CHAPTER 9

Central Banking
and the Conduct
of Monetary
Policy
 Chapter Preview

Central banks are the government authorities

in change of monetary policy. For example, in
the U.S., the central bank is the Federal
Reserve System. Although we typically hear
about central banks in connection with
interest rates, their actions also affect credit,
the money supply, and inflation (just to name
a few areas).

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 Chapter Preview

In this chapter, we will more closely examine

the structure of the major central banks
throughout the world. We start with the Fed,
looking at both the formal and informal power
structure. We then move to the other central
banks.

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 Chapter Preview
We examine the role of government authorities over the
money supply. We focus primarily on the role of the U.S.
Federal Reserve System, but also examine similar
organizations in other nations. Topics include:
Origins of the Federal Reserve System
Structure of the Federal Reserve System
How Independent is the Fed?
Structure and Independence of the European Central Banks
Structure and Independence of other Foreign Central Banks
Explaining Central Bank Behavior
Should the Fed Be Independent?

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 Origins of the Federal
Reserve System
Fear of centralized power and distrust of moneyed
interests guided central bank activities in the 19th century
The First Bank of the U.S. was disbanded in 1811
The Second Bank of the U.S. was disbanded in 1836
when President Andrew Jackson vetoed its renewal.
As a result, banking panics became regular events,
absent a lender of last resort, culminating in the panic of
1907.
Widespread bank failures and depositor losses convinced
the U.S. that a central bank was needed.

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 Federal Reserve Act of 1913
Fear of a central authority was rampantpeople
worried that powerful Wall Street interests would
manipulate the system.
Questions arose as to whether such a monetary
authority would be private or a government
institution.
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was a
compromise that created the Federal Reserve
System, including elaborate checks and balances.

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 INSIDE THE FED: The Political
Genius of the Funders of the FRS

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 Structure of the Federal
Reserve System
Design was intended to diffuse power along the following
dimensions:
Regions of the U.S.
Government and private sector interests
Needs of bankers, businesses, and the public

The system as it exists now includes:

Twelve Federal Reserve Banks
Board of Governors (BOG) of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
Federal Advisory Council
Member Banks (around 2,800)

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 Structure of the Federal
Reserve System

The next slide outlines the relationships of

these entities to one another and to the three
policy tools of the Fed:
Open market operations
Discount rate
Reserve requirements

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 Structure
of the
Federal
Reserve
System

2012 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 9-10

 Twelve Federal Reserve Banks
Each of the twelve districts has a main Federal
Reserve Bank and at least one branch office
The banks are quasi-public
Owned by member commercial banks in the district
Member banks elect six directors, while three directors
are appointed by the Board of Governors
Directors represent professional bankers, prominent
business leaders, and public interests (three from
each group)

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 Structure of the Federal
Reserve System

The next slide shows the location of the

12 main Federal Reserve Banks, and other
prominent cities in the Federal Reserve
System.

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 Federal Reserve Banks

2012 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. 9-13

 Federal Reserve Bank
Functions: General
Clear checks
Issue new currency and remove damaged currency
Administer and make discount loans to banks in their
districts
Evaluate bank mergers and expansions
Liaison between local community and the Federal
Reserve System
Perform bank examinations
Collect and examine data on local business conditions
Conduct research related to monetary policy

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 Federal Reserve Bank
Functions: Monetary Policy
Establish the discount rate at which member
banks may borrow from the Federal Reserve
Bank (subject to BOG review)
Determine which bank receive loans
Elect one member to the Federal
Advisory Council
Five of the 12 bank presidents vote in the Federal
Open Market Committee

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 The FRB of New York

Before we discuss the member banks of the

system, its worth talking about the special
role that the New York bank plays in the
system.
Being in NYC, the New York Fed is
responsible for oversight of some of the
largest financial institutions headquartered
in Manhattan and the surrounding area.

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 The FRB of New York

The New York Fed houses the open market

desk. All of the Feds open market
operations (discussed in a bit) are directed
through this trading desk.
The New York Fed is the only member of
the Bank for International Settlements,
providing close contact with other foreign
central bankers.

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 The FRB of New York

Finally, the chairman of New York Fed is

the only permanent member of the FOMC,
serving as the vice-chairman of the
committee.

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 Member Banks

National banks (banks chartered by the

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)
are required to be members.
State commercials banks may elect to join.
Currently, 37% of the commercial banks in
the U.S. are members of the system.

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 Member Banks

Prior to 1980, only member banks were

required to maintain reserves. By 1987, all
depository institutions were required to
maintain reserves, eliminating this
downside of membership.

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 Board of Governors
The seven governors are appointed by the President,
and confirmed by the Senate, for 14-year terms on a
rotating schedule.
All Board members are members of the FOMC.
Effectively set the discount rate.
Serve in an advisory capacity to the President of the United
States, and represent the U.S. in foreign economic matters.
Other duties as established by legislation (e.g., Regulation
Q, Credit Control Act of 1969).
Set margin requirements for stock purchases.

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 The research staff

The Federal Reserve System employs over

500 research economists. What do all these
researchers do?
Offer insight on incoming economic data
and interpret where it suggests our
economy is heading.
Provide briefs for formal meetings on the
economic outlook of the country.
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 The research staff

Provide support for supervisory staff in

decisions about bank mergers, lending
activities, and other technical advice.
Produce reports on the developments in
major foreign economies.
Public education.

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 Federal Open Market Committee
Make decisions regarding open market operations, to
influence the monetary base.
The chairman of the BOG is also the chair of this
committee
Open market operations are the most important tool that
the Fed has for controlling the money supply (along with
reserve requirements and the discount rate)
All actions are directed the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, where securities are bough / sold as required.

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 Federal Open Market
Committee Meeting
Meet eight times each year (about every
six weeks)
Important agenda items include
Reports on open market operations (foreign and
domestic)
National economic forecasts are presented
Discussion of monetary policy and directives, including
views of each member
Formal policy directive made
Post-meeting announcements, as needed

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 Inside the Fed: the books

Several research documents are by the Fed,

and have been given official, colorful names:
Green book: national forecasts for the next
two years
Blue book: projections of monetary
aggregates
Beige book: districts state of the economy

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 Chairman of the
Federal Reserve System
Spokesperson for the entire Federal Reserve
System, and supervises the Boards staff
Negotiates, as needed, with Congress and the
President of the United States
With these, the chairman has effective control
over the system, even though he doesnt have
legal authority to exercise control over the system
and its member banks.

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 How Bernankes Style Differs
from Greenspans

Greenspan vs. Bernanke

Professional career Academic career at
running a consulting firm Stanford and Princeton
Disciple of Ayn Rand, More of a theorists
believer in laissez-faire involved in model design
capitalism
Not a theoristbelieved More informal FOMC
more in what the data meetings relative to
showed him Greenspan

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 How Independent is the Fed?
A broad question of policy for the Federal Reserve
Systems is how free the Fed is from presidential and
congressional pressure in pursuing its goals.
Instrument Independence: the ability of the central bank to
set monetary policy instruments.
Goal Independence: the ability of the central bank to set
the goals of monetary policy.
Evidence suggests that the Fed is free along both
dimensions. Further, the 14-year terms (non-renewable)
limit incentives to curry favor with either the President
or Congress.
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 How Independent is the Fed?
Other Evidence
The Fed usually generates revenue in excess of its
expenses, so it is not typically under appropriations
pressure.
However, Congress can enact legislation to gain control of
the Fed, a threat wielded as needed. For example, the
House Concurrent Resolution 133 requires the Fed to
announce its objective growth rate for the money supply.
Presidential appointment clearly sets the direction of the
Fed.

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 The European Central Bank
Founded (as it currently exists) in 1999 by a treaty
between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB).
The ECB is housed in Frankfurt, Germany.
Executive board consists of the president, vice president,
and four members, all serving eight-year terms.
The policy group consists of the executive board and
governors from the 11 member countries central banks.

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 The European Central Bank

Difference between the Fed and the ECB:

Budgets of the Fed are controlled by the BOG,
while the National banks that make up the ECB
control their own budgets (and the ECBs).
Monetary operations are conducted at the
national level, not directly by the ECB.
The ECB is not involved in bank regulation or
supervision.

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 The European Central Bank

Difference between the Fed and the ECB:

Only the 18 members attend the monthly
meetings of the ECB, with no staff.
No voting! All decisions are made by consensus.
The ECB holds a press conference following the
monthly meeting, while the Fed typically doesnt.

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 The European Central Bank

Difference between the Fed and the ECB:

Finally, the ECB may actually expand in the
future, while the Fed obviously wont. Other
countries which may eventually join include
the U.K., Sweden, Denmark, and many
others.

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 The European Central Bank

The ECB is the most instrument and goal

independent central bank in the world. It
was given independence in the Maastricht
Treaty, and that policy can only be changed
by amending the treaty.
The treaty set the ECBs long-term goal as
price stability, so its not entirely free to
pursue its own goals.

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 Structure and Independence of
Other Foreign Central Banks

Unlike the United States, central banks of

other industrial countries consist of one central
bank that is owned by the government. Here,
we examine the structure and independence
of four important foreign central banks:
Bank of Canada
Bank of England
Bank of Japan

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 Bank of Canada
Founded in 1934
Directors are appointed by the government for three-year
terms, and they appoint a governor for a seven-year term.
A governing council is the policy-making group
comparable to the FOMC.
In 1967, ultimate monetary authority was given to the
government. However, this authority has never been
exercised to date.

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 Bank of England
Founded in 1694
The Court (like our BOG) consists of the governor, two
deputy governors (five-year terms), and 16 nonexecutive
directors (three-year terms).
The Monetary Policy committee compares with the U.S.
FOMC, consisting of the governor, deputy governors, two other
central bank officials, plus four outside economic experts.
The Bank was the least independent of the central banks, until
1997, when it was granted authority to set interest rates.
The government can step in under extreme circumstances,
but has never done so yet.

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 Bank of Japan (Nippon Ginko)
Founded in 1882
The Policy Board sets monetary policy, and consists of the
governor, two vice governors, and six outside members.
All serve five-year terms.
The Bank of Japan Law (1998) gave the Bank
considerable instrument and goal independence.
Japans Ministry of Japan can exert authority through its
budgetary approval of the Banks non-monetary spending.

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 Trend toward Independence

In recent years, we have seen a remarkable

trend toward increasing independence. The
Fed used to be substantially more
independent than other central banks, but
this has changed with the formation of the
ECB and changes at other central banks.
This trend should continue.

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 Explaining Central Bank
Behavior
Two competing theories try to explain the
observed behavior of central banks:
Public Interest View: the central bank serves the public
interest.
Theory of Bureaucratic Behavior: the central bank will
seek to maximize its own welfare.

The Fed often fights to maintain autonomy while

avoid conflict with Congressional power groups.
These seem to favor the latter theory, but this
view is probably too extreme.
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 Should the Fed Be
Independent?

Every few years, the question arises in

Congress as to whether the independence
of the Fed should be reduced in some
fashion. This is usually motivated by
politicians who disagree with current
Fed policy.
Arguments can be made both ways, as we
outline next.

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 Transparency

The Fed generally likes to keep its actions

hiddennot transparentto avoid conflicts
with Congress and other politicians. For
example, in the past, the Fed didnt
announce the results of the FOMC meetings.
Now it does. But try to find out what bonds
are being traded at the New York Fed. That
is guarded closely.

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 Transparency

Each chairman, of course, adds changes to

this view:
In 2007, Bernanke extended the forecast horizon
for FOMC projections from 2 years to 3 years.
FOMC publishes these projects quarterly (instead
of twice a year).
Forecast also includes discussion from FOMC
members.

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 Case for Independence

The strongest argument for independence

is the view that political pressure will tend to
add an inflationary bias to monetary policy.
This stems from short-sighted goals of
politicians. For example, in the short-run,
high money growth does lead to lower
interest rates. In the long-run, however, this
also leads to higher inflation.

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 Case for Independence
The notion of the political business cycle stems
from the previous argument.
Expansionary monetary policy leads to lower
unemployment and lower interest ratesa good idea
just before elections.
Post-election, this policy leads to higher inflation, and
therefore, higher interest rateseffects that hopefully
disappear (or are forgotten) by the next election.

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 Case for Independence
Other arguments include:
The Treasury may seek to finance the government
through bonds purchased by the Fed. This may lead to
an inflationary bias.
Politicians have repeatedly shown an inability to make
hard choices for the good of the economy that may
adversely affect their own well-being.
Its independence allows the Fed to pursue policies
that are politically unpopular, yet in the best interest of
the public.

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 Case Against Independence
Some view Fed independence as undemocratican
elite group controlling an important aspect of the economy
but accountable in few ways.
If this argument seems unfounded, then ask why we dont
let the other aspects of the country be controlled by an
elite few. Are military issues, for example, any
less complex?
Indeed, we hold the President and Congress accountable
for the state of the economy, yet they have little control
over one of the most important tools to direct
the economy.

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 Case Against Independence
Further, the Fed has not always been successful
in the past. It has made mistakes during the Great
Depression and inflationary periods in the 1960s
and 1970s.
Lastly, the Fed can succumb to political pressure
regardless of any state of independence. This
pressure may be worse with few checks and
balances in place.

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 Central Bank Independence and
Macroeconomic Performance
Throughout the World

Empirical work suggests that countries with

the most independent central banks do the
best job controlling inflation.
Evidence also shows that this is
achieved without negative impacts on
the real economy.

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 Chapter Summary

Origins of the Federal Reserve System: A

brief history on central banking in the U.S.
was discussed, including key dates leading
to the formation of the Fed.
Structure of the Federal Reserve System:
The checks and balances of power in the
Federal Reserve System were outlined.

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 Chapter Summary (cont.)

Structure of the Federal Reserve System:

Further, the internal structure of the Fed
and the important relationships were
detailed.
How Independent is the Fed?: Both the
instrument independence and goal
independence of the Federal Reserve
System was discussed.

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 Chapter Summary (cont.)

Structure and Independence of the ECB

and Other Foreign Central Banks: The
instrument and goal independence of the
foreign counterparts of the Federal Reserve
System was discussed.
Explaining Central Bank Behavior: The
important roles and theories of bank
behavior were outlined.

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 Chapter Summary (cont.)

Should the Fed Be Independent?: This big

picture question was asked and examined
from various perspectives.

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