TAADA VS.

TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials
to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no
legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
LOLOY UNDURAN v. RAMON ABERASTURI, GR No. 181284, 2015-10-20
Facts:
Petitioners... are members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or
Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag,...
Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers.
respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the lawful owners and possessor of an
unregistered parcel of agricultural land
On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages... before the Regional Trial Court
of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC)
On March 23, 2004, the rest of the petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Certificate of Ancestral Domain
Title (CADT)
As awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the
subject matter concerns a dispute and controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).
On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional
Hearing Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Issues:
In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents'
amended complaint,
Ruling:
The petition has no merit.
Court disagrees with their contention that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file
the petition, for failure to show that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they are authorized to... represent the
Talaandig tribe.
That petitioners are the real parties in interest can be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with Motion to Refer the
Case to the Regional
Hearing Office of the NCIP[12] filed by the NCIP Special Transition Team-Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU).
The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein that the respondents' complaint for recovery of ownership (accion...
reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in Miarayon, Bukidnon, from petitioners, all
of whom are, with the exception of Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-
TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of... the Talaandig Indigenous Peoples, located at Talakag,
Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation, petitioners presented a certification[13] that the disputed land is
within the area covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of
Talaandig Ancestral Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon.[
In contrast, respondents failed to submit any evidence to dispute petitioners' claim that they are members of the
Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents' contention... that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is
without merit.
Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their
respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations in the original and amended complaints to find out which
tribunal may properly exercise jurisdiction over this... case.
respondents traced the provenance of their title over said land to one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig
tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957
They claimed that by means of fraud, stealth and surreptitious means, petitioners entered the said... land, without
permission and against the consent of the landowners, caused damages therein and harassed respondents by
indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers.
The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the amended complaint based on
allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their ancestral land
is not enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:
A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights
of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1)
exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through
the said certification by the Council of
Elders/Leaders.
In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to
Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within the ancestral domain of
the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and... decide this case.
the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR,[23] Rule III, Section 5[24] and Rule IV, Sections 13 and 14
of the NCIP Rules[25] as null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the
IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
Court of Appeals Decision
AFFIRMED.
Principles:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real parties in interest"
The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the
allegations contained in the complaint... of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.
Once vested by the allegations in the... complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein."[15]
Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this
restrictive definition, it can be gleaned that it is only... when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the
abovesaid two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are
recognized to have their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they... will fail to
meet the abovesaid two conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is
neither bound by customary laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be
violative of the principles of fair play and... due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to
be subjected to its customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders.
parties belonging to different ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the
jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the NCIP.
Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Rep., G.R. NO. 180705, Nov. 27,2012 686 SCRA 472

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco AG.R.eement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did
not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acopy thereof
attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said AG.R.eement the status
of a law.

1st set

110 Agoy vs. NLRC PICHAY, NIMPA T.

Quitclaims; Compromise Agreements

AGOY vs. NLRC G.R. No. 112096, January 30, 1996 FRANCISCO,J.

FACTS:
This is a petition petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the NLRC dismissing petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal.
Grave abuse of discretion is imputed to respondent NLRC consequent to the assailed resolution which petitioner maintains was
rendered with evident partiality and mental prejudice. Petitioner Marcelino Agoy alleged that he applied for overseas
employment as civil engineer with private respondent EUREKA, and was subsequently accepted to work as "CE/Road Engineer"
for private respondent AL-KHODAR) under a two year contract with a basic salary of SR1,750.00 per month and food allowance
of SR200.00 with free accommodation. On January 28, 1990, petitioner was deployed by respondent Eureka to Jubail, Saudi
Arabia under the category of "Foreman" at a basic monthly salary of US$460.00, which terms were allegedly different from the
original contract. Left with no other choice, petitioner was forced to accept the position and started to work on February 7, 1990.
He was later asked by respondent Al-Khodari to sign a new contract at a reduced salary rate of SR1,200.00 or suffer termination
and repatriation. Complainant's refusal to sign the new contract eventually resulted in his dismissal from employment on March
26, 1990. After being paid the remaining balance of his salary, petitioner executed a Final Settlement releasing respondent Al-
Khodari from all claims and liabilities. On April 5, 1990, petitioner received a letter dated April 2, 1990 with subject "Termination
of Services Within the Probation Period" which he was forced to sign and consent to. Petitioner was finally repatriated to Manila
on April 6, 1990. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for payment of salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract, salary differential and damages against respondents Eureka and Al-Khodari. POEA dismissed petitioner's complaint after
finding that the evidence on record clearly indicated that petitioner himself voluntarily consented to his termination and
repatriation. It also found as self-serving and hardly credible petitioner's allegation that he was merely forced by his employer to
indicate "agreed" to his notice of termination, absent any clear and convincing proof to corroborate the same. Moreover, the
POEA upheld respondent employer's right to dismiss petitioner within the probationary period on the ground that he failed to
meet its performance standard

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is illegal dismissal despite the petitioner is only a probationary employee.

HELD
Yes, the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Probationary employees, notwithstanding their limited tenure, are also entitled to
security of tenure. Thus, except for just cause as provided by law or under the employment contract, a probationary employee
cannot be terminated. 16 As explicitly provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code, a probationary employee may be terminated
on two grounds: (a) for just cause or (b) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The assailed Resolution of respondent NLRC dated September 22, 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE and the Decision dated December 9,
1992 is REINSTATED.
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO AND UPTON
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985

FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were
married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also
in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties,
and asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.

Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community property as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is
located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?

HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after their
marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court
during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree
to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction,
the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation
before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

.
Quita vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998

FACTS:

Fe Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941 and were
not blessed with children. Their relationship soured and eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in U.S.A and
in July 1954, she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three weeks after, she married a certain Felix Tupaz
in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for the
third time, to a certain Wernimont.

On 16 April 1972 Arturo died and left no will. In August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of
Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent BlandinaDandan, claiming to be the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan,
named in the children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of
Atty. Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the oppositors
themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the
deceased Arturo, intervened.

Petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate.
At a scheduled hearing, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan
children within ten days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on
the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.

ISSUE:

Who between petitioner and private respondent may validly claim as the spouse of the decedent

RULING:

The right of petitioner to inherit as Arturos spouse must still be determined by the trial court. The trial
court failed to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship when she obtained the divorce abroad. The
purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.

On the other hand, private respondents claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting
thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the
Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes
a legitimate relationship.

The case was remanded to the trial court.