ABUNADO VS PEOPLE

In 1967, Narcisa Arceo married Salvador Abunado. Later, Arceo left for Japan to work there. She
returned in 1992 but Abunado was nowhere to be found as he left the family home. Arceo was able to
locate Abunado but when she did, Abunado was already cohabiting with somebody else. Further, Arceo
also discovered that in 1989, Abunado married a certain Zenaida Bias.

In January 1995, Abunado filed an annulment case against Arceo. In May 1995, Arceo filed a bigamy
case against Abunado. Both cases proceeded simultaneously and independently in different courts.

In 1999, the marriage between Arceo and Abunado was annulled. In 2001, Abunado was convicted by
the trial court for bigamy.

Abunado now questions the judgment of conviction against him as he alleged that the annulment case he
filed against Arceo was a prejudicial question to the bigamy case filed against him by Arceo. Hence, the
proceedings in the bigamy case should have been suspended during the pendency of the annulment case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abunado is correct.

HELD: No. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for
it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related
to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue
or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.

Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if Abunado eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled. In short, all the elements of bigamy were present the nullity of the prior
marriage is immaterial.

MEYNARDO BELTRAN VS PEOPLE AND JUDGE TUAZON

In 1973, Beltran and Charmaine Felix married each other. Theyve had 4 children since then but after 24
years of marriage Beltran filed an action for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage due to Felixs
PI. Felix countered that Beltran left the conjugal home to cohabit with a certain Milagros and that she filed
a case of concubinage against Beltran. In 1997, the lower court found probable cause against Beltran and
Milagros. In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, Beltran raised the issue that
the civil case he filed is a prejudicial question to the criminal case filed by Milagros. He said that the courts
hearing the cases may issue conflicting rulings if the criminal case will not be suspended until the civil case
gets resolved. The lower court denied Beltrans petition and so did Judge Tuazon of the RTC upon appeal.
Beltran then elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of a previous marriage be invoked as a prejudicial question in
the case at bar.
HELD: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has
two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of Beltrans marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based,
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

The SC ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable.

In a case for concubinage, the accused (Beltran) need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage
void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to Beltrans argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

TE VS CA (TE V. CHOA)

FACTS: Arthur Te and Liliana Choa were married on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. In 1989, Liliana gave birth to a girl. Thereafter,
Arthur stopped visiting her. In 1990, Arthur contracted a second marriage while marriage with Liliana was
subsisting. Liliana filed bigamy case against Arthur and subsequently an administrative case (revocation
of engineering license for grossly immoral act) against Arthur and Julieta Santella (2ndwife of Arthur).
Arthur petitioned for the nullity of his marriage with Liliana. RTC and Board rendered decision while the
petition for annulment of first marriage was pending.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Marriage annulment case is a prejudicial question and had to be resolved first
before criminal and administrative case be rendered judgment?

HELD: NO. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise
in a judicial proceeding. Thus, it cannot be used as a prejudicial question to the prior criminal case and
administrative case against the petitioner. Moreover, the second marriage was clearly a void ab initio.
Lastly, Article 40 of the Family Code is the prevailing rule: the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may
not be invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void.

QUIMIGUING VS. ICAO

Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors and had close and confidential relations. Defendant,
although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with the plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation and without her consent. As a result she became pregnant and had to stop studying. Later
she gave birth to a baby girl. She instituted an action to recover damages from the defendant. The lower
court dismissed the case on the ground that the original complaint averred no cause of action. Plaintiff
appealed.

Issue: W/N defendant is liable for damages.

Held: The orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.

Ratio: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation
of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21
of Civil Code of the Philippines: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

ANTONIO GELUZ, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND OSCAR LAZO, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know Geluz when she was pregnant by her husband before their marriage.
Geluz performed an abortion on Nita Villanueva. After the latters marriage, she again became pregnant
and since she was employed in the Commission on Elections, the pregnancy was inconvenient and she
had herselfaborted again by Geluz. In less than two years, she again became pregnant and had her two-
month old fetus aborted by Geluz for a sum of fifty pesos. Nitas husband was then campaigning for his
election and was aware and did not give consent to the abortion. He filed for an action for the award of
damages. The trial court and Court of Appeals predicated the award of damages in the sum of three
thousand pesos for moral damages.

Issue:

Whether or not the spouses Lazo could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.

Held:

The petition is meritorious.

The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages which the parents of an
unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development
of the fetus, on account of distress and anguish attendantto its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations. In this case, however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions
of his wife, clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
expectations.
The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.

DE JESUS V SYQUIA 58 PHIL 866

Facts:

This is an action by Antonia Loanco de Jesus, as mother of two infants, for the purpose of recovering from
the defendant, Cesar Syquia damages arising from (1) breach of promise to marry, (2) to compel the
defendant to recognize Ismael as his natural child and pay maintenance for him. Cesar met Antonia at the
barbershop where she works as a cashier. Soon, she became pregnant. Cesar was a constant visitor at her
home, and wrote a letter to the priest saying that if the child was a boy, it will be christened in his name.
On his trip to China and Japan, he was writing letters to Antonia cautioning her to keep in good condition
so that junior will be strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house where
they lived together for 1 year as a family, with expenses being shouldered by Syquia. She became pregnant
again, but soon Syquia left her to marry another woman.

Issue:

WON (1) there would be damages for the breach to marry. (2) WON Syquia is compelled to recognize
Ismael loanco as his natural child

Held:

The SC upheld the decision of the trail court in refusing to give damages to Antonia for breach of promise
to marry. The action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.

As for the recognition of the child, the acknowledgment of paternity is satisfied by the production of more
than 1 document of indubitable authenticity.

LIMJOCO VS. ESTATE OF FRAGRANTE

FACTS:
On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate
Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special or Judicial
Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice
plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2) tons in the Municipality of San Juan and
to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and
Quezon City; that Fragantes intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the
latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD:
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view
of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was
applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it
received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the
decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his
demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person",
as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from
the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the
settlement and distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration of
those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel
of the assets of his estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the
decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death
like his pending application at the commission.

DUMLAO V. QUALITY PLASTICS, 70 SCRA 472

FACTS: Pedro Oria died on April 23, 1959. On June 13, 1960, Quality Plastic Products, Inc. filed a case
gaianst Pedro Oria, Vicente Soliven, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbog, and Juana Darang. On June
24, 1960, Vicente Soliven received and signed the summons and copies of the complaint in his behalf and
his co-defendants. On February 18, 1962, CFI ordered the defendants to pay P3,667.03 to Quality Plastic
Products Inc to avoid foreclosure of their surety bonds. However, Oria failed to pay (eh kais patay na nga)
the said amount. Thus the lower court ordered the foreclosure of his surety bond and sale of his public
land which he had given as a security for the bond. On March 1, 1963, Orias land was sold through auction
by the sheriff. Hence, the testamentary heirs of Oria sued Quality Plastic Products and prayed for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the sale of his land. Quality Plastics did not know about Orias
death.

ISSUE: W/N the judgment against Oria and his land are valid

HELD: The Quality Plastics only learned about Orias death upon receipt of the summons of Orias heirs.
They acted in good faith in including Oria as a co-defendant. However, no jurisdiction was acquired over
Oria. Hence, the judgment against him is patent nullity. Oria, upon his death, had no more civil personality
and his juridical capacity which made him capable of legal relations was lost through death. However,
Dumlaos (heirs) are not entitled to claim attorneys fee for the corporation.
MOY YA LIM YAO VS COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the Philippines, whose authorized stay in the Philippines was to expire,
claims herself to be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes
the ground that the marriage of the alien to a Filipino citizen does not automatically confer on the latter
Philippine citizenship. Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the qualifications required for applicant for
naturalization (CA 473), even she has proven that she possesses none of the disqualifications in said law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso facto,
provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)

FRIVALDO VS COMELEC

FACTS:

Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time.
The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the
ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.

Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was naturalized
as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.

RULING: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws
of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him and
the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63
as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation.

UYTENGSU VS. REPUBLIC

Facts: Petitioner-appellee was born, of Chinese parents, in Dumaguete, Negros Oriental on October 6,
1927, where he also finished his primary and secondary education. He went to the United States, where,
from 1947 to 1950, he was enrolled in the Leland Stanford Junior University, in California. In April of the
same year he returned to the Philippines for four (4) months vacation. Then, to be exact, on July 15, 1950,
his present application for naturalization was filed. Forthwith, he returned to the United States and took
a postgraduate course, in chemical engineering, in another educational institution. He finished this course
in July 1951; but did not return to the Philippines until October 13, 1951.

Petitioner contends, and the lower court held, that the word residence, as used in the aforesaid
provision of the Naturalization Law, is synonymous with domicile, which, once acquired, is not lost by
physical absence, until another domicile is obtained, and that, from 1946 to 1951, he continued to be
domiciled in, and hence a resident of the Philippines, his purpose in staying in the United States, at that
time, being, merely to study therein.

Issue: Whether or not the application for naturalization may be granted, notwithstanding the fact that
petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition and did not return until several
months after the first date set for the hearing thereof.

Held: While, generally speaking, domicile and residence mean one and the same thing, residence
combined with intention to remain, constitutes domicile while an established abode, fixed permanently
for a time for business or other purposes, constitutes a residence, though there may be an intent, existing
all the while, to return to the true domicile.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and
did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his
explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the
filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship, he has not complied with
the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a
judgment in his favor.

ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte. She stated in the COC that she is a resident of the place for seven months. Private
respondent Montejo subsequently filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification on the ground that
Imelda failed to meet the constitutional requirement of one-year residency. COMELEC granted the
Petition for Disqualification, holding that Imelda is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City as her place
of domicile when she lived and even voted in Ilocos and Manila.

ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda is deemed to have abandoned her domicile of origin

HELD:
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residence in different places.
Residence implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion that she could not have been
a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election purposes.

GRACE POE VS. COMELEC

The Case

Grace Poe was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by Edgardo
Militar in 1968. Parental care and custody over her was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano
Militar and his wife. Emiliano reported and registered Grace Poe as a foundling with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Iloilo City. Fenando Poe, Jr. and Susan Roces adopted Grace Poe.

1991 Poe went to the US to be a permanent resident therein

2001 She became a naturalized US citizen

First quarter of 2005 she came back to the Philippines to permanently reside herein

February 14, 2006- she went back to the US to dispose family belongings

July 18, 2006 she re-acquired Filipino citizenship

According to Poe in her 2013 COC for Senator, before the May 13, 2013 election, she has been a
resident of the Philippines for 6 years and 6 months (reckoned from year 2006 when she re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225).

Poe filed her COC for Presidency for the May 9, 2016 elections (hence, computing from May, 2013,
she has been a resident in the Philippines for 9 years and 6 months only)

However, in her COC, Poe declared that she is a natural born and her residence in the Philippine up
to the day before election would be 10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005(when she
returned from the US to the Philippines for good).

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

Poe is qualified to be a candidate for President in the National and Local Election on May 9, 2016.

1) Is Poe, a foundling, a natural-born citizen? Yes, based on:

a) Circumstantial evidence

b) Legislation

c) Generally accepted principles of international law

Circumstantial evidence

There is more than sufficient evidence that Poe has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born
Filipino. xxx. [T]here is a high probability that her parents are Filipinos. The Solicitor General offered official
Statistics from the Philippine Statistics office that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born
in the Philippines was 15,985. While the Filipinos born in the country were more than 10 Million. On this
basis, there is a 99% chance that the child born in the Philippines would be a Filipino which in turn, would
indicate more than ample probability that Poes parents are Filipinos.

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poes parents are the fact that:

1. She was abandoned in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo

2. She has typical Filipino features.

There are disputable presumptions that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature.
On this basis, it is safer to assume that Poes parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd.

Legislation

Foundlings are as a class, natural born citizens.

The amendment to the Constitution proposed by constitutionalist Rafols to include foundlings as

natural born citizens was not carried out, not because there was any objection to the notion that persons
of unknown parentage are not citizens, but only because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. There was no intent or language that would permit discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws.

Likewise, domestic laws on adoption support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do
not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee, rather, the adoptee must be Filipino in
the first place to be adopted.

Recent legislation all expressly refer to Filipino children and include foundlings as among Filipino
children who may be adopted.

Generally accepted principles of international law

The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights obligates the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and to ensure that no child is stateless. The principles stated in the:

1. Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality laws (that a foundling
is presumed to have the nationality of the country of birth)

2. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found)

bind the Philippines although we are not signatory to these conventions.

Poes evidence shows that at least 60 countries in Asia, North and South America and Europe have passed
legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizens. 166 out of 189 countries accept that foundlings are
recognized as citizens. Hence, there is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born and a national of the country in which it is found.

2) After renouncing her American citizenship and after having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, has Poe re-acquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen? Yes, Poes
repatriation resulted to reacquisition of natural born citizenship.

A natural born citizen before he lost his Philippine nationality will be restored to his former status as
natural born Filipino after repatriation (Benson v. HRET, Pareno v. Commission on Audit etc).

3) Has Poe satisfied the 10 year residency requirement? Yes, she will have been a resident for 10 years
and 11 months on the day of the election.

[T]here is overwhelming evidence that leads to no to other conclusion that Poe decided to permanently
abandon her US residence and reside in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005.

Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their US domicile and
relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include former US passport showing her arrival on
May 24, 2005 and her return to the Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email correspondences
with freight company to arrange for the shipment of household items as well as with the pet Bureau;
school records of her children showing enrolment in the Philippine to the Philippine schools starting on
June 2005 etc. xxx These evidence, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship is clear that when she returned in May 2005, it was for good.

Poe was able to prove that her statement in her 2013 COC was only a mistake in good faith. As explained
by Grace Poe, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the
day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which
was the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard,
she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. Such a mistake
could be given in evidence against her but it was by no means conclusive considering the overwhelming
evidence submitted by Poe.