252 SCRA 259 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Origin of

Forum Non Conveniens

Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has
been under conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land.
The Bank had an agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the
two to purchase theparcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5 million
pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and Janolo with the Banks
manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its
conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement
as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an
agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently,
Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in
favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank,
filed a motion for intervention with the trial court. The trial court
denied the motion since the trial has been concluded already and the case
is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office,
filed a separate civil case against Carlos Ejercito as successor-in-
interest (assignee) of Demetria and Janolo seeking to have the
purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against the Bank.
Ejercito et al argued that the second case constitutes forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest
and parties between the first case and the second case. There is identity
of interest because both cases sought to have the agreement, which
involves the same property, be declared unenforceable as against the Bank.
There is identity of parties even though the first case is in the name of
the bank as defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co as
plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here because Henry Co essentially
represents the bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability from
the agreement it entered into with Demetria et al.
The Supreme Court also discussed that to combat forum shopping, which
originated as a concept in international law, the principle of forum non
conveniens was developed. The doctrine of forum non conveniens provides
that a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and
the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

**Forum Shopping: occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried
in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the
most favorable judgment or verdict.
 343 SCRA 1 Private International Law Forum Non Conveniens
In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988,
he was recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and
benefits, Santos agreed to the hotels job offer and so he started working
there in November 1988. The employment contract between him and Palace
Hotel was however without the intervention of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace Hotel notified
Santos that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September
1989, he was officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd.
(MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but no summons were served upon it.
MHC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL,
a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of the Palace
Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of Santos.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:

1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that
Santos is a Filipino;
2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations MHC cannot
be held liable because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct
business in the affairs of the Palace Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction
cant be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is directly managing
the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.
3. Santos contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the
Philippines;
4. Santos contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA
(had POEA intervened, NLRC still does not have jurisdiction because it
will be the POEA which will hear the case);
5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their
agents/officers are not residents of the Philippines;

Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant
facts pertaining to the case. It is not competent to determine the facts
because the acts complained of happened outside our jurisdiction. It
cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case a judgment is
rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first
place, it was not served any summons).
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens,
a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it
chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce
its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.
 300 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of
Foreign Law
In February 1993, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd., through
its local agent, Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation,
engaged Eduardo Felipe to work as a rigger in Malaysia. In June 1993, the
ferry boat in which Eduardo was assigned met an accident. His body was
never found.
A provision in the Malaysia labor law provides:
Where death has resulted from the injury, a lump sum equal to forty five
months earnings or fourteen thousand four hundred ringgit [RM], whichever
is the less;
A local labor office in Malaysia then wrote a letter to Hyundai advising
the latter of the computation it arrived at, to wit;
45 months x US $620.04 (monthly salary of Eduardo) = US $27,902.02.
RM14,400 which is equivalent to US $5,393.29 is less than US $27,902.02,
hence, Hyundai deposited the lesser amount with the said labor office.
The wife of Eduardo, Lora Felipe, does not agree that Hyundai is liable
for the lesser amount hence she filed a labor case against Hyundais
agent, Omanfil. The labor arbiter ordered Omanfil to pay $27,902.02 to
Lora. This was affirmed by the National Labor Relations Commission. It was
ruled that the Malaysian labor law is susceptible to two interpretations
because it is vague; that in case of doubt of labor laws, it must be
construed in favor of the laborer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Relations is correct.
HELD: No. The Malaysian Law in question is not vague. Clearly what is due
to Lora as death benefit (for her dead husband) is 14,400 Malaysian
Ringgit since that amount is less than US $27,902.02. Further, it appears
that the Director General of Labor of Malaysia certified that Eduardo is
only entitled to a maximum of RM14,000.00 pursuant to the labor law in
question. This certification is duly authenticated by Mr. Bayani V.
Mangibin, our Consul General in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Such
authentication of the said Certification, which provides an interpretation
of said foreign labor law by none other than the Director of Labor of
Malaysia is proof of the foreign law. Further still, this was never
contested by Lora.
 342 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of
Foreign Law
In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through
it must be piloted by pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain
Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine
President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a
duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River.
Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while
being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other
vessels. One such vessel was owned Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC).
The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able
to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila. It
averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of
Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento
Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1 del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the
master and owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of
the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to check on
certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the
river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the
said Venezuelan laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the
court. Only mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a
copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following
requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records
or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or
foreign service officer, and with the seal of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert
witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published books of reports of
decisions of the courts of the country concerned if proved to be commonly
admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption
where the foreign law is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under
Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon cannot be held liable for the
negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting
Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly
accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.
 324 SCRA 414 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of
Foreign Law Applicability of Foreign Laws
In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines
Limited (SAL). In 1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to
lay off some employees. Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for
reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor
case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor
case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal termination
of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines.
SAL moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the
termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising
the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws,
and estoppel, among others. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
HELD: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of
Laureano is not proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a
determination if the termination is indeed valid under Singaporean Law.
Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore.
SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine
law shall apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from employer-employee
relationships must be filed within three years from the time the cause of
action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was
terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three
years from 1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.
 537 SCRA 409 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Proof of
Foreign Law
In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar Ahmed Ali Bin
Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi Arabia, sent to OAB resumes from
which OAB can choose a computer specialist. Eleazar Gran was selected. It
was agreed that his monthly salary shall be $850.00. But five months into
his service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a termination letter and right
there and then was removed from his post. The termination letter states
that he was incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system which is
required in his line of work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge
during his 5 month stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient
because he failed to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then
signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing OAB from any
liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against
EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that the dismissal is valid
because when Gran and OAB signed the employment contract, both parties
agreed that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters relating to the
termination of Grans employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Grans
termination due to incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Grans
insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the termination letter
Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed the labor case but on appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of
the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did
not present proof as to the existence and the specific provisions of such
foreign law. Hence, processual presumption applies and Philippine labor
laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee like Gran shall only be
terminated upon just cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall
only merit a suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven
because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required
trade test to prove his competence. The presumption therefore is that he
is competent and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove otherwise. No proof
of his incompetence was ever adduced in court. His alleged insubordination
is likewise not proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily
track records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was also
a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to the two notice
rule whereby prior to termination he should receive two notices. In the
case at bar, he only received one and he was immediately terminated on the
same day he received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine
laws is again applied here sans proof of Saudi laws. Under Philippine
Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon and are strictly examined. In
this case, based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but
to sign the quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation
pay was merely 2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00 monthly salary
(3,190 Riyal).
 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Foreign Judgments When
May It Be Enforced
In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of California, USA, entered into a contract with Philippine
Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a Philippine corporation, whereby the latter
agrees to deliver 8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and so
it paid PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that the wheels
are defective and did not comply with certain US standards. So in 1979,
FASGI sued PAWI in a California court. In 1980, a settlement was reached
but PAWI failed to comply with the terms of the agreement. A second
agreement was made but PAWI was again remiss in its obligation. The
agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return the purchase price in
installment and conversely, FASGI shall return the wheel in installment.
PAWI was only able to make two installments (which were actually made
beyond the scheduled date). FASGI also returned the corresponding number
of wheels. Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the enforcement of the
agreement and it received a favorable judgment from the California court.
PAWI is then ordered to pay an equivalent of P252k plus damages but FASGI
was not ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was not able to
comply with the court order in the US. So in 1983, FASGI filed a complaint
for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with RTC-Makati. Hearings were
made and in 1990, the trial judge ruled against FASGI on the ground that
the foreign judgment is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not ordered
to return the remaining wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWIs
American lawyer entered into the agreements without the consent of PAWI.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced here in the
Philippines.
HELD: Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a foreign
tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the
underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly
shown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing
before a court of competent jurisdiction; that trial
uponregular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or
voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is
nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws
under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign
judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it
comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign
forum.
In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California court.
PAWIs insistence that its American lawyer colluded with FASGI; that he
entered into the compromise agreement without PAWIs authority is belied
by the fact that PAWI initially complied with the agreement. It did not
disclaim the agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly) but
failed to comply on the rest. It cannot now aver that the agreement is
without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for the California
court not to order FASGI to return the remaining wheels because of PAWIs
arrears.
 361 SCRA 489 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Foreign
Judgments How Assailed
In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the Philippine National
Construction Corporation (PNCC) to pay $5.1 million to Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad. This was the result of a recovery suit filed by
Asiavest against PNCC in Malaysia for PNCCs failure to complete a
construction project there despite due payment from Asiavest. Despite
demand, PNCC failed to comply with the judgment in Malaysia hence Asiavest
filed a complaint for the enforcement of the Malaysian ruling against PNCC
in the Philippines. The case was filed with the Pasig RTC which eventually
denied the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
RTC.
Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the foreign judgment
cannot be enforced here because of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
PNCC, collusion and/or fraud, and there is a clear mistake of law or fact.
Asiavest assailed the arguments of PNCC on the ground that PNCCs counsel
participated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should be enforced
against PNCC in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and mistake
of fact. On the contrary, Asiavest was able to present evidence as to the
validity of the proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest
presented the certified and authenticated copies of the judgment and the
order issued by the Malaysian Court. It also presented correspondences
between Asiavests lawyers and PNCCs lawyers in and out of court which
belied PNCCs allegation that the Malaysian court never acquired
jurisdiction over it. PNCCs allegation of fraud is not sufficient too,
further, it never invoked the same in the Malaysian Court.
The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the party must
present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Otherwise, the judgment
enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly certified and
authenticated. In this case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.
540 SCRA 424 Civil Law Private International Law Nationality Theory
Practice of Law is Reserved for Filipinos
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In
order for him to take advantage of Canadas free medical aid program he
became a Canadian citizen in 2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his
Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he returned to
the Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of
law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the
Philippines are reserved and limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar. So when Dacanay
became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the privilege to
practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer
who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship in
accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay reacquires his Filipino
citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was deemed to
have never been terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of
law right after reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume
his practice of law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing
legal education; this is especially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a
member of the Philippine bar.
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard
Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established
their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced
in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore
Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating
that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to
render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the
administrator of the said property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and
private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where
petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would

have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue
of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own
country if the end of justice is to be served.
 139 SCRA 139 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws
Nationality Principle Divorce Obtained Abroad
In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married
in Hong Kong. However, in 1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada,
USA.
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was
petitioning that he be granted management rights over a property in Manila
(The Galleon). It was his contention that the divorce decree they obtained
abroad do not apply to properties in the Philippines, hence, despite the
divorce, Reyess property in the Philippines remained conjugal with Upton.
Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled that the
divorce decree issued by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail
over the declared national policy of the Philippines which prohibits
divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
(nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the marriage
from the standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no longer the
husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as Reyess husband as
he is not entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound
by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private

respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar
of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of
Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named
Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private
respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner
then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to
Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground

of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of
divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he
is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal
standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
PILAPIL VS IBAY-SOMERA

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al

G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in
Germany. The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a
decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling
filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an
affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the
corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon review, the respondent
city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2
complaint for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by
the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the
respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the order
of the lower court denying her motion to quash.

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes

that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery.

ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the
complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after obtaining a
divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted
except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has
long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance
with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to

institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have
the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the
raison detre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case.

Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the

commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds
between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the
time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said
divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the same
considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed
suit.