EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-29274. November 27, 1975.]

SEC. QUIRICO P. EVANGELISTA, in his capacity as Secretary of the

Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations, and
the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS (PARGO) , petitioner, vs. HON. HILARION U. JARENCIO,
as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIII,
and FERNANDO MANALASTAS, Assistant City Public Service Officer
of Manila, and ALL OTHER CITY OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES
SIMILARLY SITUATED , respondents.

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, and Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo & Assistant Solicitor
General Pacifico de Castro and 1st. Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali for
petitioners.

SYNOPSIS

The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO), created by the
President pursuant to his special powers duties under Section 64 of the Revised
Administrative Code to forestall nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service and
vested with the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the
same Code, issued to respondent Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of
Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the
Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS . . .
then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein." Instead of
obeying the subpoena respondent Manalastas assailed its validity and filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against the PARGO and/or other persons acting in its behalf from further issuing
subpoenas to respondent. When the respondent court granted the petition, the matter was
elevated to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, set respondent court's order aside and held that the disputed
subpoena is well within the legal competence of the Agency to issue.

SYLLABUS

1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES MAY CONDUCT PURELY

INVESTIGATORY PROCEEDINGS; WITNESS MAY BE REQUIRED TO ATTEND PROCEEDING.
It has been essayed that the lifeblood of the administrative process is the flow of fact,
the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for
all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also
for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for
recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure
areas to find out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be
authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature,
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 but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future
action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries
into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions.
2. ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS; PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS
AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS (PARGO); SUBPOENA POWER; POWER EXTENDS TO
INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS. The Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO), created to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in
the civil service, draws its subpoena power from the Executive Order creating it. Such
subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the agency and is not bordered
by nor is it merely exercisable in its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. To hold that the
subpoena power of the agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
would imperil or inactive its investigatory functions. More than that, the enabling authority
itself fixes no distinction when and in what function should be subpoena power be
exercised. Similarly, there is no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids
differentiation when the law itself makes none.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RESTRICTION ON JUDICIAL SUBPOENA NOT APPLICABLE TO
ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA. The proviso in Section 580 of the Revised Administrative
Code that the subpoena power of an administrative agency shall be "subject in all respects
to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar
character" could refer to restraints against infringement of constitutional rights or when
the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the books,
documents or things does not appear. The strictures of a subpoena issued under the Rules
of Court, namely, that a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial
and that the hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court's judicial
or adjudicatory functions, cannot apply to a non-judicial subpoena issued by an
administrative agency. An administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial
subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a competent court, and not an
administrative subpoena.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIFIC CHARGE OR COMPLAINT OR VIOLATION OF LAW NOT
NECESSARY FOR ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA. Administrative agencies may enforce
subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved,
and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint.
It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of
violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SUBPOENA IS TO DISCOVER
EVIDENCE. The purpose of an administrative subpoena is to discover evidence, not to
prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so
justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough
that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the
proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF SUBPOENA. An
administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or
controversy in order to get evidence, but an investigate merely on suspicion that the law is
being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigate and
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 accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take
steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. In sum, it may be
stated that subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within
the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is
reasonably relevant.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; EXTENSION OF PRIVILEGE
TO WITNESS IN FACT-FINDING INVESTIGATION. UNWISE. The privilege against self-
incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to
adversary proceedings. Thus, in an administrative charge of unexplained wealth under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it was held that since the proceedings is criminal or
penal in nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without
encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. This same
approach was later followed in an administrative proceedings against a medical
practitioner that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical
profession. Nevertheless, where the person cited in the subpoena is not facing any
administrative charge, but is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding
investigation of anomalies and irregularities in a government office with the object of
submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to file the
corresponding charges, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would be unwise since
the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action. Anyway,
by all means, the person so cited may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends
to disregard his privilege against self-discrimination.
8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER CANNOT BE
COLLATERALLY IMPEACHED. For reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of
executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes cannot
be collaterally impeached. Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the lower
court as to be acceptable for adjudication in a certiorari proceeding before the Supreme
Court. The settled rule is that the Supreme Court will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF A PERSON IN
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. The constitutional rights of a person who may be
involved in an administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded
reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory
statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person
who may find himself cited to appear as a witness in a fact finding investigation conducted
by a regulatory or administrative agency.
2. ID.; RIGHT AGAINST REASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURES; RIGHT CANNOT BE
RENDERED MEANINGLESS BY ADMINISTRATIVE POWER OF INVESTIGATION. The right
to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by the wayside.
The board sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot, consistently with the
Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a reading that the
pronouncement in US vs. Morton Salt Co. that "it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the
authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is
reasonably relevant", on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin, should be
viewed. Such pronouncement has been given approval in an impressive number of
subsequent adjudication. The Morton Salt Co, case, however, involves a corporation and it
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 suffices to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson that "corporations can claim no
equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy" to remove any doubt as to
the pronouncement's lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of
search and seizure is now permissible. The landmark Boyd decision which warned against
the use of the subpoena power to trench upon the guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure still speaks authoritatively. The Supreme Court has spoken to the same effect,
Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. The opinion of Justice Martin should
therefore be read as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever
relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not
apply where an individual is concerned.

3. ID.; RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; RIGHT SHOULD EXTEND TO

PROSPECTIVE RESPONDENT BEING CITED AS "WITNESS" IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE
INVESTIGATION. The right not to incriminate oneself is deserving of the utmost
deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the
Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. A re-examination of the pronouncement in
the instant case involving the calling of a witness in an investigation being conducted by
the PARGO, that "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of
future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise" is,
therefore, desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may be too tenous
if the realities of the situation be fully considered. The force of the Cabal and the Pascual,
Jr. decisions upholding the right against self-incrimination of a respondent in an
administrative complaint may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a
witness and is thus compelled to testify. Concurrence with the opinion of the Court in the
instant case is not ruled out, however, in view of the caveat that "Anyway, by all means,
respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends
to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination".
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; RESPONDENT
BEING SUBPOENAED AS "WITNESS" IN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION ENTITLED TO
PRIVILEGE. Where, contrary to the finding of the main opinion that the person cited in a
subpoena issued by an investigating agency "is not facing any administrative charge" and
that "he is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-finding investigation of
anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila . . .", it is a fact shown by the
very petition itself and its annexed sworn statements that said person is in fact and for all
intents and purposes subpoenaed as respondent or one directly implicated with alleged
bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself
initiated the investigating agency's alleged "fact-finding investigation", said person is
justified in invoking the privilege against self-incrimination and in securing the respondent
court's injunction against enforcement of the agency's subpoena. The person cited was
unquestionably a party respondent, who, under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, had the
right to remain silent and invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take
the witness stand. This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the
transparent expedient of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to
be a general fact-finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare
respondent as a prime suspect.
2. ID.; ID.; PRIVILEGE STRENGTHENED BY 1973 CONSTITUTION. The 1973
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 Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege
against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of
Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV,
section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in violation of said section
by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; STATE MUST RESPECT INDIVIDUAL'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN
INVESTIGATION OF WRONG DOINGS. The State with its overwhelming and vast powers
and resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrong doing, graft and corruption
and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to
privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search
and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up
through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as
provided in the petitioner's executive charter and the evidence secured by proper
applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the
corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding charges against the
persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices
such as the Fiscal's office, like what was done in other cases."

DECISION

MARTIN , J : p

This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent
Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec.
Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as follows:
"IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner
[private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners] their
agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf
from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding
investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting
contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code." (Stress supplied).

Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and
Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2
Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities: 3
"b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral
practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical),
lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the
government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations
to the President of the Philippines.

"e. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of

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 Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to
establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed
wealth . . .
"h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding
investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of
any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges
with the appropriate agency."

For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the
powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena
duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the
Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer
of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at
the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
. . . then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25, 1968
with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for prohibition, certiorari
and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order docketed as Civil
Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned Order:
"IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00, let the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner
[private respondent] be issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their
agents, representatives, attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf
from further issuing subpoenas in connection with the fact-finding
investigations to the petitioner [private respondent] and from instituting
contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent] under
Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code." (Stress supplied)

Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for
reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent nullity.
6

As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its officials,
enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the
gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all
administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for
recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure
areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be
authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature,
but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future
action of a legislative or Judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of
witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries
into evils calling for correction and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions. 1 0
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 We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power
from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to
"summon witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" 1 1
with the authority "to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum
or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in
judicial proceedings of a similar character." 1 2 Such subpoena power operates in extenso
to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e),
and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely exercisable, as respondents would have it, in
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated
in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the
principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to
forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the
subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions
would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-
paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be
exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids
differentiation when the law itself makes none.

Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena
issued under the Rules of Court 1 3 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses and
the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or
otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly seized upon to
require, in respondents' formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the Rules, a specific case
must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the hearing or trial must be in
connection with the exercise of the court's judicial or adjudicatory functions 1 4 before a
non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It
must be emphasized, however, that an administrative subpoena differs in essence from a
judicial subpoena. Clearly, what the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable
from and issuable by a competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent,
therefore, the "restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional
rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy of the
books, documents or things does not appear. 1 5
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause
is shown 1 6 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 1 7 It is not necessary, as in the
case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that
the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully
authorized purpose. 1 8 The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove
a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. 1 9
Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the
proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed
witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. 2 0 Because
judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant
to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with
seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry.
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 The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a
case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that
the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When
investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it,
too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. 2 1
In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the
inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3)
the information is reasonably relevant. 2 2
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon
sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in
anomalous transactions 2 3 fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the
information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of which he is
claimed to be in possession, 2 4 is reasonably relevant to the investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative
investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 2 5 In Cabal v. Kapunan,
Jr., 2 6 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against
the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in nature, the complainant cannot call
the respondent to the witness stand without encroaching upon his constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. Later, in Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 2 7 the same
approach was followed in the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner
that could possibly result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession.
Nevertheless, in the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not
facing any administrative charge. 2 8 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the
fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila
with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to
file the corresponding charges. 2 9 Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover
facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
unwise. 3 0 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any
attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power of
the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 3 1 More tersely stated, respondents
would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic authority, Executive Order
No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88. Unfortunately, for reasons of public
policy, the constitutionality of executive orders, which are commonly said to have the force
and effect of statutes 3 2 cannot be collaterally impeached. 3 3 Much more when the issue
was not duly pleaded in the court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 3 4 The
settled rule is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it. 3 5
Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner
Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal
competence of the Agency to issue.
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is hereby set
aside and declared of no force and effect.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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 Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, C.J., in the result.
Barredo, Makasiar and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO , J., Concurring:

The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and
comprehensive. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American
Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in
accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises, that of Davis
1 and that of Jaffe. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the same
conclusion. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, 4 and
McFarland and Vanderbelt. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. That for me does not
conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be involved in
such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the expanded reach of
the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of a regulatory statute be
attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution affords a person who may
find himself in the position of a respondent. It is worthwhile to my mind that there be a
reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. Hence this separate opinion.
1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall by
the wayside. 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation cannot,
consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is with such a
reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton Salt Co., 7 on
which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine formulated in such
American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a governmental investigation
into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter
properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power. Federal Trade Comm. v.
American Tobacco Co., . . . But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the
agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant.
'The gist of the protection is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure
sought shall not be unreasonable.'" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of
subsequent adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice
Jackson in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its
lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is now
permissible: "The Commission's order is criticized upon grounds that the order
transgresses the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures and the Fifth Amendment's due process of law clause. It is unnecessary here to
examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. . . . Although the 'right to be let alone the most comprehensive of rights and
the right most valued by civilized men,' . . . is not confined literally to searches and seizures
as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of process, . . . neither
incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct
their affairs in secret. . . . While they may and should have protection from unlawful
demands made in the name of public investigation, . . . corporations can claim no equality
with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy . . . . They are endowed with public
attributes. They have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege
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 of acting as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of
engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an
enhanced measure of regulation. . . . Even if one were to regard the request for information
in this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing
agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is
consistent with the law and the public interest." 1 0 Thus is rendered clear that the landmark
Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to trench upon this
guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the same effect, Boyd
having been cited in a number of cases. 1 1 I would, therefore, read the opinion of my
brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its command. Whatever
relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of corporations should not
apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure respondent Manalastas that
if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the constitutional mandate on search and
seizure, he is not without a remedy.

2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the
opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis
of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be unwise." 1 2 The
right not to incriminate oneself 1 3 is equally deserving of the utmost deference and
respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the Miranda doctrine
has vitalized it even further. 1 4 There is, happily, the last sentence of such paragraph:
"Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may contest any attempt in the
investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against self-incrimination." 1 5 When read
in connection with the earlier reference to the fact that the respondent is called as a
witness not as the party proceeded against, it cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in
Planas v. Gil, 1 6 that it offends against this constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with
the question of any modification of the Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can
yield my concurrence. Candor compels the statement, however, that for me a
reexamination of such a pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and
a respondent may be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am
bothered by the thought that the force of the Cabal 1 7 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 1 8
may be eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus
compelled to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate,
concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion of
Justice Martin.

TEEHANKEE , J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants the
petition and sets aside respondent court's order and writ of preliminary injunction of July
1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as assistant city
public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly situated) to comply
with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the investigation of anomalies
and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City officials or other public
officers." 1
While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before the
PARGO, 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is not facing
any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in connection with the
fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila
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 with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or to
file the corresponding charges". 3 it is a fact shown by the very petition at bar itself and its
Annexes B and B1 that respondent Manalastas is in fact and for all intents and purposes
subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly implicated with alleged bribery and graft in
the said sworn statements that concededly as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO's
alleged "fact-finding investigation." 4
Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles,
investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through him as
commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of said
declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named and
unnamed got the lion's share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the sworn
statement of one Carlos Montaez with reference to some overpriced equipment sold by
him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the modus operandi and
specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other officials to whom he allegedly
gave: "due monetary consideration."
All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said annexed
sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his expressly
asking for them during the course of the hearing 5 ) show that respondent Manalastas
(and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in reality respondents
(subject to administrative and criminal charges.)
Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 wherein the Court
through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully
refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee
investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such
proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually that
of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all
questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against him.
Pascual, Jr. vs. Bd. of Examiners 7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the lower
court's writ of injunction against the respondent board's order compelling therein
petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was respondent) in
view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the accused to refuse "not only
to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the witness stand." 8 The Court therein
stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused,
stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be
revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or
methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and
more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those
suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice
Warren, 'the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government .
. . must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.'" and that "while earlier decisions
stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precluding as it does
all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental, current judicial opinion
places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. Thus according to
Justice Douglas: 'The Fifth Amendment in its Self Incrimination clause enables the citizen
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to his detriment."
That petitioner's investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in
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 substance and effect criminal in mature against him as a respondent (and not merely as
witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay vs. Pumaran 9 (of
which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971 respondent Manalastas
as well as Carlos Montaez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1, petition, supra, 1 0 ) and a
number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal in the Circuit Criminal Court of
Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) in connection with the alleged
gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam cleaners and air compressor) purchased
for the City.
The main opinion's justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only
purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary
extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination) would thus be unnecessary" 1 1 thus
appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact being investigated as
respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation was actually criminally
charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973 Constitution has recognized
the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the privilege against self-incrimination by
expressly providing as a constitutional mandate in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of
any confession obtained in violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in
evidence.
Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination and in securing the respondent court's injunction against enforcement of
petitioner's subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who under the
doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand. This legal and
constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient of citing respondent
as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-finding investigation but
obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as a prime suspect, as borne out
by the sworn statements withheld from respondent court and now annexed to the very
petition at bar and petitioner's contention that "In effect, the injunction issued by the lower
court is one to restrain criminal prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven
baseless by the events already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact
filed in court against respondent and others without the need of petitioner's "fact-finding
investigation" and subpoenas.
The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and resources
can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption and at the same
time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual's right to privacy, silence and
due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable search and seizure. This
means that leads and charges must be investigated and followed up through the
assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement agencies as provided in the
petitioner's executive charter 1 2 and the evidence secured by proper applications for
search warrants, and as conceded in the petition itself, after the corresponding report to
the President "to file the corresponding charges against the persons who may appear
responsible or merely refer them to other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal's office,
like what was done in other cases." 1 3

There appears to be validity in respondent's contention that the subpoena power granted
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 petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding investigations
conducted by it. 1 4 I find no need, however, of going further into this issue, since this
dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent Manalastas was
unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a prime suspect (and
not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he had every right to
remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and to refuse to take the
witness stand.
I therefore vote for upholding respondent court's injunction against enforcement of
petitioner's subpoena.
Footnotes

1. "Sec. 64 (c). To order, when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, an
investigation of any action or the conduct of any person in the Government service and
in connection therewith to designate the official, committee, or person by whom such
investigation shall be conducted."
2. Executive Order No. 205, dated February 9, 1967, converted the Agency into a division
under the Executive Office and is now known as "Complaints and Investigating Office".

3. Executive Order No. 88, dated September 25, 1967, amending in part Executive Order No.
4.
4. Executive Order No. 4, para. (5). "The Agency is hereby vested with all the powers of an
investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths,
take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation."
5. Resolution of the Court on November 28, 1969 excluded Ramon D. Bagatsing as
petitioner in the case.

6. See Matute v. Court of Appeals, 31 Jan. 1969, 26 SCRA 799, 800; Central Bank v. Cloribel,
L-26971, 11 April 1972, 44 SCRA 314.
7. Administrative Law, Jaffe and Nathanson, 1961 ed., 491.

8. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Smith, 340 P. 2d 964, citing 1 Davis Administrative Law Treatise,
160.
9. See Notes on 27 ALR 2d 1208, 1209, and cases cited.

10. Marchitto v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 160 A 2d 832.

11. Section 71, Revised Administrative Code.

12. Section 580, Revised Administrative Code.

13. See Sections 1 and 3, Rule 23, Rules of Court.

14. Answer, Respondents, at 43, 45 Case Records.

15. See Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court.

16. 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 171.

17. NLRB v. Anchor Rome Mills, Inc., 197 F. 2d 447 (5th Cir. 1952).

18. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 US 185 (1946).

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 19. SEC v. Vacuum Can Co., 157 F. 2d 530, cert den 330 US 820 (1947).

20. See Marchitto, ante.

21. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 US 632 (1950), abandoning the Harriman, 211 US
407; (1908) and American Tobacco, 264 US 298; (1924) doctrine against "fishing
expedition".

22. Adams v. FTC, 296 F. 2d 861, cert den 369 US 864 (1962).
23. Petition, at 6, Case Records; See Annexes B, B-1, Petition; at 17-24, Case Records.

24. Petition, at 7, Case Records.

25. Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 1214.

26. L-19052, 29 Dec. 1962, 6 SCRA 1064, per Concepcion, J.

27. L-25018, 26 May 1969, 28 SCRA 345, per Fernando, J.

28. Memorandum, Petitioners, at 154, Case Records.

29. Idem; Petition, at 8, Case Records.

30. Rights of Witnesses in Administrative Investigations, ante.

31. Memorandum, Respondents, at 160, 161, Case Records.

32. US v. Borja, 191 F. Supp. 563, 566; Farkas vs. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F. 2d 629,
632, dert den 389 US 977.

33. San Miguel Brewery, Inc. vs. Magno, L-21879, 29 Sept. 1967, 21 SCRA 297.

34. Idem; also 2 Modern Constitutional Law, Antieau, 1969 ed., 648.
35. Petite vs. United States, 361 US 529 (1960).

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

1. Cf. 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 159-232 (1958).

2. Cf. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, 115-119 (1965).

3. Cf. Parker, Administrative Law, 135-143 (1952).

4. Cf. Katz, Cases and Materials in Administrative Law, 175-221 (1947).

5. Cf. McFarland and Vanderbilt, Administrative Law: Cases and Materials, 83-86 (1952).

6. According to Article IV, Section 3 of the present Constitution: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized."
7. 338 US 632 (1950).

8. Ibid, p. 652-653.
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 9. Cf. F. T. C. v. Browning, 435 F2d 96 (1970); Local No. 104, Sheet Metal Worker's
International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 439 F2d 237
(1971); United States v. Newman, 441 F2d 165 (1971); Securities and Exchange
Commission v. First Security Bank of Utah, 447 F2d 166 (1971); Modine Manufacturing
Company v. National Labor Relations, 453 F2d 292 (1971); United States v. Litton
Industries, Inc., 462 F2d 14 (1972); Burlington Northern Inc. v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 462 F2d 280 (1972); Wilmoth v. Hansel, 25 A 86 (1892); Flanagan v. New
York L.E. & W.R. Co., 32 S. 84 (1895); Mobil Oil Corporation v. Durkin, 278 A2d 477
(1971); Fred Depkin & Son, Inc. v. Director, New Jersey Division of Taxation, 276 A2d 161
(1971); Appeal of Ohio Radio, Inc., 266 NE 2d 575 (1970); Mckay v. Stewart & Cecire v.
Stewart, 272 NE 2d 887 (1971); McKay v. Cecire, 324 S2d 302 (1971); Koch v. Kosydar,
290 NE 2d 847 (1972); State Real Estate Commission v. Roberts, 271 A2d 246 (1970).
10. 338 US 632, 651-652 (1950).

11. Cf. U.S. v. Navarro, 3 Phil. 143 (1904); Ocampo v. Jenkins, 14 Phil. 681 (1909);
Worcester v. Ocampo, 22 Phil. 42 (1912); U.S. v. Ipil 27 Phil. 530 (1914); Uy Kheytin v.
Villareal, 42 Phil. 886 (1920); People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925); Alvarez v. Court of
First Instance, 64 Phil. 33 (1937); Rodriguez v. Villamiel, 65 Phil. 230 (1937); Yee Sue Kay
v Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940); Moncado v. Peoples Court, 80 Phil. 1 (1948).
12. At 9.

13. According to Article IV, Section 20 of the present Constitution: "No person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."

14. Cf. Magtoto v. Manguera, L-37021, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4.

15. At 9.

16. 67 Phil. 62 (1939).

17. Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr., L-19052, December 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 1064.

18. Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, L-25018, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 345.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

1. Petition, p. 11, prayer (b).

2. Now known as Complaints and Investigating Office (CIO) under Ex. Order No. 208, dated
Feb. 9, 1967.
3. Main opinion at p. 9 thereof, citing petitioners' Memorandum at p. 154, Rollo, emphasis
supplied.

4. Petition, p. 3, par. 5.
5. Answer, Rollo, p. 40.

6. 6 SCRA 1064.

7. 28 SCRA 344, per Fernando, J.; emphasis supplied.

8. Idem, at p. 348; citing Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663.
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 9. L-33877-79, 41 SCRA 260 (Sept. 30, 1971).
10. At page 2 hereof.

11. At page 9.

12. Ex. Order No. 88, dated Sept. 25, 1967, amending Ex. Order No. 8 which created "as the
executive instrumentality in the Office of the President" thus provides that petitioner
shall "receive and evaluate, and (to) conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and
(to) file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency . Petition, Annexes
A and A-1. (Emphasis supplied)

13. Petition, at page 8.

14. Vide Harriman vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 211 U.S. 407 and Federal Trade
Commission vs. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, where Justice Holmes in the first
case ruled out a federal commission's application to require witnesses to testify before it
except in connection with specific complaints for violation of the Interstate Commerce
Act or with its investigation of specific subjects that might have been the object of
complaint. In the second case, Justice Holmes likewise ruled against a federal
commission's fishing expeditions into private papers on the mere possibility that they
may disclose evidence of crime in view of the Constitutional provision against
unreasonable searches and seizures.

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