap
A

Fe
Fe

M
O
Ju

Se

l
Ju

Ap
M
l

u
e
u

ar
ar

b
b

ne
n
y

nu
%
nu

ril
ct
c

ov

pt

ay
ril
e

ay

a
e

gu

ru
ru

ch
ch
gu

r
ar

ob
y

st
m
em

ar
ar
st

er

y
y

y2
be
be

be
20

r
r

00
CeaseFire Workers Cut

7
08

from State Budget

Figure #4 The same month that CeaseFire was shut down, shootings started increasing after a long trend downward. While CeaseFire remained shut down, shootings increased in 11 of 12 months for an additional 416
shooting victims and 37 additional homicide victims.
 As shown in Figure #5, many of the districts
2007-2008 Former CeaseFire Districts Had Increases in Shootings
where the CeaseFire program was shut
down had large increases in shootings. For
example, in the 7th police district, where the
- 20 to 100 more shootings CeaseFire program maintained violence
CF - 0 to 19 more shootings
- Shootings decreased
interrupters but did not have outreach
CF workers or community norm change
activity, there were 100 additional shootings
CeaseFire remained active
CF ! in 14th which had decrease compared to the previous year, 41 of which
were in the former CeaseFire beats. This
was the largest increase in shootings of any
CeaseFire was cut
! large increases in shootings
Chicago Police district over this period. In
the 5th police district, which also had
violence interrupters but no outreach or
Figure #5 Many of the districts that had CeaseFire programs shut down also had large
community norm change, had an increase
increases in shootings. One of the districts where CeaseFire remained active was one of the of 85 shootings. Beat 522, a former
few that had a decrease in shootings. CeaseFire community, had an additional 20
shootings.

There were a few CeaseFire communities that were able to maintain an active program. Three
police beats in the 14th district were able to maintain CeaseFire programs through the generous
support of private funders and had continued decreases in shootings. After September 2007, when
the other CeaseFire beats were shut down and the shootings were increasing, these CeaseFire beats
in the 14th district had a reduction of 14 fewer shootings and one fewer homicide.ix The 11th district
was the one other district that maintained a full program, however the program was maintained in
only two beats while it was cut in five beats. Overall, the 11th district had an increase of 19
shootings and decrease of 2 homicides, but the two active CeaseFire beats had no change in
shootings and had a reduction of nine fewer homicides. The five CeaseFire beats that shut down in
the 11th district had an increase of 7 shootings and a decrease of four fewer homicides. x

Few other explanations have been offered for this increase in violence. The news media, which
largely did not report on the increase that started in September 2007 until 2008 (see Rozas, May
2008), put forth the theory that it could have been related to the hiring of a new police
superintendent (see Rozas, July 2008). However, the superintendent did not join the department
until February 2008, six months after the point at which the increase in shootings actually began.
There is no other record of any change to law enforcement or criminal justice programs during this
time period.

At the end of December 2008, CeaseFire funds were fully restored to the pre-cut level. In 2009,
the number of workers and active community sites were fully restored, and there were 458 killings in
2009 essentially a full return to the 2007 number. Therefore not only were the increases in killings
concurrent with the drop in CeaseFire staffing, but the subsequent reductions in killings also
followed the restoration of the program.

8

2011 - 2nd Homicide Increase and Interruption of CeaseFire in Chicago
As in 2007, in 2011 there was an interruption in the CeaseFire program, this time because of delays
in state contracting. During the period of implementation from January to June 2011, CeaseFire had
an average of 91 workers who were working with 423 high-risk participants per month, peaking in
July 2011 with 562 participants. Beginning in July 2011 most of CeaseFire program sites shut down.
In August, after implementation levels decreased, the number of high-risk participants was reduced
to 227 and continued to drop, bottoming out in November at 134 participants. This means that 428
of the highest risk individuals who CeaseFire was working with to get their lives on a better pathxi
were dropped from the program and left without assistance from CeaseFire.

As with the 2007-2008 increase, this

2011-2012 Cut in CeaseFire Coincides with Increase in Homicides
drop in CeaseFire implementation 600 60%

coincided with an increase in shootings Participants levels climb to

348, still 38.1% lower than
and killings. There had been reductions
40%
CeaseFire funding interrupted highest level in 2011
500

in shootings and killings from January CeaseFire participants levels

20%

Aggregated Change in Homicides

Avg. 423 participants/month

to August 2011, with shootings 400

go from 562 in July to 227 in
August (59.6% drop)
0%
# of Participants

decreasing by 62 (a 5% drop) and CeaseFire clients levels reach their

lowest level of 134 participants
!20%

homicides by 37 (a 12% drop). If this 300

Avg. 265 participants/month
!40%

same level of reduction had been 200 !60%

maintained for the remainder of the

year, homicides could have been 100
!80%

reduced to less than 400 in 2011, to an !100%

estimated 382 killings. Starting in 0

Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12
!120%

September 2011, these trends reversed. CF Participants Change in Homicides

From September 2011 to June 2012, Figure #6 In June 2011, CeaseFire lost most of its funding in Chicago and had to shut down
many sites. Starting in September, homicides increased after a large downward trend.
homicides increased every month for a
total of 106 additional victims compared to the previous year. Shootings also increased, although
the increase did not begin until December 2011 and continued to March 2012 for a total of 109
additional victims.

Most of the sites that were shut down experienced increases in homicides, shootings, or both, while
the areas with CeaseFire sites that were able to maintain funding were mostly able to continue to
reduce homicides and shootings. Sites that previously had an active CeaseFire program from
January to June that was shut down had a subsequent increase of 21 homicides from September
2011 to June 2012 compared to the previous year. When these sites were active from January to
June 2011 they had a reduction of 5 homicides.xii Shootings increased in these sites by 10 additional
shootings from September 2011 to December 2011 before decreasing in 2012.

This decrease in shootings in 2012 was largely due to a few very large decreases in a few
communities that had CeaseFire programs reinstated. For example, the Chicago Lawn community
was cut from July 2011 to December 2012, but was able to rehire workers in January 2012 and was
able to maintain a partial staff of outreach workers and violence interrupters in 10 of 12 months. In
2012, this one community had 28 fewer shootings than the previous year. By comparison, beats 833
and 835, which had been part of the Chicago Lawn CeaseFire site in 2011, but were not able to be
reinstated in 2012, had an increase in shootings of 6 additional shootings. Although the timing of
reinstatement and the decrease in shootings varied, and other communities did not have as large of a
reduction as Chicago Lawn, similar results occurred in CeaseFire. These sites were interrupted in

9

2011 and homicide and shootings increases occurred, then reinstated in 2012 and decreases
occurred.xiii

There were also a few sites that were able to maintain implementation throughout 2011 and 2012,
although some experienced some short interruptions.xiv These four sites covering 10 beats had a
reduction of 14 homicides and 4 shootings in 2011, including 5 fewer homicides and one fewer
shooting in the final 6 months when the rest of the city was increasing. In 2012, these sites had 3
fewer homicides and 54 fewer shootings.

There are many factors that affect violence in Chicago, but few appear as closely linked in time and
place as CeaseFire implementation levels. Law enforcement and criminal justice initiatives, which
are major factors that determine the level of violence in a community, may also have had an effect in
this period but were not able to be systematically reviewed. One of the leading theories in the media
was that the unseasonably warm weather in early 2012 could have brought more people out,
increasing the chance of conflict. However, this theory does not account for the increase in
homicides during the fall of 2011 (i.e. the increase started earlier), which preceded and followed a
similar trajectory in 2012. Furthermore, a separate review of other cities that also experienced
unusually warm weather including Detroit, St. Louis, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati did not
experience an increase in homicides.xv

Also telling is that no other violent crime category experienced a similar increase over this same
period. If law enforcement, criminal justice programs, or the weather were responsible, the increase
likely would have occurred for other crime categories as well. Since CeaseFire is a program that
addresses gun violence, specifically shootings and killings, it should not be surprising that around the
time that it was cut back, lethal violence increased while other crime did not.

2015-6 3rd Homicide Increase and Interruption of CeaseFire in Chicago

There has been a well document increase in shootings and killings in Chicago in 2016 with August
2016 designated the deadliest month in Chicago in almost 20 years and the projection for the end of
year total predicting the deadliest year in at least 10 years. While the 2016 levels have skyrocketed to
record levels, the increasing trend actual began in the spring of 2015.
208 AddiAonal Killings and 1,014 AddiAonal ShooAngs in Chicago
As illustrated in Figure 8, the decreasing A=er Cure Violence (CeaseFire) Funding Cut (March 2015)
trend extended until February 2015, when 900.0

the trend reversed and increased 200.0

Killings ShooAngs

throughout 2015, and then sharply 700.0

17 Months a=er
increased additionally in 2016. xvi As 17 Months a=er CeaseFire cut
AddiAonal shooAngs based on average levels (2004-2014)

150.0
CeaseFire cut
+724
AddiAonal killings based on average levels (2004-2014)

shown in Figure 7, the decreasing trend +162 500.0

resulted in 290 fewer shootings and 46 100.0

fewer homicides, while the increasing 300.0

trend resulted in 724 more shootings and 50.0

162 more homicide. Before this epidemic 100.0

rise in violence, shootings in Chicago had 0.0

17 Months before
CeaseFire cut
been on a long downward trajectory - -46
-100.0
17 Months before
CeaseFire cut
decreasing in 21 out of the 25 months -50.0
-290
before March 2015. After March 2015,
-300.0
Data: Ocial Chicago Police Department data

shootings increased in 13 out of 17 Figure #7 The period preceding the cut to CeaseFire, shootings and homicides were both
down substantially based on the average levels of the past 10 years. The period after the cut
months. in CeaseFire had a large increase in shootings and killings.

10


Chicago ShooCng Levels Increase When CeaseFire Funding Cut
300.0

Over next 17 months
200.0 724 addi4onal people shot
162 people killed
100.0 (based on baseline avg. from 2004-14)

0.0 CeaseFire operaCng in 20% of

violent communiCes
CeaseFire cut
-100.0
- from 71 workers to 10
- from 14 program sites
-200.0
to 1 full and 3 parCal sites

11
-300.0

-400.0

-500.0 536 fewer shoo4ngs

(Jan 2013 to Feb 2015)

AddiConal shooCngs based on average levels (2004-2014)

-600.0

Jul-15

Jul-13
Jul-14
Jul-16

Jan-13
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16

Jun-13
Jun-14
Jun-15
Jun-16

Oct-15

Oct-13
Oct-14
Apr-15

Apr-13
Apr-14
Apr-16

Feb-13
Sep-13
Feb-14
Sep-14
Feb-15
Sep-15
Feb-16

Dec-13
Dec-14
Dec-15

Aug-13
Aug-14
Aug-15
Nov-15

Nov-13
Nov-14

Mar-13
Mar-14
Mar-15
Mar-16

May-13
May-14
May-15
May-16

Data: Ocial Chicago Police Department data

Figure #8 The period before the cut in CeaseFire experienced a long downward trend. This trend was reversed at the same time
that CeaseFire was cut and resulted in a large increase in shootings This trendline uses an average level of homicides from 2004 to
2014 in Chicago (a relatively stable period) to compute a baseline. The trendline is formed by adding together each months
deviation from the meanfor that particular month to the prior months accumulated deviation.
 Chicago Killing Levels Increase when CeaseFire Funding Cut As before, this increase in violence
150.0
Over next 17 months coincides with a sharp reduction in the
162 addi<onal people killed
(based on baseline avg. from 2004-14) level of implementation of CeaseFire in
CeaseFire opera<ng in 20% of
100.0
violent communi<es Chicago. On March 4, 2015, funding from
the state of Illinois was suspended,
50.0
CeaseFire cut
- from 71 workers to 10
effective immediately. In March, about
- from 14 program sites half of the staff were immediately laid off
0.0 to 1 full and 3 par<al sites
and by July 2015 most of the staff were
laid off. In February, CeaseFire had 71
-50.0
staff in the communities, including 26
-100.0
interrupters. By July 2015, CeaseFire was
down to 10 workers mostly in the 4th

6
3

6
13

13

13

14

14

14

15

15

15

16
-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

-1

l-1
-1

-1

-1
n-

p-

v-

n-

p-

v-

n-

p-

v-

n-
ar

ar

ar

ay

ar
ay

ay

ay
Ju

Ju

Ju

Ju
No

No

No
Ja

Se

Ja

Se

Ja

Se

Ja
M

M
M
M

M
district. From July 2015 to July 2016
Data: Ocial Chicago Police Department data
CeaseFire had between 9 and 12 workers,
Figure #9 The trendline for homicides shows that the decreasing trend actually stopped in
July 2014 and began an upward trend in early 2015. In January 2016, a substantial rise 3-4 of which were interrupters.
in the trend occurred and has been maintained, including August 2016, the last point on the
chart and the deadliest month in almost 20 years.
This decrease in staffing had a major
impact on program activity. Clients in
most communities were left without support. Before the cut, CeaseFire sites were helping 372 high
risk clients (July to December 2014). After the cut, the remaining program sites could only manage
54 high risk clients (July to December 2015). Likewise, there were much fewer activities for the
community only 56 compared to 386 before the cut (July to December, 2014 v. 2015).

Perhaps the greatest indicator is the number of mediations that occur because these mediations
interrupt events that are ongoing in a community. In the 6 months before the cut (September 2014
to February 2015), CeaseFire sites were averaging 81 mediations of high risk conflicts per month. In
the 12 month period after the wind down of the program (July 2015 to June 2016), the remaining
programs averaged only 30 mediations per month half of which were concentrated in the 4th
district (the remainder occurring in Woodlawn and Little Village).

Beyond the timing of the increase 4th District Is Only District with Reduc$on in Shoo$ngs and Killings
Only District with Full CeaseFire Program A@er Cut (March 2015)
coinciding with the cuts to CeaseFire, the
Killings Shoo$ngs
places where this historic increase in
violence has occurred also coincides with
the places the program has been cut.
The districts where the CeaseFire
programs were cut are the districts where
violence increased the most, accounting
for 94% of the total citywide increase in
shootings. In particular, the 11th
districtwhere CeaseFire operated its
longest running program with 10 -10 to -15
-5 to 0
-100 to 0
+1 to +50

experienced staff before the cutwere +1 to +10

+11 to +20
+51 to +100
+100 to +150
+21 to +30
two times greater than the district with +150 to +200
Data: Ocial Chicago Police Department data
the next highest total. This 11th district Figure #10 The only district with decreases in both shootings and killings was the 4th
team were averaging 10 mediation per district, which is also the only district where CeaseFire maintained a full program. The
month the previous year before the places of greatest increase were districts that had previously had CeaseFire programs,
including the 11th district, which had a longstanding, strong program.
program was stopped.
12

As shown in Figures 10 and 11, the 4th district was the only district that had reductions in shootings
and killings (57 fewer shootings and 6 fewer homicide than the mean baseline). The 4th district is
also the location of the only CeaseFire program that had full staffing after the cut in funding. The
South Shore program in the 4th district began just as the other programs were being shut down in
March 2015. The program has two interrupters and six total staff. From July 2015 to June 2016, the
program averaged 15 mediation per month, and performed 33 mediations in July 2016.

4th District Has Largest Reduc8on in Killings 4th District Has Only Reduc3on in Shoo3ngs
Only Full Cure Violence (CeaseFire) Program AGer Cut to CeaseFire (March 2015) Only Full Cure Violence (CeaseFire) Program ALer Cut to CeaseFire (March 2015)
25.0 200.0

Change in # of Shoo3ngs (17 months Pre Cut 17 months Post Cut)

Change in # of Killings (17 months Pre Cut 17 months Post Cut)

20.0
150.0

15.0
100.0

10.0

50.0

5.0

0.0
0.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 24 25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22 24 25

-50.0
-5.0

Largest decline occurred Only large decline occurred

in 4th district in 4th district
-10.0 -100.0
(ac8ve Cure Violence program) (ac3ve Cure Violence program)

Data: Ocial Chicago Police Department data Data: Ocial Chicago Police Department data

Figure #11 Districts that formerly had CeaseFire programs accounted for 94% of the total increase in shootings in Chicago. Meanwhile, the only district to have a
decrease in shootings and killing is the only site to have a full program after the March 2015 cut.

The contrast between the 11th district and the 4th is worth looking at closer due to their vastly
different experiences. As shown in Figure #12, the trends in these individual districts show a pattern
of CeaseFire implementation being inversely correlated with the trend in shootings. In the 4th
district, as workers become active, the shootings trend decreases. This occurs in May 2014 when an
initial increase I workers coincided with a drop in shootings. These workers were lost in July 2014,
which coincides with an increase in shootings. The workers return in October 2014, which
coincides with a stabilization of the upward trend, however the trend does not drop until around
July 2015. During this period of stabilization, the location of the site was changing which was
4th District as CeaseFire workers increase, shoo-ngs decrease 11th District as CeaseFire workers decrease, shooCngs increase
40.00 13
6.00 15 ShooCngs increase
ASer cut to CeaseFire
35.00
# of Workers 11
AddiConal shooCngs based on average levels (2004-2014)
Addi-onal shoo-ngs based on average levels (2004-2014)

4.00 10
30.00
from 8-11
# of Workers to 0 9

from 0 to 6 25.00
2.00 5
# of Workers
# of Workers

7
20.00

0.00 0 15.00 5
3

6
3

6
13

14

15

15

15
14

16
13

14
-1

l-1

-1

l-1

-1

-1

l-1

-1

l-1
-1

-1

-1

-1
v-

v-

n-

p-

v-
n-

n-
p-

p-
ay

ay

ar

ay

ay
n

ar

ar

ar
Ju

Ju

Ju

Ju
No

No

No
Ja

Se
Ja

Ja

Ja
Se

Se

M
M

M
M

10.00 3
-2.00 -5

5.00
1

-4.00 -10 0.00

3

6
3

13

13

14

14

15

15

15
14

16

-1
-1

-1

l-1

-1

-1

l-1

-1

-1

l-1

-1

-1

l-1
-1

p-

v-

p-

v-

n-

p-

v-
n-

n-
ar

ay

ar

ay

ar

ay

ar

ay
n

Ju

Ju

Ju

Ju
No

No

No
Se

Se

Ja

Se
Ja

Ja

Ja
M

M
M

-5.00

-6.00 -15
-3
-10.00
Shoo-ngs decrease
AQer CeaseFire implemented -15.00 -5
-8.00 -20

Figure #12 As workers in the 4th district were deployed, drops in shootings followed. This includes an initial drop that followed an initial staff, an increase when
those workers were lost, and then a sustained decrease when 6 workers are maintained. By contrast, in the 11th district as workers dropped to 0, shootings increased.

13

essentially closing one site in the 4th district and opening a new site. The new site began in March
2015, but had unstable staffing until August 2015, when the trend in shootings began to drop.

By contrast, in the 11th district, a loss of funding coincides with a large increase in shootings. First,
with a low but stable number of workers there is a downward trend in 2013. In late 2013, a loss of
workers coincides with a reversal of the trend. The program increases the number of workers to
between 8 and 11 workers in 2014, but the trend continues to increase until the end of 2014 when a
6-month downward trend begins. This trend reverses in July 2015 and increases sharply for the next
year. The 11th district site, unlike the other sites that shut down in March 2015, received crisis
funding from a donor (along with the 7th district sites) that extended it operations with a full staff
through June and completely shutting down in July coinciding with the increasing trend in
shootings.

Summary
This report describes the correlation between the level of implementation of the CeaseFire program
and the level of killings in Chicago. Chicago had been on a long and continuous trend of decreasing
shootings and killings starting in 2001, coinciding with the start of the CeaseFire intervention. In
2004, the tripling of the CeaseFire program coincided with a sharp drop in killings. In mid-2007, the
CeaseFire intervention was interrupted and shootings and killings started increasing during the exact
same month. These increases occurred in the same districts where CeaseFire used to work and not
where the CeaseFire intervention remained active. In mid-2011, the CeaseFire program again
experienced an interruption in funding, which again coincided with an increase in shootings and
killings. Additionally, when funding was restored in 2008 and 2012, violence dropped to previous
lower levels. In 2015, a sharp reduction in staff coincided with reversal of a downward trend with a
sharp increase that continues today.

These are six instances in which there was a documented and consistent correlation between
CeaseFire implementation and trends in shootings and killings. This report is consistent with
multiple independent scientific evaluations that have shown that the program causes large
statistically significant decreases in shootings and killings as well as associations between staffing
patterns and trends in violence. This explanation takes into account the timing of the decreases, the
timing of the increases, the location of the increases, and the removal and re-institution of an
intervention that has been scientifically demonstrated effective in Chicago.

Possibility of Expanding CeaseFire Citywide

While the increases can be discouraging, they at least provide for hope and a possible course of
action. Levels of implementation of CeaseFire are achievable that can be predicted to get Chicagos
number of homicides to less than 350, and possibly less than 200. This would have a very strong
impact on the city in terms of saving lives from unnecessary tragedy and restoring communities to
vibrancy.

Currently, CeaseFire remains at a low level of coverage in Chicago when calculated according to
districts and community areas with rates that would warrant the implementation of the strategy.
Even at its peak of implementation, CeaseFire has only been funded to cover a quarter to a third of
the areas of Chicago with high rates of lethal violence. Over the last five years, the program has had
an interruption in funding on two occasions that have caused major cut backs in the intervention for
long periods of time.

14

 Multiple calculations have been done to
New York and Los Angeles Declining in Homicide Rate determine the need and potential impact
Chicago Increasing
of enhanced coverage of the Cure
30.0 Violence strategy in Chicago. Calculating
Chicago where the strategy is warranted and where
25.0
effectiveness is expected is based on an
20.0 area having rates twice the national
average as is done for the Cure Violence
Homicide Rate

15.0
national and international program a
10.0 criterion which would currently be met by
New York City
approximately 90 to 110 Chicago police
5.0
Los Angeles beats. Furthermore, CeaseFires funding
0.0 needs would require stabilization for
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
summer periods when state contracting
issues are problematic so that
Figure #13 - New York and Los Angeles have stron and robust health responses to interruptions in implementation do not
violence and have experienced large and consistent reductions in violence.
cause reversals of the progress made.

If CeaseFire were fully funded throughout Chicago, extrapolations of data from the evaluations
suggest that the city could experience a large reduction in gun violence conservatively to less than
350 killings per year and possibly to fewer than 200. The evaluation of the program in Chicago
showed reductions in shootings due to the program controlling for other factors of up to 28%.
The evaluation of the program in Baltimore showed reductions in homicides of up to 56% and in
drops in shootings of up to 44%.xvii
There is also reason to believe that an expansion of coverage throughout the city could result in a
more effective program. The primary reason for this is the synergies that would be created by
having teams of workers throughout the city that could work together to address a violence problem
that does not recognize community boundaries. This has already been demonstrated in one
independent analysis of the program that compared the implementations in Chicago and Baltimore
(Whitehall, 2012). The Baltimore implementation, which had larger reductions due to the program,
also had more staff per program area suggesting that larger teams could get larger reduction. There
would also be an enhanced ability to saturate the city with the message of rejecting the use of
violence increasing the effect on community norms.

With all of these results and all of the factors that affect violence, it is hard to predict how much a
fully funded CeaseFire program could reduce lethal violence over and above what law enforcement
could achieve. Assuming that all other factors remain constant the economy does not worsen, the
police do not reduce their efforts, and many others - a 30% annual reduction would seem to be a
conservative estimate. Over three years, this type of reduction would result in dropping Chicagos
total homicide level below 200 per year. An even more conservative 10% reduction per year
estimate, resulting in a 27% decline over 3 years, would result in around 350 homicides in a year.

This type of reduction would have profound impacts on the city. Estimates of the costs of
untreated violence to Chicago taxpayers are in the range of $2 to $2 billion. Costs of treating the
victims, arresting the offenders, and repairing the community would be drastically cut. Schools,
community organizations, and businesses would all improve. Real estate values would increase
bringing in increased tax revenue to the city. In all, this type of reduction would have an effect on
the city that would be valued in the billions of dollars per year.
15

 CeaseFire Funding and Killings in Chicago
700 CeaseFire
tripled

CeaseFire CeaseFire
600 partially restored partially restored

500

400
Killings

CeaseFire CeaseFire CeaseFire

CeaseFire partially interrupted
unstable funding partially interrupted
partially interrupted
300

200 Projected
30% annual reduction

100

20 Pro 15

20 Pro ed

ro d

99

00

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

ed
1

-P te
19

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

ct
17 jec

18 ec
je
j
-

-
16
Data: Ocial CPD

20
Figure #14 Based on effect sizes demonstrated in three independent evaluations, a fully implemented CeaseFire program would be expected to reduce homicides to 200 to 350 per
year after three years of continuouscoverage.

16

APPENDIX A: Short Description of Model

Cure Violence Model is a public health approach to violence prevention that understands
violence as a learned behavior that can be prevented using disease control methods. The model
prevents violence through a three-prong approach:

1. Interrupt transmission
The Cure Violence model deploys violence interrupters who use a specific method to locate
potentially lethal, ongoing conflicts and respond with a variety of conflict mediation techniques both
to prevent imminent violence and to change the norms around the need to use violence. Cure
Violence hires culturally appropriate workers who live in the community, are known to high-risk
people, and have possibly even been gang members or spent time in prison, but have made a change
in their lives and turned away from crime. Interrupters receive specific training on a method for
detecting potential shooting events, mediating conflicts, and keeping safe in these dangerous
situations.

2. Identify and change the thinking of highest potential transmitters

Cure Violence employs a strong outreach component to change the norms and behavior of high-risk
clients. Outreach workers act as mentors to a caseload of participants, seeing each client multiple
times per week, conveying a message of rejecting the use of violence, and assisting them to obtain
needed services such as job training and drug abuse counseling. Outreach workers are also available
to their clients during critical moments when a client needs someone to help him avoid a relapse
into criminal and violent behavior. The participants of the program are of highest risk for being a
victim or perpetrator of a shooting in the near future, as determined by a list of risk factors specific
to the community. In order to have access and credibility among this population, Cure Violence
employs culturally appropriate workers, similar to the indigenous workers used in other public health
models.

3. Change group norms

In order to have lasting change, the norms in the community, which accept and encourage violence,
must change. At the heart of Cure Violences effort at community norm change is the idea that the
norms can be changed if multiple messengers of the same new norms are consistently and
abundantly heard. Cure Violence uses a public education campaign, community events, community
responses to every shooting, and community mobilization to change group and community norms
related to the use of firearms.

Three additional elements are essential for proper implementation. First, with all of these
components, data and monitoring are used to measure and provide constant feedback to the Cure
Violence workers. Second, extensive training of workers is necessary to ensure that they can
properly carry out their duties. This includes an initial training before they are sent out on the
streets, follow up trainings every few months, and regular meetings in which techniques for effective
work are reviewed. Third, the program implements a partnership with local hospitals so that
workers are notified immediately of gunshot wound victims admitted to emergency rooms. These
notifications enable workers to respond quickly, often at the hospital, to prevent retaliations
(Ransford et al., 2014).

17

References

Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2012). Uniform Crime Report. Available at:

http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/preliminary-semiannual-uniform-
crime-report-january-june-2012.

Henry, D., Knoblauch, S., & Sigurvinsdottir, R. (2014). The Effect of Intensive CeaseFire
Intervention on Crime in Four Chicago Police Beats: Quantitative Assessment. Chicago, IL: Robert
R. McCormick Foundation.

Milam, A. J., Buggs, S. A., Furr-Holden, D. M., Leaf, P. J., Bradshaw, C. P., and Webster, D. W.
(2016). Changes in Attitudes toward Guns and Shootings following Implementation of the
Baltimore Safe Streets Intervention. Journal of Urban Health: Bulletin of the New York Academy of
Medicine.

Picard-Fritsche, S., & Cerniglia, L. (2013) Testing a Public Health Approach to Gun Violence. New
York: Center for Court Innovation.

Ransford, C. L., Kane, C. M., & Slutkin, G. (2013). Cure Violence: A Disease Control Approach to
Reduce Violence and Change Behavior. In E. Waltermaurer & T. Akers. (Eds.), Epidemiological
Criminology. London: Routledge.

Rosenbaum, D. P. & Stephens, C. (2005). Reducing Public Violence and Homicide in Chicago:
Strategies and Tactics of the Chicago Police Department. Chicago, IL: Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority.

Rozas, A. (May 17, 2008). Chicago's increased murder rate blamed on 3 multiple slaying incidents.
Chicago Tribune.

Rozas, A. (July 13, 2008). For new top cop, job has just begun. Chicago Tribune.

Salzman, S. L. Regan, S. C., Quintana, E., Wisnieski, E., Mack, C. F., Stone, L., Smith-Singares, E.,
Thomas, Y., and Giloth, B. (unpublished).

Skogan, W., Harnett, S. M., Bump, N. and DuBois, J. (2009) Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago,
Chicago: Northwestern University Institute for Policy Research.

Slutkin, G., Ransford, C. L., Decker, R.B., (2015). Cure ViolenceTreating Violent Behavior as a
Contagious Disease, in Eds. Maltz, M. & Rice, S. Envisioning Criminology: Researchers on
Research as a Process of Discovery. Springer.

Slutkin, G. (2013). Violence Is a Contagious Disease. The Contagion of Violence. Institute of

Medicine. Available at: www.cureviolence.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/iom.pdf.

University of Chicago. (unpublished) 7-11 HIT: Evaluation of Impact on Shootings.

Webster, D. W. (2016) Summary of Findings from External Evaluation of Safe Streets. Memo to Health
Commissioner Leana Wen
18

Webster, D. W., Whitehall Mendel, J., Vernick, J. S., Parker, E. M. (2012). Evaluation of
Baltimores Safe Streets Program. Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health.

Whitehall, J. M., Webster, D. W., & Vernick, J. S. (2012). Street conflict mediation to prevent youth
violence: Conflict characteristics and outcomes. Injury Prevention.

i
For a more detailed description of the components of the model, see the appendix at the end of
this report.
ii
Overall reductions in shootings in the seven program sites were between 41% and 73%. When
comparing to control communities to control for other factors such as law enforcement, statistically
significant reductions that were specifically attributable to the CeaseFire program were found to be
between 16% and 28% in four communities by time series analysis. Hot spot analysis found
reductions of shooting density between 15% and 40% in four partially overlapping communities.
Six of the seven communities examined had reductions due to the program as determined by either
time series analysis or hot spot analysis. The seventh community had -100% drop in retaliation
homicides and large reductions in shootings, but the neighboring comparison community had
similar reductions.
iii
There was also a -40% citywide reduction in shootings in 2004, however a change in the definition
of what was classified as a shooting occurred in late 2003 making analysis of shooting trends
impossible. The shooting reductions in CeaseFire beats and districts were greater than the
reductions in beats and districts without a program.
iv
Papachristos et al. 2007 - While the analysis of the PSN program showed strong effects of the
program, the analysis appears to have incorrect data for the CeaseFire implementation and therefore
could not have properly controlled for the CeaseFire effect. For example, the paper claims
CeaseFire began in 1999 and that it was present in 50% of PSN beats, both incorrect statements.
v
There were 2 sites that secured private funding to reinstate workers after shutting down for 2 to 3
months. One other site shut down for 4 of 7 months before stabilizing at half strength. The
remaining sites shut down for at least 12 months. Some of the sites maintained violence
interrupters, but the outreach staff were cut effectively shutting down the intervention.
vi
The external evaluation of the Chicago program confirmed that the program worked with the
highest risk individuals with 84% of the participant meeting the criteria to be considered high risk.
vii
This is based on anecdotal evidence from outreach workers and has not been otherwise
documented.
viii
From January to October there were 27 to 35 violence interrupters. The number of violence
interrupters dropped to 12 from November through January. The number of interrupters fluctuated
in 2008 between 12 and 21 violence interrupters.
ix
Both Logan Square and Humboldt Park maintained staffing after two periods of program
interruption in November and December 2007 and again in February and March 2008. Of the 12
months being examined here, these two communities maintained at least 75% staffing in 8 months.
x
There were two additional communities that maintained partial outreach staffs for the period in
question, however they did not have violence interrupters. The Auburn Gresham community shut
down for two months and had half staff for five months and had an increase of two shootings. The

19


Woodlawn community shut down for three months, had half staff for four months, and three-
quarters staff for six months. This area of Woodlawn had an increase of four shootings.
xi
The external evaluation of CeaseFire in Chicago showed that CeaseFire was 85% to 97%
successful in meeting client needs on a number of areas including leaving a gang, finding a job,
finishing their education, and getting drug treatment (Skogan et al., 2009).
xii
Some sites that shut down had brief periods of program activity. It is theorized that this program
activity was not consistent enough to have a positive effect and could in fact have a negative effect.
xiii
The decreases in homicides did not begin to occur until September 2012 while shootings
decreases started in January 2012.
xiv
Seven of the 10 active beats had periods where the program shut down, but was active most
months. The 3 other active beats had only 3 outreach workers instead of 4, but had very high levels
of violence interrupters. There was one additional new site that was active only from January to
June 2012 and had a reduction of 2 homicides.
xv
Of 265 cities with population over 100,000 for which data was available, 105 had an increase in
homicides in the first six months of 2012. Chicago had, by far, the highest real number increase in
homicides with 69 additional homicides. The next closest was Philadelphia with an increase of 26.
Only seven cities had double digit increases (FBI UCR 2013).

xvii
Not every program area had significant reductions in all measures, but all program areas had at
least one significant reduction.

20