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III. REAL AND DEMONSTRATIVE EVIDENCE

A. RULE 130; SEC. 1; SEC. 2

Rule 130. RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY

B. OBJECT (REAL) EVIDENCE

SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses
of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact ialn issue, it may be exhibited to,
examined or viewed by the court.

REAL EVIDENCE Ranks high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence. Where physical
evidence runs counter to testimonial evidence, the physical evidence must prevail.

REQUISITES:
1. Evidence must be relevant;
2. Evidence must be authenticated;
3. The authentication must be made by competent witness; and
4. The object must be formally offered in evidence at the appropriate time (after
authentication, before admission)

C. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

SECTION 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of writings or any

material containing letters, words, numbers, figures, symbols or other modes of written
expressions offered as proof of their contents.

TEST FOR ADMISSIBILITY

a. RELEVANCY

1. TIJING vs CA, March 8, 2001 (facial similarity to prove kinship)

G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001

FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest
child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered
Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn
him over to his parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It
questioned the propriety of the habeas corpus in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.

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RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons
entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free
will. It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant
and material, subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.

The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and
by the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there
are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born
were presented. Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not
capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15
years of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.

The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas
Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician
or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of
the physician or midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed
with the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth
certificate were typed in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted
that she is a "common-law wife."

Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the
two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is
competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical
records and testimony of the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.

2. PEOPLE vs RULEPA, 398 SCRA 567 March 5, 2003 (appearance to establish age)

FACTS: Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto (Rullepa), a houseboy, was charged with Rape before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for allegedly having carnal knowledge with AAA, three (3) years
of age, a minorand against her will and without her consent.
AAA described her abuse under the hands of Rullepa in a plain and matter-of-fact manner in her
testimony. The victim and her mother testified that she was only three years old at the time of the
rape. However, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic
documents in evidence.

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Finding for the prosecution, the RTC rendered judgment finding Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape and accordingly sentenced him to death. The case was placed for automatic review
of the Supreme Court

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon Rullepa

HELD: A persons appearance, where relevant, is admissible as object evidence, the same being
addressed to the senses of the court. As to the weight to accord such appearance, especially in
rape cases, the Court in People v. Pruna laid down the guideline.

Under the guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient
to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt in cases (a) and (b) above. In such cases, the disparity
between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can easily determine from
the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the
relatives testimony.

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance,
as object evidence of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater
and, following United States v. Agadas, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be
proved (below twelve years), the trial court would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims
age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second element of
statutory rape is present.

Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable
doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped
seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.

As it has not been established with moral certainty that AAA was below seven years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, Rullepa cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty.
Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.

3. PEOPLE vs ULZORON, March 2, 1998 (absence of mark of physical violence)

G.R. No. 121979

FACTS: On 31 March 1987, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Emily Gabo, private
complainant, was watering her plants near a well in Brgy. Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan, when
Samuel suddenly appeared. He was armed with a 2-foot long bolo hanging in its scabbard
around his waist with a long-sleeved work shirt slung over his shoulder. After Emily finished
watering her plants and before she could start washing clothes, Samuel grabbed her wrists and
locked them with one hand behind her back with the other hand drawing his bolo and pointing
it at her neck. She struggled to free herself from his hold but was so intimidated with the bolo

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that she could not shout for help; she lost her strength eventually. After she weakened, he
dragged her some forty (40) meters away to the bushes and tall grasses. He forced her to lie
down; then he mounted her. He laid his bolo beside him, pinned her arms with one hand, and
with the other, loosened the buttons of her dress. Emily could only struggle in vain until he
ripped off her dress and panties. After which, Samuel had a carnal knowledge of Emily that
lasted for about 15 minutes. Emily told her husband Roberto what unfortunately happened to
her. The following afternoon, Emily went to Dr. Feliciano M. Velasco Jr. for physical
examination. The doctor noted the discharge mixed with semen in her private part. The next
day Emily lodged a complaint for rape against Samuel Ulzoron as she turned over his belongings
to the police authorities as her evidence in support thereof. Appellant faults the trial court for
convicting him on the basis of his defense. He argues that the undisputed facts and
circumstances made it more likely that Emily was involved in an adulterous relationship with
him. He claims, for instance, that there was absolutely nothing to support the victim's claim of
struggle, and that while he allegedly dragged her forty (40) meters away before assaulting her
sexually, the examining physician could not conclude that physical force was actually inflicted
since she did not sustain any physical injuries.

ISSUE: WON Ulzoron is correct on claiming his innocence because of the absence of marks of
physical violence of rape

HELD: No, Ulzoron is not correct. The arguments of appellant are unpersuasive; they fail to
convince the Court. The term "dragged" should not indeed be taken in the meaning understood
by appellant as "dragged along on the ground." When asked on cross-examination by the
defense counsel to "describe how she and appellant traveled at (sic) forty (40) meters
distance," she said, "He was holding my hands and at the same time he is (sic) pushing me
forward." This testimony adequately explains the absence of injuries in her body. At any rate,
it is not necessary for the commission of rape that there be marks of physical violence on the
victim's body. While Emily repeatedly mentioned her struggles to be released from his grasp,
such efforts need not always result in physical injuries. Besides, they did not refer to the
circumstances when she was being dragged by the accused, but to the circumstances when he
initially grabbed her hands, when he was on top of her, when he was undressing her, and when
she was exerting efforts to disengage herself from the sexual anchorage.

The circumstances of force and intimidation attending the instant case were manifested clearly
not only in the victim's testimony but also in the physical evidence presented during the trial
consisting of her torn dress and underwear as well as the medico-legal report. Such pieces of
evidence indeed are more eloquent than a hundred witnesses. The fact of carnal knowledge is
not disputed. It was positively established through the offended party's own testimony and
corroborated by that of her examining physician.

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4. ABALOS vs CA, Dec. 22, 1999 (absence of gun powder)

FACTS: On 26 February 1993 an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, charging petitioner Delfin Abalos with murder for the killing of Liberato Damias. The
bereaved Veronica Bulatao testified that she had known petitioner Abalos for several years. Delfin
was courting her since June 1992 but she jilted him since she was already involved with the now
deceased Liberato Damias. In fact, she said, Delfin was enraged when she rejected him that he
even threatened to kill her if she decided to marry Liberato.
On the night of January 1993 Liberato visited her at around 7 o'clock. As she was entertaining
him at the balcony of their house she noticed petitioner walking back and forth in front of their
house. As she was ill at ease with petitioners conspicuous demeanor below, she asked Liberato
to transfer to their sala where they could continue talking. Delfin suddenly appeared at the door
shot Liberato on his left side. Liberato could only embrace Veronica as blood trickled from his
mouth and he desperately gasped for breath. Veronica positively identified petitioner Delfin
Abalos.

But Delfin denied killing Liberato. He claimed that on the night of 27 January 1993 he worked
with his father in the tobacco fields from 3:00 p.m. until midnight and the only time he left was
from 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening to get supper from their house. Celestino Abalos, Delfins father,
together with Ruben Fragata and Virgilio Ortiz, tried to corroborate Delfin's alibi. Another defense
witness, testified that after spraying insecticide on his plants he took a bath at a well near the
tobacco plantation from 8:00 to 9:00 p.m. during which he saw Delfin around twenty (20) meters
away working at the fields, and that before heading for home he noticed Delfin still busy with his
work.

Delfin Abalos alibi failed to convince the trial court. The Court of Appeals sustained on appeal
the award for damages but set aside the conviction of petitioner for murder and found him guilty
instead of the lesser crime of homicide. His motion for reconsideration was denied.

Petitioner argues that the testimony of the lone witness, Veronica Bulatao, was not credible;
that the Court of Appeals erred in considering his three (3) prior convictions as basis for finding
him guilty of homicide; and, his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

In an apparent attempt to destroy Veronicas credibility and also cites inconsistencies in her
testimony, such as her assessment of the time frame when he courted her and her statements as
to when she last saw him prior to the commission of the crime. He even went to the extent of
saying that Veronicas act of allowing him to court her despite her existing relationship with Liberato
showed her deceitful character, hence, her unreliability as a witness.

ISSUE: WoN the appellate court erred in finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
homicide. And whether or not the absence of powder burns on his hand would be a solid alibi to
prove his innocence.

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HELD: For alibi to prosper, petitioner must not only prove that he was not at the crime scene but
that it was also physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time the offense
was committed. He miserably failed to satisfy the second requisite. Delfin himself testified that
the distance between the tobacco fields to Veronicas house was only around 400 meters and it
only took eight (8) minutes to traverse such path. Evidently, it was not impossible for Delfin to be
present at the locus criminis.

Further, it has been long established that alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification
of the accused by a credible witness who had no ill motive to falsely testify.

This Court acknowledges that the absence of powder burns in a suspects hand is not conclusive
proof that he has not fired a gun. In fact, the traces of nitrates can easily be removed by the simple
act of washing ones hand.

The Court of Appeals, abiding by established jurisprudence, ruled that before treachery could
be considered, two (2) conditions must be present. First, that the means, method or manner of
execution employed would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the retaliatory or defensive
acts of the victim; and second, that the perpetrator deliberately or consciously adopted such
means of execution. However, the appellate court ruled that the prosecution failed to satisfy the
second requisite there being no proof that petitioner deliberately sought such manner of executing
the crime to ensure his own safety from any form of retaliation that the victim might have
employed.

It should be remembered that the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on
an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the latter. This was what Delfin
did. He attacked Liberato while he was deeply engrossed in conversation with Veronica, oblivious
of the lurking peril to his life. The trial court was therefore correct in ruling that the crime
committed was murder.

Petitioner should therefore be convicted of murder qualified by treachery, with the generic
aggravating circumstance of recidivism. When he committed the crime, the imposition of the death
penalty was still proscribed by the 1987 Constitution, thus he should only be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and not death.

Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner DELFIN ABALOS guilty of homicide is
MODIFIED. He is instead adjudged GUILTY of MURDER with recidivism as a generic aggravating
circumstance.

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RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE

A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (2 October 2007)

SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply whenever DNA evidence, as defined in Section 3 hereof,
is offered, used, or proposed to be offered or used as evidence in all criminal and civil actions as
well as special proceedings.

Sec. 2. Application of other Rules on Evidence. In all matters not specifically covered by this Rule,
the Rules of Court and other pertinent provisions of law on evidence shall apply.

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:

a. Biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if
found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva
and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones;
b. DNA means deoxyribonucleic acid, which is the chain of molecules found in every
nucleated cell of the body. The totality of an individuals DNA is unique for the individual,
except identical twins;
c. DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
d. DNA profile means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample
obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from
that person;
e. DNA testing means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction
of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of
the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or
more distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or
if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and
f. Probability of Parentage means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage
of a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated
individuals in a given population.

Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of
the following:

a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

b. The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

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d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant
to the proper resolution of the case; and
e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.

Sec. 5. DNA Testing Order. If the court finds that the requirements in Section 4 hereof have
been complied with, the court shall

a. Order, where appropriate, that biological samples be taken from any person or crime
scene evidence;
b. Impose reasonable conditions on DNA testing designed to protect the integrity of the
biological sample, the testing process and the reliability of the test results, including the
condition that the DNA test results shall be simultaneously disclosed to parties involved in
the case; and
c. If the biological sample taken is of such an amount that prevents the conduct of
confirmatory testing by the other or the adverse party and where additional biological
samples of the same kind can no longer be obtained, issue an order requiring all parties
to the case or proceedings to witness the DNA testing to be conducted.

An order granting the DNA testing shall be immediately executory and shall not be appealable.
Any petition for certiorari initiated therefrom shall not, in any way, stay the implementation
thereof, unless a higher court issues an injunctive order. The grant of DNA testing application
shall not be construed as an automatic admission into evidence of any component of the DNA
evidence that may be obtained as a result thereof.

Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need
of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment
provided that (a) a biological sample exists, (b) such sample is relevant to the case, and (c) the
testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.

Sec. 7. Assessment of probative value of DNA evidence. In assessing the probative value of the
DNA evidence presented, the court shall consider the following:

a. The chair of custody, including how the biological samples were collected, how they were
handled, and the possibility of contamination of the samples;
b. The DNA testing methodology, including the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure, and compliance with the
scientifically valid standards in conducting the tests;
c. The forensic DNA laboratory, including accreditation by any reputable standards-setting
institution and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. If the laboratory

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is not accredited, the relevant experience of the laboratory in forensic casework and
credibility shall be properly established; and
d. The reliability of the testing result, as hereinafter provided.

The provisions of the Rules of Court concerning the appreciation of evidence shall apply
suppletorily.

Sec. 8. Reliability of DNA Testing Methodology. In evaluating whether the DNA testing
methodology is reliable, the court shall consider the following:

a. The falsifiability of the principles or methods used, that is, whether the theory or
technique can be and has been tested;
b. The subjection to peer review and publication of the principles or methods;
c. The general acceptance of the principles or methods by the relevant scientific
community;
d. The existence and maintenance of standards and controls to ensure the correctness of
data generated;
e. The existence of an appropriate reference population database; and
f. The general degree of confidence attributed to mathematical calculations used in
comparing DNA profiles and the significance and limitation of statistical calculations used
in comparing DNA profiles.

Sec. 9. of DNA Testing Results. In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider
the following:

a. The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching
DNA evidence;
b. The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented
in the case; and that
c. DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of
non-paternity. If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of
the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of the
Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable presumption of
paternity.

Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. The
convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if
the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the case the court,
after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the judgment of
conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a
lawful cause.

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A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any
member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court
of origin and issue the appropriate orders.

Sec. 11. Confidentiality. DNA profiles and all results or other information obtained from DNA
testing shall be confidential. Except upon order of the court, a DNA profile and all results or other
information obtained from DNA testing shall only be released to any of the following, under such
terms and conditions as may be set forth by the court:

a. Person from whom the sample was taken;

b. Person from whom the sample was taken;
c. Lawyers of private complainants in a criminal action;
d. Duly authorized law enforcement agencies; and
e. Other persons as determined by the court.

Whoever discloses, utilizes or publishes in any form any information concerning a DNA profile
without the proper court order shall be liable for indirect contempt of the court wherein such
DNA evidence was offered, presented or sought to be offered and presented.

Where the person from whom the biological sample was taken files a written verified request to
the court that allowed the DNA testing for the disclosure of the DNA profile of the person and all
results or other information obtained from the DNA testing, he same may be disclosed to the
persons named in the written verified request.

Sec. 12. Preservation of DNA Evidence. The trial court shall preserve the DNA evidence in its
totality, including all biological samples, DNA profiles and results or other genetic information
obtained from DNA testing. For this purpose, the court may order the appropriate government
agency to preserve the DNA evidence as follows:

a. In criminal cases:
i. for not less than the period of time that any person is under trial for an
offense; or
ii. in case the accused is serving sentence, until such time as the accused has
served his sentence;
a. In all other cases, until such time as the decision in the case where the DNA evidence was
introduced has become final and executory.

The court may allow the physical destruction of a biological sample before the expiration of the
periods set forth above, provided that:

a. A court order to that effect has been secured; or

b. The person from whom the DNA sample was obtained has consented in writing to the
disposal of the DNA evidence.

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Sec. 13. Applicability to Pending Cases. Except as provided in Section 6 and 10 hereof, this Rule
shall apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity.

Sec. 14. Effectivity. This Rule shall take effect on October 15, 2007, following publication in a
newspaper of general circulation.

DNA EVIDENCE vs ADMISSIBILITY (Right against self-incremination)

- Already recognized method, although no Automatic Admission as Evidence.

- Must comply with the Requisites (People vs Vallejo)
a. How samples are collected
b. How they were handled
c. The possibility of contamination of the samples
d. The procedure followed in analyzing the samples
e. Whether the proper standard and procedure were followed in conducting the test
f. The classification of the analyst who conducted the test
- May or may not require a Court Order (puede MOTU PROPRIO)
- Determination on probative value of DNA Test Result; Courts discretion.
- Results re nevertheless, CONFIDENTIAL: Requesting party must have legal interest
- Court is mandated to Preserve the DNA Evidence in its totality

b. COMPETENCY

FRUIT OF A POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE

ART. 3, Section 2. 1987 CONSTITUTION.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The Doctrine of the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree

1. Evidence will be excluded if it was gained through evidence uncovered in an illegal arrest,
unreasonable search or coercive interrogation, or violation of a particular exclusionary law.

2. It is an offshoot of the Exclusionary Rule which applies to primary evidence. The doctrine
applies only to secondary or derivative evidence. There must first be a primary evidence which
is determined to have been illegally obtained then secondary evidence is obtained because of

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the primary evidence. Since the primary evidence is inadmissible, any secondary evidence
discovered or obtained because of it may not also be used.

a. The poisonous tree is the evidence seized in an illegal arrest, search or interrogation. The
fruit of this poisonous tree is evidence discovered because of knowledge gained from the
first illegal search, arrest, or interrogation or violation of a law.

b. It is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the state should not be used
to gain other evidence because the original illegally obtained evidence taints all those
subsequently obtained.

Illustrations:

A suspect as forced to make a confession where he revealed he took shabu from the room of X.
Based on this knowledge the police went to the house of X and with the consent of X, searched his
room and found the shabu. The confession is inadmissible because of the exclusionary. It is the
poisoned tree. The shabu is inadmissible because knowledge of its existence was based on the
confession. It is the fruit.

D. Exceptions to the two principles - when evidence is still admissible despite the commission of an
illegal arrest, search or interrogation, or violation of a particular exclusionary law.

1. Under the Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery- Evidence is admissible even if obtained through an
unlawful arrest, search, interrogation, or violation of an exclusionary law, if it can be established,
to a very high degree of probability, that normal police investigation would have inevitably led to
the discovery of the evidence

2. Independent Source Doctrine- evidence is admissible if knowledge of the evidence is gained from
a separate or independent source that is completely unrelated to the illegal act of the law
enforcers.

3. Attentuation Doctrine: evidence maybe suppressed only if there is a clear causal connection
between the illegal police action and the evidence. Or, that the chain of causation between the
illegal action and the tainted evidence is too attenuated i.e too thin, weak, decreased or fragile.
This takes into consideration the following factors:

a). The time period between the illegal arrest and the ensuing confession or consented search
b). The presence of intervening factors or events
c). The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct

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EXCEPTIONS:
1. CUSTOMS SEARCHES
- Searches of vessel and aircraft for violation of immigration and smuggling laws

2. SEARCH OF MOVING VEHICLES

- Securing a search warrant is not practicable since the vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which warrant must be sought

CABALLES vs CA, 2002

G.R. No. 136292, 373 SCRA 221, January 15, 2002

FACTS: Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in a Barangay in
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves. Suspecting that the
jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle.

With appellant's alleged consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation (NPC).
Thereafter, appellant and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station. Danilo Cabale took pictures of the appellant and the jeep loaded with the wires
which were turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Appellant was
incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail.

In defense, appellant interposed denial and alibi. Thus, the court a quo rendered judgment finding
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure made by the police officers, and the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by virtue thereof was valid.

RULING: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their
persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2,
Article III.

The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right.

The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits
of certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in
plain view;9 (3) search of moving vehicles;10 (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6)
stop and frisk situations (Terry search);12 and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the
Rules of Court must be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to

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effect a valid search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured.

MUSTANG LUMBER vs CA, 257 SCRA 430 (1996)

A search warrant has a lifetime of 10 days. It could be served at any time within 10 days. If its
object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following day
or days until completed, provided it is within the 10 day period.

FACTS: On 1 April 1990, Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID), acting on information
that a huge pile of narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen inside the lumberyard of Mustang
Lumber, conducted a surveillance at Mustang lumberyard. The team saw a truck loaded with lauan
and almaciga lumber coming out of the lumberyard. Since the driver could not produce the
required invoices and transport documents, the team seized the truck together with its cargo and
impounded them at DENR compound. On 3 April 1990, RTC Valenzuela issued a search warrant.
On same day, the team seized from the lumberyard narra shorts, trimmings and slabs, narra
lumber, and various species of lumber and shorts. On 4 April 1990, team returned to lumberyard
and placed under administrative seizure (owner retains physical possession of seized articles, only
an inventory is taken) the remaining lumber because Mustang Lumber failed to produce required
documents upon demand. Upon recommendation of SAID Chief Robles, DENR Sec Factoran
suspended Mustang Lumbers permit and confiscated in favor of the govt the seized articles.
Mustang Lumber filed for a TRO against Factoran and Robles, and questioned the validity of the
April 1 and 4 seizure. RTC held that the warrantless seizure on April 1 is valid as it comes within
the exceptions where warrantless seizure is justified (search of a moving vehicle), and April 4
seizure was also valid pursuant to the search warrant issued on April 3. CA affirmed. Mustang
lumber filed a petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUES: a) WON the search and seizure on April 4 was valid.

HELD:
Yes. The search and seizures made on April 1, 3, 4 were all valid. valid. (1) April 1 search was
conducted on a moving vehicle, which could be lawfully conducted without a search warrant. (2*)
The search on April 4 was a continuation of the search on April 3 done under and by virtue of the
search warrant issued on 3 April 1990 by Exec Judge Osorio. Under ROC Rule 126 Sec 9, a search
warrant ahs a lifetime of 10 days. Hence, it could be served at any time within the said period, and
if its object or purpose cannot be accomplished in 1 day, the same may be continued the following
day or days until completed, provided it is still within the 10-day period.

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3. CHECKPOINTS
- No illegal per se, so long as it is required by exigency of public order and limited to a visual
search, where people/vehicle were not subjected to physical or body search

PEOPLE vs BALINGAN, GR No. 105834, FEB. 13, 1995

FACTS: On August 1988, the Narcotics Division of the Baguio City police received a telephone call
from an unnamed male informant, alleging that petitioner Balingan is going to Manila with a bag
full of marijuana. Acting on such information, police officer Obrera conducted surveillance of
petitioner in different places, such as her house and at bus stations around the city. Upon receiving
information that petitioner boarded a Dangwa Bus, Obrera immediately went to the terminal to
confirm the said report. He boarded the bus and saw petitioner carrying a gray maleta. A prior
checkpoint along Kennon Road was set-up by the police in order to apprehend petitioner. Upon
arrival at the checkpoint, the bus stopped and yielded to the police officers. Obrera announced a
routine check on petitioner, but petitioner did not respond. The police officers then grabbed the
bag in the overhead compartment of petitioner Balingan and opened it. Just as they suspected,
they found approximately 3 kilos of marijuana.

The police officers then requested Balingan to go with them to the police station. However, the
petitioner resisted and bit one of the police officers. Eventually, after thirty minutes, they were
able to pull Balingan out of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City Police Station and locked
her up in jail.

The marijuana confiscated were then submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for a confirmatory
test on the said prohibited drugs. The test yielded a positive result. Petitioner alleged that she is
innocent and that the gray bag is not hers. Notwithstanding petitioners protestations, the trial
court found her guilty of the crime of illegal transportation of prohibited drugs and was charged
with a penalty of life imprisonment.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was sufficient probable cause for the police officers to believe that
she was then and there committing a crime so as to justify the warrantless search and seizure of
the bag

HELD: Yes.
The search and seizure in the case at bench happened in a moving, public vehicle. The warrantless
search does not lack probable cause, as it was the product of the surveillance activities
conducted by the Narcotics Division of the Baguio City Police, revealing the petitioner as the person
that would be bringing the said prohibited drug to Manila via bus. As the court ruled, When the
moving, public bus was stopped, her bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those
circumstances, the warrantless search of appellant's bag was not illegal.

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4. ROUTINE AIRPORT PROCEDURES

PEOPLE vs JOHNSON, 348 SCRA 526 (2000)

(UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE)
GR 138881, 18 December 2000

FACTS: Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a
resident of Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an
American on 16 June 1968 and had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of
geriatric patients and those with Alzheimer's disease, in convalescent homes in the United States.
On 16 June 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her son's family in Calamba, Laguna.
She was due to fly back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine
Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and
checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, 26 June 1998. At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia
Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure area. Her duty was to frisk
departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs,
contraband goods, and explosives. When she frisked Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the
United States via Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latter's abdominal
area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just
undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4
Reynaldo Embile, saying "Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon." She was directed to
take Johnson to the nearest women's room for inspection. Ramirez took Johnson to the rest room,
accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside. Inside the women's room, Johnson
was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach was and Johnson gave the same
answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her "to bring out the thing under her girdle."
Johnson brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile, outside the
women's room.
The confiscated packs contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance which was fount by
NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." Embile took
Johnson and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO) at the
arrival area of the NAIA, where Johnson's passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened.
Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized. Johnson was charged for the
possession of 3 plastic bages of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, weighing a
total of 580.2 grams; a violation of 16 of RA 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by RA 7659.
On 14 May 1999, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City, found Johnson guilty and
sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and the
costs of the suit. Johnson appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the extensive search made on Johnson at the airport violates her right against
unreasonable search and seizure.

RULING: The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under
custodial investigation but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of

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Section 5, Rule 113 of tie 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when
an offense has in fact just been committed and person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the
Rule above cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far
from being accurate.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport
was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport security procedures. Persons may lose the protection
of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the public in a manner
reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nation's airports.
Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-
on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with
airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs,
and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials
or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure.
These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures. The packs of
methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search,
they are admissible in evidence against Johnson. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of
"shabu" in her person in flagrante delicto.

5. SEIZURE OF EVIDENCE IN PLAIN VIEW

The plain view doctrine is usually applied where the police officer is not searching for evidence
against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes upon an incriminationatory object (People
v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597).

Requisites: a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; 2) the evidence was accidentally discovered by
the police who have the right to be where they are; c) the evidence must be immediately visible;
and d) plain view justified the seizure of the evidence without any further search (People v. Sarap,
G.R. No. 132165, March 26, 2003).

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PEOPLE vs ROLANDO ASPIRAS, Feb 12, 20012

G.R. No. 138382-84

FACTS:
On December 26, 1994, Sr. Inspector Valdez of Paraaque Philippine National Police Drug
Enforcement Unit received a telephone call, informing him that a certain alias Rolly, later identified
as Rolando Aspiras, herein accused-appellant, of Tambo Paraaque was peddling prohibited drugs.
Upon such information, Sr. Insp. Valdez constituted PO3 Jose Soreta, Police Aides (P/A) Abelardo
Soto and Jerry Sabino to conduct a surveillance operation on Rolando Aspiras. On the same day,
surveillance was conducted at J. Puyat Compound where the house of the suspected peddler was
located. Afterwards, the surveillance team went back to the police station and planned a buy-bust
operation.
On December 27, 1994, at around 7 in the evening, P/A Jerry Sabino acted as the poseur-
buyer while PO3 Soreta, P/A Soto and Crisanto Cruz positioned themselves approximately ten
meters away from Aspiras house. When Sabino called for Aspiras, Rodolfo Aha San Lorenzo alias
Bukol went out and inquired what Sabino wanted. Sabino related to San Lorenzo that he wanted
to score or buy marijuana for P50.00 pesos. Sabino then gave to San Lorenzo the marked 5 pieces
of ten peso bills worth P50.00. Upon receipt of such amount, San Lorenzo entered Aspiras house.
Soon after, Aspiras came out and asked Sabino if he was the one who wanted to score. When
Sabino confirmed, Aspiras handed five (5) pieces of aluminum foils. Upon verifying its contents as
marijuana, Sabino signaled his companions to make the arrest. When Aspiras saw the rest of
Sabinos companions, he rushed inside his house and the police team sought after him. Thereat,
the marked money was recovered from Aspiras while PO3 Soreta seized two bricks of marijuana
flower tops wrapped in plastic bag under a table. Afterwards, Aspiras and San Lorenzo were
brought to the headquarters and the marijuana flower tops were sent to the NBI for examination.
Charges were then filed against Aspiras and San Lorenzo for violation of Sections 4 and 8
of R.A. 6425, as amended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the buy-bust operation is valid?

RULING: In this appeal, accused-appellant Aspiras questions the existence of the buy-bust
operation, imputes ill-motive on the police officers and asserts that the evidence against him is
planted.Is the evidence presented before the trial court sufficient to warrant accused-appellants
conviction?

The evidence shows that upon an information of alleged involvement of accused-appellant in the
sale of prohibited drugs, the PNP-Drug Enforcement Unit surveyed the area and identified accused-
appellants residence. After the surveillance, a buy-bust operation was planned and the serial
numbers of five (5) pieces of P10.00 bills were written in the office logbook. Then, the day after
the surveillance, the buy-bust operation was conducted.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment employed by peace officers to catch a malefactor in

flagrante delicto. It has been defined as the employment of such ways and means for the purpose

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of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. The idea to commit the crime originates from the accused;
nobody induces or prods him into committing the offense.

The testimonies of P/A Sabino and PO3 Soreta had sufficiently established how the crime was
committed. The fact that accused-appellant handed to P/A Sabino the five marijuana aluminum
foils amounting to P50.00 pesos constitute the illegal sale of marijuana. There is no fixed procedure
for conducting buy-bust operation and no rule of law requires the simultaneous exchange of the
marked money and the prohibited or regulated drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher or
seller. The well-entrenched principle is that the crime of illegal sale is committed as soon as the
sale transaction is consummated, whether payment precedes or follows delivery of the drug sold.

PEOPLE vs QUE MING KHA, et al, May 29, 2000

FACTS: On May 16, 1997, members Central Police District received a phone call from an informant
that a blue Kia Pregio van with plate number UPN 595 which was being used in the transport of
shabu has been seen within the vicinity of Barangay Holy Spirit, Quezon City. A team was
immediately dispatched to the reported place. Around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the team
spotted the blue Kia van on the opposite sideof the street going toward the direction of
Commonwealth Avenue. Before reaching Commonwealth Avenue, in front of Andok's Litson
Manok, the van hit. A concerned motorist picked up the boy and rushed him to the hospital. When
the police finally intercepted the van, they introduced themselves as police officers to the driver
and passenger of the van and informed them that they committed the crime of reckless
imprudence and asked for his driver's license. The police noted that Go was on the driver's seat
while Que sat on the passenger's seat. The police peered through the window of the van and
noticed several sacks placed on the floor at the back of the van. They opened one of the sacks and
noticed that it contained several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance. The arresting
officers thereafter forwarded the seized substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination.
Each of the nine sacks contained 253 plastic bags which contained around one kilo of the white
crystalline substance. Upon examination, the substance was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.5Both Go and Que claim ignorance about the presence of shabu at the
back of the van.

ISSUE: Whether appellants are guilty of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act

HELD: The Supreme Court found appellant Go guilty of transporting prohibited drugs, but
acquitted appellant Que. It has been established that Go was driving the van that carried the
contraband at the time of its discovery. He was therefore caught in the act of transporting a
regulated drug without authority which is punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Section 15,
Article III of the Dangerous Drugs Act penalizes "any person who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distributed any regulated drug." To exonerate himself, Go
claimed that he was not aware of the existence of the contraband at the back of the van. We are
not persuaded. The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum. In such case, the lack of
criminal intent and good faith do not exempt the accused from criminal liability. Thus, Go's
contention that he did not know that there were illegal drugs.

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PEOPLE vs VALDEZ, G.R. No. 129296, September 25, 2000

(may another version ng Digested Cases after Hizon vs Valdez Page 34)

FACTS:
Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz, accused-appellant, is charged for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended by R.A. No. 7659. The accused was allegedly caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted, cultivated and cultured seven (7) fully
grown marijuana plants known as Indian Hemp from which dangerous drugs maybe manufactured
or derived. Appellant was arraigned and with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, namely: SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2
Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut, all member of the police force,
who testified how the information was received, the commencement of their operation and its
details under the specific instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, they found appellant
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his
kaingin and saw seven (7) five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25
meters away from his nipa hut. PO2 Balut asked appellant who owned the prohibited plants and,
according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. They uprooted the seven marijuana
plants, took photos of appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. One of the
said plants was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for analysis which produced
a positive result. The prosecution also presented a certification from the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources that the land cultivated by appellant where the growing
marijuana plants were found, was part of the public domain. Appellant was acknowledged in the
certification as the occupant of the lot, but no Certificate of Stewardship had yet been issued in his
favor.

The defense presented appellant as its sole witness. He testified he was weeding his vegetable
farm when he was called by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with
the latter to see something. This unknown person then brought appellant to the place where the
marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters away from his nipa hut. Five armed
policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked
if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof,
SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants. Appellant was so
nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana. The police team then brought him to
the police station at Villaverde. At the police headquarters, appellant reiterated that he knew
nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the police. Appellant contends that there was
unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure
a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not
remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of ones person, which includes
his residence, his papers, and other possessions.

ISSUE:

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 Fac Fortia Et Patere

(1) Whether or not the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case is lawful and
the seized evidence admissible.
(2) Whether or not the seized plants is admissible in evidence against the accused.
(3) Whether or not the prosecution has proved appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
(4) Whether or not the sentence of death by lethal injection is correct.

HELD:
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of
the existence of probable cause given the fact that police had ample time to obtain said warrant.
The protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under
specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by
the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law
enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

With respect to the first issue, the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal
search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants
as evidence for the prosecution, the said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and
seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It
was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon
the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.

In the third issue, it is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be
convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a
crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the
accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and
competent. Competent evidence is generally admissible evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn,
is evidence of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be
introduced at trial. And as earlier discussed, it was error on the trial courts part to have admitted
evidences against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him for said evidence
is doubly tainted.

In the fourth issue, the Constitution decrees that, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. To justify the conviction of the accused, the
prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof
of an accuseds guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.

PEOPLE vs ESTELLA, Jan 21, 2003

FACTS:
Antonio C. Estella appealed from the RTC decision of Zambales finding him guilty of violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act.

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 Fac Fortia Et Patere

Appellant claims that the hut, which was searched by the police and where the subject marijuana
was recovered, does not belong to him. He points to another house as his real residence. To
support his claim, he presents a document that shows that the subject hut was sold to his brother
Leonardo C. Estella by one Odilon Eclarinal. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that just because
"appellant has another house in a place away from the hut that was searched does not necessarily
mean that the hut is not occupied by him or under his full control." The prosecution cites the
testimony of Rey Barnachea, the barangay captain of that place, to show that the hut in question
belongs to appellant.

Brgy. Captain Barnachea testified that appellant, after being served the search warrant, remained
outside the hut and did nothing. He categorically stated that when the police officers had gone
inside the hut to conduct the search, appellant remained seated on a rocking chair outside. Hence,
his statements sow doubts as to the veracity of SPO1 Buloron's claim that, after being apprised of
the contents of the search warrant, appellant voluntarily surrendered the prohibited drug to the
police. Hence, the testimony of Barnachea undermined, not advanced, the position of the
prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a search incident to a lawful arrest.

HELD: NO. The search was not incidental to a lawful arrest.

The law provides that the scope of the search should be limited to the area within which the person
to be arrested can reach for a weapon or for evidence that he or she can destroy. The prevailing
rule is that the arresting officer may take from the arrested individual any money or property found
upon the latter's person that which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of
the crime, or which may provide the prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping,
or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.

In the case at bar, searched was the entire hut, which cannot be said to have been within
appellant's immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of that which may be
considered to be incident to a lawful arrest. The attempt to make it appear that appellant occupied
it, or that it was under his full control, is merely conjectural and speculative. To lead to conviction,
evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt. It must
engender moral certainty.

6. CONSENTED SEARCHES

Requisites: a) there is a right; b) there must be knowledge of the existence of such right;
and c) there must be intention to waive (De Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil 689).

PEOPLE vs COMPACION, GR 124442, 20 July 2001

FACTS:
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that Armando Compacion y
Surposa was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1 Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio

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 Fac Fortia Et Patere

Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod
City Detachment conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion who was then the
barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on 9 July 1995.
During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the backyard of Compacion which they
suspected to be marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their
surveillance to SPO4 Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately
formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division Provincial Command, the
Criminal Investigation Command and the Special Action Force.
Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL Radio, were
also included in the composite team. On 12 July 1995, the team applied for a search warrant with
the office of Executive Judge Bernardo Ponferrada in Bacolod City.
However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that he did not have territorial jurisdiction over
the matter. The team then left Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around 6:30
p.m., then went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search warrant.
They were not able to do so because it was nighttime and office hours were obviously over. They
were told by the judge to go back in the morning. Nonetheless, the team proceeded to barangay
Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of Compacion in the early morning of 13 July 1995. SPO4
Villamor knocked at the gate and called out for Compacion. What happened thereafter is subject
to conflicting accounts.

The prosecution contends that Compacion opened the gate and permitted them to come
in. He was immediately asked by SPO4 Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he
admitted that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering from
migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for violation of Section 9 of RA
6425 and informed him of his constitutional rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected
marijuana plants. SPO1 Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics
Drug Identification Kit.

The test yielded a positive result. On 15 July 1995, the plants were turned over to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to
Senior Inspector Reah Abastillas Villavicencio. Senior Inspector Villavicencio weighed and
measured the plants, one was 125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches
and weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted, namely: the
microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin layer chromatographic test. All yielded positive
results. On his part, Compacion maintains that around 1:30 a.m. on 13 July 1995 while he and his
family were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down bringing with
him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, 4 persons who he thought were members of the
military, entered the premises then went inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the
others who entered the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men
told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the others went around the
house. None of them asked for his permission to search his house and the premises. After about
20 minutes of searching, the men called him outside and brought him to the backyard. One of the
military men said: "Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at your backyard" to which Compacion
replied: "I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana plants but what I know is that they are

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medicinal plants for my wife" who was suffering from migraine. After he was informed that the
plants in his backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and themselves. Constitutional
Law II, 2005 ( 61 ) Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where
he and the military men spent the night. At around 10:00 a.m., they brought him with them to the
city hall. Compacion saw that one of the 2 service vehicles they brought was fully loaded with
plants. He was later told by the military men that said plants were marijuana. Upon arrival at the
city hall, the men met with the mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture
of him together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as back drop. Soon
thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF Headquarters. A criminal complaint for
violation of Section 9 of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659 was filed against Compacion. On 2
January 1996, the trial court convicted Compacion of the crime charged, and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated.

HELD: Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution are safeguards against reckless,
malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty.

A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of the
constitutional provision. Evidence secured thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure, will
be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding."

The requirement that a warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior
to the conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several instances when
the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of the premises consents or voluntarily
submits to a search; when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; when
the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of
customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of
smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves
a "stop and frisk" situation; when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; or in
cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and
building regulations.

In these instances, a search may be validly made even without a warrant. Herein, the search
and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not
authorized by a search warrant, It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the
above mentioned cases.

Consequently, Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly
violated. As a general rule, objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently
comes across an incriminating object.

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Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a
prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) "plain
view" justified were seizure of evidence without further search. Here, there was no valid
warrantless arrest. They forced their way into Compacion's premises without the latter's consent.
It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion
on 9 July 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly
came in "plain view" of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on 13 July
1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him.
In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one
to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants
inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into Compacion's residence. As held
in People v. Musa, the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Hence, Compacion is acquitted of the crime to which he was charged.

7. SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST

Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.

Requisites: a) arrest must be lawful; b) search and seizure must be contemporaneous with arrest;
c) search must be within permissible area (People v. Estella, G.R. Nos. 138539 40, January 21,
2003)

PEOPLE vs JERRY TING UY, APRIL 11, 2002

FACTS:
Appellant Jerry Ting Uy, a Taiwanese national, was arrested in a buy-bust operation. Marked
money bills were retrieved from him, and three plastic bags of shabu were confiscated found
underneath the drivers seat. He was charged for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. However, he
contended that he was a victim of frame-up and that the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest
is inadmissible.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence seized in the warrantless arrest is inadmissible.

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HELD:
No. Clearly, the search made by the police officers in the instant case was incidental to a lawful
arrest. Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a
person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
Undoubtedly, appellant was lawfully arrested, caught as he was in flagrante delicto as a result of a
buy-bust operation conducted by police officers.
The Constitution generally proscribes searches and seizures without judicial warrant. Any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding (Sections 2 and
3(2), Article III). The rule is not absolute, however. Searches and seizures may be made without
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1)
the search was incident to a lawful arrest; (2) the search is of a moving motor vehicle; (3) the search
concerns violation of customs laws; (4) the seizure of evidence in plain view; and (5) when the
accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures (People vs. Doria, 301
SCRA 668 [1999]).

A buy-bust operation is vastly different from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests in the course of
a buy-bust operation, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to
conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the accused but also in the permissible
area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of the person arrested,
or that which may furnish him the means of committing violence or of escaping (People vs.
Cueno, 298 SCRA 621 [1998]). In other words, a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control.

Sharica filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against
her husband Steven and her parents-in-law, spouses Pecto Yan and Ramona Yan before the RTC.
She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with her parents-in-law, were causing verbal, psychological
and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004.

However, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-
known rule of law expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Are parents-in-law covered by R.A. No.
9262?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The SC ruled that while RA 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity

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to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on
a particular matter.

The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262
because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law.
Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be
applied suppletorily.

"Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action
in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, fellester.blogspot.com the act of one is the act of
all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals."

It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated
by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the
legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law
according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence
against women and children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds
no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory
construction. It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as
a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be
permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. (Tan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 168852,
September 30, 2008)

PEOPLE vs CUENO, 298 SCRA 621

In People v. Cueno, the failure to present the marked money in evidence is not indispensable for the
conviction of the accused, as long as the sale can be adequately proved in some other way by the
prosecution. The production of the marked money recovered from the possession of accused-
appellant further strengthened the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that a buy-bust operation
was conducted.

FACTS:
Ferdinand Cueno y Mala was charged and convicted for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Cueno questions his conviction in this Criminal Case allegedly because of the illegality of the search
made in his house. The arrest of appellant has been made in the course of a buy-bust operation,
thus, in flagrante delicto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was illegal.

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HELD:
No, the arrest was not illegal. A buy-bust operation - a form of entrapment which has repeatedly
been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law - is far variant
from an ordinary arrest. In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but
also in the permissible area within his reach, i.e., that point which is within the effective control of
the person arrested, or that which may furnish him with the means of committing violence or of
escaping. Furthermore, the search was made within the permissible area of the house of the
appellant.

PEOPLE vs CATAN, 1992

8. STOP AND FRISK

Stop and frisk is defined as the particular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons whenever he observes unusual conduct
which leads him to conclude that criminal activity may be afoot (Terry v. Ohio).

Requisites: a) that there is a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct; b) that the
police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial inquiries; c) that the police officer
approached and restrained the person in order to check the latters outer clothing for possibly
concealed weapon; and d) that the apprehending officer must have a genuine reason to warrant
the belief that the person to be held has weapon or contraband concealed about him People v. Sy
Chua, G.R. Nos. 136066 67, February 4, 2003)

PEOPLE vs SALAYAO 262 S 255 (1996)

FACTS:
- Nilo Solayao was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition defined and penalized under Presidential
Decree No. 1866.
- SPO3 Jose Nio stated that he and other operatives went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran,
Biliran. They were to conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer
to verify reports on the presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.
- The team of Police Officer Nio proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met the group of
accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they

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observed that the latter were drunk and that Solayao was wearing a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit. Solayaos companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.
- Confiscated from Solayao is a homemade firearm called Latong. Solayao admitted that he had no
permission to possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Nio confiscated the firearm and turned him
over to the custody of the policeman of Caibiran who subsequently investigated him and charged
him with illegal possession of firearm.
- Solayao was found guilty, then he appealed to the court against the admissibility of the firearm
as evidence as it was the product of an unlawful warrantless search.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

HELD:
Firearm is admissible as evidence.

RATIO:
The case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be effected without
first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-appellant when his
companions fled upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first. Suspicion also arouse when the
group was spotted dressed in camouflage.
Also the officers were precisely in the area to conduct an operation to verify the intelligence
report and stop any potential disturbance in the area.

PEOPLE vs MALMSTEDT, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDTG.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

FACTS:
Captain Alen Vasco, the commanding officer of the first regional command (NARCOM)
stationed at camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint for the purpose of
checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana
and other prohibited drugs. And an information also was received about a Caucasian coming from
Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

In the afternoon the bus where accused was riding stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC Galutan
boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would
conduct an inspection. During the inspection CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused waist.
Suspecting the bulge on accused waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accuseds passport and
other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out
whatever it was that was bulging o his waist. And it turned out to be a pouched bag and when
accused opened the same bag the officer noticed four suspicious looking objects wrapped in brown
packing tape. It contained hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

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Thereafter, the accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted
from the bus accused stopped to get two travelling bags. The officer inspects the bag. It was only
after the officers had opened the bags that the accused finally presented his passport. The two
bags contained a stuffed toy each, upon inspection the stuff toy contained also hashish.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure

RULING:
The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides:

Arrest without warrant; when lawful a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person
a. When, in the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
b. When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c. When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporary confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto, thus the
search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph 1 of the foregoing
provision of law, which allows a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the object
sought in connection with the offense are in the placed sought to be searched.

When NARCOM received the information that a Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City
was carrying with him a prohibited drug, there was no time to obtain a search warrant.

MANALILI vs CA, 1997

FACTS:
Pat. Romeo Espiritu and Pat. Anger Lumabas were patrolling the vicinity of the Kalookan
City Cemetery due to reports of drug addicts roaming the area. They chanced upon a male (who
turned out to be petitioner Alain Manalili y Dizon) who seemed to be high on drugs in front of
the cemetery. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. When
Manalili tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and asked what he was holding
in his hands. Manalili tried to resist, but the policemen were persistent until he yielded his wallet
which they examined and found to contain crushed marijuana residue. Further examination by the

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Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI confirmed the findings. Trial court convicted Manalili of
violation of Section 8, Article II, of RA 6425. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court.
(In his defense, Manalili claimed that he was not walking; that he was riding a tricycle until
the three policemen ordered the driver of the tricycle to stop because the driver and passenger
were allegedly under the influence of marijuana. He claimed that he was searched and his pants
were turned inside-out but nothing was found. To some extent he implied that the marijuana
sample found in his entity was framed up by the policemen.)

ISSUE: WON the evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk operation is admissible.

HELD: Yes

The general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant. However, this is not absolute and exceptions have been contemplated by the law:
1. Search incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Search of moving vehicles
3. Seizure in plain view
4. Customs search
5. Waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and
seizure.

In the cited cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as
essential requirement.

Probable cause (in relation to search and seizure): Existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the item, article, or object sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
A stop-and-frisk operation is another exception to the general rule. In this case, probable
cause was established with Manalilis suspicious behavior.

9. UNDER EXIGENT AND EMERGENCY CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE vs DE GRACIA, 233 S 716

FACTS: The incidents involved in this case took place at the height of the coup d''etat staged in
December, 1989. Accused-appellant Rolando de Gracia was charged in two separate informations
for illegal possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
homicide. Appellant was convicted for illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion,
but was acquitted of attempted homicide. Surveillance was undertaken by the military along
EDSA because of intelligence reports about a coup. Members of the team were engaged by rebels
in gunfire killing one member of the team. A searching team raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They

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were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16 ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites,
M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain
Col. Matillano. De Gracia was seen inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and
suspiciously peeping through a door. The team arrested appellant. They were then made to sign
an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding
team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team. Accused was found guilty of illegal
possession of firearms. That judgment of conviction is now challenged before us in this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case.

HELD: YES It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were
not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was
a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a group
of men coming from the Eurocar building.

In people vs de gracia, the raid of, and the consequent seizure of firearms and ammunition in, the
Eurocar Sales Office at the height of the December 1989 coup detat was held valid, considering the
exigent and emergency situation obtaining. The military operatives had reasonable ground to believe
that a crime was being committed, and they had no opportunity to apply for a search warrant from
the courts because the latter were closed. Under such urgency and exigency, a search warrant could
be validly dispensed with. (NACHURA)

10. INSPECTION OF BUILDINGS AND OTHER PREMISES TO ENFORCE SAFETY, SANITARY AND OTHER
BUILDING REGULATIONS

11. SEACHES OF VESSELS AND AIRCRAFTS FOR VIOLATION OF IMMIGRATION, CUSTOMS AND DRUG
LAWS

HIZON vs VALDEZ, Sept 25, 2005

FACTS:
In September 1992, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Command of Puerto Princesa
City, Palawan received reports of illegal fishing operations in the coastal waters of the city. In
response to these reports, the city mayor organized Task Force Bantay Dagat to assist the police in
the detection and apprehension of violators of the laws on fishing. On 30 September 1992 at about
2:00 p.m., the Task Force Bantay Dagat reported to the PNP Maritime Command that a boat and
several small crafts were fishing by "muro ami" within the shoreline of Barangay San Rafael of
Puerto Princesa. The police, headed by SPO3 Romulo Enriquez, and members of the Task Force
Bantay Dagat, headed by Benito Marcelo, Jr., immediately proceeded to the area and found several
men fishing in motorized sampans and a big fishing boat identified as F/B Robinson within the
seven-kilometer shoreline of the city. They boarded the F/B Robinson and inspected the boat with
the acquiescence of the boat captain, Silverio Gargar. In the course of their inspection, the police

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saw two foreigners in the captain's deck. SPO3 Enriquez examined their passports and found them
to be mere photocopies.
The police also discovered a large aquarium full of live lapu-lapu and assorted fish weighing
approximately one ton at the bottom of the boat. They checked the license of the boat and its
fishermen and found them to be in order. Nonetheless, SPO3 Enriquez brought the boat captain,
the crew and the fishermen to Puerto Princesa for further investigation. At the city harbor,
members of the Maritime Command were ordered by SPO3 Enriquez to guard the F/B Robinson.
The boat captain and the two foreigners were again interrogated at the PNP Maritime Command
office.
Thereafter, an Inspection/Apprehension Report was prepared and the boat, its crew and
fishermen were charged with the following violations: (1) Conducting fishing operations within
Puerto Princesa coastal waters without mayor's permit; (2) Employing excess fishermen on board
(Authorized 26; On board 36); and (3) Two (2) Hongkong nationals on board without original
passports." The following day, 1 October 1992, SPO3 Enriquez directed the boat captain to get
random samples of fish from the fish cage of F/B Robinson for laboratory examination. On 7
October 1992, NBI Forensic Chemist Emilia Rosaldes conducted two tests on the fish samples and
found that they contained sodium cyanide. In light of these findings, the PNP Maritime Command
of Puerto Princesa City filed the complaint against the owner and operator of the F/B Robinson,
the First Fishermen Fishing Industries, Inc., represented by Richard Hizon, the boat captain Silverio
Gargar, the boat engineer Ernesto Andaya, two other crew members, the two Hongkong nationals
and 28 fishermen of the said boat for the offense of illegal fishing with the use of obnoxious or
poisonous substance penalized under Presidential Decree (PD) 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.
In an Information dated 15 October 1992, Hizon, et. al. were charged with a violation of PD 704.
Hizon, et. al. were arraigned and they pled not guilty to the charge. On 23 November 1992,
however, Salud Rosales, another forensic chemist of the NBI in Manila conducted three (3) tests
on the specimens and found the fish negative for the presence of sodium cyanide. On 9 July 1993,
the trial court found Hizon, et. al. guilty and sentenced them to imprisonment for a minimum of 8
years and 1 day to a maximum of 9 years and 4 months. The court also ordered the confiscation
and forfeiture of the F/B Robinson, the 28 sampans and the ton of assorted live fishes as
instruments and proceeds of the offense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
court. Hizon, et. al. filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the search and seizure conducted in Hizons boat is valid.

HELD: Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure and the arrest of persons without a judicial
warrant. As a general rule, any evidence obtained without a judicial warrant is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, subject to certain exceptions.

Some of these are: (1) a search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving motor vehicle; and (4) search in violation of customs laws.

Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and aircrafts for violations of customs laws
have been the traditional exception to the constitutional requirement of a search warrant. It is

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rooted on the recognition that a vessel and an aircraft, like motor vehicles, can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought and secured.

Yielding to this reality, judicial authorities have not required a search warrant of vessels and
aircrafts before their search and seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception
ought to apply to seizures of fishing vessels and boats breaching our fishery laws. These vessels are
normally powered by high-speed motors that enable them to elude arresting ships of the Philippine
Navy, the Coast Guard and other government authorities enforcing our fishery laws. The
warrantless search on the F/B Robinson, a fishing boat suspected of having engaged in illegal
fishing, thus is valid. The fish and other evidence seized in the course of the search were properly
admitted by the trial court.

Moreover, Hizon failed to raise the issue during trial and hence, waived their right to question any
irregularity that may have attended the said search and seizure. However, Hizon et. al. are not
guilty of the offense of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. The prosecution failed
to explain the contradictory findings on the fish samples and this omission raises a reasonable
doubt that the one ton of fishes in the cage were caught with the use of sodium cyanide. The
absence of cyanide in the second set of fish specimens supports Hizon, et. al.'s claim that they did
not use the poison in fishing. According to them, they caught the fishes by the ordinary and legal
way, i.e., by hook and line on board their sampans. This claim is buttressed by the prosecution
evidence itself. The authorities found nothing on the boat that would have indicated any form of
illegal fishing. All the documents of the boat and the fishermen were in order. It was only after the
fish specimens were tested, albeit under suspicious circumstances, that Hizon, et. al. were charged
with illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances. Hence, Hizon, et. al. are acquitted of the
crime of illegal fishing with the use of poisonous substances defined under Section 33 of Republic
Act 704, the Fisheries Decree of 1975.

About the PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

PEOPLE vs VALDEZ, Sept. 25, 2005

People vs. Valdez [GR 129296, 25 September 2000]

FACTS:
At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police
force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, received a tip from an unnamed informer about the presence
of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung,
Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez's hut.
Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a
reaction team from his operatives to verify the report.

The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S.
Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific
instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At approximately

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5:00 a.m. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for the site where
the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police
found Valdez alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where Valdez
had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25
meters from Valdez's hut. PO2 Balut asked Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and, according
to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the 7 marijuana plants, which
weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of Valdez standing beside the cannabis plants.
Valdez was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros
Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said
plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana.
She next conducted a chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions.
Valdez alleged otherwise. He claims that at around 10:00 a.m., 25 September 1996, he was
weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called by a person whose identity he does
not know. He was asked to go with the latter to "see something." This unknown person then
brought Valdez to the place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters
away from his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen were present and they made him stand in front of the
hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana growing there. When he
denied any knowledge thereof, SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership
of the plants. Valdez was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the marijuana.

The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of the marijuana plants. He
was then made to uproot 5 of the cannabis plants, and bring them to his hut, where another photo
was taken of him standing next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then
brought him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a barangay peace
officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers. Pascua, who bore a grudge against
him, because of his refusal to participate in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him
to admit owning the marijuana, otherwise be would "be put in a bad situation." At the police
headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana plants seized by the
police. Still, on 26 September 1996, Valdez was charged for the cultivation and culture of the 7
fully grown marijuana plants. On 15 November 1996, Valdez was arraigned and, with assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued. On 18 February 1997,
the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case 3105, found
Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal
injection. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to warrantless search and
seizure, based on the plain view doctrine.

HELD:
The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the
strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable."
Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for

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being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Herein, there was no search warrant
issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause.

From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1
day to obtain a warrant to search Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them.
The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their
possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the
issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the
accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not
underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and
only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants.

The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty
alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of
their intentions. The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that it
should apply the "plain view" doctrine.

For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are; and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified
mere seizure of evidence without further search.

Herein, the police officers first located the marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested
without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of
Valdez's premises. The police team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin precisely to search for and
uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. Also, upon
arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal
plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further
search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to
eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.

c. AUTHENTICITY

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