Case Digest: Tuna Processing v.

Philippine Kingford
G.R. No. 185582 : February 29, 2012

TUNA PROCESSING, INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE KINGFORD, INC.,

Respondent.

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Philippine Kingford, Inc. (Kingford) is a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Philippines while Tuna Processing, Inc. (TPI) is a foreign corporation not
licensed to do business in the Philippines. Due to circumstances not mentioned in the
case, Kingford withdrew from petitioner TPI and correspondingly, reneged on their
obligations. Petitioner submitted the dispute for arbitration before the International
Centre for Dispute Resolution in the State of California, United States and won the case
against respondent. To enforce the award, petitioner TPI filed a Petition for
Confirmation, Recognition, and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before the RTC
of Makati City. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the petitioner lacked
legal capacity to sue in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Can a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines, but
which collects royalties from entities in the Philippines, sue here to enforce a foreign
arbitral award?

HELD: RTCs decision is reversed.

POLITICAL LAW: special vs. general law

The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 2004 shall apply in this case as the Act, as its
title - An Act to Institutionalize the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in
the Philippines and to Establish the Office for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for
Other Purposes - would suggest, is a law especially enacted to actively promote party
autonomy in the resolution of disputes or the freedom of the party to make their own
arrangements to resolve their disputes. It specifically provides exclusive grounds
available to the party opposing an application for recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral award. The Corporation Code is the general law providing for the formation,
organization and regulation of private corporations. As between a general and special
law, the latter shall prevail generalia specialibus non derogant.

The Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution provides that any party to
a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award.Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice that in the enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award, the losing party can not avail of the rule that bars foreign corporations not
licensed to do business in the Philippines from maintaining a suit in our courts. When a
party enters into a contract containing a foreign arbitration clause and, as in this case, in
fact submits itself to arbitration, it becomes bound by the contract, by the arbitration and
by the result of arbitration, conceding thereby the capacity of the other party to enter
into the contract, participate in the arbitration and cause the implementation of the
result.

GRANTED.

G.R. No. 169332 February 11, 2008

ABS-CBN
vs.
WORLD INTERACTIVE NETWORK SYSTEMS (WINS) JAPAN CO., LTD.

FACTS:
Petitioner ABS-CBN entered into an agreement with respondent World Interactive
Network Systems (WINS). Under the agreement, respondent was granted the exclusive
license to distribute and sublicense the distribution of the television service known as
"The Filipino Channel" (TFC) in Japan. A dispute arose As a result, petitioner notified
respondent of its intention to terminate their licensing agreement. Thereafter,
respondent filed an arbitration suit pursuant to the arbitration clause of its agreement
with petitioner and contended that the airing of WINS WEEKLY was made with
petitioner's prior approval. It also alleged that petitioner only threatened to terminate
their agreement because it wanted to renegotiate the terms thereof to allow it to
demand higher fees. Respondent also prayed for damages for petitioner's alleged grant
of an exclusive distribution license to another entity, NHK (Japan Broadcasting
Corporation). The parties appointed a sole arbitrator and the latter reached a decision in
favor of respondent. Petitioner filed in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court or, in the alternative, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the same
Rules, with application for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA rendered the assailed decision dismissing ABS-
CBNs petition for lack of jurisdiction. It
ruled that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction over questions relating to arbitration. It
held that the only instance it can exercise jurisdiction over an arbitral award is an appeal
from the trial court's decision confirming, vacating or modifying the arbitral award. It
further stated that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper
in arbitration cases only if the courts refuse or neglect to inquire into the facts of an
arbitrator's award.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an aggrieved party in a voluntary arbitration dispute may avail of,
directly in the CA, a petition for review under Rule 43 or a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition to vacate the award in the.
RULING:
The CAs decision is sound. A petition for review under Rule 43 or a petition for
certiorari
under Rule 65 directly in the CA is NOT the proper remedy. RA 876 itself mandates that
it is the Court of First Instance, now the RTC, which has jurisdiction over questions
relating to arbitration, such as a petition to vacate an arbitral award. As RA 876 did not
expressly provide that errors of fact and/or law and grave abuse of discretion, which is
the proper grounds for a petition for review under Rule 43 and a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65, This means that such ground is not acceptable for maintaining a petition
to vacate an arbitral award in the RTC. Thus, it follows that a party may not avail of the
remedies under Rule 43 and Rule 65 on the grounds of errors of fact and/or law or
grave abuse of discretion to overturn an arbitral award.

PHILROCK, INC. vs. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION COMMISSION G.R. No.

132848-49 June 26, 2001 FACTS:
Private respondent Cid spouses filed a complaint for damages against Philrock and its officers. At the initial trial
date, both parties agreed to refer the matter to the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
A preliminary conference was held among the parties and their appointed arbitrators where
disagreements arose. No common ground could be reached by the parties; hence, both the Cid spouses
and Philrock requested that the case be remanded to the trial court. The Court ordered that it no longer had
jurisdiction over the case. The parties proceeded to finalize, approve and sign the Terms of Reference which
stated that the parties agree that their differences be settled by an Arbitral Tribunal. Thereafter, the petitioner
filed a Motion to dismiss alleging that the CIAC has lost jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
The petition has no merit. Section 4 of Executive Order 1008 expressly vests in the CIAC original and exclusive
jurisdiction over disputes arising from or connected with construction contracts entered into by parties that have
agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. It is undisputed that the parties submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of the Commission by virtue
of their Agreement to Arbitrate Petitioners contention is untenable because first, private respondents
removed the obstacle to the continuation of the arbitration, precisely by withdrawing their objection to the
exclusion of the seven engineers. Second, petitioner continued participating in the arbitration even after the CIAC
Order had been issued. It even concluded and signed the Terms of Reference in which the parties stipulated the
circumstances leading to the dispute; summarized their respective positions, issues, and claims; and identified
the composition of the tribunal of arbitrators. The document clearly confirms bot
h parties intention and agreement to submit the dispute to voluntary
arbitration. In view of this fact, we fail to see how the CIAC could have been divested of its jurisdiction. The
Court will not countenance the effort of any party to subvert or defeat the objective of voluntary arbitration for
its own private motives. After submitting itself to arbitration proceedings and actively participating therein,
petitioner is estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CIAC, merely because the latter rendered an adverse
decision.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp. (URSUMCO) vs. Heirs of Angel Teves G.R. No. 128574,
September 18, 2002 FACTS
: Andres Abanto owned two parcels of lot in Campuyo, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. Lot 1 with
55,463 sq.m. is registered in his name (TCT H-37). Lot 2 with an area of 193, 789 sq.m. is
unregistered. He died in 1973. On
October 1974 Abantos heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of estate with sale. The lot
measuring 193,789
sq.m. was sold to United Planters Sugar Milling Co. Inc. (UPSUMCO) while TCT H-37 was sold to
Angel Teves. Sale was unregistered. Teves verbally allowed UPSUMCO to use H-37 for pier and
loading facilities free of charge on the condition UPSUMCO will pay the property taxes and its
use shall be co-terminus with its existence.
Years later UPSUMCOs properties were acquired by PNB, transferred to Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) and sold to URSUMCO. Teves heirs demanded the return of H
-37 from URSUMCO, which the latter refused. RTC ruled in favour of Heirs of Teves except
where pier and guest house are concerned. CA affirmed RTC decision
ISSUE
: (1) Does respondents have cause of action? (2) Does petitioner have legal capacity to question
the sale? (3) Is barangay conciliation needed?
RULING
: (1) Yes, respondents have cause of action since the transfer of H-37 was a contract of sale. In
addition, it was Teves who allowed UPSUMCO to construct the pier and guest house, clearly
manifestations of acts of ownership over the land by Teves. (2) No, petitioner cannot hide
behind the veil of an innocent purchaser for value as two important factors are absent: (1)
property bought for consideration and (2) lack of knowledge of adverse claim prior to sale. In
addition, H-37 was not included in the property acquired by URSUMCO from APT which was
limited to UPSUMCO properties foreclosed by PNB. (3) No, Sec. 1, Rule VI of IRR exempts from
barangay conciliation if one party is a juridical entity. Petition denied, CA decision affirmed.
Teresita Montoya vs. Escayo et al. G.R. No. 82211-12, March 21, 1989 FACTS
:
Escayo et al. were former salesgirls in petitioners store in Bacolod City. On different dates they
filed complaints
separately for collection of sums of money against petitioner for overtime pay, holiday pay, 13
th
month pay, ECOLA, and service leave pay among others. Petitioner filed for dismissal of
complaints for failure to comply with the Katarungang Pambarangay law as stated in PD 1508.
Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of petitioner, this was reversed by the NLRC which directed the
Labor Arbiterto proceed with the case.
ISSUE
: Are labor disputes under PD 1508 covered by the Lupong Tagapamayapa before such cases
can be filed with the court or any government offices?
RULING
: No, Sec. 6, PD 1508 applies only t
o courts of justice and not to labor relations commissioners or labor arbiters
office. In addition, Art. 226, PD 442 grants original and exclusive jurisdiction over the
conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances, or problems in the regional offices of the
DOLE. It is the said Bureau and its divisions, and not the barangay Lupong Tagapamayapa,
which are vested by law with original and exclusive authority to conduct conciliation and
mediation proceedings on labor controversies before their endorsement to the appropriate
labor arbiter for adjudication. Petition dismissed.