Establishment of Military Justice, Here Depicted Could Have Existed in The Face of An Express Grant of Power To TH e
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EsLebeDeutschlandEstablishment of Military Justice, Here Depicted Could Have Existed in The Face of An Express Grant of Power To TH e
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EsLebeDeutschland848 ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY JUSTICE ,
here depicted could have existed in the face of an express grant of power to th e
Judge Advocate General, which Gen . Ansell finds in section 1199, Revised Stat-
utes, to modify or reverse the approved proceedings of courts-martial . Yo u
directed me to examine the brief and make a report thereon . I have had a
limited time in which the do this, but the results of my study, which I think i s
complete enough to answer the main propositions, follow.
The logic of Gen . Ansell's brief converges to its conclusion in these distinct
channels :
. 1 . That the single word " revise," as used in section 1199, Revised Statutes ,
by ordinary construction so clear as to abate any precedent or accepted mean-
ing, confers upon the Judge Advocate General not only the power to examine ,
analyze, and review courts-martial proceedings, but also invests the Judg e
Advocate General with the power to modify or reverse the same .
2. That the history of the legislation discloses that the statute was originally
intended to confer this power upon the Judge Advocate General .
3. That the administrative history of the department discloses that the powe r
was actually utilized during the Civil War period and apparently until the
early eighties.
4. That the power has never been questioned by the civil courts or other civi l
authority .
5. That the power is, and for a long time has been, vested in the judge advo-
cate general of the British Army .
Since the brief concededly purports to overturn the authorized practice o f
over one-third of a century and to advance a doctrine as to which there is littl e
or no previous expression or any authority or opinion outside or the brief itself,
it will be well to follow the outline of discussion upon which the brief is buil t
and to address ourselves first to the contention that the word " revise," in section
1199, Revised Statutes, confers upon the Judge Advocate General the power t o
review acid then to modify or reverse the approved proceedings and sentences o f
courts-martial .
1 . MEANING OF THE WORD " REVISE. "
Practically the whole fabric of Gen. Ansell ' s argument is built upon an inter-
pretation of the meaning of this single word " revise ." In support of the broad
meaning whcih he gives this word, his brief collates definitions of the word b y
lexicographers and jurists . On the authority of the Standard Dictionary, whic h
defines the word " revise" as :
" To go or look over or examine for the correction of errors, or for the pur-
pose of suggesting or making amendments, additions, or changes ; reexamine ;
review . Hence, to change or correct anything as for the better or by authority ;
alter or reform ."
He classifies the word " review " as a synonym of the word " revise ;" an d
upon this justification indiscriminate definitions of the words "revise" an d
" review " are quoted throughout the brief. I think the deductions he makes
in this part of his brief are unauthorized .
In essential etymology the word " revise " means " to look over ." It has ac-
quired a special meaning going to the purpose of the " looking over," and impart s
a purpose of suggesting, or making amendments . Thus a proof reader revise s
copy and suggests changes. But he does not effect changes . Special com-
mittees of men learned in the law revise statutes and codes by special legisla-
tive commission, but their revisions do not give legal life to the result of thei r
labors . The legislature must enact the revision as a law . In the same sens e
the " looking over," the "reexamination " of the proceedings of an inferio r
tribunal by an appellate court is not the reversal or the modification of th e
judgment, albeit the revision is for the purpose of making such a change . All
this is most significant, since in the statutory grant of so wide a power as tha t
contended for we should expect, by all the analogies of grants of appellat e
power, to find something more than authority " to look over," or " to examine . "
Such brief survey of the field of statutes conferring appellate power on th e
various tribunals of the several States and of the United States as I hav e
been able to make in the limited time I have had to prepare this paper, fail s
to disclose a single instance in which the power to modify or reverse the judg-
ment of inferior courts is deduced from the words " review " or "revise,"
without the addition of apt words specifically conferring the power to revers e
or modify .
