SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 198585. July 2, 2012.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . METRO INDEX

REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION , respondent.

DECISION

REYES , J : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 dated

September 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94616.
The Facts
Sometime in June 2006, Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation
(respondent) led with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Naic, Cavite an application for
judicial con rmation of title over three (3) parcels of land located at Barangay
Alulod/Mataas na Lupa, Indang, Cavite. These properties have a consolidated area of
39,490 square meters and more particularly described as Lot No. 16742 Csd-04-
014277-D, Lot No. 17154 and Lot No. 17155 Cad-459-D of the Indang Cadastre.
During the hearings on the application, which was docketed as LRC Case No. NC-
2005-0006, the respondent presented two (2) witnesses, Enrico Dimayuga (Enrico) and
Herminia Sicap-Fojas (Herminia). Enrico, who was the respondent's Project
Documentation O cer, testi ed that: (a) the respondent bought the subject properties
from Herminia, Melinda Sicap (Melinda), and Hernando Sicap (Hernando); (b) the
subject properties had been declared for tax purposes in the respondent's name since
2006; (c) the subject properties are alienable and disposable as evidenced by the
certi cation issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
(d) as shown by their respective a davits, the adjoining lot owners had no adverse
claim and objections to the respondent's application; and (e) the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the subject properties for more
than fty (50) years. Herminia, on the other hand, testi ed that: (a) she and her siblings,
Melinda and Hernando, inherited the subject properties from their parents, Brigido
Sicap and Juana Espineli; (b) their parents had been in possession of the subject
properties since 1956 as shown by the tax declarations in their name; (c) from the time
they inherited the subject properties, they had actively cultivated them and religiously
paid the taxes due; 2 and (d) the subject properties are planted with coconut, banana,
santol, palay and corn. 3 IaDSEA

On August 7, 2009, the RTC issued a Decision 4 granting the respondent's

application, ratiocinating that:
From the evidence presented by the applicant thru counsel, this Court nds that
the land being applied for registration is alienable and disposable land; that it is
not within any military or naval reservation; that the possession of herein
applicant as well as that of its predecessor(s)-in-interest has (sic) been open,
public[,] continuous, notorious and adverse to the whole world and therefore, the
applicant is entitled to the relief prayed for. 5
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 On appeal to the CA, the same was denied. In its assailed decision, the CA ruled
that while only a few trees are found on the subject properties, this fact coupled with
the diligent payment of taxes since 1956 su ced to substantiate the claim that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession in the manner and
for the length of time required by law.
Although as a rule, tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
they are proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property and serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession.

It may be true that only few trees are planted and grown on the lots, but this does
not mean that appellee and their predecessors-in-interest do now own them.
Surely, ownership is not measured alone by the number or kind of crops planted
on the land. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to
have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion
over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.
The general rule is that the possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract
under claim of ownership of its entirely (sic) is a constructive possession of the
entire tract, so long as no portion thereof is in the adverse possession of another.
At any rate, some owners may be hardworking enough to fully utilize their lands,
some may not be as hardworking. But both do not retain or lose their ownership
on the basis alone of the degree of hard work they put into their respective lands.

This Court nds that while appellee's predecessors-in-interest may not have fully
tilled the lots, this does not destroy their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession thereof, in the concept of owner. They have proven their
particular acts of ownership by planting crops on the lots, declaring them for tax
purposes in their names, religiously paying taxes thereon since 1956 onward, and
retaining peaceful, open, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession of it
for over 50 years. . . .: 6 (Citation omitted)
IaESCH

In the instant petition, this Court is urged to reverse the CA as the respondent
allegedly failed to prove its compliance with the requirements of either Section 14 (1)
or Section 14 (2) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Assuming that the
respondent's application was anchored on Section 14 (1), there is no evidence that
possession and occupation of its predecessors-in-interest commenced on June 12,
1945 or earlier. In fact, the earliest tax declaration presented by the respondent was for
the year 1956. On the other hand, assuming that the respondent's claim of imperfect
title is based on Section 14 (2), the subject properties cannot be acquired by
prescription as there is no showing that they had been classi ed as patrimonial at least
thirty (30) years prior to the ling of the application. The respondent failed to show
proof of an o cial declaration that the subject properties are no longer intended for
public service or for the development of national wealth; hence, the subject properties
cannot be acquired by prescription.
In any case, the petitioner posited, the CA erred in nding that the respondent
and its predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the property openly,
continuously, notoriously and exclusively for more than fty (50) years. Tax
declarations, per se, are not conclusive evidence of ownership. Alternatively, while the
tax declarations are accompanied by the claim that the subject properties are planted
with coconut and fruit-bearing trees, their numbers are insigni cant to suggest actual
cultivation. Moreover, only the tax declarations in the name of the respondent show the
existence of these fruit-bearing trees.
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 Our Ruling
Finding merit in the foregoing submissions, this Court resolves to GRANT this
petition. The issue of whether the respondent had proven that it is entitled to the
bene ts of P.D. No. 1529 on con rmation of imperfect titles should be resolved
against it.
It is not clear from the assailed decision of the CA as well as that of the RTC
whether the grant of the respondent's application is based on Section 14 (1) or Section
14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529. Nonetheless, considering the respondent's evidence
purportedly demonstrating that its predecessors-in-interest started to possess and
occupy the subject properties sometime in 1956 and not on June 12, 1945 or earlier,
the reasonable conclusion is that its claim of having acquired an imperfect title over the
subject properties is premised on its supposed compliance with the requirements of
Section 14 (2), which states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may le in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives: HDIaST

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription

under the provisions of existing laws.

That properties of the public dominion are not susceptible to prescription and
that only properties of the State that are no longer earmarked for public use, otherwise
known as patrimonial, may be acquired by prescription are fundamental, even
elementary, principles in this jurisdiction. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic , 7 this
Court, in observance of the foregoing, clari ed the import of Section 14 (2) and made
the following declarations: (a) the prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring an
imperfect title over a property of the State shall commence to run from the date an
o cial declaration is issued that such property is no longer intended for public service
or the development of national wealth; and (b) prescription will not run as against the
State even if the property has been previously classi ed as alienable and disposable as
it is that official declaration that converts the property to patrimonial. Particularly:
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable and disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. 8

The Court deemed it appropriate to reiterate the foregoing principles in Republic

v. Rizalvo, Jr. 9 as follows:
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration
because his claim of ownership and possession over the subject property even
exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-
year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring ownership and registration
of public land under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the moment
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 the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of national wealth or that the
property has been converted into patrimonial. . . . 1 0

Simply put, it is not the notorious, exclusive and uninterrupted possession and
occupation of an alienable and disposable public land for the mandated periods that
converts it to patrimonial. The indispensability of an o cial declaration that the
property is now held by the State in its private capacity or placed within the commerce
of man for prescription to have any effect against the State cannot be overemphasized.
This Court nds no evidence of such o cial declaration and for this reason alone, the
respondent's application should have been dismissed outright.
It is rather unfortunate that the lower courts operated on the erroneous premise
that a public land, once declared alienable and disposable, can be acquired by
prescription. Indeed, familiarity with the principles cited above would have instantly
alerted them to the inherent incongruity of such proposition. First, an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is not necessarily patrimonial. For while the
property is no longer for public use, the intent to use it for public service or for the
development of national wealth is presumed unless the contrary is expressly
manifested by competent authority. Second, while the State had already deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation and disposition, the only mode which the
law provides for its acquisition is that provided under Section 14 (1) of P.D. No. 1529.
It was therefore of no moment if the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
had allegedly been in possession and occupation of the subject properties for more
than fifty (50) years for the subject properties cannot be acquired by prescription for as
long as they remain reserved for public service or the development of national wealth.
That there was much ado on whether the evidence on the character and nature of the
respondent's possession and that of its predecessors-in-interest measured up to the
standards imposed by law and jurisprudence is de nitely futile and otiose; the primary
question of whether the subject properties are patrimonial, hence, may be acquired by
prescription should have been addressed first hand but regrettably neglected.
Worse than its failure to see that the subject properties cannot be acquired by
prescription, the CA erred in concluding that the possession and occupation of the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest was in the manner contemplated by law.
The CA is de nitely mistaken in downplaying the importance and indispensability of
demonstrating actual cultivation and development in substantiating a claim of
imperfect title and in putting much premium on the religious payment of realty taxes
effected by the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest. It is well-settled that tax
declarations are mere bases for inferring possession. They must be coupled with proof
of actual possession for them to constitute "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence of a
claim of ownership. 1 1
Moreover, it is undisputed that the number of coconut trees is unspeci ed while
the number of fruit-bearing trees is too few (three santol, one avocado and one star
apple). However, the CA haphazardly ruled that this warranted the application of the
doctrine of constructive possession without considering the size of the subject
properties contrary to this Court's pronouncements in Spouses Rumarate v. Hernandez:
12

However, the records do not support the argument of respondents that Santiago's
alleged possession and cultivation of Lot No. 379 is in the nature contemplated
by the Public Land Act which requires more than constructive possession and
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 casual cultivation. As explained by the Court in Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court:
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and
occupation." Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the
clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other.
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to
delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive a n d notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under
paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the land must not
be mere ction. As this Court stated, through then Mr. Justice Jose P.
Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands:
". . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us
i n Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. 175, 180). (See also
Rosales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be
observed that the application of the doctrine of constructive
possession in that case is subject to certain quali cations, and this
court was careful to observe that among these quali cations is 'one
particularly relating to the size of the tract in controversy with
reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant.'
While, therefore, 'possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground
before it can be said that he is in possession,' possession under
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph
(b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is not gained by mere nominal
claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot
justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of
territory. Possession as a means of acquiring ownership, while it
may be constructive, is not a mere fiction . . . ."
EATCcI

Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, this Court noted:

". . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation
purposes and visiting it every once in a while, as was done by him,
does not constitute acts of possession." 1 3 (Citation omitted)

Rather than proof of constructive possession, the presence of a meager number

of plantings on the subject properties shows that the respondent and its predecessors-
in-interest engaged in mere casual cultivation, which does not constitute possession
under claim of ownership. As ruled in Republic of the Philippines, et al. v. Hon. Vera etc.,
et al.: 1 4
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant does not
constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not
exclusive and notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
15

Republic of the Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court , 16 which is an

illustration of what is considered casual cultivation, states:
But even granting that the witnesses presented by herein respondent applicants
were indeed bona de overseers and tenants or workers of the land in question, it
appears rather strange why only about 3,000 coconut trees and some fruit trees
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 were planted (2,000 coconut trees on Lot 1 which is 119 hectares, and 1,000
coconut trees on Lot 2 which is 19 hectares) on the vast tract of land subject of
the instant petition. In a practical and scienti c way of planting, a one-hectare
land can be planted to about 114 coconut trees. In the instant case, if the hired
tenants and workers of respondent applicants managed to plant only 3,000
coconut trees, it could only mean that about only 25 hectares out of the 138
hectares claimed by herein respondent applicants were cleared, cultivated, and
planted to coconut trees and fruit trees. Once planted, a coconut is left to grow
and need not be tended or watched. This is not what the law considers as
possession under claim of ownership. On the contrary, it merely showed casual or
occasional cultivation of portions of the land in question. In short, possession is
not exclusive nor notorious, much less continuous, so as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the government. 1 7

Furthermore, in Wee v. Republic, 1 8 this Court held it is not enough that

improvements or signs of use and cultivation can be found on the property; there must
be proof that the use or development of the property is attributable to the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest: EHCaDS

We are, therefore, constrained to conclude that the mere existence of an

unspeci ed number of coffee plants, sans any evidence as to who planted them,
when they were planted, whether cultivation or harvesting was made or what
other acts of occupation and ownership were undertaken, is not su cient to
demonstrate the petitioner's right to the registration of title in her favor. 1 9

This Court does not see why this case should be decided otherwise given that
the evidence of the alleged overt acts of possession in the two cases cited above and
in this case are unsatisfactory and cannot be considered as "well-nigh incontrovertible"
that the law and jurisprudence requires.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petition is GRANTED . The Decision
dated September 14, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94616 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The respondent's application for original registration of
Lot No. 16742 Csd-04-014277-D, Lot No. 17154 and Lot No. 17155 Cad-459-D of the
Indang Cadastre is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Brion, Perez and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, with Associate Justices Rebecca De
Guia Salvador and Sesinando E. Villon, concurring; rollo, pp. 48-55.
2. Id. at 58-60.
3. Id. at 38.
4. Penned by Judge Lerio C. Castigador; id. at 56-61.

5. Id. at 60.
6. Id. at 53-54.
7. G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
8. Id. at 210.
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 9. G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011, 644 SCRA 516.

10. Id. at 526, citing Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, supra note 7.
11. See Republic v. Heirs of Doroteo Montoya, G.R. No. 195137, June 13, 2012; Heirs of
Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012.
12. 521 Phil. 447 (2006).
13. Id. at 462-463.
14. 205 Phil. 164 (1983).
15. Id. at 172.
16. 224 Phil. 247 (1985).
17. Id. at 254-255.
18. G.R. No. 177384, December 8, 2009, 608 SCRA 72.
19. Id. at 84.

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