Comparative Connections

A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations

China-Korea Relations:
A Complex China-ROK Partnership
Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations/Pacific Forum CSIS
See-won Byun, George Washington University

The September summit between Presidents Xi Jinping and Park Guen-hye in Beijing catalyzed
the resumption of trilateral talks with Japan in October and the launch of the China-ROK Free
Trade Agreement in December. Beijings Korean engagement also included a four-day visit to
North Korea in October by Politburo Standing Committee member Liu Yunshan for 70th
anniversary celebrations of the founding of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK) as Kim Jong
Uns highest-ranking foreign guest. The visit was credited with preventing a rocket launch by
Pyongyang that had reportedly been planned to mark the anniversary. Meanwhile, Pyongyangs
reached out to Beijing with a friendship tour to China led by Choe Hwi of the WPK
Propaganda Division. However, Kim Jong Uns declaration of North Koreas new military
advancements as a powerful nuclear weapons state and the abrupt cancellation of
performances by the Norths visiting Moranbong band in Beijing two days later revealed
apparently unresolved tensions over Pyongyangs nuclear ambitions. Despite new initiatives to
expand economic cooperation, Pyongyangs apparent defiance of Chinese diplomatic efforts on
denuclearization suggests further difficulties in Sino-DPRK relations.

An upgraded China-ROK strategic partnership?

The launching of the China-ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on Dec. 20 marked a new stage
in bilateral diplomacy under Presidents Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye, who met in September
for the sixth time since taking office. Breaking a three-year deadlock, China and South Korea
resumed trilateral talks with Japan on Nov. 1 in Seoul, where Premier Li Keqiang met separately
with President Park, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, and National Assembly Speaker Chung
Ui-hwa. A day ahead of talks with Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Park and Li oversaw
the signing of 17 bilateral agreements in various functional areas of cooperation.

Since November, China-ROK political and security exchanges have shown steady improvements
in strategic coordination and trust-building between the two countries, a priority of Xi and Park
since their first summit in 2013. Ruling Saenuri Party Representative Suh Chung-won led a
ROK bipartisan parliamentary delegation to China to meet PRC leaders including Liu Yunshan
on Nov. 10, a month after Liu met Kim Jong Un at Pyongyangs 70th anniversary celebrations of
the WPKs founding. PRC and ROK navies advanced China-South Korean global cooperation
by holding their first joint anti-piracy drills in the Gulf of Aden on Nov. 17, following an

This article is extracted from Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations,
Vol. 17, No. 3, Jan. 2016. Preferred citation: Scott Snyder and See-won Byun, China-Korea Relations: A Complex
China-ROK Partnership, Comparative Connections, Vol. 17, No. 3, Jan. 2016, pp.101-112.

China-Korea Relations 101 January 2016

agreement reached during PLA Navy Rear Adm. Yu Manjiangs tour of a ROK Navy destroyer
in the region in September. Seoul hosted a joint conference on public diplomacy on Nov. 19 and
a bilateral forum of state-run research institutions on Dec. 3. These engagements were part of an
initiative begun in 2013 to promote people-to-people exchanges.

Following a 2014 summit agreement between Presidents Xi and Park, China and South Korea
launched a new round of talks on the demarcation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in late
December. Despite regular consultations on the demarcation of sea boundaries over the past two
decades, tensions have remained since Chinas November 2013 declaration of an air defense
identification zone over the East China Sea, including frictions over the submerged rock Ieodo
and confrontations over illegal Chinese fishing in waters claimed by South Korea. Within two
weeks following the eighth round of working-level consultations on fisheries cooperation, the
ROK Navys firing of warning shots at a Chinese patrol boat in the Yellow Sea on Dec. 8 drew
criticism from the PRC Foreign Ministry and official media outlets. Despite early skepticism,
the resumption of talks on Dec. 22 talks led by Vice Foreign Ministers Liu Zhenmin and Cho
Tae-yul is significant since they were convened at a higher level than the director general-level
talks held from 1996-2008. In addition, the heads of PRC and ROK Coast Guards Hong Ik-tae
and Meng Hongwei reached an agreement on Dec. 17 to open a maritime hotline and to hold
annual consultations to promote mutual understanding.

President Parks China policy has drawn positive public reactions in both China and South
Korea. Korean media attributed a spike in Parks domestic approval rating in early September to
public support for her China visit. Chinese media organizations selected Park among the top 10
people of 2015, citing her balancing role between major powers and attendance at Beijings
military parade commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. However, at a
parliamentary audit of the ROK Foreign Ministry in September, opposition lawmakers
questioned whether Park had been able to use her China visit to win Beijings support for the
ROKs core priorities, namely North Korean denuclearization and Korean reunification. These
criticisms reflect the domestic debate on the substantive value of Seouls outreach to China.

China-ROK coordination on North Korea

While Kim Jong Uns Dec. 10 claims regarding North Koreas new nuclear capabilities as a
powerful nuclear weapons state were received with skepticism in Washington, the cancellation
of a three-day friendship performance by North Koreas Moranbong propaganda band in
Beijing, and simultaneous breakdown of inter-Korean talks on Dec. 12, underscored the nuclear
issue as an obstacle in both Beijing and Seouls diplomacy toward Pyongyang. China-ROK
coordination on DPRK denuclearization within the Six-Party Talks framework included
meetings between chief envoys Wu Dawei and Hwang Joon-kook on Sept. 1 and Nov. 24, and
between deputy envoys Xiao Qian and Kim Gunn on Sept. 7. In an apparent dismissal of efforts
to resume dialogue, however, DPRK representatives reportedly did not attend a forum on the
Six-Party Talks hosted by China Institute of International Studies in September, which First Vice
Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan and chief nuclear envoy Ri Yong Ho had attended in the past.

Presidents Xi and Parks respective statements with President Obama on Sept. 25 and Oct. 16
further affirmed an emerging Chinese and South Korean consensus with the US on Korean

China-Korea Relations 102 January 2016

Peninsula denuclearization, sending a message of solidarity on the nuclear issue to Pyongyang.
At their press conference in Washington, Xi and Obama renewed their commitment to complete
and verifiable denuclearization, called for full implementation of relevant UN resolutions,
and stated that we will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon state. In her talks with
Obama, Park identified US-ROK coordination with China, Russia, and Japan as her first priority
in the effort to deter any strategic provocation by the North. While the ROK Foreign Ministry
on Oct. 19 called for Chinese cooperation on Seouls and Washingtons two-pronged approach
of pressure and incentives, White House officials ahead of the US-China summit indicated
Chinas growing support for the necessity of both denuclearization and pressure on Pyongyang.

President Parks consecutive summits with Xi and Obama also highlighted looming questions
over Seouls strategic orientation between China and the US. After meeting Xi in Washington,
Obama emphasized no contradiction in South Koreas pursuit of good relations with both
the US and China, supporting ROK Ambassador Ahn Ho-youngs remarks to Korean lawmakers
in September on the importance of the US-ROK alliance as the foundation of Seouls
engagement with China. Former ROK Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo at a September forum at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace further indicated that Parks attendance at
Beijings military parade would help reassure China over the potential deployment of the
Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system on the Korean Peninsula, a point of
recent strain in Chinas relations with South Korea and the US. The US-China Economic and
Security Review Commissions annual report to Congress in November, however, suggested that
Chinese opposition to THAAD is likely to be based on concerns that such deployments would
reduce the value of Chinas missile inventory supporting its regional ambitions, revealing
suspicion over Beijings strategic intentions.

Warming China-DPRK diplomatic ties?

Liu Yunshans October visit to North Korea and Choe Hwis friendship tour to China in
December were the first public signs of mutual China-DPRK diplomatic reengagement efforts
following an extended period of cool relations. Liu attended North Koreas biggest ever military
parade on Oct. 10 as Kim Jong Uns highest-ranking foreign guest, demonstrating renewed
solidarity with Pyongyang in the most significant display of support for the North since Kim
took power in 2011. In talks with ceremonial head of state Kim Yong Nam, Liu expressed
Chinas willingness to maintain high-level political exchanges and promote economic
cooperation. DPRK Health Minister and Chairman of the DPRK-China Friendship Association
Kang Ha Kuk reciprocated during PRC Civil Affairs Minister Li Liguos Oct. 26 visit to
Pyongyang, where Li paid respects to Chinese and North Korean soldiers killed during the
Korean War. While Kim Jong Un in his public speech on Oct. 10 declared North Koreas
military as a global military power, the Chinese state media instead emphasized Pyongyangs
prioritization of a stable external environment for economic development as well as efforts to
improve inter-Korean ties.

PRC Ambassador to South Korea Qui Guihong at a Seoul National University forum on Oct. 29
noted Beijings quest for normal ties with Pyongyang, attributing the Norths military restraint
to both international pressure and improving political ties with China. South Korean perceptions
of Chinas normal (vs. special) approach to relations with Pyongyang were further

China-Korea Relations 103 January 2016

reinforced by Beijings replacement of CPC International Department head Wang Jiarui, who
cultivated close political ties with Pyongyang over the past 12 years. The new head, Song Tao,
who accompanied Liu Yunshan to Pyongyang in October, has limited experience in Korean
affairs. Kim Jong Uns nuclear claims on Dec. 10 and the subsequent breakdown of Choe Hwis
planned six-day visit to China what Chinas Foreign Ministry identified as part of people-to-
people exchanges conducive to our mutual understanding and friendship revealed the
growing political costs of Pyongyangs military provocations.

Since Choe Hwis visit, China-DPRK friendship exchanges have continued in the form of sports
diplomacy. For instance, DPRK Vice Sports Minister Son Kwang-hos visited China in
December to promote sports exchanges in 2016. Although some Chinese analysts attributed
Pyongyangs apparent restraint from an October rocket launch to improving political ties with
China, South Korean observers raised early doubts over the likelihood of China and North Korea
reaching consensus on the nuclear issue. The DPRK state media did not mention Liu Yunshans
expression of Chinas willingness to work together for the resumption of Six-Party Talks as
reported by Chinese counterparts. According to the ROK Unification Ministry, Pyongyangs
70th anniversary commemorations of the WPKs founding were primarily targeted at a domestic
audience, designed to strengthen internal solidarity by promoting Kim Jong Uns own people-
first policy. DPRK Health Minister Kang Ha Guk in a Sept. 30 meeting with PRC Ambassador
Li Jinjun in Pyongyang claimed that North Korea is undergoing a dramatic change under Kim
Jong Uns rule.

Meanwhile, recent political contacts between Beijing and Pyongyang reignited controversy in
South Korea. South Korean reactions to Ambassador Li Jinjuns remarks praising the role of
Chinas intervention in the Korean War in his tribute to Chinese soldiers on the eve of Chinas
National Day revealed public concerns over Chinese interpretations of history.

Chinese assessments of North Korea friendship

While both Beijing and Pyongyang have declined to elaborate on the current status of political
ties, Chinese commentaries in the state-run Global Times reflect an active reassessment of the
relationship. In October, Da Zhigang of the Heilongjiang Academic of Social Sciences claimed
that Liu Yunshans visit would not only consolidate the traditional friendship but also expand
Chinas strategic choices in safeguarding its geopolitical interests against challenges posed by
major countries or aligned nations outside the region. Other assessments suggest differences
over the nuclear issue between the two countries have not been avoided. There is also some
skepticism over the impact of Chinas political reengagement such as Lius high-profile visit,
which, according to Yu Shaohua of the China Institute of International Studies, is unlikely to
restrain Pyongyang from missile and nuclear advancement. Pyongyangs 70th anniversary
celebrations of the WPKs founding even drew negative reactions on Chinese social media
where some mocked the Norths military parade and others expressed anger over recent attacks
on Chinese citizens by North Korean soldiers on the China-DPRK border. The PRC Foreign
Ministry on Sept. 24 revealed that Chinas public security agency was investigating another
shooting incident in Changbai that occurred on Sept. 18.

China-Korea Relations 104 January 2016

Recent activity on the human rights issue also suggests a shift in Chinas approach to North
Korea, as evidenced by reactions to the UN General Assemblys Dec. 17 resolution referring
North Korea to the International Criminal Court. While China has long supported North Korea
at the UN, a Dec. 19 Global Times editorial warned that Beijings vote against the resolution was
made under certain domestic pressures and based on Chinas basic policy of non-interference,
claiming that the vote does not mean we endorse the human rights situation in North Korea. In
a more direct message to the Kim regime, it also argued that North Korean authorities should
also strive to provide a positive environment, so that the Chinese public can better appreciate the
country.

China-DPRK trade and economic cooperation

South Korean data shows that the recent decline in China-DPRK diplomatic contacts has been
accompanied by a downward trend in bilateral trade and investment over the past two years.
According to the Korea International Trade Association (KITA), North Koreas trade with China
reached $2.5 billion in the first half of this year, reflecting a 10.6 percent decline in exports and
15.8 percent decline in imports compared to the same period last year. In 2014, Chinese
investment in North Korea totaled $59.1 million, half the amount in 2012, while North Korean
investment in China reached $0.29 million, less than 11 percent of levels in 2013. At an annual
international trade fair in Pyongyang in September, PRC Ambassador to North Korea Li Junjun
called for deepening Chinas trade and economic cooperation with North Korea, urging more
Chinese firms to invest in the North Korean market.

Indicative of joint efforts to expand economic ties, China and North Korea began their annual
trade fair in Dandong on Oct. 15 with the launching of the Guomenwan trade zone, worth a total
investment of $158 million according to the Chinese state media. Pyongyang reportedly sent a
400-member delegation to this years trade fair, where Dandong officials claimed that the trade
zone will accommodate up to 50 North Korean businesses by April 2016. Local officials in
Liaoning have long sought to develop the border city as the center of Northeast Asian logistics
and China-DPRK trade, which accounts for 40 percent of Dandongs total foreign trade. North
Korea on Nov. 18 released its own plans to develop the Rason special economic zone as a
regional logistics hub on the China-DPRK-Russia border.

Current projects in the China-DPRK border region also include tourism initiatives, such as Jilin
provinces five-year project to build a tourism zone with North Korea and Russia in Fangchuan,
which was approved by the CPC in October. Such projects support Kim Jong Uns current
tourism campaign. There are also reported plans to develop a Sinuiju economic zone, which is
perceived by South Korean observers as part of Kims efforts to earn hard currency while
bypassing international sanctions. One South Korean source estimates that North Korea earned
between $30.6 and $43.6 million from mostly Chinese tourists in 2014, about half as much as
North Koreas $86 million income from the Kaesong Industrial Complex that year.

Although outside observers expect the much-anticipated WPK Congress in 2016 to outline new
economic reforms, North Koreas investment environment remains an issue between Chinese
and North Korean partners. Chinese experts remain doubtful over North Korean efforts to attract
foreign investors, pointing to poor infrastructure and geopolitical risks as key obstacles that have

China-Korea Relations 105 January 2016

deterred investors from Rason economic zone and Sinuiju special administrative zone since they
were established in 1991 and 2002. Despite such setbacks, however, even South Korean
counterparts are showing growing interest in Rason as a logistics center supporting a trilateral
project for the shipment of Russian coal to South Korea via the North Korean port.

China-ROK FTA and its strategic implications

The launching of the China-ROK FTA on Dec. 20 came at a time of slowing Chinese growth and
South Korean exports to China, which declined for the fifth consecutive month in November.
South Korean government projections show that the FTA will raise South Koreas real GDP by
0.96 percent, create 53,000 new jobs in the next 10 years, and expand annual bilateral trade to
more than $300 billion, a 39.5 percent increase from 2012 levels. The FTAs anticipated effect
on access to the Chinese consumer market is the biggest gain for South Korean companies, vis--
vis US, Japanese, and European competitors, all of whom have yet to sign FTAs with China. Its
early implementation was backed by high-level support, including talks between Premier Li
Keqiang and President Park, and Trade Ministers Gao Hucheng and Yoon Sang-jick in South
Korea in October. Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) President-designate Jin Linquns
meetings with Finance Minister Choi Kyung-hwan and other officials and businessmen in Seoul
on Sept. 8-9 also aimed to establish the framework for South Koreas participation in Chinas
regional initiative.

The China-ROK FTA, however, also draws attention to the strategic implications of China and
South Koreas growing trade interdependence. First, the trade deal raises questions over Seouls
position in what is perceived as a US-China rivalry for regional influence. The National
Assemblys ratification of the China-ROK FTA on Nov. 30, five months after its signing,
prompted comparisons with the KORUS FTA, which was ratified in 2011, four years after its
initial signing despite teargas protests from an opposition lawmaker. The Trans-Pacific
Partnership (TPP) agreement reached in October posed further questions. In talks with President
Obama in October, President Park reaffirmed that the existing KORUS FTA makes the US and
South Korea natural partners for TPP, but the new partnerships with China have also raised
Chinese calls for a bigger South Korean role in Chinas regional economic network, suggesting a
competition for economic influence in Seoul between Beijing and Washington.

Shortly after the Korean National Assembly ratified an accord for South Koreas participation in
the AIIB, deputy AIIB chief Chun Hun in early December indicated hopes for a more active role
from South Korea as the banks fifth biggest shareholder. Both Chinese and South Korean
officials, however, have emphasized the complementarity of new and existing regional economic
initiatives. The PRC Commerce Ministry reasserted Chinas open attitude toward the TPP,
while ROK Vice Finance Minister Joo Hyung-hwan at a Korea Chamber of Commerce and
Industry meeting in November similarly raised the possibility of cooperation between the AIIB
and existing lenders on regional infrastructure projects.

The deepened China-ROK trade relationship has also emerged as a point of South Korean
leverage for seeking Chinese support for Seouls broader regional economic initiatives that
ultimately link to North Koreas reform and denuclearization. A priority initiative on Seouls
agenda is the Northeast Asian Development Bank, which aims to complement the AIIB and

China-Korea Relations 106 January 2016

President Xis One Belt, One Road initiative by promoting integration between northeast China,
the Russian Far East, and Korea after North Koreas denuclearization. President Park pushed for
Chinas cooperation on the proposed Northeast Asian Development Bank in her talks with
Premier Li Keqiang and AIIB President-designate Jin Liqun, as did Finance Minister Choi
Kyung-hwan in his meeting with PRC counterpart Lou Jiwei on the sidelines of the G20 in
Turkey. Parks promotion of regional initiatives such as the Northeast Asian Development Bank
and Eurasia Initiative is also linked to calls to Pyongyang to abandon its dual policy of nuclear
and economic development. Recent indications of economic cooperation on the China-DPRK
border despite a lack of progress on the nuclear issue raised South Korean debate on the extent of
Chinese cooperation on Seouls North Korea policy and broader regional integration initiatives.

Conclusion: shift in geopolitics?

President Parks September visit to Beijing generated public perceptions of a major shift in
geopolitics in the region, stimulating speculation that South Koreas increasing alignment with
China in pursuit of Korean unification signals abandonment of the US and Japan. But this
speculation has proven to be misplaced for several reasons.

First, such a view suggests that South Koreas intensified diplomacy with China is unprincipled,
ignoring the fact that this enhanced engagement rests on the anchor and platform provided by a
solid US-ROK alliance. President Obama said as much during the Oct. 16 summit when he
defended improved China-ROK relations as consistent with US interests, while also encouraging
South Korea to stand up publicly against Chinese unilateral efforts to challenge the global order.

Second, this view minimizes Chinese efforts to restore leverage and influence with Pyongyang
following Liu Yunshans attendance at the Oct. 10 ceremonies marking the 70th anniversary of
the Korean Workers Party. While China clearly opposes North Koreas nuclear advancement, it
remains committed to North Korean stability and to retaining leverage with Pyongyang. In this
regard, an unintended consequence of Parks participation in Chinas military parade may have
been to bring Pyongyang and Beijing to the realization that both sides needed to work harder to
restore Sino-DPRK relations.

Third, improvement in China-ROK relations lays the foundation for coordinated action between
Seoul and Beijing to pressure North Korea toward denuclearization, which is also in US
interests. Minimizing the gaps between Beijing and Seoul generates greater pressure and limits
North Korean alternatives to denuclearization.

Fourth, it is premature to judge whether the Park-Xi discussions on Korean unification are
generating tangible strategic gains in line with South Koreas aspirations. In the absence of
tangible deliverables, Parks intensification of relations with Beijing may be subject to domestic
criticism from both left and right in Seoul.

The Korean Peninsula faces a challenging regional security environment for 2016 including
political tensions between Beijing and Pyongyang as well as US-China. Major risk factors
include the heightening of tensions stemming from differences over the South China Sea, cross-
strait relations in the aftermath of Taiwans presidential election, and the possibility that the US

China-Korea Relations 107 January 2016

rebalance and Chinas response might generate obstacles or preconditions for the common
pursuit of a non-nuclear Korean Peninsula and a peaceful, gradual process of Korean unification.
Then there is North Korea, which continues as a matter of state policy to pursue nuclear
development unchecked, alongside its economic development efforts. While these developments
may challenge effective coordination on North Korea, Seoul may seek a more active approach to
regional diplomacy by leading policy coordination efforts with Washington and Beijing to forge
a united approach toward North Korea. As the US and China face an increasingly complicated
relationship with North Korea as only one of many issues on the bilateral agenda, South Koreas
role will increasingly be to lead efforts to focus sustained attention and coordination on North
Korea in both Washington and Beijing.

Chronology of China-Korea Relations

September December 2015

Sept. 1, 2015: PRC and ROK nuclear envoys Hwang Joon-kook and Wu Dawei meet in Beijing.

Sept. 2, 2015: China and South Korea sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in Beijing
on non-tariff barriers.

Sept. 2-4, 2015: President Park Geun-hye visits China and meets President Xi Jinping and
Premier Li Keqiang, attends 70th anniversary commemorations of the end of WWII, and
addresses the China-ROK business cooperation forum in Shanghai.

Sept. 2-3, 2015: Choe Ryong-hae, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Workers
Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee, visits Beijing to attend WWII commemorations.

Sept. 4, 2015: Blue House announces a telemedicine project between Seouls St. Marys
Hospital and Ruijin Hospital in Shanghai.

Sept. 5, 2015: PRC and ROK finance ministers meet on the sidelines of the G20 in Turkey.

Sept. 7, 2015: PRC and ROK deputy envoys to the Six-Party Talks Xiao Qian and Kim Gunn
meet in Seoul.

Sept. 8-13, 2015: PRC, ROK, and DPRK companies attend the 10th China-Northeast Asia Expo
in Changchun.

Sept. 8-9, 2015: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) President-designate Jin Liqun
visits Seoul to meet ROK officials and businessmen.

Sept. 8, 2015: Kim Jong Un, Kim Yong Nam, and Pak Pong Ju receive a message from Xi
Jinping, Li Keqiang, and Zhang Dejiang on the occasion of the DPRKs 67th anniversary.

Sept. 9-11, 2015: PRC officials attend the regional Seoul Defense Dialogue hosted by the ROK
Defense Ministry.

China-Korea Relations 108 January 2016

Sept. 10-12, 2015: ROK and DPRK tourism representatives attend an international travel fair in
Dandong hosted by Liaoning province.

Sept. 13, 2015: PRC, ROK, and Japanese deputy agriculture ministers meet in Tokyo.

Sept. 15, 2015: China-ROK-Japan Trilateral Policy Dialogue on African Affairs held in Beijing.

Sept. 18, 2015: Shooting incident occurs in Changbai near the China-DPRK border.

Sept. 18-19, 2015: ROK deputy nuclear envoy attends a forum in Beijing hosted by the Chinese
Institute of International Studies.

Sept. 24, 2015: Eighth round of China-ROK-Japan trade talks are held in Beijing.

Sept. 24, 2015: PRC Ambassador to North Korea Li Jinjun attends 11th Pyongyang Autumn
International Trade Fair.

Sept. 26, 2015: Rear Adm. Yu Manjiang, commander of Chinas naval unit in the Gulf of Aden,
visits ROK destroyer Chungmugong Yi Sun-sin and agrees to hold a joint anti-piracy drill.

Sept. 30, 2015: PRC Ambassador to North Korea Li Jinjun meets DPRK Health Minister and
Chairman of the North Korea-China Friendship Association Kang Ha-guk on the occasion of
Chinas National Day.

Oct. 8, 2015: PRC, ROK, and Japanese finance ministers hold talks on the sidelines of
multilateral meetings in Peru.

Oct. 9-12, 2015: Liu Yunshan, member of the CPC Political Bureau Standing Committee, visits
North Korea on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the WPKs founding.

Oct. 15, 2015: Liaoning province opens Guomenwan trade zone in Dandong with North Korea.

Oct. 15, 2015: China, South Korea, and Japan hold cyber security talks in Seoul.

Oct. 15, 2015: South Koreas Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries announces plans to expand ROK
fishery exports to China in light of the China-ROK FTA.

Oct. 15-18, 2015: China-DPRK trade fair is held in Dandong.

Oct. 26, 2015: PRC Civil Affairs Minister Li Liguo meets DPRK Health Minister and Chairman
of the North Korea-China Friendship Association Kang Ha-guk in Pyongyang, and pays respects
to Chinese and DPRK soldiers killed in the Korean War.

Oct. 30, 2015: Chinese state media reports CPCs approval of a planned transborder tourism
zone on Jilins border with North Korea and Russia.

China-Korea Relations 109 January 2016

Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 2015: Premier Li Keqiang visits Seoul to attend the sixth China-ROK-Japan
summit and separately meets President Park, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, and National
Assembly Speaker Chung Ui-hwa.

Oct. 31, 2015: PRC and ROK Trade Ministers Gao Hucheng and Yoon Sang-jick meet in Seoul.

Nov. 10-13, 2015: Rep. Suh Chung-won leads a bipartisan ROK parliamentary delegation to
China and meets Liu Yunshan and Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui.

Nov. 17, 2015: PRC and ROK navies hold joint anti-piracy drills in the Gulf of Aden.

Nov. 18, 2015: South Korea launches a bipartisan consultative body on the China-ROK FTA.

Nov. 19, 2015: Seoul hosts the third China-ROK forum on public diplomacy.

Nov. 20, 2015: South Koreas National Assembly ratifies the China-ROK FTA.

Nov. 23, 2015: PRC Foreign Ministry extends condolences on the Nov. 22 death of former ROK
President Kim Young-sam.

Nov. 23, 2015: South Koreas National Institute of Environmental Research reports that China,
South Korea, and Japan have agreed to strengthen efforts against yellow dust from China.

Nov. 24, 2015: PRC and ROK nuclear envoys Wu Dawei and Hwang Joon-kook meet in
Beijing.

Nov. 25, 2015: PRC Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin leads a delegation to the ROK Embassy
in Beijing to pay respects to former ROK President Kim Young-sam.

Nov. 29, 2015: PRC, ROK, and Japanese health ministers meet in Kyoto.

Dec. 3, 2015: Peoples Daily and Yonhap News Agency sign a news exchange agreement.

Dec. 7, 2015: Newly-appointed CPC International Department head Song Tao meets DPRK
Ambassador to China Ji Jae-ryong in Beijing.

Dec. 8, 2015: ROK Navy fires warning shots at a Chinese patrol boat in the Yellow Sea.

Dec. 9, 2015: PRC Foreign Ministry expresses concern over the ROK Navy firing of warning
shots at a Chinese patrol boat.

Dec. 10, 2015: North Koreas Moranbong Band and an Army orchestra arrive in Beijing for a
friendship tour led by Choe Hwi, first vice-department director of the WPK propaganda
division, who meets head of the CPC International Department Song Tao.

China-Korea Relations 110 January 2016

Dec 10, 2015: China at a UN Security Council meeting in New York opposes including DPRK
human rights issues on the UN agenda.

Dec. 10, 2015: PRC Foreign Ministry calls for the easing of tensions on the Korean Peninsula in
response to Pyongyangs claims on nuclear development.

Dec. 12, 2015: North Koreas band Moranbong returns to Pyongyang after canceling
performance in Beijing.

Dec. 15, 2015: ROK Finance Ministry announces it has issued RMB-denominated foreign
exchange stabilization bonds in China.

Dec. 17, 2015: UN General Assembly adopts a resolution on referring North Korea to the
International Criminal Court for human rights violations.

Dec. 17, 2015: PRC and ROK Coast Guard heads Meng Hongwei and Hong Ik-tae meet in
Beijing.

Dec. 17, 2015: PRC Foreign Ministry praises Kim Jong Il on the fourth anniversary of his death.
North Koreans in Beijing pay respects at the DPRK Embassy.

Dec. 19-20, 2015: PRC, ROK, and Japanese culture ministers hold talks in Qingdao.

Dec. 20, 2015: The China-ROK FTA comes into force.

Dec. 20, 2015: DPRK Vice Sports Minister Son Kwang-ho visits Beijing and signs an agreement
with Deputy Secretary of the PRC General Administration of Sports Yang Shuan on sports
exchanges in 2016.

Dec. 21, 2015: China Beijing Environment Exchange and Korea Exchange sign a MoU on
carbon trading.

Dec. 22, 2015: PRC and ROK vice foreign ministers begin the first round of talks on EEZs.

Dec. 23, 2015: ROK Supreme Court calls on the government to disclose reports on China-ROK
FTA negotiations.

Dec. 28, 2015: Chinese media organizations select President Park Geun-hye among the top ten
people of 2015.

Dec. 28, 2015: PRC Foreign Ministry calls on Japan to deal with related issues in a responsible
way after a ROK-Japan history agreement on comfort women.

China-Korea Relations 111 January 2016