W H A T IS A

T H IN G ?
by M artin Heidegger

translated by W. B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch

w ith an an alysis by Eugene T. Gendlin

( iA T K W A Y E D IT IO N S , i .t d .
s o i l II BENI). INDIANA


Copyright 1967 by Gateway Editions. Ltd.,

620 West Washington Street, South Bend, Indiana 46625.
Manufactured in the United States of America. 9-77.

Library oj Congress Catalog Card Number: 67-31050

International Standard Hook Number: 0-89526-979-1
(old I.S.B.N.: 0-8092-6137-5)

First published in German as Die Frage nach dem Ding

bv Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tbingen.
 Contents

Translators Note v
Preface vii

A. V ar io u s W ays o r Q u e st io n in g A bout

the T h in g
1. Philosophical andscicntific questioning 1
2. Ambiguous talk about thething 4
3. The difference in kind between the question
of thingness and scientific and technical
methods 7
4. The everyday and scientific experiences of
the thing 11
5. Particularity and being-this-one 14
6. The thing as just this one 24
7. Subjective-objective; the question of truth 26
8. The thing as the bearer of properties 32
9. The essential construction of the truth,
the thing, and the proposition 35
10. The historicity of the definition of the thing 39
11. Truthproposition (assertion)thing 44
12. Historicity and decision 49
13. Summary 52

B. K a n t s M anner op A sk in g A bout t h e T h in g
I. The Historical Basis on Which Kants C ritique
o f Pure Reason Rests 55
1. The reception of Kants work in his lifetime 57
2. The title of Kants major work 61
3. The categories as modes of assertion 62
4. -yos ratioreason 64
5. The modern mathematical science of nature
and the origin of a critique of pure reason 65
iii
iv WHAT IS A T H I N G ?

6. The history of the question about

the thing: summary 108
7. Rational metaphysics(Wold, Baumgarten) 112
II. The Question About the Thing in
Kants Main Work 119
1. What does "critique mean in Kant 119
2. The relation of the "critique of pure reason
to the "system of all principles of the pure
understanding 121
3. Interpretation of the second main section
of the transcendental analytic 124
4. The highest principle of all analytic
judgments 132
5. Kants essential definition of the judgment 153
6. On the highest principle of all synthetic
judgments 181
7. Systematic representation of all the
synthetic principles of pure understanding 184
A n alysis 245

Indices 297
 T ran slato r s N o n -

Translating Heidegger alw ays presents difficulties. We

have attem pted to be as accurate as possible, w hile hold
ing the invention o f cum bersom e term s to a minimum.
Dasein has been retained wherever possible. This key
word, translated literally as "Being-there, is Heideggers
unique term for m ans own w ay o f Being over against
other entities in the world. In a few instances, however,
it seemed best to translate it as "existen ce, according to
the accepted mode. In these cases the German word is
retained in parentheses.
We take this opportunity to acknowledge the valuable
assistan ce o f W altraut J. Stein in translating som e knotty
sentences, M arsha Lynn B allew, who helped w ith proof
ing and the indices, and Elizabeth Barton, who worked
indefatigably in typing the m anuscript.

W. B. Barton, Jr.
Vera Deutsch ( E m eritu s)
Memphis S tate University
 Preface

I his work presents the text of a lecture w hich w as held

in the w inter sem ester, 1935-36, at the U niversity o f Frei
burg. The lecture w a s entitled B asic Questions o f Meta
p hysics.

Martin Heidegger
Freiburg
April, 1962
WHAT IS A THING?
A . V a r io u s W a y s o f Q u e s t i o n i n g A b o u t t h e T h in g 1

I. Philosophical and Scientific Questioning

From the range o f the b asic questions o f m etaphysics

w e shall here ask this one question: What is a thing? The
question is quite old. What rem ains ever new about it is
merely th a t i t m u s t b e a skcd again and a g a m T ^
We could im m ediately begin a lengthy discussion
about the question "W h at is a thing? before w e have
really posed it. In one respect this would even be justified,
since philosophy alw ays sta rts from an unfavorable posi
tion. This is not so w ith the sciences ( W issen sch aften ),
lor there is alw ays a direct transition and entrance to
them starting out from everyday representations, beliefs,
and thinking. If one takes the everyday representation as
the sole standard of all things, then philosophy is alw ays

1 The following footnote appears on the first page o f the author

ized German text from which this translation is made: "A tran-
* n o t ol this lecture w as reproduced without the knowledge
o! the author and w as put on the market outside Germany without
mentioning the source." Trans.
2 WHAT IS A T H I N G ?

som ething j eranscd (verr ck test. This shifting ( Ver

rckung) o f tHe attitude o f thought can be accom plished
only after a jo lt (R u ck ). Scientific lectures, on the other
hand, can im m ediately begin w ith the presentation of
their su bject. The plane o f questioning thus chosen w ill
not be abandoned again when the questions become more
difficult and complex.
Philosophy, on the other hand, executes a continuous
shifting o f standpoint and level. Therefore, one docs not
know for a tim e which w ay to turn in it. However, in
order that this unavoidable and often beneficial entangle
ment does not go to excess, there is a need for a prelim
inary reflection about w h at should be asked. Otherwise
there is the danger o f ones speaking long-windedly about
philosophy w ithout considering its meaning. We shall use
the first hour, and only it, to reflect on our intention ( Vor
haben ).
When the question "W h at is a thing? arises, a doubt
im m ediately announces itself. One may say that it m akes
sense to use and cn ioy things in our reach, to elim inate
objectionable things, to provide for necessary ones, but
that one can really do nothing"with the qu estion "W h at
is a c h in g /" This is true. One can start to do nothing
w itlT it. It would be a great m isunderstanding of the ques
tion itse lf if w e tried to prove that one can start to do
so mething w ith it. No one can start to do anything w ith it.
This assertion about our question is so true that w e m ust
cverTunderstand it as a determ ination o~f~1ts essence. The
quest inn 5 B E a t is a thing? is one w ith w hich nothing can
bi ' ~/Iorc than this need not be said about it.
question is already very old (a s old, in fact,
as the beginning o f W estern philosophy in Greece in the
seventh century b .c .), it is therefore advisable that this
question also be outlined from its historical point o f view.
Regarding this question, a little story is handed down
which Plato has preserved in the Theaetetus (174 a.f.):
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 3

"ih n r tp k il l > ( ' . . . \tn o v r a f c is

, tls y i/ie X y * & a im < A cycrat

tv to ciSevai, '
riots' . '"The story is that Thales, w hile oc-
cupied in studying the heavens above and looking up, fell
into a w ell. A good-looking and w h im sical maid from
Thrace laughed at him and told him that w hile he might
passionately want to know all things in the universe, the
things in front o f his very nose and feet were unseen by
h im ." Plato added to this story the remark: Si
ini o i t o l *ev , "T h is je st also fits
all those who becom e involved in philosophy. Therefore,
the question "W h at is a thing? m ust alw ays be rated as
one which cau ses housem aids to laugh. And genuine
housem aids m ust have som ething to laugh about.
Through the attem pt to determine the question o f the
thing w e have unintentionally arrived at a suggestion
about the ch aracteristic o f philosophy w hich poses that
question. Philosophy, then, is that thinking w ith which
one can start nothing and about w hich housem aids neces
sarily laugh. Such a definition o f philosophy is not a mere
jo ke but is som ething to think over. We shall do well to
remember occasionally that by our strolling we can fall
into a w ell whereby w e m ay not reach ground for quite
some time.
There rem ains the question as to w hy w e talk about
the fundamental questions of m etaphysics. The term
"m e ta p h ysics here should indicate only that the ques
tions dealt w ith stand at the core and center o f philos
ophy. However, by "m e ta p h ysics w e do not mean a spe
cial field or branch w ithin philosophy in contrast to logic
and ethics. There are no fields in philosophy b ecause
Philosophy itself is not a field. Something like a d ivision
o f labor'i~s~senseless in philosophy; sch o lastic learning is
to a .certain extent indispensable to it but is never its
e therefore want to keep the term m etaphysics
4 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

free from all (hat h isto rically adheres to it. For us it signi
fies only that procedure during w hich one runs the danger
o f falling into a w ell. Now, after this general preparation,
we can more closely delineate the question "W h at is a
thing?

2. Am biguous Talk About the Thing

First, what arc we thinking about when we say " a

thing ? We mean a piece o f wood, a rock, a knife, a w atch,
a ball, a javelin, perhaps a screw or a piece of wire. But
also a huge building, or a depot, or a giant spruce are re
ferred to as huge things." In the sum m ertim e w e speak
o f m any things in the meadow: grasses, herbs, the butter
flies and the bugs. The thing there on the w a ll the paint
ing w e also call it a thing, and the sculptor has m any
different finished and unfinished things in his w o rk
shop.
By contrast, w e hesitate to call the number five a thing,
because one cannot reach for the number one cannot
hear it or see it. In the sam e w ay a sentence The weather
is bad is not a thing any more than is a single word
"h o u se . We distinguish precisely the thing house and
the word which names th is thing. Also, an attitude or d is
position which w e m aintain or lose on som e occasion is
not considered as a thing.
If, however, a betrayal is in the air w e say, "There are
uncanny things going on. Here we do not refer to pieces
of wood, utensils, or sim ilar item s. When, in making a
decision, it depends "above all things on this or that con
sideration, the other things which have been om itted are
not rocks or sim ilar item s but other considerations and
decisions. Also, when we say "th in g s arent right, "th in g
is used in a much broader sense than at the start o f our
inventory. Now it has the sense which our German word
had from the very beginning, namely a court trial or an
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 5

affair.2 Sim ilarly, w e "cle a r things up som ewhere, or as

the proverb states, "G ood things take tim e. Also that
which is not wood or stone, but every task and enterprise
needs time. And someone for whom things are going
w e ll is a man whose affairs, w ishes, and w o rks are in
good order.
It now becom es clear that w e understand the term
"th in g in both a narrower and a broader sense. The
narrower or lim ited meaning o f "th in g is that which can
be touched, reached, or seen, i.e., what is present-at-hand
( das Vorhandene). In the wider meaning o f the term, the
"th in g is every affair or transaction, som ething that is in
this or that condition, the things that happen in the world
occurrences, events. Finally, there is still another use of
this word in the widest p ossible sense; this use w a s intro
duced w ithin the philosophy o f the eighteenth century and
w as long in preparation. W ith respect to this, Kant speaks
of the "th in g -in -itself" ( Ding an sich ) in order to distin
guish it from the "thing-for-us ( Ding fr un s), that is, as
a "phenom enon. A thing-in-itself is that which is not ap
proachable through experience as are the rocks, plants,
and anim als. Every thing-for-us is as a thing and also a
thing-in-itself, which m eans that it is recognized ab so
lutely w ithin the absolute knowledge o f God. But not
every thing-in-itself is also a thing-for-us: God, for in
stance, is a thing-in-itself, as Kant uses the word, accord
ing to the meaning o f Christian theology. Whenever Kant
calls God a thing, he does not mean a giant gaslike form a
tion that a cts som ewhere in hidden depths. According to
strict usage, "th in g here means only "som eth in g
(e tw a s), that which is not nothing. We can think some-

- Das Ditig: From Germanic legal language, originally desig

nating the tribunal, or assem bly of free men. The thing'""0' w as a
cause one negotiated or reconciled in the assem bly of judges.
Heidegger in a later work refers to this in setting forth the notion
of thing as what assem bles a world. See the lecture on Das Ding
in Martin Heidegger, Vortrge unci Aufstze (VA) (Pfullingen:
Verlag Neske, 1954), pp. 172-74. Trans.
6 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

thing by the term and concept o f God, but w e cannot

experience God as w e do this piece o f chalk, about which
we can m ake and prove such statem ents as: If w e drop
this piece o f chalk it w ill fall with a certain velocity.
God is a thing insofar as He is som ething at all, an X.
Sim ilarly, number is a thing, faith and faithfulness are
things. In like manner the signs > < are "som eth in g,"
and sim ilarly "a n d and "e ith e r/o r .
If w e again ask our question What is a thing? we
realize that this question is not in good order, because
what should be put into question, that is, the "th in g , is
ambiguous in its meaning. W hat is to be put into question
must be sufficiently defined to becom e questionable in the
right way. "W here is the dog? "The dog cannot be
searched for if I do not know whether it is our own dog or
the neighbors. "W h at is a thing? Thing in w hat sense
in the lim ited, the wider, or the w id est? We have to distin
guish three different meanings even if the means of dis
tinction is still uncertain:
1. A thing in the sense o f being present-at-hand: a rock,
a piece of wood, a pair o f pliers, a w'atch, an apple, and a
piece o f bread. All inanim ate and all anim ate things such
as a rose, shrub, beech tree, spruce, lizard, and w asp. . . .
2. Thing in the sense in which it means w hatever is
named but which includes also plans, decisions, reflec
tions, loyalties, actions, historical th in g s.. . .
3. All these and anything else that is a som ething ( ein
E tw a s) and not nothing.
W ithin w hat boundaries we determine the m eanings of
the term "th in g alw ays remains arbitrary. With respect
to this the scope and direction o f our questions w ill
change.
It is closer to our linguistic usage of today to under
stand the term "th in g in the first (n arrow er) significa
tion. Then each o f these things (rock, rose, apple, w atch )
is also som ething (e tw a s), but not every som ething (the
number five, fortune, bravery) is a thing.
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 7

In asking What is a thing? w e shall adhere to the

first meaning; not only because w e want to stay close to
the usage o f language but also because the question con
cerning the thing, even where it is understood in its wider
and w idest meanings, m ostly aim s at this narrower field
and begins from it. As w e ask What is a thing? w e now
mean the things around us. We take in view w hat is m ost
immediate, m ost capable o f being grasped by the hand.
By observing such, w e reveal that w e have learned som e
thing from the laughter of the housemaid. She thinks we
should first look around thoroughly in this round-about-
us ( Um-uns-herum). .

3. The Difference in Kind Between the Question

o f Thingness ('Dinghcit) and Scientific
and Technical Methods

As soon as w e begin to define these things, however, we

run into an em barrassm ent. All thcsc-th in gs have really
been settled long ago, and, if not, there are nroven scien
tific procedures and m ethods o f production in w hich they
can be scttle37 What a stone is can hest and most quickly
be told by m ineralogy and ch em istry; what a rose or a
b jislijs . botany teaches rclTablv: what a Irog or a falcon is,
/.oology; as to what a shoe is, or a horseshoe, o r a w atch,
the. shoemaker, the hfa^k.smiili^iixl the w atchm aker re
s pectively, give the best technical inform a tio n.
It turns out that we are alw ays too slow w ith our ques
tion, and we are im m ediately referred to quarters which
already have a far better answ er ready or, at least, experi
ences and m ethods to give such answ ers quickly. This
only confirm s w hat we have already adm itted, namely,
that w e cannot start to do anything w ith the question
What is a thing? But since we intend ( Vorhaben) to
<-Iat ify this question, especially w ith regard to im m ediate
1 lings, it w ill be necessary to m ake clear what else we
w ant to know in contradistinction to the sciences.
 With our question "W h at is a thing? it obviously is
not our purpose to discover what granite, a pebble, lime
stone, or sandstone is but rather what the rock is as a
thing. We do not care to know how to distinguish at any
tim e m osses, ferns, grasses, shrubs, and trees, but what
* the plant is as a thing, and sim ilarly in respect to anim als.
We do not care to know w hat pliers are in com parison
w ith a hammer, what a w atch is in com parison w ith a
key; but we w ant to know what these implements and
tools are as things. What this means, o f course, m ust be
further clarified. But if one once adm its that we can ask
the question in this way, then obviously one demand re
m ains: nam ely, that we stick to the facts and their exact
observations in order to discover what things are. What
things are cannot be contrived at a desk or prescribed by
generalized talk. It can be determined only in w orkshops
and in the research laboratories. And if w e do not confine
ourselves to this then w e w ill be exposed to the laughter
o f housemaids. We are inquiring about things, and yet w e
p ass over ( berspringen) all the givens and the opportu
nities which, according to general opinion, give us ade
quate inform ation about all these things.
This is how it actually looks. With our question "W hat
is a thing? w e not only p ass over the particular rocks
and stones, particular plants and their species, anim als
and their species, im plem ents and tools, w e also p ass over
whole realm s o f the inanimate, the anim ate, and tools,
and desire to know only "W h at is a thing? In inquiring
this wav, we seek what m akes thcHliTng^ tftffrg and~n( 11
w h at m akes it a stone or wood: what conditions
( be-dingty the thing. .We do not ask concerning a thing of
som e species but after the thingness of a thing. j^oFthe
:l Be-dingt; verb bedingen: "conditioned; "to condition." As
already suggested. Heidegger wants to connect dingen w ith the
notion of ".assem bling. Thus he writes: "D as limn aTTigt. Das
Dingen versam m elt." The thing things. The (hinging assem bles"
(VA, p. 17Z). Here he seems to w ant to call our altention to the
original signifigaiiLL t)l httilHiWi. The originanegrcnnoTation
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 9

condition of being a thing, which conditions the thing as

a thirigTeannot itse lf again be a thing, i.e., som ething con-
ditloned. The thingness must be som ething un-condi-
tioned ( un-bedingtes). VVith fRe^question "W h at is a
thing? ~\vc are asking for someTtrTTlg unconditioned. We
a skltboiTt what is all around us and ca n be grasped bv the
haritTand vet we alienate ourselves from those immediate
things very much more than did Thales, who could _see
onl y a s far as the s ta r s. But we want to pass beyond even
these things to the unconditioned, where there are no
more things that provide a b a sis and ground.
And, nevertheless, w e pose this question only in order
to know w hat a rock is, and a lizard taking a sunbath on
it, a blade o f grass that grows beside it, and a knife w'hich
perhaps w e hold in our hands w hile w e lie in the meadow.
We w ant to know ju st that, som ething that the m ineralo
gist, b otan ist, zoologist, and m etallurgist perhaps dont
w ant to know at all, som ething that they only think they
want to know w hile actu ally w anting som ething else: to
promote the progress o f science, or to satisfy the joy of
discovery, or to show the technical usage of things, or to
m ake a livelihood. We, however, desire to know w hat
these men not only do not want to know but perhaps w hat
they never can know in spite o f their science and technical
skill. This sounds presumptuous. It doesnt only sound
so, it is. N aturally this is not the presum ptuousness o f a
single person any more than our doubt about the desire
and ab ility o f the sciences to know passes sentence on the
attitude and conviction of particular persons or even
against the u tility and the necessity o f science.
The demand for knowledge in our question is a pre
sumption o f the kind found in every essential decision
( E ntscheidung). Although we are already fam iliar w ith
this decision, that does not mean that w e have already
passed through it. It is the decision whether w e want to
of these words must not be overlooked. An "assem b ly " does condi
tion something. Traits.
 10 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

know those things w ith which one can start to do nothing

in the sense o f this figure o f speech. If w e forego this
knowledge and dont ask this question, then all remains
as it is. We shall p ass our exam inations, perhaps even bet
ter, without asking this question. Even if w e ask this
question, we shall not overnight become better botanists,
zoologists, historian s, ju rists, or physicians. But per
haps better or more cau tiously put certainly different
teachers, different physicians and judges, although even
then w e can start to do nothing w ith this question in our
professions.
With our question, we want neither to replace the sc i
ences nor to reform (verbessern ) them. On the other
hand, we want to participati in the. pnpnratTon ol ^deci
sio n; the decision: Is science the measure o f know ledge,
or is there a knowledge in which the ground and limit o f
science and thus its genuine effectiveness are determined?
Is this genuine knowledge necessary for a historical peo-
ple^ or is it dispensable or replaceable by som ething
else?
However, decisions are not worked out by merely talk
ing about them but by creating situ ation s and taking posi
tions in which the decision is unavoidable, in which it
becom es the most essential decision when one does not
make it but rather avoids it.
The uniqueness o f such decisions remains that they are
prepared for only by questions w ith which one cannot
start to do anything insofar as common opinion and the
horizon o f housemaids are concerned. Furthermore, this
questioning alw ays looks like a pretense to know better
than the sciences. The term "b e tte r alw ay s means a
difference o f degree in one and the sam e realm. However,
w ith our question w e stand outside the sciences, and the
knowledge for w hich our question strives is neither bet
ter nor w orse but totally different. Different from science
but also different from w hat one calls a W eltan
schauung.
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 11

4. The Everyday and Scientific Experiences of the Thing;

The Question Concerning Their Truth

The question "W h at is a thing? seem s now to be in

order. It is at least roughly determined: (1 ) What is put
in question, and (2 ) That w hereafter w e ask regarding
w h at is put in question. Put in question is the "th in g " in
its narrower meaning, w hich refers us to the present-at-
hand ( Vorhanden). That w hereafter the thing is asked
and interrogated, as it were, is thingness, w hat deter
m ines a thing as such to be a thing.
Yet when w e start to ascertain this thingness o f a thing
w e are im m ediately helpless in spite o f our well-ordered
question. Where should we grasp the thing? And besides:,
w e nowhere find "th e thing," but only particular things,) I
these and those things. W hat m akes this so? Is it only we,
because, first and forem ost, we strik e only the particular
and then only afterw ard, as it seem s, extract and pull off
(a b str a c t) the general, in this case the thingness, from the
particular? Or is the fact that we alw ays meet only par
ticular things inherent in the things them selves? And if it
is in the things, is it then only their som ehow b asic or
accidental caprice to meet us in this w ay, or do they meet
us as p articulars because they are w ithin them selves par
ticular, as the things w hich they are?
In any case, this is where our everyday experience and
opinion about things is directed. But before w e continue
this line o f our questioning, it is necessary to insert an
intervening exam ination o f our everyday experience.
There is not at first, nor later on, any valid reason to
doubt our everyday experiences. Of course, it is not suffi
cient sim ply to claim that that which everyday experi
ence show s o f the things is true, any more than it is
sufficient to m aintain in a seem ingly more critical and
cautious way: after all, as individual humans we are in
dividual su b jects and egos, and what \vc represent and
12 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

mean arc only su bjective pictures which we carry around

in us; w e never reach the things them selves. This view, in
turn, w ill not be overcome, in case it is not true, hv talk
ing about " w e " instead o f "1 and bv taking into account
the com m unity rather than the individual. There alw ays
remains the possib ility that we only exchange su b jective
pictures ol things with one another, which m a v j i ot
thereby become any truer because we have exchanged
them com m unally
We now set aside these different interpretations of our
relation to the things as w ell as the truth o f this relation.
But, on the other hand, we do not w an t to forget that it is
not at all sufficient to appeal only to the truth and cer
tainty o f everyday experience. Precisely if everyday ex
perience carries in itse lf a truth, and a superior truth at
that, this truth m ust be founded, i.e., its foundation m ust
be laid, adm itted, and accepted. This w ill becom e even
more necessary when it turns out That the evei v d a y jhings
show still another face. That they have long done, a nd
they do it for us today to an extent and in a w ay that w e
have hardly com prehended, let alone m astered^
Take the common example: The sun's diam eter is at
m ost half a meter to one m eter w ide when it sets behind
the m ountains in the form o f a glowing disk. All that the
sun is for the shepherd coming home w ith his Hock does
not now need to be described, but it is the real sun, the
sam e one the shepherd aw aits the next morning. But the
real sun has already set a few m inutes before. W hat we
sec is only a sem blance ( S ch ein ) caused by certain proc
esses o f rays. But even this sem blance is only a sem blance,
for "in reality," w e say, the sun never sets at all. It does
not wander over the earth and around it but the reverse.
The earth turns around the sun, and this sun, further
more, is not the ultim ate center o f the universe. The sun
belongs to larger system s w hich w e know today as the
M ilky W ay and the spiral nebula, which are o f an order
o f magnitude compared to w hich our solar system must
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 13

be characterized as diminutive. And the sun, w hich daily

rises and sets and dispenses light, is ever growing colder;
our earth, in order to m aintain the sam e degree of
warm th, would have to com e alw ays closer to the sun.
However, it is moving aw ay from the sun. This m eans it
rushes toward a catastrophe, albeit in time sp an s in
com parison w ith which the few thousand years of human
history on earth amount to not even one second.
Now which o f these is the true sun? Which thing is the
true one, the sun of the shepherd or the sun o f the astro
p hysicist? Or is the question wrongly put, and if so, w h y?
How should this be decided? For that, obviously, it is
necessary to know w hat a thing is, w hat it means to-be-a-
thing, and how the truth o f a thing is determined. On
these questions neither the shepherd nor the astrop hysi
cist inform s us. Neither can or needs to pose these ques
tions in order to be im m ediately who they are.
Another example: The English ph ysicist a nd astrono-
mer Eddington once said o i his table that every thing of
this kind the tab le, the cHaTFTTtL.'liaa a dntfBTeTTable
nuinber one is the table known Since his ch ild h o o d fta b lc
number twoTs the "scie n tific t a b i c / This scientific table,
th a t is , the table which science delines in its thingness,
con sists, according to the atom ic physics o f today, not of
wood but m ostly of em pty space; in this em ptiness elec
trical charges are distributed here and there, which are
rushing back and forth at great velocity. Which one now
is the true table, number one or number tw o ? Or are both
true? In the sense o f w hat truth? What truth m ediates be
tween the tw o? There must be still a third one according
to which number one and number two are true in their
w ay and represent a variation of this truth. We cannot
save ourselves by the favored road o f saying: w hatever is
assei ted about the scientific table number tw o, the spiral
nebula, and the dying sun are but view p oints and theories
o physics. To that the retort is: on this physics are
ounded all our giant power station s, our airplanes, radio
 14 W H A T IS T H I N G ?

and television, the whole o f technology which has altered

the earth and man w ith it more than he suspects. These
are realities, not view points w hich som e investigators
distant from life defend. Does one want science even
"clo se r to life ? I think that it is already so close that it
suffocates us. Rather, w e need the right distance from life
in order to attain a perspective in which w e m easure w hat
is going on w ith us human beings.
No one knows this today. For this reason w e must ask
everyone and ask again and again, in order to know it, or
at least in order to know w hy and in w hat respects w e do
not know it. Have man and the nations only stum bled into
the universe to be sim ilarly slung out of it again, or is it
-otherw ise? We^must ask. For a long time there is-first
som ething m uch m ore prelim inary: w e m ust first again
learn how to ask. That can only happen by asking ques
tions o f course, not just any questions. W e chose ihe
question What is a thing? It now turns out: the~tliings
^t.-inrl in rliff.-n-ni truths. What is the thing such that it is
like th is? From w hat point o f view should w e decide the
being-a-thing o f things? We take our standpoint in every
day experience w ith the reservation that its truth, too,
w ill eventually require a foundation ( eine Begrndung).''

5. Particu larity and Being-This-One (Jediesheit^.

Space and Time as Determ inations o f Things

In evejxd.ay experience w e alw ays meet particular

things. W ith this suggestion w e resume the pursuit of our
question after the above digression.

Begrndung: "A foundation, "establishm ent, "argum ent,

"reasons for, "explanation, "proof." The English "ground" is
equivalent to Grund; but the German includes the idea of a foun
dation of a building. Heidegger seems to emphasize this aspect
of its meaning. Therefore, in the related words this sense w ill be
adhered to where possible. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
Jam es S. Churchill, trans. (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1962), p. 3, n. 1. Trans.
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 15

The things arc particular. That means first: the ston e,^
the lizard, the blade of grass, and the knife are each-for-
itself (je fr sich ). Moreover, the stone is a com pletely
definite one, exactly this one; the lizard is not a lizard in
general, but just this one, and so it is w ith the blade of
grass and the knife. There is no thing in general, only par
ticular things; and the particulars, moreover, are ju st
these (je diese). Each thing is one such this one (ein je A
d ie se s) and no other.
Unexpectedly, w e meet w ith som ething w hich belongs
to the thing as a thing. This is a determ ination that is
disregarded by the sciences w hich, w ith their thrust to
ward facts, apparently com e clo sest to things. For a
botanist, when he exam ines the labiate llowcr, w ill never
be concerned about the single flower as a single one: it
alw ays rem ains an exemplar only. That is also true o f the
anim als, for example, the countless frogs and sala
manders which are killed in a laboratory. The "th is one"^
(je d ieses) which distinguishes every thing, is passed over
by science. Should w e now consider the things in this
w ay? W ith the coun tlessness o f things w e would never
come to an end, and w e would continually establish
nothing but irrelevancies. H owever, w e are not directing
ourselves exclusively at the particulars, alw ays these
things (je diese D inge) one after another, but are after
every things general ch aracteristic o f being "th is one :>
the bcing-this-one (Jed iesh eit), if such a word form ation
is acceptable. fitq v /a S r v f t t s p-frtjlaffr W a /
But is the sentence "E v ery thing is a this one (ein je
d ieses) and not another one at all applicable? There are
tilings which do not differ at all from one another, things
uhich are exactly alike, as tw o buckets or tw o pine
needles which we cannot distinguish from each other in
any respect. I he fact, one could say, that w e cannot d is
tinguish between the two exactly alike things does not
piove that, in the end, they are not different. However,
L"-n assum ing that tw o single things are sim ply alike,
 16 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

each is still this thing because each of these tw o pine

needles is in another place (O r/); and if they are to oc
cupy the sam e place, they can do so only at a different
tim e point. Place and time point m ake even absolutely
alike things be these very ones (je diesen), i.e., different
ones. Insofar as each thing has its placc, its time, and its
* time duration, there are never tw o sam e things. The par
ticularity ( Je w eilig k e it) o f the places and their m anifold
ness are grounded in space, and the p articularity o f the
tim e points is grounded in time. That b asic ch aracteristic
o f the thing, i.e., that essential determ ination of the thing
ness o f the thing to be this one (je d ieses), is grounded in
the essence o f space and time.
Our question "W h at is a thing? includes, therefore, the
questions "W h at is sp ace? and "W h at is tim e? It is cu s
tom ary for us to speak of them both together. But how
and why arc space and tim e conjoined? Are they con
joined at all, as though externally thrust onto one another
and into one another, or are they prim ordially at one? Do
they stem from a common root, from som e third, or b et
ter, som e first which is neither space nor time because
more prim ordially it is both? These and other related
questions w ill occupy us, i.e., w e w ill not set our minds at
rest that there is space and time and that w e place them
next to each other space and time by use of the patient
little word "a n d , as in "d og and ca t. In order to keep
. hold o f these questions by m eans of a title, w e call them
I the question o f the time-span (Z eitrau m ). We understand
by time-span a certain length o f time, and say: w ithin the
time-span of a hundred years. By this expression w e really
mean only som ething temporal. In con trast to this very
com m on usage, which is very instructive for further
thought, w e w ill give the com posite "Z eitra u m a
I meaning that is designed to indicate the inner unity of
space and time. Thereby, the real question applies to the
and. That w e name tim e first, that w e say Zeitraum and
not Raumzeit, should indicate that tim e plays a special
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 17

role in this question. But that should not mean at all that
space can be deduced from time or that it is som ething
secondary to it.
The question "W h at is a thing? includes in itse lf the
question: "W h at is Zeitraum (tim e-sp an )?", the puzzling
unity of space and time w ithin w hich, as it seem s, the
basic character of things, to be only this one, is deter
mined.
We w ill not escape the question about the essence of
space and time, because im m ediately so m any doubts
arise regarding the distinguishing mark w e gave of the
thingness o f the thing. We said: Place and time point
make even absolutely identical things just these (je
diesen), i.e., different ones. But are space and time at all
determ inations of the thing itse lf? The things, as w e say,
are indeed w ithin space and time. Space and time arc a
frame, an ordering realm , w ith the help o f which we
establish and indicate the place and time point o f the
particular things. It might be, therefore, that each thing,
if it is determined w ith respect to place and time, is now
ju st this (je d ieses), not m istakable for any other. How
ever, these are only determ inations w hich are externally
brought to and at a thing through the space-tim e relation.
As yet, nothing is said about the thing itse lf or what
makes it to be this one. We easily see that behind these
difficulties hides the principal question: Are space and
time only a fram e for the things, a system o f co-ordinates
which we lay out in order to reach sufficiently exact state
ments about things, or are space and time som ething
else? Is the relation to them ol the thing not this external
one? (Compare D escartes.)'
. Descartes identifies space or internal place with the body
11|1.1Ci.,<,ccuP*es it: For, in truth, the same extension in length,
Th'i a,K* depth, which constitutes space, constitutes body.
ih ^lsllncl,on wo rnake is only a conceptual one; extension being
i o Wn.lmwn j actor. individualized in the case of body, but given
]01 !i l,m t' ' n *!lc ease ol space. For this reason Descartes
s lie notion of the vacuum. ( The Principles of Philosophy,
18 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

According to the everyday manner w e are used to, w e

look at w hat is around us. We can notice: this chalk is
white; this wood is hard; the door is closed. But such
statem ents do not carry us to the goal. We w an t to look
at the things w ith respect to their thingness, therefore for
what presum ably characterizes a ll things and each thing.
When w e look at them w ith respect to this w e find that
things are singular: one door, one piece o f chalk, one
blackboard, etc. Being singular is obviously a general, uni
versally applicable ch aracteristic (Z u g ) o f things. If w e
look more closely, w e even discover that these single
things are ju st these (je d iese): this door, this chalk, this
now and here, not those o f classroom six and not the ones
from last semester.
Thus, we already have an answ er to our question
"W h at is a thing? A thing is alw ays a this one (je d ieses).
We now seek to understand more precisely wherein this
essential ch aracteristic of the thing co n sists. The above
named ch aracteristic o f the things, that they are alw ays
these (je d iese), stands in conjunction w ith space and
time. Through its particular space and tim e point, each
thing is un m istakably this one and not another. However,
some doubts arise as to whether w ith such a reference to
space and time w e are saying anything about the thing
itself. Such statem en ts about the place and time point
after all concern only the fram e w ithin w hich things stand

Part II, Principles X-XVI, E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, trans..

The Philosophical Works of Descartes [N. Y.: Dover Publications,
1955], 2 vols., 1, 259-62.)
In Meditation III and in his reply to P. Gassendis objections,
Descartes asserts the doctrine of continual creation, based on his
belief that the moments of time are discrete. Thus he asserts:
". . . that the single moments of this time can be separated from
their neighbours, i.e., that a thing which endures through individ
ual moments may cease to exist. ( I b i d II, 219; 1, 163, 164.)
Descartes, therefore, identifies both space and time with the
existent thing. Both are considered as external in their relation
to the thing only because of the w ay we conceptually give them
generic unity. Trans.
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 19

and how, that is to say where and when, they happen to

stand w ithin it. One could point out that each thing as
far as w e know things has its space-tim e-position
( Raum -Zeit-Stelle), and that this relation o f the thing to
space and tim e is not som ething arbitrary. Do things
necessarily stand within this space-tim e-relation ( Raum-
Zeit-Bezug), and w hat is the b asis for this necessity?
Does this b a sis lie in the things them selves? If this were
the case, then the aforementioned ch aracteristic would
have to assert som ething about things them selves, about
the being-a-thing ( D ingsein).
First, however, we have the im pression that space and
time are som ething outside o f things. Or does this im
pression deceive us? Let us look more closely: this piece
o f chalk, the room better, the space o f the classroom
lies around this thing, if w e m ust speak o f a lying
around. We say that this piece of chalk takes up a certain
space. This space is delim ited by the surface o f the piece
of chalk. Su rface? Plane? The piece o f chalk itse lf is ex
tended. The space is not only around it, but directly in it,
even within it; but this space is occupied, filled up. The
chalk itself co n sists inwardly o f space. After all, w e say
the chalk takes up this space, encloses this space by its
surface, in itself, as its interior. Therefore, for the chalk,
this space is not a mere exterior frame. But w hat does
interior mean here? What does the interior o f the chalk
look like? Let us sec. We break it into tw o pieces. Are we
now at the interior? Exactly as before w e are again out
side. Nothing has changed. The pieces o f chalk are
sm aller, but bigger or sm aller does not m atter now. The
surfaces where it is broken are less sm ooth than the rest
the surface, but that does not m atter. The moment we
'anted to open the chalk by breaking it, to grasp the in
terior, it had enclosed itself again. And we could continue
1 iis action until the piece ol chalk had becom e a little pile
powder. Under a m agnifying glass and a m icroscope
" e could still break up these tiny grains. Where this lim it

c f.ouA
 20 W IS A T H I N G ?

o f such a "m e ch a n ica l" division lies cannot be clearly de

termined. In any case, such breaking up never yields any
thing but w hat w a s already here, from which it started.
Whether this piece o f chalk is four centim eters or .004
m illim eters only m akes a difference in how much but not
in what (essen ce).
Following this m echanical division w e could carry out
a chem ical-m olecular analysis. We could even go behind
that, to the atom ic structure of the m olecules. But a c
cording to the starting point of our question, w e w ant to
remain in the realm o f the things im m ediately around us.
But even if w e go the w a y of chem istry and physics, we
never reach beyond the sphere o f m echanics, that is, be
yond such a spatial sphere wherein m atter m oves from
place to place or rests in one place. On the b a sis of the
results o f our present atom ic p hysics since N iels Bohr
exhibited his model o f the atom (1913) the relations be-
tween m atter and space are no longer so sim ple, although
I
fundam entally still the same. What keeps a place oc
cupied, takes up space, m ust itself be extended. Dm- qn cs-
tion has been what the interior of a physical body looks
lik e; m ore exactly, the space there. The result is: this
interior is alw ays again an exterior lor the sm aller andl
s m aller particles. fj
Meanwhile, our piece o f chalk has become a little pile^
o f powder. Even if w e assum e that nothing o f the m atter
has escaped, that the full amount is still here, it is no
longer our chalk, i.e., w e can no longer w rite w ith it on
the blackboard. We could accept that. But w e cannot ac
cept that w e could not find the space w e looked for in the
interior o f the chalk, the space w hich belongs to the chalk
itself. But, perhaps w e did not reach for it fast enough.
Let us break the piece o f chalk again! The surface where
it is broken and the pieces o f surface are now the exterior.
But this piece of surface which w as ju st previously "in
terior is exactly that piece o f surface delim iting the
grains of chalk, and it w a s alw ays the exterior o f these
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 21

pieces o f chalk. Where does the interior begin and the ex

terior end? Does the chalk con sist of space? Or is the
space alw ays a container, som ething o f an enclosure, of
which the chalk co n sists, o f that w hich the chalk itself is?
The chalk only fills space; a place is alw ays placed into
the thing. This placing in o f space tells us exactly that the
space rem ains outside. W hatever occupies space alw ays
form s the border between an outside and an inside. But
the interior is really only an exterior lying farther back.
(S trictly speaking, there is no outside or inside w ithin
space itse lf.) But where in the world would there be an
outside and inside, if not in space? Perhaps, however,
space is only the p o ssib ility o f outside and inside but it
self neither an interior nor an exterior. The statem ent
"S p ace is the p ossib ility of inside and ou tside might be
true. What w e call "p o ssib ility ( M glich keit) is still
rather indefinite. P o ssib ility can mean many things. We
are not of the opinion that w e have decided w ith such a
statem ent the question o f the relation between the thing
and space. Perhaps the question has not yet been suffi
ciently posed. Up to now w e have not considered that
space w hich especially concerns such things as this chalk,
as well as w riting tools and im plem ents in general, which
we call the storeroom (equipm ent room: Zeugraum ).
We were concerned to reflect on whether space and
time are "exterio r to things or not. Yet it becam e evident
that the space w hich appears m ost likely to be w ithin
things is som ething exterior when viewed from the physi
cal thing and its particles.
Still more exterior to things is timeXThe chalk here also
has its tim es: the time point ( Zeitp u n kte) now in which
flu chalk is here, and this next now when it is there. With
ho question concerning space there still appeared some
prospects of finding it w ithin the thing itself. But even
iliis is not the case with time. Time runs over things as a
n o o k passes over rocks. Perhaps not even in this way,
because, in the movement of the w aters, the rocks are
22 WIIAT IS A T H I N G ?

pushed and driven so that they rub and polish each other.
The movement of time, however, leaves things untouched.
That the tim e now advances from 5:15 to 6:00 does
nothing to the chalk. We do say "w ith time or "w ith the
p assin g" o f tim e things are changing. It is even said that
the ill-famed "to o th of time is nibbling on things. That
things are changing in the passing o f time is not to be de
nied. But did anyone ever observe how time nibbles at
things, that is, generally speaking, how time goes to work
on things?
But perhaps time is identifiable only w ith som e out
standing things. We know such things: clocks. They show'
the time. Let us look at this clock. Where is tim e? We see
the figures and the hands which move, but not time. We
can open a clock and examine it. Where here is tim e? But
this clock does not give the time im m ediately. This clock
is set according to the German Observatory in Hamburg.
If w e were to travel there and ask the people w'here they
have the time, we would be ju st as w ise as before our
journey.
If, therefore, w e cannot even find time on that thing
which sh ow s time, then it actually seem s to have nothing
to do w ith things them selves. On the other hand, it is after
all not m erely empty talk when w e say that w e can tell
the time w ith the help o f clocks. If we deny this, where
would that lead? Not only the schedule o f everyday life
would fall to pieces, but every technical calculation would
also becom e im possible; history, every memory, and
every decision would be gone.
And yet, in what relation do things stand to tim e? With
every attem pt to determine this, the im pression is re
newed more strongly than before that space and tim e are
only perceptual realm s for things, indifferent toward
these but useful in assigning every thing to its space-time-
position. Where and how these perceptual realm s really
are rem ains open. But this much is certain: only on ac
count o f this position do particular things becom e ju st
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 23

these (je diesen). And there is then, after all, at least the
p ossib ility o f m any sam e things. Precisely when w e look
at the question from things them selves and not from their
fram e o f reference, each thing is not un m istakably a sin
gle one (je d ieses); it is that only w ith respect to space
and time.
Now, it is true that one o f the greatest German
thinkers, Leibniz, has denied that there ever could be tw o
identical things. Leibniz established, w ith regard to this,
a special principle w hich ruled throughout this philos
ophy, o f which today w e hardly have an idea. It is the
principium id entitatis indiscer nib ilium, the principle of
the identity o f indiscernible things. The principle states:
Two indistinguishable things, i.e., tw o alike things, cannot
be tw o things but m ust be the sam e, i.e., one thing. Why,
we ask ? The reason Leibniz gives is ju st as essential for
the fundam ental principle as for his entire b a sic philo
sophical system . Two alike things cannot be tw o, i.e., each
is irreplaceably this one (je d ieses) because tw o alike
things cannot exist at all. Why not? The being o f things is
their creation by God, as understood in the Christian
theological interpretation. If there ever were tw o alike
things, then God had tw ice created the sam e, i.e., sim ply
repeating som ething eternal. Such a superficially me
chanical deed, however, contradicts the com pleteness of
the absolute Creator, the perfectio Dei. Therefore, there
can never be tw o alike things, by reason o f the essence of
being, in the sense o f being created. This principle is
based here upon certain more or less explicit principles
and basic perceptions o f w hat is in general and the being
ol that; moreover, upon certain conceptions of the perfec
tion o f creation and production in general.
VVe are not now sufficiently prepared to take our stand
\\ith respect to the principle expressed by Leibniz and its
oundation. It is necessary alw ays to see again to what
i-'ngths the question "W h at is a thing? im m ediately
eads. It could be that this theological argument of the
 24 W H A T IS T H I N G ?

principle is im possible for us, even disregarding the ques

tion of the dogm atic truth o f Christianity. However, one
thing rem ains certain; in fact, it now first com es to light
that the question concerning the character of the being of
\ things, to be singular and "th is one, is com pletely and en-
, 'tir e ly hung up in the question concerning being. Does be
ing still mean to us being created by God? If not, what
then? Does being no longer mean anything at all to us, so
that w e are only staggering around in a confusion? Who
can decide how it stands w ith being and Ks determina
tion?
But w e first ask only about the proxim ate things
around us. They show them selves as singular and as ju st
these." From our reference to Leibniz, w e concluded that
the character of the things, to be ju st these, could be
based on the being o f things them selves and not only w ith
reference to their position in space and time.

6. The Thing as Just This One ( jc d ieses)

But w e shall let alone the question from where the

character o f a thing as ju st this one is determined, and
pose a still more prelim inary question, which is wrapped
in the preceding one.
We said that the single things around us are ju st
these. When w e say o f som ething which encounters us
that it is this, are w e saying anything about the thing itse lf
at all? This, namely, the one here, i.e., that which we now
point out. In th is lies a pointing, a referring. We in d i--*
cate som ething to the others who are w ith us, w ith whom
we are together. It is a reference w ithin the range of the
here this one here, this here. The th is means, more
precisely, here in our im m ediate neighborhood; w hile we
alw ays mean som ething more distant by that, but still
w ithin the range of the here and there this here, that
there. The Latin language has in this connection still
sharper distin ction s. Hie means "th is here, iste means
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 25

"th a t there. Ille means "th a t far aw ay, the Greek ei

by w hich the poets intend what is at the periphery w hat
we call the ulterior (Jen seitig e).
In gram m ar such w ords as "th is and "th a t are called
dem onstratives, for these w ords dem onstrate, they point
at. . . . The general verbal character o f these reference
words com es to expression in the term dem onstrative
pronoun (Fr-w rter). The Greeks said , w hich
became the standard for W estern gram m ar (,
). In this designation o f such w ords a s "th is and
"th a t lies a quite definite explanation and interpretation )
of their essence. The interpretation is indeed significant
for W estern gram m ar (w hich, in spite of everything, still
governs us today). Yet it is m isleading. The name "p ro
noun (F iir-w o rt), considering a word as a noun (nom en),
a name (N am e) and substantive, means that such w ords
as " th is take the place of substantives. It is true that they
clo this, yet it is only what they do also. We speak o f the
chalk but do not alw ays use the name, using instead the
expression " th is . However, such a su bstitu ting role is
not the original essence of the pronoun; its naming func
tion is more prim ordial. We grasp it im m ediately when
we remember that the article "th e is derived from the
dem onstrative words. It is custom ary to place the article
before the substantive. The naming reference o f the arti
cle alw ays goes beyond the noun. The naming o f the sub
stantive itse lf a lw a y s occurs on the basis o f a pointing-
out. This is a "d em on stration , exhibiting the encoun
tered and the present-at-hand. The function of naming,
'\liie h is performed in the dem onstrative, belongs to the
most prim ordial w ay of speaking in general. It is not '
merely a substitu tion, i.e., not a second or later order o f
expression.
lo consider w hat has been said is im portant for the
coi i ect evaluation o f the "th is . It is som ehow included in
'- 'e iy naming as such. Insofar as things confront us, they
>-ome into the character o f " th is . But thereby w e are say-
 ing that the " t h is " is not ch aracteristic o f the thing itself.
The " t h is " takes the thing only in sofar as it is an object of
a dem onstration. Those speaking and thinking, however,
who use such dem onstrative w ords, i.e., human beings,
are alw ays single su bjects. The "th is , instead o f being a
... character o f the thing itself, is only a su bjective addition
on our part.

7. Subjective-O bjective. The Question o f Truth

To see how little, indeed, is said b y the statem ent that

"th is is only a "su b je c tiv e determ ination o f the thing is
recognizable from the fact that w e are ju st as ju stified in
calling it "o b je ctiv e , for objectum means som ething
thrown against you. The th is" m eans a thing in sofar as it
faces us, i.e., it is objective. W hat a " th is is does not de
pend upon our caprice and our pleasure. But even if it de
pends on us, it also equally depends upon the things. This
only is clear, that such determ inations as the "th is,
which w e use in the everyday experience o f the things,
are not as self-evident as they m ay appear to be. It re
m ains absolu tely questionable w hich kind o f truth con
cerning the thing is contained in the determ ination o f it
as a "th is . Tt is questionable which kind o f truth in
general w e have of things in our daily exncrience. whether
it i s su bjective or objective, whether both together or
neither.
Up to now w e have only seen that beyond the sphere of
daily experiences the things also stand in different truths
(the sun o f the shepherd and o f the astrop h ysicist, the
ordinary table and the scientific ta b le ). Now it becom es
clear that the truth about the sun for the shepherd, the
truth about the ordinary table, e.g., the determ ination
this sun and "th is tab le this truth about the th is
rem ains opaque in its essence. How shall w e ever say
som ething about the thing w ithout being sufficiently in
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 27

structed about the kind o f truth which is proper to it?

At the sam e time w e can state the opposite question: How
are w e to know som ething about the essential truth o f the
thing if w e do not know the thing itse lf to determine
w hat kind of truth can and m ust be proper to it?
It is now clear: to go straight to the things cannot be
carried out, not because w e shall be stopped on the w ay
but because those determ inations at which w e arrive and
which we attribute to the things them selves space, time,
and " th is present them selves as determ inations w hich
do not belong to the things them selves.
On the other hand, w e cannot invoke the comm on an
sw er which says that if determ inations are not "o b je c
tive they are "siih fep tive Tl ronld he that tl-iey -arp
neither, that the distinction betw een su b je c t and o b je ct.
and w ith it the su b je ct-object relationship itself, is a
highly questionable, though generally favored, sphere of
retreat for philosophy.
Hardly a gratifying position so it seem s. There is no
information about the thingness of the thing without
knowledge of the kind of truth in which the thing stands.
But there is no inform ation about this truth o f the thing
without knowledge o f the thingness o f the thing whose
truth is in question.
Where are w e to get a foothold? The ground slip s aw ay
under us. Perhaps w e are already close to falling into the
well. At any rate the housem aids are already laughing.
And what if only w e ourselves are these housem aids, i.e.,
I we have secretly discovered that all this talk of the
his, as well as sim ilar discussions, is fantasy and
empty!
rhe w orst, however (not for our daily livelihood but
loi philosophy), would be if w e wanted to escape from
t ie d^ve bad position by trying to steal aw ay on some
andestine path. We could say: our everyday experiences
a i s t " reliable; this chalk is this chalk, and I take it if I
28 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

need it and leave it aside if I do not. This is as clear as

day, certainly, if w e are concerned about daily use. But
now it is a question of w hat the thingness o f this thing is
and w hether the " t h is is a true ch aracteristic o f the thing
itself. Perhaps w e still have not understood the " th is su f
ficiently clearly. We renew our question o f whence and
how the truth o f a thing as a " ju s t th is (je d ieses) is de
termined. Here w e come upon an observation w hich
Hegel has already made in his Phenomenology of Mind.1'
To be sure, the approach (A n satz), level (E ben e), and in
tention (A b sich t) of Hegels w ay of thinking are o f a
different kind.
The suspicion arose that a things ch aracteristic as
"ju s t th is is only subjective, since this ch aracteristic de
pends on the standpoint o f the experiencing individual
and the time point in which, on the part o f the su bject, the
experience o f a thing happens to be made.
Why is the chalk "ju s t th is and no other? Only because
it is ju st right here now. The "h ere and the "n o w m ake
it to be " th is ." W ith the dem onstrative ch aracteristic
" t h is w e refer to the "h ere, i.e., to a place, to a space,
and, equally, to the now, i.e., time. We already know this,
at least in general. Let us now pay special attention to
the truth about the chalk: "H ere is the ch alk. That is a
truth; the here and the now hereby characterize the chalk
so that w e em phasize by saying: the chalk, which means
"th is . However, this is alm ost too obvious, alm ost offen-
11It is interesting to compare Heideggers analysis of "th is with
that of Hegel, whom he apparently has in mind throughout this
section. For Hegel, at the level of sensory experience, "pure being
breaks into "th ise s": " I on the one hand and "o b je c t on the
other. Together they make up "th e This. The This exists in the
twofold form of the Now and the Here. But Hegel wants to estab
lish that the Now and Here, as well as the This, are Universals.
It is not the individual thing that continues to maintain itself but
the NJow and Here. (G. F. YV. Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, J. B.
Baillie, trans. [2nd ed.; New York: Macmillan Co., 1949], section
A, 1, 151-52.) Trans.
 Various W avs o f Questioning About the Thing 29

sively self-evident. But w e want to do som ething more

and elaborate still further the self-evident truth about
the chalk. We even w ant to w rite down this truth about
the chalk to avoid losing this great valuable.
For this purpose w e take a scrap o f paper and w e w rite
the truth down: "H ere is the ch alk. We lay this written
statem ent beside the thing o f w hich it is the truth. After
the lecture is finished both doors are opened, the cla ss
room is aired, there w ill be a draft, and the scrap o f paper,
let us suppose, w ill flutter out into the corridor. A student
finds it on his w ay to the cafeteria, reads the sentence
"H ere is the ch alk, and ascertains that this is not true at
all. Through the draft the truth has become an untruth.
Strange~Tttat a LiUth should"depend on n i?ust of w in d .
U sually- philosophers tell each other that the truth is
something w hich is valid in itself, which is beyond tim e
and is eternal, and w oe to him who says that truth is not
eternal. That means relativism , which teaches that every-
thing is only relatively true, only partly true, and that
nothing is fixed any longer. Such doctrines are called
nihilism. N ihilism , nothingness, philosophy o f anxiety,
tragedy, unheroic, philosophy of care and woe the cata
log of these cheap titles is inexhaustible. Contemporary
man shudders at such titles, and, w ith the help o f the
shudder thus evoked, the given philosophy is contra
dicted. What wonderful tim es when even in philosophy
one need no longer think, but where someone somewhere,
occasionally, on higher authority, cares to provide shud
dering! And now the truth should even depend on a draft!
Should it? I ask whether perhaps it is not so.
But finally, this sim ply depends upon the fact that we
lave w ritten only half o f the truth and entrusted it to an
unstable scrap o f paper. Here is the chalk and right
l,ou' We w ant to define this "n o w more exactly. So that
w iitten truth w ill not be exposed to the draft, w e in
tend to put the truth about the "n o w ," and thus about
 30 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

the chalk, on a blackboard. Now when now ? We w rite

on the blackboard: "N o w it is afternoon. All right, ju st
now, this afternoon. We suppose that after the lecture
the classroom w ill be locked up so that no one can creep
to the w ritten truth and secretly fa lsify it. Only early the
next morning the custodian is permitted to enter and to
clean the blackboard. He reads the truth: "N o w it is after
noon." And he finds that the statem ent is untrue and that
this professor has made a m istake. The truth becam e an
untruth overnight.
W hat a rem arkable truth! All the more rem arkable
since every time w e w ant sure inform ation about the
chalk, it itse lf is here and alw ays now here, a thing present
here and now. W hat changes is alw avs only fl ^'i.-rmina.
tion o f the here and "n o w . and, accordingly, o f the
thing. But the chalk remains a lw a v s n Thotyfpi-r
in spite o f everything, these determ inations belong to>the
v '. lH7r?g_iIseit The " t h is " is a general charnctcrisLte- f the
T thing and belongs to its thingness. But the generality o f
the th is" demands g en erattystw ays to be determined as
particular ( je w eilig e). The chalk could not be for us w hat
it is, that is, " a chalk, i.e., "th is ch alk and no other,
were it not alw ays a now and here. Of course, w e shall say
that fo r us the chalk is alw ays a " th is ." But w e finally
want to know w hat the chalk is fo r itself. For this purpose
we have made the truth about the chalk independent o f us
and have entrusted it to a scrap o f paper and the b lack
board. And observe: while in truth som ething about the
chalk itse lf w a s to be truly preserved, th> %
into untruth.
't his gives us a hint for approaching the truth about
the chalk in another w ay, nam ely, instead o f entrusting
this truth to a scrap o f paper or to the blackboard, to
keep it w ith us, to guard it much more carefully than w e
have so far done, whereby w e drop our peculiar fear be
fore su b jectivism or perhaps even endure it. So it could be
that the more w e understand the truth about the chalk as
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 31

our truth, the more w e com e closer to w hat the chalk itself
is. It has been shown to us more than once that the truth
about a thing is connected w ith space and time. There-
fore, w e also may suspect that w e shall come closer to the
thing itse lf if we penetrate into the essence o f space and
time, although it alw ays again appears as though space
and time are only a fram e for the thing.
Finally, the question shall arise whether the truth con
cerning the thing is only som ething that is carried to the
thing and pinned on it w ith the help o f a scrap o f paper
or whether, on the contrary, the thing itse lf hangs
within the truth, ju st as it does in space and time, whether
the truth is not such that it neither depends on the thing,
nor lies in us, nor stands som ewhere in the sky.
All our reflections up to now have presum ably led to
no other conclusion than that w e do not yet know either
the ins or outs of the thing and that w e only have a great
confusion in our heads. Certainly, that w a s the intention
of course, not to leave us in this confusion, but to let
us know that this happy-go-lucky advance toward the
things has its special circum stances in the moment.
Therein we w ish to know how it is w ith the thingness o f
the thing.
If we now remember our position at the beginning, we
can determine, on the b a sis o f our intentional and pecu
liar questioning back and forth, w hy w e have not come
closer to the thing itself. We began w ith the statem ent:
hings around us are single, and these single things are
ju st these." With this latter ch aracteristic w e reached
the realm of reference to the things; seen in reverse: the
lealin of how things meet us. Reference and encounter
that means generally the realm in which we, the alleged
su bjects, also reside. When we attem pt to grasp this realm
we alw ays run into space and time. We called it "tim e-
''Pace, which m akes reference and encounter possible.
!>s is the realm which lies around things and m anifests
tself in the com pulsive bringing up o f space and time.
 32 W HAT IS A T H I N G ?

8. The Thing as the Bearer of Properties

Perhaps w e can never experience anything concerning

things and make out anything about them except as we
remain in the realm in which they encounter us. Mean
while, w e cannot get loose from the question whether or
not we approach the things them selves, at least w ithin this
realm, whether in it w e aren't alw ays already w ith them.
If this is so, then starting from here we shall make out
som ething about the things them selves, i.e., w e shall
acquire som e conception ( V orstellung) of how they them-
selves are constructed. It is decidedly ad visable to dis
/ regard the frame around things and look exclusively at
their construction. In any case, this w ay exerts as strong a
claim as the previous one.
We again ask: "W h at is a thing? How does a thing
lo o k ?" Though w e are looking for the thingness o f the
thing, w e now cau tiously go to w ork, stopping first at the
single things, looking at them, and holding fast to w hat is
seen. A rock it is hard, gray, and has a rough surface;
it has an irregular form, is heavy, and co n sists o f this and
that substance. A plant it has roots, a stem , foliage. The
latter is green and grooved. The stem o f the foliage is
short, etc. An anim al has eyes and ears and can move from
place to place; it has, in addition to the sense organs,
equipment for digestion and sexual reproduction or
gans w hich it uses, generates, and renews in a certain way.
Along w ith the plant, which also has organs, we call this
thing an organism . A w atch has gears, a spring, a dial, etc.
In this w a y we could continue indefinitely. What we
ascertain thereby is correct. The statem en ts w e make are
taken from a faithful fitting to w h at things them selves
show us. We now ask more definitely: As w hat do the
things show them selves to us? We disregard that they are
a rock, rose, dog, w atch , and other things and only con
sider w hat things are in general: a thing is alw ays some-
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 33

thing that has such and such properties, alw ays som e
thing that is constituted in such and such a way. This
som ething is the bearer o f the properties; the something,
as it were, underlies the qualities. This som ething is what
endures, and w e alw ays return to it again as the sam e
when we are in the process o f determining the qualities.
This is how things them selves are. What accordingly is a
thing? It is a nucleus around which many changing quali
ties are grouped, or a bearer upon w hich the qu alities
rest; som ething that p ossesses som ething else in itself
(an sich ). However we tw ist and turn it, this is how the
construction o f things sh ow s itself; and around them are
space and time, as their fram e. This is all so intelligible
and self-evident that one alm ost shuns lecturing expressly
on such com m onplaces. All is so very plain that one does
not understand w hy we m ake such a fu ss and still talk
about th is and about questionable m etaphysical prin
ciples, about steps o f truth and so forth. We said that the
inquiry ought to move w ithin the realm o f everyday ex
perience. W hat is closer than to take things as they are?
We could continue the description o f the things still fur
ther and say: If one thing changes its qualities, this can
have an effect upon another thing. Things affect each
other and resist one another. From such relations be
tween things further qu alities then derive which things
also again "h a v e ."
This description of things and their interdependence
corresponds to w hat w e call the "natural conception of
the w orld. "N a tu ra lly since here w e remain com
pletely "n a tu r a l" and disregard all the profound m eta
physics and extravagant and useless theories about
knowledge. We remain "n a tu ra l and also leave to things
themselves their own "n atu re.
I we now allo w philosophy to join in, and we question
it becom es clear that philosophy too from ancient
t'nies has said nothing else. That the thing is a bearer of
many qualities w a s already said by Plato and above all by
 34 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

A ristotle. Later on perhaps it w a s expressed in other

w ords and concepts. However, b a sica lly the meaning is
alw ays the same, even when the philosophical "p o sitio n s
are as different as, for instance, those of A ristotle and
Kant. Thus, Kant states in the Critique o f Pure Reason
(A 182: N.K.S., p. 212)7 as a principle: All appearances
(i.e., all the things for u s) contain the permanent (su b
stan ce) a s the object itself, and the changeable as its mere
determ ination, that is, as a w ay in which the object
ex ists.

\
W hat then is a thing? Answer: A thing is the existing
( vorhanden) bearer o f m any existing ( vorhanden) yet
changeable properties.
This answ er is so "n a tu ra l that it also dom inates scien
tific thought, not only "th e o retical thought but also all
intercourse w ith things, their calculation and evaluation.
We can retain the traditional determ ination of the
essence o f the thingness o f things in the fam iliar and
usual titles:
1. ----<!
Foundation ( U nterlage) w hat alw ays already
(w h at un derlies) stands along w ith , and
also com es in along with
2. Su bstan tia accidens
3. The bearer ( Trger) properties
( E igen sch aften )
4. S u bject predicate
7 References to the Critique of Pure Reason accord with Ray-
mund Schmidt, Philosophische Bibliothek (Hamburg: Verlag
Meiner, 1956). In the Preface to the fourteenth edition, written in
1930, Schmidt expresses his special thanks to E. Franck in Mar
burg, Norman Kemp Smith in Edinburgh, and M. Heidegger in
Freiburg for their valuable suggestions. A refers to the first edi
tion and "B to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason.
"N.K.S. refers to the translation by Norman Kemp Sm ith (Lon
don, 1929).
References to quotations Heidegger utilizes from the Critique
of Pure Reason remain in the text as they were originally placed.
Occasionally we have given translations in footnotes when
Heidegger has given only references. Trans.
8 imoKcievoi. Derived from (. In ancient philosophy
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 35

9. The E ssen tial Construction of the Truth,

the Thing, and the Proposition

The qu estion "W h at is a thing?^has long been decidcd

w ith '. ^ tisfaction. i.e.. tn e qucstion is obviously no
1fn~i{ " n m in io n
Moreover, the answ er to the question, i.e., the definition
of the thing as the present-at-hand ( vorhanden) bearer
of properties present-at-hand on it, has been established
(and in its truth is at any tim e capable o f being estab
lished) in such a w ay that it cannot be improved upon. For
the establishing is also n atural and, therefore, so fam il
iar that one m ust especially em phasize it even to notice it.
Wherein lies this b a sis for the truth o f the fam iliar de
termination o f the essence o f the thing? Answer: In noth
ing less than the essence of truth itself. Truth w hat does
it mean? The true is w hat is valid; w hat is valid cor
responds to the facts. Som ething corresponds to the facts
when it is directed to them, i.e., when it fits itse lf to what
the things them selves are. Truth, therefore, is fitting (An-
m essung) to things. Obviously, not only do single truths
have to suit them selves to single things, but the essence
of truth m ust also. If truth is correctness, a directing-to
( Sich-richten) . . . then this m ust obviously be really valid
<((> signified the foundation in which something else could
inhere, also what is implied or presupposed by something else.
But at least three senses must be distinguished: (1) CXij (m atter),
he substrate that received form. The so-called material cause
(Aristotle, Metaphysics, 983 30); (2) the substance, including
matter and form, in which the accidents (! ) inhere (ibid.,
9831, 16). It is interesting that Aristotle says of the substance:
-, ovaill roSt n -, ' (M etaphysics, 1037b 28).
For substance means a one and a this, as we m aintain." (The
Hasic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon, ed. [New York: Ran
dom House, 1941], p. 803.) See also the comment of W. D. Ross on
his passage in A ristotle's M etaphysics (Oxford, 1953), II, 205; (3)
he logical subject to which attributes and properties are predi
cated (M etaphysics, 103' 5).
ih takes account of (2) and (3) only. He uses Trger,
ie bearer, as the most general term to include all that tradi-
onally w as meant by the \ *vov and substantia. Traits.
36 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

all the more for the essential determ ination o f the truth.
It m ust fit itse lf to the essence o f the thing (its thingness).
It is necessary from the essence o f truth as fitting that the
structure o f things be reflected in the structure of truth.
If w e thus come upon the sam e fram ework ( Gefge) in
the essential structure (W esen sbau ) o f truth as in the es
sential structure of the things, then the truth o f the fam il
iar determ ination of the essential structure of the thing is
demonstrated from the essence of truth itself.
Truth is a fitting tt^ lii^ s, j^ jjui^ ^ ndenee ( Uberein-
stinim uhgTwnit the things. But w hat is now the character
of what fits itscnTTVnaTdoes the corresponding? What is
this about w hich w e say it m ay be true or false? Just as it
is "n a tu ra l to understand truth as correspondence to the
things, so w e naturally determine w hat is true or false. The
truth w hich w e find, establish , dissem inate, and defend we
express in words. But a single word such as door, chalk,
large, but, and is neither true nor false. Only com bina
tions o f w ords are true or false: The door is closed; the
chalk is white. Such a com bination of words is called a
sim ple assertion. Such an assertion is cither true or false.
The assertion is thus the place and seat of the truth. There
fore, w e likew ise sim ply say: This and that assertion are
truths. A ssertion s are truths and falsities.
What is the structure o f such a truth as assertion ? What
is an assertion ? The name assertion is ambiguous. We
distinguish four meanings, all o f w hich belong together,
and only in this unity, as it were, do they give a complete
outline o f the structure o f an assertion:
assertion s of ( Aussagen von) proposition (S a tz )
assertion s about (Aussagen ber) inform ation
(A u sk u n ft)
assertion s to (Aussagen an ) com m unication
(M itteilun g)
to declare oneself (Sich- expression
Aussprechen) (A usd ruck)
Someone called to court as a w itn ess refuses to give a
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 37

deposition (A u ssage), i.e., in the first place, he does not

speak out, he keeps w hat he know s to him self. Here asser
tion means com m unicating, speaking out into the open,
in contrast to silent concealm ent (V erschweigung). If the
assertion is made it does not consist m ostly of single in
coherent words, but is a report (B erich t). The w it-
ness who decides to give a deposition tells (erzh lt). In
this report the state o f facts is asserted. The assertions
set forth the event, e.g., w hat occurred and the circum
stances o f a ju st observed burglary attem pt. The w itn ess
asserts: The house lay in darkness, the shutters were
closed, etc.
The assertion in the wider sense o f com m unication con
sists o f "a sse r tio n s in the narrower sense, i.e., o f proposi
tions. Asserting som ething in the narrower sense does not
mean speaking out, but it means telling inform ation about
the house, its condition, and the entire state o f things. To
assert now means in view o f the situation and circum
stances to say som ething about it from them, as seen from
their point o f view . Assertion, that is giving information
about. . . . This inform ation is given in such a w ay that
assertions are made about what is under consideration,
about which inform ation is given. Thirdly, assertion
means to talk starting from that which is under consid
eration, e.g., from the house, to take what belongs to the
house, to attribu te to it w hat properly belongs to it, to
ascribe it, bespeak it. What is asserted in this sense we
call the predicate. Assertion in the third sense is predica
tive ; it is the proposition.
Assertion, therefore, is threefold: a proposition giving
information and w hich, when carried out vis--vis others,
becom es com m unication.0 This com m unication is correct
Compare this summary of the threefold character of asser-
with -S'/, p. 156: When we take together the three analyzed
"leanings of assertion in a unified view of the complete phenome
non. we may define assertion as a com municative and determina-
ve pointing out. Sein und Zeit (Tubingen: Max Niemever, 1957),
symbolized by "S Z . Trans.
38 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

when the inform ation is right, i.e., if the proposition is

true. The assertion as a proposition, as an assertion o f "a ,
b of H, is the scat of truth. In the structure of the propo
sition, i.e., o f a sim ple truth, we distinguish su bject, predi
cate, and copula object, assertion, and connective ( Satz-
gegenstnd, Satzaussage, und Verbindungswort). Truth
co n sists in the predicates belonging to the su bject and is
posited and asserted in the proposition as belonging. The
structure and the structural parts o f the truth, i.e., of the
true proposition (object and assertion ), are exactly fitted
to that by w hich truth as such guides itse lf to the thing
as the bearer and to its properties.
Thus we take from the essence of truth, i.e., of the struc
ture o f the true proposition, an unambiguous proof for
the truth o f the definition which gives the things struc
ture.
If w e survey again all that characterizes the answ er to
our question What is a thing?" then w e can establish
three aspects:
1. The definition of the thing as the bearer o f properties
results quite "n a tu ra lly out of everyday experience.
2. This definition of thingness w a s established in an
cient philosophy, obviously because it suggests itse lf quite
"n a tu rally ."
3. The correctness o f this definition o f the essence o f
the thing is finally proved and grounded through the es
sence of truth itself, which essence o f truth is likew ise in
telligible o f itself, i.e., is "n a tu ral.
A question which is answered in such a natural w ay and
can be grounded ju st as naturally at any time is seriously
no longer a question. If one still wanted to m aintain the
question it would be either blind obstin acy or a kind of in-
san ity w hich ventures to run up against the "n a tu ra l" an d
w hat stands beyond all question. We shall do w ell to give
up this question "W hat is a t hing?" as one that is settled.
But before w e expressly give up this settled question, let
us interject a question.
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 39

10. The H istoricity (Geschichtlichkeit^ f the

Definition of the Thing

It w a s shown that the answ er to the question "W h at is

a thing?" is the following: A thing is the bearer of proper
ties, and the corresponding truth has its seat in the asser
tion, the proposition, w hich is a connection o f subject and
predicate. We said that this answ er as well as the reason
for it is quite natural. We now only ask: W hat does
"n a tu ra l mean here?
We call "n a tu ra l ( n at rlich ) w hat is understood w ith
out further ado and is self-evident in the realm of every
day understanding. For instance, the internal construction
of a big bom ber is by itse lf understandable for an Italian
engineer, but for an Abyssinian from a remote mountain
village such a thing is not at all "n atu ral. It is not self-
evident, i.e., not understandable in com parison to any
thing w ith which such a man and his tribe have everyday
fam iliarity. For the Enlightenm ent the "n a tu ra l w as
what could be proved and comprehended according to
certain determ inate principles o f reason based upon it
self, w hich w as, therefore, appropriate to every human as
such and to mankind in general. In the Middle Ages every
thing w a s "n a tu ra l which obtained its essence, its
natura, from God and, because o f this origin, could then
form and preserve itse lf in a definite mode w ithout fur
ther intervention from God. What w as natural to a man of
the eighteenth century, the rationality o f reason as such in
general, set free from any other lim itation, would have
seemed very unnatural to the m edieval man. Also the con-
rary could becom e the case, as w e know from the French
Revolution. Therefore, it follow s: What is "n a tu ra l" is not
natural at all, here meaning self-evident for any given
ever-existing man. The "n a tu ra l is alw ays historical.
A suspicion creeps up from behind us. What if this so
natural appearing essential definition o f the thing were
40 WI I A T IS A T H I N G ?

by no m eans self-evident, were not "n a tu ra l ? Then there

m ust have been a time when the essence o f the thing w as
not defined in this way. Consequently, there also must
have been a time when the essential definition o f the thing
w a s first worked out. The form ation of this essential defi
nition o f the thing did not, then, at som e time ju st fall
absolute from heaven, but would have itse lf been based
upon very definite presuppositions.
This is in fact so. We can pursue the origin o f this es
sential definition o f the thing in its main outline in Plato
and Aristotle. Not only this, but at the sam e time and in
the sam e connection w ith the disclosure o f the thing, the
proposition as such w a s also first discovered and, sim i
larly, that the truth as correspondence to the thing has its
seat in the proposition. The so-called natural determ ina
tion of the essence o f the truth from which w e have
drawn a proof for the correctness of the essential defini
tion o f the thing, this natural concept o f the truth is,
therefore, not "n a tu ra l" without more ado.
Therefore, the "n atu ral w orld -view " ( natrliche Welt
ansicht ), to which w e have constan tly referred, is not self-
evident. It rem ains questionable. In an outstanding sense
this overworked term "n a tu ra l is something historical.
So it could be that in our natural world-view w e have been
dominated by a centuries-old interpretation of the thing-
ness of the thing, w hile things actu ally encounter us quite
differently. This answ er to our interjected question o f the
meaning o f "n a tu ra l w ill prevent us from thoughtlessly
taking the question "W h at is a thing? as settled. This
question seem s only now to be becom ing more clearly de
termined. The question itse lf has become a historical one.
As we, apparently untroubled and unprejudiced, encoun
ter things and say that they are the bearers of proper
ties, it is not w e who are seeing and speaking but rather an
old historical tradition. But why do w e not want to leave
this history alone? It does not bother us. We can adjust
ourselves quite easily w ith this conception o f things. And
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 41

suppose we acknowledge the history o f the disclosure and

interpretation of thingness of the thing? This changes
nothing in the things: the streetcar goes no differently
than before, the chalk is a chalk, the rose is a rose, the cat
is a cat.
We emphasized in the first hour that philosophy is that
thinking w ith w hich w e can begin to do nothing immedi
ately. But perhaps m ediately w e can, i.e., under certain
conditions and in w ays no longer obviously seen as forged
by philosophy and as capable o f being forged only bv it.
Under certain conditions: if, for example, w e undertake
the effort to think through the inner state of today's nat
ural sciences, non-biological as well as biological, if we
also think through the relation o f m echanics and technol
ogy to our existence (D ase/;; V^then >hiv-i*nn* Hpiir thnt
knowledge and qu estioning have here reached Ijm its
which demonstrate that, Tn fact. an original reference to
thjngs is m issing, that it is only sim ulated bv the progress
ol discoveries and technical su cc e sse s." We feel that w hat
zoology and botany investigate concerning anim als and
plants and how they investigate it may be correct. But
are they still anim als and p lants? Are they not m achines
duly prepared beforehand o f w hich one afterw ard even
adm its that they are "cleverer than w e ?
We can, of course, spare ourselves the effort of thinking
these paths through. We also can, furthermore, stick to
what we find "n a tu ra l, that is, som ething w ith which one

1,1Dasein: Literally, being-there. It is a common German

word applicable to the presence o f any thing. It is often trans-
'iterated in English. Heidegger's use of the term refers to m ans
own unique way of existing in contrast to other entities. Trans.
11 In Die Frage nach der Technik (Pfullingen: Verlag Neske,
962), p. 13, Heidegger points out the danger in the progress of
modern technology for man to misinterpret the meaning of tech
n ology; . . endangered man boasts himself as the m aster of
earth. Everything man encounters appears entirely as man-made.
I 'w e y cr, true thinking leads one to see technology () as that
which the forces of Nature are challenged to the revelation and
unconcealedness of the truth {\,). Trans.
42 W I I A T IS A T H I N G ?

thinks no further. Wo can take this thoughtlessness as a

standard for the things. The streetcar then goes exactly
as before. The decision s which are made or not made do
not take place in the streetcar or on the m otorcycle, but
som ewhere else that is, in the sphere o f historical free
dom, i.e., where a historical being (D asein ) decides its
ground, as well as how it decides, w hat level of freedom of
knowledge it w ill choose and w hat it w ill posit as freedom.
These decisions are different at differing periods and
among different peoples. They cannot be forced. With the
freely chosen level o f the actual freedom of knowledge,
i.e., w ith the inexorableness o f questioning, a people al
w ays p osits for itse lf the degree o f its being (D asein). The
Greeks sa w the entire nobilitv of their existence in the
a b ility to Question. I heir ability to qu estion w as their
stand : n - r l fur His t i iiguishmg them selves [Tom those w ho
did nnt li;ivi it nnd did not w an t it. They called them
b arbarians.
We can leave alone the question o f our knowledge about
the things and suppose that som eday it w ill set itse lf right
on its own. We can admire the achievem ents o f todays
natural sciences and technology and need not know how
they got that way, that, for instance, modern science only
became p ossible by a dialogue carried on (out o f the earli
est passion for questioning) w ith ancient knowledge, its
concepts, and its principles. We need know nothing and
can believe w e are such magnificent men that the Lord
m ust have given it to us in our sleep.
But w e can also be convinced o f the indispensability of
questioning, which m ust exceed everything up to now in
significance, depth, and certitude, because only in this
w ay can we m aster w hat otherw ise races aw ay beyond us
in its self-evidence.
D ecisions are not made by proverbs but only by work.
We decide to question, and in a very detailed and drawn
out way, w hich for centuries rem ains only a questioning.
Meanwhile, others can safely bring home their truths.
 Various W avs o f Questioning About the Thing 43

Oncc during his lone w a lk s N ietzsche w rote down the sen

tence: "E n orm ous self-reflection! To becom e conscious
not as an individual but as mankind. Let us reflect, let us
think back: let us go all the sm all and the great w a y s!
( W ill to Power [W ille zur M ach t], 585).
We go here only a sm all wray, the little w'ay o f the little
question "W h at is a thing? We concluded that the defini-,
tions which seem so self-evident arc not "n a tu ra l." The
an sw ers w e give were already established in ancient times.
When w e apparently ask about the thing in a natural and
unbiased way, the question already expresses a prelim i
nary opinion about the thingness o f the thing. H istory al
ready speaks through the type o f question. We therefore
say that this question is a historical one. Therein lies a
definite direction for our purposes, should we desire to
ask the question w ith sufficient understanding.
W hat should w e do if the question is a historical one?
And w'hat does "h isto r ic a l m ean? In the first place we
only estab lish that the common answ er to the question
about the thing stem s from an earlier, past time. We can
estab lish that since that time the treatm ent o f this ques
tion has gone through various although not earthshaking
changes, so that different theories about the thing, about
the proposition, and about the truth regarding the thing
have regularly emerged through the centuries. Thereby it
can be shown that the question and the answ er have, so to
speak, their history, i.e., they already have a past. But this
is ju st w hat w e do not mean when we say that the question
What is a thing? is historical, because every report of
he past, that is o f the prelim inaries to the question about
the th ing, is concerned w ith som ething that is static. This
kind of h istorical reporting ( historischen B erich ts) is an
explicit shutting down of history, whereas it is, after all,
happening. We question h istorically if we ask what is
still happening even if it seem s to be past. We ask w hat is
s|ill happening and whether w e remain equal to this hap
pening so that it can really develop.
44 W HAT IS A T H I N G ?

Therefore, w e do not ask about opinions, view points,

and propositions w hich appeared in earlier tim es about
the thing in order to arrange them one after another, as in
a museum o f w eapons where the javelin s are ordered by
p articular centuries. We do not ask at all about the for
mula and the definition o f the essence of the thing. These
form ulas are only the residuum and sediment o f b asic po
sition s taken by historical being (D asein ), toward, and in
the m idst of, things taken as a whole, and w hich it took it
self. However, w e ask about these b asic positions and
about the happening in them and about the b asic move
m ents o f human beings (D asein ) that have occurred,
m ovements w hich apparently are no longer m ovem ents
because they are past. But a movement need not be gone
ju st because it cannot be established: it can also be in the
s tate of quiescence ( Ruhe).
W hat appears to us as though past, i.e.. sim ply as a
happening that is no longer going on. can be quiescence
And this quiescence can contain a fullness of being and
reality^w h ich, in the end, essentially surpasses the reality
of the real, in the sense ol the actual ( Aktuellen ).
This quiescence of happening is not the absence o f his
tory, InTnrtxisic lol'tll ol its presence, w hat we normally
know as past, and tirst represent, is m ostly only the for
m erly^actu al,'' what once caused a stir or even made the
noise w h ich alw ays belongs to history but which is not his
tory nroner. What is merely past does not exhaust what
has been. This still linn NHng, its " iiv '- 1 ^ -i pe
cu 1iar qn iesconce o f a happening ol a kind detcrnlined in
t urn by what happen s . Quiescence is only a sell-con talTfed
m ovem ent. often more uncannv ( unheim licher) than
movement itse lf.

11. Truth Proposition (A sse rtio n ) Thing

There can be various form s and reasons for the quies

cence o f the happenings o f ancient tim es. Let us see how
 Various W ays of Questioning About the Thing 45

it is w ith our question in this rcsncci* We heard that in the

tim e o f Plato and A ristotle the definition I the thing w a s
set forth as the bearer of properties. The discovery o f the
essence of the p r o p o s il ion w a s made at the sam e time.
Also sim u ltaneously arose th c cfiaracterization of the truth
as the fitting o f the perception to the things, which tru th
has its placc in the proposition. All this can be presented
in detail and "unequivocally IroHl'thc d iscussions and es
says o f Plato and Aristotle. We also can point out how
these teachings about the thing, the truth, and the propo
sition changed w ith the Sto ics; furtherm ore, how again
differences appeared in medieval Sch olasticism , and som e
others in our modern tim es, and again, still others in
German Idealism. Thus, we would tell a h isto ry" ( Ges
ch ich te) about this question, but not ask h istorically at
all, i.e., we would, thereby, leave the question What is a
thing? com pletely quiescent. The movement would then
consist only in the fact that,w ith the help o f a report about
theories, w e m ay contrast these w ith one another. We
bring the question What is a thing? out of its quiescence
bv inserting the Platonic-Aristotelian determ inations of
the thing, the proposition and the truth into specific p ossi
bilities, and by putting these up for decision. We ask: Do
the definition o f the essence o f the thing and the definition
of the essence o f the truth occur at the sam e time only by
accident, or do they all cohere among them selves, perhaps
even necessarily? If such proves to be the case, how do
these definitions cohere? O bviously, we have already given
an answ er to this question when we refer to what has been
cited to prove the correctness of the essential definition
l the thing. Thereby, it is dem onstrated that the defini
tion of the essential structure o f truth m ust conform to
the essential structure of things on the b a sis o f the essence
<>i truth as correctness ( R ich tig k e it). This establish es a
certain interdependence between the essence of the thing,
()l a proposition, and of truth. This also sh ow s itself ex
ternally in the order o f the determ ination o f the thing and
 46 W HAT IS A T H I N G ?

the proposition according to w hich the subject-predicate

relationship is fourth (cf. p. 34). We should certainly not
forget that w e cited the reference to the so viewed connec
tion as the opinion o f the common and "n a tu ra l" concep
tion o f this question. But this "n a tu ra l opinion is abso
lutely not natural. This means that its supposed firmness
dissolves itse lf into a series of questions. These run as fol-
\ lows: W as the essen tial structure o f truth and o f the prop-
X osition suited to the structure of the things? Or is it the
opposite: W as the essential structure of the thing as a
bearer o f attribu tes interpreted according to the structure
o f the proposition, as the unity of "su b je c t and predi
ca te ? Has man read off the structure of the proposition
from the structure of tTTe things, or has he translerred the
s tructure o f the proposition into the things?
If the latter were the case, then the further question
would im m ediately arise: How does the proposition, the
interpretation, come to present the m easure and model of
how things in their thingness are to be determined? Since
the proposition, the assertio n, the n ositing, and the telling
are human action s, w e would conclude that man does not"
ad ju st him sclfT o l h inps hut the things to man and to the
QjSp&S hnmnn suhicct as w hich one usually understands the 1. ^
i . iJrtf Such an interpretation o f the relation of origin between
the determ ination o f the thing and that o f the proposition
iV seem s im probable, at least among the Greeks. For the I
standpoint is som ething modern and, therefore, non-
Greek. The p olis set the standard for the Greeks. Everyone
today is talking of the Greek polls. Now, among the
Greeks, the nation o f thinkers, someone coined the sen
tence: '' ctTTiv , 1 '> ws
itmv, ' St ' <
( Man is the measure of all
things, of things that are that they are, and of things that
are not that they are not. ) The man who made this state
ment, Protagoras, supposedly w rote a w ork w ith the
sim ple title >/ ?)0(, The Truth. The statem ent o f this
proposition is tem porally not too far from P latos time.
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 47

Perhaps this im plies that the structure o f the thing ad ju sts

itself to the structure of the proposition, rather than the
contrary, not "su b je c tiv ism ; only later opinions about
the thinking o f the Greeks are subjective. If, indeed, the
proposition and that truth settled in the proposition,
understood as correctness, be the m easure for the deter
m ination o f the thing; if now the facts are different and
reversed from w hat natural opinion holds, then the fur
ther question arises: What is the ground and guarantee
that we have really hit on the essence o f the proposition?
Whence is it determined what truth is?
Thus w e see that w hat happened in the determ ination of
the essence o f the thing is by no means past and settled,
but at m ost bogged down and therefore to be set in m o
tion anew and so still questionable today. If w e do not
want sim ply to repeat opinions but to grasp w hat we our
selves say and usually mean, then w e im m ediately come
into a w hole turmoil o f questions.
First o f all, the question relative to the thing now stands
thus: Do the essences o f the proposition and o f the truth
determine them selves from out o f the essence o f the thing,
or does the essence o f the thing determine itse lf from out
of the essence o f the proposition? The question is posed as
an eith er/or. H owever (and this becom es the decisive
quc s tio n ), does this either or it self snflice? Are the essence
of .the thing and the essence o f the proposition only bu ilt
as m irror images because hnth nt them together deter
mine thcm scjvcs from out o f the sam e but deeper lying
root? However, w hat and where can be this common
ground for the essence o f the thing and of the proposition
and o f their origin? The unconditioned ( Unbedingt)? We
stated at the beginning that wh^t conditions the essence o f
the thing in its thingness can no longer itse lf be thing and
conditioned, it must b e a n unconditioned ( Un-bedingtes).
Hul also the essence o f the unconditioned ( Unbedingt) is
i.o-determincd bv what has been established as a tiling and
as condition ( Be-dingung). If the thing is taken as ens
 48 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

creation, a present-at-hand created by God, then the un

conditioned is God in the sense o f the Old Testament. If
the thing is considered as that which, as object, faces the
I," i.e., as the not-I, then the 1" is the unconditioned,
the absolute I o f German Idealism. Whether the uncon
ditioned is sought beyond, behind, or in things depends
upon w hat one understands as condition and being con
ditioned ( a ls Bedingung und Bedingtsein).
Only w ith this question do w e advance in the direction
\ o f the p ossible ground for the determ ination of the thing
\ and the proposition and its truth. This, however, sh a tte rs12
the original w ay s of posing the questions concerning the
thing w ith w hich w e began. That happening ( Geschehen)
o f the form erly standard determ ination of the thing, which
seemed long past but w a s in truth only stuck and since
then rested, is brought out of its quiescence. The question
o f the thing again com es into motion from its begin
ning.
With this reference to the inner qu estionability o f the
question about the thing, we ought now to clarify in
what sense w e take the question as historical. To question
\ h isto rically means to set free and into motion the happen
ing which is quiescent and bound in the question.
To be sure, such a procedure easily succum bs to a m is
interpretation. One could take this as belatedly attributing
m istakes to the original determ ination of the thing or at
least insufficiency and incom pleteness. This would be a
childish game o f an em pty and vain superiority and after
thought w hich all those latecom ers m ay at any tim e play
w ith those o f earlier tim es sim ply because they have come
later. Insofar as our questioning is concerned w ith critique
at all, it is not directed against the beginning, but only
against ourselves, in sofar as we drag along this beginning

12 Heidegger entitles the section in SZ where he calls for a re

newal of the question of being from the standpoint of its
historicity, The Task of the Destruction of the History of
Ontology (SZ, p. 19). Traits.
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 49

no longer as such, but as som ething "n a tu ra l, i.e., in an

indifferent falsification.
The conception o f the question "W h at is a thing? as
historical is ju st as far removed from the intention of
merely reporting h istorically about form er opinions about
the thing as it is from the m ania for criticizing these opin
ions and, by adding together w hat is tem porarily correct,
from figuring out and offering a new opinion from past
opinions. Rather it is a question o f s ett ini? into motion the
original inner happening of this question according to its
s implest characteristic moves, w hich have been arrested
in. a quiescence. This happening d o es not li*
aloo f from us in the dim and d istant past but is here in
every proposition everyday opinion, in every
approach l[> ihinpn

12. H istoricity and Decision

What has been said about the historical character of the

question What is a thing? is valid for every philosophi
cal question which we put today or in the future, assum
ing, o f course, that philosophy is a questioning that puts
itself in question and is therefore alw ays and everywhere
moving in a circle.
We noticed at the outset how the thing determined itself
lor us first as single and as a th is. A ristotle ca lls it , n
this here." However, the determ ination of the singleness
( Einzelnheit) inherently depends also on how the univer
sality of the universal is conceived, for w hich the single is
an instance and an example. Also, in this regard, certain
decisions set in w ith Plato and A risto tle which still influ
ence lo g ic and gramm ar. We further observed that a closer
circum scription o f the th is a lw a y s involves the help o f
he space-tim e relationship. Also w ith regard to the essen
tial determ ination ol space and time, A ristotle and Plato
sketched the w ays on which we still move today.
In truth, however, our historical being-here (D asein ) is
50 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

already on the w ay to a transform ation which, if stifled

in itself, only experiences this destiny because it does not
find its w ay back to its own self-laid grounds in order
to found itse lf anew out of them.
It is easy to derive from all that has been said what our
task must be, if w e are to set our question "W h at is a
thing?" into motion as a historical question.
It would first be necessary to set into motion the begin
ning of the essential determ ination of the thing and the
proposition of the Greeks, not in order to acknowledge
how it w a s before, but to pose for decision how essen tially
it s till is today. But in this lecture w e m ust forego carry
ing out this fundamental task, and this for tw o reasons.
The one is seem ingly more external. The task mentioned
would not be fulfilled by putting together a few quota
tions about w hat Plato and A ristotle said here and there
about the thing and the proposition. Rather, w e would
have to bring into play the whole o f Greek Dasein, its gods,
its art, its polity, its knowledge, in order to experience
what it m eans to discover som ething like the thing. In the
fram ework o f this lecture all the presuppositions are m iss
ing for this approach. And even if these were supplied w e
could not follow this path to the beginning, in regard to
the task posed.
It has already been indicated that a mere definition of
the thing does not say much, whether w e dig it out in the
past, or whether we ourselves have the am bition to solder
together a so-called new one. The answ er to the qu estion
"W hat is a tl-iiny' is diOVrent in character. It is not a
proposition but a tran sfo rmed basic position or, better
still and more cautiously, the initial transtorm ation o! the
hitherlo existing position toward things, a change ol ques
tioning and evaluation, o f seeing and deciding; in short, of
the b c in g-there ( D a-sein) in the m idst ol what is ( m nult'en
des Seien den ). To determine the changing basic position
w ithin the relation to what is, that is the task o f an entire
historical period. But this requires that w e perceive more
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 51

exactly w ith clearer eyes w hat m ost holdss us captive and

m akes us unfree in the experience and deter leterm ination of
the things. This is modern natural science, insofar as it
has becom e a universal w ay o f thinking along certain
basic lines. The Greek origin also governs this, although
changed, yet not alone and not predominantly. The ques
tion concerning our b asic relations to nature, our know l
edge o f nature as such, our rule over nature, is not a ques-
tion o f natural science, but this question is itself in
question in the question o f whether and how we arc still
addressed by what is as such w ithin the w hole. Such a.
question is not decided in a lecture, but at m ost in a cen
tury, and this only if the century is not asleen and does
not merely have the opinion that it is awake. This ques- .
tion is made decisive only through discussion.
Jn connection w ith the development of modern science^
a definite conception ot the thing attain s a unique nre- '
eminence. According to this, the thing is m aterial, a point
of m ass in motion in the pure space-tim e order, or a n ap
propriate com bination o f such points. T h e th in g so d e -.
fined is from then on considered as the ground and basis^.
ol all things. their determ inations and their interrogation.
The anim ate is also here, insofar as one does not believe
that somcPdav one w ill be able to explain it from out^o f
lifeless m atter w ith the help o f colloidal chem is try. Even
where o ne perm its the a nimate its o w n character, it is con-
ccived as an add itional structure built upon the inani
mate; in the sam e way, the implement and the tool are
considered as m aterial things, only subsequently pre
pared, so that a special value adheres to them . But this
reign ol the m aterial thing ( Stoffd in a e s). as the genuine
Mibstru ctu rco f a ll things, reaches altogether beyond the
sphere of the things into the sphere of the "sp iritu a l* ,
(G eistigen), as we w ill quite roughly call it; for example,
mto the sphere o f the signification o f language, of history,
()l the w ork o f art, etc. Why, for example, has the treat
ment and interpretation o f the poets for years been so
 dreary in our higher sch ools? Answer: Because the
teachers do not know the difference between a thing an d a
poem ; because they treat poems as things, which they clo
because they have never nolll1till ough the question ol~wTltit
a thing is. That today one reads more Nibelungenlied and
less Homer m ay have its reasons, but this changes nothing.
It alw ays is the sam e dreariness, before in Greek and
now in German. However, the teachers are not to blam e
for this situ ation ^nor the teachers ol these teachers, but
an entire period, i.e., w e ourselve s il we do not finally
open our eyes.
The question What is a thing? is a h istorical question.
In its history, the determ ination of the thing as the ma
terial present-at-hand ( Vorhanden) has an unshattered
preeminence. If we really ask this question, i.e., il we pose
for decision the p ossib ility of the determ ination of the
thing, then w e can as little skip the modern answ er as we
are permitted to forget tftc origin ol the question. ~
However, at the sam e time and before all w e should
ask the harm less question What is a thing? in such a
w ay that w e experience it as our own so that it no longer
lets go of us even when w e have long since had no oppor
tunity to listen to lectures on it, especially since the task
o f such lectures is not to proclaim great revelations and
to calm psychic distress. Rather, they can only perhaps
awaken w hat has fallen asleep, perhaps put back into
order what has becom e mixed up.

13. Sum m ary

We now sum m arize in order to arrive at the final

delineation o f our intention. It w as em phasized at the out
set that in philosophy, in contrast to the sciences, an
I im m ediate approach to the questions is never possible. It
n ecessarily a lw a y s requires an introduction. The introduc
tory reflections on our question "W h at is a thing? now
com e to their conclusion.
 Various W ays o f Questioning About the Thing 53

The question has been characterized in tw o essential re

spects: What is put in question and how it is questioned.
First, w ith regard to what is in question the thing
w ith an adm ittedly very poor light we have searched the
horizon in which, according to tradition, the thing and the
determ ination o f its thingness stand. We reached a double
result: first, the fram e o f the thing, time-space, and the
things w ay o f encountering, the "th is , and then the
structure o f the thing itse lf as being the bearer o f prop
erties, entirely general and empty: to form the one for a
many.
Second, we tried to characterize the question in regard
to the manner in w hich it m ust be asked. It turned out
that the question is historical. W hat is meant by that has
been explained.
The introductory reflection on our question m akes it
clear that two leading questions permanently go along
with it and, therefore, must be asked w ith it. The one:
Where does som ething like a thing belong? The other:
Whence do we take the determ ination o f its thingness?
Only from these as they are asked along w ith our question
result the clue and guideline along which w e must go if
everything is not to tumble around in mere chance and
confusion and if the question concerning the thing is not
to get stuck in a dead end.
But would that be a m isfortune? This is the sam e ques
tion as the following: Is there, after all, a serious sense in
posing such qu estions? We know that w e cannot begin to
do anything w ith its elucidation. The consequences are
also accordingly if we do not pose the question and ignore
it. If we ignore the w arning o f a high-power line and touch
the w ires, we are killed. If w e ignore the question "W hat
is a thing? then "nothing further happens.
II a physician m ishandles a number of patients, there
is the danger that they w ill lose their lives. If a teacher
interprets a poem to his students in an im possible man
ner, "nothing further happens. But perhaps it is good if
54 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

we speak more cau tiously here. Bv ignoring the qu estion

concerning the thing and by insulliciently interpreting*a
poem, it appears as though nothing further happens. One
da>-Derhans after fifty or one hundred years, nevertheless ,
so mething has happened.
The question "W h at is a thing? is a historical question.
But it is more im portant to act according to this historical
character in the questioning than to talk about the histori
cal character of the question. Herewith, for the purposes
and p ossib ilities of the lecture, w e m ust be content w ith
an evasive w ay out.
We can neither present the great beginning o f the ques
tion w ith the Greeks, nor is it possible, in its full context,
to display the precise determ ination of the thing, which
has becom e preeminent through modern science. But, on
the other hand, the knowledge of that beginning as well as
of the decisive periods o f modern science is indispensable
if we are to remain equal to the question at all.
 B. K a n t s M a n n e r of A sk in g A bout t h e T h in g

/. The H istorical B asis on Which K an ts

Critique of Pure Reason Rests

How do we, nevertheless, although in an im provised

manner, get on the path {Weg) to the in trinsic "liv in g
history of our question? We choose a middle section o f
this w ay, one in which, in a creative sense, the beginning
and a decisive age are joined together in a new manner.
This is the philosophical determ ination o f the thingness
of the thing which Kant has created. The essential delinea
tion o f the thing is not an accidental by-product in the
philosophy of Kant; the determ ination o f the thingness of
the thing is its m etaphysical center. By means of an inter
pretation o f K ants work w e put ourselves on the path of
the inherently h istorical question concerning the thing.
K ants philosophy sh ifts for the first tim e the whole o f
modern thought and being ( D asein ) into the clarity and
transparency o f a foundation ( Begrndung). This deter
mines every attitude toward knowledge since then, as well
as the bounds ( Abgrenzungen) and appraisals of the sci
55
56 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

ences in the nineteenth century up to the present time.

Therein Kant tow ers so far above all who precedc and
follow that even those who reject him or go beyond him
still remain entirely dependent upon him.
Moreover, in spite o f all differences and the extent of
the h istorical interval, Kant has som ething in common
w ith the great Greek beginning, which at the sam e time
distinguishes him from all German thinkers before and
after him. This is the incorruptible clarity o f his thinking
and speaking, which by no means excludes the question
able and the unbalanced, and does not feign light where
there is darkness.
We turn our question W hat is a thing? into K an ts
and, vice versa, K ants question into ours. The further
task of the lecture thus becom es very sim ple. We need not
report in broad surveys and general phrases "a b o u t the
philosophy of Kant. We put ourselves w ithin it. Hence
forth, only Kant shall speak. What w e contribute, from
tim e to time, w ill indicate the sense and the direction so
that, en route, w e do not deviate from the path o f the
question. The lecture is thus a kind o f signpost. Signposts
are indifferent to what happens on the highway itself.
They emerge only here and there on the edge of the road
to point out and to disappear again in passing.1'*
The w ay (W eg) o f our question W hat is a thing? leads
to K ant's m ajor work, the Critique of Pure Reason, the
w hole of which we cannot go through in this lecture. We
m ust once more lim it the stretch o f our w ay. But w e shall
try to get to the middle o f this stretch ( S tre ck e ) and thus
into the center o f this m ajor work in order to understand
it in its chief inner directions. If this succeeds, then w e
have not becom e acquainted w ith a book w hich a profes
sor once w rote in the eighteenth century, but w e have
entered a few steps into a historical-intellectual b asic p osi
tion which carries and determines us today.
13 This reference to signposts is not facetious. See SZ pp. 76-83,
for his enlightening analysis of "sig n s (Zeichen). Trans.
 K an ts Maimer o f Asking About the Thing 57

1. The Reception of K ants Work in His Lifetim e;

Neo-Kantianism

Kant once said in conversation during the last years of

his life: "I have come a century too soon with my w ritings.
After a hundred years, people w ill first correctly under
stand me and then study my books anew and adm it them !
(Varnhagen von Ense, Tagebcher, 1 ,46.)
Does a vain self-im portance speak these w ords or even
the angry hopelessness o f being shoved aside? Neither, for
both are foreign to K an ts character. W hat is thus ex
pressed is K ants deep knowledge about the manner and
method by which philosophy realizes itse lf and takes
effect. Philosophy belongs to the m ost prim ordial o f hu
man efforts. Of these, Kant once remarked: M an's efforts
turn in a perpetual circle, and return to a point where they
have already once been; thus m aterials now lying in the
dust can perhaps be worked into a magnificent building
(K an ts answ er to Garve, Prolegomena, Karl Vorlnder,
ed. [6th ed.; Leipzig: 1926], p. 194). Here speaks the
superior calm of a creator who know s that "contem p o
rary standards are dust and that w hat is great has its own
law o f movement.
When Kant published the Critique of Pure Reason in
1781, he w a s fifty-seven, and, until the time of its publica
tion, he had been silent for more than ten years. During
the decade o f this silence, 1770-81, Hlderlin, Hegel, and
Beethoven lived through their boyhood. Six years after
the first appearance o f the work, the second edition w as
published. Isolated passages were worked over, some
proofs were sharpened. But the total character of the
work remained unchanged.
Contem poraries stood helpless before the work. It went
beyond anything custom ary by the elevation o f its ques-
'ion-posing, by the rigor of its concept-form ation, by the
far-seeing organization of its questioning, and by the
58 WHA T IS A T H I N G ?

novelty of the language and its decisive goal. Kant knew

this; he realized that this w ork in its entire plan and
method w as against the taste of the time. Kant him self
once described the ruling taste of his age as the effort to
represent the difficult in philosophical things as easy.14
Although not understood in its essential purposes, but al
w ays apprehended only from an accidental exterior, the
w ork w as provocative. An eager tug-of-war developed in
w ritings opposing and defending it. Up to the year of
K ants death, 1804, the number of these had reached two
thousand. It is this condition o f the argumentation w ith
Kant to w hich Sch iller's fam ous verse entitled Kant and
His Interpreters refers.
Wie doch ein einziger Reicher so viele
Bettler in Nahrung
Setzt! Wenn die Knige bann, haben die
Krrner zu tun.

( How a single rich man

so many beggars feeds!
When kings build, the
carters have work.)

This sam e Schiller first helped Goethe to a conception

o f K ants philosophy and to philosophy in general. Goethe
later said that reading one page in Kant affected him
"lik e stepping into a brightly lighted room ."
During the last decade o f K ants life, 1794-1804, the
conception o f his work and consequently the effect o f his
philosophy took a certain direction. This happened
through the w ork of younger thinkers, Fichte, Schelling,
and Hegel. Their philosophy developed on the b a sis of

14 "Allein so gtig und bereitwillig Sie auch in Ansehung dieses

meines Gesuchs sein mchten, so bescheide ich doch gerne,
dass, nach dem herrschenden Geschmacke dieses Zeitalters, das
Schwere in speculativen Dingen als leicht vorausteilen (nicht
leicht zu machen), Ihre geflligste Bermhung in diesem Punkte
doch fruchtlos sein wrde. Prolegomena, p. 193. Trans.
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 59

Kants (or, rather, by taking off from it) and formed itse lf
into w hat is com m only known as "Germ an Idealism . This
philosophy leaped over Kant w ith all due respect but did
not overcom e him. This could not be done, if for no other
reason, because his essential foundation w as not attacked
but only abandoned. It w as not even abandoned, because
it w as never even taken; it w as only skirted. K ants w ork
remained like an unconquered fortress behind a new
front, which, in spite o f (or perhaps because o f) its vehe
mence, w a s already thrust into em ptiness a generation
later, i.e., it w as not capable of generating a truly creative
opposition. It seemed as if in German Idealism all philos
ophy had reached an end and finally and exclusively had
entrusted the adm inistration of knowledge to the sciences.
Around the middle o f the nineteenth century, however,
there arose the call, "B a ck to K ant.1' This return to Kant
sprang from a new historical intellectual situation; at the
same tim e it w a s determined by a renunciation o f German
Idealism. This intellectual situation toward the middle of
the nineteenth century is essen tially characterized by the
definite predominance o f a particular form o f science; it
is designated by the catchw ord "p o sitiv ism . This is
knowledge whose pretention to truth is from beginning to
end based on w h at one ca lls " f a c t s " ( T atsachen); one
holds that there can be no argument about facts; they are
the highest court o f appeal for the decisions concerning
truth and untruth. W hat is proved by experiments in the
natural sciences and w hat is verified by m anuscripts and
documents in the historical-cultural sciences is true, and
is the only scien tifically verifiable truth.
The return to Kant w a s guided by the intention of find
ing in Kant the philosophical foundation and ju stification
"O tto Liebmann (1840-1912) closcd each chaptcr of Kant und
die Epigonen (1865) with his famous call, "A lso m uss auf Kant
zlrckgegangen werden! " For reference, see Z. Weber, History of
yjilosophy, Frank Thillv, trans., w ith section Philosophy since
I 8 6 0 by Ralph Barton Perry (New York: Scribners, 1925), p.
461, n. 1. Trans.
60 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

for the p ositivistie conception o f science. But it w a s sim ul

taneously a conscious renunciation of German Idealism, a
renunciation which understood itself as the renunciation
o f m etaphysics. This new turn toward Kant, therefore,
took his philosophy as the destruction of m etaphysics.
This return to Kant w a s called Neo-Kantianism, in con
trast to the disciples o f K ants lifetim e, the form er Kant-
ians. When from our present position w e survey this re
turn to Kant, it m ust im m ediately becom e questionable
whether it could have regained, or could even find at all,
K ants basic position, which German Idealism had also
sim ply skirted or leapt over. That w a s and is indeed not
the case. Nevertheless, the philosophical movement of
N eo-Kantianism has its undeniable m erits within the in
tellectual history of the second half of the nineteenth cen
tury. These arc above all three:
(1 ) Although one-sided, the renewal o f K ants philos
ophy saved p ositivism from a complete slide into the deifi
cation of facts. (2 ) K ants philosophy itse lf w a s made fa
m iliar in its entire range through careful interpretation
and elaboration of his w ritin gs. (3 ) The general investiga
tion of the history o f philosophy, especially ancient philos
ophy, w a s carried out on a higher plane o f inquiry under
the guidance o f K ants philosophy.
All this is, o f course, little enough when w e measure it
by the standard of the intrinsic task of the philosophy,
which, again, also does not mean much as long as it only
rem ains a counterclaim , instead o f a counter achievement.
M eanwhile, w e see K an ts philosophy in a w ider visual
field than Neo-Kantianism did. K ant's h istorical position
w ithin W estern m etaphysics has becom e clearer. But this
m eans, at first, only an improved historical recognition in
the usual sense and not the discussion w ith the b a sic posi
tion he first captured. Here w hat he predicted m ust be
made to come true: People w ill study my books anew and
adm it them. When we are so far, there is no more Kant
ianism . For every mere " is m " is a m isunderstanding and
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 61

the death o f history. K ants Critique of Pure Reason is

among those philosophical w orks which, as long as there
is philosophy on this earth at all, daily becom e inexhaus-
tible anew. It is one o f those w orks that have already pro
nounced judgment over every future attem pt to "o ver
com e" them by only passing them by.

2. The Title of K an t's M ajor Work

We are attem pting here to put as learners our question

"W hat is a thing? to K ants work.
At first it is certain ly com pletely obscure w h at a work
w ith the title Critique of Pure Reason has to do w ith our
question "W h at is a thing? We shall only truly experience
how that is if w e enter into the w ork, i.e., through the
subsequent interpretation. However, in order not to leave
everything in com plete darkness for too long w e shall a t
tempt a prelim inary elucidation ( vordeutende Erluter
ung). We attem pt to gain a foothold at the center of this
work in order to com e into the movement of our question
at once. First, a prelim inary explanation is to be given
concerning the extent to which our question is intim ately
connected with this w ork regardless o f whether we take
over K an ts b asic position or not, or how far we do or dont
transform it. We give this enlightenment by w ay of eluci
dating the title. This is so arranged that w e im m ediately
orient ourselves at the spot in K an ts w ork where our in
terpretation of it begins, w ithout first knowing the preced
ing parts o f the work. Critique o f Pure Reason everyone
knows what "critiq u e and "to criticize mean; "reaso n
and w hat a "reaso n ab le man or a "reaso n ab le" sugges
tion is, are also understood by everyone. What "p u re
signifies in distinction to impure (e.g., impure w a te r) is
clear also. Yet w e cannot think anything appropriate to
the title. Critique o f Pure Reason. Above all, one would
expect a critique to reject som ething u n satisfactory, in
sufficient, and negative; one would expect criticism of
62 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

som ething like an impure reason. Finally, it is quite incom

prehensible what the Critique of Pure Reason can have to
do w ith the question concerning the thing. And yet w e arc
com pletely justified in asserting that this title expresses
nothing else but the question concerning the thing but as
a question. The question is, as w e know, historical. The
title means this history in a decisive era o f its movement.
The title means this question, and is a thoroughly h is
torical one. In an external sense this means that Kant, who
w as thoroughly clear about his w ork, has given it a title
demanded by his age and, at the sam e time, led beyond it.
What history o f the question concerning the thing is ex
pressed in this title?

3. The Categories as Modes of Assertion

We remind ourselves o f the beginning of the essential

determ ination of the thing. This takes place along the lines
of the assertion (A u ssage). As a proposition the sim ple a s
sertion is a saying in which som ething is asserted about
something, e.g., "The house is red. Here "r e d is said of
( zu-gesagt) the house. That of which it is said, , is
what underlies. Therefore, in the attribution (Zu-sagen),
as it were, som ething is said from above down to w hat
underlies. In the Greek language means "fro m above
down to som ething belo w . To say m eans , the saying
is . The sim ple assertion is a , a iyuv n
T L VOS.

Much can be said down to a thing, about it (A u f ein

Ding kann verschiedenes heruntergesagt, ber es ausge
sagt w erden). "The house is red. "The house is high.
"The house is sm aller (than that one beside it). The
house is on the creek." "The house is an eighteenth-cen
tury one."
Guided by these different assertion s, w e can follow how
the thing itse lf is determined at any given time. Thereby
w e do not now pay attention to this particular thing in the
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 63

example, the house, but to that which, in every such asser

tion o f this sort, characterizes every thing o f this kind in
general, i.e., the thingness. "R e d says in a certain respect,
namely, in respect o f color, how the thing is constituted.
Viewed in general, a trait or qu ality is attributed to
( zugesagt) the thing. In the attribution, "la rg e becom es
size, extension, (q u an tity). W ith the "sm a lle r than, there
is asserted w hat the house is, in relationship to another
(relation ); "on the creek : the place; "eighteenth cen
tury : the time.
Quality, extension, relation, place, and tim e are deter
m inations which are said in general o f the thing. These de
term inations name the respects in which things exhibit
them selves to us if w e address them in the assertion and
talk about them, the perspectives from w hich w e view
things, in which they show them selves. Insofar as these
determ inations are alw ays said down to the thing, the
thing in general is alw ays already co-asserted ( m itgesagt)
as the already present ( als das schon Anwesende). W hat is
said in general about each thing as a thing, this "th a t is
spoken down to the thing wherein its thingness and gen
erality determine them selves, is called by the Greeks
/ (-yoptvttv). But w hat is thus attributed means
nothing other than the being characterized, being ex
tended, being in relation to, being there, being now, o f the
thing as som ething that is. In the categories the m ost gen
eral determ inations o f the being of som ething that is are
said. The thingness o f the thing means the being o f the
thing as som ething that is. We cannot lay this state o f facts
too often and too em phatically before our eyes namely,
that those determ inations w hich constitute the being of
somctTiing that is, i.e., of the thing itself, have received
1he irn am c from assertion s about the thing. This name lor
the determ ination o f being ( Sein sbest unmutigen) is not
an arbitrary designation. In thus naming the determ ina
tions of being modes o f assertedness ( A usgesagtheit) lies
a unique interpretation o f being. That since then in W est
64 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

ern thinking the determ inations of being are called "c a te

gories is the sharpest expression for what w e have
already emphasized: that the structure o f the thing is con
nected w ith the structure o f the assertion. If in the past
and still today, the S ch o lastic teaching of the being o f what
is, "on tology, sets as its proper goal to erect a "th eory of
categ ories" (K ategorienlehre) , it is because therein speaks
the beginning interpretation of the being of what is, i.e.,
the thingness o f the thing from out of the assertion.

4. Ao'yos- R atio Reason

The assertion is a kind o f Xiyuv addressing som ething

as something. This im plies som ething taken as something.
Considering and expressing som ething as som ething in
Latin is called reor, ratio. Therefore, ratio becom es the
translation o f /o. The sim ple asserting sim ultaneously
gives the b a sic form in w hich w e mean and think som e
thing about the things. The b asic form o f thinking, and
thus o f thought, is the guideline for the determ ination of
the thingness ol the thing. The categories determine in
general the being ot w hat is. To ask about the bein jf of
w hat is, what and how w hat is, is at all, counts as philos-
ophys principal task. To ask in this w ay is first, first-rank
ing, and proper philosophy, />/ , prima
philosophia.
It remains essential-that thought as sim ple a sse rtion.
Ays. ratio, is the guideline for the determinat inn n( j_he
being o f what is. i.e., for the thingness of the thing. " Guide-
line (L eitfaden) here means that the modes of asserting
direct the view in the determining o f presence (A nw esen
h eit), i.e., o f the being o f w hat is.
Aoyos and ratio are translated in German as reason
(V ernunft). Herein there appears for us, as it were, for the
first time a connection between the question about the
thing on the one hand, and about "re a so n (C ritique of
Pure R eason ) on the other. But therewith has not yet been
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 65

shown how the process o f Western m etaphysics arrived at

a critique o f pure reason and w hat this means. We shall
now attem pt this in a few rough outlines.

5. The Modern M athem atical Science o f Nature

and the Origin o f a Critique o f Pure Reason

We have seen that, w ith the exception of the beginning

among the Greeks, the rise of modern natural science be
cam e decisive for the essential definition of the thing. The
transform ation o f Dasein, which w a s basic to this event,
changed the character of modern thought and thus of
m etaphysics and prepared the necessity for a critique of
pure reason. It is, therefore, necessary for m any reasons
that w e acquire a more defined conception o f the character
of modern natural science. In this w e m ust forego entering
deeply into special questions. Here w e cannot even pur
sue the main periods o f its history. Most of the facts of its
history are known, and yet our knowledge of the inner-
most xkh jn g connections of this happening is still very
poor and dark. It is very clear only that the transform a
tion of science basically took place through centuries o f
d is c u s s io n about the lu n d a m e n ta lT o iic c P ls and p r in c ip les
o f thought, i.e., the b a sic attitude toward things and to
ward what is at a ll. Such a discussion could be carried
through only w ith com plete m astery o f the tradition of
medieval as well as ancient science o f nature. This de
manded an unusual breadth and certain ty o f conceptual
thought and finally a m astery o f the new experiences and
modes o f procedure. All this presupposed a unique passion
for an authoritative knowledge, which finds its like only
among the Greeks, a knowledge which first and con
stan tly questions its own presuppositions and thereby
seeks their b asis. To hold out in this constant questioning
appears as the only human w ay to preserve things in their
inexhaustibility, i.e., w ithout distortion.
The transform ation o f science is accom plished alw ays
66 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

only through itself. But science itse lf thereby has a tw o

fold foundation: (1 ) w ork experiences, i.e., the direction
and the mode o f m astering and using w hat is; (2 ) m eta
p h ysics, i.e., the projection of the fundamental knowledge
of being, out o f w hich w hat is knowledgeably develops.
Work experiences and the projection of being are recipro
cally related to one another and a lw ays meet in a b a sic fea
ture o f attitude and o f humanly being there (D asein).
We shall now try to clarify roughly this basic feature of
the modern attitude toward knowledge. But w e do this
with the intention o f understanding modern m etaphysics
and (identical w ith th a t) the p o ssib ility and necessity of
som ething like K ants Critique of Pure Reason.

a. The C haracteristics of Modern Science in Contrast

to Ancient and Medieval Science

One com m only characterizes modern science in contra

distinction to medieval science by saying that modern sci
ence sta rts from facts w hile the m edieval started from gen
eral speculative propositions and concepts. This is true in
a certain respect. But it is equally undeniable that the
medieval and ancient sciences also observed the facts, and
that modern science also w orks w ith universal proposi
tions and concepts. This went so far as to criticize Galileo,
one o f the founders of modern science, w ith the sam e re
proach that he and his disciples actu ally made against
S ch olastic science: They said it w as "a b str a c t," i.e., it pro
ceeded w ith general propositions and principles. Yet in an
even more distinct and conscious w a y the sam e w a s the
case w ith Galileo. The contrast between the ancient and
the modern attitude tow ard science cannot, therefore, be
established by saying there concepts and principles and
here facts. Both ancient and modern science have to do
w ith both facts and concepts. However, the w ay the fa cts
are conceived and how the concepts arc established are
decisive.
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 67

The greatne ss and superiority rlju-ingr

the sixteenth a nd seventeenth centuries is because all the
scien tists were philosophers. They understood that thece
are no mere tacts, but that a fact is onlv w hat it is in the
Mph) of the fundamental conception and alw ays depends
upon how fa r that conception reaches. The characteristic
o f positivism , wherein w e have stood for decades and to
day more than ever, is contrary to this in that it thinks it
can sufficiently manage w ith facts or other and new facts,
w hile concepts are merely expedients w hich one som e
how needs but should not get too involved w ith, since that
would be philosophy. Furthermore, the comedy, or rather
the tragedy, of the present situation o f science is, first, that
one thinks to overcom e p ositivism through positivism . To
be sure, this attitude only prevails where average and sub
sequent work is done. Where genuine and discovering
research is done, the situation is no different from that of
three hundred years ago. That age also had its indolence,
just as, conversely, the present leaders o f atom ic physics,
Niels Bohr and Heisenberg, think in a thoroughly philo
s ophical w ay, and only therefore create new w avs o f
nosing questions and, above all, hold out in the question
able.
Thus, if one tries to distinguish modern from medieval
science by calling it the science o f facts, this rem ains b a si
cally inadequate. Further, the difference between the old
and the new science is often seen in that the latter ex
periments and experim entally proves its cognitions.
But the experiment, the test, to get inform ation concern
ing the behavior o f things through a definite ordering of
things and events w a s also already fam iliar in ancient
tim es and in the Middle Ages. This kind of experience lies
at the b asis o f all technological contact w ith things in the
cra fts and the use of tools. Here, too, it is not the experi
ment as such in the wide sense o f testing through observa-
1 n , but the manner of setting up the test and the intent
w ith which it is undertaken and in which it is grounded.
 68 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

The manner of experimentation is presum ably connected

w ith the kind of conceptual determ ination of the fa cts and
w av of applying concepts, i.e., w ith the kind o f hypothesis "
about things.
Besides these tw o constan tly cited ch aracteristics of
modern science, science of fa cts and experimental re
search, one also usually m eets a third. This third affirms
that modern science is a calculating and measuring inves
tigation. That is true. However, it is also true of ancient
science, w hich also worked w ith measurement and num
ber. Again it is a question of how and in what sense calcu
lating and m easuring were applied and carried out, and
what im portance they have for the determ ination o f the
ob jects them selves.
With these three ch aracteristics o f modern science, that
1 it is a factual, experimental, m easuring science, w e still
m iss the fundamental ch aracteristic o f modern science.
The fundam ental feature m ust co n sist in w hat rules and
determines the basic movement ol science itself. This
characteristic is the manner ol working w ith the tTiTngs
and the m etaphysical projection o f the thingness of the
things. Ho w are we to conceive this fundamental feature?
We entitle this fundam ental feature of modern s c ience
for which w e are searching by saying that modern science
i is m athem atical. From Kant com es the oft-quoted but still
little understood sentence, "H ow ever, I m aintain that in
any particular doctrine of natu re only so m uch-grmnne
science can be found as there is m athem atics to be found
in it. ( Preface to M etaphysical Beginning Principles of
N atural Science. )
The decisive question is: What do "m a th em a tics and
"m a th em a tica l mean here? It seem s as though we can
only take the answ er to this question from m athem atics
itself. This is a m istake, because m athem atics itse lf is only
a p a r tic u la r th' ^nth'iT i a tica l
The fact that today m athem atics in a practical and
pedagogical sense is included in the department of
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 69

natural science has its historical basis, but it is not essen

tially necessary. Formerly, m athem atics belonged to the
septem artes liberales. M athem atics is as little a natural
science as philosophy is one o f the hum anities. Philosophy
in its essence belongs as little in the philosophical facu lty
as m athem atics belongs to natural science. To house
philosophy and m athem atics in this w ay today seem s to be
a blem ish or a m istake in the catalog o f the universities.
But perhaps it is som ething quite different (and there arc
people who are even concerned about such things),
namely, a sign that there no longer is a fundamental and
clarified unity o f the sciences and that this unity is no
longer either a n ecessity or a question.
b. The M athem atical, M,*
How do we explain the m athem atical if not by m athe
m atics? In such questions w e do well to keep to the word
itself. Of course, the facts are not alw ays there where the
word occurs. But w ith the Greeks, from whom the word
stem s, we m ay safely make this assum ption. In its form a
tion the word "m ath em atical stem s from the Greek ex
pression , w hich m eans what can be learned and
thus, at the sam e time, w hat can be taught; means
to learn, the teaching, and this in a tw ofold sense.
First, it means studying and learning; then it means the
doctrine taught. To teach and to learn are here intended
in a wide and at the sam e tim e essential sense, and not in
the later narrow and trite sense o f school and scholars.
However, this is not sufficient to grasp the proper sense
ol the m athem atical. To do this we m ust inquire in w hat
further connection the Greeks employ the m athem atical
and from what they distinguish it.
We experience w hat the m athem atical properly is when
we inquire under what the Greeks c la ssify the mathe
m atical and against what they distinguish it within this
classification . The Greeks identify the m athem atical,
, w ith the following determ inations:
 70 WHA T IS T H I N G ?

1. '. The things insofar as they originate and

come forth from themselves.
2. ,: The things insofar as they are produced
by the human hand and stand as such.
3. ,: The things in sofar as they are in use and
therefore stand at our constant disposal they may
be either , rocks and so on, or >, som e
thing specially made.
4. '/: The things in sofar as w e have to do w ith
them at all, whether w e work on them, use them,
transform them, or w e only look at and examine
them , w ith regard to ^: here is
taken in a truly wide sense, neither in the narrow
meaning o f practical use ( ), nor in the sense of
s- as moral action: , is all doing, pursuing,
and enduring, w hich also includes , finally:
5. : According to the characterization run
ning through these four, w e m ust also say here of
: The things in sofar as they . . . but the ques
tion is: In w hat respect?
In every case w e realize that the m athem atical concerns
\ things, and in a definite respect. W ith the question con
cerning the m athem atical w e move w ithin our original
question "W h at is a thing? In what respect are things
taken when they are viewed and spoken o f m athem at
ically?
We are long used to thinking of numbers when w e think
o f the m athem atical. The m athem atical and numbers are
obviously connected. Only the question rem ains: Is this
connection because the m athem atical is numerical in char
acter, or, on the contrary, is the num erical som ething
m athem atical? The second is the case. But in sofar as num
bers are in a w ay connected w ith the m athem atical there
still rem ains the question: Why precisely are the numbers
som ething m athem atical? W hat is the m athem atical itse lf
that som ething like numbers m ust be conceived as som e
thing m athem atical and are prim arily brought forward as
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 71

the m athem atical? means learning; , what is

learnable. In accord w ith what has been said, this denomi
nation is intended of things in sofar as they are learnable.
Learning is a kind of grasping and appropriating. But not
every taking is a learning. Wc can take a thing, for instance,
a rock, take it w ith us and put it in a collection of rocks.
We can do the sam e w ith plants. It says in our cookbook
that one "ta k e s," i.e., uses. To take m eans in som e w ay to
take possession of a thing and have disposal over it. Now,
what kind o f taking is learning? ;/ things, insofar
as w e learn them. But strictly speaking, we cannot learn a
thing, e.g., a weapon; w c can learn only its use. Learning
is therefore a w ay o f taking and appropriating in which
the use is appropriated. Such appropriation occurs
through the using itself. We call it practicing. However,
practicing is again only a kind o f learning. Not every
learning is a practicing. What is now the essential aspect
of learning in the sense o f ? Why is learning a tak
ing? What o f the things is taken, and how is it taken?
Let us again consider practicing as a kind o f learning.
In practicing we take the use o f the weapon, i.e., w e take
how to handle it into our possession. We m aster the w ay
to handle the weapon. This means that our w ay o f han
dling the weapon is focused upon what the weapon itself
demands; "w ea p o n " does not mean ju st this individual
rifle of a particular serial number, but perhaps the model
98. During the practice w e not only learn to load the
rifle, handle the trigger and aim it, not only the manual
skill, but, at the sam e time, and only through all this, we
become fam iliar with the thing. Learning is alw ays also
becom ing fam iliar. Learning has different directions:
learning to use and learning to becom e fam iliar. Becom
ing fam iliar also has different levels. We becom e fam iliar
with a certain individual rille, which is one of a certain
model and also a rifle in general. W ith practice, w hich is a
learning ol its use, the becom ing fam iliar involved in it re
mains within a certain lim it. Generally, the thing becom es
72 WHAXIS A THING?

known in general only in that the learner becom es a good

m arksm an. But there is m ore to becom e fam iliar with
about the thing the rille i.e., to learn in general, lor ex
ample, b a llistics, m echanics, and the chem ical reaction of
certain m aterials. Furthermore, one can learn on it what a
weapon is, what this particular piece o f equipment is. But
is there much else still to learn? There is: How does such
a thing w ork? ( Welche Bewandtnis es . .. hat.) But to use
the thing, to shoot it, we need not know that. Certainly
not. But this does not deny that how it w orks belongs to
the thing. When a thing we are practicing to use m ust be
produced, in order to provide it so that it can be at ones
disposal, the producer must have becom e fam iliar before
hand w ith how the thing w o rk s (B ew an d tn is). With re
spect to the thing there is a still more b asic fam iliarity,
w hatever m ust be learned before, so that there can be
such models and their corresponding parts at all; this is a
fam iliarity w ith what belongs to a gun as such and what
a weapon is.
This m ust be known in advance, and m ust be learned,
and m ust be teachable. This becoming fam iliar is what
m akes it p ossible to produce the thing; and the thing pro
duced, in turn, m akes its practice and use possible. What
w e learn by practice is only a limited part of what can be
learned of the thing. The original b asic learning takes into
cognition w hat a thing is. w hat a weapon is, and w h at a
thing to be used is. But w e already know that. We do not
first learn w hat a weapon is when we becom e fam iliar w ith
this rifle or w ith a certain model o f rifle. We already know
that in advance and m ust know it; otherw ise we could not
perceive the rifle as such at all. Because w e know in ad
vance w hat a weapon is, and only in this way, does w hat
we see laid out before us becom e visible as w hat it is.
Of course, w e know w hat a weapon is only in general and
in an indefinite way. When we come to know this in a
special and determined w ay, we come to know som ething
w hich we really already know. Precisely this "tak in g cog-
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 73

nizancc is the genuine essencc of learning, the s-. The

are the things insofar as w e take cognizance of
them as w hat we already know them to be in advance,
the body as the bodily, the plant-like of the plant, the an-
imal-like of the anim al, the thingness of the thing, and so
on. This genuine learning is therefore an extrem ely pecu
liar taking, a taking where he who takes only takes what he
actually already has. Teaching corresponds to this learn
ing. Teaching is a giving, an offering; but what is offered
in teaching is not the learnable, for the student is merely
instructed to take for him self what he already has. If the
student only takes over som ething which is offered he
does not learn. He com es to learn only when he experi
ences what he takes as som ething he him self already has.
True learning only occurs where the taking o f w hat one j
already has is a self-giving and is experienced as such. |
Teaching, therefore, does not mean anything else than to
let the others learn, i.e., to bring one another to learning.
Learning is more difficult than teaching; for only he who
can truly learn and only as long as he can do it can
truly teach. The genuine teacher differs from the pupil
only in that he can learn better and that he more genu
inely w a n ts to learn. In all teaching, the teacher learns the
most.
The m ost difficult learning is to com e to know all the
w ay w hat we already know. Such learning, w ith which we
are here solely concerned, demands sticking rather closely
to what appears to be nearest at hand; for instance, to the
question o f what a thing is. We stead fastly ask, consider
ing its usefulness, the sam e obviously useless question of
w hat a thing is, what tools arc, w hat man is, what a work
<>l art is, w hat the state and what the world are.
I here w as, in ancient tim es, a fam ous Greek scholar
who traveled everywhere lecturing. Such people were
called Sophists. Once this fam ous Sophist, returning to
Athens from a lecture tour in Asia Minor, met Socrates on
tbe street. It w a s S o cra tes habit to hang around on the
74 WHAT IS THING?

street and to talk w ith people, with a cobbler, for instance,

over w hat a shoe is. Socrates had no other topic than what
the things are. Are you still standing there, condescend
ingly asked the much traveled Sophist of Socrates, "and
still saying the sam e thing about the sam e thing? "Y e s,
answered Socrates, that I am. But you who are so ex
tremely sm art, you never say the sam e thing about the
sam e thing."
The ), the m athem atical, is that "a b o u t things
which we really already know. Therefore we do not first
get it out o f things, but, in a certain w ay, w e bring it already
w ith us. From this w e can now understand why, for in
stance, number is som ething m athem atical. We see three
ch airs and say that there are three. W hat "th re e is the
three ch airs do not tell us, nor three apples, three ca ts nor
any other three things. Moreover, w e can count three
things only if w e already know "th re e." In thus grasping
the number three as such, w e only expressly recognize
som ething which, in som e w ay, w e already have. This rec
ognition is genuine learning. The number is som ething in
the proper sense learnable, a , i.e., som ething mathe
m atical. Things do not help us to grasp "th ree as such,
i.e., threeness. "T hree w hat exactly is it? It is the num
ber in the natural series o f numbers that stands in third
place. In "th ir d ? It is only the third number because it is
the three. And "p la ce where do places come from ?
"T hree is not the third number, but the first number.
"O n e isn t really the first number. For instance, we have
before us one loaf o f bread and one knife, this one and, in
addition, another one. When w e take both together w e say,
"b o th of th ese," the one and the other, but w e do not say,
"th ese tw o, or 1 + 1. Only when we add a cup to the bread
and the knife do we say " a ll. Now w e take them as a sum,
i.e., as a whole and so and so many. Only when w e perceive
it from the third is the form er one the first, the form er
other the second, so that one and two arise, and "a n d be
com es "p lu s, and there arises the p o ssib ility of places and
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 75

of a series. What we now take cognizance o f is not created

from any of the things. We take what w e ourselves som e
how already have. What m ust be understood as m athe
m atical is what w e can learn in this way.
We take cognizance o f all this and learn it without re
gard for the things. Numbers are the m ost fam iliar form
of the m athem atical because, in our usual dealing w ith
things, when w e calculate or count, numbers are the
closest to that which we recognize in things w ithout creat
ing it from them. For this reason numbers are the m ost
fam iliar form o f the m athem atical. In this w ay, this m ost
fam iliar m athem atical becom es m athem atics. But the
essence o f the m athem atical does not lie in number as
purely delim iting the pure how m uch, but vice versa.
Because number has such a nature, therefore, it belongs
to the learnable in the sense o f .
Our expression "th e m ath em atical" alw ays has tw o
meanings. It means, first, w hat can be learned in the man
ner we have indicated, and only in that w ay, and, second,
the m anner o f learning and the process itself. The m athe
m atical is that evident aspect o f things w ithin which we
are alw ays already moving and according to w hich we
experience them as things at all, and as such things. The
m athem atical is this fundamental position w e take toward
things by which w e take up things as already given to us,
and as they should be given. Therefore, the m athem atical
is the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of
things.
Therefore, Plato put over the entrance to his Academy
the Words: diritati Let one who has
not grasped the m athem atical enter h ere !"10 These words
do not mean that one m ust be educated in only one sub
je ct geom etry but that he m ust grasp that the funda
mental condition for the proper p o ssib ility o f knowing is
"' Elias Philosophus, sixth century A.D. Neoplatonist, in Aris
totelis Categorias Commentaria (Commentaria in Aristotelem
Graeca), A. Busse, ed. (Berlin, 1900), 118.18. Trans.
76 W H A T IS A THING?

the knowledge o f the fundamental presuppositions o f all

knowledge and the position we take based on such know l
edge. A knowledge which docs not build its foundation
knowledgeably, and thereby takes its lim its, is not know l
edge but mere opinion. The m athem atical, in the original
sense o f learning what one already knows, is the funda
mental presupposition o f "a ca d e m ic" work. This saying
over the Academ y thus contains nothing more than a hard
condition and a clear circum scription o f work. Both have
had the consequence that we today, after tw o thousand
years, are still not through with this academ ic work and
never w ill be so as long as w e take ourselves seriously.
This short reflection on the essence o f the m athem atical
w as brought about by our m aintaining that the b asic char
acter of modern science is the m athem atical. After what
has been said, this cannot mean that this science em ploys
m athem atics. We posed our question so that, in conse
quence o f this basic ch aracter of science, m athem atics in
the narrower sense first had to com e into play.
Therefore, w e must now show in w h at sense the founda
tion of modern thought and knowledge is essentially m ath
em atical. With this intention w e shall try to set forth an
essential step of modern science in its main outline. This
w ill make clear what the m athem atical co n sists o f and
how it thus unfolds its essence, but also becom es estab
lished in a certain direction.

c. The M athem atical Character o f Modern Natural

Science; N ewtons First Law o f Motion

Modern thought does not appear all at once. Its begin

nings stir during the later Sch olasticism o f the fifteenth
century; the sixteenth century brings sudden advances as
w ell as setback s; but it is only during the seventeenth
century that the decisive clarification s and foundations
are accom plished. This entire happening finds its first
system atic and creative culm ination in the English mathe
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 77

m atician and p h ysicist, Newton, in his m ajor work,

Philosophiae N aturalis Principia M athem atica, 1686-87.
In the title, "p h ilo so p h y indicates general science (co m
pare Philosophia experim entalis" ); " principia" indi
cates first principles, the beginning ones, i.e., the very first
principles. But these starting principles by no means deal
w ith an introduction for beginners.
This work w as not only a culm ination o f preceding
efforts, but at the sam e time the foundation for the suc
ceeding natural science. It has both promoted and limited
the development o f natural science. When w e talk about
cla ssica l physics today, w e mean the form o f knowledge,
questioning, and evidence as Newton established it. When
Kant speaks o f "scie n ce , he m eans N ewtons physics.
Five years after the publication o f the Critique of Pure
Reason, exactly one hundred years after N ewtons Prin
cipia, Kant published an essay entitled The M etaphysical
Principles of N atural Science (1786). On the b a sis of the
position reached in the Critique of Pure Reason it is a
conscious supplement and counterpart to N ewtons w ork.
At the conclusion o f the preface to his piece Kant expressly
refers to Newtons work. The last decade o f K ants crea
tivity w a s devoted to this sphere o f inquiry.
As w e glance at N ewtons w ork (w e cannot do more
here), w e thereby also preview K ants concept of science,
and w e look at fundam ental conceptions still valid in
physics today, although no longer exclusively so.
This work is preceded by a short section entitled "D efi
n ition es." These are definitions o f qu antitas materiae,
quantitas m otus, force, and, above all, vis centripeta. Then
there fo llo w s an additional scholium which contains the
series o f fam ous conceptions o f absolute and relative time,
absolute and relative space, and finally o f absolute and
relative motion. Then fo llo w s a section w ith the title
Axiom ata, sive leges m otu s" ("P rin cip le s or L aw s of Mo-
tio n "). This contains the proper content o f the work. It is
divided into three volum es. The first tw o deal w ith the
78 W H A T IS THING?

motion o f bodies, de motu corporum, the third w ith the

system o f the world, de mundi system ate.
Here w e shall merely take a look at the first principle,
i.e., that Law o f Motion which Newton sets at the apex of
his work. It reads: "C orpus omne prcservare in statu suo
quiescendi vel movendi uniform iter in directum , nisi
quatenus a viribus im pressis cogitur statum illum
m utare. Every body continues in its state of rest, or uni
form m otion in a straight line, unless it is com pelled to
change that state by force impressed upon it. 17 This is
called the principle o f inertia ( lex inertiae).
The second edition o f this work w as published in 1713,
while Newton w as still alive. It included an extended pref
ace by Cotes, then professor at Cambridge. In it Cotes
says about this b asic principle: "N atu ra lex est ab om nibus
recepta p hilosophis." ( It is a law o f nature universally
received by all philosophers. )
Students o f physics do not puzzle over this law today
and have not for a long time. If w e mention it at all and
know anything about it, that and to w hat extent it is a
fundamental principle, w e consider it self-evident. And
yet, one hundred years before Newton, at the apex o f his
physics, put this law in this form, it w a s still unknown. It
w a s not even Newton him self who discovered it, but
Galileo; the latter, however, applied it only in his last
w o rks and did not even express it as such. Only the Gen
oese Professor Baliani articulated this discovered law in
general term s. Descartes then took it into his Principia
Philosophiae and tried to ground it m etaphysically. With
Leibniz it plays the role o f a m etaphysical law (C. I.
Gerhardt, Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W.
Leibniz [B erlin, 1875-1890], IV, 518).
This law, however, w a s not at all self-evident even in the

17 Isaac Newton, M athematical Principles of Natural Philoso

phy and His System of the World, Andrew Motte, trans., 1729;
revised translation, Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of Cali
fornia Press, 1946), p. 13. Trans.
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 79

seventeenth century. During the preceding fifteen hundred

years it w as not only unknown, but Nature and Being in
general were experienced in such a w ay that it would have
been senseless. In its discovery and its establishm ent as
the fundam ental law lay a revolution that belongs to the
greatest in human thought, and which first provides the
ground for the turning from the Ptolem aic to the Copcr-
nican conception o f the universe. To be sure, the law of
inertia and its definition already had their predecessors in
ancient tim es. Certain fundam ental principles o f Democ
ritus (460-370 b.c.) tend in this direction. It has also been
shown that G alileo and his age (p artly directly and partly
indirectly) knew o f the thought of Dem ocritus. But, as is
alw ays the case, that which can already be found in the
older philosophers is seen only when one has newly
thought it out for him self. Kant spoke very clearly about
this fundam ental fact in the h istory of thought when, after
the publication o f his main w ork, som e contem poraries
reproached him for saying only w hat Leibniz had " a l
ready said. In order to oppose Kant in this w a y Professor
Eberhardt of Halle, a disciple o f the WolfT-Leibniz school,
founded a special journal, the Philosophische Magazin.
The criticism of Kant w as so superficial and, at the sam e
time, so arrogant that it found considerable response
among ordinary people. When this a ctivity went too far,
Kant decided to take up the "d isg u stin g " w ork of a po
lemic w ith the title: On a Discovery, According to Which
All New Critique of Pure Reason Is Made Dispensable by
an Older One. The essay begins as follow s:
"H err Eberhardt has made the discovery that Leib-
nizian philosophy also contains a critique o f reason ju st
as the recent one, which, in addition, introduces a dogma-
ism based upon an exact an alysis o f the p ossib ility o f
knowledge, which contains all the truth of the latter, but
even beyond that contains a well-grounded enlargement of
the sphere o f the understanding. How it could happen that
people had not long ago seen these things in that great
80 W H A T IS A T i l I NG ?

m ans philosophy and its daughter, the Wolffian philos

ophy, is not explained by him. But how many discoveries,
taken as new, are now seen by som e clever interpreters
very clearly in ancient ones after it had been indicated to
them what to look fo r! 18
This also w a s the case during the age o f Galileo. After
the new inquiries were made, people could then again read
Dem ocritus. A fter people understood Dem ocritus w ith the
help of Galileo they could reproach the latter for not really
reporting anything new. All great insights and discoveries
are not only usually thought by several people at the same
time, they m ust also be re-thought in that unique effort
to truly say the sam e thing about the sam e thing.

d. The Difference Between the Greek Experience of

Nature and That o f Modern Times

d,. The experience o f nature in A ristotle and Newton

How does the aforem entioned fundamental law relate

to the earlier conception o f nature? The idea o f the uni
verse (w o rld ) w hich reigned in the W est up to the seven
teenth century w a s determined by Platonic and A ristote
lian philosophy. Scientific conceptional thought w as
especially guided by those fundam ental representations,
concepts and principles which A ristotle had set forth in
his lectures on physics and the heavens {De C aelo), and
which w ere taken over by the m edieval Sch olastics.
We m ust, therefore, brielly go into the fundam ental con
ceptions of A risto tle in order to evaluate the significance
o f the revolution articulated in N ewtons First Law. But
w e must first liberate ourselves from a prejudice which
w a s partly nourished by modern scien ces sharp criticism

,R Uber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen
Vernunft durch eine ltere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll,"
Kant, Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin and Leipzig: Preussische
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1923), VIII, 187. Trans.
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 81

o f A ristotle: that his propositions were merely concepts he

thought up, which lacked any support in the things them
selves. This might be true of later medieval Sch olasticism ,
which often, in a purely dialectical way, w as concerned
w ith a foundationless an alysis o f concepts. It is certainly
not true o f A ristotle him self. Moreover, A ristotle fought
in his tim e precisely to make thought, inquiry, and asser
tion alw ays a Xt'/etv r o t s &. (De Cclo 7,
306 a, 6.) ("T o say that which corresponds to w hat show s
itself on w hat is. ) I!>
In the sam e place, A ristotle expressly says: 81
noirjTUcij9 \<7] to Ipyov, >/*> to , (1
. (Ibid., 7,306 a, 16-17.) ("A n d that issue,
w hich in the case of productive knowledge is the product,
in the knowledge o f nature is the unim peachable evidence
o f the senses as to each fa ct. )-0
We have heard (p. 70 f.) that the Greeks characterize the
things as and , such as occurs from out of
itself, or such as is produced (w a s her-g estellt, gemacht
w ird). Corresponding to this there are tw o different kinds
of knowledge ('), knowledge o f what occurs from
out o f itse lf and knowledge o f w hat is produced. Corre
sponding to this the < of knowledge, i.e., that whereby
this knowledge com es to an end, where it stop s, what it
really depends on, is different. Therefore, the above princi
ple states, "T hat at which productive knowledge com es to
a halt, wherein, from the beginning it halts or takes its
looting, is the work to be produced. That, however, in
which the knowledge o f nature takes its foothold is
, w hat sh ow s itse lf on that which occurs out o f -
selI - This is alw ays predominant, the standard, especially
for perception, i.e., for the mere taking-in-and-up (in
contradistinction to making and concerning oneself busily

Translation of Heideggers rendition. Trans.

'' Unless otherwise stated, all following references to the
works Aristotle are to The Works of Aristotle, W. D. Ross, ed.
and trans., 11 vol. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931). Trans.
82 W H AT IS THING?

w ith creating on the things) (im Unterschied zum Machen

und Sich-zu-schaffen-machen an den Dingen). What A ris
totle here expresses as a b asic principle of scientific
method differs in no w ay from the principles of modern
science. Newton w rites (Prin cipia U ber III, Regulae IV ):
"In philosophia experimentale propositiones ex phaeno
m enis per inductionem collectae non obstan tibu s
contrariis hypothesibus pro veris aut accurate aut quam-
proximc haberi debent, donec alia occurrerint phaeno
mena, per quae aut accuratiores reddedantur aut excep
tionibus abnoxiae. ( In experimental philosophy w e are
to look upon propositions inferred by general induction
from phenomena as accurate or very nearly true, notw ith
standing contrary hypotheses that m ay be imagined, till
such tim es as other phenomena occur, by w hich they may
either be made more accurate, or liable to exceptions. )
But despite th is sim ilar b a sic attitude toward proce
dure, the b asic position o f A ristotle is essen tially different
from that o f Newton. For w hat is actually apprehended as
appearing and how it is interpreted are not the same.

d2. The doctrine o f motion in A ristotle

Nevertheless there is beforehand the common experi

ence that what is, in the general sense o f Nature earth,
sky, and stars is in motion or at rest. Rest means only a
special case o f m otion. It is everywhere a question o f the
m otion of bodies. But how motion and bodies are to be
conceived and w hat relation they have to each other is
not established and not self-evident. From the general and
indefinite experience that things change, come into exist
ence and pass aw ay, thus are in motion, it is a long w a y to
an insight into the essence of motion and into the manner
o f its belonging to things. The ancient Greek conception of
the earth is o f a disc around which floats Okeanos. The
sky overarches it and turns around it. Later Plato, A ris
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 83

totle, and Eudoxus though cach differently present the

earth as a ball but still as a center o f everything.
We restrict ourselves to the presentation of the Aris-
totlelian conception w hich later becam e w idely dominant,
and this only sufficiently to show the contrast w hich ex
presses itse lf in the first axiom o f Newton.
First, we ask, in general, w hat, according to A ristotle,
is the essence o f a thing in nature? The answ er is: r <
are Kara . ( ThoSC bodies which be
long to nature and constitute it are, in them selves, m ov
able w ith respect to location . ) Motion, in general, is
', the alteration o f som ething into som ething else.
Motion in this wide sense is, for instance, turning pale
and blushing. But it is also an alteration when a body is
transferred from one place to another. This being trans
ported is expressed in Greek as . * - means
in Greek w hat constitutes the proper motion of Newton
ian bodies. In this motion there lies a definite relation to
the place. The motion o f bodies, however, is , ac
cording to them, them selves. That is to say, how a body
moves, i.e., how it relates to the place and to w hat it re
lates all this has its b a sis in the body itself. B asis
(Grund) is and has a double meaning: that from
w hich som ething emerges, and that w hich governs over
w hat emerges in this w ay. The body is / . What
an Ktinpnuvi in this manner is, is , the prim ordial
mode o f emergence (H ervorgehens), which however re
mains lim ited only to pure movement in space. Herein
there appears an essential transform ation o f the concept
ol physics. The body m oves according to its nature. A
moving body, which is itse lf an , is a natural
body. The purely earthy body m oves downward, the
purely fiery body as every blazing llame dem onstrates
moves upward. W hy? Because the earthy has its place
below, the fiery, above. Each body has its place according
/<>its kind, and it strives toward that place. Around the
84 WHAT IS THING?

earth is w ater, around this, the air, and around this, fire
the four elements. When a body m oves in its place, this
motion accords w ith nature, </><W. A rock falls down
to the earth. However, if a rock is thrown upward by a
sling, this motion is essen tially against the nature o f the
rock, irapa . All m otions against nature are , vio
lence.
The kind o f motion and the place o f the body arc deter
mined according to its nature. The earth is in the center
for all characterization and evaluation o f motion. The rock
W'hich falls m oves toward this center, *V! < >. The fire
which rises, , m oves aw ay from the center. In
both cases the motion is , in a straight line. But
the stars and the entire heavens move around the center,
to . This motion is . Circular motion and mo
tion in a straight line are the sim ple m ovements, . Of
these two, circu lar motion is fiVst, that is, the highest, and
thus, o f the highest order. For v <>rtKwv ,
the complete precedes the incomplete. Their place belongs
to the motion o f bodies. In circular motion the body has its
place in the motion itself, wherefore this motion is per
petual, and really existent. In rectilinear motion the place
lies only in a direction and aw ay from another place, so
that motion com es to an end there. Besides these two
form s of sim ple motion, there are m ixtures of both, .
The purest motion, in the sense o f change of place, is circu
lar motion; it contains, as it were, its place in itself. A body
w hich so m oves itself, m oves itse lf com pletely. This is true
of all celestial bodies. Compared to this, earthy m otion is
alw ays in a straight line, or mixed, or forced, but alw ays
incomplete.
There is an essential difference between the motion of
celestial bodies and earthly bodies. The domains o f these
m otions are different. How a body m oves depends upon its
species and the place to which it belongs. The where de
termines the how of its being, for being is called presence
{Anwesenheit). The moon does not fall earthward, be
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 85

cause it m oves in a circle, that is, it moves com pletely,

permanently in the sim plest motion. This circu lar motion
is in itse lf com pletely independent o f anything outside it
self for instance, from the earth as center. But, in con
trast, to anticipate, in modern thought circular motion is
understood only so that a perpetual attracting force (Zug)
from the center is necessary for its form ation and preser
vation. W ith A ristotle, however, this "fo rce , , the
cap acity for its m otion, lies in the nature of the body itself.
The kind o f motion o f the body and its relation to its place
depend upon the nature of the body. The velocity o f nat
ural m otion increases the nearer the body com es to its
place, that is, increase and decrease of velocity and the
ceasing o f m otion depend upon the nature of the body. A
motion contrary to nature, i.e., a forced m otion, has its
cause in the force that affects it. However, according to its
motion, the body, driven forcibly, m ust w ith d raw from
this power, and since the body itse lf does not bring w ith it
any b a sis for this forced motion, its motion m ust neces
sarily becom e slow er and finally Stop: yap
fipahvTipov (Ilcpi As, 277 b, 6.
, ibid., _>, 269 b, 9). This corre
sponds d istin ctly to the comm on conception: a m otion im
parted to a body continues for a certain time and then
ceases, passing over into a state o f rest. Therefore, we
must look for the cau ses for the continuation or endur
ance o f the motion. According to A ristotle, the basis for
natural motion lies in the nature o f the body itself, in its
essence, in its m ost proper being (seinem eigensten Sein ).
A later Sch olastic proposition is in accord w ith this:
Operari (agere) sequitur esse. "The kind o f motion fol
lows from the kind o f being.

d;i. N ew tons doctrine o f motion

How does A risto tles descriptive observation o f nature

and concept o f motion relate to the modern one, which
86 W H A T IS A THING?

got an essential foundation in the first axiom o f Newton?

We shall try to present in order a few main distinctions.
For this purpose w e give the axiom an abridged form:
Every body left to itse lf moves uniform ly in a straight line.
("C orpu s omne, quod a viribus im pressis non cogitur,
uniform iter in directum m ovetur. ) We shall discuss
what is new in eight points:
1. N ewtons axiom begins w ith "corpu s om ne," "every
body. That means that the distinction between earthly
and celestial bodies has become obsolete. The universe is
no longer divided into tw o w ell-separated realm s, the one
beneath the stars, the other the realm o f the stars them
selves. All natural bodies are essen tially o f the sam e kind.
The upper realm is not a superior one.
2. In accord w ith this, the priority of circu lar motion
over m otion in a straight line also disappears. And,
even in sofar as now, in reverse, m otion in a straight line
becom es decisive, still this does not lead to a division o f
bodies and of different domains according to their kind of
motion.
3. Accordingly, the distinguishing of certain places also
disappears. Each body can fundam entally be in any place.
The concept of place itse lf is changed: place no longer is
where the body belongs according to its nature, but only
a position in relation to other positions. (Compare points
5 and 7). <> and change o f place in the modern sense are
not the same.
With respect to the cau sation and determ ination of m o
tion, one does not ask for the cause o f the continuity of m o
tion and, therefore, for its perpetual occurrence, but the
reverse: being in motion ( B ew egtheit) is presupposed,
and one a sk s for the cau ses of a change from m otion pre
supposed as uniform, and in a straight line. The circu larity
of the m oon's motion does not cause its uniform perpetual
motion around the earth. Precisely the reverse. It is this
motion for w hose cause w e must search. According to the
law of inertia, the body of the moon should move from
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 87

every point o f its circular orbit in a straight line, i.e., in

the form o f a tangent. Since the moon does not do so, the
question based upon the presupposition o f the law of
inertia and out o f it arises: Why does the moon decline
from the line o f a tangent? Why does it move, as the
Greeks put it, in a circle? The circular movement is now
not cause but, on the contrary, precisely w hat requires
a reason. (W e know that Newton arrived at a new an
sw er when he proposed that the force according to which
bodies fall to the ground is also the one according to
which the celestial bodies remain in their orbits: grav
ity. Newton compared the centripetal declination o f the
moon from the tangent o f its orbit during a fraction o f
time w ith this linear distance which a falling body
achieves at the surface o f earth in an equal time. A t this
point we see im m ediately the elim ination o f the distin c
tion already mentioned between earthly and celestial m o
tions and thus between bod ies.)
4. M otions them selves are not determined according to
different natures, cap acities, and forces, the elem ents o f
the body, but, in reverse, the essence o f force is deter
mined by the fundam ental law o f m otion: Every body,
left to itself, m oves uniform ly in a straight line. Accord
ing to this, a force is that w hose im pact results in a decli
nation from rectilinear, uniform motion. "V is im pressa
est actio in corpus exercita, ad mutandum eius statum vel
quiescendi vel movendi uniform iter in directum (P rin ci
pia, Def. IV ).21 This new determ ination o f force leads at
the sam e time to a new determ ination of m ass.
5. Corresponding to the change o f the concept o f place,
motion is only seen as a change of position and relative
position, as distances between places. Therefore, the de
termination o f motion develops into one regarding dis
tances, stretches o f the m easurable, of the so and so large.
Jl "An impressed force is an action exerted upon a body, in
order to change its state, either of rest, or of uniform motion in a
right line. Trans.

/
88 W H A T IS A THING?

Motion is determined as die amount o f motion, and, sim i

larly, m ass as weight.
6. Therefore, the difference between natural and
against nature, i.e., forced, is also elim inated; the , vio
lence, is as force only a measure of the change o f motion
and is no longer special in kind. The im pact, for instance,
is only a particular form o f the vis im pressa, along w ith
pressure and centripetality.
7. Therefore, the concept of nature in general changes.
Nature is no longer the inner principle out of w hich the
motion o f the body follow s; rather, nature is the mode of
the variety o f the changing relative positions of bodies, the
manner in w hich they are present in space and time, which
them selves are domains o f p ossible positional orders and
determ inations of order and have no special traits any
where.
8. Thereby the manner of questioning nature also
changes and, in a certain respect, becom es opposite.
We cannot set forth here the full im plications o f the
revolution o f inquiry into nature. It should have become
clear only that, and how, the application of the first law
of motion im plies all the essential changes. All these
changes are linked together and uniform ly based on the
new b asic position expressed in the first law and w hich we
call m athem atical.

e. The Essence of the M athem atical Project

(E n tw u r f)'2
(G alileos Experiment w ith Free F all)

For us, for the moment, the question concerns the ap

plication o f the First Law, more precisely, the question in
w hat sense the m athem atical becom es decisive in it.

22 Perhaps the best insight as to what Heidegger means by

"p roject is Kants use of the word in the Critique of Pare
Reason. When Galileo experimented with b alls whose weight he
him self had already predetermined, when Torricelli caused the
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 89

How about this law ? It speaks o f a body, corpus quod a

viribus im pressis non cogitur, a body w hich is left to itself.
Where do we find it? There is no such body. There is also
no experiment w hich could ever bring such a body to
direct perception. But modern science, in contrast to the
mere dialectical poetic conception of medieval Sch o lasti
cism and science, is supposed to be based upon experience.
Instead, it has such a law at its apex. This law speaks of a
thing that does not exist. It demands a fundam ental repre
sentation o f things w hich contradict the ordinary.
The m athem atical is based on such a claim , i.e., the ap
plication o f a determ ination of the thing, w hich is not ex-
perientially created out o f the thing and yet lies at the
base o f every determ ination o f the things, m aking them
possible and m aking room for them. Such a fundam ental
conception o f things is neither arbitrary nor self-evident.
Therefore, it required a long controversy to bring it into

air to carry a weight which he had calculated beforehand to be

equal to that of a definite column of water, or, at a later time,
when Stahl converted metal into lime and this again into metal
by withdrawing something and then adding it, a light broke in
on all investigators of nature. They learned that reason only gains
insight into what it produces itself according to its own projects
(w as sie selbst nach ihrem Entwrfe hervorbringt); that it must
go before with principles of judgment according to constant
laws, and constrain nature to reply to its questions, not content to
merely follow her leading-strings (B XIII).
Literally Entwurf means "a throwing forth; from werfen (to
throw) and ent- (indicating separation or severing in the sense
of "o u t," "aw a y ," from ," "fo rth "). In present day use it is a
sketch, and the word "sk e tch is som etim es used in this transla
tion, as well as "p ro ject and "p rojection." Originally a textile
term referring to the building of a frame, in the seventeenth cen
tury it (entwerfen) took the sense of a preliminary or preparatory
sketch. As Heidegger uses it in ST., 145, it is a sketching which is a
throwing forth of Dasein in which it "throw s before itself the pos
sibility as possibility and as such allow s it to be. It is through
understanding as project that the structure of the being of en
tities, including Dasein, becomes accessible. Project is construc
tive in that it allow s the possibilities of entities to be; in the case
ol Dasein to achieve its openness to its own being (See KM, pp.
209-10). Trans.
90 W H A T IS A THING?

power. It required a change in the mode o f approach to

things along w ith the achievement o f a new manner of
thought. We can accurately follow the history ol this b at
tle. Let us cite one example from it. In the A ristotelian
view, bodies move according to their nature, the heavy
ones downward, the light ones upward. When both fall,
heavy ones fall faster than light ones, since the latter have
the urge to move upward. It becom es a decisive insight of
Galileo that all bodies fall equally fast, and that the differ
ences in the time o f fall only derive from the resistance of
the air, not from the different inner natures o f the bodies
or from their own corresponding relation to their p artic
ular place. G alileo did his experiment at the leaning tower
in the town o f Pisa, where he w a s professor o f m athe
m atics, in order to prove his statem ent. In it bodies o f dif
ferent w eights did not arrive at precisely the sam e time
after having fallen from the tower, but the difference in
time w a s slight. In spite o f these differences and therefore
really against the evidence of experience, Galileo upheld
his proposition. The w itn esses to this experiment, how
ever, becam e really perplexed by the experiment and Gal
ileos upholding his view. They persisted the more o b sti
nately in their former view . By reason of this experiment
the opposition toward G alileo increased to such an extent
that he had to give up his professorship and leave Pisa.
Both G alileo and his opponents saw the sam e fa ct.
But they interpreted the sam e fact differently and made
the sam e happening visib le to them selves in different
w ays. Indeed, w hat appeared for them as the essential fact
and truth w a s som ething different. Both thought som e
thing along w ith the sam e appearance but they thought
som ething different, not only about the single case, but
fundam entally, regarding the essence o f a body and the
nature o f its motion. What Galileo thought in advance
about m otion w as the determ ination that the m otion of
every body is uniform and rectilinear, when every ob
stacle is excluded, but that it also changes uniform ly
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 91

when an equal force afTects it. In his D iscorsi, which ap

peared in 1638, G alileo said: "M o bile super planum hori
zontale projectum mente concipio omni secluso impedi
mento, jam con stat ex his, quae fusius alibi dicta sunt,
illius motum aequabilem et perpetuum super ipso plano
futurum esse, si planum in infinitum extendatur." ( " I
think o f a body thrown on a horizontal plane and every
obstacle excluded. This results in w hat has been given a
detailed account in another place, that the motion of the
body over this plane would be uniform and perpetual if
this place were extended infinitely. )
In this proposition, which m ay be considered the ante
cedent o f the F irst Law o f Newton, w hat w e have been
looking for is clearly expressed. Galileo says: Mobile
mente concipio omni secluso im pedim ento." ("I think in
my mind o f som ething m oveable that is entirely left to it
self. ) This " to think in the m ind ( Sich-im-Geiste-denken)
is that giving-oneself-a-cognition ( Sich-selbst-eine-Kennt-
nis geben) about a determ ination o f things. It is a pro
cedure o f going ahead in advance, w hich Plato once
characterized regarding in the follow ing way:
avros (( ( Meno 85d), bringing up
and taking up above and beyond the other taking the
knowledge itse lf from out o f him self. )
There is a prior grasping together in this mente con
cipere o f w hat should be uniform ly determ inative of each
body as such, i.e., for being bodily. All bodies are alike. No
motion is special. Every place is like every other, each
moment like any other. Every force becom es determ inable
only by the change o f motion w hich it causes this change
in motion being understood as a change o f place. All de
term inations o f bodies have one b asic blueprint ( Grund
r is s ), according to which the natural process is nothing
but the space-tim e determ ination o f the motion of points
ol m ass. This fundam ental design o f nature at the sam e
time circu m scribes its realm as everywhere uniform.
Now ii w e sum m arize at a glance all that has been said,
92 W IS A T H I N G ?

w e can grasp the essence of the m athem atical more

sharply. Up to now we said only its general characteristic,
that it is a taking cognizance o f som ething, w hat it takes
being som ething it gives to itself from itself, thereby giv
ing to itse lf what it already has. We now sum m arize the
fuller essential determ ination o f the m athem atical in a
few separate points:
1. The m athem atical is, as mente concipere, a project
( E n tw u rf) o f thingness ( D ingheit) which, as it were, skips
over the things. The project first opens a domain (Sp iel
raum ) where things i.e., fa cts show themselves.
2. In this projection there is posited that which things
are taken as, w hat and how they are to be evaluated
(w rd ig t) beforehand. Such evaluation (W rdigen) and
taking-for (D afrhalten ) is called in Greek . The an
ticipating determ inations and assertion s in the project arc
$. Newton therefore entitles the section in which he
presents the fundamental determ inations about things as
moved: Axiom ata, sive leges motus. The p roject is axio
m atic. Insofar as every science and cognition is expressed
in propositions, the cognition which is taken and posited
in the m athem atical p roject is o f such a kind as to set
things upon their foundation in advance. The axiom s are
fundam ental propositions.
3. As axiom atic, the m athem atical p roject is the an tici
pation ( V orausgriff) of the essence o f things, o f bodies;
thus the b asic blueprint (G run driss) o f the structure of
every thing and its relation toeveryoth er thingis sketched
in advance.
4. This b a sic plan (G run driss) at the sam e time pro
vides the m easure for laying out o f the realm, which, in the
future, w ill encom pass all things o f that sort. Now nature
is no longer an inner cap acity of a body, determining its
form of m otion and place. Nature is now the realm of the
uniform space-tim e context of motion, w hich is outlined
in the axiom atic project and in which alone bodies can be
bodies as a part o f it and anchored in it.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 93

5. This realm o f nature, axiom atically determined in

outline by this project, now also requires for the bodies
and corpuscles w ithin it a mode o f access ( Zugangsart)
appropriate to the axiom atically predetermined objects.
The mode o f questioning and the cognitive determination
of nature are now no longer ruled by traditional opinions
and concepts. Bodies have no concealed qu alities, powers,
and cap acities. Natural bodies are now only w hat they
sh ow them selves as, w ithin this projected realm. Things
now show them selves only in the relations o f places and
time points and in the m easures o f m ass and working
forces. How they show them selves is prefigured in the
project. Therefore, the project also determines the mode
o f taking in and studying o f w hat show s itself, experience,
the experiri. However, because inquiry is now predeter
mined by the outline of the project, a line o f questioning
can be instituted in such a w ay that it poses conditions in
advance to w hich nature m ust answ er in one w ay or an
other. Upon the b a sis of the m athem atical, the experientia
becom es the modern experiment. Modern science is ex
perimental because o f the m athem atical project. The
experimenting urge to the fa cts is a necessary conse
quence o f the preceding m athem atical skipping ( ber
springen) o f all facts. But where this skipping ceases or
becom es weak, mere facts as such are collected, and
positivism arises.
6. Because the project establish es a uniform ity o f all
bodies according to relations o f space, time, and motion,
it also m akes p ossible and requires a universal uniform
m easure as an essential determinant of things, i.e., numer
ical measurement. The m athem atical project o f N ew
tonian bodies leads to the development o f a certain m ath
e m a tics" in the narrow sense. The new form o f modern
science did not arise because m athem atics becam e an es
sential determinant. Rather, that m athem atics, and a par
ticular kind o f m athem atics, could come into play and had
come into play is a consequence o f the m athem atical
 94 W H AT IS A T H IN G ?

project. The founding of analytical geom etry by D escartes,

the founding o f the infinitesim al calculus by Newton, the
sim ultaneous founding of the differential calculus by Leib
niz all these novelties, this m athem atical in a narrower
sense, first becam e p ossible and, above all, necessary, on
the grounds of the basically m athem atical character of
the thinking.
We would certainly fall into great error if w e were to
think that w ith this characterization of the reversal from
ancient to modern natural science and w ith this sharp
ened essential outline of the m athem atical w e had already
gained a picture o f the actual science itself.
W hat w e have been able to cite is only the fundamental
outline along w hich there unfolds the entire richness of
posing questions and experiments, establishing o f law s
and disclosing o f new d istricts of w hat is. W ithin this
fundamental m athem atical position the questions about
the nature of space and time, motion and force, body and
m atter remain open. These questions now receive a new
sharpness; for instance, the question whether m otion is
sufficiently form ulated by the designation change of loca
tion. Regarding the concept o f force, the question arises
whether it is sufficient to represent force only as a cause
that is effective only from the outside. Concerning the
b a sic law o f m otion, the law o f inertia, the question arises
whether this law is not to be subordinated under a more
general one, i.e., the law o f the conservation o f energy
w hich is now determined in accordance w ith its expendi
ture and consum ption, as w ork a name for new b a sic
representations which now enter into the study of nature
and betray a notable accord w ith econom ics, w ith the
calcu lation o f success. All this develops w ithin and ac-
cording to the fundamental m athem atical position. What
rem ains questionable in all this is a closer determ ination
o f the relation of the m athem atical in the sense of m athe
m atics to the intuitive direct perceptual experience ( zur
anschaulichen E rfahrung) o f the given things and to these
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 95

things themselves. Up to this hour such questions have

been open. Their qu estionability is concealed by the re
su lts and the progress o f scientific work. One o f these
burning questions concerns the ju stification and lim its o f
m athem atical form alism in contrast to the demand for an
immediate return to intuitively-* given nature ( anschau
lich gegebene N atur).
If w e have grasped som e of w hat has been said up till
now, then it is understandable that the question cannot
be decided by w ay o f an eith er/or, either form alism or
immediate intuitive determ ination o f things; for the na
ture and direction o f the m athem atical project participate
in deciding their p ossible relation to the intuitively experi
enced and vice versa. Behind this question concerning the
relation o f m athem atical form alism to the intuition o f na
ture stand s the fundam ental question o f the ju stification
and lim its o f the m athem atical in general, w ithin a funda
mental position we take toward w hat is, as a whole. But,
in this regard the delineation of the m athem atical has
gained an im portance for us.

f. The M etaphysical Meaning o f the M athem atical

To reach our goal, the understanding o f the m athem at

ical as we have gained it up to now is not sufficient. To be
sure, we shall now no longer conceive o f it as a generaliza
tion o f the procedure o f a particular m athem atical d isci
pline, but rather the particular discipline as a particular
form developing from the m athem atical. But this m athe
m atical m ust, in turn, be grasped from causes that lie even
deeper. We have said that it is a fundamental trait o f mod
ern thought. Every sort o f thought, however, is alw ays
only the execution and consequence o f the h istorical mode

-:t Anschauen: "looking at. The usual English translation, "in

tuition, comes from the Latin in and tueor ("to see," "look,
'gaze ). Intuition refers to immediate perception in contrast to
conceptual inference. Trans.
96 W H AT IS A T H IN G ?

of being ( D asein ) at that time, of the fundam ental posi

tion taken toward what is and toward the w ay in W'hich
w h at is, is m anifest as such, i.e., to the truth.
What w e have exhibited as the m athem atical m ust now
receive a clarification in this direction; for only in this
w ay w ill w hat w e are looking for becom e visible: precisely
that form ation o f modern m etaphysical thought in w hose
train som ething like the Critique o f Pure Reason could
and had to arise.

f,. The principles: new freedom, self-binding and

self-grounding

We inquire, therefore, about the m etaphysical meaning

o f the m athem atical in order to evaluate its im portance
for modern m etaphysics. We divide the question into tw'o
subordinate ones: (1 ) What new fundam ental position of
Dasein show s itse lf in this rise o f the dominance o f the
m athem atical? (2 ) How does the m athem atical, accord
ing to its own inner direction, drive toward an ascent to a
m etaphysical determ ination o f Dasein?
The second question is the more im portant for us. We
sh all answ er the first one only in the m erest outline.
Up to the distin ct emergence of the m athem atical as a
fundam ental ch aracteristic o f thought, the authoritative
truth w as considered that o f Church and faith. The means
for the proper knowledge o f w'hat is w ere obtained by w ay
o f the interpretation o f the sources of revelation, the w rit
and the tradition of the Church. W hatever more experience
and knowledge had been won adjusted itse lf (a s if by it
s e lf) to this fram e. For b asically there w a s no w orldly
knowledge. The so-called natural knowledge not based
upon any revelation, therefore, did not have its ow'n form
o f in tellig ibility or grounds for itself, let alone from out of
itself. Thus, w hat is decisive for the h istory o f science is
not that all truth of natural knowledge w'as measured by
the supernatural. Rather it is that this natural knowledge,
 K ant's Manner of Asking About the Thing 97

disregarding this criterion, arrived at no independent

foundation and character out of itself. For the taking over
o f the A ristotelian syllogism cannot be reckoned as such.
In the essence o f the m athem atical, as the project w e
delineated, lies a specific w ill to a new form ation and self
grounding o f the form of knowledge as such. The detach
ment from revelation as the first source for truth and the
rejection o f tradition as the authoritative means o f know l
edge all these rejections are only negative consequences
o f the m athem atical project. He w ho dared to project the
m athem atical project put him self as the p rojector of this
project upon a base which is first projected only in the
project. There is not only a liberation in the m athem atical
project, but also a new experience and form ation of free
dom itself, i.e., a binding with obligations which are self-
imposed. In the m athem atical p roject develops an obliga
tion to principles demanded by the m athem atical itself.
According to this inner drive, a liberation to a new free
dom, the m athem atical strives out o f itse lf to establish its
own essence as the ground o f itse lf and thus o f all know l
edge.
Therewith w e com e to the second question: How does
the m athem atical, according to its own inner drive, move
toward an ascent to a m etaphysical determ ination of
Dasein? We can abridge this question as follow s: In what
w ay does modern m etaphysics arise out o f the spirit o f the
m athem atical? It is already obvious from the form of the
question that m athem atics could not become the stan
dard o f philosophy, as if m athem atical m ethods were
only appropriately generalized and then transferred to
philosophy.
Rather, modern natural science, modern m athem atics,
and modern m etaphysics sprang from the sam e root of the
m athem atical in the w ider sense. Because m etaphysics, of
these three, reaches farth est to w hat is, in to tality and
because at the sam e time it also reaches deepest toward
the being o f w hat is as such, therefore it is precisely m eta
98 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

p hysics which m ust dig down to the bedrock o f its m athe

m atical base and ground.
As w e pursue how modern philosophy grow s up from
this ground that it has laid in itse lf w e grasp the historical
p ossib ility and necessity o f a critique of pure reason.
Moreover, we shall com e to understand w hy this w ork has
the form it has and w hy w e shall begin our interpretation
o f this work at that place at w hich we shall enter it.

f,. D escartes: Cogito Stun; " I as a special subject

Modern philosophy is usually considered to have begun

w ith D escartes (1596-1650), who lived a generation after
Galileo. Contrary to the attem pts, which appear from time
to time, to have modern philosophy begin w ith M eister
Eckhart or in the tim e between Eckhart and D escartes, we
m ust adhere to the usual beginning. The only question is
how one understands D escartes philosophy. It is no acci
dent that the philosophical form ation of the m athem atical
foundation o f modern Dasein is prim arily achieved in
France, England, and Holland anymore than it is a cci
dental that Leibniz received his decisive inspiration from
there, especially during his sojourn in Paris from 1672-76.
Only because he passed through that w orld and truly ap
praised its greatness in greater reflection w a s he in a p osi
tion to lay the first foundation for its overcoming.
The follow ing is the usual image of D escartes and his
philosophy: During the Middle Ages philosophy stood if
it stood independently at all under the exclusive domina
tion o f theology and gradually degenerated into a mere
an alysis of concepts and elucidations of traditional opin
ions and propositions. It petrified into an academ ic kn ow l
edge which no longer concerned man and w a s unable to
illum inate reality as a whole. Then D escartes appeared
and liberated philosophy from this disgraceful position.
He began by doubting everything, but this doubt finally
did run into som ething which could no longer be doubted,
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 99

for, inasm uch as the skeptic doubts, he cannot doubt that

he, the skeptic, is present and must be present in order to
doubt at all. As I doubt I must adm it that I am . The " I ,"
accordingly, is the indubitable. As the doubter, Descartes
forced men into doubt in this way; he led them to think of
themselves, o f their " I . Thus the I, human su bjectivity,
cam e to be declared the center o f thought. From here
originated the I-viewpoint o f modern tim es and its sub
jectivism . Philosophy itself, however, w a s thus brought to
the insight that doubting m ust stand at the beginning of
philosophy: reflection upon knowledge itse lf and its pos
sib ility. A theory o f knowledge had to be erected before a
theory o f the world. From then on epistem ology is the
foundation of philosophy, and that distinguishes modern
from medieval philosophy. Since then, the attem pts to
renew Sch olasticism also strive to dem onstrate the episte
mology in their system , or to add it where it is m issing, in
order to m ake it usable for modern tim es. Accordingly,
Plato and A ristotle are reinterpreted as epistem ologists.
This story of D escartes, who cam e and doubted and so
becam e a su b jectivist, thus grounding epistem ology, does
give the usual picture; but at best it is only a bad novel,
and anything but a story in w hich the movement o f being
becom es visible.
The main work o f Descartes carries the title M edita
tiones de prima philosophia (1641). Prim a philosophia
this is the . of A ristotle, the question concern
ing the being o f what is, in the form o f the question
concerning the thingness o f things. M editationes de meta-
physica nothing about theory o f knowledge. The sen
tence or proposition con stitu tes the guide for the question
about the being o f what is (fo r the categories). (The essen
tial historical-m etaphysical b asis for the priority o f cer
tainty, w hich first made the acceptance and m etaphysical
development o f the m athem atical p ossible C hristianity
and the certain ty of salvation , the secu rity of the individ
ual as such w ill not be considered here.)
100 W H A T IS A THING?

In the Middle Ages, the doctrine o f A ristotle w a s taken

over in a very special way. In later Sch olasticism , through
the Spanish philosophical schools, especially through the
Jesuit, Suarez, the "m ed ieval A ristotle w ent through an
extended interpretation. D escartes received his first and
fundam ental philosophical education from the Jesu its at
La Fleche. The title o f his main w ork expresses both his
argument w ith this tradition and his w ill to take up anew
the question about the being o f w hat is, the thingness of
the thing, "su b sta n ce ."
But all this happened in the m idst o f a period in which,
for a century, m athem atics had already been emerging
more and more as the foundation o f thought and w as
pressing toward clarity. I tw a s a tim ew h ich .in accordance
w ith this free projection of the world, em barked on a new
assau lt upon reality. There is nothing o f scep ticism here,
nothing o f the I-viewpoint and su b jectivity but ju st the
contrary. Therefore, it is the passion o f the new thought
and inquiry to bring to clarification and display in its in
nerm ost essence the at first dark, unclear, and often m is
interpreted fundamental position, which has progressed
only by fits and starts. But this means that the m athe
m atical w ills to ground itse lf in the sense o f its own inner
requirements. It expressly intends to explicate itse lf as the
standard of all thought and to establish the rules which
thereby arise. D escartes su bstan tially participates in this
w ork o f reflection upon the fundam ental meaning o f the
m athem atical. Because this reflection concerned the
to tality o f w hat is and the knowledge of it, this had to
becom e a reflection on m etaphysics. This sim ultaneous
advance in the direction o f a foundation o f m athem atics
and o f a reflection on m etaphysics above all characterizes
his fundam ental philosophical position. We can pursue
this clearly in an unfinished early w ork which did not ap
pear in print until fifty years after D escartes death (1701).
This work is called Regulae ad directionem ingenii.
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 101

(1 ) Regulae: b asic and guiding propositions in which

m athem atics subm its itse lf to its own essence; (2 ) ad di
rectionem ingenii: laying the foundation of the m athe
m atical in order that it, as a whole, becom es the measure
o f the inquiring mind. In the enunciation of som ething
su b ject to rules as w ell as w ith regard to the inner free
determ ination of the mind, the b asic m athem atical-m eta
physical character is already expressed in the title. Here,
by w ay o f a rellection upon the essence of m athem atics,
D escartes grasps the idea o f a scien tia universalis, to
w hich everything m ust be directed and ordered as the one
authoritative science. Descartes expressly em phasizes that
it is not a question o f m athem atica vulgaris but o f m athe
m atica universalis.
We cannot, here, present the inner construction and the
main content o f this unfinished w ork. In it the modern
concept o f science is coined. Only one who has really
thought through this relentlessly sober volum e long
enough, down to its rem otest and coldest corner, fulfills
the prerequisite for getting an inkling o f w hat is going on
in modern science. In order to convey a notion o f the in
tention and attitude o f this work, w e shall quote only three
o f the twenty-one rules, namely, the third, fourth, and fifth.
Out o f these the b asic character o f modern thought leaps
before our eyes.
Regula III: "C irca objecta proposita, non quid alii
senserint, vel quid ipsi suspicem ur, sed quid clare et evi
denter p ossim us intueri, vel certo deducere, quaerendum
est; non a liter enim scien tia acq u iritu r." ("Concerning the
o b jccts before us, w e should pursue the questions, not
what others have thought, nor w hat w e ourselves con jec
ture, but w hat w e can clearly and insightfully intuit, or
deduce w ith steps o f certainty, for in no other w ay is
knowledge arrived a t. ) 4
24 Descartes, Rules for the Direction of the Mind, F. P. Lafleur,
trans. (Liberal Arts Press, 1961), p. 8. Trans.
102 WH AT IS T H IN G ?

Regula IV: "N ecessaria est methodus ad rerum verita

tem investigandam . ("M ethod is necessary for discover
ing the truth o f nature. )
This rule does not intend the platitude that a science
m ust also have its method, but it w an ts to say that the
procedure, i.e., how in general w e are to pursue things
(/0o8os), decides in advance what truth w e shall seek out
in the things.
Method is not one piece o f equipment o f science among
others but the prim ary component out o f which is first de
termined what can becom e ob ject and how it becom es an
object.
Regula V : "T ota methodus co n sistit in ordine et disp osi
tione eorum ad quae m entis acies est convertenda, ut
aliquam veritatem inveniam us. Atquae hanc exacte ser
vabim us, si propositiones involutas et obscu ras ad sim p li
ciores gradatim reducamus, et deinde ex omnium sim pli
cissim arum intuitu ad aliarum omnium cognitionem per
eosdem gradus ascendere tentem us. ("M ethod co n sists
entirely in the order and arrangement o f that upon w hich
the sharp vision o f the mind m ust be directed in order to
discover som e truth. But, w e w ill follow such a method
only if w e lead complex and obscure propositions back
step by step to the sim pler ones and then try to ascend by
the sam e steps from the insight of the very sim plest propo
sitio n s to the knowledge o f all the others. )
What rem ains decisive is how this reflection on the
m athem atical affects the argument w ith traditional m eta
physics ( prim a p hilosophia), and how, starting from
there, the further destiny and form o f modern philosophy
is determined.
To the essence o f the m athem atical as a projection be
longs the axiom atical, the beginning o f basic principles
upon which everything further is based in insightful order.
If m athem atics, in the sense o f a m athesis universalis, is to
ground and form the whole o f knowledge, then it requires
the form ulation o f special axiom s.
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 103

(1 ) They m ust be absolutely first, intuitively evident in

and o f them selves, i.e., absolutely certain. This certainty
participates in deciding their truth. (2 ) The highest
axiom s, as m athem atical, m ust establish in advance, con
cerning the whole o f what is, w hat is in being and what
being means, from where and how the thingness o f things
is determined. According to tradition this happens along
guidelines o f the proposition. But up till now, the proposi
tion had been taken only as what offered itself, as it were,
o f itself. The sim ple proposition about the sim ply present
things contains and retains w hat the things are. Like the
things, the proposition, too, is present-at-hand (vorhan
den): it is the present (vorhanden) container o f being.
However, there can be no pre-given things for a b asi
cally m athem atical position. The proposition cannot be an
arbitrary one. The proposition, and precisely it, m ust itse lf
be based on its foundation. It m ust be a b asic principle
the b asic principle absolutely. One must therefore find
such a principle o f all positing, i.e., a proposition in which
that about which it says som ething, the subjectum
(), is not ju st taken from som ewhere else. That
underlying su bject m ust as such first emerge for itse lf in
this original proposition and be established. Only in this
w ay is the subjectu m a fundamentum absolutum , purely
posited from the proposition as such, a b a sis and, as such,
a fundamentum absolutum at the sam e time inconcussum ,
and thus indubitable and absolutely certain. Because the
m athem atical now sets itse lf up as the principle o f all
knowledge, all knowledge up to now m ust n ecessarily be
put into question, regardless o f whether it is tenable or
not.
Descartes does not doubt because he is a skeptic; rather,
he must becom e a doubter because he posits the mathe
m atical a s the absolute ground and seeks fo ra ll knowledge
a foundation that w ill be in accord w ith it. It is a question
not only o f finding a fundamental law for the realm of
nature, but finding the very first and highest b asic prin-
104 W HAT IS A T H IN G ?

cip lc for the being of w hat is, in general. This absolutely

m athem atical principle cannot have anything in front o f it
and cannot allo w w hat might be given to it beforehand. If
anything is given at all, it is only the proposition in gen
eral as such, i.e., the positing, the position, in the sense o f a
thinking that asserts. The positing, the proposition, only
has itse lf as that which can be posited. Only where think
ing thinks itself, is it absolu tely m athem atical, i.e., a taking
cognizance o f that which w e already have. Insofar as
thinking and positing directs itse lf toward itself, it finds
the following: w hatever and in w hatever sense anything
m ay be asserted, this assertin g and thinking is alw ays an
" / think." Thinking is alw ays an " I think, ego cogito.
Therein lies: I am, sunt. Cogito, sum this is the highest
certain ty lying im m ediately in the proposition as such. In
"I p o sit the " I as the positer is co- and pre-posited as
that which is already present, as w hat is. The being of
w hat is is determined out o f the "I am as the certainty of
the positing.
The form ula which the proposition som etim es has,
"C ogito ergo su m ," suggests the m isunderstanding that it
is here a question o f inference. That is not the case and
cannot be so, because this conclusion would have to have
as its m ajor premise: Id quod cogitat, est; and the minor
premise: cogito; conclusion: ergo sum. However, the
m ajor premise would only be a form al generalization of
what lies in the proposition: "co g ito su m ." D escartes
h im self em phasizes that no inference is present. The sum
is not a consequence of the thinking, but vice versa; it is
the ground o f thinking, the fundamentum. In the essence
o f positing lies the proposition: I posit. That is a proposi
tion w hich does not depend upon som ething given before
hand, but only gives to itse lf w hat lies w ithin it. In it lies:
7 p o sit : I am the one who p osits and thinks. This propo
sition has the peculiarity o f first positing that about w hich
it m akes an assertion, the subjectum . W hat it posits in this
case is the The I is the subjectum of the very first prin-
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 105

ciplc. The I is, therefore, a special som ething which under

lies (Zugrundeliegendes) , subjectum the
subjectum o f the positing as such. Hence it cam e about
that ever since then the " I has especially been called the
subjectum , "su b je c t." The character of the ego as what is
especially already present before one rem ains unnoticed.
Instead the su b jectivity o f the su bject is determined by
th e "I-n css (Ich h eit) o f the "I think. That the " I com es
to be defined as that which is already present for represen
tation (the "o b je ctiv e in today's sen se) is not because of
any I-viewpoint or any su b je ctiv istic doubt, but because
of the essential predominance and the definitely directed
radicalization o f the m athem atical and the axiom atic.
This " I , which has been raised to be the special sub
jectum on the b asis o f the m athem atical, is, in its meaning,
nothing "su b je c tiv e at all, in the sense o f an incidental
qu ality o f ju st this particular human being. This "s u b je c t
designated in the "I think, this I, is su b je ctiv istic only
when its essence is no longer understood, i.e., is not un
folded from its origin considered in term s o f its mode of
being ( seinsm ssigen H erkunft).
Until D escartes every thing present-at-hand for itself
w a s a "su b je c t ; but now the " I becom es the special sub
ject, that w ith regard to which all the remaining things
first determine them selves as such. Because m athem ati
cally they first receive their thingness only through the
founding relation to the highest principle and its "su b
je c t (I ), they are essen tially such as stand as som ething
else in relation to the "su b je c t, w hich lie over against it as
objectum . The things them selves becom e "o b je c ts.
The word objectum now passes through a correspond
ing change o f meaning. For up to then the word objectum
denoted what w a s thrown up opposite ones mere im agin
ing: I im agine a golden mountain. This thus represented
an objectum in the language of the Middle Ages is, ac
cording to the usage of language today, merely som ething
su b jective ; for " a golden m ountain docs not exist "ob-
106 W H AT IS A T H I N G ?

jectively in the meaning o f the changed linguistic use.

This reversal o f the meanings o f the w ords subjectum and
objectum is no mere affair o f usage; it is a radical change
of Dasein, i.e., the illum ination (L ich tu n g )-' ol the being
of what is on the b asis o f the predominance of the m athe
m atical. It is a stretch of the w ay o f actu al history neces
sarily hidden from the naked eye, a history which alw ays
concerns the openness o f being or nothing at all.

f:t. Reason as the highest ground: the principle of the I,

the principle o f contradiction

The I, as I think, is the ground upon which, hereafter,

all certainty and truth becom es based. But thought, asser
tion, logos, is, at the sam e time, the guideline for the deter
m ination o f being, the categories. These are found by the
guideline o f the I think, in viewing the " I . By virtue o f
this fundamental significance for the foundation of all
knowledge, the I thus becom es the accentuated and
essential definition of man. Up to that tim e and later, man
had been apprehended as the anim al rationale, as a ra
tional living being. With this peculiar em phasis on the I,
i.e., w ith the "I think, the determ ination o f the rational
and of reason now takes on a distinct priority. For think
ing is the fundamental act o f reason. W ith the cogito
su m ," reason now becom es explicitly posited according to
its own demand as the first ground o f all knowledge and
the guideline o f the determ ination o f the things.
Already in A ristotle, the assertion, the Aoyos, w a s the
guideline for the determ ination of the categories, i.e., the
being of what is. However, the locus o f this guideline
human reason, reason in general w a s not characterized

28 "To say Dasein is illuminated means that it is illumined in

itself as being-in-the-world but not through any other entity, so
that it is itself the illumination (Lichtung). What is present-at-
hand hidden in the dark becomes accessible only for an entity
illuminated in this way. (SZ., p. 133.) Trans.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 107

as the su b jectivity o f the subject. But now reason has been

expressly set forth as the I think in the highest prin
ciple as guideline and court o f appeal for all determina
tions o f being. The highest principle is the I principle:
cogito sum. It is the fundamental axiom o f all know l
edge; but it is not the only fundam ental axiom, sim ply for
this one reason, that in this I-principle itse lf there is in
cluded and posited w ith this yet another one, and there
fore w ith every proposition. When w e say "co g ito su m ,"
we express what lies in the subjectum (eg o). If the asser
tion is to be an assertion, it m ust alw ays posit what lies in
the subjectum . What is posited and spoken in the predi
cate m ay not and cannot speak against the su bject. The
m ust alw ays be such that it avoids the ,
i.e., saying in the sense of speaking against (Dagegen
sprechen), o f contradiction. In the proposition as propo
sition, and accordingly in the highest principle as
I-principle, there is co-positcd equally b asically as valid
the principle o f the avoidance o f contradiction (briefly:
the principle o f contradiction).
Since the m athem atical as the axiom atic p roject posits
itse lf a s the authoritative principle o f knowledge, the
positing is thereby established as the thinking, as the 7
think," the I-principle. I think signifies that I avoid con
tradiction and follow the principle o f contradiction.
The I-principle and the principle o f contradiction spring
from the nature o f thinking itself, and in such a w ay that
one looks only to the essence o f the I think and w hat lies
in it and in it alone. The I think is reason, is its funda
mental act, w hat is drawn solely from the I think, is
gained solely out o f reason itself. Reason so compre
hended is purely itself, pure reason.
These principles, w hich in accord w ith the fundamental
m athem atical feature o f thinking spring solely from rea
son, becom e the principles o f knowledge proper, i.e.,
philosophy in the prim ary sense, m etaphysics. The prin
ciples o f mere reason are the axiom s o f pure reason. Pure
108 W H A T I S A T H I NG ?

reason, \- so understood, the proposition in this form,

becom es the guideline and standard o f m etaphysics, i.e.,
the court o f appeal for the determ ination o f the being ol
w hat is, the thingness o f things. The question about the
thing is now anchored in pure reason, i.e., in the m athe
m atical unfolding o f its principles.
In the title, "pure reason, lies the -t of A ristotle, and
in the pure a certain special form ation of the mathe
m atical.

6. The H istory o f the Question About the Thing: Sum m ary

The first chapter o f the history o f the question o f the

thing is characterized by the m utual relation of the thing
and assertion (), the guideline along which the uni
versal determ inations o f being (catego ries) are won. The
second chapter conceives the assertion, the proposition, in
a m athem atical way, as principle; and accordingly sets
forth the principles which lie in the essence of thinking, of
the proposition, as such, i.e., the I-principle and the prin-
ciple o f con tradiction. W ith Leibniz there is added the
principle of sufficient reason ( Satz vom Grund), which is
also already co-posited in the essence of a proposition as a
principle. These propositions originate purely out o f mere
reason, w ithout the help o f a relation to som ething pre
viously given before one. They are a pure self-giving of
that which thinking in its essence already has in itself.
It now rem ains to characterize the third chapter in the
history of the question of the thing, i.e., to show how a
critique o f pure reason could and had to develop from this
determ ination of things out of pure reason. For this pur
pose it is necessary that w e acquire,although only roughly,
an idea of how modern m etaphysics developed according
to the m athem atical foundation from Descartes.
The philosophical fundam ental axiom s, i.e., the abso
lute axiom s, are the I-principle, the principle of contradic
tion, and the principle o f sufficient reason. The whole of
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 109

m etaphysics is to be based on them so that these axiom s

also dom inate throughout the inner structure of m eta
physics, i.e., the cognitive form ation of its entire domain.
Up to now this has hardly been mentioned. We have only
said that m etaphysics is the question concerning what is,
as the w hole and o f the being o f what is. But how do w e
mean this, w h at is as a w hole? In the description o f the
turn from the earlier knowledge about nature to modern
thought, we lim ited ourselves to a part o f what is. Not
only that, w e also did not report how this lim ited district
(n atu re) belongs into the whole o f what is. However, since
the ascendancy o f C hristianity in the W est, not only
throughout the medieval period but also through all o f
modern philosophy, nature and universe were considered
as created. Modern m etaphysics from D escartes to Kant,
and also the m etaphysics o f German Idealism after Kant,
are unthinkable w ithout the Christian ideas that underlie
them. Yet the relation to the dogma of the Church can be
very loose, even broken. According to the predominance of
the Christian concept of w hat is, a certain hierarchy and
arrangement enters into what is, as a whole. W hat is most
real and highest is the creative source of all that is, the one
personal God as spirit and creator. All o f w hat is that is
not godlike is the created. But among all that is created,
one is distinctive. This is man, and it is because his eternal
salvation is in question. God as the creator, the world as
the created, man and his eternal salvation; these are the
th ree dom ains defined by Christian thought w ithin what
is, as a whole. Since m etaphysics ask s about w hat is, as a
whole, w hat it is, w hy it is as it is, m etaphysics proper, in
a C hristian sense, is concerned w ith God (th eology), the
world (co sm olo gy), and man and his salvation (p sych ol
ogy). But, in accord w ith the fundam ental m athem atical
character of modern thought, m etaphysics, too, is formed
out o f the principles of pure reason, the ratio. Thus, the
m etaphysical doctrine of God becom es a theology, but a
theologia rationalis, the doctrine o f the world becom es a
110 W H A T IS A I M I N G ?

cosm ology, but a cosm ologia rationalis, and the doctrine

o f man, psychology, but a psychologia rationalis.
It is natural to arrange the w hole state o f modern m eta
physics in the follow ing way. For this form of m etaphysics
tw o concepts are essential: (1 ) the C hristian conception
o f entities as ens creatum and (2 ) the b asic m athem atical
character. The first instance concerns the content o f m eta
physics, the second its form. However, this characteriza
tion according to content and form is entirely too facile to
be true. For this structure as determined by C hristianity
form s not only the content o f what is treated in thought,
but also determ ines the form, the how. Insofar as God as
creator is the cause and the ground o f all that is, the how,
the w ay o f asking, is oriented in advance toward this
principle. Vice versa, the m athem atical is not only a form
clamped on over the Christian content, but it itse lf be
longs to the content. Insofar as the I-principle, the "I
think, becom es the leading principle, the " I and, conse
quently, man, reach a unique position within this ques
tioning about w hat is. It designates not only one domain
among others, but ju st that one to w hich all m etaphysical
propositions are traced back and from w hich they stem .
M etaphysical thought m oves in the variou sly defined do
main of su b jectivity. Later Kant therefore says: All ques
tions o f m etaphysics, i.e., those o f the designated d isci
plines, can be traced back to the question: W hat is man?
In the priority of this question there is concealed the
priority o f method coined in D escartes' Regulae.
If we use the distinction o f form and content to charac
terize modern m etaphysics, then w e m ust say that the
m athem atical belongs ju st as much to the content o f this
m etaphysics as the C hristian belongs to its form.
According to the three fundam ental directions o f m eta
physical questioning it deals each time w ith what is: God,
world, man. The essence and the p ossibility of this w h at is
m ust be determined in each case rationally, out o f pure
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 111

reason, i.e., from concepts gained in pure thought. But if

w hat is and how it is m ust be decided in thinking and
purely from thought, then before the definitions of what
is as God, world, and man, there m ust obviously be a prior
guiding concept o f what is as such. E sp ecially where this
thinking conceives itse lf m athem atically and grounds
itse lf m athem atically, the projection of w hat is as such
m ust be expressly made the foundation o f everything.
Thus the inquiry into the special realm s m ust be preceded
by one w hich a sk s about w hat is in general, i.e., m eta
physics as generally asking about w hat is, the m etaphysica
generalis. Viewed from it, theology, cosm ology, and psy
chology becom e the m etaph ysica specialis, because they
inquire into a particular realm o f w hat is.
But because m etaphysics is now m athem atical, the gen
eral cannot remain w hat is only suspended above the
particular, but the particular m ust be derived from the
general as the axiom atic according to principles. This sig
nifies that in the m athem atica generalis w hat belongs to
w hat is as such, w h at determ ines and circu m scribes the
thingness o f a thing as such, m ust be determined in prin
ciple according to axiom s, especially according to the first
axiom, according to the schem a o f positing and thinking
as such. What is a thing m ust be decided in advance from
the highest principles o f all principles and propositions,
i.e., from pure reason, before one can reasonably deal w ith
the divine, worldly, and human.
The universal, advance illum ination o f all things accord
ing to their thingness out of the pure reason o f rational
thought as such, the enlightening as this advance clarifica
tion o f all things, is the Enlightenm ent, the sp irit o f the
eighteenth century. In that century modern philosophy
first received its proper form, into which K ants thought
grows and which also bears and determ ines his own m ost
novel inquiry, the form o f m etaphysics, w ithout which
that o f the nineteenth century would be unthinkable.
112 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

7. R ational M etaphysics (W olff, Baumgarten)

Between D escartes and the Enlightenm ent stands

Leibniz. But he had an effect less through his own thinking
and work than through the form of the school of philos
ophy he determined.
During the eighteenth century scientific and philosophi
cal thought in Germany w a s dominated by the doctrine
and school o f Christian W olff (1679-1754). He took his
philosophical equipm ent from a particular interpretation
of the philosophy o f Leibniz. From there he strove for an
essential unification o f the philosophical foundation
achieved by D escartes w ith traditional m edieval Sch olas
ticism and thus at the sam e time a reunification o f Plato
and A ristotle. All o f W estern m etaphysical knowledge w a s
to be gathered up in the rational clearness o f the En
lightenment and the hum anity o f man to be based on itse lf
in pure reason. Christian Wolf!' treated philosophy in
w id ely distributed German and Latin textbooks. His text
book on m etaphysics carries (in the German version ) the
significant title, which, after w h at has been said, must now
be understandable, Rational Thoughts of God, the World
and the Soul o f Man, and A lso o f A ll Things in General
(1719). W olff first taught in Halle as professor of m athe
m atics and soon transferred to philosophy. His thorough
and rigorous w ay o f teaching presented a serious threat to
the sh allow ch atter of the theologians o f the tim e; he w as
thus driven out o f Halle in 1723 through the efforts o f his
theological opponents. He w a s threatened w ith hanging if
he remained. He taught at Marburg from 1723^0. H ow
ever, Frederick the Great did not agree w ith the method of
refuting a philosophy by the threat of the gallow s, and he
called W olff back to Halle. There he becam e chancellor of
the University, privy councillor, vice-president o f the
Petersburg Academy, and baron o f the Holy Roman Em
pire. Prominent among the m any students o f W olff were
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 113

Gottsched (1700-76) and Alexander Baumgarten (1714-

62); the latter also w rote a m etaphysics ( M etaphysica,
1739). Moreover, in accord w ith the general trend of the
dom inating form o f pure reason, he attem pted the experi
ment o f subm itting art to rational principles (and our
relation to art, which, according to the prevailing inter
pretation, w as ta ste). Taste and w hat is accessible in this
cap acity to judge ( namely a r t ) belong to the domain o f the
sensible, . Just as thought is subm itted to rational
principles in logic, so also there is need for a rational doc
trine o f sen sib ility, a logic o f the sensible, *. Baum
garten therefore called this rational theory of ah the
logic o f sen sib ility or "a e sth e tics. And despite K ants op
position to the use o f this title, the philosophical doctrine
o f art has been called aesth etics ever since. This circum
stance contains much more than the mere m atter o f a title,
and can be understood only through modern m etaphysics.
It becam e decisive not only for the interpretation o f art,
but also for the position o f art in human existence
(D asein ) in the age o f Goethe, Schiller, Schelling, and
Hegel.
Through his teacher, the Wolffian disciple Martin
Knutzen, Kant h im self stand s in the tradition of the Leib-
niz-Wolffian school. All his w ritin gs before the Critique
o f Pure Reason move w ithin the sphere o f inquiry and the
mode o f thought of the contem porary school-philosophy,
even in parts where Kant already goes his own w ays. Only
incidentally, it might be mentioned, did Kant move be
yond the school tradition and penetrate directly into the
philosophy o f Leibniz in sofar as this w a s then possible.
In a sim ilarly direct w ay he made the thinking through of
English philosophy, especially Hume, fruitfu l for the for
mation o f his own questioning. On the whole, however,
the school-philosophy of Leibni/.-Wolflian stam p remained
so predominant that Kant, even after he gained the new
position ol this philosophy (a fte r the publication o f the
Critique o f Pure Reason and the w orks w hich followed i t ),
114 W H A T IS T H I N G ?

kept up the tradition of using the textbooks o f the school-

philosophy in his lectures and o f explaining them para
graph by paragraph. Kant never discussed his philosophy
in his lectures, although, in later times, the new method of
thought could not be com pletely excluded in the d iscu s
sion s of the textbooks or "read ers, as they were then
called. Kant used the previously mentioned textbook by
Alexander Baumgarten in his lectures in m etaphysics and
appreciated this textbook "esp ecially for the richness and
precision o f its teaching m ethod. ( Nachricht von der
Einrichtung seiner Vorlesungen im W interhalbjahr 1765-
66, K. Vorlnder, ed. [M einer, Der Philosophischen Biblio-
tek, 1906], XLVIa, 155.) (Compare Prolegomena, 1-3.) In
this short piece Kant indicates how he intends to adapt his
form er lectures on m etaphysics, logic, ethics, and physical
geography to a changed teaching method.
He introduces m etaphysics, the m ost difficult among
all philosophical investigations, by preceding it w ith a
m etaphysical experiential science o f man in order to lead
to m etaphysics step by step. This has the advantage in
m etaphysics " o f putting into the greatest cla rity the ab
stract by presenting the concrete in advance. But this pro
cedure has still another advantage. Kant says about it: "I
cannot help thinking o f another advantage, which should
not be valued as slight, though it is based upon incidental
cau ses only, an advantage w hich I w ant to draw from this
method. Everyone know s how eagerly attended the first
lectures are by the keen and unsettled youth, and how
later the lecture room becom es som ew hat roomier. Ontol
ogy, a science that is difficult to comprehend, scares him
off from continuing; then what he could perhaps have
understood cannot be o f the slightest further use to him .
The textbook by Baumgarten presents us w ith the form
o f the cu stom ary m etaphysics of the eighteenth century,
which Kant had before him and which finally forced him
to the work by which he lifted m etaphysics from its hinges
and put the question anew about m etaphysics.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 115

The M etaphysica o f Baumgarten divides the entire ma

terial o f m etaphysics into exactly one thousand short para
graphs. According to Sch olastic organization, the entire
work is divided into four parts: (1 ) Ontology ( M eta
physica generalis), 4-350; (2 ) Cosmologia, 351-500;
(3 ) Psychologia, 501-799; (4 ) Theologia naturalis,
800-1000.
But the presentation o f this external form does not tell
us much about rational m etaphysics, the m etaphysics o f
pure reason, even when w e rem em ber w hat has been said
about the fundamental ch aracteristic of modern m eta
physics and its foundation. On the other hand, w e cannot
go into the total content, which, although in itse lf is not so
extensive, docs, however, present a very involved struc
ture because of its m athem atical-rational form and for
mal proof.
And yet it is necessary that w e provide ourselves w ith a
more definite idea of this M etaphysica, in order to achieve
w ith som e understanding the transition from it to the
Critique o f Pure Reason. Let us characterize this m eta
physics by discussing three questions: (1 ) How does m eta
physics determine its own concept o f itse lf? (2 ) How in
this im m ediately pre-Kantian m etaphysics is the essence
of truth understood? (M etap hysics would represent the
highest human realization o f truth in knowledge.) (3 )
What is the inner structure o f m etaphysics?
Bv answering these three questions w'e once more carry
out a unified consideration o f the m athem atical b a sis of
modern m etaphysics. We w ill see w h at this m etaphysics of
pure reason claim s to be. Above all, we shall understand
what form the question about the thing has taken in it.
1. How does m etaphysics define its own concept? The
first paragraph reads as follow s: "M etaphysica est sci
entia prim a cognitionis humanae principia contin ens."
("M etap h ysics is the science which contains [em b races]
the first principles of human knowledge. ) This definition
of m etaphysics arouses the suspicion that m etaphysics is
116 W H AT IS A T H I N G ?

concerned w ith a doctrine o f knowledge, thus w ith episte-

mology. But up to now m etaphysics w a s considered as the
science of w hat is, as such, i.e., of the being of w hat is.
However, this m etaphysics, just as the old one, is con
cerned w ith what is as w ell as w ith being; and yet the de-
lining concept of m etaphysics does not im m ediately say
anything about that. Not im m ediately. The definition,
however, say s just as little that the object of m etaphysics
is knowledge as such. We must understand this definition
o f the concept of m etaphysics in such a w ay that cognitio
humana does not mean the human facu lty of knowledge,
but that which is know able and known by the pure reason
o f man. That is, w hat is. Its "fundam ental p rinciples w ill
be exhibited, i.e., the fundam ental determ ination o f its
essence, being. But w hy does the definition o f the concept
not sim ply say this, as A ristotle already defined it: "Ktmv
n s <
ry Oeotfjet to or f/ or ' .
("T here is a science w hich investigates being as being and
the attribu tes w hich belong to this in virtue of its own
n atu re.") ( M etaphysics, IV, from the beginning.)
Why are the know able and knowledge now mentioned?
Because, since D escartes, the facu lty o f knowledge, pure
reason, has been established as that bv w hose guideline all
definitions o f w hat is, the thing, are to be made in rigorous
proof and grounding. The m athem atical is the mente
concip ere" o f Galileo. In the development of m etaphysics,
it is now a question o f positing out of the essence o f pure
rational knowledge a sketch o f the being ol w hat is, that
w ill be decisive for everything further knowable. This hap
pens first in the fundam ental discipline of m etaphysics, in
ontologia. According to 4, it is the scientia praedicatorum
entis generaliorum. Kant (Op. cit., pp. 115 f.) translates
this as fo llo w s: The science of the general attribu tes o f
all things. We see from this that the concept o f the
thing" is apprehended as very broad, as broadly as pos
sible. Thing is anything that is. God, soul, and the world
are also things. We further recognize that the thingness of
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thittg 117

things is determined on the b asis o f and by the guideline

o f the principles o f pure reason. We have met three such
principles, the I-principle, the principle o f contradiction,
and the principle o f sufficient reason. With this w e stand
im m ediately before the answ er to the second question.
2. In the pre-Kantian m etaphysics o f the eighteenth
century, how is the nature o f that truth understood, whose
highest human realization in knowledge should be repre
sented by m etaphysics?
According to the traditional concept, truth ( v e rita s) is
the adaequatio intellectus et rei, the correspondence o f
thought and thing. Instead o f adaequatio one also says
com m ensuratio or convenientia, fitting or agreement. This
essential definition o f truth has a dual meaning which
guided the question o f the truth even in the Middle Ages.
There is still cast over it the reflection and afterglow o f
an earlier, more prim ordial, although hardly understood,
experience o f the essence of truth at the beginning o f the
Greek existence (D asein ). Truth as adaequatio is, in one
sense, a definition o f ratio, the assertion, the proposition.
A proposition is true in sofar as it corresponds to things.
The definition of truth as correspondence, however, not
only concerns the proposition in relation to things, but
also things, in sofar as they are created, based on the proj
ect o f a creative spirit, and as they correspond to it. Con
ceived in this way, truth is the com m ensurability of
things w ith their essence, thought by God.
We are asking, in contrast, What is the essential defini
tion o f truth in modern m etaphysics? In 92 o f his Meta
physik, Baumgarten gives the follow ing definition. "V eri
tas m etaphysica potest definiri per convenientiam entis
cum principiis ca th o licis. ( M etaphysical truth [that is,
the truth o f m etaphysical knowledge] can be defined as
an agreement o f w hat is w ith the first m ost universal
Iundamental principles. ) Principia catholica are the prin
ciples (a x io m s), specifically the "ca th o lic on es (accord
ing to the Greek ), i.e., principles directed upon the
118 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

whole, w hich assert som ething about w hat is in totality

and about the being of w hat is. All m etaphysical proposi
tions which establish being and its determ inations must
conform to these principles. These principles arc ironclad
principles o f reason itself: the I-principle, the principle o f
contradiction, and the principle o f sufficient reason. The
truth about w hat things in their thingness are is deter
mined according to the principles o f pure reason, i.e., as
we defined it above, in the essential sense: m athem atical.
The inner structure of the whole of m etaphysics m ust be
formed according to this conception o f truth. Thus w e
arrive at the third question.
3. What is the inner structure of this m etaphysics? We
can already gather it from the external arrangement and
sequence o f the discipline. The foundation is ontology, and
the apex o f the building is theology. The first is concerned
w ith w hat belongs to a thing as such, to anything that is
in general (o r in com m uni), to the enscom m une. Theology
is concerned w ith the highest being and that which is, in
the m ost essential sense, the summum ens. With regard to
content we also find this arrangement o f m etaphysics in
the Middle Ages, in fact even in Aristotle. However, w hat is
decisive is that, in the m eantime, through the development
and self-clarification of modern thought as the m athe
m atical, the claim o f pure reason has come to predominate.
This means that the m ost general determ inations of the be
ing o f w hat is arc to be projected on the ground and w ith
the guidance of the m ost universal principles of pure rea
son. At the sam e time, however, the entire knowledge o f
the world, soul, and God is to be derived from these m ost
universal concepts in a purely rational analysis and
sequence.
So the pure inner law fu ln ess of reason, from out o f its
fundam ental principles and concepts, decides about the
being o f what is,ab ou t the th ingn essof things. In this pure
rational knowledge, the truth about what is for all human
reason receives its foundation and form as an indubitable
and universally binding certainty.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 119

Pure reason in this its self-form ation, pure reason in

this claim , pure reason as the authoritative court o f appeal
for the determ ination of the thingness of all things as such
it is this pure reason w hich Kant places into "critiq u e.

II. The Question About the Thing in K ants

Main Work

1. What Does "C ritiq u e " Mean in K ant?

We w ill not pursue how Kant h im self arrives at this

"critiq u e and w hat the internal and external history of
the origin o f the w ork Critique of Pure Reason is. It is
ch aracteristic that w e find out little even from letters o f
this silent period o f his. However, even if w e knew more,
if w e could exactly reckon w hat influenced Kant and so
forth, in w hat sequence he worked out the individual parts
of the work, this would neither explain the work itse lf (the
creative is inexplicable), nor would this cu riosity about
K ants w orkshop serve our understanding, supposing that
w e do not already know and comprehend w hat Kant
wanted and achieved in his work. This is now our sole
concern. More exactly, as prelim inary, w e w ant to under
stand the title.
We know now w hat pure reason means. It rem ains
to inquire w hat "critiq u e signifies. It can here only be a
m atter o f giving a prelim inary explanation o f w hat " c r i
tique means. U sually w e take this word at once and above
all in a negative sense. Critique is for us faultfinding, a
pointing to errors, em phasis on incom pleteness and the
corresponding rejection. In citing the title "C ritique of
Pure R eason w e m ust avoid this comm on and m isleading
meaning from the beginning. Moreover, that meaning does
not correspond to the original meaning o f the word. "C ri
tique com es from the Greek , which means "to so r t
(sondern), " to sort o u t" and thus " to lift out that o f spe
cial so rt ( das Besondere herausheben). This contrast
against others arises from an elevation o f a new order. The
120 W H T I S A T H IN G ?

sense o f the term "critiq u e is so little negative that it

m eans the m ost positive o f the positive, the positing o f
w h at m ust be established in advance in all positing as what
is determ inative and decisive. Therefore, critique is a deci
sion in this positing sense. Because critique is a separation
and lifting out o f the special, the uncommon and, at the
sam e time, decisive, therefore, and only in consequence, is
it also a rejection o f the com m onplace and unsuitable.
This meaning o f the word "critiq u e appears in a
unique w ay o f its own during the second h alf of the eigh
teenth century in the d iscussions o f art, o f the form o f the
w orks o f art and our relation towards them. Critique
meant establishing the standard, the rules, legislation;
and this at the sam e time means the elevation o f the gen
eral over against the special. In this contem porary direc
tion o f meaning lies K ants use of the term "critiq u e ,
w hich he afterw ard also included in the titles of two
other main w orks: Critique o f P ractical Reason and
Critique of Judgment.
However, this word receives a fuller sense through
K ants work. It is this sense which m ust now be outlined.
This w ill first m ake it p ossible to understand by im plica
tion the negative meaning, which the word also had in
Kant. We shall try to m ake this clear by a retrospective
glance at what has already been presented, w ithout really
having yet gone into K ants work.
If critique has the designated positive meaning, the
Critique of Pure Reason w ill not sim ply reject and find
fault w ith pure reason. To "c r itic iz e w ill rather aim to de
lim it what is decisive and peculiar to its proper essence.
This laying of lim its ( Grenzziehung) is not prim arily a de
m arcation against . . . but a delim iting in the sense o f an
exhibition o f the inner construction o f pure reason. The
liftin g out of the elem ents and the structure of pure rea
son is a lifting out o f different p o ssib ilities o f the uses of
reason and their corresponding rules. As Kant once em
phasized ( A 768, B 796): the critique m akes a com plete re
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Tiling 121

view o f the whole facu lty o f pure reason; it draw s and

sketches, in one o f K ants w ords, the "o u tlin e " ( V o rriss)
o f pure reason ( B xxiii, N.K.S., p. 25).
Critique thus becom es the surveying which se ts the
boundaries for the entire domain of pure reason. This sur
veying does not take place, as Kant expressly and ever
again enjoins, by referring to " f a c t s " ( " F a k tis ), but it
occurs from principles; not by determining qu alities met
som ewhere, but by determining the w hole essence o f pure
reason out o f its own principles. Critique is a setting of
boundaries, a surveying project of pure reason. There
fore, an essential moment belonging to critique is w hat
Kant ca lls the architectonic.
Architectonic, the blueprint projected as the essential
structure o f pure reason, is as little a mere "orn am en t"
( A ufp utz) a s the critique is a mere "ce n so r (Z en su r).
(F or the use o f the term "arch itecto n ic, see Leibniz, De
Prim ae Philosophiae Em endatione, and Baumgarten,
M etaphysica, 4, ontologia as m etaphysica architec
tonica. )
In the execution o f the "critiq u e o f pure reason so un
derstood, the "m a th em a tica l in the fundam ental sense
first com es to its unfolding and, at the sam e time, to its
being lifted up (A ufhebu ng), i.e., to its own lim it. This also
results from the "critiq u e . Precisely, critique lies in the
trend of modern thinking as such and in modern m eta
physics in particular. But because o f its b asic character,
K ants "critiq u e leads to a new delim iting of pure reason
and at the sam e time, therefore, o f the m athem atical.

2. The Relation of the C ritiqu e" o f Pure Reason to the

System o f A ll Principles of the Pure Understanding

It is no accident that Kant continually accom panies the

critique of pure reason bv a reflection on the essence of
I lie m athem atical and of m athem atics, by a distinguishing
between m athem atical reason in the narrower sense over
122 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

against m etaphysical reason, i.e., the reasoning upon

which a m etaphysics, a projection of the being of what is,
the thingness o f things, m ust be based; for everything ac
tually depends on this grounding of m etaphysics. Let us
recall Baum gartens definition o f m etaphysics and of the
definition o f m etaphysical truth. Critique of pure reason
m eans to delim it the determ ination o f the being o f w hat
is, the thingness o f the things, from out of pure reason; it
means to survey and project those principles o f pure rea
son upon w hose ground som ething like a thing in its thing
ness is determined.
We can already gather from this that in this "critiq u e
the "m ath em atical feature o f modern m etaphysics is re
tained, namely, to determine in advance out o f principles
the being of w hat is. The real effort aim s at the form ation
and grounding o f this "m ath em atical. The principles of
pure reason m ust be grounded and dem onstrated accord
ing to their own character. At the sam e tim e it lies in the
essence of these principles that they exhibit a b a sic rela
tion among them selves, belong together uniform ly out o f
an inner unity. Kant calls such a unity according to princi
ples a system . The critique as a surveying of the inner
structure and foundation o f pure reason thus faces the
fundam ental task o f exhibiting and grounding the System
o f the Principles o f Pure Reason.
We know from our earlier discussion that, already for
A ristotle, the proposition as sim ple assertion w a s the
guideline for the determ inations of being (the thingness)
o f things, i.e., the categories. The assertion the house is
high is also called a judgment. Judging is an act o f
thought. Judging is a particular w ay in w hich reason takes
place and acts. Pure reason as judging reason Kant calls
understanding, the pure understanding. Propositions and
assertion s are a cts of the understanding. The system o f the
principles o f all propositions for w hich he sought is, there
fore, the system o f the principles of pure understanding.
We shall seek to understand K ant's Critique of Pure
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 123

Reason from its ground-providing center. Therefore, we

begin our interpretation at the place entitled System
o f All Principles of Pure Understanding ( A 148, B 187).
The whole passage under discussion includes A 235 and
B 294.
An aim o f the interpretation w ill be to direct our inquiry
and knowledge through this part in such a w ay that there
results an understanding o f the entire work. But even this
understanding is only in the service o f an insight into the
question "W h at is a thing?
In preparation, w e can read som e single section s from
the w ork, where the real posing o f the question does not
im m ediately appear, but which are suited for shedding
light on som e of K ants b asic concepts. Attention is called
to three such sections: ( 1 ) 4 19, B 33-A 22, B 36.2; (2 )
A 50, B 74-A 62, B 86; (3 ) A 298, B 355-A 320, B 377.
In contrast, it is not recommended that one read the
prefaces to A and B at this time, and especially not the cor
responding Introductions, because they presuppose an in
sight into the whole work.
In our interpretation w e shall not try to examine and
paraphrase the structure o f the w ork from the outside.
Rather, w e shall place ourselves w ithin the structure itse lf
in order to discover som ething o f its fram ework and to
gain the standpoint for viewing the whole.
For this w e shall only follow a direction which Kant
him self once stated in an incidental reflection. It concerns
the evaluation of philosophic w ork: "One has to begin
ones evaluation w ith the whole and to direct it to the
idea of the work together w ith its ground. W hat remains
belongs to the exposition in which much can be lacking
and be im proved. (Preussische Akademie edition, op.
tit., XVIII, No. 5025.)
Critique o f pure reason is first a measuring and survey
ing of its essence and structure. The critique does not re
je ct pure reason, but for the first tim e sets it w ithin the
boundaries o f its nature and its inner unity.
124 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

C ritique is the self-knowledge o f reason placed before

itse lf and upon itself. C ritique is the accom plishm ent
of the innermost rationality o f reason. "C ritiq u e fulfills
the enlightenment ( A ufklrun g) o f reason. Reason is
knowledge from principles and therefore itse lf the facu lty
o f principles ( Prinzip ien ) and axiom s ( G rundstze). A
critique o f the pure reason in the positive sense m ust,
therefore, set forth the principles of pure reason in their
inner unity and com pleteness, i.e., in their system .

3. Interpretation of the Second Main Section of the

Transcendental A nalytic: System of All
Principles of Pure Understanding"

The selection o f ju st this section from the entire work

m ay at first appear arbitrary. It can at least be ju stified
in that this chapter provides us w ith special insight w ith
regard to our leading question, the question of the thing
ness o f the thing. Yet, at the moment, even this rem ains
only an assertion. The question arises whether ju st this
chapter has such a special meaning for Kant him self and
for how he conceived his w ork, that is, whether w e'sp cak
in K an ts sense when w e call this section the center o f the
work. This question is to be answered affirm atively. For
in the form ation and unified proof of this system o f all
principles of pure understanding, Kant gains the ground
upon which the truth o f the knowledge o f the things is
based. In this w ay Kant lifts out and delim its (critiq u e) a
domain from w hich alone the statu s o f the determ ination
o f the thing and the truth o f all m etaphysics up to now
can be originally decided: whether the essence o f truth is
truly determined in it, whether in it a truly rigorously axi
om atic, i.e., m athem atical, knowledge, unequivocally fo l
low s its course and thereby reaches its goal; or whether
this rational m etaphysics, as Kant says, is only a groping
abou t, and indeed a groping about in "m ere concep ts
w ithout a relation to the things them selves, thus rem ain
ing w ithout ju stification and validity. The surveying o f
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 125

pure reason w ith regard to m etaphysics m ust at the same

time gauge ( ab-m essen), out o f pure reason, how m eta
p hysics (according to its definition as the science o f the
first cau ses o f human knowledge) is possible. What is the
statu s o f human knowledge and its truth?
(The follow ing interpretation m akes up for w hat the
w riting Kant and the Problem of the M etaphysics ( 1929)
lacked. Compare the preface to the second edition, 1950.
The title o f that essay is not precise and therefore easily
leads to the m isunderstanding that The Problem of M eta
p hysics is concerned w ith a problem atic w hose overcom
ing w a s the task of m etaphysics. Rather, The Problem of
M etaphysics indicates that m etaphysics as such is ques
tionable.)
Kant offers a review o f this second chapter, in which
he treats the system o f all principles. He does so at the
beginning o f the chapter entitled "The Ground of the Dis
tinction o f All O bjects in General into Phenomena and
Noumena (A 235, B 294). In an intuitive sim ile he ex
plains w h at m attered to him in establishing the "S y stem
of All Principles o f Pure Understanding. "W e have now
not merely explored the territory o f pure understanding,
and carefully surveyed every part o f it, but have also mea
sured its extent, and assigned to everything its rightful
place. This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itse lf
w ithin unalterable lim its. It is the land o f truth enchant
ing name! surrounded by a wide and storm y ocean, and
the native home o f illusion, where many a fog bank and
many a sw iftly m elting iceberg give the deceptive appear
ance o f farther shores, deluding the adventurous seafarer
ever anew w ith em pty hopes, and engaging him in enter
prises which he can never abandon and yet is unable to
carry to com pletion (N.K.S., p. 257).

a. K an ts Concept of Experience

The m easured and surveyed land, the solid ground of

truth, is the domain o f the established and establish able
126 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

knowledge. Kant ca lls this "experience. Thus the ques

tion arises: W hat is the essence of experience? The " S y s
tem o f All Principles of Pure Understanding is nothing
other than a sketch o f the essence and essential structure
o f experience. The essence o f a fact (S a ch e ), according to
modern m etaphysics, is w h at m akes the fact as such in
itse lf possible: the p ossibility, p ossibilitas, understood
as that w hich renders p ossible. The question of the es
sence of experience is the question of its inner p ossibility.
W hat belongs to the essence o f experience? But at the
sam e tim e this includes the question: W hat is the essence
o f what becom es truly a ccessib le in experience? For when
Kant uses the word experience, he alw ays understands
it in an essen tially tw ofold sense:
(1 ) Experiencing as happening to and an act o f the
su b ject I. (2 ) That as such w hich is experienced in such
experience. Experience in the sense of the experienced and
the experienceable, the ob ject o f experience, is nature, but
nature understood in the sense of N ewtons Principia as
system a mundi. The grounding of the inner p o ssib ility o f
experience is, therefore, for Kant at the sam e time the an
sw er to the question: How is nature in general p ossible?
The answ er is given in the "S y ste m of All Principles o f the
Pure Understanding. Kant, therefore, also says (Prolego
mena, 23) that these principles constitute " a physiolog
ical (p h ysiolo g isch es) system or system o f nature. In 24
he also ca lls them the "p h ysiological principles. Physi
ology is understood here in the original and archaic
sense, and not in the sense o f today. Physiology today is
the doctrine o f life processes, in distinction from mor
phology as the doctrine o f living form s. In K ants
usage it meant Ayos- of the , the fundam ental asser
tions about nature, however, <iW is now used in N ewtons
sense.
Only when w e expressly and in a grounded w ay take pos
session of the solid ground o f provable knowledge, o f the
land of experience and of the map of this land, do w e take
a position from which we can decide about the prerogative
 K ant's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 127

and pretenses o f traditional rational m etaphysics, i.e.,

about its p ossibility.
The setting up o f the system of principles is the taking
possession o f the solid land o f the p ossible truth of know l
edge. It is the decisive step of the whole task o f the critique
o f pure reason. This system o f principles is the result of a
unique an alysis o f the essence o f experience. Kant once
w rote in a letter to his pupil J. S. Beck, on January 20,
1792, ten years after the appearance o f the Critique o f Pure
Reason: The an alysis o f experience in general and the
principles o f p o ssib ility o f the latter are the m ost difficult
o f the entire critique. (B rief, C assirer X, 114; Akadam ie
edition, XI, 3!3fT.) In the sam e letter, Kant gives these
instructions for lecturing on this m ost difficult part
o f the Critique of Pure Reason: "In a word, since this
whole an alysis has only the intention of setting forth the
fact that experience itse lf is p ossible only by means of
certain synthetic a priori principles, but since this can first
be made properly com prehensible only when these prin
ciples are actu ally presented, they are to be put to work as
quickly as p ossible. Here a tw ofold point m ust be
stressed:
1. The decisive thing for the proper insight into the
essence o f experience, i.e., the truth o f knowledge, is the
s.ctual presentation o f the system o f principles.
2. The preparation for this presentation should be as
concise as possible.
Hence, w e fulfill only a clear instruction o f K ants when
we single out the system o f principles and set up the in
terpretation of this section in such a w ay that all prelim i
nary requirem ents for it are sum m arized as concisely as
possible and are furnished in the development o f the in
terpretation itself.

b. The Thing as a Natural Thing (N aturding)

The system o f principles o f pure understanding is, in

K ants m ost exact sense, the inner supporting center of
128 W H T I S A T H IN G ?

the entire work. This system o f principles is to unlock for

us the question o f how Kant determ ines the essence o f the
thing. What has been said in the preceding about the sig
nificance o f the system o f principles already gives us a pre
lim inary interpretation ( Vordeutung) o f how Kant cir
cu m scribes the essence of the thing and in what w ay he
holds it to be determ inable at all.
"T hing this is the ob ject of our experience. Since the
inclusive concept o f the p ossibly experienceable is nature,
the thing must actu ally be conceived in truth as a natural
thing. Kant does explicitly distinguish between the thing
as an appearance ( Erscheinung) and as thing-in-itself
( Ding an sich ). But the thing-in-itself, i.e., detached from
and taken out o f every relation of m anifestation (Bekund
ung) for us, rem ains for us a mere x. In every thing as an
appearance w e unavoidably think also of this x. However,
only the appearing natural thing is determ inable in truth
and knowable as a thing. We shall sum m arize in two prop
ositions K ants answ er to the question about the essence
o f the thing w hich is accessible to us: (1 ) The thing is a
natural thing. (2 ) The thing is the ob ject o f possible ex
perience. Here every word is essential, and this in the
definite meaning which it has acquired through K an ts
philosophical work.
Let us now briefly recall the introductory considera
tions at the beginning of the whole lecture. There w e
placed the question about the thing into the circle of W'hat
first o f all surrounds and encounters us every day. At that
time the question arose how the o b jects o f physics, i.e.,
the natural things, are related to the things im m ediately
encountered. In view of K an ts essential definition o f the
essence o f the thing as a natural thing, w e can judge that
from the beginning Kant does not pose the question o f the
thingness o f the things that surround us. This question has
no weight for him. His view im m ediately fixes itse lf on the
thing as an object of m athem atical-physical science.
That this view point in the determ ination o f the thing
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 129

ness of the thing becam e decisive for Kant has reasons

which we now, after an acquaintance w ith the prehistory
o f the Critique of Pure Reason, can easily appraise. How
ever, the definition of the thing as a natural thing also has
consequences for which w e cannot hold Kant in the least
responsible. One could pay homage to the opinion that
skipping over the things that surround us and the interpre
tation o f their thingness is an om ission for w hich w e can
easily m ake up and w hich can be fitted onto the definition
of natural things, or perhaps could also be pre-arranged.
But this is im possible because the definition of the thing
and the w ay it is set up include fundamental presupposi
tions w hich extend over the w hole of being and to the
meaning o f being in general. If w e do not otherw ise admit
it, indirectly w e can at least learn this from K an t's defini
tion o f the thing, nam ely, that a single thing for itself is
not p ossible and, therefore, the definition o f things can
not be carried out by considering single things. The thing
as a natural thing is only definable from the essence o f a
nature in general. The thing, in the sense o f w h at w e en
counter clo sest to us before all theory and science is
adequately and first o f all definable in a relational context
which lies before and above all nature. This goes so far
as to say that even technological things, though they
are seem ingly first produced on the b a sis of scientific nat
ural knowledge, are in their thingness ( D inghaftigkeit)
som ething other than natural things w ith the superim
position o f a practical application.
But, all this only m eans again that asking the question
of the thing is nothing less than the knowing man taking a
decisive foothold in the m idst of w hat is, taken as a whole.
In thinking through the question o f the thing sufficiently
and in m astering, not m astering or neglecting it, there oc
cur decisions w hose temporal scope and span in our his
tory are alw ays to be considered only after centuries. This
discussion o f K ants step should give us the proper pro
portions for such decisions.
130 W H AT I S A T H IN G ?

c. The Threefold Division o f the Chapter on the

System of the Principles
The chapter ("H a u p tst ck ) o f the Critique of Pure
Reason which w e shall try to expound begins at A 148,
B 187 and is entitled "S y stem of All Principles o f Pure
Understanding."
The whole chapter, which goes to A 235, B 294, is divided
into three sections: I. "The Highest Principle o f All Ana
lytic Judgm ents (A 150, B 189-/1 153, B 193). II. The
Highest Principle o f All Synthetic Judgm ents (A 154, B
193-A 158, B 197). III. "S y ste m atic Representation o f All
the Synthetic Principles of Pure Understanding (A 158, B
197-A 235, B 287).
There follow s a "G eneral Note on the System o f the
Principles (B 288-B 294).
W ith this threefold division of K ants doctrine o f the
principles, we im m ediately think o f the three principles of
traditional m etaphysics: contradiction, I-principle, and
the principle of sufficient reason. It is to be supposed that
K ants threefold division has an inner relation w ith the
threefold number o f traditional principles. The exposition
w ill show in w h at sense this is true. First, let us pay atten
tion to the titles and first to those of the first tw o sections;
we find the concept o f the highest principle, and each time
for a whole range o f judgments. The general title of the
w hole chapter comprehends the principles as such of pure
understanding. Now the discussion concerns principles
o f judgment. W ith w hat ju stificatio n ? Understanding is
the facu lty of thinking. But thinking is the uniting of rep
resentations (V orstellungen) in one consciousness. "I
think means "I com bine. Reprcscntationally, I relate
som ething represented to another: "The room is w arm ";
"W orm w ood is b itte r ; "The sun shines. "The union of
representations in one consciou sn ess is judgment. Think
ing, therefore, is the sam e as judging or relating repre
sentations to judgm ents. (Prolegom ena 22.)
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 131

Consequently, when instead of "pure understanding as

in the main title o f the chapter, it now says " judgment in
the titles o f the first tw o sections, this refers su bstan tially
to the sam e thing. Judgment is only the w ay in w hich the
understanding as the facu lty o f thinking carries out the
representing. Why in general "ju d gm en t is used, and not
pure understanding, w ill becom e clear in the content of
the sections. (W hat "p erfo rm s these acts, the perform
ance and w hat is performed, is the unity of representa
tions, and it is that as itse lf a represented unity, e.g., the
shining sun in the judgm ent: "The sun is shining. )
At the sam e time w e obtain from the first tw o titles a
distinction o f judgm ents into an alytic and synthetic. In
his polem ic against Eberhard, On a Discovery, According
to Which All New Critique of Pure Reason is Made D is
pensable by an Older One (1790), Kant once remarked that
it is "in d isp en sab ly n ecessary in order to solve the chief
problem o f the critique o f pure reason to "h ave a clear and
distin ct concept o f w hat the critique first understands in
general by synthetic judgm ents as distin ct from the ana
ly tic. "The aforem entioned distinction o f judgm ents has
never been properly comprehended (On a Discovery,
op. cit., p. 228).
Accordingly, in the titles o f the first and second sections
o f the chapter on the "S y ste m of All Principles of Pure Un
derstanding, in the distinction between synthetic and
analytic judgm ents and the highest principles belonging
to them, som ething is pointed out w hich is decisive for the
entire range o f questions o f the critique of pure reason.
Therefore, it is not an accident that Kant, in the Introduc
tion to this work, deals explicitly and in advance w ith "The
D istinction between A nalytic and Synthetic Judgm ents
( 6 ff., B ,).
But ju st as im portant as the content o f the first two
titles is the title o f the third section. This title does not
concern principles o f an alytic nor o f synthetic judgm ents,
but synthetic principles o f the pure understanding. And
132 W H A T IS T H IN G ?
J

precisely the system atic "rep resentation (presen tation )

o f these is the essential aim o f the w hole chapter.
It now seem s appropriate to preface the interpretation
o f these three section s w ith a discussion o f the difference
between synthetic and an alytic judgm ents. But in accord
ance w ith the overall plan o f our interpretation w e prefer
to deal w ith this difference where the text im m ediately de
mands it. We pass over the introductory considerations
to the chapter since these (A 148- 187) are understand
able only w ith reference to the preceding chapters o f the
w ork, into w hich w e shall not enter. We begin immedi
ately w ith the interpretation o f the first section.

4. The Highest Principle o f All A nalytic Judgments.

Knowledge and O bject (A 150 If., B 190 ff. )

In the title to Section I the principle o f contradiction is

m eant as it w a s as one o f three fundam ental axiom s of tra
ditional m etaphysics. But the fact that this principle is
here called the highest principle o f all analytic judg
m en ts already expresses K an t's special conception of
this principle. With this he distinguishes him self both
from the preceding m etaphysics as w ell as from the Ger
man Idealism w hich fo llo w s, at least that o f Hegel. K ants
general intent in his interpretation o f the principle o f con
tradiction is to contend against the leading role which
this principle had assum ed, especially in modern m eta
physics. This role of the principle o f contradiction as the
highest axiom o f all knowledge of being w a s already set
forth by A risto tle even if in another sense ( M etaphysics,
IV, chap. 3 -6 ).
At the end o f the third chapter (1005 b 33) A ristotle
says: yap / ' ' >> . ( For
this is naturally the starting point even for all the other
ft \0(t
axiom s. )-

au Heideggers translation: Vom Sein her gesehen ist dieser

Satz sogar auch der Grund (Prinzip) aller der anderen Axiome
(Grundstze). Trans.
 K an ts Manner of Asking About the Thing 133

In 1755, in his qualifying lecture ( H a b ilitatio n ssch rift),

Kant had already ventured a first, although as yet uncer
tain, thrust against the dominance in m etaphysics of the
principle of contradiction. This little w ritin g bears the
significant title Principiorum primorum cognitionis meta-
physicae nova dilucidatio (A New Illum ination of the
First Principles o f M etaphysical Knowledge). This title
could also head the Critique of Pure Reason, w ritten
nearly thirty years later.

a. Knowledge as Human Knowledge

It is true that the elucidation o f the principle o f contra

diction in the Critique o f Pure Reason m oves on a differ
ent, expressly established plane and in a clear, fully
thought out domain. This is im m ediately revealed in the
first sentence w ith which the section begins: "The uni
versal, though merely negative, condition of all our judg
ments in general, w hatever be the content o f our knowl
edge, and however it m ay relate to the object, is that they
be not self-contradictory; for if self-contradictory, these
judgm ents are in them selves, even w ithout reference to
the object, null and void. (A 150, B 189, N.K.S., p. 189.)
Here it is said in general that all our knowledge is under
the condition that all its judgm ents be free o f contradic
tion. Nevertheless, beyond this general content, w e m ust
note in th is sentence o f K ants som ething different that is
decisive for all that follow s.
1. The sentence is about our knowledge, which means
human knowledge, not indefinitely any knowledge of any
knowing being, not even about a knowledge sim ply and in
general, o f knowledge in an absolute sense. Rather it is we,
mankind, our knowledge and only it is in question here
and in the entire Critique of Pure Reason. Only in refer
ence to a knowledge that is not absolute does it m ake sense
at all to set up the principle o f contradiction as a con
dition; for absolute unconditioned knowledge cannot be
under conditions at all. What is a contradiction for finite
134 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

knowledge does not need to be one for absolute know l

edge. Therefore, when in German Idealism Schelling and
especially Hegel at once posit the essence o f knowledge as
absolute, then it is appropriate that for such knowing non
contradiction is not a condition o f knowledge, but rather
vice versa: contradiction becom es precisely the proper
element o f knowledge.
2. It is said that our judgm ents and not our cognitions
( E rk en n tn isse) m ust be without contradiction; this sig
nifies that judgments, as a cts of our understanding, con
stitu te an essential, but only one, ingredient of our know l
edge.
3. It is said of our knowledge that it alw ays has som e
content and is related in one w ay or another " to the ob
je c t. Instead o f "O b je k t," Kant often uses the word
"G egenstand."
In order to understand, in their inner connection, these
three em phasized determ inations o f knowledge as human,
and to grasp from this K an ts ensuing expositions about
the principles, it is n ecessary to present as concisely as
possible K ants basic interpretation of human knowledge
as it becom es clear for the first tim e in the Critique of
Pure Reason.

b. Intuition and Thought as the Two E ssential

Components o f Knowledge

In full consciou sn ess o f the scope o f the definitions that

he has to offer, Kant places at the beginning o f his work
the proposition which, according to his interpretation,
circu m scribes the essence o f human knowledge. "In w h at
ever manner and by w hatever means a mode o f knowledge
m ay relate to objects, intuition is that through w'hich it
is in im m ediate relation to them, and to w hich all thought
as a means is directed. But intuition takes place only inso
far as the ob ject is given to us. This again is only possible,
to man at least, insofar as the mind is affected in a certain
w a y ." (A 19, B 33, N.K.S., p. 65.)
 K ant's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 135

This essential definition of knowledge is the first and

com pletely decisive blow against rational m etaphysics.
With it Kant moved into a new fundamental position of
man in the m idst o f what is, or more precisely he lifted a
position, which, at bottom , had alw ays existed, into ex
plicit m etaphysical knowledge and laid a b asis for it. That
his concern is w ith hitman knowledge is further especially
emphasized in the addition to the second edition: to man
at le a st." Human knowledge is representational relating
of itse lf to objects. But this representing is not mere think
ing in concepts and judgm ents, but and this is empha
sized by italics and by the construction o f the whole
sentence "in tu itio n ( die Anschauung). The really su s
taining and im m ediate relation to the object is intuition.
It is true that intuition alone as little constitutes the
essence o f our knowledge as does mere thought; but
thought belongs to intuition and in such a w ay that it
stands in the service of intuition. Human knowledge is
conceptual, judgment-form ing intuition. Human know l
edge is thus a uniquely constructed unity of intuition and
thought. Again and again throughout the w hole work
Kant em phasizes this essential definition o f human
knowledge. As an example, w e can quote passage B 406,
which first appears in the second edition where otherw ise
precisely a sharper em phasis on the role of thought in
knowing m akes itse lf felt. I do not know an object
merely in that I think (th is is spoken against rational
m etap h ysics), "b u t only in so far as I determine a given
intuition w ith respect to the unity of consciou sn ess in
which all thought co n sists. ( N.K.S., p. 368.) Passages
A 719, B 747 express the sam e: "A ll our knowledge relates,
finally, to p ossible intuitions, for it is through them alone
that an object is given. (N .K .S., p. 581.) In the order of
the essential structure o f knowledge this "fin a lly "
am ounts to "fir s t," in the first place.
Human cognition is in itse lf tw ofold. That is evident
Irom the doubleness (Z w ie fa lt) o f its structural elements.
I hey are here called intuition and thought. But ju st as es-
136 W H A T IS Til ING?

sential as this doubleness in contrast w ith singleness is

how this doubleness is structured. Insofar as only the
unity of intuition and thought results in a human know l
edge, obviously these two permanent parts m ust bear
some relation ( V erw and tschaft) and have som ething in
common ( G em einsam keit) in order to be unitable. This
is that both intuition and thought are "rep resen tation s
( V orstellungen). Re-present ( V or-stellen) m eans to put
som ething before oneself and to have it before one, as the
subject to have som ething present toward oneself and
back onto oneself ( etw as auf sich a ls das Su bject zu, auf
sich zurck, prsent haben: re-praesentare). But how are
intuition and thought distinguished as modes of repre
senting w ithin the comm on character of representing? We
can now only p rovision ally clarify this: "T his blackboard
w ith that we address som ething that stands before us
and is presented to us (uns vorgestellt is t). What is there
by represented is thus this certain Hat extension w ith this
coloring and in this light and o f this hardness and m ate
rial, etc.
What w e have just enumerated is im m ediately given to
us. We see and touch all this without more ado. We see
and feel alw ays precisely this extension, this hue, this
lighting. The im m ediately represented is a lw a y s "th is,
ju st that particular one which is ju st so and so. A repre
senting that is im m ediate and therefore presents al
w ays ju st this particular one is intuiting. This essence of
intuition becom es clearer in co n trast w ith the other mode
of representing, i.e., thought. Thought is not immediate,
but m ediate representing. What thought intends repre-
sentationally is not the sin g le "th is, but ju st the universal.
If I say "b la ck b o a rd , the intuitively given is grasped and
conceived as a blackboard. "B la ck b o a rd w ith that I
represent som ething that is valid also for others, corre
sponding other givens in other classroom s. The represen
tation o f w h at is valid for many, and ju st as such a multi-
valid one, is the representation of som ething general. This
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 137

universal one, which is common to all that belongs to it,

is a concept (B egriff). Thought is the representation of
som ething in general, i.e., in concepts. However, concepts
are not im m ediately found in advance (vor-gefunden). A
certain w ay and m eans is necessary to form them. There
fore, thinking is mediate representing.

c. The Twofold Determ ination o f the O bject in Kant

W hat has been said also m akes clear that not only is
knowing (E rkennen) tw ofold, but that the knowable
(E rkenn bare), the p ossible ob ject (G egenstand) o f know l
edge, m ust also be determined in a tw ofold w ay in order
to be an ob ject at all. We can clarify the facts of this case
by examining the word Gegenstand. What w e are sup
posed to be able to know m ust encounter us from som e
where, come to meet us. Thus the gegen" (a g a in st)-7 in
Gegenstand. But not ju st anything at all that happens to
strik e us (any passing visu al or auditory sensation, any
sensation o f pressure or w arm th ) is already an object
(Gegenstan d ). What encounters us m ust be determined
as standing, som ething w hich has a stand and is, there
fore, constant (bestiin d ig).-HN evertheless, this only gives
us a prelim inary indication of the fact that the object
must obviously also be determined in a tw ofold way. But
it has not yet been said exactly w hat an object of human
knowledge truly is in the sense o f K ants concept of know l
edge. An o b ject in the strict sense o f Kant is neither what
is only sensed (Em pfundene) nor w hat is perceived
(W ahrgenom m ene). For example, if I point to the sun and
add ress it as the sun, this thus named and intended is not
the object (in the sense o f "o b je c t of kn ow led ge") in the

^Gegen: Against, also means "tow ard ," "in the direction
o l," "opposite to, "in the presence of, etc. Literally, Gegenstand
means "standing against. Trans.
- s "D as Begegnende muss bestimmt sein als stehend, als etwas,
das Stand hat und so bestndig ist. Trans.
138 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

strict Kantian sense, any more than the rock to which I

point or the blackboard. Even if we go further and make
som e assertion s about the rock and the blackboard, w e do
not penetrate into the objective in the strict Kantian
sense. Likewise, if w ith reference to the given we repeat
edly ascertain som ething, w e still have not reached the
comprehension o f the object. We can, for instance, on the
b a sis o f repeated observations, say: When the sun shines
on the rock it becom es warm . Here, indeed, arc the given,
the sun, sunshine, rock, w arm th, and these are determined
in a certain judgm ent-like w ay, i.e., sunshine and warm th
of the rock are brought into relation. But the question is:
In w hat relation? We say more clearly: Every time the
sun shines, the rock becom es w arm ; every time I have a
perception o f the sun there fo llo w s in me after this percep
tion o f mine, the perception o f the warm stone. This b e
ing together of the representations of sun and rock in the
assertion every time when . . . then, is sim ply a uniting
of various perceptions, i.e., a perceptual judgment. Here
my perceptions (a s also those of every other perceiv
ing " I " ) are alw ays added to one another. This only
determ ines how what is presently given to me appears
to me.
If I say by contrast, Because the sun shines, the rock
w ill therefore becom e w arm , then I express a cognition.
The sun is now represented as the cause and the becom ing
w arm of the rock a s the effect. We could also express this
knowledge in the sentence "The sun w arm s the rock. Sun
and rock are now joined not sim ply on the b a sis of the
su b jectively ascertainable succession of the perceptions,
but they are grasped in the universal concepts o f cause and
effect in them selves as they stand in them selves and to
one another. Now an object ( G eg en stan d ) is grasped. The
relation is no longer every tim e when . . . then ; this re
fers to the succession of perceptions. The relation is now
that o f If . . . then, ("b e ca u se . . . therefore ). It refers
to the fact (S a ch e) itself, whether I presently perceive it
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 139

or not. This relation is now posited as necessary. What this

judgment says is valid at all tim es and for everyone; it is
not subjective but is true o f the ob ject (O b jek t), o f the
object (G egenstand) as such.
What encounters us in sensation and perception and is
intuitively given the sun and sunshine, rock and warm th
this "a g a in st" (gegen) only com es to the position o f a
state of affairs standing in itse lf when the given has al
ready been represented universally and thought in such
concepts as cause and effect, i.e., under the principle of
cau sality in general. The permanent elem ents (Bestand-
stiick e ) o f knowing, intuition, and concept, m ust be uni
fied in a determ inate w ay. The intuitively given m ust be
brought under the universality o f definite concepts. The
concept m ust get over the intuition and m ust determine in
a conceptual manner w hat is given in the intuition. With
regard to the example, i.e., fundam entally, w e m ust note
the following:
The perceptual judgment (W ahrnehm ungsurteil),
"every time when . . . then, does not gradually change
over after a sufficient number o f observations, into the ex
periential judgm ent (E rfahrun gsu rteil), if . . . then."
This is ju st as im possible as it is out o f the question for a
when ever to change into an if and a then to change into a
therefore, and vice versa.
The experiential judgment demands in itse lf a new
step, another w a y o f representing the given, that is, in the
concept. This essentially different representation o f the
given, its apprehension as nature, first m akes p ossible for
observations to be taken as p ossible instances o f experi
ential judgm ents, so that now, in the light of the experi
ential judgm ent the conditions o f observation m ay be
varied and the corresponding consequences o f these var
ied conditions m ay be investigated. What w e call hypoth
esis in science is the first step toward an essen tially dif
ferent, conceptual representing as over against mere
perceptions. Experience does not arise "e m p irica lly " out of
140 W H AT IS A T H IN G ?

perception but becom es p ossible only through m etaphys

ics: through a new conceptual representing peculiarly in
advance of the given in the concepts o f cause-effect. By
this means a ground for the given is established: princi
ples. An object in the strict sense o f Kant is thus first of
all the represented, wherein the given is determined in a
necessary and universal way. Such a representation is hu
man knowledge proper. Kant ca lls it experience ( E rfah
rung). Now, sum m arizing K an ts basic interpretation o l
knowledge, w e say:
1. Knowledge for Kant is human knowledge.
2. Human knowledge is essen tially experience.
3. Experience realizes itse lf in the form o f m athem at
ical-physical science.
4. Kant secs this science and w ith it the essence o f real
human knowledge in the historical form of Newtonian
physics, which today one still ca lls "c la s s ic a l.

d. Sen sib ility and Understanding. Receptivity and

Spontaneity

W hat we have said about human knowledge up to now

should, to begin w ith, make the duality in its essential
structure recognizable w ithout presenting this structure
in its innermost fram ework. Together w ith the duality o f
knowledge arose an initial understanding of the duality of
the object. The mere intuitive "a g a in st" (gegen) is not
yet an object ( G egenstand); but what is only conceptually
thought in general, as som ething constant, is not yet an
o b ject either.
This also m akes it clear w hat the w ords "con ten t of
knowledge and relation to the o b je ct mean in the first
sentence o f this section. The "co n ten t is alw ays deter
mined by w hat (and a s w h a t) is intuitively given: light,
w arm th, pressure (to u ch ), color, sound. The "relatio n to
the o b je ct (O b je k t), i.e., to the object (G egenstand) as
such, co n sists in the fact that som ething intuitively given
 K an ts Manner of Asking About the Thing 141

has been brought to stand in the generality and unity o f a

concept (cause-effect). But w e m ust carefully note that it
is alw ays som ething intuitive that is brought to stand.
Conceptual pre-senting here takes on an essentially
sharpened sense.
Therefore, when Kant stresses repeatedly: Through the
intuition the object is given, through the concept the ob
ject is thought, the m isunderstanding easily suggests it
self that the given is already the ob ject, or that the object
is an object only through the concept. Both are equally
wrong. Rather, it is true that the ob ject stands only when
the intuition is thought conceptually, and the object only
confronts us if the concept designates som ething intui
tively given. Consequently, Kant uses the term "o b je c t
in a narrow and proper sense, and in a w ider and im
proper sense.
The object proper is only what is represented in experi
ence as experienced. The im proper object is every thing to
which a representation a s such refers be it intuition or
thought. O bject in the wider sense is both what w e have
m erely thought as such and w h at is only given in percep
tion and sensation. Although in every case Kant is sure of
w hat he m eans by "o b je c t, there is in this fluent usage an
indication that Kant has broached and decided the ques
tion o f human knowledge and its truth only in a certain
respect. Kant has disregarded w h at is m anifest (d as
Offenbare). He does not inquire into and determine in its
own essence that which encounters us prior to an objec
tification (Vergegenstndlichung) into an object o f exper
ience. Insofar a s he apparently m ust return to th isd om ain ,
as in the distinction o f mere perception from experience,
the procedure o f com paring is alw ays from experience to
perception. This m eans that perception is seen from ex
perience,and in relation to it,a s a "n o t yet. However, it is
ju st as im portant, above all, to show w hat experience is no
longer, as scientific knowledge, in com parison to percep
tion, in the sense o f pre-scientific knowledge. For Kant, in
142 W II A T I S A T H I N G ?

view o f rational m etaphysics and its claim s, this alone w a s

decisive:
(1 ) To assert, in general, the intuitive (se n so ry ) char
acter of human knowledge as a fundam ental component
of its essence. (2 ) On the b a sis o f this altered definition, to
also determine anew the essence o f the second com po
nent, thought and concepts.
Now we can characterize still more clearly the tw ofold
character of human knowledge, and in different respects.
Up to now w e called the tw o different elem ents intuition
and concept. The former w as the im m ediately represented
particular and the latter the m ediately represented uni
versal. The alw ays different representations actually take
place in correspondingly different behavior and perform
ance o f the human being. In intuition what is represented
is pre-sented as object, i.e., the representing is a having
before oneself w hat encounters. Insofar as it is to be
taken as som ething, encountering it becom es w hat is
taken up and in (auf- und hingenomm en). The character
o f behavior in the intuition is that of taking-in (Hin-
nehmen), a reception, recipere-receptio, receptivity. In
contrast, behavior in the conceptual representation is such
that the representing from itse lf com pares w hat is var
iously given, and in com paring refers them to one and the
sam e and seizes this as such. In comparing spruce-beach-
oak-bireh w e bring out, seize, and determine w hat these
have in common as one and the sam e thing: "tre e . The
representing of this universal as such m ust unfold itse lf
from out o f itse lf and bring w hat is to be represented be
fore itself. Because o f this "fro m itse lf character, think
ing as representing in concepts is spontaneous, spon
taneity.
Human intuition is never able to create what is to be
viewed, the o b ject itself, through the achievem ent of its
intuiting as such. At most such is p ossible in a kind of
im agination or fantasy. But in this the o b ject itse lf is pro
vided and viewed not as one that is (Seien der), but as
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 143

imagined. Human looking ( Schauen ) is intuiting or look

ing at ( An-schauen),~u i.e., a view directed toward som e
thing already given.
Because human intuition depends upon som ething
view able given to it, the given m ust indicate itself. It m ust
be able to announce itself. This happens through the
sense organs. By means o f these organs, our senses, such
as sight, hearing, etc., are "stirre d (gerhrt), as Kant
says. Som ething is done to them; they are approached.
That which so attracts us and how the attraction is ini
tiated is sensation as affection. By contrast, in thought, in
the concept, w hat is represented is such that w e ourselves
fashion and prepare it in its form. "In its form this
means the how in w hich w hat is thought ( das G edachte),
w hat is conceptually represented, is som ething repre
sented, namely, in the how o f the universal- On the con
trary, the what, e.g., the "tree-lik e," m ust be given in its
content. The execution and preparation o f the concept is
called function.
Human intuition is n ecessarily sensuous, i.e., such that
the im m ediately represented m ust be given to it. Since
human intuition depends upon such giving ( Gebnng), i.e,
is sensuous, therefore it requires the sense organs. Thus,
w e have eyes and ears because our intuiting is a seeing and
a hearing, etc. It is not because w e have eyes that w e see,
nor do w e hear because w e have ears. S en sib ility (Sin n
lich k eit) is the cap acity for human intuition. The cap acity
o f thought, however, wherein the object as ob ject (der
Gegenstand a ls G egenstand) is brought to stand, is under
standing. We can now clearly arrange in order the differ
ent definitions o f the tw ofoldness o f human knowledge
and also lay down the various respects in which, at any
given time, these distin ction s determ ine human kn ow l
edge:
Intuition Concept (thought): the represented as
such in the object.
See note 23. Truns.
144 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

Receptivity Spontaneity: modes o f behaving in the

representing.
Affection Function: the character o f event and result
o f the represented.
S en sibility Understanding: representing as the ca
p acities o f the human mind, as sources o f knowledge.
Depending on the context, Kant uses these different
form s o f the tw o essential elements.

e. The Apparent Superiority of Thought;

Pure Understanding Related to Pure Intuition

With the interpretation o f the Critique o f Pure Reason

and the explanation o f K an ts philosophy in general, one
cannot escape from the fact that, according to his doc
trine, knowledge is com posed of intuition and thought.
But from this general statem ent it is still a long w a y to a
real understanding o f the role o f these elem ents and the
character o f their unity, and above all to the correct
evaluation o f this essential definition o f human know l
edge.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant takes up the
"m o st difficult ta sk o f analyzing experience in its es
sential structure, the discussion o f thought and the a cts of
understanding, those o f the second component, not only
occupy a disproportionately greater space, but the whole
direction of the inquiry o f this an alysis of the essence o f
experience is aimed at the characterization of thought
w hose proper action w e already have met as judgment.
The doctrine o f intuition, cm , is the aesthetics. (Com
pare A 21, B 35, note.) The doctrine o f thought, o f judg
ment, Aoyo, is logic. The doctrine o f intuition includes
A \9 -A 49, i.e., thirty pages; B 33-B 73, i.e., forty pages.
The doctrine o f thought, A 50, B 74-/1 704, B 732, takes up
more than 650 pages.
The p riority in the treatm ent o f logic, its dispropor
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 145

tionately greater extent w ithin the w hole w ork, is obvious.

Also w e can repeatedly ascertain in particular sections
that the question o f judgment and concept, thus the ques
tion o f thought, stands in the foreground. We can also
easily recognize this fact in the section upon w hich we
based our interpretation and which w e designated as the
very center o f the work. The headings say clearly enough
that it is a question o f judgm ents. The discussion is ex
pressly about ( reason ) in the title o f the w hole work.
On the b a sis o f this obvious priority o f logic, people have
alm ost universally concluded that Kant sees the true es
sence o f knowledge in thought, in judging. This opinion
w as supported by the traditional and ancient doctrine
according to which judgment and assertion are the place
o f truth and falsity. Truth is the b asic ch aracteristic of
knowledge. Therefore, the question about knowledge is
nothing more than the question about judgment, and the
interpretation o f Kant m ust therefore begin at this deci
sive point.
How far this prejudice has prevented penetrating
into the center o f the w ork cannot and need not be further
reported here. But it is im portant for the correct appro
priation o f this w ork to keep these facts continuously in
mind. Generally, the neo-Kantian interpretation o f the
Critique o f Pure Reason leads to a depreciation o f intui
tion as the b asic component o f human knowledge. The
Marburg sch o ols interpretation o f Kant even went so far
as to elim inate altogether from the Critique of Pure
Reason intuition as a foreign body. The downgrading of
intuition had the consequence that the question o f the
unity o f both com ponents, intuition and thinkingor,
more exactly, the question o f the ground of the p ossibility
ol their unification took a wrong turn, if it w a s ever se
riously asked at all. All these m isinterpretations o f the
Critique of Pure Reason as they still circu late in differing
variations today have caused the im portance o f this work
146 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

for its essential inherent and single question, concern

ing the p o ssib ility o f a m etaphysics, to be neither properly
evaluated nor, above all, to be made creatively fruitful.
But how can it be explained that in spite of the funda
mental and authoritative significance of intuition in hu
man knowledge Kant him self places the main problem o f
the an alysis o f knowledge into the discussion of thought?
The reason is as sim ple as it is obvious. Precisely because
Kantcontrary to rational m etaphysics, which put the
essence of knowledge into pure reason and into mere con
ceptual thought posits intuition as the supporting fun
dam ental moment o f human knowledge, thought m ust
now be deprived of its form er presumed superiority and
exclusive validity. But the Critique could not be content
w ith the negative task of disputing the presumption of
conceptual thought. It had first and forem ost to define
and ground anew the essence of thought.
The extended discussion o f thought and concept in the
Critique of Pure Reason indicates no downgrading o f in
tuition. On the contrary, this discussion o f concept and
judgment is the clearest proof that from now on intuition
w ill remain the authority w ithout w hich thought is
nothing.
The extensive treatment o f the one component of
know ledge,of thought, is stressed even more in the second
edition. In fact, it often looks as if the question o f the
essence o f knowledge were exclusively a question o f the
judgm ent and its conditions. However, the p riority o f the
question o f judgm ent does not have its ground in the fact
that the essence of knowledge really is judgment, but in
the fact that the essence o f judgment m ust be defined
anew, because it is now conceived as a representation re
lated in advance to intuition, i.e., to the object.
The priority of logic, the detailed treatm ent of thought,
is therefore necessary, because thought in its essence does
not have priority over intuition, but, rather, is based
upon intuition and is alw ays related to it. The priority of
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 147

logic in the Critique o f Pure Reason has its ground solely

in the non-priority o f the object o f logic, i.e., in placing
thought into the service of intuition. If correct thought is
a lw ays based on intuition, then the proper logic belonging
to this thought n ecessarily and precisely deals w ith this
essential relation to intuition, consequently w ith intuition
itself. The m odest extent o f the aesthetic as the initial
separate doctrine o f intuition is only an outward ap
pearance. Since the aesthetic is now decisive, i.e., every
where plays an authoritative part, therefore it m akes so
much work for logic. For this reason logic m ust turn out
so extensive.
It is im portant to note this, not only for the overall com
prehension o f the Critique o f Pure Reason as such, but,
above all, for the interpretation o f our chapter. For the
titles o f our first tw o sections, as w ell as the first sen
tence o f Section I, read as though the question about hu
man knowledge and its principles sim ply slip s oft into a
question about judgm ents, about mere thought. How'ever,
we shall see that exactly the contrary is the case. W ith a
certain exaggeration w e can even say that the question
of the principles o f the pure understanding is the question
o f the necessary role of intuition, which necessarily is the
b asis fo r the pure understanding. This intuition must it
self be a pure one.
"P u r e " means "m e re ( b lo ss ), "unencum bered
(led ig), "b ein g free from som ething else ; in this case,
"free from sensation. Looked at negatively, pure intui
tion is free o f sensation, although it is an intuition that
belongs to the sphere o f sen sibility. "P u re " therefore
means what is based only upon itse lf and existing first.
I his pure intuition, presented in an im m ediate represen
tation, free o f sensation, this single and only one, is time.
Pure understanding means, in the first place, mere under
standing detached from intuition. But because under
standing as such relates to intuition, the determ ination
pure understanding" can only mean understanding based
148 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

on intuition and, indeed, on pure intuition. The sam e isi

true concerning the title "pure reason." It is equivocal.
Pre-critically it means mere reason. C ritically, i.e., limited
to its essence, it means reason which is essentially
grounded in pure intuition and sen sibility. The critique
of pure reason is at once the delim itation of this reason
which is founded upon pure intuition and, at the same
time, the rejection o f pure reason as "m e re " reason.

f. Logic and Judgment in Kant

The insight into these relationships, i.e., the acquisition

of the essential concept o f a "pure understanding, is,
however, the pre-condition for the understanding of the
third section, w hich is supposed to present the system atic
structure o f pure understanding.
The clarification o f the essence o f human knowledge w e
have ju st carried out enables us to read the first sentence
o f our section w ith a different eye than at the beginning.
The universal, though merely negative, condition of all
our judgm ents in general, w hatever be the content of our
knowledge, and however it m ay relate to the object, is
that they be not self-contradictory; for if self-contradic
tory, these judgm ents are in them selves, even without
reference to the object, null and void. (A 150, D 189,
N.K.S., p 189.) We realize that our knowledge is here im
m ediately examined in a certain respect, nam ely, in terms
of the second essential component of knowing, the act of
thought, the judgment. More precisely it is said here that
freedom from contradiction is the "cond ition , though
m erely negative, of all our judgm ents in general. This is
said o f "a ll our judgm ents in general, and not yet of
"a n a ly tic judgm ents, which arc set forth as the theme
in the title. Furthermore, he speaks of " a merely nega
tive condition, and not about a highest principle
(G rund). It is true that the text speaks o f contradiction
and o f judgm ents in general, but not yet o f the principle o f
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 149

contradiction as the highest principle o f all analytic judg

m ents. Kant here considers judgment as before its dif
ferentiation into analytic and synthetic judgm ents.
In what respect is judgm ent viewed here? W hat is a
judgm ent? How does Kant define the essence of the judg
ment? The question sounds sim ple enough, and yet the
inquiry im m ediately becom es com plicated. For w e know
that judging is the function o f thought. Thought has ex
perienced a new characterization through K ants essential
definition o f human knowledge: It enters essentially into
the service o f intuition. Therefore, the sam e m ust also be
valid for the act o f thought o f the judgment. Now one
could say that through stressing the subservience of
thought and judgment only a particular purpose ( Ab-
zw eckung) of thought has been introduced. Thought itself
and its determ ination have not been thereby essen tially
touched. On the contrary, the essence o f thought (jud g
m ent) m ust already be defined, in order for thought to
enter into this subservient position.
The essence o f thought, i.e., the judgment, has, since
ancient tim es, been determined by logic. Although Kant
did determine a new conception o f knowledge along the
lines w e discussed, he could oniy add to the current defini
tion o f the essence o f thought (jud ging) the further one
that thought stands in the service o f intuition. He could
take over unchanged the logic o f the existing doctrine of
thought in order to supplement the addition that logic, if
it deals w ith human knowledge, m ust alw ays stress that
thought must be related to intuition.
In fact, this is how K ants position looks w ith respect to
traditional logic and thereby also toward its essential defi
nition of judgment. What is still more im portant, Kant
him self frequently viewed and presented the situation in
this way. Only slow ly and w ith great difficulty did he come
to recognize that his discovery of the peculiar subservi
ence o f thought might be more than ju st an additional
definition o f it; that, on the contrary, w ith it the essential
150 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

definition o f thought and thus of logic changes basically.

There is a saying of Kant about logic w hich is often
quoted, though understood in an opposite and, therefore,
false sense. This saying testifies to his sure presentiment
of this revolution w hich he had initiated. It is no accident
that it occurs only in the second edition: That logic has
already, from the earliest tim es, proceeded upon this sure
path is evidenced by the fact that since A ristotle it has not
required to retrace a single step, unless, indeed, w e care to
count as im provem ents the rem oval of certain needless
su btleties or the clearer exposition of its recognised
teaching, features w hich concern the elegance rather than
the certain ty o f the science. It is rem arkable also that to
the present day this logic has not been able to advance a
single step, and is thus to all appearance a closed and com
pleted body of doctrine. ( viii, N.K.S., p. 17.) Roughly
speaking, this means that from now on this appearance
proves itse lf to be void. Logic is to be newly founded and
transform ed.
In certain places Kant has clearly arrived at this in
sight, but he has not developed it. That would have meant
nothing less than to constru ct m etaphysics upon the
ground w hich had been cleared by the Critique of Pure
Reason. Such, however, w as not K ants intention, since to
him "critiq u e (in the specified sen se) had to be first and
alone essential. It also did not lie w ithin K ants capacity,
because such a task exceeds even the cap acity o f a great
thinker. It demands nothing less than to jum p over one's
own shadow. No one can do this. However, the greatest
effort in attem pting th is im p ossibility that is the decisive
ground-movement o f the action o f thought. We experience
som ething of this fundam ental movement in quite dif
ferent w ay s in Plato, Leibniz, and, above all, in Kant and
later in Schelling and Nietzsche. Hegel alone apparently
succeeded in jum ping over this shadow, but only in such
a w a y that he elim inated the shadow, i.e., the finiteness of
man, and jum ped into the sun itself. Hegel skipped over
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 151

( berspringen) the shadow, but he did not, because of

that, surpass the shadow (ber den Sch atten ). Neverthe
less, every philosopher m ust w ant to do this. This
"m u st is his vocation. The longer the shadow, the wider
the jump. This has nothing to do w ith a psychology
o f the creative personality. It concerns only the form
o f motion belonging to the w ork itse lf as it w o rks itself
out in him.
K ants attitude toward such an apparently dry ques
tion, "W h at is the essence o f the judgm ent? reveals som e
thing o f this fundamental movement. The relation o f the
first to the second edition of the Critique o f Pure Reason
sh ow s how difficult it w as for Kant to establish in its
w hole range an adequate essential definition of judgment
from out o f his new conception of knowledge. In term s of
content all decisive insights had been achieved in the first
edition. Yet only in the second edition does Kant succeed
in bringing forward, at the decisive spot, that essential
delineation o f judgm ent w hich accords w ith his own
fundamental position.
Kant stresses again and again the fundam ental impor
tance of the newly proposed distinction o f judgm ents into
an alytic and synthetic. This means nothing other than
that the essence o f judgm ent as such has been newly de
fined. The distinction is only a necessary consequence of
this essential definition, and, retrospectively, at the sam e
time, a method for designating the newly conceived es
sence of the judgment.
We must take all that has been said into account, in
order not to take too lightly the question: "A ccording to
Kant, o f w hat does the essence o f judgment co n sist? and
so that we are not surprised if w e cannot find our w a y uni-
lorm ly through his definitions without further ado. For
Kant has nowhere developed a system atic description of
his essential definition o f judgment on the b a sis of the in
sights at which he him self arrived. Certainly this is not
developed in his lecture on logic w hich has been handed
152 W H A T I S A T H I N G ?

down to us, where, if anywhere, one would expect to find

it. In general, this lecture m ust be consulted cautiously be
cause (1 ) lecture notebooks and notes are, at any rate, a
questionable m atter, especially in the section s which dis
cu ss difficult things; and (2 ) in his lectures, Kant pur
posely adhered to the traditional doctrines and took their
sch olarly traditional order and presentation as his guide.
Thus he w as not guided, in these notes, by the inner sy s
tem o f the su bject m atter itse lf as it presented itse lf in his
thought. Kant chose as the textbook in his logic lectures
the Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, a Schoolbook whose
author, Meier (1718-1777), w a s a student of Baumgarten,
the aforem entioned student o f Wolff.
W ith this reading o f the treatm ent of the question of the
judgment by Kant, w e are compelled, in the m ost exact
conform ity w ith Kant, to give a system atically freer, but
short, presentation o f his essential definition o f judgment.
According to w hat has been said, this w ill autom atically
lead to a clarification o f the decisive distinction between
an alytic and synthetic judgm ents.
The question Of what does judgment c o n sist? can
be posed in tw o respects: first, in the direction o f the tradi
tional definition o f thought, and second, in the direction of
K ants new delineation. This latter does not sim ply ex
clude the traditional ch aracteristics of judgment, but in
cludes them into the essential structure of judgment. This
indicates that this essential structure is not as sim ple as
the pre-Kantian logic thought it w as, and as one view s it
again today in spite of Kant. The in trinsic b asis for the
difficulty in seeing the whole essence o f judgm ent docs not
lie in the incom pleteness of K ants system , but in the es
sential structure o f judgment itself.
At this point w e should rem em ber that w e have already
schem atically indicated the organized structure o f the
judgment when w e showed (supra, pp. 35-38) how
far since A ristotle and Plato Aoyos, i.e., the assertion, has
been the guide for the definition o f the thing. We did this
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 153

w ith the aid o f the fourfold meaning of "a sse rtio n . What
w e only touched on there now finds its essential elabora
tion in a short system atic presentation o f K ants essential
definition o f judgment.

5. K an t's E ssen tial Definition of the Judgment

a. The Traditional Doctrine o f Judgment

We begin w ith the traditional doctrine o f judgment. The

differences and changes that appear in its history m ust be
left aside. We recall only A risto tles general definition of
the assertion (jud gm en t), '/os: kiyuv , rim , " t o say
som ething about som ething : praedicere. Therefore, to
assert is to relate a predicate to a su b ject "The board is
b lack . Kant expresses this universal ch aracteristic of
judgment in such a w ay that, at the beginning o f the im
portant section "The D istinction between A nalytic and
Synthetic Judgm ents" (Introduction, A 6, B 10, N.K.S.,
p. 48), he rem arks that in judgm ents "th e relation o f a
su bject to the predicate is thought. The judgment is a
relation in w hich and through which the predicate is a t
tributed to or denied o f the su bject. Accordingly, w e have
either attributive, affirmative, or denying, negative judg
ments. "T h is board is not red. It is im portant to keep in
view that w ithout exception, since A ristotle, and also in
Kant, the sim ple affirmative (and true) assertion has been
posited as the standard fundam ental form o f all judging.
Corresponding to the tradition, Kant says o f the judg
ment that in it "th e relation o f a su b ject to the predicate is
thought." In general, this statem ent proves true. However,
the question rem ains w hether this exhausts the essence o f
judgment, and whether the heart o f the m atter is under
stood. As to Kant, the question arises whether he would
adm it that the cited ch aracteristic of judgment he him self
applied had hit upon its essence. Kant would not admit
that. On the other hand, it is not clear what should be
added to the essential definition of judgment. In the end it
154 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

is also unnecessary to add further determ inations. On the

contrary, w e must note the opposite, that the given defini
tion om its essential m om ents of the judgment, so that it is
only a question of seeing how in precisely the given defi
nition there lie indications of the essential moments.
In order that we m ay take K ants new step w ith and
after him, it is advisable, first, to cite briefly the view of
judgm ent that prevailed in his time, and to w hich he paid
attention. For this purpose w e choose the definition of
judgment given by W olff in his large "L o gic. In 39 we
read: "A ctu s iste m entis, quo aliquid a re quadam diver
sum eidem tribuim us, vel ab ea removemus, iudicium ap
pellature. ( That action of mind by which we attribute
to a certain thing som ething w hich is different from it
tribuer |><*] or hold aw ay from it removere
[.] is called judgm ent [iu d ic iu m ].") Accordingly,
40 asserts: "Dum igitur mens iudicat, notiones duas vel
coniungit, vel sep arat." ("W hen [a s ] the mind judges, it
either connects or separates tw o concepts. ) In accord
ance 201 notes: "In enunciatione seu propositione no
tiones vel coniunguntur, vel separantur. ( In a proposi
tion, or sentence, concepts are either bound or sepa
rated .")
A student o f a student o f this m aster of conceptual an
alysis, Professor Meier defines it as follow s in his Auszug
aus der Vernunftlehre, 292: "A judgment ( iu diciu m ) is a
representation of a logical relation o f several concepts.
It is particularly "lo g ic a l that in this definition Logos is
defined as a representation o f a logical relation. However,
aside from this, the textbook used by Kant only repro
duces the definition o f W olff in a trite way. Thus, judgment
is "th e representation of a relation between several con
cep ts."

b. The Insufficiency o f the Traditional Doctrine; Logistics

We first contrast this definition o f judgment from the

S ch olastic philosophy w ith K ants definition that most
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 155

sharply expresses the greatest difference. It is found in the

second edition o f the Critique of Pure Reason in connec
tion w ith a section that Kant thoroughly reworked for the
second edition, elim inating obscu rities without changing
anything o f the fundam ental position. It is the section on
the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of
Understanding. The essential definition o f the judgment
is found in 19 (B 140, N.K.S., p. 158). The paragraph be
gins w ith the w ords: I have never been able to accept the
interpretation which logicians give o f judgment in gen
eral. It is, they declare, the representation of a relation
between tw o concepts. "In terp retatio n " ( E rklrun g)
m eans to make som ething clear, not to derive som ething
cau sally. W hat Kant here rejects as inadequate is ju st the
definition of Meier, i.e., o f Baumgarten and Wolff. W hat is
meant is the definition of judgment as an assertion, fam il
iar in logic since A ristotle, Aey' rivos. However, Kant
does not say that this definition is false. He merely states
that it is u n satisfactory. He him self m akes use o f this defi
nition of judgment, and still uses it several tim es in the
period after publishing his Critique of Pure Reason, even
after the second edition. In investigations carried on
around the year 1790, Kant says: "The understanding
show s its cap acity only in judgm ents, which are nothing
other than the unity o f consciou sn ess in the relation of
concepts in general. ( F ortschritte der M etaphysik," K.
Vorlnder, ed., p. 97.) Where a relation is represented, a
unity is alw ays represented which supports the relation
and becom es conscious through the relation so that w hat
we are conscious o f in judgment has the character o f a
unity. The sam e w a s already expressed by A ristotle (De
Aninia, 6, 430a, 27 f.): There is in judgment ' T L S
, " a putting together o f o b jects of
thought in a certain un ity." This characterization of judg
ment is valid for judgm ent in general. We shall use some
exam ples w hich w e m ust em ploy later: "T h is board is
b la ck "; "A ll bodies are extended ; "S o m e bodies are
heavy." Without exception, a relation is represented here.
156 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

Representations are connected. We find the linguistic ex

pression of this connection in the " i s or the "a r e . There
fore, this "little relation w ord (K a n t) or "b o n d is called
copula. The understanding, therefore, is the facu lty of
connecting representations, i.e., o f representing this sub-
ject-prcdicate relationship. The characterization o f the
assertion as the connection of representations is correct
but unsatisfying. This correct, but inadequate, definition
of assertion becam e the b a sis for a view and treatm ent o f
logic which today and for a number o f decades has been
much talked about and is called sym bolic logic ("L o g is
t ic " ) . With the help of m athem atical m ethods people a t
tempt to calculate the system o f the connectives between
assertion s. For this reason, w e also call this logic "m ath e
m atical logic. It proposes to itse lf a p ossible and ju sti
fied task. However, what sym bolic logic achieves is any
thing but logic, i.e., a reflection upon . M athem atical
logic is not even logic o f m athem atics in the sense of de
fining m athem atical thought and m athem atical truth, nor
could it do so at all. Sym bolic logic is itself only a m athe
m atics applied to propositions and propositional form s.
All m athem atical logic and sym bolic logic necessarily
place them selves outside of every sphere of logic, because,
for their very own purpose, they m ust apply , the a s
sertion, as a mere com bination of representations, i.e.,
b a sically inadequately. The presum ptuousness o f logistic
in posing as the scientific logic o f all sciences collapses as
soon as one realizes how lim ited and thoughtless its
prem ises are. It is also ch aracteristic for logistic to con
sider everything that reaches beyond its own definition of
assertion as a connection of representations, as a m atter
o f "fin er d istin ctio n s" w hich dont concern it. But here it
is not a question o f fine or gross distin ction s, but only
this: Whether or not the essence o f the judgment has been
hit upon.
When Kant says that the cited "in terp retatio n " of judg
ment in Sch olastic logic is unsatisfying, this d issa tisfa c
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 157

tion is not sim ply a personal one in regard to his own

particular w ish es. On the contrary, this interpretation
does not sa tisfy those demands which come from the
essence o f the situation itself.

c. The Relation o f the Judgment to Object

and Intuition. Apperception

What is K an t's new definition of judgm ent? Kant said

( B 141, cited above) "th a t a judgment is nothing but the
manner in w hich given modes o f knowledge are brought
to the ob jective unity of apperception. We cannot yet
fully and im m ediately grasp this definition and its deter
mining elem ents ( B estim m u ngsst cke). Meanwhile,
som ething strik es the eye. The discussion is no longer of
representations and concepts, but o f "given cognitions,
i.e., o f the given in knowledge, consequently, o f intuitions.
He speaks o f "o b je ctiv e u n ity. Here judging as an action
o f understanding is not only related to intuition and
object, but its essence is defined from this relation and
even as this relation. Through the essential definition of
judgment, as it is anchored in intuition and object-rela-
tion, this relationship is, at the very beginning, outlined
and expressly set into the unified structure of knowledge.
From here a new concept o f understanding arises. Under
standing is now no longer m erely the facu lty o f connecting
representations, but: "U nderstanding is, to use general
term s, the facu lty of knowledge. This knowledge co n sists
in the determ inate relation o f given representations to an
o b je ct----- " ( 17, B 137, N.K.S., p. 156.)
We can cla rify this new situation w ith a diagram. This
diagram w ill later serve us as a reference point when we
develop the essential distinction between an alytic and
synthetic judgm ents from this new interpretation of
judgment.
I he definition o f judgm ent quoted earlier concerns
sim ply a relation of concepts, subject and predicate. That
158 W H AT IS A T H IN G ?

the representing o f such a relation demands an actus

m entis is self-evident, since som e mode o f action belongs
to every act o f the understanding. In contrast w ith this the
new definition speaks of the objective unity of knowledge,
i.e., the unity o f the intuitions, which is represented as a

Object
Objekt IGegenstand

j
(ich)

unity belonging to the ob ject and determining it. This rela

tion o f representations, as a whole, is related to o b jects.
Therewith, for Kant, there is also posited the relation to
the "su b je c t in the sense o f the I that thinks and judges.
In the essential definition o f judgment, this I relation
is called apperception. Percipere is the sim ple apprehen
sion and grasping of the objective. In apperception the
relation to the I is grasped and perceived in a certain w ay,
along w ith the object. The standing-over-against (E n t
gegenstehen) o f the object as such is not p ossible unless
what encounters, in its standing-over-against, is present
for that which represents, which thereby at the sam e
tim e has itself present along w ith the ob ject, although not
as an object, but only in sofar as what encounters in its
againstness ( Entgegen) at all demands a directed relation
to that which is aw are of that which encounters.
According to the w ay in w hich w e have now contrasted
the tw o definitions of judgm ent, i.e., the traditional one
and K ants, it looks as though Kant only added som ething
to the definition o f judgment which had been om itted up
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 159

till then. But it is not a question of a "m ere extension," but

of a more prim ordial grasp of the whole. Therefore, we
m ust begin w ith K ants essential definition in order to be
able to evaluate the position of the traditional definition.
If we take this latter for itself, then w e can clearly see that
w e select one component and that this, so taken, repre
sents only an artificial construction which has been up
rooted from the supporting b a sis o f the relations to the
object, and to the knowing I.
From this it is easy to judge w hy the traditional defini
tions o f judgment never could sa tisfy Kant, i.e., put him at
peace w ith the m atter itself. In regard to the question of
the p ossib ility o f m etaphysics, the question concerning
the essence o f human knowledge had to becom e decisive
for him.
To understand K ants new definition o f judgment more
clearly is nothing else than to clarify the aforementioned
distinction between an alytic and synthetic judgm ents. We
ask in w hat respect these judgm ents are distinguished.
What docs this key respect imply for the new definition of
the nature o f judgm ent?
The various tw isted, slanted, and fruitless attem pts to
come to term s w ith K ants distinction all suffer in advance
from being based on the traditional definition o f judg
ment, but not on that attained by Kant.
The distinction brings into view nothing else than the
changed conception of the Logos and all that belongs to it,
i.e., the logical. Up to then the essence o f the logical w as
seen in the connection and relation o f concepts. K ant's
new definition of the logical, contrasted w ith the tradi
tional one, is som ething absolutely strange and alm ost
nonsensical, insofar as it asserts that the logical precisely
does not ju st co n sist in this mere relation of concepts. Ob
viously w ith full knowledge o f the scope o f his new defini
tion ol the logical, Kant put it into the title o f that impor
tant 19: The Logical Form of All Judgments C onsists in
the O bjective Unity o f the Apperception of the Concepts
160 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

Which They Contain. To read this as a m ethodical guide

means that all discussion o f the essence o f the judgment
m ust arise from the entire structure o f judgment as it is
established, in advance, from the relations to the object
and to the knowing human.

d. K ant's D istinction Between A nalytic and

Synthetic Judgments

What is the purpose of the distinction between analytic

and synthetic judgm ents? In w hat respect does its clari
fication give us a more fulfilled insight into the nature of
judgm ent? H itherto we know only that this distinction
directs the division between the first tw o section s o f our
chapter. We cannot get much from the names. Pursuing
them w e can easily fall into error, m ostly because the
designated distinction can also be met in the traditional
definition of judgm ent and had already been applied even
at the time o f its first form ation by A ristotle. A nalytic
means an alysis, dissolving, taking apart, Suiipanv; synthe
sis, on the other hand, means putting together.
If w e observe once again the view of judgment as the
relation between su b ject and predicate, then it immedi
ately fo llo w s that this relation, i.e., the attributing o f the
predicate to the su bject, is a synthesis, e.g., o f "b o a rd and
b la ck ." On the other hand, these two relational elements
must be separated in order to be com binable. There is an
an alysis in every synthesis, and vice versa. Therefore,
every judgment as a relation o f representations is not only
incidentally but necessarily an alytic and synthetic at the
sam e time. Therefore, because every judgm ent as such is
both analytic and synthetic, the distinction into analytic
and synthetic judgm ents is nonsensical. This reflection is
correct. However, Kant does not base his distinction upon
the nature of judgm ent as traditionally intended. What
an alytic and synthetic mean to Kant is not derived from
the traditional, but from the new, essential delineation
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 161

( W esensumgrenzung). In order really to see the difference

and its main point, we call upon the aid o f the diagram and
o f exam ples o f analytic and synthetic judgm ents.
"A ll bodies are extended is, according to Kant, an
analytic judgm ent. "S o m e bodies are heavy ( Prolego
mena 2a) is, according to Kant, a synthetic judgment.
W ith regard to these exam ples, one could base the differ
ence between analytic and synthetic judgm ents by saying
that the an alytic judgm ent speaks of " a l l bodies, w hile
the synthetic, on the contrary, speaks about "so m e . This
difference between the tw o judgm ents is certainly not a c
cidental. However, it does not suflice in order to grasp the
required difference, p articularly not when we understand
it only in the sense o f traditional logic and assert that the
first judgm ent is universal and the second particular. "A ll
bod ies here m eans "b o d y in general. According to Kant,
this "in general is represented in the concept. "A ll
bod ies m eans the body taken according to its concept,
w ith regard to what w e mean at all by "b o d y. Taking
body according to its concept, according to what w e rep
resent by it, w e can and even m ust say that body is ex
tended, whether it be a purely geom etrical body or a m a
terial and physical one. The predicate "extended lies in
the concept itself; a mere dissecting o f the concept finds
this element. In the judgm ent "The body is extended, the
represented unity o f the relation o f su bject and predicate,
the belonging together o f both, has the b asis o f its funda
mental determ ination in the concept o f the body. If I
judge about bodies in any w ay at all, I m ust already have a
certain cognition of the ob ject in the sense of its concept.
If nothing more is asserted about the o b ject than what
lies in the concept, i.e., if the truth o f the judgm ent is
based only upon a dissection o f the concept o f the subject
as such, then this judgment is an an alytic one. The
truth of the judgm ent rests on the analyzed concept
as such.
The follow ing diagram clarifies the above:
162 W H AT IS A T H I N G ?

p S

According to the new definition, there belongs to the

judgment the relation to the object (x ), i.e., the su b ject is
meant in its relation to the object. However, this relation
can now be represented in various w ays. First, so that the
object is represented only insofar as it is cited in general,
in the concept.
In the concept w e already have a knowledge of the ob
ject, and by skipping the object (X ), without detouring
through X, purely by remaining in the su bjective concept
"b o d ily , w e can draw the predicate out o f it. Such an
analyzing judgment only presents more clearly and purely
what w e already represent in the su bjective concept.
Therefore, according to Kant, the an alytic judgment is
only a clarifying one. It docs not increase the content of
our knowledge. Let us take another example. The judg
ment "The board is extended is an an alytic judgment. In
the concept o f the board as corporeal lies being extended.
This judgment is self-evident, i.e., the putting-into-relation
o f su b ject and predicate already has its ground in the con
cept w e have o f a board. In contrast, if w e say, The board
is b lack , then our assertion is not self-evident. The board
could ju st as w ell be gray, w hite, or red. The being red
docs not already lie in the concept of a board, as being ex
tended does. How the board is colored, that it is black, can
be decided only from the object itself. Therefore, to reach
the grounds o f the determ ination in w hich this relation of
su bject and predicate is based, our representation has to
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 163

take another w ay than in the analytic judgment, namely,

the w ay via the object and its particular giveness.
Viewed from the analytic judgment this means that
we cannot stay w ithin the su b je cts concept and appeal
only to w hat belongs to a board as such. We have to step
out o f the subject and pass beyond the concept and go by
w ay of the object itself. This, however, means that in ad
dition to the concept o f the object, the object itse lf must
be represented. This additional representation ( Mit-clazit-
vo rstellen ) of the object is a synthesis. Such a judgment,
where the predicate is annexed to the su bject via passage
through the X and recourse to it, is a synthetic judgment.
For that som ething outside the given concept m ust be
added as a substratum , which m akes it p ossible to go be
yond my predicate, is clearly indicated by the expression
syn th esis." ( ber eine Entdeckung . . . , op. eil., p. 245.)
In the sense o f the traditional definition of judgment, a
predicate is added to the subject also in the an alytic judg
ment. W ith respect to the subject-predicate relationship
the an alytic judgment, too, is synthetic. Conversely, the
synthetic is also analytic. But this respect is not decisive
for Kant. We now see more clearly w hat this general
judging relationship am ounts to, when it is selected in
isolation and alone alleged to be the judging relationship.
Then it is only the neutralized relation of su b ject and
predicate which is present in general in the an alytic and
synthetic judgment, but in essen tially different w ays.
This leveled and faded form is stam ped as the essence o f
judgment. It rem ains om inous that it is a lw a y s right.
Now our diagram becom es m isleading insofar as it could
give the im pression that the subject-predicate relation
ship w as first and forem ost the main support, and the
rest were just accessories.
The dec isive respect in which an alytic and synthetic
judgm ents are distinguished is the reference of the sub-
ject-predicate relationship as such to the object. If this
ob ject is only represented in its concept, and if this is
 posited as what is given beforehand, then the ob ject is in
a certain sense a standard, but only as the given concept.
This concept can yield the determ inations only in sofar as
it is dissected, and only w h at is dissected and thus thrown
into relief is attributed to the object. The grounding of
the judgment takes place w ithin the realm of thedissection
o f the concept. The object is a standard in the analytic
judgm ent, too but solely within its concept. (Compare:
" . . . o f that w hich as concept is contained and is thought
in the knowledge of the object. . . . [/1 151, B 190, N.K.S.,
p. 190])
But, if the o b ject is an im m ediate standard for the
subject-predicate relationship, if the asserting is proven
by taking its w ay via the object itself, if the object itself
p articip ates as the foundation and grounds, then the
judgment is synthetic.
The distinction classifies judgm ents according to the
p ossible difference of the b a sis for the determ ination ol
the truth in the subject-predicate relationship. If the b a sis
for the determ ination is contained in the concept a s such,
then the judgm ent is analytic. If this b a sis is contained
in the object itself, then the judgment is synthetic. From
out of the object itse lf this judgment adds som ething to
the erstw hile knowledge o f the object; it extends ( erw eit
ernd). The analytic judgment, however, is only clarifying
(erluternd).
It must have become clear that the above distinction
! between judgm ents presupposes the new concept o f judg
ment, i.e., the relation to the objective unity o f the object
itself; and that, at the sam e time, it serves to convey a
definite insight into the full essential structure o f the
judgment. Nevertheless, w e still do not see clearly what
the distinction into an alytic and synthetic judgm ents has
to do with the task of the critique o f pure reason. We
have defined this p ositively as the essential delim iting of
pure reason, i.e., what it has the power to do; negatively
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 165

put, as rejection of the presum ptuousness o f m etaphysics

based upon mere concepts.

e. A Priori A Posteriori

To w hat extent is the designated distinction one of

fundamental im portance for the execution o f the critique?
We can answ er this question ju st as soon as we have
characterized an alytic and synthetic judgm ents in one
more respect, which up to now has been intentionally
postponed.
In the clarification o f the nature of the m athem atical
and in the description o f the development o f m athem ati
cal thought in modern natural science and modern modes
o f thought in general, we ran into a striking fact. For
example, N ewtons first principle of motion and G alileos
law o f falling bodies both have the peculiarity that they
leap ahead o f what verification and experience, in a literal
sense, offer. In such principles, som ething has been antic
ipated in respect to things. Such anticipations rank ahead
of and precede all further determ inations of things. In
Latin term s such anticipations are a priori rather than
anything else. This docs not mean that in the order o f the
historical development of our knowledge these anticipa
tions as such becom e fam iliar to us first. Rather, the
anticipating principles are first in rank when it is a ques
tion o f grounding and constructing our knowledge in
itself. Thus a natural scien tist can for a long time have
various kinds o f inform ation and knowledge of nature
w ithout knowing the highest law o f motion as such; yet
what is posited in this law is alw ays already the ground
lor all particular assertion s made in the domain of sta te
ments concerning processes o f m otion and their regularity.
The priority (P rio ritt) o f the a priori concerns the
essence o f things. What enables the tiling to be what it is
pre-cedes the thing as regards the facts and nature, al
166 W H A T I S A T H I N G ?

though we only grasp that which precedes after taking

account o f som e of the most obvious qualities of the thing.
(On prioritas naturae, com pare Leibniz' "L etter to Voider
o f January 21, 1704, in Leibniz, Gerhardt, ed., 11,263.) In
the order o f explicit apprehension, w hat ob jectively pre
cedes is later. The is wnpov v/jus. Because
what ob jectively precedes is later in the order o f coming
to know, this ea sily again and again leads to the error
that it is also objectively som ething later and thus an un
important and b asica lly indifferent fact. This widespread
as well as convenient opinion corresponds to a peculiar
blindness for the essence o f things and for the decisive
im portance o f the cognition of essence. The predominance
of such a blindness to essence is alw ays an obstacle for a
change in knowledge and the sciences. On the other hand,
the decisive changes in human knowledge and scientific
attitude are based upon the fact that w'hat objectively
precedes ( das sachlich Vorgngige) can be grasped in the
right w ay also for inquiry as the preceding (d as Vor
herige) and constan tly as an advance projection.
The a priori is the title for the essence o f things. Ac
cording to how the thingness of the thing is grasped and
the being of what is is understood, so also is the a priori
and its prioritas interpreted. We know that for modern
philosophy the I-principle is the first principle in the order
of precedence of truth and principles, i.e., that which is
thought in the pure thought of the I as the prim e subject.
Thus it happens that, conversely, everything thought in
the pure thought o f the su bject holds good a priori. That
is a priori which lies ready in the su bject, in the mind. The
a priori is what belongs to the su b jectivity o f the subject.
Everything else, on the contrary, which first becom es
accessible only by going out of the su bject and entering
into the object, into perceptions, is as seen from the
su b ject later, i.e., a posteriori.
We cannot enter here into the history of this distinction
a priori, preceding in rank, and a posteriori, correspond
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 167

ingly later. Kant in his w ay takes it over from modern

thought and w ith its help characterizes the distinction o f
judgments into an alytic and synthetic. An analytic judg
ment, w hich has the fundam ental determ ination of the
truth o f its subject-predicate relationship solely in the
concept, remains from the outset in the sphere o f con
ceptual analysis, i.e., the sphere o f mere thought. It is
a priori. All an alytic judgm ents according to their essence
are a priori. Synthetic judgm ents are a posteriori. Here
we m ust first move out o f the concept to the object, from
w hich w e afterw ard derive the determ inations.

f. How Are Synthetic Judgments A Priori Possible?

Let us now look at traditional m etaphysics from the

vantage point o f K ants clarification o f the essence of
judgment. A critique o f this traditional m etaphysics m ust
circum scribe the essence o f thought and judgment
achieved and claim ed in it. What kind o f judgment does
traditional modern m etaphysics demand, in the light o f
K ants theory o f judgm ent? As w e know, rational m eta
physics is a knowledge out o f mere concepts, therefore
a priori. But this m etaphysics docs not desire to be a logic,
analyzing only concepts; but it claim s to know the super
sensible domains o f God, the world and the human soul,
hence ob jects them selves. Rational m etaphysics w an ts to
enlarge our knowledge about such things. The judgm ents
of this m etaphysics are synthetic in their claim yet at
the sam e tim e priori, because they are derived from mere
concepts and mere thought. The question concerning the
p ossib ility of the rational m etaphysics can thus be ex
pressed in the form ula: How are the judgm ents claim ed in
it possible, i.e., how are synthetic judgm ents which are
also a priori possible? We say "a ls o , since how synthetic
judgm ents are possible a posteriori is understood without
difficulty. An enlargement o f our knowledge (sy n th e sis)
results whenever w e move beyond the concept and allow
168 W H A T IS A T i l I NG ?

the givens o f perception and sensation, the a posteriori,

the later (a s seen by thought, i.e., bv that w hich precedes
[ Vorherigen] ) , to have their say.
How analytic judgm ents a priori are possible, on the
other hand, is also clear. They sim ply reproduce by clarifi
cation w hat already lies in the concept. On the contrary,
it rem ains incom prehensible, at first, how synthetic judg
m ents a priori are to be possible. According to what has
been said, at least, the mere conception o f such a judg
ment is contradictory in itself. Since synthetic judgm ents
are a posteriori, w e could replace the word synthetic by a
posteriori to see the nonsense o f this question. It runs:
How are a posteriori judgm ents p ossible a priori? Or,
since all analytic judgm ents are a priori, w e can replace
the word a priori by analytic and reduce the question to
the form: How are synthetic judgm ents an alytically pos
sib le? That is as if w e would say: How is fire p ossible as
w ater? The answ er is self-evident. It is: "Im p o ssib le ."
The question concerning the p ossibility o f synthetic
judgm ents a priori looks like a demand to make out som e
thing binding and determ inative about the object, without
going into and back to the object.
Yet, the decisive discovery o f Kant co n sists precisely in
allow ing us to see that and how synthetic judgm ents a
priori are possible. To be sure, the question concerning
the "h o w o f the p ossibility had for Kant a double mean
ing: (1 ) in which sense and (2 ) under w hat conditions.
Synthetic judgm ents a priori are indeed, as w ill be
shown, possible only under exactly determined conditions,
which conditions rational m etaphysics is not able to ful
fill. Therefore, synthetic judgm ents a priori are not achiev
able in it. The m ost special intention o f rational m eta
physics collapses in itself. Note: It does not collapse
because it does not reach the set goal in consequence of
outer obstacles and lim its, but because the conditions of
that knowledge which m etaphysics claim s in its very
character are not lulfillable on the basis o f this character.
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 169

The rejection o f rational m etaphysics on the b a sis o f its

inner im p ossibility does presuppose a positive demon
strating o f those conditions which make p ossible syn
thetic judgm ents a priori. Out of the mode of these condi
tions is also determined how, i.e., in w hat sense alone,
synthetic judgm ents a priori are possible, namely, in a
sense about which philosophy and human thought in gen
eral knew nothing until Kant.
By ascertaining these conditions that is to say, the
circum scription o f the nature of such judgm ents Kant
not only recognizes in what respect they are possible, but
also in w hat respect they are necessary. Namely, they are
necessary to m ake p ossible human knowledge as ex
perience. According to the tradition o f modern thought,
which, despite everything, Kant held to, knowledge is
founded in principles. Those principles which necessarily
underlie our human knowledge as conditions of its p ossi
b ility must have the character of synthetic judgm ents a
priori. In the third section o f our chapter there occurs
nothing more than the system atic presentation and
grounding o f these synthetic and yet, at the sam e time, a
priori judgm ents.

g. The Principle of the Avoidance o f Contradiction

as the Negative Condition of the Truth o f Judgment

From the above w e now understand more easily w hy

two section s precede this third one. The first is concerned
w ith analytic, the second w ith synthetic judgm ents. Upon
the background of these first two sections, w hat is pe
cu liar and new in the third section and the meaning of
the center o f the whole work first becom es visible. On
the basis of the achieved clarification o f the distinction
between an alytic and synthetic judgm ents, w e also under
stand why the discussion concerns the highest principles
ol these judgm ents, w hat this means.
Analytic and synthetic judgm ents are distinguished
170 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

w ith regard to their different kinds of relations to the

object, i.e., according to the respective kinds o f bases for
determining the truth o f the subject-predicate relation
ship. The highest principle is the positing of the first and
proper ground in which the truth of the respective kind
of judgment is based. Thus we can say, bv turning the
whole thing around:
The first tw o section s o f our chapter enable the original
insight into the essence o f analytic as w ell as synthetic
judgm ents in sofar as they respectively deal w ith what
constitutes the essential distinction between the tw o
kinds o f judgm ents. As soon as the discussion is o f ana
lytic and synthetic judgm ents in K ants sense, then judg
m ents and the essence o f the judgment in general are
understood in and out o f their relation to the object and,
therefore, in accord w ith the new concept o f judgment
achieved in the Critique of Pure Reason.
When, therefore, our chapter is concerned throughout
w ith judgm ents, this no longer means that thought is
examined for the sake of itself, but that the relation of
thought to the ob ject and thus to intuition is in question.
This short system atic reflection on K an ts theory of
judgment w as intended to enable us to understand the
follow ing discussion of the first section, i.e., to gain an
advance view o f the inner connections o f w hat Kant says
in the following.
A judgm ent is either analytic or synthetic, i.e., the b asic
ground of its truth is either in the given su bjective concept
or in the object itself. We can consider a judgment as
sim ply a subject-predicate relationship. By this w e only
comprehend a residue o f the structure o f judgm ents.
Even for this residue to be w hat it is, to provide a subject-
predicate relationship at all. it still stand s under the
condition that su b ject and predicate are unitable, i.e.,
that they are attribu table to each other and do not contra
dict each other. But, this condition does not yield the
com plete basis for the truth of the judgment, because
judgment is yet not fully comprehended.
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 171

The mere un itability o f subject and predicate only says

that an assertion as \iyuv n riw?, i.e., a saying ( Sp ru ch )
in general, is p ossible at all, insofar as no contradiction
hinders it. However, this un itability as a condition for
assertion does not yet reach into the sphere of the essence
of judgment. In this case the judgment is as yet con
sidered w ithout any regard for the giving o f grounds
and object relation. The mere un itability of su bject and
predicate tells so little about the truth of the judgment
that, in spite o f being free from contradiction, a subject-
predicate relationship can be false or even groundless.
"B u t even if our judgment contains no contradiction it
may connect concepts in a manner not borne out by the
object, or else in a manner for which no ground is given,
either a priori or a posteriori, sufficient to ju stify such
judgment, and so may still, in spite o f being free from all
inner contradiction, be either false or groundless." (A
150, B 190, N.K.S., pp. 189 f.)
Only now does Kant give us the form ula o f the fam ous
principle o f contradiction : "N o predicate contradictory
o f a thing can belong to it (A 151, B 190, N.K.S., p. 190).
In his lecture on m etaphysics ([E rfu rt: Plitz, 1821],
p. 15) the form ula runs: Nulli su b jecto com petit prae
dicatum ipsi oppositum . ("T o no su bject does a predicate
belong that contradicts it. ) These tw o form ulations do
not differ essentially. The one from the Critique o f Pure
Reason expressly names the thing to w hich the su bjective
concept is related; the lecture names the su bjective con
cept itself.
In the last paragraph o f our first section Kant explains
why he form ulates the principle o f contradiction in this
w ay that deviates from the traditional wording. " A l
though this fam ous principle is thus w ithout content and
merely form al, it has som etim es been carelessly form u
lated in a m anner which involves the quite unnecessary
adm ixture o f a synthetic element. The form ula runs: It is
im possible that som ething should at one and the sam e
time both be and not b e." (A 152, B 191, N.K.S., p. 190.) In
172 W HAT IS A T H IN G ?

A ristotle the principle of contradiction runs: yap

& Tt ^' ' (M eta
physics, IV, 3, 1005b, 19). ( It is im possible for the sam e
to occur as w ell as not to occur at the sam e time in the
sam e and w ith respect to the sa m e ."):i" ( Unmglich kann
dasselbe zugleich Vorkommen sowohl als nicht Vorkom
men am selben in H insicht auf das selbe. ) WolfT w rites in
his Otitulogie, 28: Fieri non potest, lit idem sim ul sit et
non s it. ( It cannot happen that the sam e at the same
tim e is and is not. ) The term s for the determ ination o f
time (UpM, sim ul, zugleich) are conspicuous in these for
m ulations. K ants own wording om its at the same tim e.
Why is it om itted? At the sam e tim e is a determ ination
o f tim e and therefore characterizes the object as tempo
ral, i.e., as an o b ject o f experience. However, insofar as the
principle o f contradiction is understood only as the nega
tive condition o f the subject-predicate relationship in
general, the judgment is meant in its separation from the
object and its temporal determ ination. But even when one
attribu tes a positive meaning to the principle o f contra
diction, as is soon done, at the sam e tim e, as a deter
mination of tim e, does not according to Kant belong to its
formula.

h. The Principle o f the Avoidance o f Contradiction

as the Negative Form ulation o f the Principle o f Identity

In w hat sense can a p ositive application o f the principle

o f contradiction be made so that it does not only represent
a negative condition of the p o ssib ility of a subject-predi-

:l" W. D. Ross translates this passage: "It is, that the same
attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the
same subject and in the same respect. (Aristotle, op. cit., VIII.)
Hugh Tredennicks translation runs: It is im possible for the
same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same
thing and in the sam e relation. (The M etaphysics [Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1947], p. 161.) Heidegger seems to trans
late this passage more cautiously than these. Trans.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 173

cate relationship at all, i.e., for all p ossible judgm ents, but
also a highest principle for a certain kind of judgm ent?
Traditional rational m etaphysics w a s o f the opinion that
the principle of contradiction \vas the principle o f all
judgm ents in general. Using K ants terms, all judgm ents
would include analytic as well as synthetic. This distin c
tion o f judgm ents enables Kant to draw more exactly
than w a s done up to that time the range of the axiom atic
validity o f the principle o f contradiction, i.e., to delim it it
negatively and positively. A principle, in contrast to a
mere negative condition, is a proposition in which there
is posited the ground for p ossible truth, i.e., som ething
sufficient for supporting the truth o f the judgment. This
ground is alw ays presented as som ething that supports
and is sufficient in supporting; it is ratio sufficiens. If the
judgment is taken only a s a subject-predicate relation
ship, then it is not at all considered w ith regard to the
grounds that determine its truth. However, it is in this
regard that the distinction of analytic and synthetic judg
ments becom es determ inative. The analytic judgment
takes the ob ject sim ply according to its given concept
and desires only to retain this concept in the selfsam eness
of its contents, in order to clarify it. The selfsam en ess of
the concept is the only and sufficient standard for the
attributing and denying o f the predicate. The principle
which estab lish es the ground of the truth o f the analytic
judgment m ust, consequently, establish the selfsam en ess
o f the concept as the ground for the subject-predicate rela
tionship. Understood as a rule, the principle m ust posit
the necessity o f adhering to the concept in its selfsam e
ness, identity. The highest principle o f analytic judgm ents
is the principle of identity.
But did we not say that the highest principle examined
in this first section is the principle o f contradiction? Were
we not ju stified in saying this since Kant nowhere speaks
about the principle o f identity in the first section ? But it
m ust puzzle us that there is the talk about a tw ofold role
174 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

of the principle o f contradiction. The talk about the p osi

tive use o f the principle of contradiction not only speaks
o f the application o f this principle as a b a sis for deter
m ination, but that this application is p ossible only if the
negative content o f the principle is turned into its positive
one at the sam e time. Presented in a form ula, it is: We
have advanced from A > non A , to A = A.
Positively used, the principle o f contradiction is the
1
principle of identity. Kant indeed does not mention the
principle o f identity in our section, but in the Introduc
tion he labels the analytic judgm ents as those in w hich
the connection o f the predicate w ith the su b ject is thought
through identity ( A 7, B 10.N .K.S., p. 48); here "id e n tity
is presented as the ground o f the analytic judgment. Sim
ilarly, in a polem ical pamphlet, Uber eine Entdeckung . . .
(op. cit., VIII, 245), analytic judgm ents are designated as
those w hich rest entirely either on the principle o f iden
tity or contradiction. In the follow ing second section
(A 154-55, B 194, N.K.S., pp. 191 f.) identity and contradic
tion are mentioned together. The relation o f these tw o
principles has not been decided even today. Nor it is pos
sible to decide it form ally, because this decision remains
dependent on the conception o f being and truth as such.
In Sch olastic rational m etaphysics the principle o f contra
diction had priority. For this reason Kant intentionally
term inates the discussion on the principle o f contradic
tion in our section. For Leibniz, on the contrary, the prin
ciple of identity becom es the first principle, especially
since for him all judgm ents are identities (Identitten).
Kant him self points out, against W olff, in his habilitation
treatise (Part I: De Principio C ontradictionis, Propositio
I) as follow s: Veritatum omnium non datur principium
unicum, absolute primum, cath olico n .11 Proposito III
show s the praeferentia o f the principium id entitatis . . .
prae principio contradictionis.
<"The principle alone is not given as the absolutely first and
universal of all truths. Trans.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 175

In an alytic judgm ents, the object is thought only ac

cording to its concept and not as an ob ject o f experience,
i.e., as a tem porally determined object. Therefore, the
principle o f these judgm ents in its form ula does not need
to contain any temporal determination.

i. K ants Transcendental Reflection; General and

Transcendental Logic

The principle o f contradiction and the principle o f

identity belong solely to logic, and, therefore, concern
only the judgm ent considered logically. When Kant speaks
thus, he certainly looks beyond the difference in the use of
the principle o f contradiction that he introduced, and
view s as only logical all thought which in its establishm ent
does not take the w ay over the object itself. Logic, in the
sense o f "general logic, disregards all relations to the
ob ject (A 55, B 79, N.K.S., p. 95). It know s nothing of
anything like synthetic judgm ents. All judgm ents o f m eta
physics, however, are synthetic. Therefore and this is
now all that m atters the principle o f contradiction is
not a principle o f m etaphysics.
Therefore and this is the further decisive consequence
w hich m ediates between section s one and tw o m eta
physical knowledge and every ob jective synthetic cogni
tion demand another foundation altogether. Other prin
ciples must be established.
Considering the im portance of this step, we shall try to
conceive more clearly the lim itation o f the principle of
contradiction as the principle o f an alytic judgm ents,
especially w ith regard to the guiding question about the
thingness ol the thing. The traditional definition o f the
thingness o f the thing, i.e., o f the being of w hat is ( Sein
des Seienden), has the assertion (the judgm ent) as its
guideline. Being is determined from out o f thought and
the la w s o f con ceivability or inconceivability. However,
the first section o f our chapter, which w e have ju st dis-
 176 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

cussed, asserts nothing else than that mere thought can

not be the final court o f appeal for the determ ination of
the thingness o f the thing, or, as Kant would say, for the
o b jectiv ity of the object. Logic cannot be the b asic science
of m etaphysics. However, in determining the object,
w hich according to Kant is the object o f human knowl
edge, it is necessary that thought p articipates, nam ely, as
thought referred to intuition, i.e., as synthetic judgment.
Hcnce logic, as the doctrine o f thought, also has a say in
m etaphysics. According to the transform ed definition of
the essence o f thought and judgment, the essence of logic,
in sofar as it is related to it, m ust also be changcd. It m ust
be a logic w hich considers thought inclusive o f its relation
' to the object. Kant ca lls this kind o f logic transcendental
logic.
The transcendental is w h at concerns transcendence.
Viewed transcendentally, thought is considered in its
passing over to the object. Transcendental reflection is
not directed upon o b jects them selves nor upon thought as
the mere representation of the subject-predicate relation
ship, but upon the passing over ( berstieg) and the re-
lation to the object a s this relation. (Transcendence: 1.
Over to [the other sid e ] as such [H inber zu als
so lch es] 2. Passing up, passing beyond [ b er-w eg.]) (For
K ants definition o f "tran scen d en tal," compare Critique
of Pure Reason, A 12, B 25.:2 In a note (A cadem ic edition,
op. cit., XV, No. 373), it reads as follow s: A determ ination
o f a thing w ith regard to its essence as a thing is trans
cen d en tal.")
According to this line of thought, Kant calls his philoso
phy transcendental philosophy. The system of principles
is its foundation. In order to be clearer here and in what
follow s w e bring into relief several view s o f the inquiry.
:t-K a n ts Critique of Pure Reason, A 12, B 25, N.K.S., p. 59: "I
entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so
much with objects as w ith the mode of our knowledge of objects
insofar as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori. A sys
tem of such concepts might be entitled transcendental philos
ophy. T rans.
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 177

We custom arily express our cognitions, and even our

questions and modes o f considering, in sentences. The
physicist and the lawyer, the historian and the physician,
the theologian and the m eteorologist, the biologist and
the philosopher all speak sim ilarly in sentences and as
sertions. Yet the domains and o b jects to which the asser
tions refer remain distinct. Hence, the content of w hat is
said differs in each case.
Thus it com es about that no other difference is generally
noticed than a difference in content when, for example,
w e speak in a biological line o f questioning of the division
o f cells, growth, and propagation, or when w e talk about
biology itself its direction o f inquiry and assertion.
People think that to talk biologically about the objects of
biology differs from a discussion about biology itse lf only
w ith respect to content. He w ho can do the first, and pre
cisely he, m ust surely also be able to do the second.
However, this is an illusion, for one cannot deal biologi
cally w ith biology. Biology is not som ething like algae,
m osses, frogs and salam anders, cells, and organs. Biology
is a science. We cannot put the biology itse lf under the
m icroscope as w e do the o b jects o f biology.
The moment w e talk ab ou t a science and reflect upon
it, all the means and m ethods o f this science in which w e
are w ell versed fail us. The inquiry about a scicnce de
mands a point o f view w hose accom plishm ent and direc
tion are even less self-evident than is the m astery of this
science. If it is a m atter o f an elucidation about a science,
then the opinion easily gains a footing that such reflec
tions are u n iversal," in distin ction to the "p a rticu la r
questions o f the science. However, it is here not sim ply a
m atter of qu antitative differences, o f the more or less
universal. A qu alitative difference appears, in the es
sence, in point o f view, in concept-form ation and in dem
onstration. In fact, this difference already lies in each
science itself. It belongs to it in sofar as it is a free h isto ri
cal action o f man. Therefore, continual self-reflection
belongs to every science.
178 W HAT IS A T H IN G ?

Let us recall the example: "The sun w arm s the rock.

If we follow this assertion and its own essential line of
assertion, then we are plainly directed to the o b jects sun,
rock, and warm th. Our representation is incorporated
into what the object itse lf offers. We do not pay attention
to the assertion as such. To be sure, by a specific turn in
the point of view o f our representing, we can turn aw ay
from sun and rock and consider the assertion as such.
That happened, for instance, when w e characterized the
judgment as a subject-predicate relationship. This sub
ject-predicate relationship itself has nothing in the least
to do w ith the sun and the rock. We take the assertion, the
"The sun w arm s the rock, now purely logically.
Not only do wre thereby disregard the fact that the asser
tion refers to natural o bjects. We do not regard its objec
tive relation at all. Besides this first representational di
rection (d irectly to the o b je ct) and besides this second
(to the o b jectless assertory relation in itse lf) there is now
a third. In the characterization of the judgment The sun
w arm s the rock, w e said that the sun is understood as the
cause and the warm th o f the rock as the effect. If, in this
respect, we hold on to the sun and the warm rock, w e are
indeed directed toward sun and rock, and yet not directly.
We do not only mean the sun itse lf and the warm rock it
self, but w e now consider the object "su n in regard to
how this object is an object for us, in what respect it is
meant, i.e., how our thought thinks it.
We do not now take a direct view of the ob ject (sun,
warm th, r o c k ) but w ith regard to the mode of its o b jectiv
ity ( G egenstndlichkeit). This is the respect in w hich w e
refer to the ob ject a priori, and in advance: as cause and
effect.
We are now not only not directed to the object o f the a s
sertion, but also not to the form of the assertion as such,
but rather to how the ob ject is the object of the assertion,
how the assertion represents the object in advance, how
our knowledge p asses over to the object, transcendit, and
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 179

how, thereby, and in w hat objective determ ination the ob

je ct encounters. Kant calls this w a y of considering tran
scendental. In a certain sense the object sta ys in our view
and in a certain sense so does the assertion, because the
relation between the assertion and the ob ject is to be
grasped.
This transcendental consideration, however, is not an
external hooking up o f psychological and logical modes
of reflection, but som ething more prim ordial, from w hich
these tw o sides have been separately lifted out. Whenever,
w ithin a science, w e reflect in som e w ay upon that science
itself, w e take the step into the line o f vision and onto the
plane o f transcendental reflection. M ostly w e are unaware
o f this. Therefore our deliberations in this respect are
often accidental and confused. But, ju st as w e cannot take
one reasonable or fruitful step in any science w ithout be
ing fam iliar w ith its ob jects and procedures, so also we
cannot take a step in reflecting on the science w ithout the
right experience and practice in the transcendental point
of view.
When, in this lecture, w e constan tly ask about the
thingness o f the thing and endeavor to place ourselves
into the realm of this question, it is nothing else than the
exercises o f this transcendental viewpoint and mode of
questioning (Fragestellung). It is the exercise o f that
w ay o f viewing, in which all reflection on the sciences
necessarily moves. The securing o f this realm , the ac
knowledged and knowing, taking possession o f it, being
able to w alk and to stand in its dim ensions, is the funda
mental presupposition o f every scientific Dasein which
w an ts to comprehend its historical position and task.

i. Synthetic Judgments A Priori N ecessarily Lie at

the B asis o f All Knowledge

When we approach the domain o f the o b jects of a sc i

ence, the ob jects o f this domain are already determined
180 W 1 IS A T H IN G ?

such and so in advance. However, this does not occur ac

cidentally nor from a lack o f attention on our part as if
this pre-determination o f the object ever could be pre
vented. On the contrary, this pre-determination is neces
sary, so necessary that w ithout it w e could not stand be
fore ob jects at all, as before som ething according to
w hich our assertion s are directed and on which they are
m easured and proven ( au sw eisen ). How can a scientific
judgment correspond w ith its ob ject? How, for instance,
can a judgment about art history really be an art-histori
cal judgment if the object is not defined in advance as a
work of art? How can a biological assertion about an ani
mal be truly a biological judgment if the anim al is not
already pre-defined as a living creature?
We m ust alw ays already have a knowledge of content,
of what an object is according to its objective nature, i.e.,
for Kant a synthetic knowledge. And w e must have it in
advance, a priori. O bjects could never confront us as ob
je c ts at all w ithout synthetic judgm ents a priori; by these
o b jects we "th e n guide ourselves in particular investiga
tions, inquiries, and proofs, in which w e constan tly ap
peal to them.
Synthetic judgm ents a priori are already asserted in
all scientific judgm ents. They are pre-judgments ( Vor
u rteile) in a true and necessary sense. How scien tific a
science is depends not on the number o f books w ritten,
nor the number o f in stitu tes and certainly not on the use
fulness it offers at the moment. Rather, it depends on how
explicit and defined is its w ork w ith w hich it strives to do
som ething on its pre-judgments. There is no presupposi-
tionless science, because the essence o f science co n sists
in such presupposing, in such pre-judgments about the
object. Kant has not only affirmed all this, but has also
shown it, and not sim ply shown but also grounded it. He
has set this grounding as a com pleted w ork into our h is
tory in the form of the Critique of Pure Reason.
If we take the essence of truth in the traditional sense
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 181

as the correspondence o f the assertion w ith the object

and Kant, too, takes it in this w ay then truth understood
in this w ay cannot be, unless the object ( Gegenstand) has
been brought to a standing-against ( Gegen-stehen) in ad
vance, by synthetic judgm ents a priori. Therefore, Kant
calls synthetic judgm ents a priori, i.e., the system o f prin
ciples o f pure understanding, the "so u rce o f all truth
( A 237, B 296, N.K.S., p. 258). The inner connection of
what has been said w ith our question about the thingness
o f the thing is obvious.
For Kant, true ( w ah rh aft) things., i.e., things o f which
a truth for us can com e to be, are objects o f experi
ence. However, the object only becom es accessible to us
when w e transcend the mere concept to that other which
first has to be added to it and placed beside it. Such
putting-along-side ( B eistellung) occurs as a synthesis. In
the K antian sense, w e encounter things first and only in
the domain o f synthetic judgm ents; and, accordingly, we
first encounter the thingness o f the thing only in the con
text o f the question o f how a thing as such and in advance
is p ossible as a thing, i.e., at the sam e time how synthetic
judgm ents a priori arc possible.

6. On the Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments

If w e put together all that has been said about the outer
lim its o f analytic judgm ents, then the two first principles
of the second section w ill becom e understandable:

The explanation o f the p o ssib ility o f syn th etic judg

m en ts is a problem w ith w h ich general logic has nothing to
do. It need not even so much a s kn ow the problem by
name. But in tran scen d en tal logic it is the m ost im portant
o f all q u estio n s; and indeed, if in treating o f the p o ssi
bility o f syn th etic a priori judgm ents w e a lso take account
o f the con d itio n s and scop e o f their valid ity, it is the only
question w ith w h ich it is concerned. For upon com pletion
o f th is en quiry, tran scen d en tal logic is in a p o sitio n com
182 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

pletely to fulfill its ultimate purpose, that of determining

the scope and limits of pure understanding.
In the analytic judgment we keep to the given concept,
and seek to extract something from it. If it is to be af-
firmative, I ascribe to it only what is already thought in it.
If it is to be negative, I exclude from it only its opposite.
But in synthetic judgments I have to advance beyond the
given concept, viewing as in relation with the concept
something altogether different from what was thought in
it. This relation is consequently never a relation either of
identity or of contradiction; and from the judgment, taken
in and by itself, the truth or falsity of the relation can
never be discovered. (A 154 f., B 193 f., N.K.S., pp. 191 f.)

The "altogether different is the object. The relation of

this "altogether different to the concept is the represen
tational putting-along-side ( B eistellen ) of the object in a
thinking intuition: synthesis. Only w hile w e enter into
this relation and m aintain ourselves in it does an object
encounter us. The inner p ossibility o f the object, i.e., its
essence, is thus co-determined out o f the p ossib ility of
this relation to it. In w hat does this relation to the ob
je ct con sist, i.e., in w hat is it grounded? The ground
on which it rests m ust be uncovered and properly
posited as the ground. This occurs in the statem ent
and establishm ent of the highest principle o f all synthetic
judgments.
The condition of the p ossibility o f all truth is grounded
in this posited ground. The source o f all truth is the prin
ciples o f pure understanding. They them selves and there
fore this source o f all truth go back to a still deeper
source, w hich is brought to light in the highest principle
o f all synthetic judgm ents.
With the second section of our chapter, the w hole work
o f the Critique of Pure Reason reaches its deepest basis,
founded by it itself. The highest principle o f all synthetic
judgm ents (or, as w e can also say, the b asic determ ination
of the essence of human knowledge, its truth and its ob-
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 183

ject) is expressed in this form ula at the end o f the second

section: . . The conditions o f the p o ssib ility o f experi
ence in general are likew ise conditions o f the p ossib ility
of the ob jects of experience. . . (A 158, B 197, N.K.S.,
p. 194.)
W hoever understands this principle understands
K ant's Critique o f Pure Reason. W hoever understands
this does not only know one book among the w ritin gs o f
philosophy, but m asters a fundamental posture of the his
tory o f man, which we can neither avoid, leap over, nor
deny in any way. But w e have to bring th is by an appropri
ate transform ation to fulfillment in the future.
The third section also takes precedence over the second,
the latter being only an unfolding of the former. There
fore, a com plete and definite understanding o f this deci
sive second section is p ossible only if w e already know the
third one. Therefore, w e shall skip the second section and
only return to it after the exposition o f the third, at the
close o f our presentation o f the question o f the thing in
the Critique of Pure Reason.
All synthetic principles o f the pure understanding arc
system atically presented in the third section. W hat m akes
an ob ject into an object, w hat delim its the boundaries of
the thingness of the thing, is described in its inner connec
tion. Also in the exposition o f the third section w e immedi
ately begin w ith the presentation o f the particular princi
ples. The p relim inary consideration need be clarified only
so far as to gain a more definite conccpt of the principle in
general and of the point of view o f the division o f the
principles.
For that purpose, the first sentence o f the third section
gives us the key: That there should be principles at all
is entirely due to the pure understanding. Not only is it
the facu lty o f rules in respect o f that which happens, but
is itsell the source o f principles according to w hich every
thing that can be presented to us as an object m ust con
form to rules. For w ithout such rules appearances would
184 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

never yield knowledge of an ob ject corresponding to

them. ( 158 f., B 197 f., N.K.S., pp. 194 f.)

7. S ystem atic Representation o f All the Synthetic

Principles of Pure Understanding

a. The Principles Make Possible the O bjectivity of the

Object; The P o ssibility of E stablish in g the Principles

In our pursuit o f the question about the thingness o f

the thing, w e were led to K ants doctrine o f the principles
of the pure understanding. In what w ay? For Kant the
thing accessible to us is the object o f experience. Experi
ence for him means the humanly p ossible theoretical
knowledge of w hat is. This knowledge is tw ofold. There
fore, Kant says: "Understanding and sen sibility, w ith us,
can determine o b jects only when they are employed in
con ju n ction ." ( A 258, B 314, N.K.S., p. 274.) An object is
determined as object by the conjunction, i.e., by the unity
of w hat is intuited in intuition and w hat is thought in
thought. To the essence o f object ( G egenstand) belongs
the "a g a in st (Gegen) and the standing (S tan d ). The
essence of this "a g a in st, its inner p o ssib ility and ground,
as w ell as the essence of this "stan d in g , its inner p ossib il
ity and ground, and, finally and above all, the prim ordial
unity o f both, the "a g a in stn e ss as w ell as the "co n
sta n cy, constitute the o b jectiv ity o f the object.
That the determ ination o f the essence o f the object re
su lts from principles at all is not im m ediately obvious.
Nevertheless, it becom es understandable when w c attend
to the traditional direction o f the question of the thing in
W estern philosophy. According to this, the b asic m athe
m atical ch aracteristic is the decisive: the recourse to
axiom s in every determ ination of what is. Kant rem ains
within this tradition. However, the w ay he conccives and
establish es these axiom s brings about a revolution. The
hegemony of the highest principle of all judgm ents hith-
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 185

crto, the principle o f contradiction, is removed from its

position o f dominance. What principles replace it?
First of all, it m ust be noticeable that Kant does not
speak o f axiom s. "A x io m s are for him a certain kind of
principle a priori, nam ely, those which are im m ediately
certain, i.e., which are verifiable w ithout further ado from
intuition ol an object. However, such principles are not
under discussion in this present context, which is already
indicated since it is concerned w ith principles o f the pure
understanding. But, as principles they m ust also include
the grounds for other principles and judgm ents. Thus
they them selves cannot be based on earlier and more uni
versal cognitions. (A 148 f., B 188, N.K.S., pp. 188 f.) This
does not exclude the fact that they have a foundation.
Only the question rem ains wherein they have their foun
dation. Principles which ground the essence of an object
cannot be grounded upon the object. The principles can
not be extracted by experience from the object, since they
them selves first make p ossible the o b jectiv ity of the ob
ject. Nor can they be grounded in mere thought alone, be
cause they are principles o f objects. Consequently, the
principles do not have the character o f general form al log
ical propositions, such as "A is A, o f which we say that
they are self-evident. Recourse to common sense fails en
tirely here. In the realm o f m etaphysics it is "a n expedient
which alw ays is a sign that the cause o f reason is in des
perate str a its. ( A 784, B 812, N.K.S., p. 622.) What the
nature of the b asis o f proof for these principles o f the
pure understanding is and how they distinguish them
selves through the nature of the b a sis o f their proof m ust
be shown from the system o f these principles itself.

b. Pure Understanding as the Source and Faculty

o f Rules; Unity, Categories

I hat the determ ination o f the thing in Kant leads back

to principles is an indication for us that Kant rem ains
186 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

within the tradition. However, this historical characteri

zation is still not an explanation of the content. When
Kant defines the essence o f thought anew, he m ust also
dem onstrate, on the basis o f this new form ulation of the
nature of understanding, w hy and to w hat extent princi
ples belong to this.
Kant w a s the first to be able not sim ply to accept and
affirm the rule o f principles, but to ground it from the na
ture o f the understanding itself. The first proposition o f
the third section points to this connection. There he says
expressly that the pure understanding is itself the source
o f the principles. We m ust show how far this proves to be
true, especially w ith reference to all that w e have heard
up till now about the nature o f the understanding. Gen
eral logic, which defines the judgm ent as the relationship
of the representations of su bject and predicate, knows
the understanding as the faculty o f connecting representa
tions. Thus, just as the logical conception of the judgment
is correct but insufficient, so also this conception of the
understanding rem ains correct but u n satisfactory. The
understanding m ust be viewed as a representing that re
fers to the object, i.e., as a connecting o f representations
so constructed that the connecting refers to the object.
The understanding m ust be form ulated as that represent
ing w hich grasps and con stitu tes this reference to an ob
ject as such.
The connection between su b ject and predicate is not
merely a connecting in general, but a definitely deter
mined connecting every time. Let us recall the objective
judgment The sun w arm s the rock. Here sun and rock
are represented objectively in that the sun is conceived of
as the cause, and the rocks becom ing warm as the effect.
The connection o f su bject and predicate occurs on the
grounds o f the general relation o f cause and effect. Con
nection is alw ays a putting-together ( Zusam m ensetzen)
w ith regard to a p ossible kind o f unity which character
izes the together" (Zusam m en). In this characterization
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 187

o f the judgment, the prim ordial sense o f Aoyos as a gather

ing-together ( Sam m lung) still faintly shines through.
Each kind o f subject-predicate connection in judgm ents
presupposes and bears in itse lf the representation o f a
unity as the guiding regard, according to w hich and in
whose sense the connecting occurs. The anticipating rep
resenting o f such unities, which guides connection, belongs
to the essence o f the understanding. The representations
of these unities as such and in general are "co n cep ts, ac
cording to the definition given earlier. Concepts o f such
unities belonging to the understandings action of connect
ing arc, however, not derived from any o b jects given be
forehand; they are not concepts which have been drawn
out o f perceptions o f individual o b jects. The representa
tions of these unities belong to the functions o f the under
standing, to the essence o f connecting. They lie purely
in the essence o f the understanding itse lf and for this
reason are called pure concepts of the understanding:
categories.
General logic has worked out a variety o f form s of
judgment, modes o f subject-predicate connection which
can be arranged in a table o f judgm ents ( U rteilstafel).
Kant took over from tradition and augmented this table
o f judgm ents, the exhibition and classification of the dif
ferent modes o f subject-predicate connection (A 70, B 95).
The dim ensions o f classification are quantity, quality, re
lation, and m odality. The table of judgm ents can, there
fore,give an indication o f ju st a sm a n y k in d s o f unities and
concepts o f unity, which guide the different connecting.
According to the table o f judgments, one can form ulate a
table o f the concepts o f unity o f the pure understanding,
ol its root concepts (Stam m begriffe) ( A 80, B 106, N.K.S.,
P 113). If anything at all is introduced as a condition for
the unifying and unified positing o f som ething manifold,
this represented condition is used as the rule o f the con
necting. The understanding is fundam entally the cap acity
lor rules, since the anticipating representing o f unities,
188 W H A X I S A T H I NG ?

w hich regulates this connecting, belongs to the essence of

the understanding as a connection o f representations, and
since these regulating unities belong to the essence o f the
understanding itself. Therefore, Kant says: "W e may now
characterize it [the understanding] as the facu lty of
rules ; and he adds: "T his distinguishing mark is more
fruitful, and approxim ates more closely to its essential na
ture. (A 126, N.K.S., p. 147.) The sam e is said in our spot
at the beginning o f the third section: The understanding
is the "fa cu lty of rules. Here the m etaphysical definition
of the essence o f the understanding show s itself.
But in the section in question, the definition o f the es
sence o f the understanding traces back still one step
further into the essence. The pure understanding is "n o t
only the faculty o f rules, but even the source of rules.
This m eans that the pure understanding is the ground of
the n ecessity of rules at all. That w hich sh ow s itself ( Sich -
zeigendes) must have in advance the p ossibility o f coming
to a stand and constancy, so that what encounters, what
show s itself, i.e., w hat appears, can come before us at all
as standing before us ( Gegenstehendes). However, what
stands in itse lf ( Insichstehendes) and does not fall apart
( N ichtauseinanderfahrendes) is what is collected in itself
( I nsich gesam m elt e s), i.e., som ething brought into a unity,
and is thus present and constant in this unity. This con
stancy is w hat uniform ly in itse lf and out of itself exists
as presented toward. (Die Stndigkeit ist das einheitliche
in sicli von sich aus An-w esen.) This presence to it is made
p ossible with the participation o f the pure understanding.
Its a ctiv ity is thought. Thought, however, is an 7 think ;
I represent som ething to m yself in general in its unity and
in its belonging together. The presence ( Prsenz) of the
object sh ow s itse lf in the representing, in w hich it be
com es present to me ( auf mich zu Prsentwerden)
through the thinking, i.e., connecting representing. But to
whom this presence o f the object is presented, whether
to me as a contingent " I w ith its moods, desires, and
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 189

opinions, or to me as an I that puts behind itself every

thing "su b je c tiv e , allow ing the object itse lf to be what it
is, this depends on the " I , namely, upon the compre
hensiveness and the reach o f the unity and the rules under
which the connecting o f the representations is brought,
i.e., fundam entally upon the range and kind o f freedom
by virtue o f w hich I m yself am a self.
The pre-senting ( vor-stellend) connecting is only pos
sib le for the understanding if it contains in itse lf modes of
uniting, rules o f the unity o f the connecting and determin
ing, if the pure understanding allow s rules to emerge and
is itse lf their origin and source. The pure understanding
is the ground o f the n ecessity of rules, i.e., the occurrence
of principles, because this ground, the understanding it
self, is necessary in fact, according to the essence o f that
to which the pure understanding belongs, according to the
essence o f human knowledge.
If w e human beings arc m erely open to the pressure of
all that in the m idst o f which w e are suspended, we
are not equal to this pressure. We m aster it only when we
serve it out o f a superiority, i.e., by letting the pressure
stand over against us, bringing it to a stand, thus forming
and m aintaining a domain o f possible constancy. The
m etaphysical necessity o f the pure understanding is
grounded in this need that the pressure m ust be free
standing. According to this m etaphysical origin o f the
source of principles, that source is the pure understand
ing. These principles, in turn, are the "so u rce of all truth,
i.e., o f the p o ssib ility for our experiences to be at all able
to correspond to objects.
Such correspondence to . . . is only p ossible when the
wherewith ( W o m it) o f correspondence already com es be
fore us in advance and stands before us. Only so docs
som ething objective address us in the appearances; only
so do they becom e recognizable w ith respect to an object
speaking in them and "corresponding to them. The pure
understanding provides the p o ssib ility o f the correspond
190 \V H A T IS A T H I N G ?

ence to the ob ject thanks to the o b jectiv ity o f appear

ances, i.e., o f the thingness of things for us.

c. The M athem atical and Dynam ical Principles as

M etaphysical Propositions

On the b a sis o f this explanation, w e can understand the

decisive proposition w hich introduces the third section.
( A 158, B 197 f., N.K.S., p. 194 f.) The principles o f pure
reason lay the groundwork for the o b jectiv ity o f objects.
In them nam ely in their connection those modes of
representation are achieved in virtue of w hich the
"a g a in st o f the object and the "sta n d of the object are
opened up in their primordial unity. The principles al
w ays concern this tw ofold unity of the essence of the ob
je ct (G egenstand). Therefore, they m ust first lay the
ground in the direction o f the against, the "a g ain stn ess
(G egenheit), and sim ultaneously in the direction o f the
stan d (S tan d es), the constancy. Thereby, from the es
sence of the principles follow s their division into two
groups. Kant calls them the m athem atical and dynam ical
principles. W hat is the objective reason for this distin c
tion? How is it intended?
Kant defines the natural thing as the thing approach
able by us, the body which is as an object of experience,
i.e., of m athem atical-physical knowledge. The body is
som ething in motion or at rest in space, so that the m o
tions, as changes of place, can be determined num erically
in terms of their relations. This m athem atical determ ina
tion of the natural body is not an accidental one for Kant,
not only a form of calculating that is merely added on to
it. Rather, the m athem atical, in the sense of w hat is mov
able in space, belongs first o f all to the definition o f the
thingness o f the thing. If the p o ssib ility of the thing is to
be m etap hysically grasped, there is need for such princi
ples in which this m athem atical character of the natural
body is grounded. For this reason, one group of the princi-
 K ant's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 191

pies o f pure understanding is called "th e m athem atical

principles. This designation does not mean that the prin
ciples them selves are m athem atical belonging to mathe
m atics, but that they concern the m athem atical character
of natural bodies, the m etaphysical principles which lay
the ground of this character.
The thing in the sense o f a natural body is, however, not
only w h at is m ovable in space, what sim ply occupies
space, i.e., is extended, but what fills a space, keeping it oc
cupied, extending, dividing, and m aintaining itself in this
occupying; it is resistance, i.e., force. Leibniz first set forth
this character o f a natural body, and Kant took over these
defining determ inations. That w hich is space-filling, which
is sp atially present, w e know only through forces which
are effective in space ( A 265, B 321, N.K.S., p. 279). Force
is the ch aracter by which the thing is present in space. By
being effective (w ir k t) it is actual (w irk lich ). The actu al
ity ( W irklich keit), the presence, the Dasein o f the things,
is determined from the force (d yn am is), i.e., dynam ically.
For that reason Kant ca lls those principles o f pure under
standing which determine the p o ssib ility o f the thing w ith
respect to its Dasein the dynam ical principles. Here, also,
is to be noted what has been said regarding the designa
tion "m ath em atical. These are not principles o f dynam
ics as a discipline in physics, but m etaphysical principles
which first render p ossible the physical principles of dy
nam ics. Not by accident does Hegel give the title "F orce
and Understanding to an important section in the Phe
nomenology of the Spirit, in which he delim its the nature
ol the object as a thing o f nature.
We find this tw ofold direction o f the determ ination of
natural bodies, the m athem atical and the dynam ical,
clearly prefigured by Leibniz. (Compare G erhardt,op. cit.,
IV, 394 I.) But only Kant succeeded in dem onstrating and
explaining its inner unity in the system of principles of
the pure understanding.
The principles contain those determ inations of things
192 W HAT IS A Til I N G ?

as appearances, w hich belong to them in advance, a priori,

w ith reference to the possible form s o f the unity of the
understanding-like conjunctions, i.e., the categories. The
table o f categories is divided into four parts. This division
corresponds to that ol the principles. The m athem atical
and dynam ical principles are each divided into two
groups, the whole system into four:
(1 ) Axiom s o f intuition. (2 ) Anticipations o f percep
tion. (3 ) Analogies o f experience. (4 ) Postulates of em
pirical thought in general. We shall attem pt in the fol
lowing to understand the titles o f the principles from the
exposition itself. Kant rem arks expressly, "T hese titles I
have intentionally chosen in order to give prominence to
differences in the evidence and in the application o f the
principles. (A 161, B 200, N.K.S., p. 196.) Under discus
sion are the principles o f quantity, quality, relation, and
m odality.
The understanding o f the principles is gained only by
going through their dem onstrations; for these dem onstra
tions are nothing other than the exhibition of the "p rin ci
ples, the grounds upon which they are based and from
whence they create what they them selves are. For this
reason everything depends on these dem onstrations. The
form ulas o f the principles do not say much, especially
since they are not self-evident. Therefore, Kant has put a
great deal o f effort into these dem onstrations. He re
worked them for the second edition, especially the first
three groups. Each is constructed according to a definite
schem a, which corresponds to the essential contents of
these principles. The wordings ol the particular principles
and, above all, their titles are also different in the first
and second editions. These differences give im portant in
dications o f the direction which K ants intention to clarify
takes, and how the real meaning o f these principles is to
be understood.
Once again w e take everything in view in order to have
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 193

available hereafter the essen tials o f the positing and proof

o f the principles of pure understanding. The principles
are "P rin cip les of the E xp osition " o f appearances. They
are the grounds upon w hose b a sis the exposing of an ob
ject in its appearing is possible. They are the conditions
for the o b jectiv ity o f the object.
From what has now been said about the principles of
pure understanding in general, w e can already more
clearly discern in w hat sense they are synthetic judgm ents
a priori and how their p ossib ility m ust be proved. Syn
thetic judgm ents are such that they extend our knowledge
ol the object. This generally happens in that we derive the
predicate by w ay of perception from the object, a posteri
ori. But w e are concerned now w ith predicates as determ i
nations of the o b ject, which belong to it a priori. These de
term inations are those from which and upon the ground
of w hich it is first determined in general w hat belongs to
an o b ject as object, those determ inations which bring to
gether the determ inations o f the o b jectiv ity of the object.
They m ust obviously be a priori; for only insofar as we
know in general about o b jectiv ity are we able to experi
ence this or that possible object. But how is it possible to
determine the ob ject as such in advance before experi
ence, and for it? This p o ssib ility is shown in the proofs
ol the principles. The respective proofs, however, accom
plish nothing m ore than raising to light the ground of
these principles them selves, which finally m ust be ever
one and the sam e and w hich w e then encounter in the
highest principles o f all synthetic judgm ents. Accordingly,
the authentic principles of the pure understanding are
those in which is expressed each time the principle ( Prin
z ip ) o f the propositions (S tz e ) of the four groups. Thus,
the real principles (G rundstze) are not the axiom s, an
ticipations, analogies, and postulates them selves. The real
principles are the principles of the axiom s, anticipations,
analogies, and postulates.
194 W 11 A T I S A T H I N G ?

d. The Axiom s of Intuition

Let us now notice the difference ol the wording of A

and B ( A 162, B 202, N.K.S., p. 197) already mentioned.
( 4 ) "P rin cip le o f the pure understanding: All appear
ances are, in their intuition, extensive m agnitudes.
( B ) "T heir principle is: All intuitions are extensive
m agnitudes."
The wording in B is not alw ays more precise than in A.
They supplement one another, and are therefore o f special
value, because this large domain, discovered by Kant, w a s
still not as thoroughly clarified by him as he envisioned in
the task o f a system of transcendental philosophy. But for
us who com e after him, ju st the inconsistencies, the back
and forth, the new sta rts, the envisioned still in process
are more essential and fruitful than a sm ooth system
wherein all the joints are filled and painted over.
Before we go through the process o f proof for the first
principle w e ask w hat the discussion is about, i.e., con
cerning the "elem en ts ( B estan d st cke). We know that
it deals w ith the determ ination o f the essence o f the ob
ject. The ob-ject ( G eg en stan d ) is determined by intuition
and thought. The object is the thing insofar as it appears.
The object is appearance. Appearance never m eans sem
blance ( S ch ein ) here, but the ob ject itself in its being
present and standing there ( D astehen). In the sam e place
in which, at the beginning o f the Critique of Pure Reason,
Kant nam es the tw o elem ents o f knowledge, intuition and
thought, he also characterizes appearance. "T h at in the
appearance which corresponds to sensation 1 term its
m atter; but that which so determ ines the m anifold of ap
pearance that it allo w s o f being ordered in certain rela
tions, I term the form o f appearance. (A 20, B 34, N.K.S.,
p. 65.) Form is the wherein ( W orinnen) of the order of
colors, sounds, etc.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 195

d,. Quantum and Quantitas

The first principle concerns appearances "w ith respect

to their intuition, thus w ith the object in regard to its
"a g a in st (gegen), the encountering, the coming-before-us
(Vor-uns-kom m en). In this respect it is said that appear
ances as intuitions are extensive magnitudes.
What do "m agnitu de and "exten sive m agnitude"
mean? The German expression "G r sse " is equivocal in
general and especially in relation to Kant. For this reason
Kant likes to add distinguishing Latin expressions in pa
rentheses, or he often uses only the Latin in order to tie
down the distinction which he w a s first to posit clearly.
We find at the end o f one paragraph and at the beginning
of the one follow ing the tw o labels for magnitude
( G r sse ) (A 163 f., R 204, N.K.S., p. 199): magnitude as
quantum and magnitude as quantitas. Magnitude as quan
titas (Cf. Re/le.x. 6338a, Akademie ed., op. eit., XVIII, 659
II.) answ ers the question "H ow b ig ? It is the measure, the
how much of a unity taken many tim es. The magnitude of
a room is so and so many m eters long, wide, and high.
However, this magnitude o f the room is only p ossible be
cause the room as spatial at all, is an up,down, back,fron t,
and beside; it is a quantum. By this Kant understands
what w e can call sizable ( G ro ssh afte) at all. On the other
hand, magnitude as quantitas is the m easure and mea
surement o f the sizable. At any given tim e it is a determ i
nate unity in w hich the parts precede and com pose the
whole. In contrast, in magnitude as quantum, in the siz
able, the whole is before the parts. It is indefinite in regard
to the aggregate (M enge) of parts and in itse lf continuous.
Q uantitas is a lw a y s quantum discretum . It is possible
only through a subsequent division and a corresponding
com bination (sy n th e sis) within and upon the ground o f
the quantum. This latter, however, never becom es w hat it
196 W H A T I S A T H IN G ?

is only through a synthesis. Magnitude as quantitas is

a lw a y s som ething that can be compared, because deter
mined by so and so many parts, w hile the spatial ( Raum-
h a fte s) disregarding qu antitas is alw ays in itsell the
same.
Magnitude as quantitas alw ays has to do w ith the gen
eration o f magnitudes. If this happens in the progress
from parts to parts to the whole through successive piec
ing together o f the separated parts, then the magnitude
( q u a n tita s) is an extensive one. The magnitude o f the
amount (aggregate) is extensive. (Re/lex. 5887, cf. 5891.)
Magnitude as quantitas is a lw ays the unity of a repeated
positing. The representation of such a unity contains at
first only w hat the understanding in such a repeated p osit
ing "d oes for itse lf ; there " i s nothing contained therein
which ca lls for sensory perception. ( Reflex. 6338a.)
Quantity is a pure conception of the understanding. But
this is not true o f magnitude as quantum ; it is not pro
duced through a positing but is sim p ly given for an in
tuiting.

du. Space and time as Quanta, as form s o f pure intuition

What does it mean that appearances as intuitions are

extensive m agnitudes? It is evident from the com parative
definitions o f magnitude as quantitas and as quantum
that quantitas alw ays presupposes quantum, that magni
tude as measurement, as so much, m ust alw ays be a mea
surement o f som ething sizable. Accordingly, appearances
as intuitions (i.e., intuitions as su ch ) m ust be quanta, siz
able, if they are to be qu antities at all. According to Kant,
however, space and tim e are ol such a nature (qu an ta).
That space is a magnitude does not mean that it is som e
thing so and so big. Space is at first precisely never so and
so big, but it is w hat first m akes p ossible magnitude in the
sense of quantitas. Space is not com posed of spaces. It
does not co n sist of parts, but each space is sim ply a lim ita-
 K an ts Manner of Asking About the Thing 197

tion o f the whole o f space, and in such a w ay that even

the bounds and border presuppose space and spatial ex
tension, and remain in space, just as the part of space
rem ains in space. Space is a magnitude (quan tum ) in
w hich the finite, m easurably-determ ined parts and com bi
nations alw ays com e too late, where the finite o f this sort
sim ply has no right and achieves nothing for the defini
tion of its essence. For this reason, space is called an "in
finite m agnitude (A 25, N.K.S., p. 69). This does not mean
"en d less w ith respect to finite determ inations as quanti
tas, but as quantum, w hich presupposes nothing end-like
as its condition. Rather, on the contrary, it is itself the
condition of every division and finite partitioning.
Space and time are equally quanta continua, basically
sizable, in-finite m agnitudes and, consequently, possible
extensive magnitudes (q u a n tities). The principle of the
axiom s o f intuition reads: "A ll appearances are, in their
intuition, extensive m agnitudes." (A 162, N.K.S., p. 197.)
But how can intuitions be extensive m agnitudes? For this
they m ust be b a sica lly sizables (qu an ta). Kant rightly
calls space and lim e such. But space and time still are not
intuitions; they are space and time.
E arlier w e defined intuition as the im m ediate repre
senting o f a particular. Something is given to us through
this representing. Intuition is a giving representing, not a
m aking one, or one w hich first form s som ething through
com bining. Intuition (Anschauung) in the sense o f som e
thing looked at ( A ngeschaut)111 is the represented, in
the sense o f a given. In the spot where Kant defines space
as an in-finite magnitude, he says, however, "S p a ce is
represented as an infinite given m agnitude" (A 25, N.K.S.,
p. 69), and "S p ace is represented as an infinite given
m agnitude (B 40, N.K.S., p. 69). The representing which
brings space as such before us is a giving representation,

:,:l In interpreting both Kant and Heidegger it is helpful to re

call that the Latin and English "intuition is the usual translation
ol the ordinary German word "looking a t" ( Anschauung). Trans.
198 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

i.e., an intuition. Space itse lf is som ething one looks at

and in this sense is intuition (Anschauung). Space is im
mediately given. Where is it given? Is space anywhere
at all? Is it not rather the condition ol the p ossib ility ol
every w here and "th e re and h ere"? One spatial char
acteristic is, for example, proxim ity ( Nebeneinander).
However, we do not acquire this "b e sid e (neben) by
first comparing o b jects lying beside one another. In order
to experience these o b jects as beside one another, we
must already im m ediately represent the beside, and,
sim ilarly, the before, behind, and above, one another.
These extensions do not depend upon appearances, upon
what sh ow s itself, since we can imagine all objects
om itted from space, but not space itself. In all cases
of things showing them selves in perception, space as a
whole is represented in advance necessarily and as im
m ediately given. But this one, general given, this repre
sented, is not a concept, is not som ething represented in
general such as " a tree in general. The general represen
tation "tr e e contains all individual trees under it as that
o f which it is assertable. Space, however, contains all par
ticular spaces in itself. Particular spaces are sim ply re
spective lim itation s o f the one originally single space as
an only one. Space as quantum is im m ediately given as a
single " th is . To im m ediately represent a particular is
called intuiting (anschauen). Space is som ething intuited,
and it is som ething intuited and standing in view in ad
vance of all appearing o f o b jects in it. Space is not appre
hended through sensation, it is som ething intuited in ad
vance a priori i.e., purely. Space is pure intuition. As
this purely intuited it is what determ ines in advance
everything em pirically given, sensibly intuited, as the
"w h erein " in which the m anifold can be ordered. Kant
also ca lls it form, that which determines, in contrast to
m atter, which is the determ inable. Seen in this w ay, space
is the pure form o f sensible intuition, specifically that of
the external sense. In order that certain sensations might
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 199

he referable to som ething outside of me (i.e., to som e

thing in another place in space other than the one in which
I find m yself), this extension o f the outside and the out-to
( H inaus-zu) must already be given.
Space, according to Kant, is neither a thing that is it
self present at hand (an sich vorhandenes Ding) (N ew
ton), nor a m anifold of relationships w hich result from
the relations o f things that are them selves present at hand
(an sich vorhandene Dinge) (L eibniz). Space is the sin
gle whole o f beside one another, behind and over one an
other, which is im m ediately represented in advance in
our receiving w hat encounters. Space is only the form of
all appearance o f the outer senses; i.e., a w ay in which we
take in w h at encounters us. It is thus a determ ination o f
our sen sibility. It is, therefore, solely from the human
standpoint that w e can speak o f space, o f extended things,
etc. If w e depart from the su bjective condition under
which alone w e can have outer intuition . . . the repre
sentation o f space stands for nothing w hatsoever. (A 26,
B 42, N.K.S., p. 71.)
The corresponding holds good for time. W ith this gen
eral clarification o f the nature o f space w e have been try
ing only to make understandable w hat it means when
Kant defines space as a pure intuition and thereby w an ts
to have achieved the m etaphysical concept o f space as
such. For it seem s strange at first how anything at all is
delim ited by being characterized as an intuition. Trees,
desks, houses, and men are also intuited. But the essence
of the house co n sists in no w ay in being an intuition. The
house is intuited in sofar as it encounters us. But being a
house does not mean being intuited. Nor would Kant ever
define the essence o f the house in such a way. But what
is right for the house should also be fair for space. This
would certainly be true if space were a thing o f the sam e
sort a s a house, a thing in space. But space is not in space.
Kant does not say sim ply: Space is intuition, but "pure
intuition and "fo rm o f external intuition. Also, intuiting
200 W H AT IS A T H IN G ?

is and rem ains a mode of pre-senting {Vor-steilen) som e

thing, a w ay o f approach to som ething and a kind of given
ness of som ething, but not this som ething itself.
Only if the w a y in w hich som ething is given con stitu tes
this som ething in its "b ein g would a characterization of
som ething as intuition becom e p ossible and even neces
sary. Space, taken as intuition, then means not only that
space is given in such a w ay, but that being space co n sists
in such a being given. Indeed, Kant so m eans it. The spa
tial being of space co n sists in the fact that it places space
( einrum t) into w hat show s itse lf ( das sich Zeigenden),
the p ossib ility o f showing itse lf in its extension ( A usbrei
tung). Space places space ( rumt ein) by giving position
and place, and this placing into is its being. Kant expresses
this placing by saying that space is w hat is purely intuited,
w hat show s itse lf in advance, before all and for all; and as
such it is the form o f intuition. Being-intuited (Ange-
sch au tsein ) is the space-placing sp atial being o f space.
We do not know o f any other being of space. Neither do
w e have any p ossib ility o f inquiring after such. Undenia
bly, there are difficulties in K an ts m etaphysics of space
entirely disregarding the fact that a m etaphysics that no
longer contains any difficulties has already ceased to be
one. Only the difficulties o f the Kantian interpretation of
space do not lie where m ost people like to find them, be it
from the standpoint o f psychology or from the standpoint
o f m athem atical natural science (theory o f relativity).
The chief difficulty lies not in the form ulation o f the prob
lem of space itself, but in attributing space as pure intui
tion to a human su bject, w hose being is insufficiently de
fined. (On how the problem of space is constructed out of
a fundamental overcom ing of the relationship to the sub
je ct, compare S Z 19-24 and 70.)
It is now im portant for us to show only how space
and time are at all conceivable as intuitions. Space gives
itse lf only in this pure intuiting, wherein space as such is
held-before ( vor-gehalten) us in advance and is pre-sented
as som ething capable of being viewed ( A n b lick b ares),
 K an ts Manner of Asking About the Thing 201

som ething "pre-form ed (vor-gebildet) as that sizable

character o f the beside one another and over or behind
one another, a m anifoldness which gives out o f itse lf the
p ossibility o f its own delim itations and boundaries.
Space and time are pure intuitions. Intuition is dealt
with in the "A e sth e tic." Intuition, accordingly, is what be
longs a priori to the o b jectiv ity of the object, w hat allow s
appearances to show them selves; pure intuition is tran
scendental. The transcendental aesthetic gives us only a
prelim inary view. Its real them atics reaches its goal only
in the treatm ent o f the first principle.

d:t. The proof o f the first principle. All principles are

based on the highest principle o f all synthetic judgm ents

W ith w hat has been said the essen tials have been pre
pared for our understanding of the proof o f the first
principle and the principle itself. The proof co n sists of
three propositions w hich are clearly distinguished from
each other. The first proposition begins w ith "A ll, the
second w ith "N o w is and the third w ith "T hu s. {A 162,
B 203, N.K.S., pp. 197 f .) :tl U nm istakably these three prop-
:i4 Full text of proof from Kemp Sm iths translation (pp. 197
f.): "(A ll) appearances, in their formal aspect,contain an intuition
in space and time, which conditions them, one and all. a priori.
They cannot be apprehended, that is, taken up into empirical con
sciousness, save through that synthesis of the manifold whereby
the representations of a determinate space or time are generated,
that is, through combination of the homogeneous manifold and
consciousness of its synthetic unity. (N ow) consciousness of the
synthetic unity of the manifold [and] homogeneous in intuition in
general, insofar as the representation of an object first becomes
possible by means of it, is, however, the concept of magnitude
(quantum). (Thus) even the perception of an object, as appear
ance. is only possible through the same synthetic unity of the man
ifold of the given sensible intuition as that whereby the unity of
the combination of the manifold [and] homogeneous is thought in
the concept of a magnitude. In other words, appearances are all
without exception magnitudes, indeed, extensive magnitudes. As
intuitions in space or time, they must be represented through the
same synthesis whereby space and time in general are deter
mined." We have added (A ll), (N ow), and parentheses around
Thus" to correspond to Heideggers reference. Trans.
202 W II T I S T H I N G ?

ositions are connected in the form o f a syllogism : m ajor

premise, minor premise, and conclusion. Each of the fol
lowing proofs is constructed in this w a y the proofs for
the anticipations and analogies which, as is true of the
proofs o f the axiom s, are found only in the second edition.
We carry out the three step s of the deduction by clari
fying w hat is still unclear in each proposition.
The proof begins by indicating that all appearances
show them selves in space and time. With regard to the
manner o f their appearing, in regard to their form, they
contain an intuition o f the kind mentioned. What does this
mean in regard to the objective character of appearances?
We say, "The moon is in the sk y. According to its sensible
and perceptual givenness it is som ething shining, colored,
w ith variously distributed brightness and darkness. It is
given outside us, there, in this definite form , o f this mag
nitude, at this distance from other heavenly bodies. The
space the wherein of the givenness o f the moon is lim
ited and bounded to this shape, o f this magnitude, in these
relationships and distances. Space is a determined space,
and only this determ ination con stitu tes the space o f the
moon, the sp atiality o f the moon. Being determined to
this shape, this extension, this distance from others, is
grounded in a determining. The determining is an ordered
putting in connection, a lifting out o f particular exten-
sional parts which are them selves homogeneous in their
parts, for instance the parts o f the circum ference o f the
shape. Only as the m anifoldness o f an in itself indefinite
space is divided into p arts and is put together out o f these
parts in a particular sequence and w ith determined lim its
can the bright-colored show itse lf to us as moon-shape
w ith this magnitude and distance, i.e., become received
and taken up by us in the domain o f w hat alw ays already
encounters us and stands-over-against-us ( Gegen-uns-
stehenden).
That which appears, according to its intuition and the
form o f its intuitedness, that is, w ith respect to space and
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 203

its prior undifferentiated m anifoldness, is a such and such

determined one: a composed homogeneity. This com
positeness, however, is so only on the ground o f a unity of
the shape represented therein in such and such a way, i.e.,
the magnitude. Unity governs in the synthesis and regu
lates the representation and consciousness of it. With this
we have set in relief the essential content o f the m ajor
premise. The minor premise begins w ith w hat w as last
said, i.e., w ith the consciousness o f the synthetic unity of
the m anifold ( B 203, N.K.S., p. 198).
Consciousness o f the synthetic unity of the m anifold
[and] homogeneous in intuition in general, insofar as the
representation o f an object first becom es p ossible by
means o f it, is, however, the concept o f a magnitude
(q u a n ti)." Here it is stated through w hat the unity of
som ething m anifold becom es p ossible at all. Let us begin
with w hat is m anifold and homogeneous itself. Homo
geneity is the consequence of serializing and connecting of
the m any equal ones into one, a result of m ultiplicity w ith
out differences. The unity o f such is alw ays a "s o and so
much, i.e., quantity as such. Unity as such o f a m ulti
plicity as such is the governing notion of connecting (Ver
binden), o f an "I think, a pure concept o f the under
standing. But in sofar as this concept of the understand
ing, u n ity," as the rule o f unification, refers to som ething
sizable, to quantum as such, it is the concept o f a quanti.
This concept, quantity, brings w h at is homogeneous and
m anifold to a stand in a unified collectedness (Gesam m elt-
heit). By this means the representation o f an object, the
I think and the over-against for the I, first becom e pos
sible. Now, as suggested in the m ajor premise, insofar as
appearances appear in the form o f space and time the first
determ ination of the encountering as such is this com
posite, shaped unification w ith respect to quantitas.
Now the conclusion follow s w ith necessity: It is thus
the sam e unity and unification w hich permit the encoun
tering o f the appearances as shaped, so and so big, in the
204 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

separations of space and time, and which bring the homo

geneous to a stand in the com position o f quantities of a
m ultiplicity (M enge). Therefore, appearances are from
the beginning extensive m agnitudes w ith respect to their
intuition and the w ay o f their encountering standing-
against (G egenstellen). The quantum, space, is alw ays
determined as these appearing spatial form ations only in
the synthesis o f quantity. The sam e unity of quantity per
m its w hat encounters to stand-over-against (entgegen
stehen) collectedly. With this the principle has been
proved. However, thereby it is also established w hy all
principles w hich say som ething about the pure m anifold
ness o f extension (e.g., the shortest distance between two
points is a straight line) as m athem atical principles are
valid for the appearances them selves, w hy m athem atics is
applicable to the o b jects o f experience. This is not self-
evident and is possible only under certain conditions.
These are presented in the proof of the principle. There
fore, Kant ca lls this principle the "tran scend ental prin
ciple of the m athem atics o f appearances (A 165, B 206,
N.K.S., p. 200). Under the title "A xio m s o f Intuition these
axiom s are not them selves laid down or discussed. The
principle is proved in that the ground of the objective
truth of the axiom s is posited, i.e., their ground as neces
sary conditions of the o b jectiv ity of ob jects. The applica
b ility of the axiom s of the m athem atics of extension and
number, and, therewith o f m athem atics as such, is neces
sarily justified, because the conditions o f m athem atics it
self, those o f qu antitas and quantum, are at the sam e time
the conditions o f appearance o f that to which m athe
m atics is applied.
With this we hit upon that ground which m akes pos
sible this ground and all others, to w hich every proof of
every principle o f the pure understanding is referred. This
is the connection which w e now for the first time bring
more clearly into view:
The condition o f experiencing appearances (here w ith
 K an ts Manner of Asking About the Thing 205

regard to shape and siz e ) namely, the unity of the syn

thesis as quantity this condition o f experiencing is at the
sam e time the condition of the p ossib ility o f an object of
experience. In this unity the encountering m anifoldness
of the "a g a in st (G egen) first com es to a "sta n d (S tan d )
and is ob ject (G egenstand). The particular quantitas of
spaces and tim es m akes p ossible the reception o f the en
countering, the apprehension, the first perm itting o f a
standing-against o f the object (d as erste Gegenstehenlas-
sen des G egenstandes). Our question about the thingness
of the thing, about the o b jectiv ity of the ob ject, is an
swered by the principle and its proof as follow s: because
o b jectivity as such is the unity o f the collection of som e
thing m anifold into a representation o f unity, and is a
conception in advance, and because what is m anifold en
counters in space and time, what encounters m ust itself
stand against us in the unity o f quantity as extensive
magnitude.
Appearances m ust be extensive magnitudes. Thereby is
asserted about the being of o b jects them selves som ething
which docs not already lie in the conception o f som e
thing in general about which w e assert in a judgment.
With the determ ination o f being an extensive magnitude
som ething is syn th etically attributed to the object; but
it is attributed a priori, not on the ground o f perceptions
o f single ob jects, but in advance, out of the essence of
experience as such.
What is the hinge upon which the whole proof revolves,
i.e., w h at is the ground upon which the principle itself
rests? What is, therefore, prim ordially expressed by the
highest principle itse lf and thus brought into the light?
W hat is the ground o f the p o ssib ility of this principle as
a synthetic judgment a priori? In it the pure concept of
the understanding, quantity, is transferred to the quan
tum space, and so to the o b jects which appear in space.
How can a pure concept o f the understanding become de
terminant at all for som ething like space? These totally
206 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

heterogeneous pieces m ust conform in som e respect if

they are to be united at ail as determ inable and determin
ing, and it m ust be in such a w ay that there is an object by
virtue o f this unity o f intuition and thought.
Because these questions repeat them selves in each of
the principles and their proofs, they are not to be an
swered right now. We first w an t to see that these questions
constan tly and unavoidably return in the treatm ent o f the
principles. However, w e do not w ish to postpone the
answ er until the close o f the exposition o f the principles,
but shall expound it after the discussion o f the following
principle, in the transition from the m athem atical to the
dynam ical principles.

e. The A nticipations o f Perception

The ground and inner p o ssib ility o f the ob ject is posited

in the principles. The m athem atical principles grasp the
object w ith respect to the "a g a in st and its inner p ossi
bility. Hence, the second principle as w ell as the first
speaks o f appearances w ith respect to their appearing.
"The principle w hich anticipates all perceptions, as such,
is as fo llo w s: In all appearances sensation, and the real
which corresponds to it in the o b ject ( realitas phaenome
non), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree. ( A
166, N.K.S., p. 201.) "Their principle is : :,r' In all ap
pearances, the real that is an object of sensation has in
tensive magnitude, that is, a degree. ( B 207, N.K.S., p.
201.)
Here appearances are taken in another respect than in
the first principle. In the first principle appearances are
considered as intuitions w ith respect to the form of
space and time in w hich the encountered encounters. The
principle o f the "an ticip ation s o f perception does not a t
tend to the form, but to that which is determined through

3r,N.K.S. leaves out "Their principle i s : Trans.

 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 207

the determining form. It is the determ inable as m atter of

the form. M atter does not mean here the m aterial stuff
present at hand. M atter and form are understood as con
cepts of reflection, and indeed as the m ost general ones
which result from reflecting back ( R ckbesinnung) on the
structure o f experience. ( A 266 ff., B 322 ff., N.K.S., p.
280.)''
In the proof o f the an ticip atio n s the discussion is of
sensations, o f the real, and also again of magnitude, spe
cifically o f intensive magnitude. It is now not a question o f
axiom s of intuition, but of basic asp ects o f perception,
i.e., the sort o f representing "in which sensation is to be
found (B 207, N.K.S., p. 201).

e,. The several meanings o f the word "se n sa tio n ; the

theory o f sensation and modern natural science

In human cognition the cognizable m ust encounter and

m ust be given, because w hat is, is som ething other than
ourselves, and because w e have not ourselves made or
created what is. One does not first have to show a shoe to a
shoem aker for him to know w hat a shoe is. He know s this
without the encountering shoe, and know s it better and
more exactly w ithout this, because he can produce one. By
contrast, what he cannot m ake must be presented to him
from som ewhere else. Since w e human beings have not
created what is as such as a whole and could never create
it, it must be shown to us if w e are to know o f it.
In this showing of w hat is in its openness, that doing
(Tun) has a special task which show s things by creating
them in a certain sense, the creation of a w ork of art. Work
m akes world. World w ithin itse lf first reveals things. The

:l,i Heidegger refers here to the fourth section of the "Appen

dix: The Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection: Matter and
Form. " These two concepts underlie all other reflection, so in
separably are they bound up with all employment of the under
standing. Trans.
208 W H AT I S A T H I N G ?

p ossib ility and necessity o f the work o f art is only one

proof that we com e to know what is, only when it is spe
cia lly given to us.
However, this usually happens through encountering
things in the realm of everyday experience. For this to
occur, they m ust approach us, affect us, obtrude and in
trude upon us. Thus occur im pressions, sensations. Their
m anifoldness ( M an n igfaltigkeit) is divided into the differ
ent areas of our senses: sight, hearing, etc. In sensation
and its pressure w e find that which con stitu tes the d is
tinctive difference between em pirical and a priori know l
edge ( A 167, B 208 f., N.K.S., p. 202). The em pirical is the
a posteriori, that which is second, viewed from us con
sidering us as first. It is alw ays subsequent and playing
along side o f us. The word sensation, like the word "rep
resentation, has at first tw o senses: in one sense it means
w h at is sensed red as perceived, the sound, the red-sen-
sation, the sound-sensation. It also m eans the sensing as a
state o f ourselves. Yet this differentiation is not its point
(Bewenden). W hat is designated as sen sation is for this
reason so equivocal, because it occupies a peculiar inter
mediate position between the things and the human
beings, between object and su bject. The interpretation
and explanation o f the essence and role o f sensation
changes according to how w e interpret w hat is objective
and according to the conception of the subjective. Here let
us only cite an interpretation w hich prevailed very early in
W estern thought and is not com pletely overcom e even
yet. The more one passed over to seeing things according
to their mere appearance, their shape, position, and exten
sion (D em ocritus and P lato), the more obtrusive in con
trast to spatial relation becam e that w hich fills intervals
and places, i.e., the sensory given. Consequently, the
givens o f sensationscolor, sound, pressure, and impact
becam e the first and forem ost building blocks out of
w hich a thing is put together.
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 209

As soon as things were broken up into a m anifold o f the

sensory givennesses, the interpretation of their uniform
essence could proceed only by saying: Things are really
only collection s of sensory data. In addition they also have
value and an aesthetic value, and in sofar as w e know
them a truth value. Things are collections o f sensations
w ith values attached. In this view sensations are repre
sented as som ething in them selves. They are them selves
made into things, w ithout first saying what that thing
might be, through w hose splitting the fragm ents (the sen
satio n s) rem ain as allegedly original.
But the next step is to interpret the fragment-things, the
sensations, as effects o f a cause. P h ysics establish es that
the cause o f color is light w aves, endless periodic undula
tions in the ether. Each color has its determined number
of vibrations per second. For example, red has the wave
length o f 760 and 400 billion vibrations per second. That
is red. This is the ob jective red in contrast to the mere
subjective im pression o f the red sensation. It would be
even nicer if w e could trace the red sensation back to a
stim ulation o f electric currents in the nerve pathways.
When w e get that far w e know w hat things are objec
tively.
Such an explanation o f sensation appears to be very
scientific, and yet it is not, insofar as the domain of the
givenness o f sensations and what is to be explained, i.e.,
color as given, has at the sam e time been abandoned. Be
sides, it goes unnoticed that there is still a difference,
whether w e mean by color the determ inate color o f a
thing, this red on the thing, or the red sensation as given
in the eye. This last-m entioned givenness is not given im
mediately. A very com plicated and artful focus is neces
sary to grasp the color sensation as such in contrast to the
color of the thing. If w e observe apart from any theory
ol knowledge the givenness o f the color of the thing,
e.g., the green o f a leaf, w e do not find the slightest cause
210 WH AT IS A T H IN G ?

which might produce an effect on us. We are never aware

o f the green o f the leaf as an effect on us, but as the
green o f the leaf.
Where, however, the thing and the body are represented
as extended and resisting things, as in modern m athe
m atical physics, the view able m anifold sin ks to one o f sen
sory givennesses. Today the given for experimental atom ic
physics is only a m anifold o f light spots and streaks on a
photographic plate. Now few er presuppositions are neces
sary for the interpretation o f this given than for the inter
pretation o f a poem. It is only the solid ity and tangibility
o f the measuring apparatus w hich gives rise to the appear
ance that this interpretation stands on firmer ground than
the allegedly subjective b a sis of the interpretations of
poets in the arts.
Fortunately, there first still exists (apart from the light
w aves and nerve cu rren ts) the coloring and shine of
things them selves, the green o f the leaf and the yellow of
the grain field, the black o f the crow and the gray o f the
sky. The reference to all that is not only also here, but
m ust be constan tly presupposed as that which the phy
siological-physical inquiry breaks up and reinterprets.
The question arises as to what more truly is (w a s ist
seiender), that crude chair w ith the tobacco pipe depicted
in the painting by Van Gogh, or the w aves which corre
spond to the colors used in the painting, or the states of
sensation which we have "in u s w hile looking at the pic
ture? The sensations play a role each time, but each time
in a different sense. The color of the thing is, for instance,
som ething different from the stim ulus given in the eye,
which we never grasp im m ediately as such. The color o f
the thing belongs to the thing. Neither does it give itse lf
to us as a cause o f a state in us. The things color itself, the
yellow , for instance, is sim ply this yellow as belonging to
the field o f grain. The color and its bright hue are alw ays
determined by the original unity and kind o f the colored
thing itself. This is not first composed o f sensations.
 K an ts Manner o f Asking About the Thing 211

The reference serves only to make it clear to us that it is

not im m ediately clear what is meant by sensation. The
undelimited am biguity o f the word and the uncontrolled
diversity of the fact intended only reflect the uncertainty
and bafflement which prevent a conclusive definition of
the relation between man and thing.
Furthermore, the opinion reigns that the comprehen
sion o f things as a mere m anifold o f sensory givens is the
presupposition for the m athem atical-physical definition
of bodies. The theory o f knowledge according to which
knowledge essen tially co n sists o f sensations is held to be
the reason for the rise o f modern natural science. But the
contrary is really the case. The m athem atical starting
point concerning the thing as som ething extended and
m ovable in space and time leads to the consequence that
the usual everyday given ( das umgnglich alltglich
Gegebene) is apprehended as mere m aterial ( a ls blosses
M aterial) and is fragmented into the m anifoldness o f the
sensations. Only the m athem atical starting point effected
a favorable hearing for a corresponding theory o f sensa
tion. Kant also rem ains at the level o f this starting point.
Like the tradition before and after him, he skip s that
sphere of things in which we know ourselves im m ediately
at home, i.e., things as the artist depicts them for us, such
as Van Goghs sim ple chair w ith the tobacco pipe which
w as just put down or forgotten there.

ev. K ants concept o f reality; intensive magnitudes

Although K ants critique rem ains from the beginning

within the sphere o f the experience o f the ob ject o f m athe
m atical-physical natural knowledge, his m etaphysical in
terpretation of the givenness o f sensations differs from all
before and after him, i.e., it is superior to all o f them. The
interpretation o f the o b jectivity of the object in regard to
the sensory given in it is carried out by Kant in the p osit
ing and proof of the principle o f the anticipations of per-
 212 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

ccption. It is ch aracteristic o f the usual interpretations of

Kant that the}' have either overlooked this section alto
gether or m isunderstood it in every respect. The proof of
this is the bafllement w ith which a fundamental concept is
manhandled, which plays an essential role in the prin
ciple. We are referring to the concept o f the real and of
reality.
The clarification of this concept and o f its application
by Kant belongs to the first elem entary course in the intro
duction to the Critique o f Pure Reason. The expression
"r e a lity " is usually used today in the sense o f actu ality or
existence. Thus one speaks o f the question of the reality of
the external w orld and one means by this the discussion
whether som ething really and truly ex ists outside o f our
consciousness. To think Real politisch means reckoning
w ith the actu ally existing situ ations and circum stances.
Realism in art is the mode o f representation in w hich one
copies only w hat is actual and w hat one takes to be actual.
We have to drop the currently fam iliar meaning of real
ity " in the sense of actu ality in order to understand w hat
Kant means b y the real in appearance. This meaning of
"r e a lity " current today, moreover, corresponds neither
w ith the original meaning o f the word nor the initial use
o f the term in medieval and modern philosophy up to
Kant. Instead, the present use has presum ably come about
through a failure to understand and through a m isunder
standing of K an t's usage.
Reality com es from realitas. R ealis is w hat belongs to
res. That m eans a som ething (S a ch e). That is real which
belongs to something, w hat belongs to the what-content
( W asgehalt) o f a thing, e.g., to w hat con stitu tes a house or
tree, w hat belongs to the essence of something, to the
essentia. R eality som etim es m eans the to tality o f this defi
nition of its essence or it m eans particular defining ele-
1 ments. Thus, for example, extension is a reality of a
natural body as well as weight, density, resistance. All
such is real, belongs to the res, to the som ething "n atu ral
 K an t's Manner of Asking About the Thing 213

body, regardless o f whether the body actually exists or

not. For instance, m ateriality ( Stofflich keit) belongs to
the reality o f a table. For this the table does not need to be
real in the present-day sense o f "r e a l. Actual being or
existence is som ething which m ust first be added to the
essence, and in this regard existentia itse lf w a s considered
a reality. Only Kant first dem onstrated that actuality,
being present-at-hand, is not a real predicate of a thing;
that is, a hundred p ossible dollars do not in the least differ
from a hundred real dollars according to their reality. It is
the sam e, one hundred dollars, the sam e w hat ( W as), res,
whether p ossible or actual.
We distinguish actu ality from p o ssib ility and necessity.
Kant unites all three categories under the title o f m odality.
From the fa ct that "r e a lity is not found in this group, w e
can see that reality does not mean actuality. To which
group does reality belong? What is its m ost general sense?
It is qiialLLy quale a so and so, a that and that, a what.
"R e a lity a s thinghood ( S ach h eit) answ ers the question
of what a thing is and not whether it exists. ( A 143, B 182,
N.K.&., p. 184.) The real, that w hich con stitu tes the res,
is a determ ination of res as such. Pre-Kantian m etaphysics
explains the concept o f reality in this way. In K an ts use of
the m etaphysical concept of reality, he fo llo w s the text
book of Baumgartcn in which the tradition of medieval
and modern m etaphysics is discussed after the m anner of
the classroom .
The fundam ental ch aracter o f realitas according to
Baumgarten is determ inatio, determ inateness. Extension
and m ateriality are realities, i.e., determ inations which
belong to the res, "b o d y . Viewed more exactly, realitas is
a determ inatio positiva et vera, a determ inateness belong
ing to the true essence o f .something, and posited as such.
The opposite concept is a w hat w hich does not determine a
thing positively, but in regard to w hat is m issing in it.
Thus blindness is a p rivation ( Fehlen) which is lacking in
what is seeing. However, blindness, obviously, is not noth
214 W H AT IS A T H I N G ?

ing. W hile it is not a positive determ ination, it is a nega

tive one, i.e., a "negation . Negation is the concept op
posite to reality.
Kant gives a new critical interpretation to realitas, as he
does to all the fundam ental concepts he takes from tradi
tional m etaphysics. O bjects are the things as they appear.
Appearances alw ays bring som ething (a w h at) to a show
ing of itself. What thereby presses and attack s us and ap
proaches us, this first what and thinglike ( S ach h afte) is
called " the real" in appearance. "A liqu id sive obiectum
qualification is the occupation o f space and tim e." (A ka
demie edition, op. cit., XVIII n. 6338a, p. 663.) The real in
appearances, the realitas phaenomenon ( A 168, B 209) is
that which, as the first what-content ( W asgehalt), m ust
occupy the void of space and time, in order for anything
to appear at all, so that appearance and the press o f an
against ( eines Gegen) become possible.
The real in the appearance, in K ant's sense, is not w hat
is actually in the appearance as contrasted w ith w^hat is
inactual in it and could be mere sem blance and illusion
( Schein und D unst). The real is that which m ust be given
at all, so that som ething can be decided w ith respect to
its actu ality or inactuality. The real is the pure and first
necessary w hat as such. Without the real, the something,
the object is not only inactual, it is nothing at all, i.e.,
w ithout a what, according to w hich it can determine itse lf
as this or that. In this what, the real, the object qualifies
itse lf as encountering thus and so. The real is the first
quale o f the object.
Along w ith this critical concept o f reality Kant also
uses the term in the traditionally wider sense for each
thinghood, w hich co-determ ines the essence o f the thing,
the thing as an object. Accordingly, we frequently meet
w ith the expression "o b je ctiv e reality, precisely in a fun
damental inquiry o f the Critique of Pure Reason. This
tw ist has induced and promoted the epistem ological m is
understanding o f the Critique of Pure Reason. The term
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 215

"o b je ctiv e reality w a s explained in our discussion of the

first principle. Here it is a question as to whether and how
the pure concepts o f the understanding, which, although
not taken em pirically from the object, at the sam e time
belong to the content of the object; for example, whether
quantity actually has objective reality. This question is
not whether quantity is actu ally present-at-hand, or
whether som ething outside consciou sn ess corresponds to
it. Rather it is asked whether and w hy quantity belongs to
the ob ject as object. Space and time have "em p irical
reality."
Besides sensation and the real, the discussion in the
second principle is about intensive magnitude. The dis
tinction in the concept o f magnitude between quantum
and quantitas has already been discussed. If w e speak
about extensive magnitude, then magnitude is called
quantitas, the measure of size ( G rssen m ass), and speci
fically that o f an aggregate added piece by piece. The in
tensive, the intensio, is nothing else than the qu antitas o f a
qualitas, or a real, e.g., the m oons shining surface. We ap
prehend the extensive magnitude of the object when we
measure its spatial extension step by step. Its intensive
magnitude, on the other hand, we apprehend when w e do
not attend to the extensive size, nor pay attention to the
surface as surface, but the pure what o f its shining, the
"h o w great o f the shining, o f the coloring. The quantitas
of the qu alitas is the intensity. Every magnitude as quan
titas is the unity o f a m ultiplicity; but extensive and inten
sive magnitude are this in different w ays. In extensive
magnitudes the unity is alw ays apprehended only on the
grounds of, and in the gathering together of, the many im
m ediately posited parts. In contrast, intensive magnitude
is im m ediately taken as a unity. The m ultiplicity which be
longs to the intensity can be represented in it only in
such a w ay that an intensity o f negation down to zero is
approached. The m u ltip licities o f this unity do not lie
spread out in it in such a w ay that this spreading yields a
216 W H AT IS A T H I N G ?

unity by adding together the many stretches and pieces.

The single m u ltiplicities o f the intensive magnitude stem ,
rather, from the lim itation of the unity of a quale; each of
them, again, is a quale, they are many unities. Such unities
arc called degrees. A loud tone, for instance, is not com
posed of a determined number of these tones, but there is
a gradation by degrees from soft to loud. The m ultiplici
ties of the unity o f an intensity are many unities. The
m ultiplicities o f the unity o f an extension are single units
o f a m ultiplicity. Both intensity and extension, however,
permit them selves to be ordered as numerical quantities.
But the degrees and step s o f intensity do not thereby be
come a mere aggregate of parts.

e3. Sensation in Kant, understood transcendentally;

Proof of the second principle

Now w e understand the principle in its general con

tent: "The principle which anticipates all perceptions, as
such, is as follow s: In all appearances sensation, and the
real which corresponds to it in the object ( realitas phae
nom enon), has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.
(A 166, N.K.S., p. 201.) In B 207 (N.K.S., p. 201) this prin
ciple reads: "In all appearances, the real that is an object
o f sensation has intensive magnitude, that is, a degree.
We first grasp this principle, however, only on the b a sis
o f the proof which dem onstrates wherein as a principle
o f pure understanding this principle grounds. The steps
o f proof are at the sam e time the interpretation o f the
principle. Only by m astering the proof shall we be in a
position to evaluate the difference between versions A and
B and decide about the superiority o f the one over the
other. It rem ains noteworthy that the principle says som e
thing about sensations, not on the b asis o f a psychological
em pirical description or even a physiological explanation
o f its form ation and origin, but by w a y of a transcendental
consideration. This m eans that sensation is taken in ad-
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 217

vance as som ething which com es into play w ithin the rela
tionship o f a stepping over to the object and in the deter
m ination o f its o b jectivity. The essence o f sensation is
delim ited through its role w ithin the transcendental rela
tionship.
In this w ay Kant w in s a different fundam ental position
w ithin the inquiry about sensation and its function in the
appearance o f things. Sensation is not a thing for which
causes are sought, but a given whose givenness is to be
made understandable through the conditions o f the pos
sib ility o f experience.
These sam e circum stances also explain the designation
of these principles as anticipations of perception.
The proof has the sam e form again even though the
m ajor and minor prem ises and conclusion are spread out
over more sentences. The minor prem ise begins ( B 208):
Now from em pirical consciousness to pure . . the
transition to the conclusion begins: Since, however, sen
sation is not in itse lf . . the conclusion: " I t s magnitude
is not extensive. . . ." S7
We w ill try to build up the proof in a sim plified form so
that the jo in ts show up more distin ctly. Since w e have
already conveyed the essential definitions o f "se n sa tio n ,"

:!T"N ow from empirical consciousness to pure consciousness a

graduated transition is possible, the real in the former completely
vanishing and a merely formal a priori consciousness of the mani
fold in space and time remaining. Consequently there is also pos
sible a synthesis in the process of generating the magnitude of a
sensation from its beginning in pure intuition equals zero, up to
any required magnitude. Since, however, sensation is not in itself
an objective representation, and since neither the intuition of
space nor that of time is to be met with in it, its magnitude is not
extensive but intensive. This magnitude is generated in the act of
apprehension whereby the empirical consciousness of it can in a
certain time increase from nothing equals zero to the given
measure. Corresponding to this intensity of sensation, an inten
sive magnitude, that is, a degree of influence on the senses (i.e., on
the special sense involved), m ust be ascribed to all objects of
perception, insofar as the perception contains sensation. (B 208,
N.K.S., pp. 201 f.) Trans.
218 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

"re a lity , and "in ten sive m agnitude," no difficulty rem ains
as to content. First w e m ay be reminded again o f the
probandum of the proof. It is to be dem onstrated that the
pure concept o f the understanding (here the category of
q u a lity ) determ ines appearances in advance w ith respect
to their what, their encountering aspect, that as a conse
quence o f this qu ality of appearances a quantity (in the
sense o f in ten sity) is possible, thus w arranting the appli
cation o f number and m athem atics. W ith this proof it is
also dem onstrated that an against cannot encounter at all
w ithout the presentation ( V orh alt) of a what, so that in
any receiving there m ust already lie an anticipation o f a
what.
M ajor prem ise: All appearances in addition to the space
tim e determ inations contain, as w hat sh ow s itse lf in per
ception, that w hich m akes an im pression (K ant ca lls this
the m atter), w h at affects us, lies exposed and occupies the
space-tim e domain.
Transition: Such an ex-posing and a present given ( Auf-
und Vorliegendes) ( p ositu m ) can be perceivable as so ly
ing before and occupying only by being represented in ad
vance in the light o f a w hat-character, in the opened range
o f the real in general. Only upon the open background of
the what-\\ke can sen sibles becom e sensations. Such a re
ception o f the w hat as it encounters is "m om en tary
( au gen blicklich ) and does not rest upon a consequence o f
an apprehension that puts together. The aw areness of the
real is a sim ple having-there ( Da-haben), allow ing it to be
posited; it is the positio of a positum.
Minor prem ise: It is p ossible that in this open field of
the real w hat occupies a place alternates between the ex
trem ity of full pressure and the void of the space-tim e do
main. W ith respect to this range o f the pressure there is in
sensation a sizable that does not piece together an increas
ing aggregate, but alw ays concerns the sam e quale, yet al
w ay s o f a varying so-large.
Transition: The how-large, the quantity o f a quale, i.e.,
of som ething real, is, however, a definite degree o f the
 K an t's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 219

sam e what. The magnitude o f the real is an intensive mag

nitude.
Conclusion: Consequently what affects us in appear
ance, the sensible as real, has a degree. Insofar as the
degree as quantity m ay be determined in number, and
number is a positing in accord w ith the understanding of
"h o w many tim es one, therefore w hat is sensed as an
encountering w hat can be brought to a stand m athe
m atically.
Therewith the principle has been proven. According to
B 207 ( N.K.S., p. 201): "In all appearances, the real that
is an object o f sensation has intensive magnitude, that is,
a degree." More exactly, the proposition ought to read: In
all appearances, the real, which con stitu tes the constancy
and the against-like ( das Gegenhafte-Stndige) o f sensa
tions. . . . The proposition by no m eans asserts that the
real has a degree because it is an ob ject o f sensation.
Rather, because the im pressing w hat o f sensation is a
reality for the representing which allo w s the standing
against ( Entgegenstehenlassen) and since the quantity o f
a reality is but the intensity, therefore sensation (a s the
som ething [ Sach h eit\ o f the o b je ct) has the objective
character o f an intensive magnitude.
On the other hand, the wording of the principle in A is
subject to m isunderstanding and nearly contrary to w hat
is really meant. It suggests the m isconception that sensa
tion has, first o f all, a degree and then in addition the
reality w hich corresponds to it, differing from it in its
thingness and standing behind it. But, the principle w an ts
to assert that the real has first and properly as quale a
quantity o f degree and therefore also does sensation,
w hose ob jective intensity rests upon the prior givenness of
the reality character of what can be sensed. The wording
o f A is, therefore, to be modified in the follow ing w ay: "In
all appearances sensation, and that m eans first the real,
w hich lets the sensation show itself as an o b jectivity, has
an intensive m agnitude."
It seem s as though w e have arb itrarily changed K ant's
220 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

text hei'e. However, the different wordings of A and B

dem onstrate how much effort Kant him self expended to
force his novel insight on the transcendental nature of sen
sation into the understandable form o f a proposition.

c,. What is strange about the anticipations.

R eality and sensation

Just how new the principle w as for Kant h im self w e

easily recognize from the fact that he con stan tly won
dered at the strangeness which the principle expresses.
And w hat can be stranger than this, that even where w e
are dealing w ith such things as sensations, w hich assail
us, which w e only receive, that just in this "to w a rd u s
( auf uns zu ) a reaching out and an anticipation b y us is
possible and necessary? At first glance, perception as pure
reception and anticipation as a reaching and grasping be
forehand {entgegen-fassendes Vorgreifen) are thoroughly
contradictory. And yet it is only in the light o f the reaching
and anticipating presentation o f reality that sensation be
com es a receivable, encountering this and that.
On the one hand w e believe that to sense or perceive
som ething is the m ost ordinary and sim plest thing in the
world. We are sentient beings. Certainly! But no human
being has ever sensed a "som eth in g or a w h a t alone.
Through w h at sense organ could this ever take place? A
"som eth in g is neither seen, heard, smelled, tasted, nor
felt. There is no sense organ for a "w h a t or for a "th is
and "th a t. The u/trt/-character o f what can be sensed
must be pre-sented beforehand and anticipated in advance
within the scope and as the scope of w hat can be received.
W ithout reality there is no real; w ithout a real, no sensi
bles. Since such an anticipating beforehand can be as
sumed least in the domain o f receiving and perceiving, and
to make this strangeness recognizable, Kant gives the
name "a n ticip a tio n to the principle of perception. Seen
in general, all principles in which the predeterm ination of
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 221

the object is expressed are anticipations. Som etim es Kant

uses this term alone in the w ider sense.
Human perception is anticipating. An anim al, too, has
perceptions, i.e., sensations, but it does not anticipate. It
docs not permit the im pressing to encounter in advance
as a w hat that stands in itself, as the other w hich stands
toward the anim al as an other and thus sh ow s itse lf as
existing. Kant rem arks in another place ( Religion Within
the L im its of Reason Alone) that no beast can ever say
"I . This m eans that it cannot bring itse lf into a stand
point as that against which an ob jective other could stand.
It m ust not be inferred from this that the anim al has no
relation to food, light, air, and other anim als, and even in
a very orderly fashion w e need only recall how anim als
play. But in all this there is no attitude toward w hat is
any more than there is toward what is not. Their lives run
their course on this side o f the openness o f being and non-
being, though at this point the far-reaching question m ay
arise as to how w e know w hat is happening in the anim al
and what is not. We can never know it im m ediately, a l
though m ediately w e can gain m etaphysical certainty
about being an anim al.
Anticipation o f the real in perception is strange not
only by com parison w ith anim als but equally in com pari
son w ith the traditional conception o f knowledge. We are
reminded of the in advance (im vorhinein) which at an
earlier occasion w a s cited in the distinction between ana
lytic and synthetic judgments. The synthetic judgment
has the peculiarity that it m ust step out o f the subject-
predicate relationship to som ething w holly other, to the
object. The first fundamental grasping-out ( H inausgriff)
by representation in the direction o f the having-there (Da-
liaben ) an encountering w h a t as such is the anticipation
of the real, that synthesis, provision, in which a w hat
sphere is represented at all, from which appearances are
to be able to show them selves. Therefore, Kant says in the
concluding sentence of his treatm ent o f the anticipations
222 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

o f perception: But the real, which corresponds to sensa

tions in general, as opposed to negation = 0, represents
only that som ething the very concept of which includes
being [i.e., presence of som ething]'1* and signifies nothing
but the synthesis in an em pirical consciou sn ess in gen
era l." ( A 175 f., B 217, N.K.S., p. 208.)
The anticipating representation o f reality opens our
viewing for any being-what (W as-scien des) in general
(here this means "b ein g ) and thus form s the relation
on the basis o f which the em pirical consciou sn ess is at all
consciou sn ess o f something. The w hat in general is the
"transcendental m atter ( A 143, B 182, N.K.S., pp. 183 f.)
the what which belongs in advance to the p ossib ility of
an againstness {Gegenhaften) in the object.
Psychology m ay describe sensations in w hatever w ays;
physiology and neurology m ay explain sensations as
processes o f stim ulation, or however; physics may dem
onstrate the causes o f sensations in ether w aves and elec
tric w aves all these are p ossible sorts o f knowledge. But
they do concern the question of the o b jectivity of o b jects
and o f our im m ediate relationship to these. K ants discov
ery o f the anticipations o f the real in perception is espe
cia lly astonishing if one considers that, on the one hand,
his esteem o f Newtonian physics and, on the other, his
fundamental position in D escartes concept o f the su b ject
are not suited to promote the free view o f this unusual
anticipation in the receptivity of perception.

e-. M athem atical principles and the highest principle.

The circu larity o f the proofs

II w e now take together both principles in a shortened

form , we can say that all appearances are extensive mag
nitudes as intuitions, and they are intensive magnitudes
a s sensations: quantities. Such arc p ossible only in

38 Heideggers interpolation. Trans.

 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 223

quanta. All quanta, however, are continua. They have the

feature that no separable part of them is ever the sm allest
possible. Therefore, all appearances, in the what of their
encountering and in the how o f their appearing, are con
stant. This character of appearances, the constancy,
which concerns its extension as w ell as its intensity, is
discussed b y Kant in the section concerning the second
principle for both principles together (A 169 ff., B 211 ff.,
N.K.S., pp. 203 If.). Thereby the axiom s of intuition and
anticipations are united together as m athem atical princi
ples, i.e., as those w hich m etap hysically estab lish the pos
sib ility o f an application o f m athem atics to o bjects.
The concept of magnitude in the sense o f quantity
finds its support in science and its meaning in numbers.
Number represents quantities in their determ inateness.
Because the appearances come to a stand as an against-
ness ( G egenhaftes) in general and in advance only upon
the ground of the anticipating collection, in the sense of
the concepts o f unity (categ o ries), quantity and quality,
therefore m athem atics is applicable to ob jects. Therefore
it is p ossible on the ground o f a m athem atical construc
tion to meet w ith som ething corresponding in the object
itself and to prove it by experiment. The conditions of the
appearing o f appearances, the particular qu antitative de
term inateness o f their form and m atter, are at the same
time the conditions o f standing-against (G egenstehen),
the collectedness and constancy o f the appearances.
Both principles o f the extensive and intensive magni
tude o f all appearances enunciate (but in a particular
respect) the highest principle o f all synthetic judgments.
This fact must be observed if the character o f the above
proofs o f the principles is to be comprehended. Apart
from specific difficulties in content, there is som ething
strange about these proofs. We seem con stan tly tempted
to say that all thought processes move in a circle. This
difficulty o f the proofs needs no special pointing out.
However, a clarification of the reason for the difficulty is
224 W I I A T TS A T H I N G ?

necessary. This does not lie merely in the special content

o f the principles, but in their nature. The reason for the
difficulty is a necessary one. The principles are to be
proved to be those determ inations w hich first m ake an
experience o f o b jects p ossible at all. How is som ething
like that proven? By showing that the principles are
them selves only p ossible on the b asis of the unity and
the belonging together o f the pure concepts o f the under
standing w ith that w hich intuitively encounters.
This unity o f intuition and thought is itse lf the nature
of experience. Therefore, the proof co n sists in showing
that the principles o f pure understanding are made p ossi
ble by that which they ought to m ake p ossible experi
ence. This is an obvious circle. Certainly, and for the
understanding o f the process of the proof and o f the char
acter o f w hat w e arc discussing it is indispensable not
only to suspect this circle and so to create doubts about
the cleanness of the proof, but to recognize the circle
clearly and to carry it out as such. Kant would have
grasped little o f his own task and intention if he had not
been aw are of the circu lar character o f these proofs. His
assertion that these propositions are principles, a l
though, w ith all their certainty, never as obvious as
2 x 2 = 4, points this out. ( A 733, B 761, N.K.S., pp. 589 f.)

f. The Analogies of Experience

The principles arc rules according to which the stand-

ing-against of the object form s itse lf for human pre-scnt-
ing ( V or-stellen). The axiom s of intuition and the antici
pations o f perception concern the againstness of an
against from a double point o f view: first, the wherein of
what is against, and second, the '///-ch aracter of the
against.
The second group o f principles, on the other hand, con
cerns (relative to the p o ssib ility of an ob ject in general)
the p o ssib ility o f an o b je cts standing, of its constancy,
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 225

or, as Kant puts it, the existence ( D asein ), "th e actu

ality, o f the o b ject, or in our words, the being-present-at-
hand (Vorhandensein).
The question arises w hy the analogies o f experience do
not belong to the principles of m odality. The answ er must
be because Dasein is definable only as a relation o f the
states o f appearances among them selves and never im
m ediately as such.
An object stand s first and is first disclosed as standing
when it is determined in its independence of any acci
dental act o f perception of it. "Independence from . . .
is, however, only a negative determ ination. It is not su f
ficient to estab lish in a p ositive w ay the standing o f the
ob ject. This is obviously only p ossible by exposing the
ob ject in its relationship to other o b jects and if this rela
tionship has the con stan cy and the unity o f a self-su b sist
ing connection w ithin which particular o b jects stand. The
constancy o f the o b ject is, therefore, grounded in the con
nection (n exu s) o f appearances or, more exactly, in
w hat m akes such a connection possible in advance.

fi. Analogy a s correspondence, as the relation of

relations, and as the determ ination o f its being
that (D ass-sein s)

Connection (n exu s), like com positio, is a mode o f con

junction (co n iu n ctio ) (B 201, n.) and presupposes in it
se lf the guiding representation o f a unity. However, now
it is not a question of those conjunctions, w hich set to
gether the given, that w hich is encountered, in its what-
content according to sp atiality, reality, and their degrees;
it is not a question of the conjunction o f w hat is alw ays o f
the sam e sort (hom ogeneous) in the u/z/-content of ap
pearance (com positio, i.e., aggregation and co alitio n ).
Rather, it is a question o f a conjunction of appearances
w ith respect to their som etim e existence (D asein ), their
presence. The appearances, however, change, occur at
226 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

different m om ents w ith different durations, and hence

differ from each other (heterogeneous) w ith respect to
their existence (D asein). Because it is now a m atter of
the determ ination o f the constancy o f the object, conse
quently upon its stand in the unity o f its connection w ith
the rest, and thus upon the determ ination o f its existence
(D asein ) in relation to the existence (D asein ) o f the
others, it is a m atter o f a conjunction of w hat is hetero
geneous, a unified standing together in different tim e re
lationships. This standing together o f the whole o f ap
pearances in the unity o f the rules o f its togetherness
(Zusam m en ), i.e., according to law s, is, however, nothing
other than nature. "B y nature, in the em pirical sense,
w e understand the connection of appearances as regards
their existence according to necessary rules, that is, ac
cording to law s. There are certain law s w hich first m ake a
nature possible, and these law s are a p riori." (A 216, B
263, N.K.S., p. 237.) For these "origin al la w s, expressed
in the principles, Kant reserves the heading "A nalogies of
Experience. It is not a question now as in the preceding
principles o f "in tu itio n and "p ercep tion ," but o f the
whole o f knowledge, wherein the to tality o f o bjects, na
ture as presence, is determined. It concerns experience.
But w hy "A n alo g ies ? W hat does "an alo g y m ean? We
shall here try a reversed procedure. By clarifying the title
w e w ill prepare for an understanding o f these principles.
First o f all, let us again recall the contrast between
these principles and the preceding ones. The m athem at
ical principles concern those rules o f the unity of con
joining according to w hich the object determines itself
as an encountering w hat in its what-content. The p ossible
form s of the encountering can be constructed in advance
upon the ground o f the rules of quantitative com position
in the domain o f the extension of space and the intensity
o f w hat is sensed. The m athem atical construction o f the
w hatness o f appearances may be verified and proven
from experience by exam ples (A 178, B 221, N.K.S., p.
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 227

210). In the follow ing principles it is not a question o f the

determ ination o f w hat encounters in its w hatness, but
o f the determ ination as to whether, how, and the fact that
w hat encounters does encounter and does stand here, i.e.,
of the determ ination of the existence ( D asein ) o f the ap
pearances w ithin their connection (or context).
The existence ( D asein ) o f an object, whether and that
it is present-at-hand, can never be im m ediately forced
and brought before us a priori by a mere representation
of its p ossible existence. We can only infer the existence
of an ob ject (th at it m ust be here) from the relation of
the ob ject to others, not by im m ediately procuring the ex
istence. We can look for this existence according to defi
nite rules; w e can even reckon it as necessary, but w e
cannot by this means conjure it up now or ever. It m ust
first allo w itse lf to be found. When it has been found, w e
can recognize it and "id e n tify it by certain m arks as
that fo r which w e were seeking.
These rules for looking and finding the existential con
nection o f appearances ( Daseinszusam m enhang der
Erscheinungen) the existence o f the one non-given ap
pearance in relation to the given existence o f the others
these rules for the determ ination o f the relations of ex
istence o f ob jects are the analogies o f experience. Ana
logy means correspondence, a relation, nam ely, o f how
. . . so ( Wie . . .s o ) . W hat stands in this relation are again
relations. Understood according to its original concept,
analogy is a relation o f relations. M athem atical and m eta
physical analogies differ according to what stands in this
relation. In m athem atics the "h o w . . . so contains rela
tionships, which, in short, are homogeneously constru-
able: ju st how a is to b, so c is to d. If the relation o f a
and b is given, and c also, then, according to the analogy,
d can be defined and construed, and can itse lf be provided
by such a construction. In m etaphysical analogy, on the
other hand, it is not a question of purely qu antitative
relations, but of qu alitative ones, relations between what
228 W H AT IS T H ING ?

is heterogeneous. Here the encountering o f the real, its

presence, does not depend on us, but w e depend on it. In
the domain o f w hat encounters us, if a relation o f two that
encounter is given, as well as som ething that corresponds
to one of the tw o givens, then the fourth itse lf cannot be
inferred in such a w ay as though it were already present
through such an inference. Moreover, according to the
rule o f correspondence, w e can only conclude the rela
tion of the third to the fourth. From the analogy w e ob
tain only an indication about a relation of som ething
given to som ething not given, i.e., an indication of how,
from the given, w e m ust look for the non-given and as
what we must meet it when it sh ow s itself.
Now it becom es clear w hy Kant can and must call the
determining principles of relationship o f the existence of
appearances among them selves "an alo g ies. Since it is a
question o f the determ ination of existence, that and
whether som ething is, but since the existence o f a third
is never brought about a priori, but can only be encoun
tered, and, indeed, in relation to som ething present-at-
hand, the rules which are necessary here are alw ays for
a correspondence: analogies. There lies, therefore, in such
rules an anticipation o f a necessary connection of percep
tions and appearances in general, i.e., o f experience. The
analogies are analogies o f experience.

fu. The analogies as rules o f the universal

time-determination

Therefore, the "p rin cip le of the analogies of experi

ence reads a s fo llo w s in B 218 ( N.K.S., p. 208):
Experience is possible only through the representa
tion of a necessary connection of perceptions." Or in
more detail (A 176 f., N.K.S., p. 208): "A ll appearances
are, as regards their existence ( D asein ) su bject a priori
to rules determining their relation to one another in one
tim e.
 K ant's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 229

The key w ord is "tim e , and it indicates the connection

in which these principles as rules have their anticipatory
power. Kant, therefore, expressly ca lls the analogies
"ru les o f universal tim e-determ ination (A 178, B 220).
"U niversal time-determination designates that time-de-
termination which is present in advance o f all em pirical
time m easurem ents in physics, and it is present in ad
vance specifically as the ground of the p ossibility o f such
measurement. Since an object can stand in relation to
time with respect to its duration and w ith respect to the
sequence in w hich it occurs w ith other o b jects and w ith
respect to its being at the sam e tim e another, Kant dis
tinguishes "th ree rules o f all relations o f appearances in
tim e ( A 177, B 219, N.K.S., p. 209), that is, the existence
of appearances in time w ith respect to their relation in
time.
Up to now we have not directly discussed time. Why
does the relation to time move into the foreground in the
analogies o f experience? What has tim e to do w ith what
these principles regulate? The rules concern the relation
of appearances among them selves in regard to their "ex
istence (D asein ), i.e., the constancy (Stn d igk eit) of the
object in the totality o f w hat con stitu tes (B estan d ) ap
pearances. Constancy in one sense means that which
stands here (D astehen ), the presence. But constancy also
means continuance ( Fortw hren ), enduring (Beharren).
In the term co n stan cy w e hear both in one. It suggests
continuous presence, existence o f the object. We can eas
ily see that presence and presentness contain a relation
to time ju st as do continuance and enduring. Principles
which are concerned w ith the determ ination o f the con
stancy o f the object, therefore, n ecessarily and in an ex
ceptional sense have to do w ith time. For us, the question
is in w hat w ay. The answ er presents itse lf when w e think
through one o f the principles and run through its proof.
We choose for this the first analogy. (A 182 fi., B 224 ff.,
N.K.S., pp. 212 If.)
230 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

By w ay o f introduction w e briefly point out how Kant

circum scribes the nature of time. We restrict ourselves,
thereby, to what is necessary for an understanding of
these principles. Rightly seen, however, w e first directly
discover the essen tials of K ants concept of time only
through the form ation and proof o f the analogies.
Until now time w a s discussed only in passing when the
nature of space w as being defined. There w e attributed to
time w hat corresponds to w hat w a s said of space. W c also
lind that Kant introduces the discussion of time together
w ith that o f space in the transcendental aesthetic. We
say "in tro d u ces intentionally, because what is said there
concerning time neither exhausts w hat Kant has to say
nor is it the decisive part.
Corresponding to space and by the sam e fundamental
proofs, time is first exhibited as pure intuition. Co-exist
ence and succession are represented in advance. Only by
this pre-senting-in-advance ( Voraus-vor-stellung) can one
represent to oneself that several encountering things are
sim ultaneous or one after the other. . . . Different tim es
are not sim ultaneous but successive (ju st as different
spaces are not su ccessive but sim u ltan eo u s). (A 31, B
47, N.K.S., p. 75.) Different times, however, are only parts
of one and the sam e time. Different tim es are only as de
limited in one single whole time. Time is not first com
posed by a piecing together, but is unlim ited, endless, not
made by a com position, but given. The originally united,
single to tality of succession is represented im m ediately,
in advance, i.e., tim e is an a priori intuition, a "pure in
tuition.
Space is the form wherein all outside appearances en
counter us. Time, however, is not lim ited to these; it is
also the form o f inner appearances, i.e., the appearing and
succession o f our modes o f relation and experiences. For
this reason time is the form of all appearances in general.
"In it alone is actu ality (i.e., existence, presence) of ap
pearances p ossible at a ll. (A 31, B 46, N.K.S., p. 75.) The
 K ant's Manner of Asking About the Thing 231

existence o f each appearance, as existence, stands in a re

lationship to time. Time itse lf is "unchangeable and per
m anent, it does not run out. . . Time itse lf does not
alter, but only som ething w hich is in tim e. (A 41, B 58,
N.K.S., p. 82.) In each now time is the sam e now; time is
constan tly itself. Time is that enduring which alw ays is.
Time is pure remaining, and only insofar as it remains are
succession and alteration possible. Although time has a
now-character in each now, each now is unrepeatably this
single now, and different from every other now. Accord
ingly, time itse lf perm its different relations between ap
pearances w ith regard to itself. What encounters can
stand in different relations to time. If it is related to time
as permanent, i.e., to time as quantum, as sizable, then
existence is taken according to its time-magnitude and it
is determ inable in its duration, i.e., as to how much of
time as a whole. Time itse lf is taken as a magnitude. If
the appearing is related to time as the succession of nows,
then it is taken as it is successively in time. If it is related
to time as the sum total, then the appearing is taken ju st
as it is now in time. Accordingly, Kant designates three
modes o f time; duration, succession, and co-existence.
With regard to these three p ossible relations o f the exist
ence o f appearances to time (the tim e-relations), there
are three rules for their determ ination, three principles
that have the character o f analogies:
I. Analogy: Principle o f Permanence.
II. Analogy: Principle of Succession in Time, in A c
cordance w ith the Law o f Causality.
III. Analogy: Principle of Co-existence, in Accordance
w ith the Law o f Reciprocity or Community.
We shall try to grasp the first analogy, i.e., to follow its
proof. Here it might be well to remember again the gen
eral nature o f analogies. They are to be established as
those rules which, in advance, determine the constancy
( Stiin d igkeit) of the object ( Gegenstand), the existence
ol the appearance, in their relation to one another. But
 232 W H A T I S A T 11 I N G ?

because the existence of appearances cannot be at our

disposal, this rule cannot present and produce existence
through a priori construction. It only gives a direction
for looking for relations along which w e can infer from
one existence to another. The proof o f such rules has to
dem onstrate w hy these principles are necessary and
wherein they are grounded.

f;t. The first analogy and its proof. Substance as a

time-determination

The principle of permanence reads: All appearances

/contain the permanent (su b sta n ce) as the object itself,
and the tran sitory as its mere determ ination, that is, as a
w ay in which the ob ject e x ists. ( A 182, N.K.S., p. 212.) In
order that this sentence m ay be read at once as an anal
ogy, it is im portant to pay attention to the and ," i.e.,
to the citing o f the relation o f permanence and the tran si
tory. Kant points out that "a t all tim es," not only in
philosophy but also in common sense, som ething like sub
stance, permanence in the change o f appearances, is pre
supposed. The principle tacitly underlies all experience.
"A philosopher, on being asked how much sm oke weighs,
made the reply: Su btract from the weight o f the wood
burnt the weight of the ashes which are left over, and you
have the weight o f sm oke. He thus presupposed as unde
niable that even in fire the m atter (su b sta n ce) does not
vanish, but only suffers an alteration o f form . (A 185,
B 228, N.K.S., p. 215.) But Kant em phasizes that it is not
enough for one only to "fe e l the need for the principle of
permanence as a basis. It m ust also be dem onstrated: (1 )
that and w hy there is som ething permanent in all ap
pearances; (2 ) that the changeable is nothing else than a
mere determ ination o f the permanent, i.e., som ething
that stands in a tim e-relation to permanence as a time-
determ ination.
K ant's proof is again presented in the form of a syllo
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 233

gism. The proof concerns rules for the determ ination of

existence, but existence means " to be in a tim e, and, as
Kant rem arks, it is to be taken as a mode of time (A 179,
B 222, N.K.S., p. 210). Therefore, the hinge on which the
proof turns must be time, in its peculiar nature in its re
lation to appearances. Since a proof in the form of a
syllogism has its form al turning point in the minor
premise, the decisive thing m ust be said in the minor
premise, which m ediates between the m ajor premise and
the conclusion.
M ajor premise: All appearances i.e., all that which
encounters us humans encounter in time and, there
fore, w ith respect to the unity o f their connection, they
stand in the unity o f a time-determination. Time itself is
the original enduring; original, because only as long as
time endures is som ething enduring in time possible.
Therefore, permanence as such is w hat faces us and un
derlies in advance all that encounters us: the substratum .
Minor premise: Time itself, as absolute, cannot be per
ceived as itself, i.e., the time wherein everything that
encounters has its spot is not perceivable as such. If it
w ere perceivable, the particular tim e-spots {Zeitstellen)
o f what encounters, and, therewith, what encounters in
its time-spot could also be determined a priori in it. In
contrast, time, as the permanent in all appearances, de
mands that all determining o f the existence o f appear
ances, i.e., their being-in-time ( In-der-Zeit-sein), refer in
advance and above all to this permanent.
Conclusion: Thus, first and above all the standing of
the ob ject m ust be conceived from out o f permanence,
i.e., the representation o f enduring in change belongs in
advance to the character ( Sach h altig k eit) o f an object.
However, the representation o f enduring in change is
w hat is meant by "su b sta n c e " in the pure concept of the
understanding. Consequently, according to the necessity
of this principle, the category o f substance has objective
reality. There is constant alteration in the o b ject of ex
234 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

perience, o f nature. Constant alteration is that mode of

existence w hich follow s another mode o f the existence of
the same object. The determ ination of alterations, thus
o f natural events, presupposes permanence. Alteration
is determ inable only in relation to permanence, since
only the permanent can be changed, w hile the transitory
suffers no alteration (Vernderung), but only a change
(W echsel). The accidents by means of which the determ i
nations o f substance are grasped are, therefore, nothing
other than various modes o f permanence, i.e., o f the ex
istence o f substance itself.
The whole o f the constancy o f o b jects is determined
upon the ground of the relation of their alterations among
one another. Alterations are modes o f the presence of
forces. For this reason the principles w hich concern the
existence o f o b jects are called dynam ical. A lterations,
however, are alterations o f som ething permanent. Perma
nence m ust determine beforehand the horizon within
which objects in their connection are constant. Accord
ing to Kant, however, permanence as continual presence
is the fundamental character of time. Time thus plays
a decisive role in the determ ination o f the constancy of
objects.
In all the proofs of the dynam ical principles this role
o f time com es to the fore through the decisive assertion
about the nature o f time which is brought to bear each
tim e in the m inor premise. Time, on the one hand, is the
sum total w ithin which all appearances encounter; w ith
in which, therefore, the standing o f o b jects is determined
in their relations of permanence, o f succession, and o f co
existence. On the other hand, as is alw ays asserted in the
minor premise, time itse lf cannot be perceived. W ith re
gard to the p ossible determ ination o f the presence o f ob
je cts at any time, this m eans nothing less than that the
m om entary position in tim e and time relation o f an ob
je ct can never be constructed a priori out o f the pure
running on o f tim e as such, i.e., can never them selves be
 K ants Manner o f Asking About the Thing 235

intuitively produced and presented a priori. What is ac

tual of time, i.e., w h at is im m ediately present, is only the
particular now. There rem ains only the p ossibility of de
termining the time character o f a not im m ediately given
but nevertheless real object, from out of what is ju st then
present, thus determining it a priori in its p ossible time-
relation to w hat is present; and thereby to gain a guide
line for how the object is to be sought. The o b je cts ex
istence ( D asein ) itse lf must alw ays chance to occur in
addition (zu-falien). Accordingly, if the whole o f appear
ances in its ob jectivity is to be capable of being experi
enced by us at all, then well-founded rules are required
which would contain an indication o f the time relations
as such in which the encountering must stand, so that
the unity o f the existence of appearances, i.e., a nature, is
possible. These transcendental tim e-determ inations are
the analogies of experience, the first of w hich w e have
been discussing.
The second analogy reads according to B 232:
All alterations take place in conform ity w ith the law
of the connection o f cause and effect; w hile according to
A 189: Everything that happens, that is, begins to be,
presupposes som ething upon w hich it follow s according
to a rule. (N.K.S., p. 218.)
The proof of this principle presents for the first time
the foundation o f the law of cau sality as a law for the
ob jects o f experience.
The third analogy reads in B 256 as follow s:
All substances, in so far a s they can be perceived to
co-exist in space, are in thoroughgoing reciprocity; w hile
according to A 211: All substances, so far as they coexist,
stand in thoroughgoing com m unity, that is, in mutual in
teraction ." (N.K.S., p. 233.)
This principle and its proof, aside from its content, is
of special im portance for K ants argument w ith Leibniz,
as all the "an alo g ies really throw a special light on the
change in the fundam ental position o f the tw o thinkers.
236 W H A T IS A T H IN G ?

In closing w e refer to the second group o f the dynam

ical principles, the last group in the whole system of
principles.

g. The Postulates of Em pirical Thought As Such

gi. The ob jective reality of the categories.

The m odalities as su bjective synthetic principles

We know that the system of principles o f the pure un

derstanding is ordered and divided according to the order
and division o f the table o f categories. The categories are
representations o f unity which arise in the nature of the
act o f understanding itself, w hich serve as rules of judg
mental connection, i.e., the determining of the encounter
ing m anifold in the object. The four titles for the four
groups o f categories are quantity, quality, relation, and
m odality. In retrospect w e see more clearly:
In the axiom s o f intuition it is demonstrated in what
sense quantity (a s extensive m agnitude) belongs neces
sarily to the nature o f the ob ject as som ething encoun
tering.
In the anticipations of perception it is demonstrated
how qu ality (re a lity ) determines w hat encounters in ad
vance as an encountering.
In the analogies, the principles o f correspondence, o f
what-stands-in-relation and its determ ination, it is dem
onstrated in w hat sense the ob ject w ith respect to its con
stancy can only be determined on the b a sis o f a previous
view o f the relations in which w hat encounters (the ap
pearances) stands. Since these relations must represent
and include in advance all o b jects capable o f coming to
appearance in any w ay, they can only be relations of what
is inclusive of all appearances namely, relations o f time.
The three groups o f principles corresponding to the cate
gories o f quantity, quality, and relation have this in com-
 K ant's Manner of Asking About the Thing 237

inon: they determine in advance what belongs to the fac

tual nature o f the ob ject as som ething encountering and
constant. W ith regard to these categories, these three
groups o f principles show that (and in w hat sen se) the
categories constitute in advance the factual nature o f the
object, its thinghood ( S ach h eit) as such and as a whole.
These three categories are the realities o f the nature of
the object. The corresponding principles prove that these
categories as these realities make the object ( Gegen
sta n d ) p ossible and belong to an object ( O b jek t) as
such. They show that the categories have objective
reality.
The principles so far discussed constitute the founda
tion through w hich a horizon is first formed at all, w ithin
which this and that and many can encounter and stand in
connection as som ething objective.
What more, then, is the fourth group o f principles (the
postulates o f em pirical thought) to accom plish? This
group corresponds to the categories o f m odality. The
term already indicates som ething ch aracteristic. Modal
ity: modus, mode, manner, a how namely, in contrast
to the what, to the real as such. Kant introduces the dis
cussion o f the fourth group o f principles w ith the remark
that the categories o f m odality have a "sp e c ia l char
acteristic (A 219, B 266, N.K.S., p. 239). The categories of
m odality (p o ssib ility, actu ality or existence, n ecessity) do
not belong to the factual content o f the nature of an ob
je ct. Whether, for instance, a table is possible, actual or
necessary, does not touch on the thinghood (S ach h eit) of
"ta b le . This rem ains alw ays the sam e. K ants w ay of
expressing this is that the categories o f m odality are not
real predicates o f the object. Accordingly, neither do they
belong to the content o f ( sach h altig ) the nature of
o b jectiv ity at all, nor to the pure concept of that which
delim its the nature o f the object as such. Rather, they
assert som ething o f how the concept of the object is re
238 W H A T I S A T H I N G ?

lated to its existence and the modes o f its existence, that is

to say, according to w hich modes the existence of the
object is to be determined.
The principles which say som ething about this cannot,
therefore, like the foregoing, concern the question if and
how the categories (p o ssib ility, actu ality, n ecessity) have
objective reality, since they do not belong at all to the
reality of the object. Because the principles cannot assert
anything like this, neither can they be dem onstrated in
this respect. There are, therefore, no proofs for these prin
ciples, but only elucidations and clarification s of their
content.

g.. The p ostulates correspond to the nature of

experience. The m odalities refer to experience and
no longer to conceivability

The p ostulates o f em pirical thought as such indicate

only what is required in order to define an object as pos
sible, actual, or necessary. There also lies in these re
quirem ents ("p o stu la te s ) the delim iting of the nature
o f p ossibility, actuality, and necessity. The postulates
correspond to the nature o f that through which objects
are definable at all: the nature of experience.
The p ostulates are m erely assertion s of a requirement
w hich lies in the nature o f experience. This, therefore,
com es into play as the standard by w hich the m odes of
existence and, therewith, the essence of being is mea
sured. Accordingly, the postulates run as follow s (/1 218,
B 265 f., N.K.S., p. 239):
1. That w hich agrees with the form al conditions of
experience, that is, w ith the conditions of intuition and
o f concepts, is p ossib le."
Kant conceives of "p o ssib ility as agreement w ith what
regulates in advance the appearing of appearances: w ith
space and tim e and their qu antitative determ ination. The
p ossib ility o f a representation can be decided only as the
 K ants Manner of Asking About the Thing 239

representation obeys what w as said about the object in

the first group o f principles. Rational m etaphysics, on
the contrary, had until then defined p o ssib ility as non
contradiction. According to Kant, what does not contra
dict itse lf is indeed thinkable. However, nothing about
the p o ssib ility o f the existence o f an object is settled by
this p o ssib ility of thought. W hat cannot appear in space
and time is an im possible ob ject for us.
"2. That which is bound up w ith the m aterial condi
tions o f experience, that is, w ith sensation, is a ctu al."
Kant conceives o f actu ality ( W irklich keit) as connec
tion w ith w hat sh ow s us som ething real, having content
( S ach h altig es): w ith sensation. The actu ality o f an ob
ject can be decided only in that the representation obeys
w hat is said about the object in the second group of
principles. Rational m etaphysics until then, on the con
trary, form ulated actu ality only as a complement to pos
sib ility in the sense o f conceivability: existentia as com
plementum p ossib ilitatis. But w ith this nothing is settled
about actu ality itself. What could still be added to p ossi
bility w ithin pure understanding is only the im possible,
but not the actual. The meaning o f actu ality is fulfilled
and borne out for us only in the relation between repre
senting and the encountering o f the real of sensation.
Here w e are at the point at w hich the m isunderstand
ing o f the conception o f reality begins. Because the real,
specifically as a given, alone bears out the actu ality o f an
ob ject people have wrongly identified reality ( R e a litt)
w ith actu ality ( W irklich keit). Reality, however, is only a
condition for the givenness o f an actuality, but not yet
the actu ality o f the actual.
3. That which in its connection w ith the actual is de
termined in accordance w ith universal conditions o f ex
perience is (th at is, exists a s ) n ecessary."
Kant conceives o f n ecessity as determ ination by that
which, out of agreement w ith the unity o f experience as
such, estab lish es the connection w ith actuality. The
240 W H A T IS A T M ING ?

necessity o f an object can be decided only in that the

representation obeys w hat is said in the third group of
principles concerning the constancy of the object. Ra
tional m etaphysics, until then, on the contrary, under
stood necessity merely a s w hat cannot not be. However,
since existence is defined only as a complement o f the
p ossible and this only as what is conceivable, this defini
tion o f necessity also remained w ithin the domain of
conceivability. The necessary is what is unthinkable as
non-existent ( unseiend). However, w hat w e have to think
need not for this reason exist. We can never recognize the
existence o f an object in its n ecessity at all, but alw ays
only the existence of a state of an ob ject in relation to
another.
*

g;i. Being as the being of the o b jects of experience.

M odalities in relation to the power of cognition

From this elucidation o f the contents o f the postulates,

w hich is synonym ous w ith the essential definition o f the
m odalities, w e gather that Kant, in defining the modes
o f being, at the sam e time delim ited being to the being of
the object o f experience. The merely logical clarification s
o f p ossibility, actuality, necessity, as in rational m eta
physics, are rejected. In short, being is no longer deter
mined out o f mere thought. From whence then? The re
curring form ula "w h a t agrees w ith , "w h a t is connected
w ith , is strikin g in the postulates. P o ssib ility, actu ality,
n ecessity are understood out of the relationship between
our cap acity to know (an intuiting determined in accord
ance w ith thought) and the conditions o f the p ossib ility
o f objects conditions w hich lie in our knowing cap acity
itself.
The m odalities (p o ssib ility, actu ality, and n ecessity)
add no content ( Stich h altiges) to the content ( Sachhal-
tigk eit) of the object, and yet they are a synthesis. They
put the object into a relationship to the conditions o f its
 K an ts Manner of Asking About the Thing 241

standing-against ( Gegen-stehen). These conditions, how

ever, are also those very ones o f the letting-stand-against
( G egenstehenlassen) o f experience, and, therefore, of
the actions of the su bject. The postulates, too, are syn
thetic principles, although not objective, but only su b jec
tively synthetic. This is to say that they do not put to
gether the content o f the object, but they put the whole
nature o f the ob ject as determined by the three first
principles into its p ossible relations to the su bject and to
its modes o f intuitively-thought representing. The m odal
ities add to the concept of the ob ject its relation to our
cognitive faculty. (A 234, B 289, N.K.S., pp. 251 f.) There
fore, also, the three modes of being correspond to the
first three groups of principles. W hat is asserted in these
presupposes the m odalities. In this sense, the fourth
group o f synthetic principles o f pure understanding re
m ains superior in rank to the others. Conversely, the
m odalities arc determined only in relation to w hat is pos
ited in the preceding principles.

g,. The circu larity o f the proofs and elucidations

Now it is clear that ju st like the proofs o f the other

principles, the elucidation o f the postulates, too, m oves in
a circle. Why is there this circu lar movement, and what
does it say?
The principles are to be proved as those propositions
which establish the p ossibility o f an experience of ob
je cts. How are these propositions proven? It is done by
showing that these propositions them selves are possible
only on the ground of the unity and agreement of the pure
conceptions o f the understanding w ith the form s of in
tuition, w ith space and time. The unity o f thought and
intuition is itsell the essence o f experience. The proof con
sists in showing that the principles o f pure understand
ing are p ossible through that which they them selves
m ake possible, through the nature o f experience. This is
242 W H AT IS A T H IN G ?

an obvious circle, and indeed a necessary one. The princi

ples are proved by recourse to that w hose arising they
make possible, because these propositions are to bring to
light nothing else than this circu larity itself; for this con
stitu tes the essence o f experience.
In the concluding part o f his w ork Kant says o f the
principle o f pure understanding that it has the peculiar
character that it m akes possible the very experience
which is its own ground o f proof, and that in this experi
ence it m ust alw ays itse lf be presupposed ( A 737, B 765,
N.K.S., p. 592). The principles are such propositions
which ground their ground of proof and transfer this
grounding to the ground o f proof. Expressed differently,
the ground w hich they lay, the nature o f experience, is
not a thing present-at-hand, to which w e return and upon
which w e then sim ply stand. Experience is in itse lf a
circular happening through w hich w hat lies w ithin the
circle becom es exposed (erffnet). This open (Offene),
however, is nothing other than the between (Z w isch en )
between us and the thing.

h. The Highest Principle of All Synthetic Judgments.

The Between

What Kant hit upon and what he constan tly tried to

grasp anew as the fundam ental happening is that w e hu
man beings have the power o f knowing what is, w hich we
ourselves are not, even though w e did not ourselves m ake
this what is. To be w hat is in the m idst of an open vis-a-
vis what is, that is con stan tly strange. In K ants form ula
tion this means to have o b jects standing against us as
they them selves, even though the letting encounter (das
Begegnen-lassen) happens through us. How is such pos
sible? Only in such a w a y that the conditions o f the p ossi
b ility o f experiencing (sp ace and time as pure intuitions
and the categories as pure concepts o f the understanding)
are at the sam e time the conditions of the standing-
against o f the objects o f experience.
 K ant's Manner o f Asking About the Thing 243

What is expressed in this w ay Kant has established as

the highest principle of all synthetic judgm ents. It now
becom es clear what the circu larity in the proof of the
principles means. It means nothing else than this: Funda
m entally these principles alw ays express only the highest
principle, but in such a w ay that in their belonging to
gether they explicitly cite all that which belongs to the
full content o f the nature of experience and the nature
of an object.
The ch ief difficulty in understanding this b asic section
of the Critique o f Pure Reason and the w hole work lies in
the fact that w e approach it from our everyday or scien
tific mode o f thinking and read it in that attitude. Our a t
tention is directed either toward what is said of the ob
je ct itse lf or toward w hat is explained about the mode in
w hich it is experienced. What is decisive, however, is
neither to pay attention only to the one nor only to the
other, nor to both together, but to recognize and to know:
1. that we m ust alw ays m ove in the between, between
man and thing;
2. that this between exists only w hile w e move in
it;
3. that this between is not like a rope stretching from
the thing to man, but that this between as an anticipation
( V orgriff) reaches beyond the thing and sim ilarly back
behind us. Reaching-before ( Vor-griff) means thrown
back ( R iick-w u rf).
Therefore, when, from the first sentence onward, we
read the Critique o f Pure Reason in this attitude, from the
start everything m oves into a different light.

Conclusion

We have sought to press forward to the doctrine of the

principles, because in this center o f the Critique o f Pure
Reason the question about the thing is newly put and an
swered. We said earlier that the question o f the thing is a
historical one; now we see more clearly in w hat sense
244 W H A T I S A T H I NG ?

this is the case. K an ts questioning about the thing ask s

about intuition and thought, about experience and its
principles, i.e., it ask s about man. The question "W h at is
a thing? is the question Who is m an? That does not
mean that things becom e a human product ( G etniichle),
but, on the contrary, it means that man is to be under
stood as he who alw ays already leaps beyond things, but
in such a w ay that this leaping-beyond is p ossible only
w hile things encounter and so precisely remain them
selves w hile they send us back behind ourselves and our
surface. A dimension is opened up in K ants question
about the thing w hich lies between the thing and man,
w hich reaches out beyond things and back behind man.
In the pages to follow, four main topics w ill be discussed:
(1 ) the sort o f questions that are philosophical (to ex
plain such questions as "W h at is a th in g ?"); (2 ) the text
itself, dealing w ith section s A, in which the question
What is a th in g ?" is raised; B-I, which exam ines the
basic assum ption system involved in modern science; and
-, which presents the w ay Kant fundam entally altered
the grounds on which this scientific assum ption system
w as based and the lim its w ithin which it can be valid;
(3 ) the relationship o f Heidegger to Kant; (4 ) the later
Heidegger and future philosophy.
Heidegger's first section (A ) is preparatory and is de
signed to give the reader a fresh start, freeing him from
som e o f the preconceptions he is likely to have. Although
w ritten as a sim ple common-sense discussion, it con
tains all of Heidegger's m ajor points. This an alysis w ill
attem pt to relate these points as raised in section A w ith
their carefully detailed an alysis in section s B-I and B-I I.
However, before examining the text itself, we must dis
cu ss the meaning of the question "W h at is a thing? , and,
247
248 W II A T IS A T H I N G ?

as this question is one version of the sort ol question

philosophy alw ays ask s, we must briefly discuss what
sort of questions are philosophical.

I. PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS

The task of philosophy differs from that of science, for,

unlike science, philosophy exam ines not our conclusions
but the basic conceptual m odels we employ the kind of
concepts and ordering patterns we use. Philosophy con
cerns not the explanation o f this or that but questions
such as "W h at, really, is an explanation?"
For example, is som ething explained when it is divided
into parts and if we can tell how the parts behave? This
is but one type o f explanation. It w o rks fairly well for a
car (although it does not tell w hat m akes it ru n ), less w ell
for a biological cell (w h o se p arts are not alive and do
not explain its life ), and very poorly for explaining per
son ality (w h at are the "p a r ts " of a p erson?). Or, choosing
another o f the m any types, has som ething been explained
when we feel that we "un derstan d it because we have
been shown how it fits into some larger context or
broader organization? These questions, philosophic ques
tions, are not designed to determine the explanation of
this or that, but to discover what an explanation is. Yet,
as we have seen, there are m any different kinds of ex
planations. In any one case, w hich shall w e use? Or should
we try to use them all, and, if so, when and with what ad
vantages and p itfalls? How is our choice among these
varied explanations to be m ade? Should it depend on the
field in which w e work, on what we want an explanation
for, or on the style of the tim es?
When w e ask questions o f this sort, we seem to be
talking about nothing in particular; as Heidegger points
out, such philosophic issu es at first seem to be empty.
Yet, they very basically affect w hatever w e study, for,
 Analysis 249

depending upon w hich mode o f approach we use, dif

ferent questions and hypotheses w ill be form ulated, d if
ferent experiments set up, different illu stration s cited,
different arguments held to be sound, and different con
clusions reached. Much in our conclusions about any
thing com es not from the study of the things but from the
philosophical decisions im plicit in the w ay w e start.
Ideally, a clear division could be made between w hat is
asserted of the things and what is only ch aracteristic of
one's preferred type of explaining. But these tw o arc so
intermeshed and interdependent that the very research,
findings, and ob jective results o f one approach w ill seem
to those holding another approach as com pletely irrele
vant or poorly asked about and answered from start to
finish. It would be convenient to be able to say, "These
asp ects I found by studying my subject m atter, and about
them you m ust accept what I say; whereas those other
aspects o f my results stem m erely from the sort o f ap
proach I alw ays use, from 'the w a y I slice things,' and so
you neednt accept that side o f my co n clu sio n s." But the
effects o f ones approach cannot be separated out. Even
w hat we ask, the questions w ith w hich we begin (a s well
as every subsequent step and finding), is already a re
sult of, and is form ulated w ithin, a certain context and
a certain w ay of conceptualizing things.
Since it is philosophys task to discuss, clarify, and
decide about such choices, philosophy cannot be based
on a study o f how the things are in order to see what
approach is m ost suitable. How w e find the things to be
already depends upon our approach. Thus, the question
"W hat is a thing? is one w ay of putting the b asic ques
tion of approach.
The "th in g ," as w e have things today, is a certain sort of
explanatory schem e, a certain sort of approach to any
thing studied. Heidegger finds this approach current in
both science and ordinary common sense. It is an ap
proach that renders w hatever w e study as som e thing in
250 W 11 A T 1 S A T H I N G ?

space, located over there, su bsistin g separate It om and

over against us and having certain properties of its own.
It is as obvious as that orange-colored chair over there,"
or an atom , " a cell, a se lf, " a sense datum , a body.
Although E in stein s p hysics has changed this thing-
model som ewhat, Heidegger view s E instein s theory as a
more complex m odification of the same basic thing-model
(20, 15).* We assum e the thing so naturally that only a
far-reaching discussion such as Heideggers can make us
realize how constan tly we approach everything in this
way, how this approach cam e about, and how a different
approach is possible. These are the sort ol aim s that are
the task of philosophy.
Heidegger tells us that science begins and can begin
without explicitly examining its b asic approach. Science
begins w ith contem porary problem s, w hich arise in the
context of how the people o f the time approach things.
Although philosophic questions are often decided in
science, this occurs only im plicitly. In proceeding further,
science m akes further decisions, but these are made
through action.
Fashions in science change, and, therewith, much seem
ingly important work becom es irrelevant. But, since it is
not the task of science to examine its im plicit decisions
directly, it can begin w ithout prelim inaries. Heidegger
argues that philosophy, however, cannot sim ply begin. It
a sk s a question "w ith w hich nothing can be started
(2, 2). Therefore, the question o f the thing is a question
w ith which one cannot begin. Thus, w e are faced w ith a
dilemma: Since philosophy cannot sim ply start w ithout
abandoning its task, which is to examine how we are to
begin, how we are to approach and conceptualize; how,
then, can philosophy ever begin and proceed at all?

* In this analysis the first reference given w ill be to the English

translation of What Is A Thing?, and the second, in italics, to the
German text.
 A nalysis 251

Another w ay to put this dilem ma is to talk about "ex

perience. People often say that they w ant their know l
edge to fit (or to be based on ) experience. But different
modes o f study involve different sorts of "experience.
For instance, one might know som ething from reading
a dial on a complex experimental apparatus, or one might
know som ething from cu lturally learned common-sense
observation. When these and other sorts of "experience"
occur they already m ake sense, even before interpreta
tions are form ulated. The p h ysicists dial reading is ob
viously an "exp erience" into which much thought has
already gone, and common-sense o b jects around us are
also experienced only w ith interpretations already in
them. What w e appeal to, check against, and call experi
ence is alw ays already organized and cut up, defined and
made. Thus, philosophys problem is not solved by basing
philosophy on experience. Once w e have chosen how to
have "experience (and on what selected and shaped
asp ects o f it our statem ents can be "b a se d ), w hat philos
ophy must first examine has already been decided and
concluded. Hence, the b asic philosophical choices and
decisions are already settled in any settled acceptance of
"experience."
So far these have been presented as if they were quite
free "ch o ice s, as if one could adopt any sort of method,
type o f concept, sense o f explanation, form of thing, and
type o f "exp erience." But this is not so. In Heideggers
view we cannot today, for instance, ignore our m athe
m atics and science and em bark on som e new beginning
that bears no relation to science (95, 73). Nor can we
ignore our com m on-sense perspective. One is alw ays in a
given situation, at a particular pass in history. The choices
confronting us arc choices in our current h istorical con
text.
Although a decision to assum e our present context re
lieves us ol w hat could otherw ise seem an endless and
arbitrary relativity of choices, Heideggers decision to
252 W H AT I S T H I N G ?

study this context is made in order to put it into question,

to reopen questions that at present appear settled. In this
exam ination Heidegger sees the answ er to our dilem m a of
how philosophy can start at all w ithout abandoning its
b asic task, how it can examine basic approach and not
sim ply fall into the existing approach.
While we cannot accept our present approach unexam
ined, neither can we sim ply reject it, for in rejecting it w e
would still be standing in it and we would still be using it,
constantly, im plicitly, in spite o f ourselves. We m ust,
then, examine this approach as we have it, realizing that
it has developed as a series of answ ers to a series of
questions asked long ago, settled long ago, and now no
longer asked. Our now unquestioned, im plicit approach
w a s once a new answ er to a question that w as then open.
If we find our w ay back to those questions, we w ill not
only see them as live questions and as they were answered
at that time, but w e w ill be, thereby, in a position to an
sw er them differently. Regaining these questions as live
and open is the only w ay to get behind our unexamined
assum ptions, to see how they are now our b asis, and to
change them (49-50, 3#). Heidegger ca lls this "reopen
ing a question, or taking a question that is now "q u ie s
cen t and "se ttin g [it] into m otion again (49, 38).
In order to move beyond the current context, the cur
rent w ay w e see "th in g s and "experience, the w ay we
have knowledge and questions, Heidegger presents the
historical steps and philosophical decisions that brought
us to the current approach. He reopens decisions that
w ere made and are now im plicit (are now "happening )
in our assum ed approach. Philosophy thus m akes the
current, im plicit context explicit and thereby provides the
opportunity to carry further, add to, or change "th in g s"
(49-50, 38)! Thus, Heidegger says that only philosophy
builds the roads that create and alter what things are.
But does he not say that science and ordinary common-
sense living in any culture do this also (65-66, 100; 50,
78)? Yes, but they do it im plicitly. Philosophy adds a
 A nalysis 253

different power in explicating im plicit decisions, thereby

reopening them and posing them for further decision (10,
41, 53-54; 8, 31, 41).
Heidegger tries to reopen som e o f these crucial deci
sions that made things and experience as w e now have
them, decisions set by Plato and A ristotle, G alileo and
Newton, Leibniz and Kant. The book reopens especially
those b asic cultural decisions that at first were involved
chiefly in modern science, although they also cam e to
determine how w e now view and live w ith and in any
thing. Thus far w e have seen w hat philosophy does and
how, for Heidegger, it is p ossible only as it exam ines its
own role in history.
But are w e not today quite aw are of the thing-model
and its lim itation s? Is there now already a sufficiently
widespread critica l attitude of this sort? Since the pub
lication o f Sein unci Zeit in 1927, an entire generation of
thinkers scien tists, authors, artists has lived and w rit
ten in the clim ate that Heidegger (w ith Dilthey and Hus
serl ju st before him ) helped create. Because o f this in
tellectual clim ate, nearly all thinkers since the thirties
have been at least indirectly influenced by Heidegger and
his im m ediate predecessors. We ow e to Heidegger much
o f current thought, w ith its em phasis on getting beyond
mere m odels by appealing to the w ider context o f ordi
nary living.
In reading What Is A Thing? (w hich w a s first published
in Germany in 1962, although it co n sists o f lectures given
in 1935),' we do m uch more than reinforce todays general
attitude that science co n sists o f man-made m odels within

1 Bv 1935 Heidegger had already courageously withdrawn from

support of Nazism, which had at first seemed to him a hopeful re
volt against rationalized, technologized culture. He withdrew at a
time when very few could see ahead, and his early support should
not be remembered without also remembering his early w ith
drawal. On the other hand, why this type of philosophy w as not a
better guide for his political decisions and how this type of phi
losophy relates to political allegiance, are certainly questions to
reopen!
254 W H I S T H I N G ?

a human world. Wc cannot remain content w ith this mere

attitude, this im plicit assum ption about science. Only if
we see an exact an alysis of science in the human context,
if that is spelled out, explicated, can w e move further.
We must go behind our own current clim ate of thought,
which Heidegger helped to create, and examine Heideg
gers exact an alysis o f the thing-model. The thing-model
is, despite our current attitudes, still second nature to us.
In the following pages I w ill be more exact and w ill at
tempt to state som e main points that should make the
reading of Heideggers book easier and more enjoyable
(fo r the w ay in which the book reveals and delineates cer
tain m ajor asp ects b asic to our thinking is extremely
enjoyable, once barriers to its understanding have been
overcom e).

2. THE TEXT

Section A

In citing the housemaid who laughed at the ancient

philosopher Thales when he fell into the well w hile ob
serving the stars, Heidegger agrees that philosophy can
look like a laughable endeavor o f no particular use; while
searching for the ultim ate grounds of things one can
easily fall into a w ell, and in a well one fa lls a long time
before hitting the ground. (W e are searching for the
"grou n d " or b asis o f how anything appears and is ap
proached and studied.) Also, the maid is right in that it is
best to look carefully at the ordinary things around us
before looking far aw ay.
As we shall see later, Heidegger goes beyond Kant and
other philosophers, for he does begin w ith the ordinary
things around us. To be more accurate, he begins with us
and the things around us, as we are among them at this
time in history. Kant does not do this, nor, in Heideg
 A nalysis 255

ger's view, do the natural sciences. Throughout the book,

therefore, Heidegger adds the larger human context to the
discussion o f Kant and o f science.
We come today upon a scene in which "th in g s are held
to be o b jects around us, separable and m ovable in space.
But, already at the start o f the discussion (4-6, 3 -5 ),
Heidegger prepares for his own larger context, which in
volves humans as well as things. Thus, he sets up three
sorts o f things: (1 ) the ob jects around us, (2 ) our human
attitu des and procedures, and (3 ) the to tality o f these
two in interdependence together. And, as he says later, the
third is really first (16, 74; 12, 57). Within this larger con
text, our inquiry here w ill center on the things w e find
around us. In order to grasp how these seem ingly inde
pendent things com e to be as we ordinarily find them
around us w e w ill have to concern ourselves also w ith our
own human speech and attitu des and w ith the context
that encom passes both us and them.
Heidegger uses such phrases as "th e being o f w hat is
or "th e thingness o f the thing, and means by that the
basic w ay (m odel, approach, fram ew ork) in which w e
meet these things. This is not som e m ysterious, addi
tional, floating "B ein g, for it is only the mode of being of
these things around us, how they are (9, 7). But that in
volves more than they do. What they are also involves the
context in which, together with us, they com e to be the
w ay they are for us.
Heidegger next discu sses the difference between the
things of common sense and those sam e things as ren
dered by science. Why does he discu ss this difference
here? He w an ts to make clear to us that the things w e run
into are not sim ply given, as they seem, but have alw ays
already involved a certain "ap p roach , w hich could be
different. Once we note these tw o very different w ay s in
which we render things, w e can no longer consider the
things according to either as sim ply given, independent
of us.
256 W HAT I S A T II I N C ?

The w ays in which science and everyday common sense

present "th in g s" arc not at all the sam e. For example, in
ordinary term s, the sun " r is e s " and "s e ts , w hile science
says that it does not (13, 10). What is the relation between
these tw o things the thing of science and the thing of
common observation? Heidegger finds that an under
standing o f an original reference to things is m issing
these days between the things as rendered by science and
the ordinary things around us (41, 31). To relate these
two current approaches o f ours w e w ould have to under
stand how approaches come to be. It is one o f the tasks
of this book to show this, and to show the common origin
of these two.
Heidegger says that ordinary things are alw ays partic
ulars, this one or that one, whereas science studies only
universalities (15, 11-12). He asks: Does modern science
drop out particularity? The common sense things around
us are alw ays this one or that one, but, for science, any
specific thing or event m ust be "d eriva b le from general
theories. We say that w'e lack an explanation (scien tific
accou n t) o f a thing as long as we cannot yet derive its
nature and occurrence from universal, b asic theoretical
postulates (axiom s,p rem ises, principles, Grundstze, pos
tu lates). This is the b a sic "a x io m a tic character o f mod
ern science with w hich Heidegger deals in detail in the
latter part o f this book. In contrast, any ordinary thing is
alw ays this one, a singular, particular thing.
Heidegger next sh ow s that the p articularity o f things
seem s to depend com pletely on their space and time, that
each is here or there, now or then. If tw o things are alike
(15-16, 23; 12, 17), this one is different from that one only
because it is here now, w hile the other is there, or is here
later. It is space and tim e that make ordinary things
particulars. Here he poses a question that he deals w ith
only later: Scientific propositions, too, concern events in
space and time, and not only generalizations. How' does
 A nalysis 257

science use space and tim e so that events can be both

specifically determined and derivable from universal
theory (1 i 1, 129; 86, 101)?
Kant assum ed that human space and time are those of
N ew ton's physics (77, 59), and he showed how N ewtons
"a b so lu te space and time are really generated in the
w ay man thinks about and perceives any law fu l and spe
cific ob ject. (Later we shall see exactly how this is done.)
While Heideggers notion of man is fuller than K ants
Newtonian man, he, too, derives space and time in the
sam e b asic w ay as did Kant: Space and time are gener
ated in the encounter between man and the things that
humans point out, locate, and make specific.
But Heidegger ask s: Is space really involved in the
very make-up o f specific things? Is not space merely a
system o f external relations obtaining between things?
He sh ow s (19, 198; 15, 153) that even if we break a thing
to get to the space "in sid e w e find external relations
between its parts, bits, and pieces. Space seem s to be
not really " in the thing but only the "p o ssib ility of ar
rangements of its parts (in, out, next to, etc.). How does
this p o ssib ility o f spatial structuring come into what a
thing is?
"P o s s ib ility is an important concept in this book and
alw ays refers to how our b a sic approach first m akes
things: it is our p ossible mode o f approach that m akes
it "p o ssib le for things to be as they are encountered, lo
cated, and found by us (21, 189; 16, 148). The thing is
given there, over against us. This encounters externality
is an arranging that m akes and gets into the thing. And
ju st as w e did not see space in the thing directly, we
certainly never see or perceive tim e as such, or in things.
Yet, only space and tim e are in the particularity of each
Ihing.
w h at does Heidegger trace this ch aracteristic of
things, that they are alw ays "th is one or "th a t one (and,

L
258 WH AT IS T H I N G ?

thus, to what docs he trace space and time, since space and
time lend things their p articu larity)? He traces the things
character o f being alw ays "th is one to the things relation
to us or our relation to the thing. IVc point at things and
so call them "th is on e" or "th a t one (24-25, 202; 18-19,
157).
Thus, again (a s he did when he set up the three kinds of
"th in g s ), Heidegger invokes the larger, ordinary, human
context in which w e and things appear together. In that
interplay between us and things, space and time are
generated.
Heidegger argues that w ords such as " t h is and that,
the dem onstrative pronouns, should not be called "p r o
nouns, that is, su b stitu tes for nouns. The use of the w ords
" t h is and th at is the m ost original and earliest mode
o f saying anything and thereby selecting and determining
a thing (25, 19). Only after our interplay w ith things do
they come to have a resulting nature of their own. The
noun becom es p ossible only on the b a sis o f our pointing.
Our dem onstrative definitions precede more developed
definitions, i.e., "th in g s arise only in the context o f their
relation to us and our pointing them out.
And so w e arrive at w hat might be called the main
theme of the book, the betw een." Heidegger is not saying
that a thing is som ething subjective. What a th is is does
not depend upon our caprice and our pleasure. What it is
does depend upon us, but it also equally depends upon
the things (26, 20; also 243, 188). This "b etw een is not
as though first we and things could have existed sepa
rately and then interacted. Rather, w hat a person is is
alw ays already a having things given, and a thing is al
ready som ething that encounters.
As we have seen, w hat a thing is (fo r instance, the sun)
depends on whether we take the thing of science or the
thing o f comm on sense. As Heidegger phrases it, "The
things stand in different truths (14, 11). What a thing is
 Analysis 259

alw ays depends on som e interplay with us, upon some

truth in which it stands.
But Heidegger never speaks of mere view points con
cerning w hat things are. He is concerned w ith concrete
situations, w ith things w e run into, w ork on, and use (both
the common sense things and the scientific airplanes we
fly). That the airplanes we build actually fly is no mere
viewpoint! It is through action in concrete situ atio n s that
'th in g s" com e to be acted on and taken as of a certain
character. The character of things is therefore no mere
viewpoint, but is made in our actions and in the situations.
With our approach w e create. And by explicating the im
plicit approach, philosophy can reopen old decisions and
make further crucial decisions that have equally concrete
effects on w h at things are. Conversely, only in perceiving
and acting on things do we constitute ourselves as hu
mans, ju st as only thereby do the things becom e things.
Heidegger now illu strates this interplay "b etw een man
and things with som e exam ples from Hegel. Hegel showed
that the seem ingly obvious and solid things, this here
and "th is now, change constan tly and are relative to us.
Space and tim e are generated in the interplay between us
and things. The "th is here now depends on me and is a
different "th is here n o w " when I turn. The mere here
n ow is not enough to make a thing." It lacks a lasting
truth and is only its changing relation to us. Thus, the
temporal and spatial asp ects o f this interplay "b etw een
us and things is not alone sufficient to determine a thing.
A second m ajor consideration m ust be taken up (32, 24).
This is our opportunity, therefore, to d iscu ss the two
m ajor considerations along which everything in this book
is divided: ( a ) sensation and ( b ) concepts, or, more b a si
cally, ( a ) givenness and ( b ) collection in a cla ss, or (a )
particulars and ( b ) universals: ( a ) the here-nowr "th is
one and ( b ) "w h a t it is.
What som ething is is alw ays a universal (m any other
 260 W MAT IS T H I N G ?

things can be the sam e "w h a t ). IT w e call "th is one here

now a "c a t , we thereby take and know it a s the sam e as
many other things not here now, which are also cats. "C a t
is thus a universal or a class. What is a ca t? We can delin
eate the traits that make som ething a cat, and each of
these traits is also a universal: many other things (other
ca ts and still other things) are furry, or are anim als, etc.
These are "co n ce p ts in K ants sense o f that word. For
Kant (/1320, B377), a concept is a "ch a ra cteristic m ark
(hat defines the m embers o f a class. Concepts are com
m onalities; they are the sam e wherever and whenever
they occur. A thing is a "th is here now that "b e a r s such
universal "tr a its .
Heidegger ca lls time and space (a s w e ju st left them,
ab o ve) the "re a lm (32, 24) in which things encounter us
(now , and from over there), in w hich things can be
"g ive n as over against us. Concepts, however, organize.
They stabilize the llow o f sentience; they make it into
something. They bring it to a lasting stand. Only both
make a thing. An object in German is a Gegenstand, liter
ally, a standing-against (137, 140, 184, 190; 107-110, 144,
148).
Both givenness and concepts are really interplays "b e
tw een us and things, for givenness is tlieir mode o f en-
' countering us, and the concepts of traits are our w ay of
determining and defining them. Thus, both givenness and
concepts are our w ays. And both are the things w ays.
Yet it is clear that both belong to us only in regard to
how givenness and concepts make things, and belong to
things only as encountering us.
But to w hat does Heidegger trace this conceptual trait-
constitution o f things? He traces it (37, 28) to the struc
ture of our speaking to each other about a situation ( much
as, earlier, he traced the time-space realm of the partic
ularity o f th is or th a t thing to our pointing things
out to each other).
Traditionally in philosophy, a sentence had been an-
 A nalysis 261

alyzed as a connection between a su bject and a predi

cate. Heidegger puts the sentence into the larger context
o f a persons expressing him self to others about a situ a
tion in which facets of the situation are stated, and
som ething (the predicate) is asserted about some facet
(the su b je ct). What is said, the predicate, becom es the
" tr a its of a "th in g . The su bject of the sentence is the
thing, not as seen or perceived but as hypothesized as one
"un der its many traits. The su bject "b e a r s the traits.
This ancient mode o f the underlying subject, as fam iliar
and pervasive as it is, seem s foolish, and its widespread
use m ust be puzzling unless it is seen in the light of its
derivation from the context o f uttering som ething in
speech. 01 course, once it is seen in this way, one is hardly
inclined to assum e that this model is sim ply a given thing
that has this structure of its own accord and apart from
us. In Heideggers view , the underlying trait-bearing
thing w a s modeled after the sentence.
Thus, w e have the second o f the tw o m ajor considera
tions: the thing as bearer of traits (or cla sse s), this, too,
deriving from w ithin an interplay "b etw een man and
things.
It is vital that givenness and concepts are really seen
as tw o different considerations. In modern tim es it is
a Kantian contribution to in sist upon the difference. ;
D escartes, Leibniz, and many others before Kant did not
view perception and thought as really different. Percep
tion w a s viewed as still-unclarified thought. It could be
wholly analyzed and reduced to thought units. But that
meant that there w a s no realm o f givenness of here-now
"th is one and that one. Hence, Leibniz had to hold the
principle o f in discernibles : Two things cannot be alike
in every one o f their conceptualizable traits. They would
be only one thing (23, 17). For Leibniz, only traits, not
space and time, could distinguish tw o things. Why does
this m atter here? Because that view gave all power to |
axiom atic concepts and none to givenness. In that view,
262 W H AT IS A T H I N G ?

reason determ ines everything and depends only on itself

(a rational, axiom atic, m athem atical-physical system ).
That w as the Renaissance w ay "th in g s" were. Heidegger
w an ts to show that it w as this lim itless power o f pure
reason that Kant lim its" in his Critique. Kant lim its the
rational bv show ing how concepts are only the w ays in
which sensory givens go into the make-up o f the things
we experience. These have been some of the main prob
lem s which Heidegger discu sses in the first section and
upon which he builds the latter sections o f the book.
Even though it seem s so "n a tu ra l," the "th in g is a
historical product (37, 28). Things would not need to
be as they are, over there, m ovable in space, lasting
through time, each thing with its traits (u n iversals) held,
carried, and borne by an individuating space-tim e posi
tion.
That orange chair over there" is a historical product.
It is som ething made. A furniture m anufacturer made it
along certain lines of use and taste that a designer had
before he designed the chair (71-72, 55). And the "m e re
observer is also a maker, but in a special, narrowed case
that occurs in a setting o f cultural making. As its charac
ter as a chair is made, so also are its general ch aracteristics
as a thing made, along the model o f m ovable units in
space and time, a model that the p hysicists first made, i.e.,
postulated axiom atically.
We might w ish sim ply to reject this model of the thing
because it is a "m ech an istic, lifeless, rigid model. There
is a current tendency among som e groups to denigrate
scientific conceptual methods without actu ally grasping
their nature, and to reject pseudo-explanatory models
altogether. In line with this tendency we might w ish to
reject the thing-model in favor of a sim ple appeal to the
ordinary, or in favor of a reaffirmation o f life and human
creativity. But if w e do only that we w ill fail to move
beyond the thing-model, because without examining it
fully, we w ill not notice how it pervades the w ay we think,
 A nalysis 263

meet, and deal with alm ost any thing. Thus, w e might re
ject the m echanistic, thinglike ways o f thought where we
do see them clearly, and yet w e w ill operate w ith them and
w ith nothing else in all w e see and do. As Heidegger
argues, only by studying the model in depth, only by ap
preciating the questions it answered (putting w hat it
decided into question an ew ) can w e really get beyond it.
Heidegger gives som e examples (51-52, 39): We tend
to approach poems as things and thereby make the study
o f poetry "d reary. We fail to understand plants and ani
m als because we tend to approach them as "th in g s, i.e.,
as m ovable bodies in space, as the orange chair over there.
We have becom e so accustom ed to this "th in g that we
approach anything as a separable "th in g over there. A
plant is considered as a "livin g thing, as b asically a
thing or body w ith m ysterious added-on traits o f life.
W orks o f art are considered "th in g s w ith aesthetic traits
som ehow added on. Sim ilarly, w e often view personality,
and even ourselves, as a "p erso n ality structure, or a
" s e lf " (a s if it were a thing, in side), or as having "p er
sonality co n ten ts or "p erso n ality tra its as if a person
were a structure w ith parts, a container w ith things in
side, or a su bject bearing traits.
A thing has a separate location in space, and hence we
impute a separate location to anything we approach as
a thing. This model of the thing leads to a great many
separations: w e separate su b jects and objects, inside and
outside, feelings and situ ations, individuals and inter
personal relationships, individual and com m unity, the
time moment now and tim e a moment later, sym bol and
knower, body and mind, etc. These m any d ivisions are not
separate issues, since each involves the sam e type o f con
ceptual constru ct of things, each as separately located, a
unit "th in g existing here now in a certain unit of space
and at a "m o m en t," i.e., a unit bit o f time. Time, too, is
conceived as made up o f bit things, units, m om ents. W hy?
11 is not because w e som ehow perceive and study tim e and
264 W H IS T H I N G ?

find it to be such. One does not perceive time as such.

We conceive time as m om ents because our approach is
one of thing units.

Section B -I

Here, Heidegger traces the thing-models history. We

w ill likely take for granted that "sp a ce is everywhere the
sam e until we realize that the notion o f such a space w as
lacking among the Greeks. Instead, they thought that
each thing had its own proper place, and that the move
ment of a thing w a s alw ays back to its proper place. Un
less externally restrained, an earthen thing tended down
w ard and a fiery one "u p w ard . Each thing thus tended
to move in a certain w ay o f its own accord, and this w as
termed each thing's "in tern al principle o f m otion. Greek
things were not mere bodies that had to be moved. If
allowed to do so, they moved them selves back to their
own places (83-84, 64-65). Thus, there were different
kinds of places in the Greek model. We realize that out-
own everywhere-uniform space, too, is very much a
model, perhaps better than the Greek, perhaps not, but at
any rate not self-evident.
In the Newtonian model, ju st as in the Greek, the nature
o f space is related to what thing and motion are. For us
there is no "in tern al principle o f m otion by which a
body m oves itself. Rather, bodies are moved, put into
motion only by som ething else, and they remain in motion
until stopped by som ething else. All our "p rin cip les of
m otion are "ou tsid e p rincip les": som ething else out
side the body is alw ays posited to explain w hy a body
com es into motion. Our law s o f motion are the sam e for
all places, and, hence, there is "sp a ce , everywhere ju st
the same. Of course the earthen things, when allowed to,
can still be observed to move "d o w n w ard ju st as they
did in ancient Greece. But how we grasp what things are
differs. We posit gravitational attraction outside the
thing to explain why it m oves.
 A nalysis 265

When the different m otions of different things are ex

plained by different outside causes, all "b o d ie s (th in g s)
are viewed as fundam entally the sam e in their basic
nature. Of course they do not all look or act the same,
but then w e think of them as made up o f little "th in g s
(a few types, each alw ays the sam e: atom s, electrons,
protons), and we explain all differences as different ar
rangements of these sam e things. What, where, and when
anything is or moves w ill alw ays be derivable according
to the sam e b asic principles.
The world is conceived as made o f arrangem ents of
uniform units o f m atter and space (92-93, 71-72). If two
constellation s are made of the sam e parts and in the
same patterns, exactly the sam e events w ill occur. And
if time and space do not make tw o otherw ise identical
constellation s different (a s for Leibniz they do n ot), such
tw o things would really be only one thing.
Heidegger term s this aspect of the scientific approach
its basic "m a th em a tical character. He calls modern
science m athem atical, not because it so widely em ploys
m athem atics but because this basic plan of uniform units
m akes it p ossible to quantify everything one studies. It
m akes everything am enable to m athem atics.
Heidegger discusses tw o related reasons for calling the
basic scientific approach "m ath em atical, i.e., tw o reasons
lor m athem atics becom ing such an important tool in this
approach: First, because it is a model of uniform units
and hence m akes uniform measurement possible every
where, and, second, because it is "a x io m a tic that is
it is posited (a s an axiom in geom etry). Furthermore,
Heidegger argues that the model copies our own thought
procedures. Its uniform units are uniform thought steps
transformed into a ground plan postulated as the basic
structure o f things. Here these tw o lines o f argument
w ill be discussed in turn:
1) The approach to things as consisting of uniform
units m akes m athem atics applicable to things: numbers
are com positions of uniform units. Seventeen co n sists ol
 266 W HAT IS T H I N G ?

the sam e units as fourteen, only there are three more of

them. Since the units are the sam e, it would not m atter
which three of the seventeen units were considered to
be three more than fourteen. T h e iv js a serial procedure
employed in counting. In this procedure w e obtain various
numbers because we alw ays keep in mind the units al
ready counted. Our counting "sy n th e size s" (pu ts to
gether) fourteen and another, another, and another. We
keep what we have with us as w e add another sam e unit.
Our own continuity as w e count gets us to the higher
number. As Kant phrased it, without the unity o f the I
think, there would be only the one unit counted now,
and no com position of num bers. We get from fourteen
to seventeen by taking fourteen with us as we go on to

I
add another, another, and another. Thus, our activity of
thinking provides both the series of uniform steps and
the uniting o f them into quantities. These units and
numbers are our own notches, our own "an oth er, our
own unity, and our own steps. Why do tw o plus tw o
equal four? The steps are alw ays the sam e; hence, the
second tw o involves steps o f the sam e sort as the first
tw o, and both are the sam e uniform steps as counting to
four. Thus, the basic m athem atical com posing gives
science its uniform unitlike "th in g s and derivable com
positions (70-71, 54). Therefore, everything so viewed
becom es am enable to m athem atics (93-94, 72).
2) But Heidegger term s the modern model o f things
"m ath em atical (97, 74) for a second reason. He argues
that "m ath em atical means "a x io m a tic : the basic nature
of things has been posited as identical to the steps of
our own proceeding, our own pure reasoning. The law s
of things are the logical n ecessity o f reasons own steps
(102, 75) posited as law s o f nature. It is this that m akes
the model "m ath em atical and explains w hy m athem atics
acquired such an im portant role. The everywhere-equal
units of the space of uniform motion o f b asically uni
form bodies are really only posited axiom s. They are the
uniform step s o f pure, rational thought, put up as axiom s
 A nalysis 267

of nature. D escartes had said it at its "co ld e st (101, 78)

and m ost extreme: Only a method o f reducing everything
to the clear and distin ct steps o f rational thinking grasps
nature.
Is not such an approach sim ply unfounded? Every
thing may follow from the starting assum ptions, but what
are they based upon? How can that be a valid method?
Heidegger says that the axiom atic method lays its own
ground (98, 75). He thus gives the term "a x io m a tic a
meaning it does not alw ays have: he m akes it reflexive
(a s D escartes method w a s ). "A x io m a tic" means not only
to postulate axiom s and then deduce from them; it does
not refer to ju st any unfounded assum ptions one might
posit and deduce from. Rather, Heidegger em phasizes that
the axiom s that rational thought posits assert the nature
o f rational thought itself. Axiom atic thought p osits itself
as the w orld s outline. It is based on itself. It creates the
model o f the world, not only by but as its own steps of
thought. As w e have seen, it is rational thought that has
uniform unit steps and their com posits, logical neces
sity and so forth. The axiom atic ground-plan o f nature is
sim ply the plan o f the nature o f rational thought a s
serted o f nature. This, then, is the b asic "m ath em atical
character o f modern science. It is founded on the "a x io
m atic" method o f "pure reason, which, as we shall see,
Kant retains but lim its.
Heidegger now sh ow s the extent to which sciences
axiom atic thought-plan had reigned. Even God w a s sub
ject to it. Philosophically explicated (D escartes and
Leibniz), the law ful character o f nature meant that Gods
thinking (the thinking that creates nature) w a s axio
m atic, logical thought. The power o f axiom atic thought
is thus lim itless. It creates nature. And so it w as held that
God him self could not act otherw ise than he does and
that he is subservient to logical thought. Nature could not
p ossibly be otherw ise than along the lines o f that which
fo llo w s logically.
Heidegger recalls that medieval philosophy had be
268 W HAT IS A T H I N G ?

queathed three different main topics o f philosophy: God

(theology), w orld (co sm olo gy), and man (psychology)
(111, 86), which are sim ilar to Heideggers three sorts
o f "th in g s (6, 5). All three now becam e determined bv
m an 's axiom atic thought. There w a s thus a rational
theology," a rational psychology, and a "ration al co s
m ology. Reason w as lim itless. Using pure reason, man
could conclude not only about man, world, and God but
about w hat w a s possible and im possible in any p ossible
reality. This unlimited power of pure reason leads to
K ants task o f setting its lim its. We m ust notice, however,
not only the vast extent of this power and the evident
need to lim it it but that this power is founded on the role
that thought has in generating the b asic scientilic ground-
plan, unity, and law fu lness o f things! Kant lim its the
power o f reason only by showing more exactly how its
power is legitim ately founded. He sh ow s how thought
legitim ately participates in the form ation of anything w e
experience. But first, Heidegger prepares for his discus
sion of Kant by reopening the question o f the time: Why
is the axiom atic model applicable to nature? Heidegger
show s the vast role that cam e to be assigned to rational
thought. Then Kant lim its it by showing the roles of
thinking in the experience o f things, the generating of
space, time, units, the unity of anything, and the law fu l
ness o f events.
We recall Heideggers earlier discussion of the need for
the thing to be an underlying "bearer o f traits. A persons
"th is here n ow is alw ays changing. Som ething m ust stand
steady: it is the thing, w hich underlies all its visib le and
changing traits. This view goes back to A ristotle, for
whom the thing w a s analogous to the subject o f the
sentence and the traits w ere the predicates. The Greek
term for m atter means "w h a t underlies, and its Latin
translation is "su b je c t. Thus, already for the Greeks, the
thing as the underlying m atter w a s viewed in term s of
the subject to which predicates are lied in thought.
 Analysis 269

With the rise o f modern science the axiom atic method

of purely logical steps of thought has replaced the under
lying m atter that holds the traits together and explains
how they change. (F or instance, in D escartes' example
( M editations, II), a piece o f w ax is first w h ite and then
charred. The scientific explanation requires that the wax
really be an underlying analytical fram ework. Both the
perceived w hite and charred m ust be reduced to these
underlying thought-dim ensions.)
Heidegger points to the change in meaning that the
word "su b je c t underwent from being "w h a t underlies
as the su b ject of the sentence and the m atter o f the thing
to its modern meaning as the "p e rso n and "su b je c tiv e
thought. The thing that underlies is now our own thought!
For Kant, too, the unity o f things and of space and
time (in fact, all necessary connective un ity) com es from
"I th in k." If there were not a single thinker and perceiver,
thoughts and perceptions would be isolated: if you both
saw and tasted a lump o f sugar, it would be as though
you saw w hite and someone else tasted sw eet. The one
ness o f our thinking is "w h a t underlies" (as, for example,
when w e count units w e take them along and thereby
unite them as we go on counting). Thus, the su bject that
"b e a r s " the traits or predicates is the thought unity of
the experiencer.
But this "I think is not an object; it is only the unity
of our process in knowing sensory objects. For Kant,
rational logic is no longer valid independent o f sensation.
Sensation is no longer sim ply "co n fu se d " thought that
must be reduced to analytic clarity derivable from axiom s.
Rather, the sensory given and rational thought are two
different ingredients o f any experience.
K ants Critique o f Pure Reason considers axiom atic
thought to be only our human, finite thinking (rather than
world-constituting ration ality). This fundam entally alters
the whole approach (135, 105-106). As human and finite,
our axiom atic thinking is limited to its roles in the make
270 W H AT I S A T H I N G ?

up of sensory experience. Alone it does not constitute an

object. Thereby, rational m etaphysics com es to be seen
as invalid speculation.
With Kant (and Heidegger), this valid, lim ited role
o f our thinking has alw ays already occurred whenever
we experience. It is not som ething w e "g et from or "add
to experience. Thus, the m athem atical asp ects o f nature
are not som e grid that wo place over what w e experience,
but our approach to sensible things. Only w ith som e ap
proach does one encounter anything. Kant thought only
the Newtonian approach w as really b asic to human ex
perience; Heidegger view s this as histo rically variable.
But they agree that things are never experienced except
as some approach has already played its role. Only then
is anything such as "experience rendered possible, for
experience is alw ays already organized (fo r example,
laid out, sequential, quantifiable, predictable, and under
stood as w hatever it is an experience o f). We never ex
perience som ething totally unrecognizable, unidentifiable,
and out o f context. Even if wre were to have such an ex
perience, w e would identify it by time, place, and w hat
led up to it. Thus, the Kantian Critique, and Heidegger
too, w ill do nothing to overthrow those asp ects o f the
axiom atic method that im ply that experience is made
partly by thought. The best example o f this is the scien
tific experiment.
Heidegger argues that the basic character of modern
science is m issed if one says that it differs from earlier
science by being experimental. For Heidegger, the fact
that modern science is "exp erim en tal is only another
result o f its being b asically axiom atic: an experiment is
no mere observing. An experiment in the modern sense
alw ays first sets up a hypothetical fram ework. We set
up the conditions and procedures in advance; only w ithin
them is nature allowed to answer, and it can say only yes
or no. It m ust respond w ithin our fram ework (67-68,
93; 52, 72). ( Bacon had said that it is not enough to observe
 A nalysis 271

nature. We m ust "to rtu re nature and see w h at then hap

pens under the circum stances w e set up and put into
action. And Kant cites Bacons point in his Preface.)-
Heidegger argues that o b jects in science are made in
a w ay sim ilar to the w ay w e m ake tools. (Again, here he
provides the broader, ordinary man-world context within
which science and all else a rise.) The use o f a tool is
known in advance and determines the structure w e give
it when we invent and make it (71-72, 55). A context of
culture and use is alw ays already im plicit when anything
is made. As tools are made, the things of science and the
results o f experiments arc also made and involve a prior
cultural knowing a pre-existing context o f man and
world in w hich the thing is made a s (and can then be taken
a s ) that kind of thing.
For the Greeks there w as a b asic difference between
made things and things of nature (83, 63). Only natural
things had their own nature and internal origin o f motion.
Som ething artificially made had its being moved only
from the outside, by being made. For axiom atic science
all things are only as we m athem atically "m a k e them.
Later in this an alysis w e w ill discuss Heideggers at
tem pts to move beyond the current technological situ a
tion, in w hich nature is som ething w e make. Heidegger
sees vast dangers in it, just as he criticizes the view of
human nature, art, and life as "th in g s. We have seen that
the thing is made. W ill man the m aker reduce him self
to an axiom atically made "n atu re that can say only yes
or no w ithin a fram ework set in advance?
Of course this making o f nature w orks only when
nature says " y e s to the fram ew ork and apparatus we
devise. But nature and reality are "w o rkin g fo rces (93,
72). Nature "w o r k s for us w ithin the term s w e pre-set.
1hus, the experimental character o f modern science is

. . constraining nature to give answer to questions of rea

sons own determining (B xii-xiii).
272 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

another aspect of its "a x io m a tic character: our deter

mining what things are. As w e w ill see now, Kant ex
plained and lim ited this puzzling fact.

Section B -II

Kant accepts the axiom atic character o f thought (184,

144), as can be seen from his own axiom atic w ay o f pro
ceeding. He sets up a "sy ste m and derives experience
from the principles he sets up (122, 94-95).
Kant also retains the m athem atical approach to ex
perience: as w e still often do, Kant view s experience in
term s of units. The m athem atical method has been ap
plied to break things up into sense-data un its felt pres
sure sensations, heard b its o f sounds, seen color bits,
etc. as if these were self-subsistin g, separate unit-things
(209, 162). But for Kant these are not experience. Ex
perience is never had except as it involves much more
than such unit sensations.
For example: I am hit on the arm by a rock. The sen
satio n s are the pressure, the sound thud, and the gray,
etc. However, these sensations occur here (on my left
arm ), now (w h ile the sun is shining), and at a certain,
given, m easurable intensity. For Kant, sensations never
occur without being definitely located in space and time,
nor do they occur w ithout a certain intensity.3 It is not

;! These w ays in which conceptual aspects participate in experi

ence to make up objects are w ays in which objects become in
dividually and specifically "determ ined (186, 202; 146, 157). We
must alw ays see em pirically ju st where and when something oc
curs, and with what intensity, and in which necessary explanatory
connections. These specifications determine a specific thing. Any
objective thing is necessarily determined along these respects,
and as long as we do not know all these we have not determined
the thing objectively.
Thus, explanatory concepts belong to the determinate charac
ter of any thing, as Leibniz held, but so do space and time loca
tions, as Newton held.
Leibniz argued, against Newtons absolute space, that space is
 A nalysis 273

possible to have an experience o f pressure such that I

would not know where, or would not as yet know when,
or not yet sense any degree of intensity. Finally, sensations
are never experienced except as connected to other events.
I would not consider it "p o ssib le that I am being hit,
but not by anything related to anything previous ( if I
had only this m om entary appearance of pressure and a
floating gray shape). If a rock hit me I would wonder
who threw it. Someone "m u st have. Or it "m u st have
lallen from somewhere. It "cou ld n ot have popped out
of nowhere ju st in front o f m y arm. Experience is only
"p o ssib le as a tissue o f already connected events.
Of course w e m ay not as yet know who threw it, or

only a system of relations between bodies. Thus, motion is alw ays

only relative. Motion is a change of location, but location for
Leibniz w as definable only relative to other bodies and not in an
absolute space. If this body moves, one can just as well say that all
others move in various w ays with respect to it, and it is at rest.
Things are real, but space is only their relation.
Newton, however, found that a body in motion develops centrif
ugal force. Yet nothing like this happens to the objects at rest,
although they have motion with respect to the first body.
Thus, an objects spatial location (and change in location,
which is motion) must somehow be absolute. The space system
must be capable of determining which body is in motion, and not
merely the spatial relations between them. In this context it is
very important for Kant to show how spatial location has a de-
terminative role in making up what the object is. Thus, for Kant,
space and time are not concepts but (as Heidegger put it)
realm s" in which anything encounters, or, in Kants words, the
form of anything sensorily given, i.e., outside us and sequentially.
Kant thus showed both the quantitative idealization aspect of
time and space, which has a conceptual origin, and the determina
tive role that space and time location must play in specifying any
possible sensory object, this one rather than another one like it.
(And thus, too, Leibnizs principle of indiscernibles comes to an
end, precisely because it had been an expression of the lim itless
and sole power of axiom atic thought without its function in inter
play with givenness.)
But, for Kant (B136 and 138), the united and uniform quantita
tive character of space is fundamentally organized only by the
observers thought connections. In this latter respect Kant antici
pates Einstein, for whom also the measurers framework is an
inherent part of what space is and how it determines things.
274 W IS A T H I N G ?

even if it w as a rock. If it looks very strange we may not

yet know what it is. But w e know it cannot be ju st a
sensory datum o f grayness and pressure, floating and
unconnected to any other observable events.
Thus, the explanatory connective relations are alw ays
already necessarily involved in any sensory experience,
and even if we do not yet know what they are w e flatly
in sist that they are there and that w e m ust study until
w e find them.
It m ay require long and highly specific em pirical study
to determine w hat the object is, i.e., w hat necessary rela
tions actually obtain between this sensation and other
sensations. (S a y w e eventually discover that it is a meteor,
a leftover bit from a planetary explosion attracted to
Earth bv gravitation.) We do not ju st invent the specific
conceptual relations that explain and tie together the ap
pearances w e sense. But in advance of determining w hat
a given connection is, we already know and in sist that
som e necessary ob jective connections do obtain. The gen
eral system o f necessary relations is set in advance. W ith
out it the pressure and gray shape could be purely floating
appearances, but w e consider that "im p o ssib le . The
necessary relations are ob jectively there, they are already,
in experience. We work until we discover them spe
cifically.
Thus, in the scientific approach any experience alw ays
already involves definiteness in spatio-temporal quanti
tative and intensity respects, and necessary conceptual
connections between events. The peculiar tw ist here is
that it is ju st the conceptual connections (o f thought)
that m ake sensations into o b jects rather than mere sub
je ctive appearances.
This Kantian puzzle is resolved when w e realize that
connections are not p ossible without that which they
connect. Therefore, these are valid thought-connections
only as they are the connections of sensory givens. Kant
begins w ith the interplay. "E xp erience is an interplay.
 A nalysis 275

Only w ithin it are there a thinker and things. There is no

human su b ject except as a receiver and thinker o f ex
perience. There are no things except as received and
thought in experiencing.
As Heidegger view s it, German nineteenth-century
Idealism , although later than Kant, failed to absorb
this insight o f K ant's: that the whole experiential inter
play is already involved in anything like a self. Sim ilarly,
Positivism failed to absorb K ants insight: that the ex
periential interplay is already involved in anything like
a separate thing. Therefore, in Heideggers own historical
sequence, Kant com es after German Idealism and Posi
tivism . (Only as a result o f the much later neo-Kantianism
w as Kant understood, says Heidegger (60, 46). It w as
one hundred years late (57, 43), as Kant him self pre
dicted.)
How do conceptual connections function in given sen
sation s?
An "o b je c t is really sensations. But sensations have
a definite size and duration in space and time (Categories,
group 1) and intensity (group II), and Kant ca lls such
determ inate sensations appearances. (Sen satio n s never
actu ally appear any other w a y .) And, when such deter
m inate sensations are further determined by explanatory
conceptual connections (group III) so that their occur
rence fo llo w s from law s, Kant calls such sensations ob
jects. (A s unconnected, such appearances could only be
su b jective.) We really see only the gray shape, even when
w e see it now and here, so large and as a rock, w hich m ust
have been thrown. Thus, o b jects are sensations, but the
conceptual connectives have alw ays already functioned
in any actual experience.
Kant ca lls this conceptual tying together of sensations
into o b jects "sy n th e sis. But it is only from experience
that we learn what specific connections do obtain be
tween tw o events (and w hat space-tim e relations and
what intensity ob tain ). Only the fram ework of the type
276 W IS A T H I N G ?

o f measures and questions is conceptual. It w as in this

sam e sense that we said earlier than an experiment poses
the hypothetical fram ework in advance of the results,
and only w ithin this fram ework does the experiment have
precise results. Only w ithin the fram ework does it pro
vide objective, em pirical answers.
But such science raises the b asic question: In w hat
w ay does the given exert control over the specific con
ceptual connections? Thought steps such as in logic or
counting m ust be such that sensory givens can control
them! When and why?
Thus, Kant alters the b asic view that until then had
been held traditionally, concerning w hat such a thought
step, a judgm ent, is. As had been discussed by Descartes
and Leibniz, a judgment w a s only a connection between
tw o concepts (the su b ject and the predicate in a sen
tence). Heideggers example, The board is b la ck (155,
122). A judgm ent w as viewed as a connection between
tw o concepts, a merely logical step from one to the other,
tying the two. Now Kant show s that there is a type of
thought step that connects not only concepts but, in the
sam e act, connects the grid ("r e a lm ," Bereich, m anifold)
in w'hich any possible sensations w ill occur.
Heidegger em phasizes that for Kant the view o f judg
ments as mere connections between tw o concepts (S u b
je ct and Predicate) is insufficient. Kant seeks the sort
o f connection between tw o concepts that sim ultaneously
organizes whatever sensory givens can occur. Kant calls
such a connection syn th etic."
The question of judgm ent is now not On what basis
are a su bject and a predicate tied together ( S - P )? Rath
er, the question is How does an S -P tie go to make up
(syn th esize) an experience o f an object (S P -O )? It
is not a thought coupled to another thought, but a thought-
couple coupling all p ossible sensations, thereby making
an object (157, 123).
But there are four w ays in w hich synthetic thought
 A nalysis 277

connections w ork in an experience o f objects. These arc

the four principles, the Kantian dem onstrations, which
Heidegger d iscusses in the last part o f the book:
I. For Kant, "tw o plus tw o equals four is a "sy n
thetic judgment. By explaining his view on this, w e can
best shed light on the first role conceptual connections
play in m aking up experience ("T he Axiom s of Intuition,
194, 151).
Judgments are "a n a ly tic when the su bject already
means the predicate. ("B ach elo rs are unmarried. ) What
D escartes said applies to such judgm ents: One need only
avoid contradiction. Thus, the principle of non-contradic-
tion is the "to p principle of all analytic judgm ents. But,
in opposition to D escartes, Kant holds that the principle
of non-contradiction is not enough (173, 181-182; 135,
142). M athem atics first involves a synthesis that is nec
essary for all experience.
Synthetic judgm ents involve a further step o f thought
not given by non contradiction alone. But the "to p prin
ciple o f synthetic judgm ents involves not merely the
two concepts o f this step of thought but also imagination
and the unity of the thinker. "T w o plus tw o, considered
as mere concept, seem s to give enough inform ation to
give us four, and thus seem s analytic. But w e are con
cerned w ith how the concepts are formed in the first
place, and wo are concerned w ith how, in being formed,
they also synthesize the realm for all o b jects. In forming
the concept o f "tw 'o and o f "fo u r w e must add, count,
and keep or unify the steps to form the number. (S im i
larly, if w'e imagine drawing a line, \vc keep w hat w e have
imagined drawing as w e draw further, or we would get no
line, only m om entary b its.) The unity o f one a ctivity of
thought provides the connective union. Kant ca lls the
judgment "sy n th e tic " because in the connection o f the
steps of counting w e generate the continuous quantifiable
grid for all p ossible ob jects. Wc generate the quantifiable
space (a s w e draw lin es) and the sequence of time (a s we
278 W II A T I S A T H I N G ?

cou n t). Space and time are b a sically those of imagined

drawing and counting units. Hence, the connections be
tween our steps o f thought "sy n th esize the imagined
"sch e m a ta of space and time.
Thus, conceptual connections are involved in the gen
eration o f the continuous imagined grid o f units o f space
and tim e, and anything ever sensed or imagined m ust
appear w ithin them.
Because o f this synthesis or com position o f units, w e
can also define the purely an alytic relationships of the
concepts. But, for Kant, the synthesis (th e m aking) of
concepts alw ays precedes their analytic relationships.
Concept form ation precedes the an alysis of already
formed concepts. The origin o f the connections in a con
cept m ust first be shown. And concept form ation m ust
be so accounted for that w e can see how the experience
of object is thereby patterned. In this instance w e have
seen the form ation o f numbers and the thought steps o f
counting in such a w ay that the uniform unit com posi
tion of experience in space and time w a s also shown.
Heidegger, too, show s how time, space, and unit things
are generated in the interplay between man and thing.
We are our concerns, fears, and hopes, and, because w e
are a projection into the future, we generate time. (Hence
w e m ust not think o f ourselves as "th in g s" present in
tim e.) For Heidegger, w e generate space in the context of
pointing to and distancing o b jects as over there, plotting
out a system o f orientations in a social interaction w ith
others amid things (2 5 ,19). But the uniform , quantitative
grid o f size and duration is only one o f the w ays that con
nections between conceptual steps also connect experi
ence. Let us turn to a second.
II. Quantitative m easurement is applicable, not only
to space and time locations and durations o f sensations,
but also to their intensity. K ants "an ticip atio n s of per
ception (2 0 6 ,160) concern this second and different way.
 A nalysis 279

Space and time alone, only imagined, m ake geom etry and
arithm etic applicable to anything. Why is degree o f in
tensity a different sort o f thought connection? Because
som ething actually sensed m ust appear. But even before
it appears we know it must have a m easurable in tensity.
To color shades, light, intensity, degree o f pressure, etc.,
the (co n cep tu al) continuum o f degrees and m athem atical
measurement is again applicable. This is the second w ay
in which connections between concepts also thereby syn
thesize a connective continuum for sensory experience.
III. The first two have been K ants "m ath em atical
principles. In these the thought steps and connections
are inherent in the sensory appearance itself. In contrast,
the third concerns connections between different occur
ences of givens (224, 174). Kant ca lls the third and fourth
dynam ical. From som ething now given we can often
infer that som ething else must soon happen. Let us
say we know that the inferred alw ays had happened when
ever this sort o f thing first happened. But our sequential
memory alone cannot ensure that it m ust happen in the
sam e sequence again. If we do not know why this alw ays
happens when that does, w e m ay well be wrong or we
may have neglected to account for som e intervening
change. At any rate, we did not yet have the ob jective
connection. Only if we know w hy this m akes that happen
can w e say that it "m u st" happen again. Thus, explana
tory conceptual connections (ju st as D escartes said ) pro
vide the ob jective scientific connections o f any p ossible
appearances.
But, even so, w e might be wrong. We are sure only that
the general structure of experience is along these lines.
There is som e explanation connecting events. The spe
cific explanations are con stan tly discovered, improved,
and extended. They m ust be found from experience. When
we find that w e were wrong, we find that what we
thought w as an "o b je ctiv e explanation really w as not.
280 W II A T IS A T H I N G ?

Thus, w e experience o b je cts only in term s of necessary

connections between events, i.e., the explanatory relations
we seek.
IV. Finally (236, 183), since experience is p ossible
only w ith us, not for o b jects apart from us, what can ra
tional thought conclude in advance as to w hat is p ossible
or im possible? For Kant, God, nature, and man are no
longer su bject to the logical law s o f rational thought.
Logical p o ssib ility is not experiential p ossibility. Only
that is possible in experience which conform s to the
above three groups o f principles (I, II. III). Except as
thought connections also synthesize actual sensory ex
perience, thought alone is not decisive about w hat is
p ossible or im possible.
In these four principles, Heidegger sh ow s that Kant
dem onstrates the role of each conceptual principle in
experience by a syllo g istic sequence. The first (m a jo r)
prem ise tells som ething that is the case in all experience.
The second (m in o r) premise states that this aspect o f ex
perience is p ossible only as a certain conceptual connec
tion has already participated. The principle Kant is prov
ing then fo llo w s by logical necessity. But despite this
elegant method of proof, the proofs are all circu lar :
the principle that is concluded (proven) is really m erely
shown to have been already involved in the first premise.
In short, the dem onstration show s how the principles
are already involved in experience.
This "c ir c le " (224, 241; 174, 187) is of great im portance
to Heidegger and lies in the very nature o f ontology (the
study of how what is is con stitu ted ). W hatever is is al
w ays already patterned in interplay w ith us before we
ever make explicit what and how it is. Our "understand
ing prestructures everything in those respects we have
outlined. We have alw ays already been involved in any
thing we have experienced. Our approach has functioned
already. To m ake it explicit is what Kant calls the "tra n s
cendental task. We can show only circu larly how w e are
 Analysis 281

alw ays already involved. The human su b je ct's process

is alw ays already involved im plicitly and thought along
w ith the thing when the thing is approached as a separate
entity out there. Thus, the roles o f thought in synthesizing
what things are "leap ahead o f" things in Heideggers w ay
o f putting what Kant called "tran scend ental. Philosophy
m akes explicit how we have already approached and par
ticipated in the making o f the thing (a s well as, in the
sam e process, in the making of ourselves as selves or sub
je cts). But such explicating can alter (h ow w e app roach)
things. Therein, Heidegger sees the power of philosophy.

3. HEIDEGGER AND KANT

One reason, among others, that it w a s n ecessary to go

so exactly into K ants approach is that Heideggers philos
ophy fo llo w s K ant's in so many b asic w ays w ith this
difference: Heidegger begins w ith man in the context of
the ordinary world rather than in the context o f science.
This difference gives a very different ring to everything
Heidegger says. We w ill take up here how K ants "tra n
scendental roles that thought plays (in what ob jects
are) becom e Heideggers "tran scend ence the w ay hu
man beings feeling, explication, language, and action
"sk e tc h out the world, set up situ ations, and thereby
partly create what the things are.
Heidegger, like Kant, view s tim es order as generated
by us in our interplay w ith things. For Heidegger, how
ever, this is not the linear time generated by m athem at
ical thought but a tim e generated by the broader human
process o f "being-in-the-world, feeling, speaking, and
acting in situ ations. Hence, it is a time in which the im
port of the past is being modified by how one is now con
cerned about what one is about to do.
Ju st as for Kant the human su bject (the I think that
provides the synthesizing and steps o f thought) is not
282 W H A T IS T H I N G ?

itse lf an object, so for Heidegger the human being is not

a thing, but rather the process of approaching things. A
human person is a being-in and a being-toward, alw ays a
caring for, w orrying about, trying to avoid, striving for,
being afraid of, hoping for, etc. Man is this projecting.
(Heidegger ca lls it the care structure.) I am my being-in
the situ ation s (the sentence I am trying to w rite, the
point 1 am getting at, the book I am finishing, the situ a
tion J am trying to create, the p itfalls I am trying to avoid,
e tc .).
Heidegger in sists, as did Kant, that in any experience or
situation the crucial w ays w e participate in creating
things and situ atio n s have already functioned. Heidegger
points out that apart from our own striving or fearing
there cannot be a situation in the first place. A situation
is not like given things in the room, but like my trying to
find something, or get out, or in, or w hatever I am trying
to do there, perhaps w hat I w ish I could and cannot. But
there is no fact that I cannot do it until I first p roject it
by wanting to do it, and this im plies my purposes, fears,
or concern.
Kant had shown that even for the things in the room to
be given, thought has already functioned in constituting
and objectively connecting sensations into objects. Thus,
the role Kant assigned to scientific thought Heidegger
assign s to the w ider human feeling, living, and thinking.
For Heidegger, as for Kant, our transcending has al
w ays functioned in advance o f ( it "lea p s ahead" and helps
create) the facts we experience. But what for Kant w as
called "exp erience" (the connected system of experienced
nature as rendered by scien ce) becom es, for Heidegger,
our alw ays finding ourselves "th ro w n into situ ations.
Just as o b jects involve our being affected by sensations,
so for Heidegger a situation is my situation because it can
affect me (in term s of affect, feeling, B efindlichkeit). Like
Kant, Heidegger asserts the partial independence of both
the human role and the things role. We can define neither
 Analysis 283

except as the interplay has already functioned, but what

can be done with the things is not at all arbitrary, not
ju st anything w e like.
Kant derived the transcendental principles from pure
concep ts o f the "un derstan din g" (V erstan d) (144, 112).
For Heidegger, how human feeling sets up situ ation s is
called "understanding (V erstehen) and is pre-concep-
tual. A context o f meaning is projected by the w ay w e are
feelingly in our situ ations. (S itu atio n s are made by our
concerns in terms o f which they are situ ation s for us.)
With w ords w e can then explicate this "understanding
of our situ ations, w hich w as already im plicit in our felt
being-in situ ations.
It is an error to consider feeling as som ething within
us that could exist without constituting a situation, and
to consider situ ation s as external, apart from how w e feel
our thrownness and vulnerability. That view considers
feelings along the thing-model as if they were little things
located inside us. My fear is my vulnerability to being
affected in the situation, and it con stitu tes the threat. The
threat that could m aterialize or that I could avoid is my
situation. What I feel is not my feeling but my situation.
The situ ation is not p hysically defined facts but the sig
nificance and facts created by how I am and could be in
them. Therefore, Heidegger says that man is his p ossib il
ities.
As lor Kant, so for Heidegger: we do not "un d erstan d
relationships that are given in the facts except as w e have
already created those facts by how we have already func
tioned. And Heidegger is perfectly deliberate in so using
the word "understanding along K an ts lines, as creating
("sy n th e tic ) things and situ ations before w e can ex
plicate (K ant called it "a n a ly ze ). Here, too, and in the
sam e sense, the synthesis of meanings precedes their
analysis.
But, as w e have seen, "ex p licatio n (Auslegung) for
Heidegger is not merely conceptual and analytic, but is it
284 W 11 A T IS A T I I I N G ?

self a further creative process. Thus, w hile the primary

human "un derstan din g" is a feeling process, the further
human processes o f explicating in language and thought
are also co n stitu tive of w hat man is. This means that
w hat we are as humans and how we con stitu te situations
and things is alw ays partly and irreducibly linguistic. We
have seen that Heidegger traces the m etaphysical model
of the thing as the "b earer o f tra its back to modes of
speech (the su bject "bearin g p redicates). Our approach
to w'hat is (the thing) w a s modeled on the nature o f the
proposition that, in turn, stem s from the context o f peo
ples ordinary speaking to each other about facets o f their
situation (37, 64, 152-153; 27, 49, 119). Explication and
speech, as well as felt understanding, project p ossib ilities
and render things along certain lines. They are processes
that transcend, sketch, and thus partly create w hat things
are. Thus philosophys power. Language and thought add
their own structures and do not merely draw out the sig
nificances of feeling. They are o f a different order. Expli
cation must be based on w hat w as already understood in
feeling, but "b ase d on does not mean "e q u a l." Rather,
it m eans "herm eneutic, a process of further drawing out
and further creating, w hich, when authentic, expresses
my directly felt "th ro w n n ess and creatively explicates
w hat I am, i.e., my felt being-in my situations.
In keeping the role Kant gives to "understanding," but
expanding it to be prim arily feeling and only then ex
p licative thought, Heidegger follow s Schleierm acher and
Di 11hey. Dilthcy had outlined a method o f Verstehen in
which one interpreted human products, in stitution s, and
literary w orks as expressions o f a felt experiential process
that made its own sense. For Dilthev, mere logic uses
only certain very thin derivatives from the felt continuity
of human experiencing.
Of course for Kant too (and D escartes and oth ers),
logical relationships and logical necessity were derived
from the continuity (Kant called it "u n ity ) of human
processes as, for example, the unity and continuity of
 Analysis 285

the "I think in counting units and keeping them so as

to com pose numbers. But to Dilthey this meant that
logical relations were extrem ely thin derivatives from
the broad lived and felt process o f experiencing and its
continuity. This continuity w a s the adaptive and his
torically elaborated process of the living human organism
and w a s first o f all felt. It made its own experiential sense
and had its own experiential meanings in its organism ic,
structural, and functional context.
Thus, to attem pt to explain som ething experiential by
som e logical construction w as, for Dilthey, like explaining
man by one of his own thinnest derivatives. Instead,
Dilthey proposed view ing any human product as pat
terned by an experiential process w ith experiential signifi
cances. Thus, the felt "understanding o f the inquirer
would parallel (and explicatively elaborate verb ally) the
"understanding im plicit in the felt experiential process
itself.
Dilthey, too, w as deliberate about the Kantian use of
"understanding," and saw h im self as providing a "critiq u e
of h istorical reason to augment K ant's Critique o f purely
conceptual reason.
And, for Heidegger, history is alw ays im plicit in any
m ans w ays o f feelingly being-in and setting up his situ a
tions. The individual is a creative "rep etitio n of his
torical meanings in an alw ays already historical con
text. I can attem pt to live from out of my own authen
tically felt meanings, but I can do this only by explicating
and elaborating the histo rically given meanings I actually
already feel and live. Just as w e said o f philosophy in
Heideggers view , so also he view s the individual as open
ing up new avenues, but only as he begins by feeling and
explicating that which he already is. Nothing else is au
thentic. Nothing else can be creatively elaborated. To
avoid w hat one authentically is leaves one totally alien
ated and at the m ercy o f routines and patterns given by
others. Of course in such avoidance, when one is "fa lle n
into everydayness, one still has ones desire to m aintain
286 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

this avoiding, but one usually avoids explicating that

as w ell. Explicating it would be ones m ost authentic
move and would lead through everydayness beyond it.
Therefore, in Sein und Zeit Heidegger begins precisely
w ith "everyd ayn ess and explicates its felt under
standing.
One cannot authentically and creatively elaborate
everything, nor would one w an t to. I m ust choose what
shall be im portant to me. In som e very few chosen re
spects I can attem pt to w ork genuinely, creatively. In
m ost respects each day I w ill remain more or less in
everydayness. Either w ay I stand on and in a historically
produced context and h istorical meanings.
Not only the other people o f past history but the other
people o f now are already an inherent part o f w hat a
person is. One is alw ays a being-with and a being-toward
others, and human situ ation s are not p ossible without
this. Even being painfully lonely or needing to be alone
is p ossible for human beings only because being-with is
an inherent aspect o f w hat they are. Chairs and tables
neither feel lonely nor need to be alone.
Thus, Heidegger overcom es H usserl's problem o f the
existence of others by finding ones living w ith and toward
others as already part o f w hat it is to be a person. Again,
here he fo llo w s Kant, who overcam e the so lip sistic prob
lem s left by Berkeley (fo r example, "R efu tation of Ideal
ism , B274), by not allow ing the existence of su b jects
except as they are already a perceiving and thinking of
o bjects. Heidegger, by widening "understanding to the
feeling and acting in situ ations, includes the others as
they are for and to us in situ ations, that is to say, as hu
m ans w hose concerns and cares are part o f our situations.
Thus, neither they nor I, as selves, are su bjective things
inside, but alw ays already a feeling and living-in situ a
tions, and situ ation s are partly created by our under
standings. Just as K ants "I think is not an object but
partly con stitu tes o bjects, so, for Heidegger, people are
not o b jects but situation-constitutors. My being toward
 Analysis 287

others is alw ays already involved in any situation as I find

m yself thrown in one.'
Thus, both history and my being toward present other
people are already involved in the felt understanding
that has functioned to make me what I am, as I am a
being-in the situ ation s that are authentically situ ation s
for me.

4. THE LATER HEIDEGGER AND

FUTURE PHILOSOPHY

Heideggers em phasis in later years has been consistent

with his earlier work, but in an im portant sense he has
added som ething. He has made very clear exactly in what
new sense one ought to interpret his earlier w ork. There

1The way in which being-toward others is inherent in what a

person is cannot be split from the persons living among things
(as though these were our relations to other people and those
were our relations to things). Rather, anything that encounters us
is already the sort of thing it is (a door or a gun) by virtue of its
having been made along lines of use and purpose by people, both
historically in devising such a thing and currently as the makers
of this thing. We have already seen what Heidegger does to the
"understanding, to which Kant gave the roleof partly constituting
objects. Heidegger widens it to include human feeling and living.
Hence, for Heidegger, a thing is no longer limited to its being a
body in physics and chem istry, but also includes what it is as a
use-object partly constituted by human situations. But in having
that sort of being, every thing through and through involves the
other people who made it and who are implied in it. Even the
things of physics are humanly made and imply physicists and
history, although such things involve narrowing the usual experi
ence to a "m ere observing. We do not usually receive the pure
sense of mere hearing. We do not usually hear "a sound; we hear
a door slamming downstairs. As Heidegger says (209, 162), ordi
narily experienced things must first be "broken up" into separate
bits of sense data," and only by this careful and deliberate pro
cess can we then have sense data. A science that employs care
fully narrowed perception and deliberate mere looking (as he
says in Sein und Zeit) can have a perfectly legitimate place in
Heideggers view. But, it requires a very complicated and artful
locus" (209, 163). It must be recognized as a narrowed focus
within the wider human world and the wider human experiencing,
which involves other people, history, and human making.
288 W H AT I S A T H I N G ?

are tw o w ays in w hich one could interpret all this insis-

tance that things alw ays already involve our making, de
fining, projecting, transcending, approaching. One might
conclude that being is what we make it, w hat w orks for
us, w hat we define and devise. But Heidegger denies pre
cisely this view o f being. A different interpretation is
really intended in all his work: Heidegger has all along
reminded us that w hat things are is made by our ap
proach, but being is not the made things. Being is the pos
sib le interaction, a third which is first. It is not the things
we made. Being is the whole context in w hich such making
and defining can make, define, reveal, and bring forth.
Being is predefined; it is the whole, infinite, as yet undis
closed richness o f all p o ssibilities, o f all possible de
fining and making.
In this w ay arises Heidegger's great interest in the pre-
So cratic philosophers, since they w ere concerned w ith
predefined being, "th a t in which all defined things come
to be and perish again. It seem s to Heidegger that this
w as lost with Socrates.
From Plato through Nietzsche, Heidegger sees one con
tinuous development (w ith m any decisive steps, som e
o f which he traces in this b o o k ). From Plato on, being
is taken as that w hich is clear, already defined, and co n sti
tuted. Being is w hat is formed and what w orks. Modern
technology is the ultim ate development of this approach.
Heidegger term s the structure posited by technology
a "G e ste ll, which in German com bines the meanings of
"p o sitin g " and "stru ctu re, and also has the connotation
o f an apparatus or a contraption. As w e look about us in
the city today, w e find ourselves surrounded by man-made
things, by technologically determined routines and view s.
There has been a silencing o f nature, including our own
nature.
Heidegger sees vast danger in this w ay o f construing
being as som ething formed and made. That view is idola
try. It forgets our role in making anything formed. It
m isses being and m ay enslave us to w hat we have made.
 Analysis 289

Not only might man blow up the w orld w ith technology,

technology has already gone far toward making man its
appendage, m aking man into a thing whose nature can
say only yes or no w ithin the structuring of technological
projecting. The danger is man (and being) as made!
Both "u n d isclo sed " being and man must be grasped
in their roles in the making of anything. "B ein g needs
m an, says Heidegger in Die Technik und die Kelire. To
"re scu e ourselves from the danger of technology we
must look precisely there "w h ere the danger is. Tech
nology sh ow s us not just a few contraptions but a much
larger fa ct the interplay. Man is in danger o f becom ing
som ething made o f man and being. Instead, he must
take him self as maker. So viewed, being is not what is
made, but that va stly w ider sense o f being as the not yet
made, in w hich we bring forth anything that is made.
Mans approach at a given historical time is a certain
w ay, and hence things are a certain w ay. At another time
the m odels are different, and so are things. Evidently,
then, being can be defined neither by this nor by that
model or approach. Rather, being is this whole condition
in which different human approaches can differently de
termine w hat things are.
This is also w hat Heidegger means by overcom ing met
a p h y sics.' We m ust think beyond any one model, for any

'*Kant had overcome the speculativo metaphysics of his time.

He showed that reason is valid only in its transcendental role of
partly making experience. Kant w as then able to show that apart
from this experiential power the purely rational speculative
schemes could be argued for or against equally well (K ant's
antinom ies).
Kant posited "things in themselves as a limiting notion. We
cannot know anything about things in themselves, for anything
known is related to us, given to us, partly made bv our reception.
The notion of things in themselves allowed Kant to treat the
things of experience not as things in themselves but as partly-
involving us. Heidegger puts being in relation to man, but. like
Kants things in themselves, being has no made form. It is that
"in which is formed anything we participate in forming. But
Heidegger envisions the next development in man as going beyond
this merely made and as approaching this being in another way.
2 90 W II IS T H I N G ?

model is still only that sam e approach that began w ith

Plato and cam e to its height w ith N ietzsche and tech
nology. A new approach to being is coming, says Heideg
ger. What is this new approach to being? He cannot tell
us. It w ill be the w ork of an entire culture, not the w o rk
of one man (50, 38).
No philosopher can jum p over his own shadow (150
151, 118). Heidegger m eans that no philosopher can jum p
over the historical context in which he w o rks and which
he alters. No one can get out o f the lim its of his own
h istorical time to deal w ith the further changes that his
own philosophical decisions have made necessary. (Only
Hegel did it, but by "ju m p in g into the sun, i.e., beyond
history altogether, to the idea o f an absolute end of all
history. But that is purely theoretical. We are alw ays still
w ithin history.)
And so Heidegger cannot jum p over his own shadow.
Each o f his recent w ritin gs ends with his standing at
the edge of an a b yss, pointing into the fog o f a coming
new approach to what is.
Can we move beyond Heideggers shadow ?
On the one hand, we are not to fall back into models,
m etaphysics, this or that assum ption system , w hich ren
ders what is as m erely these or those created things. On
the other hand, an "ap p roach to being, as far as Heideg
ger has gone, a lw a y s is a model, a fram ework, a sketching
out o f "th in g s, be they sim ilar to our things or different.
Thus, the new approach he envisions poses a dilemma: It
cannot be a new "ap p roach ; it must be a different sort
of thing altogether and, in fact, precisely not ju st a
"th in g .
In the first half o f our century (and due partly to Hei
degger and o th ers) there has already occurred a funda
mental split between m odels and concrete living. There
is no longer a "th in g , w ith a single inherent form seem
ingly o f its own, nor does man view h im self as having one
given inherent human nature. That is exactly w hy w e
 Analysis 291

speak of "m o d e ls" or "ap p roach es ; those words indicate

variety and relativity. The rigid bodies Newton located
in absolute space have given w ay to E instein s relativity
to the m easurer in physics. The cu b ists gave us things
not from one but from many sim ultaneous perspectives.
Pure form without representing anything permitted vast,
wonderful, formal virtu osities, for example, in art and
in logic and m athem atics. Amazing achievem ents becam e
possible w ith the variety that form s could have when
Ireed from life. Non-Euclidian geom etries, modern design,
architecture in reinforced concrete, proliferations of
specialized social roles all these attest to the new power
achieved w ith form s freed from w hat had been thought
to be the con strain ts o f their "n a tu ra l contents.
But w hereas in the past man had lived and felt him
self in his roles and definitions, now the relativity and
contradictions ol so m any different form s do not permit
that sort o f inherent identification w ith a role or form.
We are no longer any o f the m any roles, values, or form s
of expression. Form sp lit from living leaves living in
choate. Thus, living hum anness has more and m ore ex
pressed itse lf bv inchoate protest against reason, against
em pty roles and forms. This protest has som etim es been
beautiful and som etim es not.
How shall form (m odel, construct, "ap p roach ) and
man come back together in a new w a y ? It m ust be a
new way, since there can no longer be a genuine restora
tion o f som e one model, form, m etaphysics, value system ,
social role, or artistic style. "N e w w a y " does not mean
the old im position of som e one model, but a method of
using many m odels, a method of using this human model
ing power rather than staying within som e one model for
a century or two. As I see it, the process o f forming must
itself be the new type o f "ap p roach . What has happened
occasion ally and som e centuries apart must now becom e
routine for us. It is not this or that model, but the process
o f model-creating itself.
292 WHAT IS A T H I N G ?

In modern life, to get through even one day an indi

vidual cannot depend solely on the models and interpre
tive patterns he is given by his culture. These contradict,
they are too many, and often they do not solve the situ a
tion in which he finds him self. To deal w ith what he is up
against they are too few. He m ust reinterpret, newly in
terpret, invent meaning, create myth, and generate new
futures and new significances in order to mold the already
given troubling meanings of his situation.
Recently, Kuhns an alysis1' (highly consistent w ith Hei
deggers analyses in this boo k) has clarified the basic
difference between merely carrying out the im plications
of a given scien tific model and creating a new one. Kuhn
term s the creation o f a new model a scientific revolu
tion ." I have termed it the creation o f meaning.7
The process (or doing) that creates and schem atizes
cannot itse lf be explained by some supposedly underly
ing or axiom atic model or scheme. In retrospect one finds
that ones doing has set up a situation that is im plicitly
meaningful in w ays that can be explicated. Such explica
tion m ay look like a logical account o f w hat occurred, but
it is an error to view it as the cause o f the process. The ex
plication is a product o f the process. It is a model or
scheme created by the process, and w e must see that the
process as concrete doing is prior.
But is not such an approach to being as the process
o f meaning making really an invitation to arb itrari
ness? Is it not m erely saying that there arc no criteria, that
you can have it any w ay you like? Anything you say or
do is a s good as anything else you might say or do; it all
depends on your interpretation. E xistentialism often

,! Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chi

cago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
7 Eugene Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning
(New York: The Free Press, 1962).
 A nalysis 293

sounds like that.s But this is not at all the case! We know
this from how difficult it is to devise courses o f action
and interpretations that take account o f all in the situ a
tion and leave us feeling whole and unconflicted. That
is w hy the situation in physics remained unresolved for
so many years, and why Einstein worked for so many
years. That is w hy w e so often fail to devise any action
or meaning that resolves hang ups. There are alw ays
plenty o f easy alternatives for saying and doing som e
thing that fails to resolve anything.
To really resolve the hang u p s" is a very different and
far more difficult m atter than just picking one or an
other o f the many available schem es and actions that
w ill not resolve anything. In practice w e know the dif
ference from the ease o f one and the difficulty of the
other, from our frequent failure to devise the latter,
and from the unhappily unm istakable consequences of
such failures. Thus, the use o f this human power of de
fining is anything but arbitrary, anything but a choice
from among many available alternatives. It is a highly
controlled process o f devising meanings that m ust take
account o f more facets than have ever yet been for
mulated.
E xisten tialism seem ingly places a gap o f arbitrariness
between every moment and the next, just because exis
tentialism denies the logical, deductive type o f continuity.
What sort o f ethics, for example, can come from a view
that rejects every statab le criterion o f value or rightness,
and view s it as created by, but not determining, human

KIt is a question that besets the method of linguistic analysis

also. The rules for the use of a word are not in the dictionary;
they are implicit in our knowing how to speak. One explicates
these rules, not by leaning on a m odel," but by leaning directly
on our knowing how to talk and act in situations. Current philos
ophy of both sorts is very much at the juncture at which Heideg
ger pictures it. There is a pre-conceptual court of appeal.
294 W II A T IS A T H I N G ?

action ? Must it not result in high-sounding rationaliza

tions for doing absolutely anything one pleases? And,
sim ilarly, how can there be a b a sis for discussing being or
science if one purports to explicate some not fully formu
lated situ ation ? To say that it cannot be deduced or
checked against a schem e how is that more than saying
that it m ust alw ays remain unfounded?
Heidegger helped light and w in the battle against equat
ing concrete living w ith a scheme, won the battle against
reading some theoretical schem e into things, and showed
that living humans are the reason for schem es and not
the reverse. Therefore, w e m ust understand the seeming
gap as these oppositions to the earlier ration alistic and
logistic view.
We m ust reopen the question to which Heideggers ap
parent gap o f arbitrariness is the answer. That question
w as: Is there som e rational or scientific thinglike de-
fined order that determ ines world and man? His answer:
No.
Having seen the question to which Heideggers "N o is
the answer, w^e can now separate out a different question
that is too often merged w ith the first. Our second ques
tion is: Arc there other criteria, other w'ays w e might
characterize and recognize an authentic, successful in
venting and form ing from those many, easily achieved
w ays o f interpreting, inventing, and forming that seem
to offer solutions but really leave us in pain, in conllict,
sick, or about to em bark on som ething w e w ill later say
we knew better than to do? Even if there is no logical or
rational scheme o f things except one that is histo rically
derived and in the process o f being changed by us
might there be a (n on sch em atic) w ay o f recognizing
the scientific revolution and telling it apart from mere
nonsense or evil?
And, as Heidegger states so w ell, further reinterpre
tations in life or philosophy are p ossible only on the
grounds of the ones w e are already in, the given ones. We
 A nalysis 295

cannot genuinely throw aw ay our interpretations, values

and reactions, problem s and anom olies, no m atter how
em ancipated we are in general, no m atter how convinced
we are in general that our values are merely relative,
that science uses "o n ly m odels. In fact, they are not just
relative," they are "rela tiv e to " the situ ations in w hich
they inhere, the problem s they helped pose. Unless we
carry all this further w e cannot get out of it. Therefore,
scientific revolutions and everyday problem s are so dif
ficult to solve adequately (and so easy to avoid or deny
verbally in obviously futile and merely pained w a y s).
But is there nothing then that can be said to differen
tiate the authentically experienced, context-inclusive, un
conflicted manner of meaning-making from an alienated,
inauthentic, m erely irresponsible manner of have it w h at
ever w ay you like? In different kinds o f situ ations there
are different recognizable m arks, som e private and some
observable (even in objective research). What basically
sets the authentic manner of meaning-making apart is
that it m oves from the defined to the as yet undefined
(th e felt, concrete sense o f the whole situ a tio n ), and then
from out o f that to another, new or modified, more ade
quate form. This movement can apply to anything formed
things, w ords, art, w ays o f acting, or social roles.9
The next form is not ju st another model taking the
place o f the first; it is a "z a g in a continuing "zig-zag

On this and on the points made above, the reader may wish
to examine my other writings: Experiencing and the Creation of
Meaning (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Experiential Ex
plication and Truth, Journal o f Existentialism , VI, (1966), 22; "A
Theory of Personality Change," in Personality Change, ed. by
Worchel and Byrne (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962); "F ocu s
ing Ability in Psychotherapy, Personality and Creativity," in Re
search in Psychotherapy, ed. by J. Shlien (Washington, D.C.:
American Psychological Association, 1967), Vol. I ll; "What are
the Grounds of Explication?, The Monist, XLIX (1965), 1; "E x
pressive Meanings," in Invitation to Phenomenology, ed. by J. Edie
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1965).
296 W H AT I S A T H I N G ?

process between ones live sense and the realm o f form s.

The next definition can change one's felt sense. To de
fine a situation alters w hat one is about. Saying som e
thing in w ords has an effect on what one w an ts to say it
clarifies, intensifies, or sh ifts it. From such an experien
tial sh ift one can move to a further step o f forming; one
can suspend any given form ulation and turn to the pre-
conceptual, which alw ays im plicitly includes the whole
com plexity o f w hich w e are sensitive, and which develops
further in interaction, and is carried forward in a zig-zag
that is experientially (though not lo gically) continuous.
There are a number of different kinds o f moving rela
tionships between form s and concrete experiencing. I
give experiencing the "in g form because it is activity. In
various distinguishable w ays, experiencing lets us create
an endlessly greater variety o f relevant form s than the
few rigid ones that culturally given perception and social
roles hold steady for us. This experiential zig-zag move
ment is the approach that is more than an approach.

Eugene T. Gendlin
The University of Chicago
 Index of N a m e s

Aristotle, 34, 35m., 40, 45, 49- G alileo G alilei, 66, 79-80, 88,
50, 78, 80-83, 85, 106, 108, 90-91, 116, 165
112, 116, 118, 132, 153, 155, G oethe, Johann W olfgang
172 von, 58, 113
G ottsched , Johann C hris
B aliani, G iovanni B a ttista , 78 toph, 113
B aum garten, Alexander, 112
15, 117, 121, 152, 155,213 Hegel, Georg W ilhelm , 28,
Bohr, N iels, 20, 67 28/1., 58, 113, 132, 134, 150-
D escartes, Rene, 17, 94, 98- 51, 191
H eisenberg, W erner, 67
106, 112
D em ocritu s, 79-80, 208 Hume, D avid, 113

E berh ard , Johann A ugustus, K ant, Im m anuel, 5, 34, 55(1.

79, 131 K nutzen, M artin, 113
E ck h art, M eister, 98
Eddington, S ir Arthur, 13
Leibniz, G o ttfried W ilhelm
Eudoxus, 83
von, 23-24, 79, 94, 98, 108,
Fichte, Johann G ottlieb, 58 112, 121-22, 150, 166, 174,
F red erick the G reat, 112 191, 199, 235
298
 Indices 299

Meier, Georg Friedrich, 154 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm

55 Joseph von, 58, 113, 134, 150
Schiller, Johann Christoph
Newton, Sir Isaac, 76-78, 80, Friedrich von, 58, 113
82, 85-88, 91, 94, 97, 126, Socrates, 73-74
165, 199 Sudrez, Francisco, 100
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 43, 150
Thaies, 3
Plato, 2, 33, 40, 45-46, 49-50,
75,82,91, 112, 150, 208 WoliT, Christian von, 78, 87,
Protagoras, 46 112, 152, 154-55, 172
 Index of G er m an Term s

Abzweckung (p u rp o se ), 149 Aufklrung (en lig h ten m en t),

Aktuellen (a c tu a l), 44 124
Anblickbar (c a p a b lc o f being auf-und hingenommen ( taken
v ie w e d ), 200 up and in ), 142
Angeschaut ( som ething Auf-und Vorliegendes (ex
looked a t ), 197 p osing and a present
Angeschaut sein (bein g-intu g iven ), 218
ite d ), 200 auf uns zu (to w a r d u s), 220
Anmessung (fittin g ), 35 augenblicklich ( m om en tary),
Ansatz (ap p ro ach ), 28 218
An-schauen (lo o k in g a t ), 143 Ausdruck (e x p re ssio n ), 36
anschauen (lo o k in g a t ), 95.; Ausgesagt heit (a sserte d -
(in tu itin g ), 198 n e s s ), 63
Anschauung (in tu itio n ), 135, Auskunft (in fo rm a tio n ), 36
197-98 Aussage (d e p o sitio n ), 37; ( a s
an sich (in its e lf), 33 se rtio n ), 62
Anwesende (p r e se n t), 63 Aussagen an, von, iiber ( a s
Anwesenheit (p r e se n ce ), 64, sertio n s of, ab ou t, to ), 36
84 ausweisen (p ro v en ), 180
Aufhebung (bein g lifted u p ),
121 bedingen (to co n d itio n ), 8
300
 Indices 301

Bedingtsein (being condi Dastehen (standing there),

tioned), 48 194, 229
Bedingung (condition), 47- Ding an sich ( thing-in-itself),
48 5, 128
Begegnen-lassen, das ( the let Ding fr uns ( thing for us), 5
ting encounter), 242 Dinghaftigkeit ( thingness),
Begriff (concept), 137 129
Begrndung (foundation), Dingheit (thingness), 7, 92
14, 55 Dingsein (being-a-thing), 19
Beharren (enduring), 229 Dunst (illusion), 214
Beistellung ( putting-along-
side), 181 Ebene (level), 28
Bekundung (manifestation), Eigenschaften ( properties),
128 34
Bericht (report), 37, 43 ein je dieses (one such this
bestndig (constant), 137 one), 15
Bestand (what constitutes), ein rumen (to place space),
229 200
Bestandstcke (permanent Einzelnheit (singleness), 49
elements), 139, 194 Empfundene (what is
Bestimmungsstcke ( deter sensed), 137
mining elements), 157 Entgegen (againstness), 158,
Bewegtheit (being in mo 204
tion), 86 entgegen-fassendes Vorgrei
Bewenden (point), 208 fen (reaching and grasping
bloss (mere), 147 beforehand), 220
Entgegenstehen (standing-
over-against), 158
Dafrhalten (taking-for), 92 Entgegenstehenlassen (al
Dagegensprechen ( speak lowing to stand against),
against, contradict), 107 219
Da-haben (having-there), 218, Entscheidung (decision), 9
221 Entwurf (project), 88-89, 92
Dasein (existence), 41-42, 44, Erfahrung (experience), 140;
49-50, 55, 65-66, 89, 96-98, anschauliche (intuitive di
106, 113, 117, 191, 225-29, rect experience), 94
235 Erfahrungsurteil ( experien
Daseinszusammenhang ( ex tial judgment), 139
istential connection), 227 Erkennbare (the knowable),
Ding, das (thing), 5, 15, 128 137
 Index op G e r m an Term s

Abzweckung (purpose), 149 Aufklrung (enlightenment),

Aktuellen (actual), 44 124
Anblickbar (capable of being auf-tind hingenommen ( taken
viewed), 200 up and in), 142
Angeschaut ( something Auf-und Vorliegendes (ex
looked at), 197 posing and a present
Angeschaut sein (being-intu given), 218
ited), 200 auf uns zu (toward us), 220
Anmessung (fitting), 35 augenblicklich ( momentary),
Ansatz (approach), 28 218
An-schauen (looking at), 143 Ausdruck (expression), 36
anschauen (looking at), 95/j.; Ausgesagtheit (asserted-
(intuiting), 198 ness), 63
Anschauung (intuition), 135, Auskunft (information), 36
197-98 Aussage (deposition), 37; (a s
an sich (in itself), 33 sertion), 62
Anwesende (present), 63 Aussagen an, von, iiber (as
Anwesenheit (presence), 64, sertions of, about, to), 36
84 ausweisen (proven), 180
Aufhebung (being lifted up),
121 bedingen (to condition), 8
300
 Indices 301

Bedingtsein (being condi Dastehen (standing there),

tioned), 48 194, 229
Bedingung (condition), 47- Ding an sich (thing-in-itself),
48 5, 128
Begegnen-lassen, das ( the let Ding fr uns ( thing for us), 5
ting encounter), 242 Dinghaftigkeit ( thingness),
Begriff (concept), 137 129
Begrndung (foundation), Dingheit (thingness), 7, 92
14, 55 Dingsein (being-a-thing), 19
Beharren (enduring), 229 Dunst (illusion), 214
Beistellung (putting-along-
side), 181 Ebene (level), 28
Bekundung (manifestation), Eigenschaften ( properties),
128 34
Bericht (report), 37, 43 ein je dieses (one such this
bestndig (constant), 137 one), 15
Bestand (what constitutes), ein rumen (to place space),
229 200
Bestandstcke (permanent Einzelnheit (singleness), 49
elements), 139, 194 Empfundene (what is
Bestimmungsstcke ( deter sensed), 137
mining elements), 157 Entgegen (againstness), 158,
Bewegtheit (being in mo 204
tion), 86 entgegen-fassendes Vorgrei
Bewenden (point), 208 fen (reaching and grasping
bloss (mere), 147 beforehand), 220
Entgegenstehen (standing-
over-against), 158
Dafrhalten ( taking-for), 92 Entgegenstehenlassen (al
Dagegensprechen ( speak lowing to stand against),
against, contradict), 107 219
Da-haben (having-there), 218, Entscheidung (decision), 9
221 Entwurf (project), 88-89, 92
Dasein (existence), 41-42, 44, Erfahrung (experience), 140;
49-50, 55, 65-66, 89, 96-98, anschauliche (intuitive di
106, 113, 117, 191, 225-29, rect experience), 94
235 Erfahrungsurteil (experien
Daseinszusammenhang (ex tial judgment), 139
istential connection), 227 Erkennbare (the knowable),
Ding, das (thing), 5, 15, 128 137
302 WHA T IS A T H I N G ?

Erkennen (knowing), 137 Gegenstehen (standing be

Erkenntnisse (cognitions), fore), 188
134 Gegenstehenlassen ( permit
Erklrung ( interpretation), ting a standing-against),
155 205, 241
erluternd (clarifying), 164 Gegen-uns-stehenden (what
erffnet (exposed), 242 stands-over-against-us), 202
Erscheinung (appearance), Geistigen (spiritual), 51
128,227 Geinchte (product), 244
erweiternd (extending), 164 Gemeinsamkeit (sharing in
erzhlen (tell), 37 common), 136
etwas (something), 5-6 gerhrt (stirred), 143
Gesammeltheit (collected
ness), 203
Fakt is ( facts), 121
Geschehen (happening), 48
Fehlen (privation), 213
Geschichte (history), 45
Fortwhren (continuance),
Geschichtlichkeit ( historic
229
ity), 39
Fragestellung ( mode of ques
Grenzziehung (laying of
tioning), 179
lim its), 120
Frwort (demonstrative pro
Grsse (magnitude), 195
noun), 25 Grssenmass ( measure of
size), 215
Gebung (giving), 143 Grosshafte (sizeable), 195
Gedachte, das (what is Grund (b asis), 83; (prin
thought), 143 ciple), 148
Gefiige (framework), 36 Grundriss (blueprint), 91-92
gegen (against), 137, 139-40, Grundstze (axioms), 124;
184, 195,205,214 (real principles), 193
Gegenhaft (againstness),
222-23 Hervorgehens ( emergence),
Gegenhafte-Stndige, das
83
(against-like constancy),
Hinausgriff ( grasping-out),
219
221
Gegenheit (againstness), 190
Hinaus-zu (out-to), 199
Gegenstand (object), 134,
Hin-nehmen (taking-in), 142
137-40, 143, 181, 184, 190,
194, 205, 231, 237
Gegenstndlichkeit ( objec Icliheit (I-ness), 105
tivity), 178 Identitten (identities), 174
 Indices 303

im vorhinein (in advance), Mitteilung (communication),

221 36
In-der-Zeit-sein ( being-in- Mglichkeit (possibility), 21
time), 233
inmitten des Seienden ( in the Natiirding (natural thing),
midst of what is), 50 127
Insichgesammelt (what is natrliche Welt-ansicht (nat
collected in itself), 188 ural world-view), 40
/ nsichstehende (what stands neben (beside), 198
in itself), 188 Nebeneinander (proximity),
198
je diese ( just these), 15-18,23 Nicht auseinanderfahrende
je diese Dinge (these things), (what does not fall apart),
15 188
je dieses (this one), 15-18,
23-24, 28 Objekt (object), 134, 139-40,
Jediesheit ( being-this-one), 237
14-15 Offenbare, das (what is man
je fr sich (each-for-itself), 15 ifest), 141
Jenseitige (ulterior), 25 Offene (open), 242
jeweilig (particular), 30 Ort ( place), 16
Jeweiligkeit (particularity),
16 physiologisch ( physiologi
cal), 126
Prsenz (presence), 188
Kategorienlehre ( theory of
Prinzip (principle), 124, 193
categories), 64
Prioritt (priority), 165

ledig (unencumbered), 147 Raumhafte (the spatial), 196

Leit jaden (guideline), 64 Raum-Zeit-Bezug ( space-
Lichtung (illumination), 106 time-relation), 19
Logistic (symbolic logic), 156 Raum-Zeit-Stelle (space-
time-position), 19
Mannigfaltigkeit ( manifold Realitt (reality), 239
ness), 208 Richtigkeit (correctness), 45
Menge (aggregate), 195; Ruck (jo lt), 2
(m ultiplicity), 204 Rckbesinnung ( reflecting
Mit-dazu-vorsteilen ( addi back), 207
tional representation), 163 Riick-wurf (thrown back),
mit gesagt (co-asserted), 63 243
304 W H A T IS A T H I N G ?

Ruhe (quiescence), 44 Sich-richten (a directing-to),

35
Sich-selbst-eine-Kenntnis
Sache (fact), 126, 138; (a geben (giving-oneself-a-
something), 212 cognition), 91
Sachhaft (thinglike), 214 Sich-zeigendes (what shows
Sachhaltig (belonging to the itself), 188, 200
content of), 239-40 Sinnlichkeit (sensibility), 143
Sachhaltigkeit (character), sondern (to sort), 119
233; (content), 240 Spielraum (domain), 92
Sachheit (something), 219; Spruch (saying), 171
(thinghood), 213, 237 Stammbegriffe (root con
sachlich Vorgngige, das cepts), 187
(what objectivily pre Stand (standing), 184, 190,
cedes), 166 205
Sammlung (gathering-to- Stndigkeit (constancy), 229,
gether), 187 231
Satz (proposition), 36, 193 Stoff ding (material thing), 51
Satzaussage (assertion), 38 Stofflichkeit (m ateriality),
Satzgegenstand (object of a 213
proposition), 38 Strecke (stretch), 56
Satz vom Grund ( principle of
sufficient reason), 108 Tatsachen (fa cts), 59
Schauen (looking), 143 Trger (bearer), 34, 35n.
Schein (semblance), 12, 194, Tun (doing), 207
214
schon Anwesende, das (the bereinstimmung ( corre
already present), 63 spondence), 36
Seiender (one that is), 142 berspringen (pass over, skip
Sein des Seienden (the being over), 8, 93, 151
of what is), 175 berstieg (passing over), 176
Seinsbestimmung ( deter ber-weg (passing beyond),
mination of being), 63 176
seinsmssige Herkunft (ori umgnglich alltglich Gege
gin considered in terms of bene, das (the usual every
its mode of being), 105 day given), 211
Sich-Aussprechen ( to declare Um-iins-herum ( round-about-
oneself), 36 us), 7
sich-im-Geiste-denken ( to Unbedingt (unconditioned),
think in the mind), 91 9,47
 Indices 305

unheimlicher (more un Vorhanden ( the present-at-

canny), 44 hand), 5, 11,35,52, 105, 199;
unseiend (non-existent), 240 (existing), 34
Unterlage (foundation), 34 Vorhandensei)i ( being-pres-
ent-at-hand), 225
Vernderung (alteration), Vorherige, das (the preced
234 ing), 166, 168
verbessern (reform), 10 Vorriss (outline), 121
Verbinden (connecting), 203 Vor-stellen (pre-senting, rep
Verbindungswort ( connec resenting), 200, 224
tive), 38 vor-stellend (pre-senting),
Vergegenstndlichung (ob 189
jectification), 141 Vorstellung (conception), 32;
Vernunft (reason), 64 (representation), 130, 136
verrcktes (deranged), 2 Vor-uns-kommen ( coming-
Verrckung (shifting), 2 before-us), 195
Verschweigung (conceal Vor-urteile (pre-judgments),
ment), 37 180
Verwandtschaft (relation),
136
Vorausgriff (anticipation), 92 Wahrgenommene (what is
Voraus-vor-stellung ( pre- perceived), 137
senting-in-advance), 230 wahrhaft (true), 181
vordeutende Erluterung Wahrnehmungsurteil ( per
(preliminary elucidation), ceptual judgment), 139
61 (w hat), 210, 213
Vordeutung (interpretation), Wasgehalt (what-content),
128 212, 214
vor-gebildet ( pre-formcd), was ist seiender (what more
201 truly is), 210
vor-gefunden (found in ad Was-seiendes ( being-what),
vance), 137 222
vor-gehalten ( held-before), Wechsel (change), 234
200 Weg ( path), 55-56
Vorgreifen (beforehand), werfen (throw), 89.
220 Wesensbau (essential struc
Vor-griff ( reaching-before), ture), 36
243 Wesensumgrenzung ( essen
Vorgriff (anticipation), 243 tial delineation), 161
Vorhalt (presentation), 218 wirklich (actual), 191
306 WH A T IS A T H I N G ?

Wirklichkeit (actuality), 191, ZM-fallen (to occur in addi

239 tion), 235
wirkt (being effective), 191 Zug (characteristic), 18
Wissenschaften (sciences), 1 zu-gesagt (said of), 62; (at
Womit (wherewith), 189 tributed to), 63
Worinnen (wherein), 194 zugleich (at the same time),
Wrdigen (evaluation), 92 172
wrdigt (evaluated), 92 Zugrundeliegendes ( some
thing which underlies), 105
Zeichen (signs), 56 Zu-sagen (attribution), 62
Zeitpunkte (time point), 21 Zusammen (together), 186;
Zeitraum (time-span), 16-17 ( togetherness), 226
Zeit st eilen ( time-spots), 233 Zusammensetzen (putting-to
Zensur (censor), 121 gether), 186
Zeugraum (equipment Zweifalt (doubleness), 135
room), 21 Zwischen (the between), 242
 I n d e x oh L a t i n Term s

accidens (accident), 34 compositio (composition),

actus mentis (action of the 225
mind), 158 coniunctio ( con junction),
adaequatio (correspond 225
ence), 117 convenientia (agreement),
animal rationale (rational 117
animal), 106 copula (bond), 156
axiomata sive leges motus cosmologia rationalis (ra
(principles or laws of mo tional cosmology), 110
tion), 77, 92
determinatio ( determinate
ness), 213
cogito (I think), 98, 104, dynamis (forcc), 191
106-7
cognitio humana (what is ens commune (things in gen
knowable by mans pure eral ), 118
reason), 116 ens creatum (created thing),
commensuratio (fitting), 117 47, 110
complementum possibilitatis essentia (essence), 212
(complement to possibil existentia (existence), 213,
ity), 239 239
307
308 WHAT IS A T H I N G ?

experientia (experience), 93 metaphysica architectonica

experiri ( to experience), 93 (architectonic metaphys
ics), 121
fundamentum (basis, metaphysica generalis (gen
ground), 104 eral metaphysics), 111
fundamentum absolutum metaphysica specialis (spe
(absolute ground), 103 cialized metaphysics), 111
moto corporum, de (on the
hie (this here), 24 motion of bodies), 78
mundi systemate, de (on the
ille ( that far away), 25 system of the world), 78
inconcussum (unshakable),
103
systema mundi (system of
iste ( that there), 24
the world), 126 ..
indicium (judgment), 154

lex inertiae (law of inertia), theologia rationalis (rational

78 theology), 109
transcendere (to pass over),
mathematica universalis 178
(universal mathematics), tribuere (to attribute), 154
101 tueor (to look, gaze), 95n.
mathematica vulgaris (com
mon mathematics), 101
mathesis universalis (univer veritas (truth), 117
sal teaching), 102 vis centripeta (centripetal
mente concipere (to con force), 77
ceive in the mind), 91-92, vis impressa (impacted
116 force), 88
 Index oe G r e ek Term s

<< (the sensible), 113; eVei (that far away, there), 25

(sensibility, perception), ' ( knowledge), 81
144
a (truth), 46 (according to them
(at the same time), 172 selves), 83
> (pronoun), 25 (in general, on the
(evaluate), 92 whole), 117
(fundamental propo (from above to below),
sitions, axioms), 92 62
( simple movements), 84 (assertion, attribu
(holding away), 154 tion), 62, 107, 154
,'' (beginning), 83; (category), 63
(beginning of mo -s- (motion in a
tion), 83 straight line), 84
Kara ( motion with
(by violence), 84, 88 respect to location), 83
(to sort, separate), 119
Suiiptait (taking apart, analy (in a circle), 84
sis), 160
( force, power, capac Xtyciv (to address, assert as
ity), 85 something), 64
309
310 WHAT IS A T H I N G ?

yos (reason), 108, 145; \ ( first philos

(judgment), 144; (gather ophy, metaphysics), 64, 99
ing together), 187; (asser (chance, contin
tion), 106, 108, 126, 152-53, gency), 34
156, 178
tcXos (aim, end), 81
tc ( this here, a particu
ru fmOijiuLTiL ( the mathemati
lar), 49
cal, what can be learned),
69, 71, 73-74
\<(. (what underlies,
(mathematics, learn
substance), 34, 62, 103, 105
ing), 69, 71, 73, 75, 91
wTTtpov 7rpo*i y/pti'i ( what is later
, ( to learn), 69
toward us), 166
(motion), 83
' (mixture), 84
< ( that which
/itoSos- (method), 102 makes itself manifest), 81
(to say), 62
(doing, making), 70 (a saying), 62
T ( things made or (being transported), 83, I
done), 70, 81 86
(things dealt ( things which come '
with), 70 forth), 70, 81
; (dealing with, doing, < (nature), 83, 126;
acting), 70 (against nature), 84; |
(what is former (in accordance 9
in nature), 166 with nature), 84