RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, INTERSECTIONALITY THEORY

AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EPISTEMIC PROBLEMS IN

INDIGENOUS SETTINGS

by

Bruno Osmar Vergini de Freitas

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF LAWS

in
The Faculty of Graduate Studies

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

(Vancouver)
April 2011

Bruno Osmar Vergini de Freitas, 2011

Abstract

This thesis problematizes the use of feminist intersectionality theory within the

context of the restorative justice social movement as applied in cases of violence against women

in culturally heterogeneous settings. I argue that there is an imbalanced anti-essentialist tendency

in some intersectional approaches to restorative justice (RJ) and domestic violence that slides

toward gender underestimation, ultimately, leading to a phenomenon defined by feminist scholar

Kimberl Crenshaw: intersectional disempowerment. This position threatens the epistemological

and critical stances of that feminist analytical tool for understanding racialized womens needs

for security, offender accountability and empowerment at an individual level in situations of

domestic violence. In addition, the existence of competing analytical categories in intersectional

analysis and multicultural drives obscure pre-existing patriarchal relations in Indigenous

communities applying RJ as remedial justice, i.e., intra-group gender inequality and allows co-

optation of the intersectionality theory by ethnocultural non-emancipatory political interests.

This poses potential detrimental consequences to racialized women dealing with

some RJ interventions like alienation, exclusion and the silencing of victims' individual histories,

reinforcing the fact that the representation of the individual female victim within the RJ

movement has not been adequately resolved and remains deeply problematic. To illustrate my

arguments, I focus on sentencing circles that are used ostensibly as state-sanctioned alternative

criminal justice responses designed to ameliorate the systemic racism and over-incarceration

rates that Aboriginal peoples experience in postcolonial jurisdictions such as Canada and

Australia. I argue that these restorative-like experience are especially vulnerable to intersectional

disempowerment. In these RJ models, it becomes unclear whether intersectional approaches can

sustain the particular needs and interests of victimized women.

ii
Table of Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................. ii
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................. iii
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ v
Dedication ............................................................................................................................. vi
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
1. Topic: Restorative justice, intersectionality theory co-optation and violence against women ..... 1
2. Thesis structure ................................................................................................................................................................ 5
3. Caveat, topic developments and literature review............................................................................................ 7
4. A brief word on the co-optation of the feminist anti-violence movement by political interests 16
5. Theoretical framework: Intersectionality theory ............................................................................................17
6. Intersectionality and restorative Justice..............................................................................................................22
7. Thesis preliminary critique and defense .............................................................................................................28

Chapter I Restorative justice .............................................................................................. 32

Chapter outline.........................................................................................................................................................................32
1. The foundations of restorative justice ..................................................................................................................38
a) The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s.................................................................................................40
b) Programs and practices ..............................................................................................................................................42
c) Informal justice and abolitionism ...........................................................................................................................46
d) Reintegrative shaming and psychological theories ........................................................................................50
e) Feminists theories on justice .....................................................................................................................................52
f) Peacemaking criminology and philosophy theories ........................................................................................53
g) Indigenous justice and religious roots ..................................................................................................................56
2. Defining restorative justice........................................................................................................................................66
a) Restorative justice working definition..................................................................................................................68
b) Overview of restorative justice models .................................................................................................................73
i. VORPs and VOMs ..............................................................................................................................................................74
ii. Family group conferences ...........................................................................................................................................79
iii. Restorative and sentencing circles ........................................................................................................................84
3. Points of tension: a brief critique of restorative justice ................................................................................94
a) Categorizing the critique of restorative justice ................................................................................................95
b) The critiques revolving around RJ within the context of a paradigmatic shift...................................99
i. Is RJ really a paradigmatic shift? ..............................................................................................................................99
ii. Restorative Justice versus Retributive Justice: The role of punishment ............................................... 101
iii. Other criticisms revolving around claims of a paradigmatic shift ....................................................... 103
Privatizing crime: Lack of public denunciation ............................................................................................... 104
Imbalance of power in RJ encounters................................................................................................................... 105
Accusations of manipulation.................................................................................................................................... 106
Postmodern critique of RJ.......................................................................................................................................... 107
General criticisms.......................................................................................................................................................... 109

iii
 c) The critique revolving around RJ as an appendage of the justice system........................................... 111
d) Feminist critique of RJ: Deferring the discussion .......................................................................................... 112

Chapter II Feminism, restorative justice and domestic violence........................................ 113

Chapter outline......................................................................................................................................................................113
1. The feminist engagement with restorative justice .......................................................................................115
a) General Issues ............................................................................................................................................................... 115
b) Feminist criminology and RJ .................................................................................................................................. 117
i. Feminist schools of thought ...................................................................................................................................... 123
ii. Essentialist schools of feminism ............................................................................................................................ 125
Liberal or sameness feminism.............................................................................................................................. 126
Cultural or difference Feminism ......................................................................................................................... 128
Radical or dominance Feminism ........................................................................................................................ 130
iii. Anti-essentialist schools of feminism ................................................................................................................. 133
Marxist feminism and socialist feminism............................................................................................................ 134
Postmodern and poststructuralist feminism..................................................................................................... 137
iv. Incorporating intersectionality theory ............................................................................................................. 140
Multiracial feminisms intersectionality theory............................................................................................... 141
v. Connecting multiracial feminism, restorative justice and indigenous justice claims .................... 145
c) Problems with intersectionality analysis .......................................................................................................... 151
Intersectionality theory: making feminist analysis less open to gender equality concerns ......... 152
Epistemic problems with Intersectionality theory: anti-essentialism.................................................... 153
Strategic essentialism.................................................................................................................................................. 156
RJ self-advocacy: contributing to the imbalance of intersectional approaches through cultural
frame alignment. ................................................................................................................................................................... 157
2. Daly & Stubbs on the appropriateness of RJ for domestic violence ......................................................160
a) Potential problems of using restorative justice ............................................................................................. 163
b) Potential advantages of using restorative justice......................................................................................... 164

Chapter III Further developments, implications and conclusions ...................................... 168

Chapter outline......................................................................................................................................................................168
1. Further developments: Intersectional feminism, multiculturalism and sentencing circles.......172
a) Multiculturalism and restorative justice: establishing connections..................................................... 173
b) Intersectionality and multiculturalism: finding common ground......................................................... 175
c) Intersectionality and multiculturalism: establishing differences .......................................................... 178
d) Intersectionality and multiculturalism: shared vulnerabilities.............................................................. 180
2. Discussion and implications: contextualizing imbalanced intersectional approaches ................184
a) Sentencing circles: further clarifications.......................................................................................................... 190
b) Imbalanced intersectional approaches in context: incorporating insights....................................... 196
c) Detrimental effects of collective ethnocultural political claims ............................................................. 205
d) Intersectionality and uncritical validation of ethnocultural political claims .................................. 208
e) Tendencies to co-optation ....................................................................................................................................... 210
f) Other implications: RJ international expansion and the perils of intersectional imbalance ...... 213
3. Summary of conclusions and recommendations ..........................................................................................218

Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 231

iv


Acknowledgements

I offer my enduring gratitude to the faculty, staff and my fellow students at UBC,

who have inspired me to continue my work in this field despite all the adversities that life and

language barriers imposed on me. I owe particular thanks to Professor Janine Benedet, whose

keen intelligence and penetrating knowledge about womens studies are a reflection of her

endless generosity and patience.

I thank Angela Cameron for enlarging my vision of restorative justice and

domestic violence providing prompt answers to my endless questions.

v
Dedication

To my family for the lost hours.

vi
 Introduction

1. Topic: Restorative justice, intersectionality theory co-optation and violence against

women

This thesis explores the affinities and tensions that arise between the restorative

justice social movement (hereafter RJ) and feminist intersectionality theory within the context

of violence against women.1 Basically, I contend that a theoretically ideal intersectional feminist

analysis of the problem of the use of RJ as a remedy for cases of violence against women should

bear in mind analytical criteria which meet all the intersectional inequality categories in a

balanced way without losing the focus on the final purpose of any feminist analytical tool worthy

of the name: to serve, above all, womens interests. A possible failure of some intersectional

feminists in giving balance to claims of gender injustice with various other intersectional

inequality markers like culture; social class; religion; and ethnicity may have been silencing

critical objections to RJ as a tool for dealing with the problem of violence against women,

especially within Indigenous communities. It might also create an impression encouraged by

some RJ advocates that in general restorative experiences ---in their various models and forms

1
Although throughout this paper I may refer to the expression violence against women which is as a catch-all
phrase to any kind of violence that is directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women
disproportionately, my emphasis is on intimate partner violence also known as domestic violence, battering or
family violence. These terms will be used in this paper generically and interchangeably as forms of gender-based
violence; notwithstanding, distinctions among them can be found in the literature over violence against women.
Definitions of intimate partner violence or domestic violence can vary according to jurisdiction, but in general they
refer to a range of often repetitive and meaningful violent and abusive behaviours that reflect patterns of conduct
characterised by the misuse of power and control by one person over another who are or have been in an intimate
relationship. It can occur in heterosexual and same sex relationships and has profound negative impacts in the
lives of children, individuals, families and communities. It may also involve physical, sexual, emotional and/or
psychological abuse.
1
are egalitarian, gender-friendly and victim-oriented forms of justice that are suitable to any

empirical and cultural context, no matter how disparate womens socioeconomic and ethnic

realities are structured.2 I challenge this assumption throughout this study by arguing that there

are epistemic problems with the intersectional approach of RJ in Indigenous settings: mainly

because of radical anti-essentialist stances in intersectionality analysis.

Furthermore, I hope to reveal that in some cases the underlying cause of this

imbalanced intersectional approach is a possible co-optation of intersectionality theory by RJs

advocacy discourse and other ethnocultural political agendas. I argue that this appropriation of a

feminist intersectional approach may function as a stamp of approval to still unreliable

restorative experiences resulting finally, in an intersectional backfire. According to Brian

Martin a backfire is what happens when an action is counterproductive to its originators, and

recoils against them. In a backfire dynamic, outcomes and processes can be worse than

anticipated and in some cases worse than having done nothing.3 I use the expression

intersectional backfire in this same sense. These are intuitive insights for a very particular

niche of feminist analysis on RJ that in general does not overlook the problems regarding RJs

doctrine and its scope. Nevertheless, I am aware of no study theoretical or empirical that

2
Feminists, however, have been made a critique of the RJ movement that revolve around three main themes:
womens safety, offender accountability, and the politics of gender and race. See, e.g., Angela Cameron,
Restorative Justice: A Literature Review (Paper presented to the British Columbia Institute Against Family
Violence, 2005) [unpublished] at 18-22. (Noting and citing sources in a comprehensive literature review on RJ and
domestic violence). Furthermore, here I make one more remark on terminology. Although I make casual use of the
terms Indigenous and Aboriginal throughout this paper, in order to refer generically to autochthonous peoples
from North America (United States and Canada) and Australasia (Australia and New Zealand). I do not have the
intention to strip them of their particularities, ethnic diversity or to the right of designating and retaining their own
names for communities, places and persons. For the sake of simplicity, I will use those terms interchangeably and
as a neutral replacement instead of giving specific names. Nevertheless, when suitable for the purposes of this
paper I may mention a specific group or ethnicity by their self-indentified name.
3
See Brian Martin, Justice Ignited: The Dynamics of Backfire (Lanhan, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,
2007). (Discussing through case studies theoretical implications of a backfire dynamic). See also Dana Greene,
Repeat Performances: Why Good Reforms Go Bad & Testing the Next Wave, RJ (Ph.D. Thesis, The city University of
New York, 2005) [unpublished]. (Describing a backfire dynamic concerning RJ as a benevolent penal reform
initiative).
2
attempts directly to connect the (mis)use of an intersectional approach and the validation of RJ

practices through the co-optation of the former.4 In fact, the literature proceeds as if there are no

potential epistemological problems, or as if intersectionality theory could be declared fault-proof

as an analytical tool. However, my assessment of the subject matter considers an intersectional

approach as open to criticism. In sum, my thesis problematizes the accommodation of

intersectionality theory as a research tool within the context of RJ, domestic violence and

Indigenous justice practices.

The conventional assumption is that an intersectional feminist approach brings

about certain emancipatory effects for women. This usually means that the intersection of the

inequality categories (or social identities) brings into light the structures of domination and

oppression embedded in womens lives, and has the potential to expose existing detrimental

power relations. However, in my opinion, some feminists and activists on RJ may reflect, at

times, an unhelpful bias in their conceptualizations of the RJ processes and institutions

producing an opposite effect when using an intersectional approach. These conceptualizations

especially in Indigenous settings are developed with an explicit connection with collectivist RJ

values and anti-racist political claims which do not coincide necessarily with Aboriginal

womens primary interests. For this reason, it is possible that an imbalanced intersectional

approach does not benefit its intended particular beneficiaries (in our main focus of study:

Indigenous women), because it cannot assure them of a sense of security and empowerment in

RJ conferences. Besides that, those intersectional conceptualizations of RJ can foster

4
I do not want to suggest that RJ and feminist scholars have ignored this topic completely. Intersectional themes
have been openly considered in a great deal of feminist studies on restorative justice. In fact, almost the totality of
them used somehow intersectional insights. However, none of them explored the problems and prospects of the
methodology itself, or asked whether it might be co-opted by other political interests present in the RJ field. Most
of the scholarly commentaries are laudatory front-page endorsements of an intersectional approach and do not
engage in debate regarding possible procedural problems due to the presence of competing inequality categories.
That is my original take on the issue.
3
ethnocentrism and cast doubts over the real achievements of outstanding members of the

"benefited" group since they can create an unhealthy preoccupation with other political claims,

causing an intersectional backfire on them.

This complicates the application of intersectionality theory to the study of RJ

generating a kind of intellectual myopia. It may serve to reproduce and reinforce those

structures of domination and oppression, or may even contribute to their perpetuation by

masking their principles of operation. In addition, an imbalanced version of an intersectional

approach may not capture the internal and external flaws and vulnerabilities of the RJ rhetoric

since it might be conflated with them. Instead of providing an explanation or critical evaluation

of RJ insights from this imbalanced intersectionality approach might become more like a claque,

where intersectional feminists and RJ practitioners function to validate RJ experiences rather

than enlighten policy-makers about possible dangers. One could argue that almost any action can

generate unforeseen adverse consequences. The relevant issue is to determine what is the cost of

an intersectional backfire for Aboriginal women versus the cost of not using intersectional

insights, and the benefits and/or costs to the RJ movement itself?

In order to advance understanding of the problem posed, besides an overview of

the most relevant feminist theory scholarship about RJ and domestic violence, my thesis

establishes as a working hypothesis positive links between the existence of competing inequality

markers in an intersectional approach, and dissonant voices among feminist scholars about RJ

effectiveness to cope with violence against women, especially regarding RJ models used in

Aboriginal communities in Canada and Australia (mainly sentencing circles models). I seek to

demonstrate that an excessive reliance on other intersectional inequality categories rather than a

gender-oriented approach may result, paradoxically, in a feminist analytical tool that turns out

to be divisive, uncritical and far from being in any way emancipatory to oppressed Aboriginal
4
women. As a matter of fact, I contend that an intersectional approach might function as a

double-edged sword with the potential to address how other forms of inequality and

oppression, such as racism, colonialism, ethnocentrism, and class privilege affect Aboriginal

women victimized by violence, but at the same time it has the potential to be co-opted to serve as

a validation tool for RJ advocacy purposes. In my opinion the rhetoric of RJ proponents

resonates with a political agenda of diverse (and sometimes conflicting) interest groups where

self-advocacy motives, multi-cultural drives and intersectional anti-essentialist epistemic stances

tend to impact directly on some intersectional approaches of RJ interventions. The reason for

that is a pattern of identification and divided loyalty by a number of intersectional feminists with

RJ tenets and other movements historical struggles like those represented by the battered

womens movement, victims and offenders rights advocates, and ethnic or racial minorities

anti-colonial political claims. In addition, the anti-essentialist rejection of gender as a standard

category of analysis provides the epistemological frailty for intersectionality analysis. In this

sense, the heart of my study is to test whether or not intersectionality theory is vulnerable to be

tamed as a critical feminist analytical tool by the militant advocacy of restorative proponents.

In sum, intersectional feminists epistemological (in)ability to deal with the messiness of these -

most of the time - overlapping interests will be the central topic of my thesis.

2. Thesis structure

The idea of engaging the problematic positioning of intersectionality theory

within the context of RJ and violence against women will be presented in the body of this thesis

in three chapters: In the first chapter, I sketch out the foundational assumptions and main features

of RJs theoretical framework. In addition, a brief general critique of the RJ movement from

various perspectives will be provided. The objective is to bring them into focus providing a solid

foundation for the development of the following chapters.

5
 A second chapter will focus on feminist scholarship and its interactions with

restorative justice. In this chapter, the aim is to explore the relationship between feminism and

RJ, by addressing the contributions of several schools of feminist thinking. This leads to

positioning feminist intersectionality theory within the context of feminist criminology, RJ and

violence against women. In addition, I present a more critical understanding of intersectionality

analysis revealing epistemological vulnerabilities and connections with Indigenous postcolonial

political claims. Whereas some intersectional feminists employ a feminist theory that focuses

disproportionately on anti-essentialist stances to the detriment of gender as an important

analytical category, I contend that intersectionality needs a more balanced approach ---

strategically focused on individual gender equality concerns --- in which the forces shaping and

obstructing intersectional analysis can be properly taken into consideration. Finally, this chapter

will focus on the mainstream feminist contribution on the debate regarding the suitability of RJ

to cope with domestic violence.

In the third chapter criticisms, conceptualizations and concerns introduced in the

first two chapters regarding the interplay between intersectionality theory, domestic violence and

RJ will be contextualized in Indigenous settings and further developed. This last chapter ---

which also incorporates the conclusion --- seeks to develop insights into the use of intersectional

thinking that reveal a lack of understanding from some intersectional feminists of particular

cooptive structures (e.g., the impact of postcolonial multicultural theory on RJ and intersectional

feminism) and other political (e.g., ethnocultural postcolonial claims) and epistemic processes

(e.g., prospects of intersectional disempowerment) that point to the necessity of a more cautious

approach of intersectionality analysis due to the risks of co-optation by non-woman centered

interests.

6
3. Caveat, topic developments and literature review

Before proceeding, as a caveat to the reader I must acknowledge that my

arguments concerning a possible co-optation of the intersectional theory by the RJ rhetoric

cannot be applied to all intersectional feminist views on RJ and domestic violence. Actually, the

prevailing perception of feminists (intersectional or not) over the use of models of RJ to cope

with violence against women is highly critical and markedly hinders its use in several

jurisdictions. By subjecting RJ concepts, practices and promises to critical analysis, feminist

scholars have been playing an influential role in the adoption or otherwise of RJ models to cope

with cases of violence against women to the extent that their objections or approval is, at times,

decisive in the policy-making process.5

For this reason, my aim is to provide an assessment of the current feminist

thought on this important public policy issue and to understand better the conflicting stances

among feminist scholars, especially those that can be labelled as intersectional feminists or at

least inspired by its methodology within the context of Indigenous women. I take this very

particular niche of research concerning Aboriginal communities and the long term relationship

between feminist theory and violence against women as a starting point for my study about how

the feminist theory of intersectionality interacts with RJ in ways that can produce a backfire,

especially in relation to Aboriginal women. As stated in the last section, I hope to emphasize the

significance of a direct interplay between intersectionality theory and policy-making processes

regarding RJ experiences for Aboriginal women.

5
Daly and Stubbs, for instance, observed that, with the exception of circle sentencing, RJ has largely been kept
off the agenda for partner and sexual violence, in part due to feminist or victim advocacy. See Kathleen Daly &
Julie Stubbs, Feminist Engagement with RJ (2006) 10:1 Theoretical Criminology 9-28 at 11. More recent
literature, however, suggests that this tide may be turning with several ongoing RJ programmes particularly in
Canada and the United States coping with domestic violence. See James Ptacek, ed., Restorative Justice and
Violence Against Women (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2009).
7
 I will focus my analysis mainly in two empirical contexts. Firstly, the access to

and use of sentencing circles in Canada by Aboriginal communities.6 I start with scholarly

commentaries on the relationship between RJ and Indigenous justice particularly the adoption of

RJ practices by Indigenous communities. That will permit us to get insights about the existence

of competing inequality categories in an intersectional analysis of the relationship between

specific models of RJ, and how Aboriginal women are affected by it empirically. Secondly, I ask

whether we might not expand upon those insights by analyzing the effects of the use of similar

models of RJ by Aboriginal people mainly in Australia. I use data collected by feminist scholars

to explore whether or not there is a pattern of repetition concerning how Aboriginal women are

impacted by RJ experiences.

Certain patterns of those imbalanced inequality categories seem to emerge to exist

predominantly within particular political and socio-legal feminist mindsets. Thus, for instance,

cultural and ethnic justice arguments found especially within the context of Indigenous Justice

and RJ such as that domestic violence occurs because the community is still suffering from the

effects of colonialization, gendered racism or lack of political self-determination may be

6
As Stubbs points out, There are problems in conflating Indigenous justice with RJ, but no agreement on how to
differentiate between the two. Circle sentencing is commonly designated as an example of RJ but Marchetti and
Daly disagree and classify it as an Indigenous justice practice. See Julie Stubbs, Restorative Justice, Gendered
Violence, and Indigenous Justice in James Ptacek, ed., Restorative Justice and Violence Against Women (New York,
NY: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 1656-1659 in a kindle e-book version. Emma Cunliffe and Angela Cameron
also resist to the idea of considering Aboriginal sentencing circles a form of RJ since, in their words, This
endorsement is risky because categorizing judicially convened sentencing circles as restorative justice acts as a
frame by which the circle practice is interpreted as helping to secure restorative objectives, regardless of the fact
that circles actually operate more ambivalently. The categorization also accords the practice legitimacy within the
Canadian criminal justice system. See infra note 8, Cameron & Cunliffe, Writing the Circle at 14 . Angela Cameron
also articulates several distinctions between Indigenous Justice and RJ, but at the same time she notes that: Other
scholars, as well as the Supreme Court of Canada, have noted the striking similarities between Aboriginal justice
and other restorative justice practices in Canada (R v. Gladue, 1999; Doulis, 1996; LaPrairie, 1992). See note 2 at
6. But see Ann Skelton, Tapping indigenous knowledge: traditional conflict resolution, restorative justice and the
denunciation of crime in South Africa (2007) Acta Juridica 228-246 at 230. (Observing that African writers are
more open to making the linkages between modern restorative justice and Indigenous justice than are their
counterparts from Australia, New Zealand and North America). For the purposes of my thesis I will treat Aboriginal
sentencing circles as consistent with RJ experiences since the general perception is that both are conflated.
8
acclaimed by some intersectional feminists and RJ advocates, while womens safety and

autonomy are neglected. Emphasizing some inequality categories may hamper the pursuit of

others. In fact, advocacy of political goals through RJ and Indigenous justice may have a

profound negative impact on the achievement of a safe environment for Indigenous women in

restorative conferences, both ignoring and silencing the victim.7 Recently, a number of scholarly

works have given considerable attention to this focus of study. They highlight the potential perils

of the way in which conflicting inequality markers and disparate political goals have been

fostering the debate among and between Indigenous and non-Indigenous women on the

appropriateness of restorative justice and Indigenous justice in response to partner, sexual and

family violence.8 Daly summarizes these concerns, as she writes:

Indigenous communities often show a willingness to engage with alternative forms of

justice, born in part from a critique of the damage wrought by conventional criminal
justice, and many are keen to adopt RJ. However, Indigenous aspirations for justice are
commonly holistic and are associated with calls for self-determination; these elements are
not often acknowledged in alternative modes of justice, nor are Indigenous womens
perspectives typically addressed.9

7
Giving voice to victims is of paramount importance in any RJ conference since it is considered part of the healing
process to allow victims to tell their stories to the community and to the ones who caused the harm in order to
have them understand the impact of their actions.
8
See, e.g., Angela Cameron & Emma Cunliffe, Writing the Circle: Judicially Convened Sentencing circles and the
Textual Organization of Criminal Justice (2007) 19:1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1-35; Elizabeth
Adjin-Tettey, Sentencing Aboriginal Offender: Balancing Offender's Needs, the Interests of victims and Society,
and the Decolonization of Aboriginal Peoples (2007) 19:1 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 179; Carol
LaPrairie & Jane Dickson-Gilmore, Will the Circle be Unbroken? Aboriginal Communities, Restorative Justice and the
Challenges of Conflict and Change (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing 2005); Angela Cameron, Sentencing Circles
and Intimate Violence: A Canadian Feminist Perspective (2006) 18:2 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law
479-512 and Rashmi Goel, No Women at the Center: The use of the Canadian Sentencing Circles in Domestic
Violence Cases(2000) 15 Wiscosin Womens Law Journal 293-3334. (Addressing specifically the issue of the use of
sentencing circles in Indigenous settings and its consequences for Indigenous women). See generally the following
books: James Ptacek, ed., Restorative Jutice and Violence Against Women (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2009) and Heather Strang & John Braithwaite, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2002). (In these collections of essays over the theme RJ and violence against women
several several contributors have used a perspective of Aboriginal women).
9
See Kathleen Daly & Julie Stubbs, Feminist Theory, Feminist and anti-racist politics and Restorative Justice in
Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness, eds., Handbook of Restorative Justice (Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing,
2007) at 161.
9
 Although the intersectional approach addresses multiple discrimination categories

(or inequality markers) --- gender; religion; ethnicity; culture; social class, etc.--- and helps us

understand how different sets of social identities impact Indigenous womens interactions with

RJ there is the tangible risk in considering a given inequality category or marker, for example,

culture, as more important than others and by so doing neglecting essential features of the

traditional feminist thought like security and empowerment.10 Just to take one example of how a

dynamic like that can function, I single out for demonstration an insight drawn from the work of

the Canadian feminist scholar Angela Cameron. She points out the existence of asymmetric

approaches by Indigenous women and feminist scholars concerning how they see RJ

interventions in Canada. Some have a focus on community interests with self-determination as

their primary goal --- clearly a cultural and political agenda. Others focus more on gender to

address subordination of women in some Canadian Aboriginal communities.11 She writes,

the quest to incorporate an appropriate cultural and gender perspective in the debate about

restorative justice is a difficult one. The scholars discussed in this segment, in many cases,

prioritize a cultural agenda over an agenda that incorporates gender equality and culture in the

context of intimate violence.12

10
As Barbara Hart, an historical militant in the battered womans movement, argues: In the context of domestic
violence, there are six primary goals. The first and overarching goal is safety for battered women and children.
Every intervention should be measured against the yardstick of safety. (According to her, safety is followed by
stopping the violence (the second goal); holding perpetrators accountable (the third goal); divesting perpetrators
of control (the fourth goal); restoring women who have been battered (the fifth goal), and enhancing agency in
women who have been battered (the sixth goal) making them able to make decisions without interference by the
batterer). See Barbara J. Hart, Arrest, Whats the Big Deal (1997) 3 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. at 207-209.
Goodmark defines empowerment,as consistent with autonomy or agencyas self-direction, self-determination,
enabling the woman who has been battered not only to make choices, but to define the options for herself,
regardless of how others would evaluate those options. (I adopt her same view on womens empowerment). See
Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-essentialist Critique of Mandatory Interventions in Domestic
Violence Cases, This article will be adapted as a chapter in A Troubled Marriage: Domestic Violence and the Legal
System publication forthcoming (NY: New York University Press, 2011) at 48.
11
See Angela Cameron, Gender, Power and Justice: A Feminist Perspective on Restorative Justice and Intimate
Violence (LL.M. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2003) [unpublished] at 136.
12
Ibid.
10
 Defenders of the primacy of community interests over gender issues often argue

that women should put the community before themselves as a political assertion of their

autonomy and self-governance. However, other Indigenous women and feminist scholars have

criticized claims like those arguing that womens choices are, in that context, constrained by

political forces. These forces are objectionable since they re-victimize Indigenous women

undermining their freedom of choice --- even using state-based coercive sanctioning schemes --

and reinforcing gender subordination. They deprive individual Indigenous women of the self-

determination and self-direction that are essential for their autonomy and empowerment. As

Rashmi Goel, another Canadian scholar observes: this dynamic is complicated when

community members also see themselves as victims of the mainstream system interactions

might simply shift to one in which the community and the offender stand as victims of the

state.13 She adds, This could work to excuse the offender or to blame the victim for bringing

punishment on a fellow member.14

This prioritization of the political assertion of autonomy and self-governance over

safety and offenders accountability is only one example consistent with a strand of feminist

thought that I contend has permeated some imbalanced intersectional approaches. Those

intersectional feminists do not focus on womens subordinated and victimized statuses believing

they believe that other inequality loci are most significant, such as, cultural or ethnical political

claims or even RJ advocacy interests. Doing so they might be giving validation to those RJ

experiences as culturally sensitive while in truth womens security and empowerment are

neglected. Cameron observes that although culture really matters, (...) we need to move away

13
See Rashmi Goel, Aboriginal Women and Political Pursuit in Canadian Sentencing Circles: At the Cross Roads or
Cross Purposes? in James Ptacek, ed., Restorative Jutice and Violence Against Women (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2009) at 1048-1051 in a kindle e-book version.
14
Ibid.
11
from romanticized, abstract notions of what can be achieved by western RJ or Aboriginal justice

and turn our attention to the actual experiences of victims and offenders. Their experiences,

whether positive or negative (or both) need to be grounded in a more adequate theorization of the

intersection of culture and gender in post-colonial societies.15 From my point of view this

adequate theorization means to combine and balance a commitment to womens interests with

a commitment to culturally appropriate forms of alternative justice in what Blagg named

constructive hybridization. Daly, citing Blagg, defined the term constructive hybridization:

Blagg (2005, p. 3) terms this constructive hybridization, and it refers to the ways in
which Aboriginal values and principles can be incorporated into the non-Aboriginal
justice system. Constructive hybridization reveals intersectional thinking. However, it
must include Indigenous womens interests and avoid inappropriate uses of cultural
arguments. Restorative justice practices typically work within a dominant white
perspective, but they could benefit by using constructive hybridization. Indigenous justice
practices can be improved by bringing the voice or perspective of the victim into the
process. This is especially important so that an offender does not take up the position of
offender and a victim of colonial society, which has the effect of obscuring the victim. It
may also serve to break the common ground of male interests (that is, those comprising
16
white justice and black community leaders).

The question is how to balance values based on alternative forms of justice like

RJ with values like gender empowerment. Part of the answer certainly includes studies that

address fairness concerns regarding RJ conferences; that females and victims interests are not

properly protected, and that feminist scholars are more likely to engage in dissent when they

(mis)use an intersectional approach --- as I try to demonstrate in this thesis.

15
See Angela Cameron, Stopping the Violence: Canadian Feminist Debates on Restorative Justice and Intimate
Violence (2006) 10 Theoretical Criminology at 56-57.
16
See Kathleen Daly, Seeking Justice in the 21st Century: Towards an Intersectional Politics of Justice in H. E.
Ventura Miller, ed., RJ: From Theory to Practice. Sociology of Crime, Law, and Deviance Series, Vol. 11 (Amsterdam:
Emerald Group Publishing Ltd.,2008) at 27. See also Harry Blagg, A new way of doing justice business? Community
justice mechanisms and sustainable governance in Western Australia (2005) State Solicitor's Office, Background
Paper No. 8. Perth: Law Reform Commission of Western Australia at 3.
12
 The uncertainty concerning who should play the major role in RJ thinking, or

whether it is reasonable to expect restorative interventions17 to be able to equally address

victims, offenders and community interests, provides another opportunity to examine the

complex relationships and contradictions inherent but latent in the RJ rhetoric. Many RJ

proponents embrace (and defend) that restorative conferences have the capacity to benefit

victims in a wide range of symbolic, material, therapeutic, and moral outcomes.18 For example,

as Stubbs observes: Proponents typically point to the opportunity for victims to participate and

have a voice and receive validation, and for offenders to take responsibility, for a communicative

and flexible environment and relationship repair (if that is a goal; Daly and Stubbs 2006)19.

Moreover, victims have allegedly reported reduced levels of fear, anxiety, and anger and show

less interest in seeking revenge. There are also claims of potential benefits concerning the

reduction of the symptoms of posttraumatic stress after participating in RJ conferences.20

However, the worry of many critics is that the capacity of RJ to advance victims interests is

more contingent than actual. As Stubbs put it:

The aspirations of the RJ movement to deliver such a range of benefits to victims of

crime are laudable. However, the capacity to advance victims interests remains limited
by several factors. First, it does not have its own concept of either victim or
victimization and thus lacks a foundation for challenging opposing claims Second, a
theoretical basis for how and why RJ might benefit victims are rarely articulated Third,
despite emerging evidence that experiences of RJ might vary according to victim,
offender, and offence characteristics and to the subjective experience of victimization,
little theoretical empirical work guides practice in responding to these issues. Fourth, the
tendency of much RJ literature to theorize crime as a discrete incident is at odds with
research demonstrating that domestic violence is commonly recurrent and escalating and

17
The most common practices of restorative justice include family-group conferences, peace-making circles/
sentencing circles, and a variety of victim-offender mediation processes depending on the legal jurisdiction. In
chapter 1 these models of RJ will be presented in more details.
18
Stubbs, supra note 6 at 1551-1554.
19
Ibid. at 1560-1564.
20
Ibid. See also Heather Strang, Repair or Revenge: Victims and RJ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
(Discussing the RJ promises to victims and offenders. There are allegedly benefits to the community like, for
example, participation in their own problems reinforcing participatory democracy).
13
 that the threat of violence may be ongoing and not reducible to discrete incidents (Cocker
2002; Stubbs 2002).21

In fact, the link between the mis(use) of the intersectional approach and the

uncertain status of victims interests in some RJ models is less obvious than the link between the

RJ claim of RJ to bring together victims, offenders and community and the desire to reform the

conventional criminal justice system. Nonetheless, my thesis seeks to explore an otherwise

overlooked connection between the mis(use) of intersectionality theory and the equivocal role of

victims, offenders and community in RJ theory and practice.

Another possible problem one comes up against in attempting to set priorities

among the various RJ stakeholders is identifying which RJ model will adequately capture all the

subtle shades of meaning within the RJ realm, while not excluding the richness and diversity of

its experiences. Different versions of RJ thinking or models imply different appraisals by

feminist scholars. By examining the literature I hope to identify problematic RJ models that

victim-oriented feminist scholars would be willing to engage like sentencing circle experiences

in Aboriginal communities in Canada and Australia. Key authors like Kathleen Daly; Julie

Stubbs; Rashmi Goel; Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, and Angela Cameron are particularly pertinent in

this sense because they address the subject-matter in a way that privileges a victim-oriented

analysis of the appropriateness of RJ to cope with violence against women without losing well-

balanced intersectional feminists insights.

These scholars and others have summarized the current RJ theoretical framework

under a feminist perspective, and at the same time either conducted or investigated several

empirical studies on RJ, especially based on ongoing actual experiences in Canada and

21
Stubbs, supra note 6 at 1552-1556.
14
Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) with white and non-white subjects.22 According to

them, domestic violence offences and other manifestations of violence against women cannot be

subsumed within existing generic restorative practices without significant risks to victims

interests. Furthermore, the extensive research data allowed them to identify a group of feminists

who do not apply a balanced approach in using inequality categories which generates distortions

in the critical evaluation of RJ experiences, especially in Indigenous communities. My thesis is

largely inspired and influenced by their findings and intends to complement their work adding

my own perspective on the issue, especially regarding the (mis)use of an intersectional approach

and a possible co-optation of it by RJ advocacy arguments and other political claims that become

amalgamated with them.

Furthermore, the importance of the applicability of RJ for gender-based violence

is especially striking when one considers that the UN Basic Principles on RJ fundamentally aim

to provide an opportunity for victims to obtain reparation, feel safer and seek closure (...)

(Preamble).23 This pledge for the protection of victims and victims rights as absolute priority is

a key feature that cannot be ignored when implementing any RJ program. If the restorative

approach fails in delivering reparation, security or even empowering the victim, it also fails as a

remedy and, therefore, as a viable practice to cope with cases of gender violence. Under that

premise, any RJ legislation, program or policy must unquestionably assure the women victims of

violence that their safety and autonomy will be preserved whether Indigenous or not; otherwise it

cannot be deemed a viable approach. Likewise, I argue that if an intersectional approach to the

problem of the use of RJ to cope with gender-based violence is co-opted by RJ advocacy

discourses and other political agendas --- being diverted from its purpose as a methodology that

22
See, e.g., note 8.
23
UN Economic and Social Council, Declaration of Basic Principles on the use of Restorative Justice Programmes in
Criminal Matters, ECOSOC Res. 2002/12, UN Doc A/40/881 (1999).
15
furthers womens interests --- the whole idea of intersectionality may also become seriously

compromised.

4. A brief word on the co-optation of the feminist anti-violence movement by

political interests

As noted in the previous sections the main impetus for my thesis is my perception

that an intersectional feminist approach to RJ may be co-opted by other interests rather than

those committed to womens empowerment and autonomy. There are good reasons to hold such

fears. The history of the feminist anti-violence movement suggests that its co-optation by other

political interests in ways that could be misused to create policies to further alienate and

disempower battered women, is by no means a novelty. Indeed, as James Ptacek put it, the

history of how feminism has transformed state responses (to domestic violence) is the story of

how the state has sought to co-opt feminist activism24 Ptacek of course is concerned about the

appropriation of the feminist movement by the conservative right in order to legitimise and

validate get tough policies such as mandatory pro-arrest policies for police and no-drop

prosecution policies.25 In truth, Ptaceks concerns are not very different from mine. While Ptacek

24
See James Ptacek, ed., Restorative Jutice and Violence Against Women (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2009) at 155-158 in a kindle e-book version. Parentheses added by me.
25
The impact of tough on crime or zero tolerance policies on domestic violence cases was subjected to harsh
criticism by some feminist scholars who found that these policies operate in ways that may further state control of
women, particularly women who are marginalized by race, class, and immigrant status. Mandatory arrest and
prosecution policies, for instance, may result in increased numbers of arrests of non-citizen women who may then
be deemed deportable under immigration law; my aggravate racist and abusive police behaviors; result on
overincarceration of men of color; reinforce pathological notions that battered women do not want to assist
prosecution and that they accept violence staying with the offender; unwarranted removal by the state of children
from women who have been battered; prosecution of battered women involved, even peripherally, in criminal
conduct, and limits womens ability to use the criminal justice system strategically to gain greater control over
their lives, but did not necessarily complete legal processes. Nevertheless, many feminists aligned themselves with
those policies. See Donna Coker, Transformative Justice: Anti-Subordination Processes in Cases of Domestic
Violence in John Braithwaite & Heather Strang, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge, UK
:Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 133. (summarizing the literature on this point). See also Donna Coker,
"Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review"(2001) 4 Buffalo Criminal
Law Review 801-860.
16
would ask: how is feminism affected by conservative political agendas? I would ask: How is

feminism --- especially intersectionality theory --- affected by informal alternative justice

practices like restorative justice? As we shall see, those alternative forms of justice practices are

also capable of assimilating feminist theoretical approaches in their own terms, especially within

the context of specific models used in Indigenous justice such as sentencing circles.

5. Theoretical framework: Intersectionality theory

At this point it should come as no surprise that this study will draw on insights

from intersectionality theory. But what does intersectionality mean? Intersectionality theory also

known as feminist critical race theory, integrative feminism, anti-essentialist feminist theory, and

multiracial (or multicultural) feminism may be defined as a feminist theory with the purpose of

making plurality visible in academic debates and policy-making discussions.26 Intersectionality

theory is distinguished by its anti-essentialist claims. An intersectional approach demands to

acknowledge that there is no unitary or monolithic experience for women. Feminists who take an

intersectional approach to questions of power and subordination among women are highly

critical of descriptions of inequality that tend to homogenize their experiences into experiences

and political claims of white, middle-class women. For example, the experiences of Black

women may be vastly different than those of white women, or those of poor women distinct

from those more socially advantaged.27 In fact, Kimberl Crenshaw, who originally devised this

26
See Alison Bailey, On Intersectionality and White Feminist Philosophy SSRN (29 September 2008), online:
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334786 at 4.
27
See Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women
of Color (1991) 43:6 Stanford Law Review 1241-1299. See also Kimberl Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and
Antiracist Politics (1989) 14 University of Chicago Legal Forum, 538-54. But see Amanda Burgess-Proctor,
Intersections of Race, Class, Gender, and Crime: Future Directions for Feminist Criminology (2006) 1 Feminist
Criminology 7 at 44. (Arguing that, in her words: intersectionality actually emerged during the 1970s. That is, at
the beginning of the second wave of the feminist movement, women of color (as well as White antiracist women
17
approach in the 1980s, employed the term intersectionality to address specifically a black

feminist perspective in contrast to the sameness of mainstream white feminism in the United

States. Furthermore, intersectionality has been a fruitful analytical resource for feminist scholars

working in a variety of fields. For example, history; feminist criminology; feminist theory;

critical legal studies; and international human rights have been using intersectionality theory to

emphasize the interactions between inequality markers and complex systems of domination or

privilege.28 The term intersectionality itself has its roots in the word intersection which lead

us to the metaphor of crossroads and traffic used by Kimberl Crenshaw to explain her insights

on women of colors oppression. In her words:

Intersectionality is what occurs when a woman from a minority group tries to navigate
the main crossing in the city. The main highway is racism road. One cross street can
be Colonialism, the [other] Patriarchy Street She has to deal not only with one form of
oppression, but with all forms, those names as road signs, which link together to make a
double, a triple, multiple, a many layered blanket of oppression.29

Therefore, intersectionality can also be seen as a heuristic approach for studying,

understanding and responding to the ways in which gender intersects with other inequality

markers or social identities and how these intersections can raise concerns about womens

experiences of oppression, privilege and subordination. As Ange-Marie Hancock writes: The

and others who felt marginalized by mainstream feminism) began calling for scholarship that simultaneously
attended to issues of race, class, gender, and sexuality. However, the concept of intersecting inequalities first
appeared in criminology during the 1980s, corresponding to feminisms third wave).
28
Supra note 26.
29
This quotation was extracted from Baileys paper On Intersectionality and White Feminist Philosophy and
according to her is originated from a paper Crenshaw gave at the World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in
South Africa. She adds that the paper is no longer available, but it is cited by Nira Yuval-Davis on her paper
Intersectionality and Feminist Politics. Supra note 16 at 31. See also Nira Yuval-Davis, Intersectionality and
Feminist Politics (2006) 13:3 European Journal of Womens Studies at 196. (Yuval-Davis cites Crenshaws
metaphor as a passage of a report of the WCAR meeting as presented by Indira Patel to a day seminar in London in
November 2001). See also Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What
Makes a Feminist Theory Successful (2008) 9:1 Feminist Theory 67-85 (Observing incidentally that Crenshaw
expanded her conceptualization of intersectionality to address domestic violence in order to show how feminists
have been primarily concerned with getting the issue of domestic violence on the political agenda as a womens
issue, and have tended to downplay differences among women).
18
term intersectionality refers to both a normative theoretical argument and an approach to

conducting empirical research that emphasizes the interaction of categories of difference ---

including but not limited to race, gender, class, and sexual orientation.30 Under an intersectional

theory approach, therefore, women are usually divided along multiple inequality categories or

social identities such as class, race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and nationality. As

Ange-Marie Hancock has pointed out, intersectionality posits an interactive, mutually

constitutive relationship among these categories and the way in which race (or ethnicity) and

gender (or other relevant categories) play a role in the shaping of political institutions, political

actors, the relationships between institutions and actors, and the relevant categories

themselves.31 Similarly described by Bailey, an intersectional approach offers a helpful

strategy for bringing out the tensions and connections between feminism, anti-racism, anti-

colonialism and other resistance movements.32

For this reason, one of the often heralded attributes of intersectionality theory has

been its capacity to reflect critically upon the objects of study vis--vis the existence of

inequality categories that would help us to identify how different sets of identities impact on

womens oppression. In my thesis, however, I contemplate a paradoxical connection between an

intersectional approach and RJ where intersectionality theory acts more like a validation tool

than a critical instrument of analysis. Although I recognize the importance of other inequality

markers as a theoretical framework in the intersectional approach to RJ and intimate violence, I

also cannot ignore the potential negative effects of overemphasizing certain aspects to the

detriment of others. For this reason, dividing the attention of feminists among so many and

30
See Ange-Marie Hancock, When Multiplication Doesnt Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a
Research Paradigm (2007) 5:1 Perspectives on Politics at 63-64.
31
Ibid.
32
See note 26 at 7
19
sometimes conflicting inequality categories may have come with a price, namely an imbalance

among them.

Knudsen recognized this issue and argued that multiple inequality perspectives are

turned into a problem, because any category may be considered as the most significant one. She

depicted this problem using Crenshaws metaphor of the crossroad, writing: the ethnicity may

be chosen in favour of gender as the one road chosen, while the other road is left behind.33

Another insight pointed out by Knudsen that I also share is that inequality categories may be

treated as competing intersectionality, where categories are weighed in a hierarchy-basis as

was the case in the 1970s where, for example, class and race gained more significance than

gender. In the context of RJ, I contend that some intersectional feminists and RJ advocates ---in

Indigenous settings --- adopted an imbalanced perspective putting gender as a secondary

analytical category giving primacy to collectivist interests.

These problems were multiplied by substantive weaknesses of the RJ rhetoric and

practice. More specifically, an overemphasis on the offender in some programs which have

contributed to a great suspicious among some feminists about RJ is really committed to victims

of gendered violence. According to my view, the phenomenon of gender underestimation derives

directly from imbalanced intersectionality theory, and has led to a variety of stances in the

feminist community regarding the appropriateness of the use of restorative justice models in

cases of violence against women. Some enthusiastically support it, while others vehemently

oppose it. By looking at the multifaceted, sometimes contradictory inequality markers and social

movements that influence these points of view, I contend that we can better deal with the

33
Susanne Knudsen, Intersectionality - A Theoretical Inspiration in the Analysis of Minority Cultures and Identities
in Textbooks on line: (2008) Caught in the Web or Lost in the Textbook,
<www.caen.iufm.fr/colloque_iartem/pdf/knudsen.pdf+intersectionality+theory&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=3&client=firef
ox firefox-a> at 63. Retrieved on 20 March 2008 (In the transversal intersectional perspective the categories
intertwine, pervade and transform each other).
20
problem of the divergence between feminists revealing which inequality categories have more

weight in an intersectional analytical perspective of RJ and how this might affect the feminist

judgement and appraisal of restorative justice practices. For example, in Canada, Angela

Cameron calls for a moratorium on new RJ and Indigenous justice practices for addressing

violence against women under the argument that they do not provide necessary security and

empowerment to victimized women, while in the USA Dona Cocker believes that it would be

disastrous due to the implications in Indigenous political self-determination.34 Cameron is a

representative of the more gender-based school of feminism (although clearly inspired by

postmodern feminism epistemic positions), and Cocker is more concerned with other inequality

categories like culture, ethnicity and political assertion.

An impasse like that illustrated above places intersectionality simultaneously for

and against restorative justice. For this reason my thesis also argues that there is a need for a

more thoughtful and integrated intersectional approach within the context of RJ concerning its

ability to cope with violence against women. After all, it is at least odd that the same analytical

tool turns out to have such diametrically opposing appraisals of experiences inspired by the same

RJ tenets. Of course, I acknowledge that the diversity of RJ models and practices also

contributes to those conflicting results, but my point is that the existence of competing values in

the intersectionality theory are left out of the picture. I suggest that great caution should be

exercised in interpreting studies professing to employ intersectionality theory as an analytical

tool, since contradictorily they can address adequately the use of RJ in relation to violence

against women, and can also take the restorative claims on their own terms and without further

investigations.

34
See Donna Coker, Restorative justice, Navajo Peacemaking and domestic violence (2006) 10:1 Theoretical
Criminology 67-85. See especially Cameron, supra note 10. See also note 14.

21
6. Intersectionality and restorative Justice

As Daly points out, intersectionality theory, is used empirically to represent

the multiple and shifting identities of people (e.g., Maher, 1997; see also McCall, 2005) and

politically and analytically to critique categorical thinking in law, social theory, and social

movement groups (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991; Marchetti, 2008).35 Daly uses the latter sense more

specifically, to address the conflicting interests of victims and offenders, social movement

groups, and individuals and collectivities in responding to crime.36 I use her insights to analyse

the interplay between intersectionality theory and RJ. To do so when using an intersectional

perspective of RJ requires recognition of the existence of categories of difference other than

those usually found in the intersectionality doctrine, such as gender; ethnicity; social-economic

status; sexual orientation; immigration status; religion, and age. Daly, for example, identifies

three not so self-evident loci of inequality that she names sites of contestation between and

among feminists and anti-racist groups, because these relate to alternative justice practices like

RJ. They are the inequalities caused by crime (victims and offenders), social divisions (race and

gender politics), and individuals and collectivities (rights of offenders and victims).

The picture that emerges from Daly's new categories of inequality is of a division

of loci, in which those sites of contestation (e.g. inequality caused by crime) and associated

actors (e.g. victims and offenders) are marked by a pursuit of disparate goals which are in

constant conflict with one another. For this reason, the political agendas of the actors belonging

to each locus of inequality tend to focus on their own interests, even within a group that is

already suffering from some kind of power imbalance or oppression. In other words, even within

groups of disadvantaged (e.g., Indigenous people), the intersection of certain inequality

35
See note 16, Daly, Seeking Justice, at 5.
36
Ibid.
22
categories are privileged (e.g., male Indigenous offenders) vis--vis the intersection of others

(e.g., Indigenous women victimized).

As a result, that imbalance among the various sites of contestation produces a

systemic dilemma for Indigenous women: in an intersectional context, for example, they may

find themselves forcibly situated in one of two camps of sometimes conflicting political agendas.

If Indigenous women question the validity of alternative justice approaches like RJ

interventions, they may be categorized either as individualists or as people who do not embrace

community interests, even though these may be more aligned to offenders interests. Crenshaw,

cited by Bailey, referred to this systemic dilemma as a form of intersectional disempowerment

since women are forced to split their political energies between two sometimes-opposing groups

while men of color and white women seldom deal with this problem.37 My fear is that a form of

intersectional disempowerment may be occurring in some models of RJ used in Indigenous

communities, especially concerning the emphasis given to male offenders as surrogates for

collective political claims. As Daly has observed citing Emma LaRocque:

For example, critics of Indigenous womens organizations say they are too closely
aligned with feminist interests (or what is termed womens or individual rights), not with
the collective interests or rights of Aboriginal people. In response, Indigenous women say
they are being asked (unfairly) to put community interests ahead of their interests as
women. Relating this to criminal justice, Emma LaRocque (1997, p. 81), a Canadian
Indigenous woman, says it remains a puzzle how offenders, more often than victims,
have come to represent collective rights. She argues that in the interests of social
harmony, (...) the pendulum has swung way too far to the advantage of [offenders] within
Native communities. 38

37
See note 27, Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins.
38
See note 16 at 6.
23
 Following this line of reasoning Daly contends that, If we want to do justice

differently, we must find ways to align race and gender justice politics, and not permit the

antagonisms to stall a more constructive and progressive agenda.39

My attempt to comprehend and engage critically the social-legal and political

implications of using an intersectional approach within the context of RJ and violence against

women draws on those insights from Daly. She uses what she terms sites of contestations in

order to describe, the different positions that feminist and anti-racist groups have taken toward

justice practices.40 Daly thinks that those loci of inequality, as a I prefer to name them,

encapsulates the different emphases that Indigenous (or racialized political minority groups)

and feminist groups take in seeking justice.41 According to Daly, that is the reason why racial

and ethnic minority groups claims commonly centre on treatment of offenders, while feminist

claims more likely convey the needs of victims. As she puts it:

Race and gender politics can be viewed as a group-based overlay on the positional
interests of offenders and victims: Indigenous (or racialized minority) groups emphasize
offenders interests; feminist groups, victims interests. In light of relations of Indigenous
(or racialized minority) groups to the state, which are grounded in distrust spawned by a
history of white racism, racial prejudice, and discrimination, taking the positional interest
of an offender is logical and expected. Likewise, for feminist groups, who awakened
consciousness to the problem that has no name (sexual and physical abuse by men
toward women, particularly in the home), taking the positional interest of a victim is
logical and expected.42

She concludes by arguing that this can create problems in finding common ground

which is in consonance with my thesis regarding the existence of competing inequality

categories in an intersectional approach on some RJ models used in Indigenous communities.

39
See note 16.
40
Ibid. at 14.
41
Ibid.
42
See note 16 at 18.
24
 As a consequence, the emerging feminist socio-legal analysis of the problem of

using RJ in Indigenous settings has its roots in other developments besides solely gender. Issues

like race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, age, religion, colonization, and other key markers or

categories of inequality have emerged to compete at times against gender as a primary feminist

category of analysis and, sometimes against each other. Razack was the first to capture this

tension between inequality markers when she argued that culture, community, and colonization

can be used to compete with and ultimately prevail over gender-based harm.43 Daly argues that

in order to address conflicts and competing interests that emerge in those sites of contestation

mentioned before a balanced intersectional approach requires resources (offender remorse;

knowledge and capacities of victims, offenders, community people; and state support);

movement of group-based interests to other positional interests; and positive rights for victims

and offenders that are not compromised by collectivities.44 Unfortunately, I believe that this is

not the case of some RJ models applied within the context of Aboriginal communities in Canada

and Australia which will be our practical focus of study.

Before advancing to the next sections, I must pause and temporarily turn away

from intersectionality theory. As stated in the previous paragraphs the main question to be raised

in my thesis is the connection between the (mis)use of procedural values (inequality categories)

in intersectionality theory, on the one hand, and the convenience of using RJ practices to cope

with violence against women cases on the other hand. Although I had highlighted the importance

of intersectionality theory in this connection, the relevance of RJ was not yet fully clarified. In

this sense it is crucial to determine whether RJ interventions can do any better than the solutions

found in the conventional criminal justice system (hereafter CJS) as feasible remedies to gender-

43
See Sherene Razack, What Is to be Gained by Looking White People in the Eye? Culture, Race, and Gender in
Cases of Sexual Violence, (1994) 19 Signs 894-923 at 910.
44
See note 29 at 24.
25
based violence. I point out two reasons which support the relevance of studying RJ within this

context.

First, scholarly literature either defends or refutes the use of RJ to cope with

violence against women which leaves an inconclusive answer among scholars concerning this

problem of public policy.45 I hope to draw my own conclusions about the topic from the debate

among scholars. In order to do this, my research looks into RJ to explore what the current

literature says or infers about the problem, either in terms of imposing constructive criticism

(telling policy-makers what they should not do) or offering positive guidance (telling policy-

makers what they should do). It is important to mention that the exploration of literature will be

preceded by an outline of the conceptual and theoretical framework of RJ that should be helpful

in addressing some of the complexities, promises and internal deficiencies of the RJ movement

itself.

For example, at first sight it may seem difficult to go against the noble aspirations

of RJ proponents. Their aspirations include a paradigmatic shift from a retributive/punishment

model to a restorative/non-punitive model that involves, in general, empathetic dialogue and

negotiation among the parties; victim/offender/community healing; offender accountability

combined with character transformation, and a more meaningful role for victims in the criminal

justice system. However, some critics of RJ question whether it is possible to achieve those

45
There is a considerable amount of scholarly work asserting the positive effects of RJ concerning violence against
women while there is an equal, if not greater, amount of scholars criticizing those stances and presenting serious
concerns, especially regarding autonomy and security of victimized women in RJ conferences. See, e.g., Stopping
Violence, note 15 at 56-59. (Angela Cameron classifying feminist stances on the use of RJ to deal with gender-
based violence into groups for and against the idea). See also note 2, Cameron, Restorative Justice: A literature
Review. (Here Angela Cameron identified an intermediary position where detractors of the use of RJ to deal with
violence against women are willing to reconsider their position if restorative justice processes were better
framed). See also, Feminist Engagement, supra note 5 at 18 ( Daly and Stubbs listing the potential problems and
benefits mentioned in the literature regarding the usability of RJ to cope with gender-based violence).
26
aspirations.46 In the literature, for instance, there is constant criticism regarding lack of clarity

and coherence of the RJ goals; doubts about whether or not there is an artificial dichotomy

(between retribution/restoration) due to the RJ claim of a paradigmatic shift; value clashes

between victims advocates and offender-oriented programmes, and the paradox inherent in the

restorative aspiration to offer a distinctive alternative to the conventional criminal justice system

while simultaneously co-existing and adopting fundamental concepts within the very framework

it seeks to challenge.47 The study of RJ aspirations and its limitations will offer guidance not

only to understand the fundamental interactions between these and violence against women, but

may also help to explain how such models might set priorities among the various sites of

contestation proposed by Daly. This is particularly the hope concerning individual interests

where victims and offenders positive rights seem not be clearly articulated in contrast to

collectivistic interests which may be acquiring primacy over others, mainly in Aboriginal models

of RJ.

46
The extent to which RJ can achieve these aspirations is hotly debated. Compare, e.g, Howard Zehr, The Little
Book of Restorative Justice (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2002; Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for
Crime and Justice (Scottdale, Pennsylvania: Herald Press, 1990); Allison Morris, Critiquing the Critics: A Brief
Response to Critics of Restorative Justice (2002) 42:3 British Journal of Criminology 596; John Braithwaite,
Principles of Restorative Justice, in A. Von Hirsch, et.al., eds, Restorative Justice: Competing or Reconcilable
Paradigms?, (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2003) and John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989). (Claiming that RJ has potential to achieve its aspirations), with
Annalise E. Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2004);
Kathleen Daly, Mind the Gap: Restorative Justice in Theory and Practice in A. Von Hirsh et. al, eds., Restorative
Justice and Criminal Justice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004); Kathleen Daly, The Limits of Restorative Justice in
Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft ,eds., The Handbook of Restorative Justice: A Global Perspective (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2006); Joanna Shapland & et. al, Situating Restorative Justice Within Criminal Justice (2006) 10:4
Theoretical Criminology 505-532 (Critiquing work seeking to reveal flaws in the RJ theory and practice).
47
See Margarita Zernova, Aspirations of Restorative Justice Proponents and Experiences of Participants in Family
Group Conferences (2007) 47 :3 Britihs Journal of Criminology 491-509 at 491. (Referring to fundamental
problems in the RJ philosophy found in the literature).
27
7. Thesis preliminary critique and defense

An imbalanced intersectional approach which, for example, de-emphasizes the

inequality caused by crime - i.e., one which occurs between victim and offender - may give

credit to certain detrimental internal power relations relevant to Aboriginal women. According to

my view, this happens simply because those power relations emerge from cultural and

philosophical practices that somehow resonate with the aspirations of RJ proponents, e.g., a

community pro-active role on conflict resolution, which can also mean --- in an Aboriginal view

of justice --- an alternative justice intervention that conveys political autonomy and self-

governance.48 However, as stated before victimized women may feel that their interests are not

exactly the same as those of their own community and that the majority of the community

support is diverted to offenders, or there is a prevalence of a victim-blaming mentality in the

restorative conferences. For example, a major untested assumption in the RJ discourse is that

when a conference is successfully undertaken, there are positive effects to all participants. It is

thought that if offenders learn from an RJ encounter they develop more empathetic feelings

about the impact of crime on victims, and they may be deterred from future offending. It is also

believed that RJ processes may assist in victims emotional and trauma recovery.49 However,

there is no guarantee that victims, offenders and community supportive members will come to

RJ conferences with equal power, equally able to assert their positions and to discuss and

negotiate the terms of a restorative agreement among them in order to benefit according to

48
As observed by Cheon and Regehr, Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of RJ is its reliance on
communities of care to carry out the weighty tasks of changing offenders behavior, supporting victims in
healing, enforcing agreements, and doing their best to prevent further offending (Dodd, 2002; Presser &
Gaarder,2000). To achieve these multiple goals simultaneously is not an easy task since they demand juggling
several interests, at times, contradictory. See Aileen Cheon & Cheryl Regehr, RJ Models in Cases of Intimate
Partner Violence: Reviewing the Evidence (2006) 1:4 Victims & Offenders 369-394 at 374.
49
See generally Elmar G. M. Weitekamp & Hans-Jrgen Kerner, eds., RJ: Theoretical Foundation (Mill Street,
Uffculme: Willan Publishing 2002); Eugene McLaughlin et al., eds., Restorative Justice: Critical Issues (Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003).
28
expectations. Some critics argue that all women are at a disadvantage in RJ conferences because

of their unequal moral, economic and social power; most agree that women who have been

battered are at a disadvantage in RJ as a result of the coercion and violence they have faced. As a

consequence the admirable motives of intersectionality theory may backfire on Indigenous

women when there is an imbalance amongst the various loci of inequality, creating more

problems than solutions and jeopardizing the very notion of it as an emancipatory feminist

research methodology. For this reason, I contend that it is better to insist on a more cautious

methodological approach before advancing a policy position in support of certain RJ practices

like those used in Aboriginal communities.

However, it is worth noting that I do not have the intention to discredit

intersectionality as a well-proven tool for feminist critical analysis. On the contrary, I intend to

strengthen it by reflecting how under certain circumstances that invaluable feminist analytical

tool can be diverted by the restorative rhetoric and practice in ways that may even be considered

detrimental to women, especially regarding undeserved favourable critical appraisals of RJ

interventions as a remedy to deal with violence against women. Consequently, those feminist

scholars who are using an intersectional approach without considering the balance needed among

the various inequality categories embedded in this theory might be inclined to rush to approval

of policies committed to RJ models. Lamentably, this may occur without further investigation

concerning whether or not interventions based on RJ practices meet the needs of abused

Aboriginal women.

In a situation like that an intersectional approach does not present concrete

beneficial effects for women as a subject of inquiry. Indeed, it might be a disservice to them

because it neutralizes the best of intersectionality theory (its critical approach) and provides

29
legitimization and validation to RJ experiences not fully committed to gender awareness.50 The

term co-optation, as used in this paper, refers exactly to a process of neutralization and

appropriation of an idea by assimilation into an established dogma in order to re-use it as an

element of self-advocacy. To remain valid as a critical emancipatory feminist tool, an

intersectional approach must produce results functionally committed to womens interests and

essentially with them in sight. Representation of other interests like those present in RJ

discourses, even when theoretically noble and legitimate --- like the assertions of autonomy and

self-governance by Aboriginal people --- can be diversionary and overlook RJ faults concerning

Aboriginal womens interests.

For this reason, a secondary objective of this study is to use an intersectional

approach as a strategy to foster a gender-centered perspective on the debate over the use of RJ to

cope with violence against women in Indigenous settings. This may be seen as a paradoxical

goal since the intersectionality methodology seeks departure from gender essentialism as I

stressed before.51 I am fully aware that recurring to gender as an inequality category that

deserves special attention may be considered a superseded idea. In fact, nowadays the use of

gender as a universal subject matter in inequality analysis is not held in esteem by new

generations of feminists (especially anti-essentialists of which intersectional feminists are part);

it is considered simplistic and a blatant failure to notice pluralistic feminist perspectives or it is

labelled as monolithic and finally dismissed. At the center of these concerns is the danger of a

gendered analysis that is unable to attend to differences among and between racialized women as

intersectional feminists are constantly reminding us. Their critique has reinforced the scepticism

51
Angela Harris explains the notion of gender essentialism as the assumption that a unitary, essential
womens experience can be isolated and described independently of race, class, sexual orientation, and other
realities of experience. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory (1990) 42 Stanford
Law Review at 581. (Intersectional feminists argue that descriptions of inequality located in one category, for
example, gender often falsely homogenizes the diverse experiences of racialized women).
30
about the unity apparent in the category gender by highlighting the intersectionality of

identities like race, class, immigration status and sexual orientation, etc. Hence, the weak point

in my line of reasoning would be not considering the fragmentation of the category gender and

how this affects victimized women in the context of RJ.

In my defense, however, I argue that I do not ignore the diversity of women

perspectives and the different needs and interests among them. I also do not see gender in

isolation from other inequality categories. Rather, I seek to shift some territory to gender

questions --- using the concept of strategic essentialism --- in the midst of other competing

categorical markers and giving adequate emphasis to a self-evident element of situational

commonality amongst victims of intimate violence. After all, it would be impossible within the

context of violence against women to not give some privilege to gender as an analytical category

simply because this particular inequality category --- among others --- arises as an important

catalyst that precipitates violence and contributes significantly to the power imbalance in RJ

encounters in Indigenous communities. In addition, the fact that women in different social loci

may experience sexism differently does not mean that they have nothing in common since they

still can suffer the consequences from sexism, patriarchal oppression and from other general

effects of violence because they are women. Even when alternative justice practices like RJ are

either applied or heralded as committed to intersectional thinking it does not take too much to

misuse an intersectional approach regarding gender and race politics, especially when

Indigenous women are kept marginalized and silenced instead of being the center of all

attentions. For this reason, the effort of creating a balanced intersectional critical theory that

advances womens interests demands awareness of the ways that, paradoxically, intersectional

thinking can interact with forces that keep individuals into traditional patterns of oppression ---

what Crenshaw appropriately named intersectional disempowerment.

31
 Chapter I Restorative justice

Chapter outline

This chapter is a general introduction to RJ with an emphasis on its ideological

foundations and theoretical framework. In the first part, I present an account of the birth and

emergence of the RJ movement taking into consideration several areas of scholarship and social-

political activism that have apparently informed it. In order to do that, I rely heavily on previous

studies by Kathleen Daly; Russ Immarigeon; Julie Stubbs; Angela Cameron, and Theo

Gavrielides who were able to accumulate a considerable amount of data on RJ literature and

practice going back to its foundations and up to current developments. These scholars not only

collected data, but also put some order in the scholarly production on RJ establishing an outline

of what comprises the RJ movement in its standard criminal justice manifestation. They did it

through an extensive literature review on RJ of which I hope to make good use in this thesis as a

theoretical support for composing my own argumentation throughout this paper.

In the second part of this chapter, a working definition of RJ will be provided in

light of the foundational accounts to be developed in the first segment. Furthermore, I identify

some definitional problems concerning RJ; notably, because it is often regarded essentially as a

contested concept in the literature, or explained in the vaguest generalities.52 It is not rare to find

52
See Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness eds., Handbook of Restorative Justice Handbook of Restorative
Justice (Mill Street, Uffculme: Willan Publishing, 2007) at 5. (Arguing that RJ is an appraisive, internally complex
and open concept that continues to develop with new practices. For this reason, it cannot accommodate a single
accepted conception otherwise the movement could be impoverished or be seen as misleading since might be
presented as more unified and coherent than it actually is). See Katherine Doolin, But What does it mean?
Seeking Definitional Clarity in Restorative Justice (2007) 71 J. Crim. L. 427-440. (For a discussion over the
definitional problems of RJ; particularly, whether it should be defined in terms of the processes to be used, or
rather, the outcomes to be achieved). See generally William B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts (1956) 56
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167. (Arguing that essentially contested concepts are in nature concepts
that we would never reach agreement about the criteria for its application because they combine a general
32
people even in academic and practitioner circles who use the term restorative justice

frequently in their everyday lives, but simply do not feel comfortable when confronted with

requests to explain what the concept of RJ really means.53 In this subsection, therefore, I hope to

shed some light on the problems regarding the lack of clarity of a RJ definition. M. Kay Harris

was amongst the first to suggest that we must have more definitional clarity in the field of RJ.

She described the problem as follows:

One issue that immediately confronts anyone interested in restorative justice is a

continuing lack of definitional clarity. Although the quantity of literature on this topic has
grown dramatically in the last several years, definitions and descriptions of core elements
of restorative justice vary rather widely. Some of the differences in how restorative
justice is described reflect the difficulty of capturing a new mindset, orientation, or
philosophy in a few sentences. However, there also is considerable diversity among
proponents of restorative justice as to core principles and values and the implications that
they see flowing from them.54

As Harris stresses above one, of the reasons for the lack of definitional clarity in

RJ is the multiplicity and ambiguity of meanings that cluster around the term restorative

justice. Actually, as pointed out by Zernova and Wright: It may not be an exaggeration to

agreement on the abstract notion that they represent with endless disagreements about what they might mean in
practice).
53
This claim, of course, is not entirely anecdotal. An empirical research conducted by Theo Gravielides among
more than one hundred RJ theorists and practitioners around the world provides support for it. The study reports
that the survey participants have highlighted that conceptual conflicts and different practical dimensions of RJ
have affected negatively the understanding and implementation of it. Concerning, for instance: a) the level of
collaboration and communication between them and other practitioners working either in the same or different RJ
programmes/organisations; b) the outcomes of their funding applications to governmental or private bodies; c)
the outcomes of the RJ processes; d) the procedure that was followed by RJ facilitators; e) the evaluation of
restorative programmes and their outcomes; f) the parties willingness to participate; g) the parties motives to
participate; h) the level of communication among the parties, and i) the genuineness of the restorative processes.
According to Theo Gravielides, the study shows that there is a division between sources of a theoretical nature
and sources that originate from the field of practice. This separation seems to have affected the way the RJ
conception was received. See Theo Gavrielides, RJ Theory and Practice: Addressing the Discrepancy (Monsey, New
York: Criminal Justice Press, 2007) at 133. (For a comprehensive study about the gaps between theory and practice
in the field of RJ)
54
See, e.g., M. Kay Harris, Reflections of a Skeptical Dreamer: Some Dilemmas in Restorative Justice theory and
practice(1998) 1:1 Contemporary Justice Review at 59.
33
suggest that each proponent has his or her own vision of restorative justice.55 So as we can see,

the fact is that RJ means many things to many people, and therefore is effectively without any

universal meaning or established standardizing procedures. This poses a challenge for employing

feminist analysis on RJ and intimate violence, since one perspective often has to be reframed in

different ways depending on proponents opinions on RJ. As a matter of fact, this can become a

serious epistemological problem since a conclusive description of what RJ really is may end up

in the eye of the beholder, i.e., what one observer might recognize as a textbook example of RJ

experience, another might recognize as something else that is not RJ in any way, and vice-versa.

Moreover, as observed by Shapland et al., This situation itself promotes a proliferation of

potential tasks and roles for restorative justice, such that different schemes or commentators can

stress the importance of different aspects, and continue to disagree about what is its essence.56

In order to circumvent this practical problem, I will narrow down my survey of RJ

to specific models accepted as being more accurate and authoritative in the literature.

Nonetheless, wherever there is considerable disagreement among scholars over whether or not a

certain practice really is RJ, I will address it in particular as I will do with the Indigenous

sentencing circles that will be engaged in a separate chapter. By referring throughout this chapter

to well known examples of RJ --- sketched in the work of several RJ scholars --- I put some flesh

on the theoretical bones that will be discussed in this chapter. My goal is to avoid equivocal

points surrounding the use of definitions in RJ, although I acknowledge that this strategy is not

fully satisfactory. In doing so I will be committing a fallacy of definition because examples

cannot define a term due to the circularity of reasoning embedded in the act of exemplifying.

55
See Margarita Zernova and Martin Wright, Alternative Visions of Restorative Justice in Gerry Johnstone and
Daniel W. Van Ness, eds. Handbook of Restorative Justice (Mill Street, Uffculme: Willan Publishing, 2007) 91
(Discussing how RJ should be conceive and practised, especially raising questions over the debate concerning the
process- oriented concept of RJ and the outcome-focused RJ concept).
56
See note 47, Shapland et al., Situating Restorative Justice, at 506.
34
This approach is only an interim arrangement to justify the absence of a better definition of what

constitutes restorative justice. Having acknowledged that, I will use exemplification more as a

convenience tool than anything else; at least until a more consistent conceptualization of RJ is

reached by the literature and RJ doctrine. Another important point to be stressed here is that the

working definition to be provided in this chapter is only a limited theoretical concept of RJ that

clearly does not retain all its features and hence does not support a claim to be definitive.

There is yet one other factor complicating the conceptualization of RJ. The term

RJ is employed many times interchangeably to designate other forms of informal or alternative

justice such as therapeutic justice; transformative justice; community justice; relational justice,

and peacemaking justice to the extent necessary to make a fine-grained analysis in order to

distinguish one from another. A good example of this difficulty are the continuities and

similarities between RJ and Indigenous justice that make them almost indiscernible from each

other to the point that one is often understood and explored in the literature through the other. In

this paper then, any unqualified reference to RJ means the inclusion of other experiences that

may fall under the rubric RJ unless specified otherwise. To complicate matters even further, RJ

principles, values and practices are also employed in other fields besides adult criminal justice;

youth justice being the most significant from which many general scholarly commentaries on RJ

were originally conceived and targeted. Where necessary I will situate RJ ideas in the specific

context of its usage and in conformity with the language and jargon articulated by the group or

particular program to which I am referring. I took this valuable lesson from Angela Cameron

who successfully used the same scheme in several of her studies on restorative justice.

As stated in a previous paragraph, the variations on RJ thinking stem in part from

differing fundamental assumptions about what aspirations; roles; responsibilities, and promises

exist for lay actors in RJ theory and practice. As a consequence, different versions of restorative
35
thinking may imply different focus on RJs stakeholders, i.e., offenders, victims and

community.57 Thus, there is clearly some logic to use a stakeholder approach when addressing

RJ. It can help in a quick assessment of the collective key issues for the lay actors of RJs theory

and practice while at the same time providing a stage where is possible to discern what is

acceptable to each as individuals. After all, a specific RJ program can give more emphasis to a

specific stakeholder, while deemphasizing others with whom it also interacts. This thesis

addresses the doubtful claim of some RJ advocates that it is possible to create a model of

alternative criminal justice which in ideal terms would equally empower all the stakeholders in

crime: victims, offenders and their communities.

While one of the tenets of RJ theory is that all stakeholders matter and that

restorative models should integrate their responsibilities to the various stakeholders uniformly,

this balancing exercise has proven difficult to enact in practice. Bearing this in mind, this chapter

also provides a brief overview on substantial divergences in emphasis that can be found in the RJ

field regarding orientation in favour of victims, offenders and community and its reflects in

practical experiences. Still in accordance with that approach, my thesis adopts a framework

proposed by Angela Cameron in which she engages the problem of the ability of RJ models to

57
As Howard Zehr and Barb Toews point out the term stakeholders is widely used in the RJ jargon and normally
refers to victims, offenders and communities which, in their words, make the heart of restorative justice. In
contrast, they also consider the term stakeholders offensive to colonized indigenous people since in its origins it
refers to European settlers of North America driving a stake into the ground to claim land that originally belonged
to Indigenous people. See Howard Zehr & Barb Toews, eds., Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (Monsey, New
York: Criminal Justice Press, 2004) at 61-63. (Although I have found quite interesting this colourful account of that
term etymology, mainly because I am an Old West movies fan, I believe that a more prosaic meaning applies for
the term stakeholders, i.e, a person or persons with an interest or concern in something. For this reason, I will
use the term in this paper without any reservations). See also David Cornwell & Heather Strang, The Penal Crisis
and the Clapham Omnibus: Questions and Answers in Restorative Justice (Hampshire, UK: Waterside Press, 2009)
at 83 (Proposing a quadripartite stakeholder approach where besides victims, offenders and community the state
government also plays a role in the RJ movement).
36
cope with intimate violence, primarily through the lens of the needs of female victims of

violence rather than considering offenders or community needs first.58

In prioritizing victims, I am not underestimating offenders and community

interests, but realizing that without placing victims interests as a priority it is not possible to

achieve justice for all stakeholders. As will be discussed in another chapter, since victims ---

especially Indigenous women --- tend to have less influence on the dynamics of RJ interventions

than offenders and communities claims, mainly due to power imbalances and deep colonizing

effects, their claims and needs should be more carefully weighed than others stakeholders. As

Cameron put it, This is not intended to indicate that the interests of the offender are

unimportant; ending violence against women can only be accomplished by ensuring that those

who commit these crimes become whole, non violent beings.59 Likewise, a community

perspective will not be downplayed, although I argue in this paper that the cumulative effect of a

certain degree of cultural tolerance for violence in intimate relationships in conjunction with the

existence of diversionary political interests, especially in RJ models used in Indigenous settings,

has been undermining the confidence in communities ability or willingness to take domestic

violence seriously enough. Finally, the acknowledgment of the primacy of victims interests is in

consonance with RJs general pledge for the protection of victims and victims rights. For this

reason, the perspective of victims will be a constant in this chapter as in the followings.

Finally, another part of this chapter considers a brief critique of the RJ movement

in the hope of providing a better portrait of it. Notably, concerning several points of tension in

the RJ movement identified mainly by Theo Gavrielides, Richard Delgado, R. London, and

Raymond Koen. These scholars invite us to take a critical look at several fault-lines in RJ theory,

58
See note 11 at 15.
59
Ibid.
37
advocacy rhetoric and practice under historical, philosophical, sociolegal, and psychological

points of view. In addition, their line of critical analysis reveals a deep understanding of the main

themes of disagreement in the RJ movement, and sets out other themes for analysis as they may

evolve to other reflections like, for instance, the usability of RJ to deal with domestic violence

and the potential harms and benefits associated with it. Their findings will be succinctly

presented in this subsection and relevant implications highlighted.

1. The foundations of restorative justice

Standing at the boundaries of disciplines like criminology, psychology, moral

philosophy, and law, RJ --- as theory and practice --- also evolved from distinct and sometimes

overlapping strands of grassroots activism, socio-legal scholarship and ethnic minorities

political claims. For this reason, keeping track of all of these influences can be a difficult and

bewildering task. However, Daly and Immarigeon identified that the RJ movement mainly took

advantage of the following strands of ideas and activism: community, offender, and victim

disenchantment with the criminal justice system; concerns with the rising costs of punitive

policies, especially the costs of imprisonment; enthusiasm on the part of citizens and

governments to use informal processes whenever possible; and the popularity of metaphors of

reconciliation, healing, and restoration.60 They translated those strands of RJ ideology into a

three-fold categorization of the theoretical and empirical roots that have informed the

development of RJ thinking. According to these authors the core insights of RJ theory entail a

commitment to a set of ideas and practices that more or less include the following ideological

60
See Kathleen Daly & Russ Immarigeon, "Restorative Justice: Origins, Practices, Contexts, and Challenges" (1997)
August ICCA Journal on Community Corrections 1-17 at 2. (Other references to the multi-layered origins of RJ
appear within general summaries of several other RJ scholars). See also Kathleen Daly & Russ Immarigeon, The
Past, Present, and Future of Restorative Justice: Some Critical Reflections (1998) 1:1 The Contemporary Justice
Review 21-45 at 14. (Refining the characterization of the origins of the RJ movement).
38
and political sources: social movements of the 1960s and 1970s; particular practices and

programs; and academic research and theories.61

Nonetheless, the RJ foundational principles and ideological characterizations

grouped above do not coexist harmoniously. RJ theory and practice may encompass ---

depending on its empirical manifestation --- one or more of the aforementioned foundational

principles, and even when some RJ experience is consistent with one set of ideas it may be

inconsistent with others. The inevitable result is a fragmented theoretical and empirical

movement that somehow puts together cohorts of stakeholders --- victims, offenders and

community --- with distinct and sometimes conflicting interests. Thus, none of the following

ideological sources of the RJ movement made by Daly and Immarigeon are a perfect portrait of

its foundations. They rely on simplifying assumptions and only provide a first cut at

demonstrating how RJ has drawn from one foundational input to another. As Angela Cameron

has pointed out:

The proliferation of the use of this term [Restorative Justice] has led to some confusion
and often to the conflation of disparate historical and political underpinnings that inform
varied visions of restorative justice. When discussing restorative justice it is vital that
the historical, political and cultural basis of the model or program in question be made
clear. This facilitates evaluation of whether a restorative initiative meets the needs of
victims of violence by framing the discussion of a particular model, with particular
attributes or problems.62 Brackets added.

In addition, their analysis was based on experiences carried out in North America

(Canada and United States) or Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) and does not reflect the

emergence of RJ in other geographical contexts. Nevertheless, their account is important because

it clarifies the theoretical foundations of the RJ movement where it originally came to

prominence and where it is currently applied as a first response to endemic social injustices

61
Ibid. Daly & Immarigeon, Origins, at 7.
62
See note 11 at 46.
39
found within the conventional criminal justice system that have a particular impact on ethnic

minorities and Aboriginal peoples. At the same time, they shed light on the underlying causes of

the difficulty of providing a unifying concept of restorative justice. In the following segments, I

refer directly or indirectly to many insights and schematizations initially devised by Daly and

Immarigeon in conjunction with other scholars contributions like Angela Cameron, and Theo

Gavrielides.

a) The social movements of the 1960s and 1970s

As Daly and Immarigeon suggest, an important sociologic input in RJ theory can

be traced back to the civil rights and womens movements of the turbulent 1960s and 1970s in

the United States and other countries.63 According to them the civil rights movement was based,

in part, on critiques of institutionalized racism in police practices, in courts, and in prisons. In

parallel, feminists perceived that conventional criminal justice institutions had been excluding

women victimized by domestic violence as protagonists. The over-incarceration of racialized

women --- who also found their partners routinely marginalized by incarceration --- ensured

feminist activists were, in the words of Daly and Immarigeon, also involved in prisoners rights

campaigns.64

Somehow, as Daly and Immarigeon observed, victims and offenders - typically

viewed as antagonists in the justice system - ended up sharing common ground in their

63
See note 61, Daly & Immarigeon, The Past, Present at 5. (Issues such as overcriminalization and imprisonment of
racial and ethnic minority groups --- particularly, African Americans and Indigenous People --- and the
mistreatment of victims in the criminal justice process were of crucial importance to catalyze the RJ movement in
the United Sates. Likewise, anti-colonial movements in Canada, Australia and New Zealand embraced those
perceptions and echoed them in their own settings. For example, the struggle of the Maori people against their
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system in New Zealand and similar concerns of Aboriginal and First
Nations people in Australia and Canada fuelled the discussions for alternatives to the conventional criminal justice
system in the mid-1970s and following decades).
64
Ibid. at 5-6.
40
experiences with conventional justice system practices usually seen as unfair and unresponsive

to their particularities and needs. Those perceptions were crucial in triggering decarceration

actions, including prisoners rights campaigns and alternatives to confinement. As a result, a new

line of feminist reasoning made a case for challenging existing remedies for violence against

women around ideas such as alternatives to prisons, methods of alternative dispute resolution

and informal justice. Some strands of RJ practice are a direct result of that criticism of the

traditional justice system and turning to alternative processes for resolving disputes; to

alternative sanctioning options, or as Daly and Immarigeon put it, to a distinctively different,

new mode of criminal justice organized around principles of restoration to victims, offenders,

and the communities in which they live.65 In contrast, during the 1970s the battered womens

movement also pursued reforms in the criminal justice system that also superficially aligned

many feminists with conservative retributive-based get tough policies. These reforms, with the

goal of providing greater victim safety and increased offender accountability, were eventually

put into effect in the mid-1980s and resulted in actions such as mandatory pro-arrest policies for

police, no-drop prosecutorial policies (mandatory policies that do not allow victims to determine

whether or not arrest and prosecution takes place), and restraining orders (also known as

protective orders). This movement is also credit with a myriad of non-punitive victim-oriented

services like battered women's shelters and safe-houses; emergency hotlines; counselling and

support groups; financial assistance; transportation; job and housing locator services; civil relief

legal assistance; and children's programs.66 However, gradually feminist scholars started to

express ambivalence about the more conservative and harsh conformation of the conventional

65
Ibid. at 2.
66
See Kim Cook, A Restorative Justice Critique of Shelters for Battered Women in the American Deep South
Center Prison Fellowship International Centre for Justice and Reconciliation, on line (26 August 2006): Restorative
Justice On line: <http://www.restorativejustice.org/10fulltext/cook/view/> Retrieved on March 2010. (Contending
that shelters cannot be deemed a community of care in the restorative justice sense of the expression).
41
criminal system that generated a desire for less-punitive and non-state-based interventions. There

were concerns that some non-white, non-middle-class, and immigrant women simply did not

want to see their partners arrested or prosecuted and were negatively impacted by these

outcomes in various ways.67

Such feelings were part of a larger set of concerns and criticisms that have run

through feminist theorizing since the 1970s when racialized-women started to question the very

notion that the conventional criminal justice system itself could deliver justice to women

victimized by intimate violence. The fact is that RJ theoretical language was profoundly

influenced by elements of anti-racist politics and feminist dissatisfaction with treatment of

victims in courts derived from social movements in the 1960s and 1970s. However, tracking the

influence of all these elements in the RJ discourse is complicated by practical experiences that

also emerged spontaneously almost at the same time in response to similar claims. In the

following subsection I address these practical experiences according to Daly and Immarigeons

previous categorizations.

b) Programs and practices

Feminist scholars like Daly and Immarigeon also share the view that RJ practical

models had important inputs in the RJ movement. In fact, citing Tony Marshall they suggest that,

67
The impact of tough on crime or zero tolerance policies on domestic violence cases was subjected to
criticism by some feminist scholars who found that these policies operate in ways that may further state control of
women, particularly women who are marginalized by race, class, and immigrant status. Mandatory arrest and
prosecution policies, for instance, may result in increased numbers of arrests of non-citizen women who may then
be deemed deportable under immigration law; my aggravate racist and abusive police behaviors; result on
overincarceration of men of color; reinforce pathological notions that battered women do not want to assist
prosecution and that they accept violence staying with the offender; unwarranted removal by the state of children
from women who have been battered; prosecution of battered women involved, even peripherally, in criminal
conduct, and limits womens ability to use the criminal justice system strategically to gain greater control over
their lives, but did not necessarily complete legal processes. See note 25, Coker, Transformative Justice, at 133.
(summarizing the literature on this point). See also note 25, Coker, Crime Control.
42
the practice of restorative justice came first, born of the exigencies of needing to do justice

differently, and that the theory came later.68 As Daly and Immarigeon point out, since the 1970s

many programs and practices have been implemented that could be labeled as restorative justice

experiments. These pioneers experiments almost functioned on a trial and error basis with no

prior guidelines apart from practitioners dissatisfaction with the fact-finding adversarial in-court

process and in earnest desire for a more humane, informal conflict resolution.69 According to

Daly and Immarigeon, early efforts focused on moderated meetings between victims and

offenders, adapting or drawing from traditional mediation models.70 According to Daly and

Immarigeon, early efforts focused on moderated meetings between victims and offenders,

adapting or drawing from traditional mediation models.71 Later, they concluded, these

68
See note 61, Daly & Immarigeon, The Past, Present, at 11. See also Tony F. Marshall, The Evolution of Restorative
Justice in Britain (1996) 4 European Journal on Criminal Justice and Research 21-43.
69
A good example is the acknowledgement of pioneer work by practitioners initiatives like the Victim offender
reconciliation programs (VORP) format that can be traced to Kitchener, Ontario where in 1974 Mark Yantzi and
Dave Worth, both members of the Mennonite Church, working with the Kitchener Probation Department and with
the help of a local judge successfully established a restitution and reconciliation program based in face-to-face
mediation addressing emotional and informal needs of offenders and victims. A few years later in 1978 the first
American program was established in Elkhart, Indiana also under the auspices of Mennonite Church
representatives; the local judge; probation officers, and a community corrections organization called PACT
(Prisoner and Community Together). These programs were quickly replicated in other parts of North America and
gained the status of being considered the first RJ practical experiences in North America. See Dean E. Peachey,
The Kitchener Experiment in Gerry Johnstone, ed., A Restorative Justice Reader: Texts, Sources, Contexts (Devon,
UK: Willan Publishing, 2003) at 178.
70
A good example is the acknowledgement of pioneer work by practitioners initiatives like the Victim offender
reconciliation programs (VORP) format that can be traced to Kitchener, Ontario where in 1974 Mark Yantzi and
Dave Worth, both members of the Mennonite Church, working with the Kitchener Probation Department and with
the help of a local judge successfully established a restitution and reconciliation program based in face-to-face
mediation addressing emotional and informal needs of offenders and victims. A few years later in 1978 the first
American program was established in Elkhart, Indiana also under the auspices of Mennonite Church
representatives; the local judge; probation officers, and a community corrections organization called PACT
(Prisoner and Community Together). These programs were quickly replicated in other parts of North America and
gained the status of being considered the first RJ practical experiences in North America. See Dean E. Peachey,
The Kitchener Experiment in Gerry Johnstone, ed., A Restorative Justice Reader: Texts, Sources, Contexts (Devon,
UK: Willan Publishing, 2003) at 178.
71
See note 61, Daly & Immarigeon, Origins, at 2.
43
meetings expanded to include family members and friends of both parties, as well as

professionals and others with access to community resources.72

In addition to alternative conflict resolution schemes, the effort of retrieving

practitioners influence on the foundations of RJ has a relationship with others strains of socio-

political justice reform. For example, many RJ practices and its decarceration aims were clearly

prisoners rights projects since its originators felt offenders were victims of societal neglect,

impoverished communities, and racial and gender discrimination. Accordingly, advocates hoped

to change prison conditions, minimize the use of incarceration, and even abolish jails and

prisons.73 Daly and Immagerion also suggested that practitioners were driven by victim

advocacy influences since Victims rights groups focused efforts on restitution for crime, on

victims having a formal voice in the court process, and on community safety.74. Although RJ

practices focus on differing interests, Alliances between victim advocacy groups and criminal

justice reform groups began to grow in the 1990s, as members recognized some common

interests.75

A summary of practices related to RJ in the context of criminal justice compiled

by Kathleen Daly in several countries, but especially in North America and Australasia include

the following experiences, in her words:

Conferencing of several varieties in Australia, New Zealand,

England, the United States and Canada. Whereas the northern
hemisphere version of conferencing is generally police-run, the
southern hemisphere version is not.
Sentencing circles, which arose in Canadian First Nations (or
indigenous) groups, and which are now being taken up in justice
practices for indigenous and non-indigenous groups in Canada

72
Ibid.
73
See note 61, Daly & Immargerion, The RJ Past, at 6.
74
Ibid.
75
Ibid.
44
 and the United States.
Victim-offender mediation schemes, which include a variety of
practices in the United Kingdom, European and Scandinavian
countries.
Other practices such as reparation boards in Vermont, services
to crime victims, meetings between imprisoned offenders and
victims (or their family members). 76

As Daly accounts, RJ practices seem to rely on the following premises (at least in

its incarnation in criminal justice matters):

Offenders have admitted to the offense (or have chosen not to

deny).
Offenders and their supporters have a face-to-face meeting with a
victim (or a victim representative) and a victims supporters,
although having a face-to-face meeting is not essential. There may
be other relevant people present, such as police officers or victim
advocates.
The process is informal, although the person organizing and running
a meeting establishes the ground rules for participants (such
as people must listen to each other and everyone has a chance to
speak).
Discussion and decisions taken rely on the knowledge and
decision-making capacities of lay actors rather than legal actors
(although diversionary conferences generally have a police officer
present).
The aims are to reduce victim fear and anger toward the offender,
for the victim to tell the story of how the crime affected him or
her, for the offender to acknowledge the harm and the negative
consequences the crime caused a victim, for the offender to apologize,
and for the offender to make up for what she or he did
(repair the harm) by penalties agreed to.77

As Angela Cameron warns, the format, scope and agenda of RJ models are

extremely diverse in their jurisdiction, display and subjects implicated. She writes: Restorative

justice interventions are used at various stages of an offenders involvement in the criminal

justice system including: 1. Police (pre-charge) 2. Crown (post charge) 3. Courts (pre-

sentence/during sentence) 4. Corrections (post sentence) 5. Parole (pre-revocation) (Latimer,

76
See Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice in Diverse and Unequal Societies, (2000) 17:1 Law in Context at 4.
77
See Kathleen Daly & Sarah Curtis-Fawley, "Gendered Violence and Restorative Justice: The Views of Victim
Advocates" (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 603 at 606.
45
 78
2001). Daly adds that all these practices may be presented, as diversion from the formal

court process, actions taken in parallel with court decisions, meetings between offenders and

victims at any stage of the criminal process (from arrest, presentencing, and prison release), or

meetings held for child protection cases.79 It is important to remind the reader that the examples

listed before are only a sample of experiences commonly associated with RJ values, processes

and outcomes. The diversity of the RJ movement cannot be contained solely in such practical

models. As Angela Cameron notes, While the term restorative justice is used to refer to

particular models, it is primarily a philosophical or theoretical approach to criminal justice that is

applied across a broad range of programs.80

Insofar as RJ ideology was enriched by pragmatism and grassroots activism,

academic research and theory occupied pivotal roles for the development of the RJ movement as

well. After this brief overview of pragmatic influences on RJ the next paragraphs will survey

precursory theoretical debates amongst scholars on the subject; it will concentrate on social-legal

scholars, feminist views and justice theorists who from academia have given shape and

substance to the RJ movement.

c) Informal justice and abolitionism

Informal Justice and Abolitionism are ideas that are strongly associated with RJ

ideological discourse. Daly and Stubbs note, for example, that informal justice along with

victim-offender mediation and community conflict resolution in the 1970s and 1980s were

78
See note 2 at 8 [unpublished]. (Noting and citing sources in a comprehensive literature review on RJ and
domestic violence. Though leaving aside other dimensions as youth justice; corrections; peacebuilding, and other
constituents of RJ practice)
79
See note 61, Daly & Immarigeon, The Past, Present at 2.
80
Supra note 77 at 4.
46
precursors to RJ interventions.81 However, they warn that many feminists, after an initial

endorsement, have become disillusioned with the ability of informal negotiated processes --- like

family mediation --- to tackle violence against women. The mediation or conciliation model was

criticized for defining battering and other offences as trivial disputes. Another critique was the

pressure put on women to obtain reconciliation. Furthermore, fear for womens safety and

dissatisfaction by the apparent futility of mediation in effecting meaningful change in recidivism

and violence patterns made feminists condemn those experiences for erasing victimization. Later

those same critiques were influential in curbing feminist enthusiasm for RJ practices. In

discussing this issue, Stephen Hooper and Ruth Busch included this comment:

Because of the similarities in philosophical perspectives and process techniques between

mediation and the processes used to implement restorative justice, the controversy about
the appropriateness of adopting a restorative justice approach for domestic violence cases
is embedded in the more general debate about utilizing mediation processes to deal with
domestic violence situations.82

On the other hand, Daly and Stubbs observe that RJ and mediation practices are

not the same.83 They argue that in their ideal form RJ practices recognize victims and offenders

and hold the latter accountable for wrongdoing. There is no push to reconcile, nor is

victimization erased. In addition there is the presence of symbolic members of the community or

family supporters of victims and offenders. The presence and interaction of these agents ensure

that the nature of the offence is wrong (denunciation); that the victim was injured (empathy); and

that the offender is considered responsible (accountability). Allegedly, the offender is also

81
See note 9 at 154. See also Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal
Dispute Resolution on Women (1984) 7 Harvard Womens Law Journal 57. (Criticizing the use of mediation for
domestic violence cases). See also Lois Presser & Emily Gaarder, Can Restorative Justice Reduce Battering? Some
Preliminary Considerations (2000) 27 Social Justice 175. See also note 61. See generally Richard L. Abel, ed., The
Politics of Informal Justice. (New York: Academic Press, 1982) Vol. I & II.
82
See Ruth Busch & Stephen Hooper, Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice Initiatives: The Risks of a New
Panacea. Waikato Law Review (1996) 4 : 188.
83
See note 81, Daly & Julie Stubbs, Feminist Theory at 154.
47
confronted with the full consequences of the crime. Finally, in the same dialogue-based process,

family, neighborhood and society are benefited by the reintegration of the offender and victim to

their previous status quo in the community.

There were also important implications in the findings that emerged from

informal justice investigations like empirical and theoretical studies of informal and formal

justice models in western industrialized societies and in tribal, agricultural-based societies.

Several of those studies advocated that criminal justice could be administered in a consistent and

efficient way without the restraints of court formalities so that the subjects involved in a crime

matter could cope with it by themselves with very low or no state intervention and without

professionals like lawyers, judges, etc. A good example is the work by Nils Christie who is

considered a leading proponent of Informal Justice and also an important penal abolitionist. He

was highly influential in the RJ field.

Christie argued that the State had stolen the conflict between citizens, and this

had deprived society of entertaining non-state-based solutions for conflicts, including crimes.84

Instead of enabling those in conflict to resolve troubles, he argued that the State had taken

control of the matter translating it into the professionalized context of the criminal justice system

in which neither victim nor offender is allowed any meaningful role. According to him we

should seek to eliminate the concept of crime from our social vocabulary. We should talk and

think not in terms of crimes, but of conflicts or troubles. Thus, conflicts and troubles are

inevitable parts of everyday life, and therefore should not be delegated to professionals and

specialists claiming to provide solutions. Christie believed that by restricting criminal procedure

and law to the narrow legal definition of what is relevant and what is not, the victim and the

84
See Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property (1977) 17:1 British Journal of Criminology 1-15.
48
offender could not explore the degree of their culpability and the real effects of the event. The RJ

advocacy argument of being an anti-State participatory and democratic form of justice that

involves victims, offenders and community is clearly articulated in Christies precursory study

about criminal justice.

Another penal abolitionist of great importance to the RJ movement is Herman

Bianchi. Bianchi claimed that there are better ways of dealing with society's criminals than

putting them behind bars, arguing that the current criminal justice system is based on a view of

justice as retribution. What he proposed instead was justice as reconciliation.85 As Gavrielides

points out, justice in Bianchis view is not a set of scales to be balanced, or a form of moral

accounting. It is a relational experience.86 Here another core insight motivating the RJ theory

can be found. As in RJ theory, crime is fundamentally seen as a violation of inter-personal

relationships.

Martin Wright, another penal abolitionist, also led the construction of the RJ

theoretical framework.87 It is in Wright's work that some of the questions that later motivated

many RJ thinkers on the conception of RJ are for the first time explicitly considered. Wright

proposed that the offender or the community should help the victim, and that the offender should

be required to make amends to both. Only this way, he argued, the offender would demonstrate

respect for a victims feelings and offer them practical help, while treating offenders in a non-

punitive way would draw them back into society rather than increase their isolation. The concept

85
See Herman Bianchi, Tsedeka Justice (1973), Review for Philosophy and Theology 306-317. Herman Bianchi,
Justice as Sanctuary: Toward a New System of Crime Control (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).
86
See note 54 at 21.
87
See Martin Wright, Nobody Came: Criminal Justice and the Needs of Victims (1977) Howard Journal 16:1 22.
See generally T. Mathiesen, Prison on Trial. (London: Sage, 1990) and L. Hulsman, The Abolitionist Case:
Alternative Crime Policies (1991) 25 Israel Law Review 681-709.
49
of victim and offender participating in a non-retributive, non-adversarial process that pursues

repair of harm rather than punishment of the offender is a common RJ approach.

d) Reintegrative shaming and psychological theories

Scholars and practitioners writing particularly from a psychological standpoint

and using concepts like shame and trauma recovery seeking to reinforce the benefits of RJ

approaches were also relevant to the construction of the RJ ideological language. The most

prominent of them is John Braithwaite who formulated one of the most famous

conceptualizations of RJ and also what is considered a general theory of crime.88 Braithwaite

introduced the idea of reintegrative shaming to argue for an integrative rather than stigmatizing

response to crime and its effects. Braithwaite's theory of reintegrative shaming was extensively

put into practice in RJ models in New South Wales, Australia. Most notably the police led

community conferences conducted in Wagga Wagga and RISE (Reintegrative Shaming

Experiments) in Canberra. Here is how Theo Gavrielides summarized Braithwaites theory:

Braithwaite believes that shaming is the key to controlling all types of crime. In
particular, he distinguishes two kinds of shame. The first is, what he calls, stigmatising
shame, as it disintegrates the moral bonds between the offender and the community. The
second is the reintegrative shame, which strengthens the moral bonds between the
offender and the community. Stigmatisation (bad shaming) increases crime, but
reintegrative shaming decreases it. Braithwaite embraces the idea of hating the sin but
loving the sinner, claiming that offenders should be given the opportunity to re-join their
community as law abiding citizens. However, in order to earn this right to a fresh start,
offenders must express remorse for their past conduct, apologize to their victims and
repair the harm caused by the crime.89

88
See especially note 47, Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration. See also Nathan Harris, Lode Walgrave,
John Braithwaite, "Emotional Dynamics in Restorative Conferences"(2004) 8:2 Theoretical Criminology 191-210.
See generally John Braithwaite & Philip Petit, Not Just Deserts: a Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1990).
89
See note 54 at 25.
50
 As also noted above, the role of trauma recovery in RJ interventions has also

emerged as an especially important feature in its theoretical framework. More recently RJ has

been seen by many of its proponents as a kind of cognitive behavioral therapy able to relieve

crime victims from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms and other pathologies

associated with victimization. For instance, Paul McCold points out that RJ conferences provide

opportunities for victims to hold offenders accountable, tell their story to offenders and others,

and receive new information that may have been missing; all of which are also components of

successful trauma recovery programs.90

He argues that experiences of victimization, and even trauma, are involved in

most situations of conflict and wrongdoing. RJ can acknowledge and address this sense of

victimization and the resulting needs often for everyone involved, including those who have

offended. (Indeed, it can be argued that much offending perhaps most or all violence grows

out of a sense of victimization and/or an experience of trauma). With or without the

psychoanalytic frameworks employed by Braithwaite and others, such ideas have proven to be

fruitful resources for restorative justice practitioners working in a variety of settings. To

illustrate, scholars listed several dimensions of the use of RJ outside the criminal justice field.

For example; youth justice; corrections; school discipline; workplace management; corporate

regulation; post-conflict peace building (truth and reconciliation commissions); neighbour

disputes, and employment/trade union disputes have been mentioned as practical dimensions of

90
See Interview of Paul MacCold by Abbey J. Porter, Restorative Conferences reduce Trauma from Crime, Study
shows from the International Institute of Restorative Practices (15 August 2006) on Restorative Practices EForum
online:www.iirp.org retrieved on January 10, 2009. See also David L. Gustason, Exploring Treatment and Trauma
Recovery Implications of Facilitating Victim Offender Encounters in Crimes of Severe Violence: Lessons from the
Canadian Experience in Elizabeth Elliott & Robert G. Cullomptom, eds., New Directions in Restorative Justice:
Issues , Practice, Evaluation (Portland, OR: Willan Publishing, 2005) at 193.
51
the RJ movement.91 All of them benefited from the allegedly curative properties of RJ

interventions.

e) Feminists theories on justice

Another fundamental input in the RJ foundations emerges in the writings of

contemporary feminist theorists on justice practices like Carol Gilligan, Frances Heidensohn and

Kay Harris. According to Daly and Immarigeon, Gilligan has asked whether and, if so, to what

extent our vision for understanding criminal justice is distorted in a way that privileges a

masculine view of justice --- named ethics of justice--- to the detriment of moral reasoning

and decision-making guided by a feminine ethic of care.92 This works in the following way, as

Daly and Stubbs put it: the ethic of care centres on moral concepts of responsibility and

relationship; it is a concrete and active morality. The ethic of justice centres on moral concepts

of rights and rules; it is a formal, universalizing and abstract morality.93 In criminology, some

have found the ethic of care useful, for example, Kay Harris and Frances Heidensohn who

developed a care/justice dichotomy of the criminal justice system, drawing on Gilligans work.

Heidensohn articulated two models of justice. The first is a Portia model, which values

rationality and individualism in opposition to a more women-centered Persephone model that

values caring and personal relations.94 Harris also emphasised values associated with the

91
See Declan Roche, Dimensions of Restorative Justice (2006) 62:2 Journal of Social Issues 217-238 (Describing
various other dimensions of restorative justice situated outside and alongside the criminal justice field)
92
See note 61 Daly & Immarigeon, The Past, Present, at 13.
93
See note 9, Daly & Stubbs, Feminist Theory at 153. See especially Carol Gilligan, A Different Voice: Psychological
Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
94
See Frances Heidensohn, Models of justice: Portia or Persephone? Some thoughts on equality, fairness and
gender in the field of criminal justice (1986) 14 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 287308.
52
care/response approach rather than a justice/rights orientation, although she acknowledges that a

complete substitution is unfeasible.95

Building on the legacy of these feminist thinkers some RJ advocates have

continued to use Gilligans different voice associating this variety of care-focused feminist

approach to RJ discourse. As Daly and Stubbs observed, Guy Masters and David Smith

(1998) invoke Gilligans work in their attempt to compare retributive justice and RJ, and they

argue that RJ offers a more caring response to crime (see the critique in Daly 2002a).96

However, Daly and Stubbs also pointed out that Gilligans different voice construct was

superseded by more complex analyses of ethics and moral reasoning, especially due to the influx

of ideas from critical race and postmodern feminism in the 1990s that addressed the multiple

influences of inequality markers like class, race, ethnicity and gender on social intereactions. In

time, as noted by Daly, these reading strategies came to be known as intersectionality analysis

or simply intersectionality theory. Nevertheless, Daly and Immarigeon observed that some

current RJ practices remained inspired by the ethic of care approach. To illustrate this point they

mention the work of Pennel and Burford on current family group conferencing in domestic

violence cases in Canada.97 The feminist project concerning RJ will be further explored in the

second chapter of this paper; notably, from the point of view of intersectionality theory.

f) Peacemaking criminology and philosophy theories

Another important influx of ideas in the formulation of the ideological

foundations of the RJ movement comes from peacemaking criminology and philosophical

95
M. Kay Harris, Moving into the new millennium: Toward a feminist view of justice in H. E. Pepinsky & R.
Quinney , eds., Criminology as peacemaking (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998) 83-97.
96
See note 9 at 154.
97
See note 61 Daly & Immarigeon, The Past, Present at 13.. See also J. Pennell & G. Burford, Widening the Circle:
The Family Group Decision Making Project (1994) 9 Journal of Child & Youth Care 1-12.
53
arguments for alternatives to the conventional justice system. According to Daly and

Immarigeon peacemaking criminology corresponds to the idea that crime and criminal justice

are violence and suffering. The idea finds substantial support in different traditions, including

spiritualism and feminism. The most striking concept of peacemaking criminology is provided

by Pepinsky and Quinney. Daly and Immarigeon delineated their new criminology by way of

Quinney's definition of it as a criminology that seeks to alleviate suffering and thereby reduce

crime.98 Quinney argues that, The ending of both suffering and crime, which is the

establishing of justice, can only come out of peace, peace that is spiritually grounded in our very

being."99

Other scholars advanced the construction of a restorative ideology using

philosophical justifications and calling for restricting the use of penal sanctions and for non-

retributive modes of response to criminal offences. Theo Gavrielides chronicled the work of

these early RJ ideologists. He starts with the work of Philip Pettit and John Braithwaite who

advanced the RJ ideological framework based on republican ideals. They have sought to reframe

what they regard as the key normative questions in the conventional criminal justice system in

accordance with the maximization of freedom as non-domination. Their vision of RJ also

compare a full retributivist position with a full republican position and conclude that a full just-

deserts policy would increase injustice while a republican policy would reduce it. As Gavrielides

noted, arguably their Not Just Deserts theory now constitutes the strongest proof of theoretical

work on RJ.100

98
See note 61 Daly & Immarigeon, The Past, Present at 13. See especially H. E. Pepinsky & R. Quinney, eds.,
Criminology as Peacemaking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1991).
99
Ibid.
100
See note 54 at 25. See especially note 88, Braithwaite and Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts.
54
 Others drew on philosophical inquiries which try to revisit some basic problems

that are associated with the role and use of punishment, criticizing the traditional punishment

theories. For example, Wesley Cragg, as Gavrielides noted, argued in favour of formal

justice, which according to his opinion is not antithetical to the restorative values of forgiveness,

understanding, compassion, healing and restoration.101 Robert Mackay, also using a

philosophical standpoint, looks to ethics in restorative processes and the issue of how to

develop and maintain mediation practice that respects ethical principles, and is of good quality

for victims and offenders.102 Aleksandar Fatic was another scholar who tried to establish a

philosophical justification for RJ. Gavrielides wrote that he based his theory on the moral

principle of refraining from the deliberate infliction of pain, as well as on the functional principle

of maximization of trust as a social commodity. and in the creation of a pacifist society, where

reconciliatory behaviour will be rewarded and punitive one will be sanctioned.103

Restoratives Justice foundational assumptions can also be conveyed in terms of

traditional legitimists accounts of justice. In fact, traditional legitimist accounts are prevalent in

RJ literature, where they typically come in the form of associations made by practitioners and

theorists between RJ and Indigenous or Christian Religious practices. RJs roots are

conceptualized on the basis of its spiritual or moral legitimacy, drawing on Indigenous forms of

Justice and religious roots.

101
Supra note at 26. See also Robert Mackay, Reparation and the Debate about Justice, (Edinburgh: University of
Edinburgh, 1992)
102
Ibid.
103
See note 54. See also Aleksandar Fatic, Punishment and Restorative Crime-Handling: A Social Theory of Trust,
(Aldershot, UK: Avebury Ashgate Publishing, 1995).
55
 g) Indigenous justice and religious roots

Another recurrent ideological foundation of RJ is associated with Indigenous

Justice. According to Daly, Indigenous justice refers to a variety of justice practices, normally

focused on sentencing, in which Indigenous people have a central role in responding to crime.

They include urban sentencing courts, community justice groups advice to judges in sentencing,

Elders participation in sentencing, and a variety of forms and contexts of sentencing circles.104

These approaches aim directly as Daly puts it, to rebuild Indigenous communities and to redress

the destruction of Indigenous peoples culture and social organization brought about by

colonialism and state violence (Marchetti & Daly, 2004, 2007)105. These attempts to increase

indigenous participation in matters of criminal justice may be considered a corollary of political

self-determination efforts (i.e., decolonization) and decarceration movements in conjunction with

multiculturalists policies of liberal democracies. It is thought that supporting Indigenous self-

determination means to use wherever possible alternatives to the non-Indigenous criminal justice

system in order to open space to alternatives to incarceration that are normally used in the

conventional criminal justice. This is particularly true because Aboriginal groups are known to

be over-represented in the criminal justice systems of Canada and Australia (our main focus of

interest) both as victims and offenders and resent by the lack of political autonomy and

representation in an administration of Justice that impacts them so negatively.106

104
See note 16, Kathleen Daly, Seeking Justice, at 8.
105
Ibid.
106
A full discussion of the implications of this claim would require much more investigation. However, the
empirical evidence speaks by itself. In the case of Canada, for example, according to data originally compiled by
Statistics Canada, in 2007/2008, Aboriginal people are being imprisoned at a disproportionate rate when
compared to non-Aboriginal people. Although Aboriginal people represent only three percent of the Canadian
population, they made up 22 percent of individuals sentenced to custody in the provincial or federal correctional
system. The figures are even more impressive in some provinces. For example, Aboriginal people accounted for 81
percent of admissions to sentenced custody in Saskatchewan and 69 percent in Manitoba, but represented only 11
percent and 12 percent of the provincial populations, respectively. In 2004 (the latest year for which data is
56
 Many RJ proponents and practitioners like to characterize RJ experiences as

suitably rooted within Indigenous Justice traditions, describing it --- as noted by Angela

Cameron as modeled on these cultures which practiced restoration and healing following

anti-social behaviour rather than punishment.107 Although Cameron has acknowledged the

confusion generated by this tendency of attributing restorative justice practices to something

analogous to Indigenous or Aboriginal Justice, she also asserted that Indigenous Justices true

identity cannot be mixed up with RJ due to the unique role of Aboriginal spirituality and culture

in making Aboriginal justice distinct from other forms of restorative justice108.

Furthermore, she points out that Indigenous Justice practices should not be

identified with RJ, since in her words, the contemporary restorative justice movement is not

synonymous with Aboriginal justice, despite sharing similar theoretical or historical

grounding.109 Moreover, citing Kent Roach, a Canadian scholar, Cameron notes that

Indigenous Justice developed a specific perspective focusing on renewing collective identity and

creating community rather than individual reparation notions, which is precisely a point of

available), Aboriginal people were also three times more likely than non-Aboriginal people to be the victim of
sexual assault, robbery or physical assault (319 versus 101 incidents per 1,000 populations). See The Environics
Institute, The Urban Aboriginal Peoples Study (2010) online: Urban Aboriginal People Study < http://uaps.ca/>
retrieved on 11 April 2010. See also Statistics Canada, Incarceration of Aboriginal people in adult correctional
services (Otawa: Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-001-XIE, 2009). See also Jodi-Anne Brzozowski et al.
Victimization and offending among the Aboriginal population in Canada. (2006) 26:3 Juristat. Statistics Canada
Catalogue no. 85-002-XIE. In Australia the figures are not much different. In Western Australia, for example, in
2004, Aboriginal people comprised 40 per cent of the prison population although they only represent 3 percent of
that state population. Aboriginal people in Western Australia are also overrepresented as victims. In 2003
Aboriginal people were eight times more likely than non-Aboriginal people to be victims of violence. For Aboriginal
women the figures are appalling; they are 45 times more likely than non-Aboriginal women to be victims of
domestic violence by spouses or partners. See Austl., W.A., Law Reform Commission of Western Australia,
Aboriginal Customary Laws: The interaction of Western Australian law with Aboriginal law and culture (Final
Report No.94) by Commissioner AG Braddock (Perth: Quality Press, 2006) at 95-96. See generally Roy Walmsley,
World Prison Population List, 8th ed. (London: International Centre for Prison Studies, 2009).
107
See note 16, Kathleen Daly, Seeking Justice, at 6.
108
See note 2 at 6
109
Ibid.
57
departure from RJ conventional practices.110 Kathleen Daly summarizes this point of sharp

distinction between RJ and Indigenous Justice in the following passage:

For restorative justice, the focus of the interaction and relationship building is between
offenders, victims, their supporters, community members, and the community (a non-
racially specified community),9 along with professionals such as a police officer and
coordinator. For Indigenous sentencing courts, the focus is between offenders, their
supporters, Elders, the Indigenous community (including service providers), and white
justice (typically, embodied in the legal roles of the magistrate, prosecutor, and defense
attorney).10 Doing justice in a restorative process gives attention to victims and to re-
building relationships between a victim, an offender, and their community; whereas doing
justice in Indigenous sentencing courts gives attention to changing relationships between
white justice and Indigenous people, including the offender. Relatively less attention is
currently given to addressing the needs of victims in Indigenous sentencing courts,
although this may change (Marchetti & Daly, 2007).111

Accordingly, only recently and perhaps because of the efforts of scholars like

Angela Cameron and Kathleen Daly, has the literature on RJ started to make distinctions

between white-based RJ and Indigenous Justice in a way that makes it possible to discern clearly

between the two informal justice alternatives. Increasingly, however, Indigenous Justice and

certain models of white-based restorative justice (mainly conference-based) have been more

difficult to distinguish from one another since their inspiration and modes of operation are

basically the same. Daly, for instance, describes the similarities between them. According to her

they share the following general features:

require an admission to offending (or in some jurisdictions, an offender choosing not to

deny an offence);

rely on lay actors (for restorative justice, victims and their supporters, an offenders
supporters, and other community members; for Indigenous justice, an offenders
supporters, Elders, and other members of the Indigenous community); and

assume that incarceration is a penalty of last resort.

In addition, both emphasize the need for:

110
Ibid.
111
Ibid. at 13.
58
 improved communication between legal authorities, offenders, victims, and community
members, using plain language and reducing some legal formalities;

procedural justice, i.e., treating people with respect, listening to what people have to
say, and being fair to everyone; and

persuasion and support to encourage offenders to be law-abiding112

The difficulty of reconciling attention to victims needs and to rebuilding

relationships between victims, offenders, and their communities (a tenet of RJ), with the great

deal of attention given in Indigenous Justice practices to changing relationships between white

justice and Indigenous justice - where more emphasis is placed on the offender - is a sensitive

point in my thesis. Clearly, the issue here is that Indigenous justice can be considered an

assertion of power and self-determination of the Aboriginal anti-racist and anti-colonial

movements that is more centered in potential short-term communal political benefits of making

use of their own cultural norms, holistic values, and customary legal institutions in order to avoid

the challenges they may face within the conventional justice system, whereas the white/western

RJ movement is more centered, as Daly writes, with changing justice practices to become more

reintegrative and negotiated, to changing individual offenders, and to assisting individual

victims.113 This proposition raises some questions: Is it Indigenous political claims that shape

the RJ movement? Or is the relationship the reverse? Does RJ shape those assertions of political

self-empowerment in ways that motivate people to act and give broader support for their cause?

More importantly: What is the role of victimized Indigenous women in this interplay?

Notwithstanding the implementation and use of Indigenous Justice, articulated

through the language and methods of the so-called white RJ, may be seen by many as

advancement of the political assertion of rights by Indigenous people. Notably, by the institution

112
Ibid.
113
Ibid.
59
of self-determining parallel structures of justice (e.g., sentencing circles) that are devised to play

an active role in the administration of justice as well as empower community rules and sanctions

to deal with law and order problems. Nevertheless, it may also create specific problems for

Indigenous women who may find themselves cornered by the conflicting expectations of the

aspirations on both justice systems. For this reason, despite the alleged advances prompted by

the merger of RJ language with Indigenous justice, scholars like Chris Cunneen argue that

gendered power imbalances still exist in both formats --- RJ and Indigenous Justice --- and

operate in the context of a background system of colonial injustice where the process prioritizes

mens knowledge over womens knowledge as particular and sectional.114 As Cunneen puts it,

Gender interests impact on the ability of indigenous women to develop and use restorative

justice programs. There is no inherent reason to believe that restorative justice practices will

reinstate the voices of indigenous women.115 Rather, this way of intersectional thinking or

constructive hybridization may use the moral authority of Aboriginal justice practices to generate

a model where sets of communitarian moral norms or political interests can silence Aboriginal

women causing an intersectional backfire.116

Analyzing the origins of restorative justice Kathleen Daly pointed out the

following:

In looking around the world, one finds many histories of restorative justice; most are
ethnocentric. For example, the "history" of restorative justice as reported by Australians
and New Zealanders begins where? In the Antipodes. The "history" as reported by North
Americans begins, where else? In North America. The "history" as reported by some
Christian-oriented North Americas begins in biblical texts.117

114
See Chris Cunneen, What are the Implications of RJs Use of Indigenous Traditions? in Howard Zehr & Barb
Toews, eds., Criticial Issues in Restorative Justice (Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press, 2004) 345-353 at 352.
115
Ibid.
116
See note 16.
117
See note 61, Immarigeon & Daly, Origins.
60
 Indeed, these ethnocentric manifestations of restorative justice often refer

themselves, especially at a symbolical level, to the moral authority of previous traditional

cultural manifestations of justice that are used by restorative justice proponents as a spearhead to

obtain legitimacy (in the sociological meaning) and a good public image. A blatant example of

the co-optation of cultural elements to reinforce restorative justice rhetoric can be found, as

stressed before, in the recurrent association made by practitioners and theoreticians, particularly

in North America and Australasia, concerning the Indigenous roots of restorative justice.

Likewise, to a certain extent the same association can be made concerning the RJ claims over the

notion of Christian biblical justice which is directly related to the long pacifist and prison

abolitionist tradition of Quakers and Mennonites, another foundational element of the RJ

movement. In fact, this latter religious group influenced enormously the first steps of restorative

justice, as we stressed in our account of the first RJ experiences in Canada and United States by

Mark Yantzi and Dave Worth.

Despite substantial geographical and cultural differences several restorative

justice proponents seem to identify a trait of restorativeness in the context of their own culture

of study. For example, in Africa restorative justice advocates have established a connection

between it and the local concept of ubuntu or utu.118 In Asia, particularly in China, restorative

justice scholars have claimed that the concept is deeply embedded and rooted in Asian heritage,

albeit they have also recognized there are variations that deviate from the Western standard, like,

for example, the coercive, arbitrative nature of Chinese mediation and undesirable outcomes

related to punishment in tribal justice such as public ignominy, labour service, re-education,

118
See, e.g., note 6, Skelton, Tapping indigenous knowledge. (For a full discussion on RJ experiences in south Africa
and its similarities with traditional African models of community justice).
61
letters of repentance, banishment, imprisonment, the death penalty and in the past even burying

the murderer alive with the victim.119

However, all these attempts to associate restorative justice with traditional justice

practices in the context of diverse cultures and places must be seen critically as incarnated in

particular modern realities that, albeit more culturally sensitive, sometimes do not have any

proximity to the very traditions by which they claim to be inspired. In these cases, as Daly

observes, they just represent a caricature of those cultural practices that both ignores

improprieties, internal contradictions and --- in the case of RJ models applied in Indigenous

settings --- a gender perspective. These caricatures as Daly properly named them, often

represent a romanticized over-emphasis of cultural elements like sentencing circles or family

group conferences that, I believe, are oversimplified for basically two reasons. Firstly: to allow a

generic identification with familiar practices to provide a prompt understanding by the targeted

audience. This perspective explains how RJ was so readily accepted in Aboriginal communities

in Australasia and by Indigenous people in North America although the diversity among these

people is enormous. Secondly: the restorative justice movement made itself more visible and

persuasive due to an aura of contestation of the status quo (represented by the conventional

criminal justice system) increasing the willingness of individuals to participate in restorative

justice experiences. In this sense, I believe that much of the throwback arguments concerning RJ

and traditional justice cultural manifestations have been operating in the hope of arousing public

opinion in favor of the restorative justice cause. This RJ advocacy, I assert, has potential to

conceal negative influences of other political interests in Indigenous settings (mainly community

autonomy and self-determination) that often precede in influence the needs of vulnerable

119
See, e.g., Ping Wang et al., Regional Review Asia in Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness, eds., Handbook
of Restorative Justice (Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing, 2007) 477-487.
62
stakeholders like Indigenous women, perpetuating harmful power relations of oppression and

privilege within Aboriginal communities. Restorative justice proponents aimed, especially at the

beginning of their movement, to propose an alternative to the so-called retributive conventional

justice system by proposing a paradigmatic shift. In order to achieve this goal they sought to

create a political space of contestation using a language that co-opted the discourse of other

social movements, which also were critical concerning the conventional justice system. For

example, Indigenous movements in North America and Australasia have always been critical of

the conventional justice systems due to disproportionate incarceration rates of Indigenous people

in those systems. Restorative justice proponents associated their own discourse of contestation

about the retributive-punitive conventional system with the political struggle of indigenous

activists, who were also trying to mobilize public opinion in recognition of their political rights

by asserting their own justice systems based on their cultural values. This conferred legitimacy

on the restorative justice claims boosting the potential appeal of its discourse. However, this kind

of tactic came with a price. It imposed serious costs on the foundation of a conclusive and

universal definition of restorative justice.

The appeal to ethnocentric manifestations of justice brought uncertainty at a

definitional level because of concessions made to adjust the RJ discourse to specific cultural

contexts of legitimization. Afterall, every model devised by practitioners had to be translated

into a local image and values in order to be more readily accepted. Nonetheless, the vantage of

being perceived as culturally appropriate in the eyes of the public and policy makers was crucial

to the enormous success of the restorative justice proposals. The cultural sensitivity of RJ

brought an irresistible appeal to policy makers eager to institute new government-funded

informal justice initiatives and enact change, especially in Indigenous settings.

63
 Indeed, that strategy proved to be very efficient. In less than thirty years RJ had

become a new international trend in the field of criminal justice. However, the adoption of a

body of universal practices and the framing of a conclusive conceptualization became unfeasible

since the adaptation to local cultural conditions implied the sacrifice of organizational features

that could be held as a constant in the idea of restorative justice. In addition, some RJ proponents

(and intersectional feminists among them), driven either by a colonial sentiment of guilt or by a

non-critical appreciation of those cultural practices seemed not to recognize the dangers that an

unplanned adherence to traditional cultural justice practices might bring when no conclusive

stance is taken towards political standpoints and cultural practices that ignore or silence

Indigenous womens interests.

This fact notwithstanding, the potential adverse impact of ethnocentric

manifestations of RJ has been raised by mainstream feminists who single out the case of

indigenous women who are victims of domestic violence. On this theme Kathleen Daly, for

instance, notes that there is a natural inclination by indigenous women to be sympathetic to RJ

experiences, particularly in the North American model of sentencing circles which involves

several cultural elements familiar to indigenous people such as mediation involving extended

family members; the moral authority exercised by community Elders; storytelling; and other

ritualistic ceremonies. Furthermore, Daly stresses that indigenous women see these experiences

as a symbol of self-determination of their own culture, which means reshaping of the

conventional justice system on their own terms.120 A paradox is that feminist scholars have

detected indigenous women who are also concerned with the prevalence of a communitarian

interest discourse detrimental to their own security and empowerment. In addition, those

scholars, particularly socio-legal feminists, have raised questions about the misuse of cultural

120
See note 9 at 161.
64
arguments in the context of restorative justice. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis,

Daly observed that: Concerns have been raised that the subordination of women in some

Canadian First Nations communities means that they do not enter the circle on an equal basis

(Goel 2000; Stewar et al. 2001) and that women have sometimes been excluded, silenced or

harmed because power relations were not recognized, or gendered violence not taken

seriously.121

In summary, the observance of an ethnocentric discourse of legitimization in the

context of RJ does not ensure per se a desirable level of credibility, accountability and

empowerment to all the stakeholders (especially to women victims of intimate violence). On the

contrary, the tendency detected in the RJ discourse to assimilate cultural elements into its

rhetoric, without determining if it is justified and critically addressed under a feminist

perspective, may end up as a potential danger to the people who experience RJ interventions

since it can perpetuate community acceptance of violence against women. For this reason, it is

necessary to bear in mind that RJ interventions repackaged in more attractive ethnocentric

discourses (as Indigenous justice for instance) are a double-edged sword that can serve as a

powerful tool to draw attention and acceptance to an intersectional way of thinking about

criminal justice, i.e., giving an opportunity to reconfigure the justice system with culturally

sensitive values, but it may also impose heavy costs on vulnerable stakeholders and even on an

epistemological level (as seen in the definitional problem of restorative justice). A better

intersectional approach to RJ and violence against women must ensure these problems are

addressed properly.

121
Ibid at 162.
65
2. Defining restorative justice

Up to this point I have tried to clarify some foundational issues with the goal of

providing an abstract framework that could be used to schematize the diverse ideological roots

that have informed RJ thought, without telling us exactly what RJ might be. In this subsection I

hope to give a face to the multi-tonal world of restorative justice. Unfortunately, however, the

phrase restorative justice has been defined in the most broadly based way; from the narrow

perspective of a promising way to redress problems within the criminal justice system to

grandiose plans to reform the world creating a more just society.122 But neither of these two

perspectives is able to provide alone a conclusive definition of restorative justice. In his book

The little book of Restorative Justice, Howard Zehr, a seminal thinker in RJ, suggests that: Even

though there is general agreement on the basic outlines of restorative justice, those in the field

have been unable to come to a consensus on its specific meaning.123 Depending on the

worldview of a practitioner or theorist a conclusive description about what Restorative Justice is

may be quite contestable. Johnstone and Van Ness, for example, have observed:

There is widespread agreement among proponents that the goal [of restorative justice] is
to transform the way contemporary societies view and respond to crime and related forms
of troublesome behaviour. However, there are a range of views as to the precise nature of
the transformation sought. These are to some extent in tension with one another,
suggesting that restorative justice is best understood as a deeply contested concept.
Brackets added.124

As a matter of fact, there seems to exist a general feeling of resistance amongst RJ

proponents to define the term conclusively. Susan Sharpe, for example, points out that many

122
See, e.g., Margarita Zernova, Restorative justice: ideals and Realities (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,
2007) at 2-3. (For an account on the various perspectives about RJ. She observes that RJ is popular both with
conservatives and liberals. The formers have an interest in promoting and maintaining RJ because it allegedly
advances family values and the interests of victims and promises cost saving and reduction of re-offending, the
latters view RJ as an individually empowering and less repressive response to crime).
123
See Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2002) at 36.
124
See note 54, Johnstone & Van Ness eds., Handbook of Restorative Justice, at 1.
66
theorists are reluctant to establish firm definitions of RJ for fear of closing off innovations or

responsiveness to local needs.125 In other words, the effort to capture an adequate meaning for

restorative justice encounters the problem of many proponents simply denying the necessity or

opportunity to provide a definition for it. Gerry Johnstone, a renowned RJ advocate, observes

that when RJ is defined only by its most visible manifestations, there is a danger that the idea can

become over-identified with a particular practice or set of practices which reduces the scope of

the movement.126 He singles out the tendency to think about RJ as being mainly or even

exclusively about processes such as victim-offender mediation or family group conferencing, or

even experiences associated with reparation schemes. Likewise, Declan Roche argues that this

tendency to see RJ as only a criminal justice initiative impoverishes the concept since restorative

processes (which encourage citizens to negotiate among themselves, rather than rely on

professionals to adjudicate), and restorative values (which emphasize the importance of repairing

and preventing harm), can be found across a wide range of regulatory fields. In this sense,

according to him, teachers dealing with bullying in schools; social workers; corporate regulators;

civil mediators members of truth commissions; diplomats; and peacekeepers all to a certain

extent practice a variety of restorative justice. As a consequence, the label restorative justice is

more easily associated with a set of principles and values which makes the phrase itself an

expression that serves as an umbrella term for a large spectrum of experiences and

interventions.127 This paper proceeds, as noted above, on the premise that there is no consensus

125
See Susan Sharpe, How Large Should The Restorative Justice Tent" be? in Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds.,
Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press, 2004) at 18. Dana Greene stated in
a good-humoured remark paraphrasing the United States Supreme Court that restorative justice, is a bit like
pornography, people know it when they see it. See note 3, Dana Greene, Repeat Performances at 245
unpublished.
126
See Gerry Johnstone, ed., A Restorative Justice Reader: Texts. Sources , Context (Mill Street, Uffculme: Willan
Publishing, 2003) at 21.
127
In the restorative justice literature, for example, we can find studies associating it with problems as diverse as
medical malpractice and school bullying.
67
on a RJ definition although it is possible to establish a working definition. In the next subsection

we develop a workable concept of restorative justice.

a) Restorative justice working definition

Howard Zhers book Changing Lenses laid the foundations for the scholarly

conceptualization of RJ studies in the early 1990s.128 According to him, RJ is a participatory

model of informal justice that encourages and expects active involvement by all stakeholders ---

offenders, victims, affected community --- in the event of a crime, as an integral part of the full

continuum of healing the harm caused by the wrongdoing. Crime in the RJ realm is seen

fundamentally as a violation of people and inter-personal relationships. In addition, its basic idea

promotes the potential value and goodness of human beings, emphasizing communitarian and

participatory values. In general, RJ practices aim at reintegration of the offender and victim in

the community, offender rehabilitation, and victim closure through informal and non-adversarial

methods. It is commonly asserted among RJ proponents that there is a paradigmatic departure

from a retributive criminal justice and its recurring themes (over reliance on punishment and just

deserts theory; special and general deterrence; incapacitation; rehabilitation; retribution, and

adjudication) to include community restoration, personal transformation, indigenous justice,

victims rights, and victim trauma treatment.

Most RJ interventions involve some sort of face-to-face meeting between victims

and offenders with the assistance of facilitators. In addition, these encounters may involve

members of the community. Depending on the RJ format the term community can mean either

victims and offenders family members/supporters, or representative members of the community.

For example, Elders (in an indigenous setting), neighbours, supportive friends and anyone

128
See note 47, Zehr, Changing Lenses.
68
affected by the crime. In some RJ models even designated court agents or police officers are

considered as members of this extended community.

For the sake of clarity this section will provide a working definition within the

context of criminal justice. Therefore, it does not include any subsequent dimension that

restorative justice advocates may propose in practice or theory in some other context. In any

case, as Theo Gavrielides has observed, the lack of precise aims and limits is not exclusive to RJ,

as he writes, theoretical disagreements and conflicting definitions are common phenomena

in the field of criminology. Many argue that there is even disagreement as to what constitutes

criminal law, criminology or even crime. RJ is no exception.129

However, whether it is true that this open concept can offer flexibility and

adaptability in a myriad of factual situations that may arise and that closing the doors to new

approaches may inhibit the movement evolution and scope is open to analysis. It is also true that

misrepresentations of RJ regarding conflicting models, objectives, or statements may cause

bewilderment, especially when one or more of the constituent human factors (offender, victim or

facilitator) of RJ interventions may be imbalanced or misguided. Zernova sounded the alert when

she stated, Restorative reforms may go astray as a result of being co-opted and diverted from

the original vision. There are historical precedents of criminal justice interventions which got

sidetracked, resulting in undesirable consequences and serving functions rather different from

those that had been intended.130

In fact, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, it would be no surprise to

find practitioners operating a program, even for a long time, without knowing exactly whether or

129
See also Theo Gavrielides. "Restorative Justice: The Perplexing Concept: Conceptual Fault-Lines and Power
Battles within the Restorative Justice Movement"(2008) 8 Criminology and Criminal Justice 165-183.
130
See note 48 at 492.
69
not what they are doing is really restorative justice until somebody shows up and labels it as

being so. On the other hand, someone may claim to operate a RJ programme without in reality

employing restorative justice values and principles.131 Commonsense dictates that we must

establish reasonable limits to the still uncertain goals and objectives of restorative justice. A

good starting point would be to provide a working definition of the term itself that encompasses

the most desirable principles and values, at least in the field of criminal justice which seems to

be the original vocation of restorative justice. In doing so, we expect to provide a working

conceptual body to it.

Even aware of the risk that a definition of RJ may always be incomplete, in this

section we use data collected by Theo Gavrielides who, whilst acknowledging this limitation,

also observed that consistent attempts for a conclusive definition were already being made. In his

meticulous research, Gavrielides listed a comprehensive set of working definitions and principles

for restorative justice. For the purpose of this paper, however, we will only focus on those with a

more favourable reception. The first in Gavrielides list is that one provided by Tony Marshall

where, Restorative Justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular

offence come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offences and
132
its implications for the future.

Marshall described the basic principles of RJ as the following: 1) making room

for the personal involvement of those mainly concerned (particularly the offender and the victim,

but also their families and communities); 2) seeing crime problems in their social context; 3) a

forward-looking (or preventative) problem-solving orientation; 4) flexibility of practice

131
Zehr and Mika also alerted to the danger that As restorative justice programs continue to be widely adopted,
the number of definitions of restorative justice has increased significantly. Oddly enough, some of the programs
defined as restorative do not appear to contain some of the essential elements originally associated with
restorative justice.. See Howard Zehr & Harry Mika, Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Justice (1998) 1
Contemporary Justice Review at 47-55.
132
See note 24 at 44. See also Tony F. Marshall, Restorative Justice: an Overview in Gerry Johnstone ed., A
Restorative Justice Reader: Texts. Sources , Context (Mill Street, Uffculme: Willan Publishing, 2003) at 28.
70
(creativity). In addition, he stated that desirable objectives of restorative justice would be (a) to

attend fully to victims needs (b) to prevent re-offending by reintegrating offenders into the

community (c) to enable offenders to assume active responsibility for their actions (d) to recreate

a working community that supports rehabilitations of offenders and victims, and is active in

preventing crime and (e) to provide a means of avoiding escalation of legal justice and the

associated costs and delays.133

Gavrielides concluded that this definition and principles, albeit still subjected to

criticism because of its limitations regarding scope, was endorsed by the Working Party on

Restorative Justice; a working group of notable restorative justice advocates and scholars that

worked under the auspices of the Alliance of NGOs on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

in preparation for the 10th United Nations crime congress in 2000134 Gavrielides also reported

that this same group endorsed Ron Claassens principles regarding restorative justice. According

to Claassens principles: (a) Crime is primarily an offence against human relationships; (b)

Restorative justice is a process to make things as right as possible; (c) As soon as immediate

victim, community and offender safety concerns are satisfied, Restorative justice views the

situation as a teachable moment for the offender; (d) Restorative justice prefers responding to

the crime at the earliest point possible and with the maximum amount of voluntary cooperation

and minimum coercion since healing in relationships and new learning are voluntary and

cooperative; (e) Restorative justice recognises that not all offenders will choose to be

cooperative, and that those who pose significant safety risks should be placed in settings where

the emphasis is on safety, values, ethics, responsibility, accountability and civility; (f)

133
Ibid.
134
This working group, according to Gavrielides, was comprised of the following notable restorative justice
scholars, practitioners and theoreticians: Gordon Bazemore, John Braithwaite, Ron Claassen, James Consedine,
Peter Cordella, Frank Dunbaugh, Burt Galaway, Julia Hall, Kay Harris, Virginia Mackey, Tony Marshall, Gabrielle
Maxwell, John MacDonald, Paul McCold, Fred McElrea, Harry Mika, David Moore, Ruth Morris, Allison Morris,
Wayne Northey, Dean Peachey, Joan Pennell, Kay Pranis, Barry Stuart, Daniel Van Ness and Howard Zehr.
71
Restorative justice recognises and encourages the role of community institutions, and requires

follow-up and accountability structures. The definitional efforts of Marshall and Claassen when

taken in conjunction are widely considered the most convincing definition in the restorative

justice field.

Another effort listed by Gavrielides in order to establish a definition of restorative

justice also includes one devised by the United Nations through the Economic and Social

Council. On the 24th of July 2002, the Council adopted Resolution E/CN.15/2002/L.2/Rev.1

Basic principles on the use of Restorative.135 However, this document in particular did not

provide an accurate definition of the term itself. In fact, it only referred to the repetition of the

previous rationalization developed by Marshall/Claassen in broad general terms limiting itself to

describing what would be restorative processes/outcomes and other restorative jargon like

parties, facilitator and community. In practical terms that effort has not added anything

substantial to the debate about whether a conclusive definition of RJ is possible. Once more this

timidity in establishing a definition was attributed by Gavrielides to the fear of restorative

advocates to use prescriptive or narrow definitions that might impede further development of

the idea. 136

As seen in the previous paragraphs the divergent objectives of RJ make it difficult

to establish a prevalent theoretical approach to the issue of a definition. However, it is essential

to delimit the field, but where the line is drawn is ultimately an arbitrary choice that might be as

good as any other. Bearing this in mind, our working definition of choice is one provided by

Kathleen Daly which is marked by a descriptive approach to the essential elements of RJ. She

wrote:

135
See note 23.
136
Ibid.
72
 First, a person has admitted responsibility for offending, either explicitly or implicitly.
Although crucial, this is a commonly overlooked feature. RJ does not adjudicate or
mediate facts, but is part of the post-adjudication (or penalty) phase of the criminal
process. Secondly, an offender typically (but not always) has a face-to-face meeting with
a victim (or a representative for a victim, say, a parent for a young child victim), along
with other supporters or relevant community members. Thirdly, it is an informal process
that relies on the knowledge and decision-making capacities of lay actors, but it is linked
to and constrained by established criminal justice (CJ) practices. There are ground rules
for participants behaviour and what can be said, and there are upper limits on penalties,
which depend on the legal context. Fourthly, the aims of RJ are to hold offenders
accountable for their behaviour and to make up for what they did. It is hoped that the
process and outcome will deter offenders from further lawbreaking and provide some
form of reintegration into the community, although neither may be achieved.137

b) Overview of restorative justice models

The relevant examples of RJ have been listed in a number of ways, however I

cannot take the space in this paper to account the great deal of information necessary in a

comprehensive survey of RJ models. Nevertheless, most of the scholarly literature certainly

would include, as the most authoritative examples of RJ interventions, the following models:

victim-offender reconciliation and mediation programmes, family group conferencing, and

sentencing circles. In fact, according to Paul McCold, these three practices are the purest

forms of RJ and the only practices that meet the requirements of a face-to-face meeting between

victims and offenders along with their communities of care.138 As he also observes, These

examples all follow similar processes. However they differ in who runs the programmes, how

cases are referred, who conducts the mediation, how much pre-mediation counselling is

involved, the length of the process, the types of offences addressed, and the primary goal of the

137
Kathleen Daly, Restorative Justice and Sexual Assault: An Archival Study of Court and Conference Cases (2006)
46:2 The British Journal of Criminology at 335.
138
See Paul McCold, Primary Restorative Justice Practices in Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, eds., Restorative
Justice for Juveniles: Conferencing, mediation and circles (Oxford, UK:Hart Publishing, 2001) at 41.
73
process.139 For this reason, I will narrow down my illustration of practical models of RJ to those

three experiences that emerged independently, but that have greatly influenced one another.

Although others models of RJ may be as important as those, I will refrain from mentioning them

in this paper.140

This subsection, therefore, is dedicated to a brief account of the three most

popular and well established formats of RJ. In order to do that I reviewed the research findings

of RJ scholars like Margarita Zernova; Paul McCold; Loretta Frederick; Kristine C. Lizdas;

Mark Umbreit; Howard Zehr; and Angela Cameron. In the following subsections, I will largely

ignore empirical uses of those models since my main concern is with sentencing circles which

will be empirically explored in the next chapter of this paper. Anyway, where it is indispensable

I may mention only in passing a specific RJ program in North America and Australasia to

illustrate better a particular model..

i. VORPs and VOMs

Historically speaking, victim-offender reconciliation or mediation programmes

are the oldest forms of restorative justice practice.141 The practice of RJ in the form of dialogue-

based encounters evolved basically from two distinct programs: faith-based victim-offender

reconciliation (VORP) and community work-based victim offender-mediation (VOM)

programmes. These programmes gained impetus in the 1970s and 1980s with victims

139
Ibid.
140
For example, victim impact panels; Navajo peacemaking; community justice sanction; community boards or
panels; victim compensation, arbitration, etc. See, e.g., Paul MacCold, The Recent History of Restorative Justice
Mediation, Circles and Conferencing in Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft , eds., The Handbook of Restorative Justice: A
Global Perspective (New York, NY: Routledge, 2006)
141
Zernova has observed that early programs were named victim-offender reconciliation programmes, or VORP,
however, some objected to the term reconciliation, because it was value-laden. Victim's rights advocates believed
that the term implied that victims need to reconcile with their offender. They preferred the term mediation. Today
most programmes adopt the terminology victim-offender mediation. See note 122 at 8.
74
organizations, religious campaigners for non-custodial sentences and community activists

involved in diverting young offenders from the conventional criminal justice system. To be more

accurate, victim-offender reconciliation was the first configuration of a dialogue-based RJ format

in the early 1970s in Canada and the United States, having emerged even before the concept of

restorative justice was fully realized.142 As Zernova points out, Victim-offender reconciliation

is based on the idea that following a criminal offence, the victim and the offender have a shared

interest in righting the wrong. The emphasis is placed on reconciliation, assisting victims in the

aftermath of an offence, helping offenders to change their lives and more, generally, humanizing

the criminal justice system.143

In a nutshell, restorative dialogues involve a face-to-face meeting between a

victim and offender with the help of a neutral trained facilitator primarily for the purpose of

giving the offender an opportunity to make reparations, express remorse and if possible reconcile

with the victim.144 Victims are supposed to have the opportunity to talk about what happened and

ask questions to the offender in a respectful and controlled atmosphere in order to mitigate

feelings of anger; fear; shame; frustration and vengeance. The idea is that these negative and

punitive inner attitudes and emotions can be channelled in more constructive ways in the

restorative encounter that ideally would function as a powerful cathartic release. According to

Heather Strang, It seems that this expression of feelings by victims is essential for the

experience of empathy by offender towards their victims. It may be that empathy is the engine

that drives remorse on the offenders part and discharge of retributive feelings on the victims

142
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, The Role of Restorative Justice in the Battered Womens
Movement, by Loretta Frederick & Kristine C. Lizdas, (Washington: Battered Women's Justice Project, 2003).
143
See note 122 .
144
If victims or offenders do not feel for any reason comfortable to meet face-to-face with their counterparts. They
either may choose a surrogate to represent themselves or use the facilitator as an intermediary to carry
information back and forth between the parties until a restorative agreement is achieved. Another common forms
of indirect dialogue like those are to exchange letters, videos, emails or to meet with an unrelated offender or
victim.
75
part.145 In sum, by appealing to the psychological and moral mechanisms of empathy, RJ

practitioners intend to trigger inner processes in victims and offenders that give rise to a search

for restoration; closure; healing; responsibility, and prevention.

Zernova concludes the description of the process mentioned above as follows:

Then the parties may decide together what needs to be done about what happened and reach a

mutually satisfying agreement. An agreement may involve the offender making financial

restitution, working for the victim (or the community), undertaking to behave in a particular way

or attending some rehabilitation programme, such as anger management.146 The facilitator helps

the mediation process, but does not impose any outcome upon the parties. The aim is to promote

a dialogue and empower victims and offenders to solve the conflict the best way they can within

certain procedural constraints. It is crucial to understand that restorative mediation processes are

not necessarily apologetic, i.e., the restorative dialogue does not suppose that the offender will

ask or receive forgiveness from the victim although this outcome may reasonably be expected in

an optimal RJ encounter. In the case of inappropriate behaviour or breach of the pre-established

protocols by the parties the facilitator normally would interrupt the encounter and refer the case

again to court for the adoption of conventional criminal justice measures when it is suitable.

Moreover, Frederick and Lizdas suggest --- citing Mark Umbreit --- that VORPs and VOMs can

have positive effects on victims and on offenders as well. For example: a) increasing the

satisfaction levels of victims with the justice systems response to their case rather than going

through the normal court procedures; b) after meeting the offender, victims are significantly less

145
See Heather Strang, Is Restorative Justice Imposing its Agenda on Victims? in Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds.,
Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press, 2004) at 101. (Arguing that RJ
processes must recognize that victims are entitled to convey retributive and bitter emotions as a valuable element
of restorative transformation of both offenders and victims). See also note 88, Harris et al., Emotional Dynamics.
(Arguing that emotions like empathy, remorse and guilt will spill over into feelings of shame, that are consistent
with the approach advocated by Braithwaites reintegrative shaming theory).
146
See note 122.
76
fearful of being revictimized; c) more compliance with restitution obligations in regard to

offenders; and d) offenders that agreed to meet their victims are rarely recidivist.147 However, RJ

critics argue these claims are in need of further empirical confirmation and theoretical

clarification.148

Cameron observes that VORP experiences were primarily developed in

Mennonite communities, and continue to be primarily run by Christian faith-based groups in

North America, but now also in other parts of the world like Germany, Finland, Belgium, and the

United Kingdom.149 She also helps to clarify a number of distinctions which can be drawn

between VORPs and VOMs. She summarizes these distinctions as follows:

VOMs rely on a similar grouping of participants, but place more emphasis on reparation
and restitution to the victim than on reconciliation of the parties (Strang, 2002). Further,
Tim Roberts, a consultant who evaluated a British Columbia VOM, states that they deal
with more serious and violent offences, while VORPs deal mainly with minor offences
committed by juveniles. According to Roberts, VOMs are more rare than VORPs; the
mediators are trained professionals rather than volunteers; they may not result in a face-
to-face meeting; they are likely to require more preparation and counselling work for
victims and offenders; and are more focused on healing rather than reconciliation
(1995)150

Furthermore, restorative victim-offender mediation can be, and has been,

presented and used in a number of configurations depending on the structure of the criminal

justice system in which it is used, as well as the level of acceptance coming from public opinion,

147
See note 140 at 8-9.
148
See note 21. (In this note I quote Stubbs who provides examples of criticism regarding the promises of RJ to
victims and community)
149
See note 2 (For an account of examples of use of victim-offender mediations in Canada and other countries).
See also note 70 for an account on pioneer experiences on VORP promoted by the Mennonite Community,
especially the Kitchener experiment in Ontario. (The Mennonites are a Christian denomination or community who
adherents have become known as deeply committed to pacifism, nonviolence and prison abolition. The
Mennonite church is one of the so-called Peace churches like, the Quakers and the Brethren in Christ. Several RJs
prominent scholars and practitioners are members either of the Mennonite church or Quaker community, for
instance, Daniel Van Ness, Howard Zehr and Joan Pennell. Basically they see RJ as a form of Biblical Justice. The
Mennonite church, for example, is a leading sponsor of RJ initiatives in North America).
150
See note 2 at 16.
77
policy-makers and the cultural and historical background of the country. According to

Gavrielides, the first configuration is of independent programmes, when they are offered as real

alternatives for criminal litigation, diverting the criminal case totally out of the formal process of

the conventional criminal justice at a very early stage --- normally pre-charge.151 The second

configuration is of relatively independent programmes in which an offenders behaviour is

reviewed and evaluated within a formal criminal proceeding.152 At any stage of that proceeding,

according to court or prosecutorial discretion, the case can be referred to a mediator or facilitator

(I prefer the term facilitator to avoid allusive references to civil mediation) who takes charge of

the responsibility of promoting an encounter between victim and offender. If this is

accomplished successfully, it will have an impact on the outcome of the criminal proceedings.

Normally, a positive outcome takes the form of a shortened sentence time, although there have

been cases where charges were dropped altogether. The third configuration is of dependent

programs which take place when the offender is already incarcerated or after sentencing. Finally,

Gavrielides schematization of victim-offender mediation configurations also attribute several

distinctions concerning operational styles that are noteworthy to quote in length. In his words:

The first is between programmes that are primarily oriented towards the needs of the
offender, and those that also take account of the needs of the victim. The second
distinction is made between projects where victims meet their offenders and projects
where groups of victims take part in discussions with unrelated offenders. Although this
type of mediation does not preclude bringing the individuals together to consider how
offenders can make amends, their main goal is to help both victims and offenders to
challenge each others prejudices. The third distinction concerns mediation programmes
that may include face-to-face meeting of the victim with the offender, and those that have
mediators act only as go-betweens. The fourth category depends on the cases that the
mediation programmes accept. For instance, a project may take cases below or above a
certain level of seriousness, or only juvenile cases. Lastly, there are victim-offender
mediation programmes that are carried out by paid professional staff or by trained
volunteers.153

151
See note 54 at 31.
152
Ibid.
153
See note 54 at 301.
78
 In the next subsections I will describe family group conferencing and sentencing

circles. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that many of the features ascribed to VORPs

and VOMs are also shared by family group conferencing and sentencing circles because in its

origins RJ was virtually synonymous with VORPs and VOMs. Paul McCold, for example, noted

that: In the beginning, mediation was restorative justice, and restorative justice was

mediation.154 However, as A.W. Roberts observed: Within a short time, VOM become more

flexible, and often was multi-part, with several victims and/or offenders, family members and/or

supporters. Next, this VOM model of practice became several models and them a family of

models.155 Family group conferences and sentencing circles are, therefore, the result of the

natural expansion of RJ dialogue-based encounters like VORPs and VOMS. For this reason, they

essentially share the same strengths and weaknesses.156

ii. Family group conferences

The central idea behind family group conferencing (hereafter FGC) is the

recognition that victims and offenders by themselves may be unable to deal with the

consequences of a crime since it also affects their families and communities as a whole. In other

words, FGC depends not only on the agency of dialogue-based processes between victim and

offender but also on the contributions of supportive family members of both of them; respected

community members, and public officials like police and probation officers. As Frederick and

Lizdas put it, A wider circle of people is recognized as being victimized by the offense

154
See note 138 at 24.
155
See Ann Wamer Roberts, Is Restorative Justice Tied to Specific Models of Practice?, in Howard Zehr & Barb
Toews eds., Critical Issues in Restorative Justice (Monsey, New York: Criminal Justice Press, 2004) at 242.
156
The term encounter encapsulates in one word one of the most important tenets of the RJ movement: that
victims, offenders and the affected community should be allowed to encounter one another outside highly formal,
professional-dominated settings like a courtroom to deal with their own problems. See note 53 Johnstone & Van
Ness, Handbook of RJ, at 9.
79
identified as primary and secondary victims in FGC. Victims are more likely to receive

comprehensive support services because a wider net of people is involved.157

This conception of a wider circle of people in conferencing models is linked to

RJs principle of participatory democracy and holistic justice. As a matter of fact, the strongest

connection between FGC and RJ is formed by one of the fundamental assumptions that underlies

RJ theory, i.e., that the wrongdoers behaviour and its consequences are only part of something

that is intimately interconnected with other stakeholders which can be only understood by

reference to them as a whole.158 In this sense, although the primary victims are those most

directly affect by the offense, other lay actors, such as family members of victims and offenders,

witnesses, and members of the affected community, are also considered victims. Bearing this

interconnection in mind, it makes sense to seek an offenders reinclusion into the circle of

community belonging and support through the application of social pressure and collective

expressions of disapproval like Braithwaites reintegrative shaming theory proposes. In sum,

FGC involves the acknowledgment of a wider range of people as being victimized by the

wrongdoing and at the same time requires collective responsibility in the task of reintegrating the

offender and victim into the community, thus contributing to the empowering and healing of the

overall community.

157
See note 142 at 9.
158
Zehr and Mika stress that any restorative programme must be applied in the light of the following principles: 1)
Recognition that crime is a violation of one person by another and not against the state; 2) Recognition that crime
is harmful to interpersonal relationships and to communities; 3) The focus is on problem solving and restoration of
social harmony; 4) Restitution, reconciliation and vindication are used as a means of restoration; 5) The
community acts as a facilitator in the restorative process, and 6) The holistic context of an offence is taken into
consideration including moral, social, economic, political and religious aspects. In addition, there are four
procedural pillars for RJ practical models. Firstly, the restorative encounter which creates a window of
opportunity for victims, offenders and community members who want to do so to meet to discuss the crime and
its aftermath. Secondly, the seek for reintegration which means to restore victims and offenders as contributing
members of society. Third, the inclusiveness that provide opportunities for parties with a stake in a specific
crime to participate in its resolution. Finally, making amends that requires from offenders to take decisive steps
to repair the harm they have done. See note 131.
80
 According to Umbreit and Zher, FGC first developed in New Zealand in the late

1980s as a way to address the failures of conventional juvenile justice and as an attempt to

incorporate traditional justice values of the Maori People --- the Indigenous group of New

Zealand --- that emphasised the role of family and community in addressing wrongdoing.159 In

accordance with that intersectional thinking initiative, FGC was institutionalized in 1989

through, The Children, Young Persons and their Families Act, as an alternative to formal court

proceedings for young offenders.160 As Umbreit has observed, FGC is now the standard for

processing juvenile cases in New Zealand and also in Australia that adopt the concept a short

period later.161 Since then, several countries such as Canada, United States, Israel and others in

Europe, have followed the example of Australia and New Zealand by adopting restorative

conferencing with minor changes in style accordingly to their own social and legal contexts.162

Kathleen Daly asserts that Australia and New Zealand are the leading

laboratories of experimentation in restorative conferencing.163 According to her, New Zealand

159
See Mark Umbreit & Howard Zehr, Restorative Family Group Conferences: Differing Models and Guidelines for
Practice in Eugene McLaughlin et al., eds., RJ: Critical Issues (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003) at 69-
70
160
See Cameron, note 2 at 15. See also Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 (N.Z), 1989/24, 2009
RS. See generally F.W.M. McElrea, Restorative Justice - A New Zealand Perspective in David J. Cornwell, ed.,
Criminal punishment and Restorative Justice: Past, present, and future perspectives (Winchester, UK: Waterside
Press, 2006) at 119. (Discussing the restorative justice principles applied in the 2002 Sentencing Act at New
Zealand). See also Sentencing Act 2002 (N.Z)., 2002/9, 2009 RS.
161
See Mark Umbreit, Family Group Conferencing: Implications for Crime Victims (2000) U.S. Department of
Justice - Office of Justice Programs. See also note 122 at 12 (For a detailed account of FGC outside New Zealand,
specially the Wagga Wagga model in New South Wales, Australia, and the Thames Valley model in UK. These
models differ from the New Zealand model because they use police officers, usually in uniform, or school officials
to set up and facilitate meetings. No other agencies are involved in their functioning. They are clearly based on
reintegrative shaming theories by John Braithwaite).
162
See note 53, Johnstorne & Van Ness, Handbook of RJ, at 446-557. (For a recent account of RJ experiences
around the globe). See also Esther Shachaf-Friedman & Uri Timor, Family-Group Conferencing in Israel: The
Voices of Victims Following Restorative Justice Proceedings in Natti Rone et al., eds, Trends and issues in
Victimology (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008) at 58. (Describing the Kedem family
conferencing model in Israel).
163
See Kathleen Daly, Conferencing in Australia and New Zealand: Variation, Research Findings, and Prospects in
Allison Morris & Gabrielle Maxwell, eds., Restorative Justice for Juveniles: Conferencing, mediation and circles
(Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2001) at 59-61. (Discussing FGC evolution in New Zealand and Australia while
pointing out misconception about the use of restorative conferencing in those countries).
81
and Australia have been spearheading a campaign to use restorative conferencing for addressing

social problems, endemic racism in the justice system and to redress inequalities. As she

observes:

With the exception of two jurisdiction in Australia, all jurisdictions have statutory-
based schemes, with conferences typically used as on component in a hierarchy of
responses to youth crime.

The overarching goal in legislative frameworks is to keep juveniles out of the formal
system as much as possible.

In addition to statutory-based schemes for juvenile offenders, conferencing is used in a

variety of other contexts, including school and workplace disputes, family and child
welfare (or care and protection matters), and as pre-sentencing advice to magistrates and
judges.164

The impetus for those policies, she argues, is a commitment to an ideology that

emphasizes social welfare and crime prevention. Moreover, their common law tradition allows a

greater degree of experimentation with new justice forms which is not possible in civil law

jurisdictions.

Typically, as in other RJ formats, a family group conference brings together the

offender with the victim to discuss the causes and consequences of the crime and ways of

preventing its repetition; but in this specific model, offender and victim are also supported by

their families (in the case of young offenders usually their parents), friends or neighbours and the

responsibility is shared among all the participants who must work together to stop the offending

behaviour.165 In addition, the restorative encounter is run by a neutral facilitator/mediator, and

the offender and their family are usually supported by local social workers not employed by the

criminal justice system. In several FGC programmes, however, as Umbreit notes, a

lawyer/advocate for the offender is invited, and a representative of the police department, who

164
Ibid. at 59-60.
165
However, Cameron notes that unlike sentencing circles FGC participants are usually limited to immediate family
members, as opposed to the larger community of supporters. See note 2 at 15.
82
serves as the prosecutor, is present.166 After all participants views have been presented, the

entire group, which includes the extended community of care of offenders and victims, is

expected to come to a consensus on the outcome for the case, not just on a restitution agreement.

Goals of the conference would normally include accountability, prevention of future misconduct,

and victim empowerment.167 In some FGC configurations the offenders family is invited to

meet in private and draw up a plan which is submitted to the whole conference for acceptance.

FGC encounters are based upon the assumption that people are more likely to honour plans to

which they feel they have made an active contribution.

As one can infer, the same principles of empathetic dialogue and claims of

substantive benefits to victims and offenders applies to FGCs as to VOMs and VORPs.

However, Mark Umbreit points out the differences between VOMs and FGC, as follows:

Unlike VOM, FGC uses public officials (police officers, probation officers, school officials)

rather than trained volunteers as facilitators. Although their roles include mediation, they are

more broadly defined, combining mediation with other methods of interaction and allowing for

more directed facilitation. The FGC process also casts a much wider circle of participants than

VOM.168 In sum, FGC programmes provide the victim, the offender and all those who are

affected by crime an opportunity to be directly involved in a discussion leading to a decision

regarding sanctions and making amends. Finally, FGC may occur at any stage of a criminal legal

proceeding. However, most of the times they are used by police as an alternative to arrest and as

a diversion of the formal criminal justice system.169

166
Supra note 161.
167
Ibid.
168
Supra note 161.
169
See note 54 at 34.
83
 iii. Restorative and sentencing circles

Restorative and sentencing circles are analyzed in depth in a following chapter.

This section is designed merely to give the reader a general comprehension of the purpose and

function of this RJ model which is the primary objective in this subsection.

Restorative circles and restorative family group conferencing, although arising

from different Aboriginal traditions, are closely related and share common emphasis.170 As

Frederick and Lizdas note, restorative circles practices place: a strong emphasis upon local

community member participation, making the circle community based; bringing victim and

offender together in face-to-face interaction as does victim/offender mediation; and involving

victim and offender family members and friends, such as in family group conferencing.171

However, a clear distinction can be drawn between restorative circles and other restorative

conferencing models. The former places aboriginal understandings of justice based in mediation

and consensual decision-making as primary elements of motivation and direction in restorative

encounters.172 This allows Frederick and Lizdas to point out that, These practices explicitly

empower each individual in the circle as an equal and lift up the relationship between justice and

the physical, emotional and spiritual dimensions of the individual in the context of community

and culture.173 In other words, those practices mean to Indigenous people at the same time the

experimentation of a more humane and meaningful form of justice, and a politically stronger and

170
There is a general consensus in the literature that family group conferences were adapted from the justice
traditions of the Maori People in New Zealand, while restorative circles are usually associated with the justice
traditions of Indigenous people in Canada and United States. For example, the Navajo peacemaking in the United
States. See note 138 at 48-49. But see note 6. (Arguing that sentencing circlers are not a form of RJ, but a
manifestation of Aboriginal Justice).
171
See note 142 at 10.
172
The Indigenous practice of peacemaking circles as a form of conflict-resolution is the basis of this approach.
173
Ibid.
84
more empowering way of conceiving criminal justice in their own terms.174 In this sense,

restorative circles are perhaps the most culturally sensitive of RJ practices largely incorporating

concepts emanating from Aboriginal perceptions of justice.175 While in other RJ models which

equally rely on conferences, Aboriginal insights function much more as an inspiration; in

restorative circles they are the essence of the experience. Certainly, this has contributed to the

vigour with which restorative circles were embraced by Indigenous communities in North

America and more recently also in Australia.176

In fact, as we saw in a previous section of this chapter, there is even some doubt

about whether the distinction between restorative justice circles and Aboriginal justice still exists

in in practice.177 Just to illustrate this claim, it is generally accepted that for Indigenous people in

North America a criminal offence normally represents an interpersonal violation of the

relationship between the offender and the victim as well as the offender and the community.178

Moreover, it is also thought that the stability of the community is dependent on healing those

174
But see the following footnote commentary by Angela Cameron: Others suggest that by having the sentencing
judge retain control of the ultimate sentencing decision, circles may be culturally inappropriate, as they are being
used by the conventional justice system to improve mainstream programs rather than as an authentic aspect of
self-determination for Aboriginal peoples (Ryan and Calliou, 2002; Linden and Clairmont, 1998; in the Australian
context see: Behrendt, 2002). See note 2 at 36. (Camerons commentary is applicable only to sentencing circles
though).
175
This claim is supported by Paul McCold who argues, in his words, The circle is central to traditional aboriginal
cultures and social processes. As Yazzie (1998:129) notes, indigenous cultures around the world have developed a
variety of similar process for responding to wrongdoing. See note 138 at 48. See also Robert Yazzie & James Zion,
Navajo Restorative Justice: The Law of Equality and Justice in B. Galaway & J. Hudson, eds., Restorative Justice:
International Perspectives (Mossey:Criminal Justice Press, 1996). Contra note 114 at 346 . (Cunneen argues that
such gross generalizations about justice practices of Indigenous societies trivialize the diversity and complexity of
Indigenous groups around the world. According to him, we cannot assume that the vision of justice is the same for
RJ advocates and all Indigenous people).
176
Restorative circles operate exclusively or primarily with Indigenous persons or within Indigenous communities.
Although there are references in the literature to the use of restorative circles in non-indigenous settings they are
not numerically relevant. For the expository purposes of this segment, I will ignore these experiences that,
however, will be mentioned in passing in a following chapter. See, e.g. ,note 2 at 13.
177
See text accompanying note 111.
178
See Heino Lilles, Circle Sentencing: Part of the Restorative Justice Continuum (Paper presented to the Third
International Conference on Conferencing, Circles and other Restorative Practices, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 8-10
August, 2002 [unpublished] on line: http://www.iirp.org/article_detail.php?article_id=NDQ3 (Retrieved on 25
March 2008).
85
strained relationships. Finally, according to a general Indigenous perception of justice the

community is better positioned to address the causes of crime, because they are often rooted in

the economic or social fabric of the community. All these standpoints are also echoed in the RJ

discourse. Restorative circles have placed a heavy emphasis on a community-driven justice

process that especially includes the assimilation and repackaging of the traditional imagery of

Indigenous justice practices like, e.g., peacemaking circles through the use of language and

methodology of restorative justice practices.179 However, it is important to bear in mind that

restorative circles are not traditional practices of aboriginal peoples now being resuscitated.

Actually, they are a much more a palatable way of doing justice growing out the existing

conventional system introduced within aboriginal communities, for the most part fostered by the

judiciary serving these communities.180 As Goel puts it:

Although the sentencing circle is drawn from Aboriginal customs, it is not a complete
return to traditional Aboriginal dispute-resolution techniques (Lowe and Davidson 2004).
Several authors have opined that sentencing circles are an example of inventing tradition,
not returning to tradition (Cameron 2006a, 2006b; Dickson-Glmore 1992; Green 1998;
McIvor 1996, Orchard 1998; Spiteri 2002).181

Soon, it also becomes evident that the adoption of restorative circles represent an

attempt of the status quo powers to redress the errors of the colonial past and the endemic

injustices found in the conventional criminal justice system towards Aboriginal people,

179
Paul McCold observes that Navajo peacemaking experiences in the desert Southwest of the United States are
perhaps the first restorative circles experiences in the contemporary world. They have been in use for criminal and
civil cases since 1982. See note 140 at 28. See also Robert Yazzie, Navajo Peacemaking: Implications for
Adjudication-based Systems of Justice (1998) 1 Contemporary Justice Review 123-131. But see note 34, Coker,
Navajo Peacemaking. (Noting the differences between Navajo peacemaking and restorative justice models like
sentencing circles. According to her, while the peacemaking process is completely controlled by the sovereign
Navajo Nation, in sentencing circles the processes is are often controlled by non-Indigenous authorities although
sometimes in consultation with Indigenous leaders).
violence
180
See Mary Crnkovich, Report on the Circle Sentencing in Kangiqsujuaq (Paper presented to for Pauktuutit and
Department of Justice, Canada, 1993) Inuit Women and Justice: Progress Report Number one [unpublished] at 23.
181
See note 13 at 969-978 in a kindle e-book version.
86
particularly, the over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in Canada and Australia.182 The

historic and systemic failures of these countries to ameliorate the impact of the criminal justice

system on Indigenous people puts them in the difficult situation of having both to renew and

reinvent their discourse and practice on justice processes just enough to make Indigenous people

believe that a change had, in fact, taken place and that adjustments were made, while actually

maintaining the basic structure of power on which their conventional criminal justice systems

depend. Notably, this has been achieved by mainly putting into practice top-down governance

strategies through which certain justice functions like sentencing powers are partially transferred

or shared with traditional institutions, e.g., Indigenous circles. As Julia Emberley suggests, this is

exactly the case in Canada where, ... the concept of legal pluralism (the multiple, and

sometimes combined, use of Aboriginal customary law and Canadian state law) is gaining

ground in the judicial system...183 Goel Rashmi echoes this perception arguing that sentencing

circles, for example, are a () a fusion of two judicial cultures.184

There are, however, two fundamental problems with constructive hybridization

strategies, as Blagg prefers to name legal pluralist initiatives. In theory, the approach is intended

to empower aboriginal customary law and communitarian governance, but in practice, it keeps

the existing professionalized justice institutions from delineating how the experience works and

what outcomes can be achieved. In addition, there is the danger of overlooking the complex

power dynamics among victimized Aboriginal women, their offenders and the community,

especially within the context of domestic violence. Crnkovich, for example, argues that

182
See, e.g., note 106.
183
See Julia Emberley, Defamiliarizing the aboriginal: cultural practices and decolonization in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2007) at 68. (Similar policies are also seen within the context of Australia).
184
See note 13 at 971-975 in a kindle e-book version.
87
sentencing circles can introduce new and perverse forms of silencing Aboriginal women. As she

has observed at first hand from an Inuit sentencing circle:

The circle was the first of its kind, being supported by the judge and Inuit leaders. If she
[the victim] spoke out about further abuses or her dislike of this sentence, what would she
be saying about this process everyone supported? Now, in addition to fearing her
husband's retribution, she may fear that by speaking out she would be speaking out
against the community. The sentence created in this circle is one endorsed not only by the
Mayor and other participants, but also by the Judge and a highly respected Inuit
politician. The pressure to not speak out against a sentencing alternative supported by so
many is great. The victim may be afraid to admit she is being beaten because such an
admission, she may fear, may be interpreted as failure of this process. She may hold
herself to blame and once again continue to suffer the silence.185 Brackets added

In conclusion, the nature of the confluence between RJ and the Aboriginal justice

political project lies in the fact that both not only require a great involvement of the community,

but also share several core notions, such as healing; victim/offender personal transformation;

victim/offender reintegration to society and rehabilitation, albeit conveyed in slightly different

terms. However, the common language and shared institutional mechanisms have the potential to

obscure fundamental distinctions and divergent objectives between RJ and Aboriginal justice.

The apparent commonality of interests conceals competing political objectives and substantive

gaps between RJ theory and practice that can impact directly Aboriginal women within the

context of domestic violence. Actually, there are several other focuses of criticism or opposition

over the use of RJ language to articulate Aboriginal justice claims for recognition of customary

law and self-determination, especially in cases of domestic violence.186 However, they will be

addressed in a later chapter.

185
See note 180 at 24.
186
See, e.g., David Milward, Making the Circle Stronger: an effort to buttress Aboriginal use of Restorative Justice
in Canada against recent criticisms (2008) 4:3 IJPS (For a discussion over the use of restorative justice in
Aboriginal settings. The author includes the most common criticisms over the idea, but contends that there are still
good reasons to maintain the use of restorative justice in Indigenous criminal justice)
88
 The goals in that hybrid justice model are easily noticeable. Firstly, the aim is to

prevent the imposition of incarceration penalties to recidivist aboriginal offenders.187 Secondly,

to allow Indigenous people to have a greater degree of input into and control over their own

justice processes that would become more aligned with self-determination political claims and

Aboriginal customary law. For example, according to traditional concepts of Aboriginal freedom

and individuality one person cannot impose a decision upon another as usually occurs in formal

courts.188 Therefore, court judgments might be seen as a form of imposing formal justice on the

Indigenous people who had been subjugated. Thirdly, to accommodate the particular needs of

Aboriginal people in conflict with the law providing a more familiar atmosphere in order to

reduce the lack of cultural sensitivity in the adjudication mechanism. Zernova, for example,

points out that measures like sentencing circles help to prevent the culture shock, which First

Nation people may experience when they have to appear in court.189 Finally, to involve the

community in creating and sharing knowledge, experiences, and solutions in order to pursue

justice practices of their own choosing and predilection.

In contrast to essentially dialogue-based RJ interventions like VOMs and VORPs,

restorative circles also imply that victims and offenders are not solely responsible for the

resolution of criminal justice-based disputes. Community members, victims and offenders are

supposed to participate in creating and expressing their own justice approach and, in so doing,

empowering themselves to effect individual and collective transformation appropriate to

187
As Cameron has observed, Frustrated with the over-incarceration of Aboriginal offenders in remote
communities, non-Aboriginal, activist judiciary looked to community-based alternatives to avoid sending recidivist
offenders to prison in the South (Hamilton, 2001; Eber, 1997; Stuart, 1996 a) and b); Barnett, 1995; Fafard, 1994).
Se note 2 at 11. (The focus is on reconciliation and rehabilitations as goals for sentencing. By broadening sentence
alternatives incarceration is seen as a last option).
188
See note 140 at 28.
189
She points out that when first nation people follow their traditional ethic during court appearances (such as
avoiding making eye contact, showing anger and confronting or criticizing others), their behaviour may be
interpreted as contemptuous acts to embarrass or engender disrespect for the court. See note 122 at 17.
89
themselves. Finally, restorative circles --- as in other models of RJ --- also require the usual

protagonists of the criminal justice system, i.e., judges, prosecutors, lawyers and law

enforcement agents, to act more as listeners and co-creators of solutions which result in a healthy

partnership with the local community.

RJ practitioners and proponents have reiterated a relatively consistent set of

arguments for the merits of restorative circles. According to Zernova --- drawing from

commentaries originally developed by Barry Stuart --- a genuine and sincere participation in a

restorative circle has the potential to reconnect offenders to their communities, rebuild broken

relationships and address victims needs.190 In addition, it has the ability to educate the

community about its problems, fostering a sense of belonging to it. Moreover, it also helps to

reveal underlying causes of crime, which in other conditions may be overlooked. Finally,

restorative circles also generate community initiatives aimed at redressing the needs of victims

and offenders as well as addressing adverse social conditions.

Some conceptualizations of restorative circles manifest a more therapeutic

perception of them, e.g., traditional Indigenous talking circles or healing circles that are

primarily used to cope with substance abuse and other social conflicts outside the criminal

justice field, while others like sentencing circles incorporate more recent influences from the RJ

discourse and are chiefly designed to address serious criminal offences in conjunction with

formal judicial institutions. For this reason, the collective meaning given by Indigenous people

to circles is not reduced to a strictly criminal justice understanding. There is a spiritual and

curative facet that cannot be ignored. Both kinds of circle models follow similar basic principles

190
Supra note. (Former Chief Judge of the Territorial Court of Yukon Barry Stuart pioneered sentencing circle
experiences in Canada. More detailed examination of his decisions will be addressed in another chapter)
90
of operation that I will describe in the next paragraphs. Nevertheless, emphasis will be given to

sentencing circles.

Typically sentencing circles involve a step-by-step procedure that is generally

followed; it starts with applications from offenders who wish to participate in the process.191 The

prerequisites are full acceptance of the responsibility for the wrongdoing or at least a plea of

guilt. In addition, a strong connection between the offender and the community must exist.

Another requirement is a sincere desire for rehabilitation and reconnection. According to

McCold, acceptance into the circle is decided by a community justice committee or circle

support group.192

Lilles observes that sentencing circles demand a significant commitment from

community members, so it is in a communitys best interest to limit access to those offenders

who demonstrate high levels of motivation and commitment to the process.193 In addition,

because the procedures are very time-consuming for everyone involved and also very costly,

only serious cases are referred to sentencing circles.194 Other considerations of public character

may be present since it is the Judge who refers the offender to the sentencing circle and only

after all the fact-finding issues have been already determined. Nevertheless, the general

assumption is that the community is the one best equipped to identify who must enter the circle.

So the final decision remains with the committee. As we can notice, therefore, sentencing circles

are restorative interventions that occur in a post-conviction stage of a regular legal proceeding

unlike other RJ models that usually occur apart from any formal proceeding.

191
The procedures and guidelines, however, may vary considerable from one community to the other. Cameron
points out that in Canada this lack of consistency has been a source of criticism and concern both in the literature
and in case law. See note 2 at 15.
192
See note 138 at 51.
193
See note 178.
194
Ibid.
91
 When a case is referred to the community committee and no concerns are

presented regarding the offenders acceptance or his commitment to the circles rules, the pre-

hearing arrangements can begin. The circle support group provides an initial contact with all

parties and their supporters as a way to promote their future link and commitment with the circle

decisions. As McCold stresses, Pre-hearing work includes exchanging information, developing

plans and preparing all parties to participate.195 Victims voluntary participation in the circle is

encouraged, however, a family member or friend can also represent them and put forward their

interests. Moreover, there is one authoritative figure in the circle that deserves some attention:

the circle keeper. The keepers of the circle are respected community members, usually Elders

who lend their prestige and moral authority to the circle. According to Zernova, their function is

to act as facilitators of the process. The keeper, as she puts it, ensures respect for the teaching of

the circle, mediates differences and guides the circle toward a consensus.196

All participants are encouraged to get closer to others and sit in a circle at the

same level. All parties and the community are invited. Criminal justice professionals like the

offenders lawyer; the prosecutor and the judge will be equally present in the proceedings. Most

of the sentencing circles are held in courtrooms specially arranged to accommodate the circle.

McCold describes the way in which the circle Keeper conducts the opening procedures. He

writes: Opening the circle with a prayer, the keepers of the circle welcome everyone to the

circle and then introduce themselves by explaining who they are, what they do, where they are

from and why they are in the circle today. The Keeper then asks others to similarly introduce

195
See note 138 at 51.
196
See Zernova, note 122 at 16-17. See also McCold, note 138. (According to McCold, the function of the Keeper
of the circle in the first experiences with sentencing circles was played by the Judge).
92
themselves, as an eagle feather or other sacred object used as a talking token is passed around

the circle.197

According to Zernova, those spiritual elements bring into consciousness the

customary physical, emotional, spiritual and intellectual connections of the participants with

their own community, and provide an opportunity for reintegration, empathy and catharsis.198

Zernova also observes that most prayers stress the interconnectedness of all things and all people

and induce in the participants a feeling of being part of community. By doing so, the participants

amplify progressively a feeling that the suffering of one is the suffering of all, and that the

disharmony caused by the offence affects the entire community. As a consequence, everybody in

the circle shares responsibility for finding solutions to the problems.

The Keeper then stresses the moral and non-moral purposes to be achieved by the

circle, and explains some guidelines. For example, to speak from the heart; to remain in the

circle until it finishes; to allow others to speak by speaking briefly; to respect others by not

interrupting, and, finally, to recognize the value of others contribution.199 At this point, the

charges are read and the prosecutor and defense lawyers make brief remarks about the offenders

conduct. Finally, every participant is invited to express his or her own opinion about the offence

and propose constructive solutions. As Lilles observes, those who participate in the circle speak

one at a time and may discuss issues not necessarily related to the criminal event.200 The issues

discussed may help to understand why the offence occurred and what needs to be done to meet

the needs of the victim, hold the offender accountable and prevent recidivism. Then the judge,

who is present during the whole process, passes a sentence and makes recommendations on the

197
Ibid.
198
Ibid.
199
See note 138 at 51.
200
See note 178.
93
basis of what has been said in the circle. McCold points out that the closing procedures normally

include summarizing what has or has not been agreed, outlining the next steps, thanking

everyone for their participation, passing the feather for closing comments by all participants, and

finishing with a closing prayer.

Now the basic question to be asked in this scenario is what happens after the

circle is closed, what follows the sentence plan? As Lilles explains, after being sentenced in a

circle, the offenders progress in following the sentencing plan is carefully monitored by his

support group, the community Justice committee and a probation officer.201 Actually, it is

expected that the preliminary screening of the circle candidates ensures that the offenders will

comply with the sentence plan without further problems. In addition, the sentence plan is not a

responsibility passed down by the formal justice system, but by his own community that vouches

for his credibility. Hence, the offenders commitment to the successful completion of the plan is

generally very sound.

3. Points of tension: a brief critique of restorative justice

This segment briefly reviews a few points of tension in the RJ theoretical

frameworks and builds a general critique around them. There are more substantial criticisms to

be made from a feminist perspective. However, this exploration will be developed in the next

chapter, which will focus on the feminist engagement with RJ within the context of domestic

violence and intersectionality theory. This section, therefore, provides only an overview of

specific points of criticism on RJ, how they are interconnected, and a sample of its complexity.

My purpose in this section is to provide an illustration of the most relevant critiques of

restorative justice. There is empirical research that can confirm or question specific points in this

201
Ibid.
94
critique of RJ.202 In this section, I extensively draw on the writings of Theo Gavrielides, R.D.

London, and Raymond Koen among others.

a) Categorizing the critique of restorative justice

According to Koen, the bulk of writings on RJ, have been accompanied by a

conspicuous dearth of critique.203 In fact, he contends that despite the near surfeit of literature

on the subject most of it is merely expository or exhortatory with little or no criticism

whatsoever. According to him, even among the critics there is a tendency to expose RJ

shortcomings and excesses with the sole purpose of avoiding any negative impact on the much

larger restorativist advocacy project. Indeed, for Koen most of the critics are themselves

committed to the success of the RJ project rather than truly critical of it.

This perception of a lack of critical approach towards RJ is echoed in other

authors like Milward.204 In his words: There has been a certain academic vogue since at least

the 1990s in extolling the virtues of restorative justice as an alternative approach. Efforts to

criticize restorative approaches have begun more recently by comparison, and are therefore less

in quantity.205 Wheeldon is of the same opinion, as he puts it: Numerous new publications in

the fields of criminology and criminal justice address restorative justice, yet few are critical of

the restorative justice paradigm.206 Gerry Johnstone, a renowned RJ scholar, seems to agree

202
For a review on empirical studies on RJ see note 54.
203
See Raymond Koen, The Antinomies of Restorative Justice in Elrena Van der Spuy et al., eds., Restorative
Justice: politics , policies and prospects (Cape Town: Juta & Co Ltd.,2007) 247. (Critiquing RJ from a Marxist point of
view).
204
See note 186 at 139.
205
Ibid.
206
See Johannes Wheeldon, Finding common ground: restorative justice and its theoretical construction(s)
(2009) 12:1 Contemporary Justice Review 91-100 at 92.
95
with those points.207 He observes that the bulk of literature on RJ is written either by passionate

proponents or more cautious sympathizers. As a result, there are not many pieces of scholarly

writing on RJ that attempt to be overtly critical in tone and substance.208

However, this does not mean that RJ is immune from criticism. As a matter of

fact, there is a growing volume of critical analysis on RJ emerging from fields of study as

diverse as philosophy, law, psychology, and feminist socio-legal studies. Chris Cunneen points

out that critical perspectives on RJ may be classified as neo-marxist, postmodernist, feminist,

postcolonial and liberal.209 According to him, these critiques cover various points of tension in

the RJ movement like the role of the state within RJ practice; RJ promises to stakeholders

(victims, offenders and community); the role of retribution and punishment in RJ theory;

concepts of globalization and community; relations of power, ethnicity and gender; and, finally,

questions about the rule of law, legal principles and due process of law.210 However, for the

purposes of this thesis, those lines of critical thought can be simplified and grouped into two

large categories according to the relationship of RJ with the conventional justice system.

207
See Gerry Johnstone, Critical perspectives on Restorative Justice in Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness,
eds., Handbook of Restorative Justice (Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing, 2007) 598.
208
An welcomed exception to this lack of critical approach on RJ is Annalise Acorns work. Her book Compulsory
Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice contains a full psychoanalytic, philosophical and social-legal critique
upon the RJ movement. See Acorn, Compulsory Compassion, note 47.
209
See Chris Cunneen, Thinking Critically about Restorative Justice in Eugene McLaughlin et al., eds., Restorative
Justice: Critical Issues (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003) at 182. See Koen, Antinomies note 203. (For a
neo-marxist critique of RJ). See Bruce A. Arrigo & Robert C. Schehrb, Restoring justice for juveniles: A critical
analysis of victim offender mediation (1998) 15:4 Justice Quarterly 629-666 (For a critique of RJ from a
psychoanalytic semiotics and postmodern perspectives). See, e.g., Chris Cunneen, Restorative Justice and the
Politics of Decolonization in Elmar G.M. Weitekamp & Han-Jurgen Kerner, eds., Restorative Justice: Theoretical
Foundations (Deon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2002) 32-49 (For a postcolonial critique of RJ). Naturally, this paper
invites criticism and discussion on RJ based on a feminist perspective within the context of critical race politics and
domestic violence. The feminist critique on RJ will be deeper explored in the next chapter.
210
See Mary Ellen Reimund, "The Law and Restorative Justice: Friend or Foe? A Systemic look at the legal issues in
Restorative Justice" (2004) 53 Drake Law Review 667. See also Mary Ellen Reimund, "Is Restorative Justice in
collision course of Constitution" (2004) 3 Appalachian Journal of Law 3. Tina S. Ikpa, Balancing Restorative Justice
Principles and Due Process Rights in Order to Reform the Criminal Justice System (2007) 24 Journal of Law &
Policy 301. See generally Lode Walgrave, ed., Restorative Justice and the Law (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing,
2002). (For an exploration of the critical liberal arguments on restorative justice).
96
 The first category involves criticism that centers on advocates claims that RJ is

an authentic paradigmatic shift, i.e., a radical departure from the conventional justice system and

its traditional, adversarial, and punitive/retributive characteristics. This claim emerged from the

early years of the RJ movement. In this period, RJ proponents appealed to a strategy of

revolutionary discourse heralding the radical replacement of the existing criminal justice system

by an allegedly more humane, informal and inclusive justice system that could equally address

victims, offenders and community needs and interests. In addition, several argued that RJ could

provide not only a better way of doing justice, but a better way of living as well.211 That kind of

visionary and grandiose project for RJ was the focus of criticism by more cautious scholars and

practitioners who raised doubts about its ability to deliver such promised benefits. Some of them,

as we shall see, even expressed concerns about whether any are realizable at all.

The second category of criticism is focused on a more recent and practical facet of

restorative justice. By assimilating the just criticism of their first wave of writings, many RJ

proponents have retreated from allegations of life-changing virtues and adopted a more

pragmatic posture where RJ functions more as an adjunct of the conventional criminal justice

system rather than a replacement for it. This left the RJ movement less vulnerable to disapproval

from skeptical legal scholars and at the same time left it more palatable to more conservative

211
See especially John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Accounts (1999) 25
Crime and Justice 1-127; John Braithwaite, A future where punishment is marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?
(1999) 46 UCLA Law Review 17271746; Gordon Bazemore & Lode Walgrave, Restorative juvenile justice: In
search of fundamentals and an outline for systemic reform in G. Bazemore & L. Walgrave ,eds., Restorative
juvenile justice: Repairing the harm of Youth Crime (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 1999); Lode Walgrave,
Restorative justice for juveniles: Just a technique or a fully-fledged alternative? (1995) 34:3 Howard Journal of
Criminal Justice 228249; Paul McCold, Restorative justice and the role of the community in B. Galaway & J.
Hudson, eds., Restorative Justice: International Perspectives (Mossey: Criminal Justice Press, 1996) at 86, and
Martin Wright, Justice for victims and offenders (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1991). See also Howard Zher
note 47. (That was the first generation of writers on RJ who emphasized its radical virtues in order to canvass
support among those discontent with rising case loads, growing prison populations, high recidivism and lack of
regard to victims of crime and to the community generally. The strategy of a radical replacement of the
conventional justice system proved to be successful. In less than forty years the RJ movement achieved
international projection with hundreds of experiences all over the world claiming to be restorativists in body and
soul).
97
audiences that found positive aspects in it like cost reductions, decrease of case loads, and victim

empowerment. Restorative justice as an appendage of the conventional criminal justice system

gathered momentum in the first decade of the 2000s when programs popped up in several

jurisdictions around the globe under the auspices of the very criminal justice system that it once

intended to replace. In this period of quick expansion even the United Nations was captured by

the intense interest in RJ and ended up buying the idea by adopting the Basic principles on the

use of Restorative Justice and sponsoring publications targeted to establish best practices in the

area.212 George Pavlich summarizes this issue well:

Here, proponents propose that restorative justice be seen as working within, and as a
basic complement to the demands, of state criminal justice. Bazemore and McLeod
(2002), Cooley (1999), and even Zher (2002) dilute the concept of 'alternative' by giving
it much more of a local, parochial meaning where restorative justice is seen as providing
limited alternatives to aspects of the existing criminal justice system. So, restorative
justice may be seen as offering an alternative to 'courtroom procedures' or 'penalty
regimes' within the criminal justice system, but not to the criminal justice itself. 213

As a result, the questions regarding the notion of RJ as an appendage of the

conventional justice system became more a matter of how to incorporate it into the mainstream

and not whether it should be incorporated. In sum, hopes of a potentially independent justice

paradigm that could stand either in parallel or instead of the current retributive paradigm were

gradually left behind by most RJ theorists and practitioners.

The incorporation and institutionalization of RJ within the existing penal and

criminal justice systems provides the empirical context for this study --- that is based on feminist

critical perspectives --- but also for other avenues of criticism like the liberal one. Indeed, many

212
See Yvon Dandurand & Curt T. Griffiths, Handbook on restorative justice programmes Prepared for The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna: United Nations Publications, 2006). See also note 23. (UN Basic
Principles on RJ)
213
See George Clifford Pavlich, Governing paradoxes of Restorative Justice (London, UK: Glasshouse Press, 2005) at
18. (Arguing that RJ works as a imitor paradox, i.e, it is supposedly independent from conventional justice, but
ensnares itself within criminal justice language, logic and agencies).
98
of the questions about the relationship with RJ and the rule of law, legal principles and due

process of law have emerged from this merely complementary version of restorative justice.

b) The critiques revolving around RJ within the context of a paradigmatic

shift

This segment identifies the main criticisms of RJ within the context of its

conceptualization as a paradigmatic shift, i.e., as an antithesis of the conventional criminal

justice system and retributive justice.

i. Is RJ really a paradigmatic shift?

According to Gravielides, many proponents claim that, RJ is a complete,

consistent and independent criminal justice paradigm that has the potential to stand alone, and

which should replace the current one.214 The explanation Gravielides offers for this kind of

claim is consistent with the advocacy motives that seemed to guide the early years of restorative

justice. According to him, by introducing RJ as a paradigmatic shift, using liberal platitudes and

overstatements, its advocates were hoping to make the then new and untested concept of RJ

more appealing and interesting for theorists, practitioners and the general public.

However, as Gavrielides has also observed, soon the RJ movement acquired

sufficient maturity to leave the phase of innovative impact to enter in the phase of practical

implementation. At that point, those proponents seeking more unrealistic means of advancing RJ

were confronted with the harsh reality that their celebrated proposition of a paradigm shift ---

214
See note 54 at 38. See also James Dignan, Restorative Justice and the Law: The Case for an Integrated,
Systemic Approach in Lode Walgrave, ed., Restorative Justice and the Law (Cullompton, UK: Willan Publishing,
2002) 16890. James Dignan, Towards a Systemic Model of Restorative Justice in A. Von Hirsch et al., eds.,
Restorative Justice: Competing or Reconcilable Paradigms? (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2003) 135-156.
99
that is still in circulation in some RJ circles --- was ill-conceived and vulnerable to criticisms.

Ross London, for example, contends that the characterization of restorative justice as a new

paradigm, as in the case of many other academic disciplines, is better regarded as rhetorical

excess than as a genuine application of Kuhns terminology.215 He summarizes the critique of

RJ as a new paradigm in justice in the following terms:

It emphasized dichotomies and divisions within the field, over-simplifying and

delegitimizing opposing views as antiquated or reactionary.

It adopted an all or nothing approach in which the many advantageous features

associated with the old paradigm were uncritically rejected while many questionable
features of the new paradigm were uncritically accepted.

It created ideological divisions that demanded dogmatic conformity from its adherents.

It politicized academic discourse, giving rise to personal antagonism expressed in

academic journals and questionable scholarship intended to advance a cause rather than
impartially search for truth.

It inhibited the development of knowledge by discouraging open inquiry into practices

that best promote healing.

It rejected attempts to integrate the best features of the old and the new approaches
as threats to the purity of the new paradigm. 216

Londons schematization above echoed several previous criticisms of RJ

regarding its conceptualization as a different paradigm of justice and eventual replacement for

the existing criminal justice system. In the following subsections some of those criticisms are

broken down into clearer points of tension in the RJ doctrine.

215
See Ross D. London, Paradigms Lost: Repairing the Harm of Paradigm Discourse in Restorative Justice (2006)
19:4 Criminal Justice Studies 397-422 at 400. (Noting systematic weaknesses in the RJ claim that it is a new and
independent paradigm of justice).
216
Supra note at 398. See generally Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996).
100
 ii. Restorative Justice versus Retributive Justice: The role of punishment

A classic focus of criticism when assigning a characteristic of paradigmatic shift

to the RJ movement emerges from advocates claims that it is the opposite of retributive

justice.217 Gavrielides points out that the views are divided into two groups.218 The first group

holds a purist version of RJ. They deny that RJ interventions can, in any way, be

retributive/punitive. In contrast, the second group holds a maximalist version of RJ that argues

that it cannot be prescinded from retributive justice elements like public censure and coercion.

According to Gavrielides, RJ scholars like Paul McCold, Wright, and Sullivan/Tifft reject

completely the idea of including any coercive judicial sanctions in the restorative process, as it

might shift RJ back to being punitive.219 However, other scholars such as Braithwaite, Walgrave

and Bazemore, while arguing that the RJ response should be primarily non-punitive recognize

that there is a role for limited punishment dispensed in a respectful way on public safety

grounds.220

Daly especially, criticizes the dichotomy between restorative and retributive

justice. According to her, there is an artificial and almost Manicheist opposition between

restorative justice (depicted as good and virtuous), and retributive justice (depicted as inherently

bad) in the RJ rhetoric.221 Moreover, she observes that some RJ proponents also include

rehabilitative justice as detrimental to a holistic view of justice because it focuses only on the

offender and ignores the victim. Her insights suggest that the opposition between RJ and

217
See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World (2007) 85 Washington University Law Review 815.
(For an overview of retributive Justice theory).
218
See note 54 at 41.
219
Ibid.
220
Ibid.
221
See Kathleen Daly, Restorative justice: The Real Story (2002) 4 Punishment & Society 55-79 at 59. See
especially Kathleen Daly, Revisiting the relationship between retributive and restorative justice in Heather Strang
& John Braithwaite ,eds., Restorative justice, from philosophy to practice (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2000) 33 .
101
retributive justice is artificial, simplistic and inadequate. As she puts it, Advocates seem to

assume that an ideal justice system should be of one type only, that it should be pure and not

contaminated by or mixed with others.222 Rather, Daly suggests that RJ processes are not pure.

As a matter of fact, she observes retributive elements (censure for past conduct) and

rehabilitative justice (encouraging law-abiding behaviour) occurring alongside the development

of RJ salutary properties (the offender making amends to the victim) in restorative encounters.

For Daly, therefore, specific components of retributive justice, albeit with some modifications

can also be important elements of RJ.

Furthermore, Daily voices concerns that RJ processes cannot ignore common-

place understandings about what to do in response to crime, including the need to incapacitate

dangerous offenders; prevent them from being recidivist; separate them from the community;

teach them a lesson; and aid them to help themselves.223 In the same line of reasoning, London

notes that strategies utilized to avoid the contradictions that arise from asserting a anti-retributive

alternative to controlling crime like limiting the scope of RJ programmes only to cooperative

offenders and to non-serious cases are destined to fail.224 According to him, although retaining

the purity of the non-punitive approach, they are still dependent on the conventional model

that refers the cases to it. In addition, in his words It strikes at the heart of the claim of

restorative justice as a new paradigm because it provides no alternate solutions to the very

problems that necessitate the creation of criminal law in the first place: serious offenses and

uncooperative offenders.225

222
Supra note Daly, The real story, at 59.
223
See note 221, Daly, Revisiting the relationship, at 45. See also Antony R. Duff, Alternatives to punishment or
alternative punishments? in W. Cragg , ed., Retributivism and its critics (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner,1992) 48-62.
224
See note 215.
225
Ibid. at 412.
102
 In fact, more recently the debate over the role of punishment within RJ

interventions, as London points out, became not so much a question of whether punishment

ought to be superseded by the new RJ paradigm, but rather, a question as to the nature and extent

of the punishment required in RJ interventions.226 In reality, even Howard Zehr, who initially

endorsed a purist view on RJ, in his subsequent writings, abandoned the view of restorative

justice as the opposite of retributive justice. As Zehr has noted, Restorative justice advocates

have done a disservice by positioning restoration and retribution as mutually exclusive

adversaries. As a restorative justice advocate who initially popularized this dichotomy, I have

personally taken this argument to heart and changed my approach accordingly.227

iii. Other criticisms revolving around claims of a paradigmatic shift

Several of the issues concerning the restorative and retributive dichotomy overlap

other avenues of criticism such as RJ practices being harmful, coercive or manipulative in

various ways towards stakeholders. This kind of criticism is both unavoidable and indispensible

in a field like restorative justice, full of rhetoric excesses, and it has done much to clarify and

expose its vulnerabilities. In the following paragraphs, I briefly address some of them although I

do not claim allegiance to any other particular line of criticism besides of course the feminist

one. Having said that, I seek to give more emphasis to points on which feminists would also

express some concern. Moreover, I try to introduce issues regarding the Aboriginal use of RJ

practices.

226
Ibid.
227
See Howard Zehr, Book review of The spiritual Roots of Restorative Justice by Michael Hadley, (2003) 43 British
Journal of Criminology 653654 at 654.
103
 Privatizing crime: Lack of public denunciation

A common line of criticism addresses the privatization of crime in RJ theory. As

Koen notes, RJ re-conceptualizes the criminal event as a private conflict between individuals that

has disturbed community relations.228 Accordingly crimes are re-conceptualized as harms and

victims and offenders rights re-conceptualized as needs. Thus, the primary goal of RJ is to

amend those relations without the intervention of professional actors of the formal justice system

(Lawyers, judges, prosecutors, etc.) and the punitive mechanisms of the state. This is, in Koens

view, the most radical tenet of RJ because it challenges the statist texture of criminal justice. In

his critical analysis of RJ as a new paradigm, London notes that the theoretical basis for

transferring state responsibilities to stakeholders is rooted in Nils Christies influential work

Conflicts as Property. As we have seen before, Christie argues that by replacing interpersonal

conflict resolution with a state-imposed solution, the state steals the conflict by re-framing the

problem as a crime against the state.229 By using the state as the offended party, it is claimed that

the needs of the actual victims are either neglected or addressed only incidentally, e.g., in victim

support services or compensation programs. As London points out, citing Kurki: The restorative

justice solution reverses this unhappy historical development by requiring the state to surrender

its monopoly over responses to crime to those who are directly affectedthe victim, the

offender and the community (Kurki, 2000, p. 236).230

Critics of RJ argue that those procedures make private what should be public, and

therefore fail to reinforce and extend both public norms of conduct and commitments to justice

embedded in formal judicial procedures. Feminist critics, for example, heavily criticize the

228
See note 203 at 249.
229
See note 84.
230
See note 215 at 413.
104
privatization of crime in RJ theory, chiefly on the grounds that the RJ conceptualization of crime

as a private harm jeopardizes womens positions since it potentially denies public denunciation

of violence against women cases. Domestic violence cases, for instance, can be seen again as

private affairs and may be channeled into more informal processing which precludes public

awareness, discussion, and potential change. Thus, some feminist critiques would see RJ as a

retrograde step in their historical struggle for raising public awareness of violence against

women. Indeed, some feminists believe that RJ maintains the continuing repression of women in

guise of an alternative to the formal criminal justice system. This theme will be further explored

in the next chapter.

Imbalance of power in RJ encounters

Another source of criticism of RJ addresses concerns with imbalanced power

relations in RJ encounters. RJs proponents often claim that in restorative encounters everybody

can speak on the same terms, and theoretically have his or her concerns addressed equally.231

However, critics suggest that such claims are merely rhetorical and restorative conferences leave

power differentials and social, racial and gender inequalities unexamined, unattended, and

unchallenged.232 .233 The concerns are threefold. Firstly, from a victims perspective, there is the

fear that they can be physically our psychologically harmed by RJ dialogue-based processes due

to power imbalances between victims and offenders, especially in certain crimes marked by

231
See, e.g., Mara Schiff, Satisfying the needs and interests of stakeholders in Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van
Ness, eds., Handbook of Restorative Justice (Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing, 2007) 228. (Discussing the needs,
interests and responsibilities of various stakeholders in restorative processes).
232
See, e.g., Loretta Capeheart & Dragan Milovanovic, Social justice: theories, issues, and movements (Piscataway,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007) at 63.
233
See, e.g., Loretta Capeheart & Dragan Milovanovic, Social justice: theories, issues, and movements (Piscataway,
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2007) at 63.
105
processes of control and power like domestic violence.234 Here the main related concern is the

danger to the victims security and empowerment due to the perils of revictimization.235

Secondly, in contrast, there is the fear that offenders can be left powerless by the

lack of impartiality of facilitators/mediators.236 Restorative justice encounters are not necessarily

centered on the neutrality of the mediator/facilitator like in others alternative dispute resolution

schemes. In fact, the ideology behind RJ is allegedly supportive of the victim.237 For this reason,

critics have also raised concerns about the imbalance between supposedly powerless offenders

and supposedly powerful victims. Finally, critics of RJ often complain that both victims and

offenders may be manipulated in RJ interventions.

Accusations of manipulation

For victims --- our main focus of attention --- the worry is that RJ programmes

may treat them as no more than props for efforts to rehabilitate offenders, as Braithwaite has

put it.238 According to Delgado, RJ may be manipulating victims by pressuring them to forgive

offenders before they are psychologically mature enough to do so.239 In addition, he argues that

facilitators/mediators, who typically want both parties to put aside their negative emotions such

as anger, distrust, and desire for punishment, may suggest that victims are being obstructionist or

emotionally immature if they refuse to do so. In other words, victims are not free to be

234
See, e.g., Goel, note 13.
235
See Cameron, note 11 at 176.
236
See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal of Restorative Justice
(2000) 52: 4 Stanford Law Review 751-775. (Delgado critiques the informal setting of restorative justice processes
and highlights issues of unequal treatment regarding victims and offenders).
237
Supra note at 760. But see, e.g., Kelly Richards, Taking Victims Seriously? The Role of Victims' Rights
Movements in the Emergence of Restorative Justice (2009) 21 Current Issues Criminal Justice 302. (Arguing that
RJ is not as intimately tied to the victims' rights movement as some proponents suggest).
238
See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
at 139.
239
See note 235 at 763.
106
themselves in restorative encounters, and facilitators/mediators or even the community would

have the capacity to induce an attitude in the victim in which he or she would feel inhibited to

express perfectly understandable feelings of anger and resentment over the crime or the outcome

of the RJ encounter.

Notably, Delgado observes that this problem is especially worrisome for victims

of domestic violence. According to him, such victims who already blame themselves may

magnify that self-blame. Delgado also explains that RJ casts the victim in the role of sentencer,

holding the power of judgment over the offender. As he writes, It may also place an unwelcome

burden on the victim who will end up determining the fate of the offender. Not every victim will

welcome this responsibility. In pressuring the victim to forgive and move on and handing him

the power of sentencer, VOM may end up compounding the injury received from the crime

itself.240

Postmodern critique of RJ

According to Capeheart and Milovanovic, a more sophisticated line of criticism

takes a postmodern/poststructuralist approach and applies Foucaults notion of disciplinary

mechanisms whereby subjects are pacified, normalized and, finally, silenced (e.g., trained to

accept system directives, rules, and roles).241 According to them, some critics borrow

Foucauldian language to argue that restorative programmes are ultimately system-supporting

schemes, i.e., mediators or community members help encourage agreements that are consistent

with status quo ante interests, values, norms, and other ideologies. As they put it:

240
Supra.
241
See note 232 at 63. See also Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison, (New York: Random
House, 1975).
107
 Arrigo and Schehr (1998) have argued that victim offender mediations programs rely
extensively on a master discourse within which system-sustaining frames of reference are
rehearsed, thus assuring predictability and stability in the programs. In other words,
victims are encouraged to verbalize their hurts in the language of mediation
(reconciliation, healing, restitution, responsibility, etc.) This language is already
ideological and points to certain outlooks (see also Acorn 2004; Pavlich 2005) 242

In short, this postmodern perspective would assert that there is not much

recognition on restorative processes of pre-existing power and status differentials regarding, for

example, gender, ethnicity or social-class. As a consequence, the power imbalances in RJ

interventions may reproduce and perpetuate the wider power imbalances embedded in the status

quo ante or even function as a discipline of silence. For example, female victims of domestic

violence may have little verbalization and influence in RJ encounters as Cameron and Cunnliffe

have noted.243

Drawing on Razack, Millward observes that power relations and gender

imbalances rooted in Aboriginal communities can reverberate in the restorative process itself. He

points out, citing a previous study by Sherene Razack, that the use of community-based

sentencing in Aboriginal communities can mirror gender imbalances in those communities. As

he puts it, Aboriginal communities are suffused with patriarchal power structures that replicate

Canadian forms of governance. It is male Aboriginal leaders who pursue community-based

sentencing initiatives, to the benefit of male Aboriginal offenders who commit crimes against

Aboriginal women.244 In sum, he observes that RJ experiences in Aboriginal communities can

be tightly linked to the perpetuation of previous gender inequalities by the agency of disciplinary

mechanisms in Foucaultian language.

242
Supra note.
243
See note 8, Cameron & Cunliffe, Writing the Circle at 26-27.
244
See note 186 at 144. See also Sherene Razack, Looking White People in the Eye: Gender, Race and Culture in
Courtrooms and Classrooms (Toronot: University of Toronto Press, 2001)
108
 General criticisms

Several other points of criticism on RJ could be cited and discussed at length

here, but an exhaustive critique of the RJ movement is not the purpose of this segment. Thus, I

shall limit myself from now on to just listing those critiques that some canonical authors

consider worthy of further attention. Towards this end, I will make use of lists originally devised

by Johnstone, Morris and Delgado. Some of the criticisms listed by them overlap at various

points. In addition, some of them are interrelated with previous and upcoming notes.

Nevertheless, their work, by way of compilation, offers a good snapshot of an RJ general

critique. The first two scholars are RJ proponents, but they clearly distanced themselves from

partisan attitudes. As Morris asserts, I acknowledge that the restorative justice literature is

plagued with imprecision and confusion and I do not seek to defend all practices that claim to be

restorative justice.245

According to Johnstone, criticisms on RJ can be summarized as follows: 1)

Proponents description of RJ is vague and incoherent; 2) Proponents make exaggerated claims

about what RJ can achieve and have multiple and unclear goals; 3) A significant move away

from punishment towards RJ would undermine the policy of deterrence; 4) A significant move

away from punishment towards RJ would result in a failure to do justice; 5) A significant move

away from punishment towards RJ would result in systematic departures from axiomatic

principles of justice; 6) While presented as a radical alternative to conventional approaches to

245
See Morris, Critiquing the Critics, note 47 at 597. See also Andrew Ashworth, Some doubts about Restorative
Justice (1993) 4:2 Criminal Law Forum 277-299. (Raising the first concerns about the RJ theoretical framework).
But see Daniel W. Van Ness, A Reply to Andrew Ashworth 4:2 Criminal Law Forum 301-306 (Responding to the
criticisms made by Ashworth).
109
wrongdoing, RJ actually is predicated on the existing criminal justice system and its use will

simply extend the reach of conventional systems of penal control (Net widening).246

Morris advances similar criticisms.247 For example: 1) RJ erodes legal rights

(basically encompassing the liberal critique); 2) RJ results in net widening; 3) RJ trivializes

crime (particularly mens violence against women); 4) RJ fails to restore victims and offenders;

5) RJ fails to effect real change and to prevent recidivism; 6) RJ results in discriminatory

outcomes; 7) RJ extends police powers (in specific programmes); 8) RJ leaves power imbalances

untouched; 9) RJ leads to vigilantism; 10) RJ lacks legitimacy and RJ fails to provide justice; 11)

RJ is too lenient an option to deal with crime, and RJ cannot deal with persistent offenders and

serious crimes. Furthermore, Delgado identifies other criticisms on RJ such as its lack of

consistency as a new criminal justice system; inequality of bargain power; waiver of

constitutional rights; lack of punishment in general terms (deterrence, rehabilitation, public

safety and retribution); lack of state control; poor evaluation criteria based on users satisfaction;

coercion to enter in the restorative schemes; disservice towards stakeholders; unlikehood of

sparking personal moral transformation and development, and treating conflict as a pathology.248

Other critics, such as Blagg and Adam Crawford, also make comments that the RJ association

with Indigenous forms of justice can be considered a form of orientalism and that the concept of

community consensus is not well established by RJ theorists.249

246
See note 207.
247
Supra note 244 at 600.
248
See note 235.
249
See Harry Blagg, A Just Measure of Shame? Aboriginal Youth and Conferencing (1997) 37:4 Australia British
Journal of Criminology 481-501. See also Adam Crawford & Todd Clear, Community justice: Transforming
communities through restorative justice? in Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff, eds., in Restorative Community
Justice: Repairing Harm and Transforming Communities (Otawa: Anderson Publishing, 2001) 127-149.
110
 c) The critique revolving around RJ as an appendage of the justice system

This subsection addresses a more modest critique of restorative justice

(compared to the volume of scholarly attention in the other category). It includes critiques of

relatively narrow scope and ambition, focused mainly on liberal concerns about RJ and the due

process of law (mainly due process protections and procedural safeguards for offenders). As I

did in the previous subsection, I will succinctly cover salient examples by means of listing them.

Cunneen, for example, lists those concerns related to the relationship between RJ and the

investigatory stage of criminal prosecution. According to him, they proceed as follows: 1) the

lack of independent legal advice; 2) pressures to admit an offence to obtain the benefit of a

diversionary alternative to court and the avoidance of a criminal record; 4) the lack of testing of

the legality of police searches, questioning and evidence-gathering and, finally, fears that the

pressure to admit an offence means that issues relating to the criminal intent in committing the

act (mens rea) and legal defenses are not considered by the court.250 In the same line of

reasoning, Reimund put forward concerns regarding, e.g., rights against self-incrimination and

confidentiality; prosecutorial discretion in referring cases; the role of the lawyers in RJ

conferences; and privation of the offenders liberty in the case of him failing with sentencing

circles adjudication and probation conditions.251 Tina Ikpa would include in the previous lists

concerns about the offenders right to trial and concerns with double jeopardy (when there is a

chance that the RJ interventions are not successful, and therefore the case proceeds to trial).252

250
See Cunneen, Thinking Critically, note 209 at 189.
251
See Reimund, Friend or Foe, note 210.
252
See Ikpa, Balancing Restorative Justice, note 210.
111
 d) Feminist critique of RJ: Deferring the discussion

In recent years feminists have turned increasing attention to RJ, bringing new

issues and fresh critical perspectives to the field. Some are only concerned with traditionally

related fields such as domestic violence and the usability of RJ within that context. Other

feminists expand the breadth of the discussion to incorporate in their research questions about

the politics of race and gender in making justice claims, i.e., whether indigenous interests in

promoting political self-determination and anti-racist organizations goals in reforming the

criminal justice system are compatible with RJ aims.253 However, these issues will not be

addressed here. They will be developed in the following chapters, where I will address how

feminist theorizing has been influencing and being influenced by RJ and I will engage my thesis

main arguments.

Indeed, this subsection concludes my overview on the RJ theoretical and practical

frameworks. The promises and shortcomings in some of the ideas put forward by the RJ

movement have been addressed. Particularly, I have noticed that the RJ movement has shown a

welcome aptitude to take account of criticisms and alter its position accordingly. Much of this is

due to its conceptual flexibility. However, RJ does not seem to be any nearer to a flawless theory

and practice. As we shall see, the feminist approach to RJ is strong evidence of this.

253
See Cunneen, Thinking Critically, note 209 at 192.
112
 Chapter II Feminism, restorative justice and domestic violence

Chapter outline

This chapter examines the feminist scholarship on RJ, briefly exploring its

ongoing critique and contributions for the conceptualization and practice of RJ particularly

within the context of violence against women. As mainstream feminist scholars and anti-

violence activists turned their attention to the new phenomenon of the RJ movement, a growing

distrust about its discourse and practice began to emerge. Utilizing insights from several varieties

of feminist thinking; from the battered womens anti-violence movement and other sources,

feminist scholars and activists presented their critique of the methods and practices used by

restorativists and sought to elevated a more gender sensitive approach in the RJ theoretical and

practical framework.

There is a great deal of variation in the approaches constituting feminist theorizing

on restorative justice. Some emphasize the centrality of conventional gender issues while others

emphasize the increasingly relevant role of non-gender-specific issues like race and post-colonial

claims for remedial justice practices. As a result, that initial wariness based solely on gender

concerns cannot be attributed to the whole feminist theoretical spectrum. The feminist analysis

of RJ evolved to encompass distinct structural elements besides gender. In other words, the

feminist critical articulation of the dialectic between RJ and gender violence has developed

within the context of diverse theoretical feminist perspectives with focus on multiple loci within

inequality or analytical categories. For this reason, the feminist distrust of RJ is not as prevalent

as may be implied by a superficial survey of the feminist thinking on that subject matter. In this

chapter, I will draw up an overview of the complex relationship between feminist scholarship

113
and RJ with special attention to the role of feminist intersectionality theory in the broader

context of that movement.

The aim here is to introduce the reader to the ways in which gender; culture; race;

self-determination politics; and other sites of inequality emerge and are used or misused in

intersectional perspectives on RJ experiences. Firstly, I provide --- in a roughly chronological

sequence --- an outline of the feminist engagement with RJ considering the several strands of

feminist scholarship that have addressed it. Notably, this serves to introduce my perception of

intersectionality theory and its prevailing epistemic stance, i.e., anti-essentialism. Secondly, I

elaborate on how intersectionality theory has expanded the mainstream feminist critical analysis

of RJ to include criticisms and contributions concerning the intersections between sexism and

other forms of oppression and subordination such as racism, cultural domination and, above all,

post-colonial claims for social justice. Following that, I indentify potential vulnerabilities

underlying intersectional analysis of restorative justice. I contend that it can be a potentially

uncritical theoretical approach to the management of inconspicuous forces operating in RJ

practices analogous to Indigenous justice. The main reason for this is the severe underestimation

by some intersectional feminists of the effects of anti-essentialists epistemic positions in relation

to their appraisals of RJ practices. This in turn makes intersectionality analysis vulnerable to

distortions and co-optation by non-feminist interests.

Following that reasoning, I argue that the anti-essentialist nature of the

intersectional approach leads to deemphasizing gender as the primary inequality category to be

addressed with unintended consequences concerning their appraisals of RJs ability to promote

safety, empowerment and justice. The issue of how to assess intersectional perspectives for

reliability is critical, especially when unexpected detrimental effects to women may arise like

silencing and exclusion. I also introduce my insights about how other forces like the self-
114
advocacy discourse of RJ and political claims for social justice/self-governance can complicate

the process of a balanced interplay of loci of inequality used in intersectional analysis. Following

this, I turn back again to mainstream feminism. I address the concerns regarding the suitability of

RJ to deal with domestic violence cases regardless of race or culture. This provides a contrasting

point between how anti-violence feminism interprets the relationship between RJ and domestic

violence and how some intersectional feminists may view it from disparate positions.

Finally, in preparation for the next chapter, I contextualize and recapitulate my

arguments as ultimately reinforcing the marginal status of Indigenous women especially when

interacting with particular RJ practices. In sum, I contend that the critical examination of RJ

experiences by feminists using intersectionality analysis may be prone to distortions and co-

optation by other interests with detrimental consequences to victimized women and the

emancipatory goals of that feminist analytical tool.

1. The feminist engagement with restorative justice

a) General Issues

Typically, feminist critical analysis on RJ seeks to add women and gender

perspectives to RJ practices and it has been accompanied by efforts to ensure a safe, meaningful

and empowering participation of women in restorative practices. Notably, it seeks to introduce

gender-specific issues with which male victims (or offenders) interacting with RJ are not usually

confronted.254 In this process, feminists have identified RJ practices as a potential site of gender

254
In general, the scholarly attention given to women interacting with RJ ascribes to them the role of victims.
Curiously, however, in R v. Gladue which is the leading case on the application of restorative justice principles for
Aboriginal offenders in Canada the offender is a woman. Ms. Gladue, an Aboriginal woman, stabbed to death her
abusive common law partner and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The Supreme Court of Canada
interpreting the Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code of Canada attenuated the sentence and endorsed the notion of
115
inequality and womens oppression.255 Their critiques essentially revolve around a common

theme, regardless of race or culture: the harmful effects of lack of security and empowerment to

women in restorative encounters. Some of them highlight that restorative dialogue-driven

processes have the potential to exclude and silence women. Others assert that they are not

designed to protect victims of gender violence from further victimization and they are not

effective solutions to domestic violence and its peculiarities.256 In essence, this means recurring

claims that gender issues have been largely absent from forums that settle the planning and

functioning of RJ models, which feminists deem to be skewed towards male offenders needs and

interests. In other words, feminist critics of RJ (to whom I will refer generically as mainstream

feminists) find that women and gender (or, more accurately, issues of concern to women

victims of gendered-violence) are routinely marginalized in RJ processes, or are treated in ways

that may reproduce or perpetuate victimization and gender normative stereotypes as seems to be

the particular case of some RJ practices used in Aboriginal settings in Canada.

Despite this generally negative view, however, this thesis identifies at least one

specific strand of feminist thinking that displays ambivalent positions that range from profound

distrust to open enthusiasm for the RJ project. I am referring --- of course --- to the feminist

intersectional approach to restorative justice. Feminist intersectional perspectives are especially

relevant for understanding the empirical focus in this work, which are restorative models used as

restorative justice and a sentencing regime which is to pay fidelity to "healing" as a normative value for Aboriginal
offenders even if the offender lives outside a reserve. See R v. Gladue [1999] S.C.J. No. 19, online: QL (SCJ). See
also Mary Ellen Turpel-Lafond, Sentencing within a Restorative Justice Paradigm: Procedural Implications of R.v.
Gladue (1999) 43 Crim. L. Q. 34. In addition, there is a growing literature on youth restorative justice and girls
associated to gangs. This discussion, however, goes beyond the scope of our thesis and will not be addressed.
255
See, e.g., Julie Stubbs, Domestic Violence and Womens Safety: Feminist Challenges to Restorative Justice, in
John Braithwaite & Heather Strang, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) at 42.
256
See, e.g., C. Quince Hopkins & Mary P. Koss, Incorporating Feminist Theory and Insights Into a Restorative
Justice Response to Sex Offenses (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 693. (Addressing concerns raised by
feminists about the use of restorative justice for gendered violence, albeit giving nuances in its use for cases of
non-penetration sex violence).
116
hybrid justice constructs in postcolonial settings. To be more precise, RJ programmes and

practices --- mainly sentencing circles --- that are used ostensibly as state-sanctioned alternative

criminal justice responses designed to ameliorate the systemic racism and over-incarceration

rates that Aboriginal peoples experience in postcolonial jurisdictions such as Canada and

Australia. Intersectional perspectives on those experiences may vary substantially in content and

in critical tone depending on the emphasis given to gender among other categories (or sites) of

inequality; for example, ethnicity, race, culture and --- occurring in parallel --- postcolonial self-

determination political claims as they relate to culturally sensitive criminal justice experiences of

governance. As a consequence, some intersectional feminists have found themselves in the odd

position of feeling compelled to endorse RJ practices, against critical views from other feminists

(co-optation). This occurs mainly because some RJ models, such as sentencing circles, are

framed and presented to conform to intersectional images of what a successful and culturally

sensitive holistic criminal justice system ought to look like, despite serious objections to the lack

of standards and safeguards that can make restorative interventions unsatisfactory for victims of

gendered-violence. But before discussing such issues and their repercussions in this thesis --- the

theme of the next chapter --- an overview of the feminist engagement with RJ is warranted.

b) Feminist criminology and RJ

At first, it should be noted that the feminist movement is as diverse and complex

as the RJ movement and perhaps even more plurivocal. Nevertheless, it is possible to define a

distinct body of scholarship on RJ clearly marked by feminist concerns and insights. For

example, in the article The Feminist Engagement with Restorative Justice, Daly and Stubbs

117
chronicled how feminist scholarship has critically engaged restorative justice.257 According to

them, through the years the feminist engagement with RJ has taken a number of forms. More

specifically, there are five areas in which feminists have made direct contact with it, at times

showing overlapping interests and common philosophical stances. Those areas are mapped as

follows: 1) theories of justice; 2) the role of retribution in criminal justice; 3) studies of gender

(and other social relations) in RJ processes; 4) the appropriateness of RJ for partner, sexual or

family violence; and 5) the politics of race and gender in making justice claims.

In my survey of the foundational accounts of RJ (chapter I in this paper), I

covered to a considerable extent the first three thematic areas of feminist engagement. Thus, in

this chapter, only the last two areas of feminist involvement with RJ will be the focus of more

detailed examination, i.e., the suitability of RJ to cope with domestic violence; and the politics of

race and gender under feminist intersectional perspectives.258

Before focusing on these specific areas of feminist interaction with RJ, it is

necessary to give a general outline of feminist theorizing in criminology and its implications for

the study of restorative justice. Daly, citing Gelsthorpe, traces out the central features of

feminists perspectives in criminology as follows:

a focus on sex/gender as a central organising principle in social life;

recognition of the importance of power in shaping social relations;

sensitivity to the influence of social context on behaviour;

recognition that social reality is a process and that research methods need to

reflect this;

257
See Daly & Stubbs, Feminist Engagement, note 5. (This article was later expanded and reviewed as a chapter of
the book Handbook of Restorative Justice under the title Feminist Theory, Feminist and anti-racist politics and
Restorative Justice ). See note 9.
258
The remainder areas of feminist engagement with RJ were examined in the first chapter under similar headings.
See pages 54 and 104.
118
 a political commitment to social change;

personal and theoretical reflexivity on epistemological, methodological, and

ethical choices and commitments; and

openness and creativity in thinking about producing and evaluating

259
knowledge.

Daly also observes that there are undeniable similarities between feminist

criminology and critical criminological avenues of research. She writes, There is a good deal of

affinity and crossover between feminist perspectives in criminology and those termed critical,

anti-racist, multi-ethnic, or cultural criminology. Differences do exist in the focus of research,

theories used, and preferred epistemologies and methodologies.260 Indeed, by comparing the

characteristics attributed to critical criminology with feminist criminology, the close proximity

between each other is readily noticeable. Below, for contrast, is the list compiled by Julie Stubbs

with characteristics commonly seen as typical of critical criminology/ies, or related categories:

transgressing mainstream criminology;

challenging official definitions and statistics of crime and crime control;

rejection of positivist methodologies;

rejection of correctionalism;

disavowal of the criminologist as neutral scientific expert;

a critical posture towards agents, systems and institutions of social control;

preference for sociological theories over individualistic theories;

emphasizing the effects of social power and inequality as underlying offending,

victimisation and criminalisation;

drawing on a wider body of social theory;

engaging with normative questions;

259
See Kathleen Daly, Feminist Perspectives in Criminology: A Review with Gen Y in Mind in Tim Newburn &
Eugene McLaughlin, eds., The SAGE handbook of Criminological Theory (London: Sage Publications Ltd., 2010). See
also Loraine Gelsthorpe, Feminism and Criminology in Mike Maguire et al., eds., The Oxford handbook of
criminology, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 112-143.
260
Supra note Daly, Gen Y in Mind, at 9.
119
 recognizing that research and knowledge are political;

a desire for social change, social justice or human rights;

political engagement, allegiances with social movements and turning cases into
issues;

valuing the view from below; and,

reflexivity concerning research and criminology (summarized from Carrington

& Hogg 2002: 2-3; Carlen 2002; Bottoms 2000: 33; Hudson 2000: 189; Loader 1998).261

As one can easily notice by going through the features listed above by Daly and

Stubbs, respectively; feminist criminology and critical criminological research have several

points of overlap. In fact, it is fair to recognize that they are coalesced into a single body of

scholarship in which critical criminological research can be described as the genus and feminist

criminology as the species. However, feminist criminology represents much more than just a

small subcategory of the critical criminology taxonomy. The significant body of work of

feminist criminology has provided key theoretical resources for understanding how gender plays

a role in RJ practices and how power relations among all the RJs stakeholders are significant

within the context of domestic violence. In other terms, feminist criminologists focusing on

gender and power relations have led to significant contributions in the developing of normative,

empirical and epistemological accounts of restorative justice. These contributions will become

gradually more intelligible to the reader when interpreted in the light of feminist theories, which

will be addressed in the following subsections. At the moment, suffice to say that without the

fore structure of feminist criminology, it would be very difficult to disentangle the complexities

of the relationship between restorative justice and gender violence. But the close proximity

between feminist criminology and critical criminology also raises some questions. Are there any

261
See Julie Stubbs, Critical Criminological Research (2008) 8:19 Legal Studies Research Paper University of
Sidney at 3.
120
differences between critical criminology and feminist criminology? What are the implications of

that proximity for the feminist theorizing of restorative justice?

As a recognizable branch of critical criminology, feminist criminology has often

reflected its various critical and political characteristics sketched above. As Daly notes, both

approaches have the shared enterprise of transgressing and transforming the field of crime

and justice by promoting social justice and human rights.262 Notwithstanding this transformative

common nature and shared goals, there has been some reflection of differences between critical

criminology and feminist criminology. Stubbs, for example, points out that the presence of

differences between them is basically supported by a lack of attention to feminist concerns in

general veins of critical criminology research. She notes: Early critical criminology showed

little interest in feminist concerns (Carrington 2002: 123, Naffine 1997).263 Feminist

criminology, therefore, distinguishes itself from general critical criminology research in its goal

of providing a normative analysis of gender and power in several areas of criminal justice.

Although both criminological approaches seek to maintain a critical posture

towards the status quo and keep giving attention to power inequalities and its consequences to

offending, victimization and criminalization, feminist criminology has its own agenda and

peculiarities. Motivated by the historic feminist emancipatory political project of eliminating the

oppression and subordination of women in patriarchal structures of power, feminist

criminologists are also concerned with how criminal justice institutions and practices affect the

lives of women and how they are implicated in those systems. It is, therefore, a discipline that

conveys a distinctive epistemological and methodological critical attitude toward issues of crime

and justice and their interactions with women. It urges the reform of gender inequities in

262
See note 257 at 9.
263
See note 260 at 7.
121
criminal justice institutions and calls attention to neglected questions with the aim of improving

womens conditions in all areas of their exposure to the criminal justice system, whether in

conventional or alternative settings. In sum, much of feminist criminology can be described as a

critical and purposeful theory --- critical either of the criminal justice system itself or of the

structures of power embedded in it --- and purposeful for calling for change and womens

emancipation on the basis of those criticisms. There are, however, various established and

sometimes conflicting theoretical feminist discourses that differ in significant ways, regarding

how to achieve the feminist goals mentioned above.

There are as many varieties of feminist criminology as there are of feminist

thinking.264 This means that feminist criminology theories evolved directly from related strands

of feminist thinking, i.e., behind a particular feminist criminological perspective there is always

a larger feminist theoretical framework that has been its formative principle and is closely

associated with it. Roughly put, any feminist criminological perspective should somehow match

a school of feminist critical analysis, which is not necessarily concerned with crime issues.

Accordingly, the feminist scholarly treatment of RJ does not differ significantly from generic

feminist approaches (not necessarily concerned with crime) and criminological feminist theories

(concerned with crime). In fact, feminist scholars usually merge both lines of thought to form a

single line of argumentation that can be used to analyze the pros and cons of restorative justice.

As a consequence, the theoretical context that provides the impetus for each type

of feminist inquiry is crucial for the understanding of feminist appraisals on restorative justice. It

is not by chance that most of the scholars addressing feminist criminology and RJ before

advancing to specific issues about crime, spend some time and space in their works to

264
See, e.g., Burgess-Proctor, Intersections of Race, Class, Gender, note 27 at 29.
122
contextualize their arguments within one or more of the varieties of feminist thinking. In the next

subsection, I will do the same by sketching out the most relevant feminist schools of thought,

specifically, intersectionality theory and its significance to restorative justice. The primary aim is

to provide a general context of feminist theoretical perspectives on law, gender and alternative

justice practices. To this end, I will use previous schematizations originally devised by feminist

scholars like Burgess-Proctor; Daly; Stubbs; and Hopkins/Koss.

i. Feminist schools of thought

There are several angles of feminist theorizing that paved the way for future

discussions within the context of restorative justice. This segment briefly lays out the various

schools of thought and areas of concern and interest that have occupied feminist thinking for the

past forty years. As Daly points out, they can provide a story of the emergence and

development of differing trajectories of feminist work in criminology, as they were informed by

the wider field of feminist and other social theories.265 But the usual caveat applies; the

categories set below will be greatly simplified for the sake of brevity and important theoretical

differences among and within each strand may well be downplayed, although the gist of each

schools intellectual contribution to feminist legal thinking will be preserved. Besides that, some

schools are more or less relevant to the study of RJ depending on the emphasis given to crime

and justice matters in the form of alternative forms of adjudication. Anyway, wherever possible,

I seek to establish connections between each school of feminist thinking and restorative justice

within the context of domestic violence.

It should also be noted that the following categorical feminist approaches are non-

exclusive and inevitably overlap. This means that they can and do coexist in close proximity

265
See Daly, Gen Y in Mind, note 258 at 10.
123
with one another. However, there are times when the theoretical differences between feminist

approaches may rise above common ground and shared interests to lead to diametrically opposite

outcomes. As we shall see, this is especially salient when a specific feminist theory is the

corollary of internal critiques of a preceding school of thought like, e.g., intersectionality theory

and previous strands of feminist theorizing. Finally, I will conclude this subsection by

identifying in more detail the practical applications of feminist intersectionality analysis in the

critical examination of the RJ movement. This will serve as a brief introduction to the next

chapter, where I provide a deeper and more satisfying account of the usefulness of that line of

feminist inquiry in understanding the realities of RJ and gendered-violence.

The various feminist schools of thought traditionally arise from a more or less

stable number of academic classifications of distinct epistemological and methodological

approaches with minor variations concerning taxonomy and terminology. To categorize the

feminist thinking is important because it promotes a certain degree of consistency, chronology

and predictability into a field that is well known for its diversity and at times overlapping

stances. In addition, each feminist research tradition may have different implications for

gender/power inequities and womens interaction with crime and justice. I will follow and adopt

the categorizations laid down by the feminist scholars cited earlier and frequently quoted within

the RJ field. Nevertheless, I will conflate their findings into a single catalogue of feminist

perspectives of my own devising for the sake of simplicity.

According to Burgess-Proctor for example, feminist legal theory is divided into

five major perspectives: liberal feminism; radical feminism; Marxist feminism; socialist

feminism, and postmodern feminist. In addition, these perspectives are supplemented by other

more recent trends in the feminist thinking such as Black feminism; critical race feminism;

124
lesbian feminism and multicultural feminism.266 Hopkins and Koss employ a slightly different

classification that is comprised of liberal, cultural, radical, Marxist and/or socialist, postmodern

(or poststructuralist), and multiracial feminism.267 Daly and Stubbs do not differentiate

themselves from others in their classification of the feminist schools of thought.268 According to

them, feminist perspectives on law and justice are usually divided into categories such as liberal

feminism, cultural feminism, radical feminism, critical race feminism, and postmodern or

poststructuralist feminists. By bringing together these scholars classifications of situated

feminist perspectives about how gender and power shapes crime and justice, we can eventually

generate our own selection of ways in which RJ can be influenced by feminist perspectives or, in

contrast, can influence them. Finally, I will consider only the classifications that are relevant to

the RJ field and gendered-violence.

I begin by describing the schools that have been labeled essentialist in order to

later introduce the concept of anti-essentialist schools of feminism. The relevance of this

distinction to our subject matter will be stressed in the following paragraphs.

ii. Essentialist schools of feminism

In this subsection, I address essentialist schools of feminism that contributed in

some way to explain restorative dynamics. However, one important limitation on this

categorization of essentialist schools should be noted. There is a pejorative sense to the term

essentialist, so some of the feminist thinkers listed here would probably reject this label.

Anyway, the influences of essentialist stances on their feminist theoretical framework should not

be ignored. The order of presentation reflects a more or less chronological order.

266
See, e.g., Burgess-Proctor, Intersections of Race, Class, Gender, note 27 at 28-30.
267
See note 255 at 698-699.
268
See Daly and Stubbs, Feminist Theory, note 9 at 150-151.
125
 Liberal or sameness feminism

The first category of feminist inquiry is concerned with equality, autonomy and

agency of women. As Dally and Stubbs observe, liberal feminism has been in place for over

three centuries as women have sought to secure equality of legal and citizenship rights with

men.269 Proponents of liberal feminism claim that womens lack of autonomy and self-

determination is due to the patriarchal nature of inherited traditions and institutions, and that the

women's movement should work to identify and remedy them.270 Classical liberal feminists are

at odds with legal frameworks that explicitly treat women differently than men, but still rely on

the state as the main agent of gender and social justice. In this sense, they recommend laws that

seek to change social policies or practices that put women in positions of lesser or secondary

importance. According to Hopkins et al., liberal feminists are also referred to as "sameness" or

"rule equality" feminists.271 They hold that "Sameness feminists" focus on the similarities

between individual men and individual women leads them to advocate "gender-neutral

categories that do not rely on gender stereotypes to differentiate between men and women."272

In other words, liberal feminists put emphasis on multi-dimensional (political, economical,

social, legal, moral) equality between women and men. Liberal feminists hold, therefore, that

women are essentially similar to men and for this reason the sexes should be treated equally (i.e.,

the sameness approach)

Within the crime and justice field, liberal feminists pursue law reforms and

practices that treat domestic violence cases in the same way that laws and practices treat stranger

269
Ibid.
270
See, e.g, Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1979).
271
See C. Quince Hopkins, Mary P. Koss and Karen J. Bachar, "Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate
Violence: Problems and Possibilities" (2004) 23 St. Louis University Public Law Review 289-312 at 297.
272
Ibid.
126
violence against men. Historically, for instance, liberal feminists were responsible for

deconceptualizing domestic violence and sexual assault cases as private or family matters

through their relentless worldwide political campaigns to criminalize and publically condemn

such practices as human rights violations. In addition, they developed actions at the theoretical

and empirical levels to protect the autonomy and agency of victimized women.273 As a

consequence, liberal feminists usually object to mandatory arrest and prosecution policies that

restrict women's autonomy particularly within the context of domestic violence.274

Liberal feminists may be potentially critical of the use of culturally alternative

justice experiences due to their preconceived notions about autonomy and equality between

women and men. As asserted earlier, the feminist liberal theoretical discourse seeks to advance

the idea of equality between the genders and autonomy of women. In that sense, an issue that

proponents may raise is whether advocating hybrid justice constructs like RJ experiences in

Indigenous settings (sentencing circles) could also mean supporting the patriarchal schemes of

traditional societies that give women subservient status in contrast to that of men. As Susan

Moller Okin --- a leading exponent of the liberal feminism --- contends, feminists must object to

multicultural experiences like that since they bestow legitimacy upon patriarchal and traditional

cultures which results in womens repression, exploitation and discrimination.275 She suggests

273
Sometimes this stance results in controversial propositions like, for example, the defence of using firearms for
protection against rape or domestic violence. See infra note. See especially Richard W. Stevens, Hugo Teufel III, &
Matthew Y. Biscan, Disarming Women: Comparing Gun Control to Self-Defense. in Wendy McElroy, ed., Liberty
for Women: Freedom and Feminism in the Twenty-First Century (Chicago: Ivan R. D.,2002) 238-263.
274
See, e.g., Amy R. Baehr, "Liberal Feminism" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward
N. Zalta (ed)., online: (2010) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/feminism-liberal/> retrieved on
April 2010. (For a comprehensive examination of the liberal feminism theoretical discourse including its several
varieties: a) Classical Liberal feminism; b) Equity feminists; c) Cultural libertarian feminists, and d) Egalitarian liberal
feminists).
275
See Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). See
generally Monique Deveaux, Gender and Justice in Multicultural Liberal States (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006). See also Roni Reingold & Lea Baratz, Feminism and Multiculturalism: Two Common Foundations for a
Vision and a Practice of Transformative Social Activities and Education in Israel (2009) 10:4 Journal of
International Womens Studies 53.
127
that in multicultural experiences with alternative justice practices the proponents and traditional

leadership may exaggerate the level of communal consensus and the level of acceptance and

knowledge among participants, in order to present a united front to larger society. As a result,

multicultural polices such as sentencing circles could end up favoring some members of minority

groups over others; and more specifically putting aside the rights of women. In sum, liberal

feminists claim that there is the danger that women's autonomy or equality with men could be

sacrificed in favour of what is deemed to be a more politically relevant cultural practice.

Indeed, in several areas liberal feminists represent the instances or issues that

most intensely challenge RJ experiences in the context of domestic violence regardless of race or

culture. Their general presuppositions and principles about autonomy and equality go against RJ

in the sense that there is a fear --- in some cases justifiable --- that those offenders who inflict

gendered harms would not receive sanctions from such alternative justice schemes, just as those

who engage in gendered violent crime are sanctioned by the conventional justice system. In

addition, they claim that the power asymmetries in dialogue-based processes like RJ experiences

may result in detrimental consequences for women. These claims require more analysis, which

will be provided in the subsection of this chapter devoted to domestic violence and restorative

justice.

Cultural or difference Feminism

The second category of feminist inquiry is cultural feminism. According to

Hopkins and Koss, cultural feminists are also referred to as substantive equality or difference

128
feminists.276 As Burgess-Proctor explains, cultural feminists believe that women have

distinctive characteristics (both biological and socially conceived) that require difference or

womans specificity appreciation. Accordingly, the difference approach demands a legal

theory that addresses the ways in which the legal system deals with differences between women

and men. Just recognizing those differences it would be possible to overcome gender-based

discrimination in patriarchal societies and institutions.277 Furthermore, cultural feminists --- as

Hopkins and Koss observe --- disagree that alteration of formal rules will result in actual

equality for women; equal treatment, they argue, disadvantages women because the baselines

favor men.278 In fact, they do not believe in neutral-gender utterances of law and justice that

affect women and men, indifferently. Following this line of reasoning, they also do not believe

that the state is capable of advancing womens interests since it is already contaminated by

masculine and patriarchal traits like, for example, hierarchical structures and impersonal

institutions.

Some of the cultural feminists discussions of justice consider how RJ was

constructed as a distinct feminine moral development in the criminal justice field. According to

Daly, for example, the main contribution of cultural feminists to RJ is related to its foundational

theoretical framework. As she has points out, Carol Gilligans concept of the different voice of

women was influential in the articulation of a theory of justice guided by a feminine ethic of

care (i.e., relational; intimate; narrative; and collaborative) where gender differences upon

276
See note 255 at 699. (The term substantive equality has other meanings in Canadian constitutional equality
law. However, the term as applied by Hopkins and Koss, has virtually nothing to do with it).
277
Supra note 265.
278
Supra note 275.
129
moral thinking resulted in direct links between RJ and feminine justice.279 As Hopkins and Koss

explain:

For cultural feminists informed and persuaded by Carol Gilligans work on womens
ethic of care, collaboration and interpersonal relationships are particularly valued by
women, whereas hierarchy is particularly embraced by men (Gilligan,1982; West, 1988).
Many (but not all) cultural feminists today, however, claim not that women are, in fact,
inherently different from men but that certain traits and values are perceived as feminine
or female or as masculine or male. These masculine or male traits, the argument
continues, are embraced by legal and other institutions, while feminine or female traits
are devalued, marginalized, or even excluded by those institutions (West, 1988). In this
sense, for cultural feminists these institutions are masculinist in practice to the extent that
the rules under which they function exclude womens unique voices and lived
experiences. 280

As a consequence, cultural feminists are particularly prone to diversions of state-

based conventional justice schemes, which are considered by them as representations of a

masculine justice. In contrast to the traditional justice system, restorative justice experiences --

- much more personal, vocal and collaborative than conventional justice schemes --- are

generally well received by cultural feminists for being considered more feminine in

manifestation. Finally, RJ experiences are also supposedly victim-centered and holistic

incorporating to a greater extent all the shades of meaning of a survivors full experience. For all

these reasons, cultural feminists, by and large, see relational and dialogue-driven alternative

justice experiences like RJ with a certain amount of sympathy and validity.

Radical or dominance Feminism

Another important mode of feminist legal inquiry is the so-called radical or

dominance feminism. Roughly speaking, radical feminism implies that the entire legal system

is an all-embracing mechanism of dominance and subordination through the eroticization of

279
See note 93.
280
Supra note 255 at 700.
130
forms of control (e.g., sex is a subject in which men are taught to see themselves as naturally

dominant and women as naturally passive). As Hopkins and Koss explain, Traditional radical

feminists argue that religious, economic, political, and judicial institutions undergird as well as

create mens dominance over women, emphasizing the centrality of patriarchy and masculine

control of womens labor and sexuality (Curran & Renzetti, 2001; Flavin, 2004; MacKinnon,

1989; Sokoloff et al., 2004; cf. Ertman, 1998).281

For this reason, gender difference is itself a characteristic of male domination and

the natural implication is that masculinity is constructed to support the exertion of power and

control over women. Accordingly, radical feminism rejects cultural feminism claims of a

different female voice, emphasizing instead that a womans specificity is nothing more than a

function of male domination. Unlike liberal feminists, who view the state as a reliable tool of

social justice that only needs some formal adjustments to be adequate, radical feminists tend to

understand the state and its justice institutions as mirroring societal inequalities and power

asymmetries which also results in gender difference. As a result, dominance feminists usually

view the state with distrust and consider it compromised by pernicious gender relations of

dominance/subordination.

The most prominent exponent of the radical or dominance feminism is Catharine

MacKinnon for whom female power is nothing more than a contradiction in terms, socially

speaking282. As Daly and Stubbs explain, In MacKinnons view, we cannot know what

womens values or voice are until there is a transformation of gender power relations.283

MacKinnon vehemently asserts, Take your foot off our necks, then you will hear in what

281
Supra note 270 at 700.
282
See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1987) at 53. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and dominance: On sex discrimination
in K. T. Bartlett & R.Kennedy, eds., Feminist legal theory (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991) 81-94.
283
See note 9 at 150.
131
tongue women speak284 According to Burgess-Proctor: within criminology, radical feminists

often focus on manifestations of patriarchy in crimes against women, such as domestic violence,

rape, sexual harassment, and pornography, and recognize that womens offending often is

preceded by victimization, typically at the hands of men.285 In regard to RJ, dominance

feminists are predisposed to believe that it provides a less structurally hierarchical framework

for resolution of gendered harms than traditional criminal justice, thus mapping onto the central

concern of radical feminism, as Hopkins and Koss have noted. 286

Notwithstanding this recommendatory brief note found in the literature, I believe

that the centrality of issues relating to power asymmetries in radical feminist models of inquiry

and the reality of power differentials and control schemes in domestic violence cases can expose

how dominance feminists may be suspicious of alternative justice schemes like restorative

justice. Indeed, stances based on radical feminism make their proponents essentially inclined to

be distrustful about RJs promises of equality, visibility and vociferousness to victims simply

because these promises usually ignore previous patterns of male power and privilege what is per

se a cause of disempowerment experienced by oppressed women in the condition of gendered-

violence victims. In other terms, because social relations, especially in some traditional

communities, are shaped by male power and privilege, radical feminists can inscribe RJ as one

more example of gender-neutral justice models that mean negative consequences for women

because of their potential to neglect issues of power and privilege between the genders.

284
Supra note 280 at 45.
285
Supra note 265 at 31-34.
286
Supra note 255 at 716.
132
 iii. Anti-essentialist schools of feminism

The feminist theoretical approaches that were featured in the established feminist

modes of inquiry of the 1960s and 1970s (i.e, sameness, difference and dominance feminist

theories) were seriously challenged from the mid-1970s onwards by critiques informed by new

streams of feminist thinking drawing from a variety of Marxist, anti-racist, postmodern and post-

structural social theories. In this period, changing political and ideological climates and internal

contradictions of previous theoretical movements have prompted feminists to shift emphasis

from one axis of inequality and power287 based uniquely in sex and gender differences --- as

Daly and Stubbs have put it --- to a more nuanced analysis. Consequently, others categories (or

sites) of inequality such as race, ethnicity, religion and class coul play a more important role in

exposing the plight of women living in gender-biased oppression, especially in homogeneous

social conditions.

In that context, a new tension has emerged across the epistemological and

ideological perspectives guiding the feminist movement as a whole. On one side we see

mainstream feminists modes of inquiry, often focused on essentialist constructions of power,

domination, inequality and subordination, i.e., based mainly in sex/gender related issues; while

on the other side we see an increasingly influent anti-essentialist feminist movement, determined

to reject the notion that gender/sex issues in feminist scholarship can or should be considered in

isolation from other topics important to women such as race, culture or socioeconomic class.288

287
See note 9 at 150.
288
In feminist theory, anti-essentialism is the view that there is no immanent and universal essence or identity of
woman and, even if so, the category of woman could not be used to represent all women. Therefore universal
claims about the category of woman are questionable by nature and effectively normalise and privilege specific
forms of femininity, e.g., white-heterosexual-middle-class women. See Alison Stone, Essentialism and Anti-
Essentialism in Feminist Philosophy (2004) 1 Journal of Moral Philosophy 135153. (For a definition of
133
The latter perspective spawned a bewildering array of complementary, but not entirely

equivalent feminist theories such as Marxist and Socialist feminism; critical race feminism;

postmodern/post-structural feminism; multiracial feminism; Lesbian feminism (whose content is

addressed in this paper only in passing), etc. These anti-essentialist perspectives are instrumental

in developing the concept upon which the analytic model of intersectionality theory is built and

how it is related to RJ, post-colonial justice claims and domestic violence.

Marxist feminism and socialist feminism

Marxist feminists --- following the ideological doctrine of their non-feminists

counterparts --- have understood womens marginal social condition as a result of economic

disparities and class struggle. According to Burgess-Proctor, Marxist feminism holds that the

capitalist mode of production shapes class and gender relations that ultimately disadvantage

women because women occupy the working class instead of the ruling class.289 This feminist

mode of inquiry also contends that revolutionary actions need to be established in order to

overcome womens oppression, namely, the overthrow of the existing economic order and class

structure, as Hopkins and Koss have noted.290 In sum, Marxist feminism is committed to the idea

that the root of womens oppression is their secondary class status within capitalist societies and

that only through a revolutionary process can women be truly liberated.

It should be noted that the centrality of the relationship between sex/gender and

inequality/power --- so present in previous avenues of feminist thinking --- is no longer as

important to Marxist feminists. As they believe that womens oppression only exists because

essentialism and anti-essentialism in feminist theory). See also note 52 (For a brief definition of essentialism in
feminist theory).
289
See note 27 at 29.
290
Supra note 255 at 701.
134
economic and class oppression also exist, sex/gender and other attributes of mainstream feminist

critical analysis are demoted as merely ancillary categories of inequality. In this sense, Marxist

feminism, during the 1970s and early 1980s, inaugurated a whole new anti-essentialist tendency

in feminist modes of inquiry where sex/gender and within power relations are not seen as the

primary analytical categories.

Unlike the revolutionary stances of Marxist feminism that seek to reject the

prevailing order altogether, --- and in the process reduce the importance of sex/gender in power

relations --- socialist feminists advocate a more nuanced understanding that encompasses a wider

range of inequality categories in which both class and sex/gender relations can co-exist as two

sides of the same coin. According to Burgess-Proctor, socialist feminism combines radical

and Marxist perspectives to conclude that womens oppression results from concomitant sex-

and class-based inequalities.291 While class struggle and economic disparity are the soul of

Marxist feminism, socialist feminists are not tied only to such inequality markers, given as they

are to placing some importance on the harm that may occur to women at the hands of sexism and

patriarchy alongside theories of class. As Burgess-Proctor puts it, In other words, class and

gender work in tandem to structure society, and socialist feminists call for an examination of the

ways in which gender relations are shaped by class and vice versa.292

Drawing from the epistemic stances and style analysis of dialectic materialism,

Marxist feminism and socialist feminism offer a view that violence against women is mainly the

result of unequal capitalist societies. Therefore, domestic violence is a product of the exploitative

class relations inherent in capitalism alongside power imbalances caused by male domination (as

291
See note 27 at 29.
292
Ibid. See, e.g., Batya Weinbaum, The Curious Courtship of Women's liberations and Socialism (Boston: South
End Press, 1978) (For a more detailed account of Socialism Feminism).
135
argued specifically by Socialist-feminists).293 Furthermore, political identification with RJs

communitarianism, informality and claims of social change seems to indicate that Marxist-

socialist feminists are prone to a positive relationship with it.294

Notwithstanding this claim, whether RJ converges to or diverges from Marxist

materialism is a matter yet to be clarified, since, more recently neo-Marxist theorists have argued

that RJ, peace-making criminology and other alternative justice forms do not represent

significant changes in conventional justice structures and contribute to netwidening. As Pavlich

observes, Neo-marxists contend that informalism enabled the state to extend and intensify its

control over individual lives. The welfare state could thereby deal with protracted legitimacy and

fiscal crises of the 19070s by turning over 'minor' cases to volunteers in the community;

however, in practice, it remained firmly in control of the finances, authorisation and even case

loads for given programs.295 In the words of Cunneen: What the Neo-marxist critique demands

is that restorative justice respond seriously to these broader social and economic issues and that

it be able to deal constructively with the various 'hidden injuries' of class, including alienation

from school and work, homelessness, drug abuse and marginalization.296

293
See Daniel J. Curran & Claire M. Renzetti, Theories of crime (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon, 2001) at
223. Jane C. Ollenburger & Helen A. Moore, A sociology of women: The intersection of patriarchy capitalism, and
colonization (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998). (Arguing that feminist theory incorporates three
separate systems of opression: patriarchy, capitalism and colonization and that mainstream feminism failed to
address the diversity of the womans condition). See especially Heidi Hartmann, "The Unhappy Marriage of
Marxism and Feminism" in Lydia Sargent, ed., Women and Revolution (Boston: South End Press, 1981).
294
But see note 203.
295
See note 213 at 7-8.
296
See note 209 at 183.
136
 Postmodern and poststructuralist feminism

Another important approach in feminist theory relies on postmodern and post-

structural social theories.297 According to Hopkins and Koss, postmodern and poststructuralist

feminists draw on the notion of social constructionism and argue that legal discourse itself

creates the categories of women that law then proceeds to regulate.298 Daly and Stubbs

characterized the postmodern/post-structural approach in similar terms as The idea of power

relations shifted from conceptualizing the dominance of one group (such men) over another

(such women) to analyzing the legal and social discourses which construct sex/gender

relations.299 In turn, Amanda Burgess-Proctor notes that postmodern feminism departs from

other feminist theoretical perspectives by questioning any notions of pre-existing truths

including womens oppression.300 In sum, the underlying aim of postmodern/post-structural

research is to challenge fixed inequality categories and identities in favor of the existence of

multiple truths. As a consequence, the postmodern approach rejects apparently self-evident

dichotomies like sex/gender and power/subordination revealing, therefore, an authentic anti-

essentialist epistemic position.301

That theoretical development in feminist theory is linked to linguistic

deconstructionism and insights derived from studies of systems of thought. Postmodern feminists

297
See Ewa P. Ziarek, An ethics of dissensus: postmodernity, feminism, and the politics of radical democracy
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). See also Seyla Benhabib, Situating the self : gender, community,
and postmodernism in contemporary ethics (New York: Routledge, 1992). (For a general perspective on
postmodern feminism).
298
See note 255 at 702.
299
See note 9 at 151.
300
See note 27 at 29.
301
See Judith Butler, Gender Trouble (New York: Routledge, 1991). (In Gender Trouble, Butler pioneered the
concept of feminist anti-essentialism drawing on social constructionism). See also Nancy Elizabeth Dowd &
Michelle S. Jacobs, eds., Feminist Legal Theory: An Anti-Essentialist Reader (NY:New York University Press, 2003).
(Collection of articles addressing anti-essentialist feminist perspectives).
137
constantly stress the need for social action to rectify the injustice and inequality in womens

lives, but shift the emphasis of analysis from binary constructs like gender and power (i.e., anti-

essentialism) to social discourses (i.e., the linguistic approach) in which they are devised and

employed. As Hopkins and Koss explain, In part, postmodern feminists seek to eradicate

inequality by undermining the existing binary construct of male and female that has the effect of

subordinating women to men Postmodern feminists thus advocate a complete restructuring of

what society understands as available gender roles.302 Consequently, there is a strong emphasis

on critical insights and in exposing monolithically constructed systems of thought (as applied,

e.g., by Michel Foucault in his account of disciplinary mechanisms in prisons)303. In the next

paragraph, I briefly demonstrate how postmodern feminism can be used to address RJ and

domestic violence both as a critique and endorsement.

Angela Cameron, for instance, has approached RJ from the perspective of

Foucauldian disciplinary mechanisms and has concluded that some restorative interventions have

the potential to function as a new discipline of silence, as she calls it. According to her, RJ

interventions may function as disciplinary mechanisms that induce self-effacing sacrifice and

harmful personal survival tactics to racialised women victims of gendered-violence.304 In a

nutshell, she contends that the incorporation of collectivist rhetoric into the RJ movement means

that victimized women ought to act as if conceding their individual needs for safety, vocalization

and autonomy and yield to the most pressing political demands of the community. As a result,

women docilely submit themselves to questionable dialogue-driven alternative justice

302
Supra note 296.
303
See note 240. (Giving a brief account of the postmodern critique of RJ)
304
See especially Angela Cameron, "Sentencing circles in cases of intimate violence: discipline, space and law"
(Paper presented to the International Round Table for the Semiotics of Law, 16 April 2005) [Unpublished]. (Arguing
that women victims of violence in judicially convened sentencing circles are being subjected to a type of infra-law
or disciplinary mechanism while offenders themselves are subjected to a lenient form of juridical discipline). See
also Angela Cameron & Emma Cunliffe, Writing the circle, note 8.
138
experiences mistakenly believing that they are serving the best interests of their communities

while in truth they are making concessions to remedial, non-punitive justice actions that often

benefit only offenders. In other words, some models of RJ can represent a new accomodationist

strategy of women when dealing with patriarchal domination. Cameron illustrates this point, by

using the example of Indigenous communities that adopted justice experiences analogous to RJ

like sentencing circles. The rationale is simple. Since in such practices women are assigned the

task of restoring the offender (and the whole community) and are also responsible for the

prevention of further harm to themselves, they end up contributing to their own oppression by

reproducing and perpetuating deeply enrooted gender hierarchies that keep them in an

obsequious silence.305

Whereas Cameron draws on Foucault's account of disciplinary power mechanisms

for a critique of RJ, Hopkins and Koss argue that feminist postmodernism provides a

particularized response to crimes related to gendered-violence since RJ rhetoric insists that

survivors and responsible parties should be viewed as something different from predetermined

caricatures of victim and offender.306 This means to begin to break down the idea of a fixed,

single role attributed to victims and offenders, which often polarizes both into an adversarial

position. So, the idea behind a postmodern approach is to deconstruct such formal categories,

which is exactly what RJ has done with its stances on new identities of healing and

transformation for victims and offenders. After all, RJ in theory and practice demands

cooperation and empathetic dialogue between all the stakeholders in order to achieve its

therapeutics outcomes. In that sense, RJ interventions would provide a considerable reduction of

tensions between victims, offenders and community.

305
Supra.
306
Supra note 297.
139
 iv. Incorporating intersectionality theory

As discussed in substantial segments of the introduction to this thesis, concepts

and epistemic positions found in intersectionality theory are invaluable as a tool for interpreting

theoretical propositions and practical angles found in RJ rhetoric and practice.307 Intersectional

feminism uses aspects of different feminist theories to reflect many interactions among diverse

analytical categories such as gender, race, class, and sexual orientation. However, no single

dimension, especially gender inequality, is supposed to have primacy in explaining systems of

oppression such as male violence against women. By revealing multiple, intersecting inequalities

present in RJ practices intersectional feminists have been addressing and responding to

exclusionary tendencies within the feminist movement itself. Notably, those tendencies that do

not take into account the heterogeneous experiences of women of color or lesbian women. In the

context of RJ and gendered-violence, Daly asserts that With an intersectional framework, we

can see the ways in which restorative and Indigenous justice improve upon established criminal

justice, and where further improvements can be made308. Notwithstanding, I contend that some

intersectional approaches on the interplay between claims of gender and other loci of inequality

such as race and post-colonial justice in RJ practices are beginning to take potentially harmful

directions to Indigenous women victims of gendered-violence; For instance, partially excusing

offenders behavior and disregarding victims interests for security, empowerment and

expression, whilst not giving privileges to women-centered perspectives and concerns. As Daly

has noted:

On the one hand, Indigenous women may, more than non-Indigenous women, see the
value of alternative justice practices, especially when these can translate into more

307
See subsections five and six in the introduction for a recapitulation of the main points including definition and
standards of operation of intersectionality analysis.
308
See note 16, Daly, Seeking Justice, at 27.
140
 meaningful ways of addressing crime and community disorder. At the same time, these
alternatives may appear to protect their men from deserved penalties or from removal
from the community. Their men (especially the more powerful leaders), in turn, may form
alliances with non-Indigenous judicial officers and lawyers, who align themselves with
the positional interests of offenders, although this is couched in terms of community
309
interests and culture

In the following subsections, I begin to elaborate on the contention that seems to

suggest a co-optation of intersectional analysis by other forces and interests present in RJ

practices. Initially, I put forward the opinion that the anti-essentialist epistemic nature of

intersectionality theory is a decisive factor in creating what I call an imbalanced version of

intersectional analysis of restorative justice. This means an epistemic attitude that makes

intersectionality analysis almost unable to critically address political conflicts and competing

pressures that emerge in sites of inequality found in some RJ models. In other words, I identify a

weakened version of intersectionality theory that lacks critical assessment of RJs standpoint on

gendered-violence. I then sketch a complementary line of reasoning that relates the existence of

other political forces operating in some RJ experiences that ultimately lead to shape the contours

of intersectional procedural values to fit their own needs, not womens emancipatory aims. In

basic terms these forces include: a) RJs self-advocacy stances and b) the rise of political

discourses for self-determination in post-colonial settings.

Multiracial feminisms intersectionality theory

Returning to the issue of how feminist disciplines engaged RJ, it is necessary to

introduce the feminist schools of thinking that are pertinent to intersectionality theory. Indeed,

there are several clear and explicit applications of feminist theory in the context of

intersectionality analysis. For example, the emergence of intersectionality theory occurs in

309
Supra note at 20.
141
conjunction with the proliferation of pluralistic feminist points of view inspired by several

feminist theoretical disciplines such as critical race feminism, women of color feminism, post-

colonial feminism and Lesbian feminism.310 In fact, the identification of intersectionality theory

with such feminist modes of inquiry has gone so far that these schools of thought and their

perspectives on issues of power and dominance have become irremediably conflated with

intersectionality analysis methodology and epistemology. As a matter of fact, some scholars use

those disciplines almost as synonyms of intersectionality theory, which causes some confusion in

less attentive readers. But the relevant fact is that all those feminist venues of research basically

share the same epistemic position of intersectional analysis, i.e., they have abandoned the

primacy of sex/gender as an analytical standard that can claim overarching epistemic superiority

over others loci of inequality like race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and social class. Such

feminist models of investigation claim that there are important lessons to be learned from taking

into consideration the experiences of marginalized groups, i.e., not only a cohort of white,

middle class, English-speaking women, but also men and women in postcolonial societies,

people of color, immigrant women, and so on.

All those feminist schools, therefore, cluster around more or less similar

theoretical perspectives, which represent a natural outgrowth of anti-essentialist and

intersectional sentiments that provided the impetus for feminist scholars and activists in

questioning the very essence of the category woman in several areas of feminist exploration. As

310
Actually, each one of these strands of feminism can be connected to marginalized women's standpoints like,
e.g., black, Latina, lesbian, postcolonial, etc. See generally Sandra G. Harding, Is Science Multicultural?:
Postcolonialisms, Feminisms, and Epistemologies (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1998). See also Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (New York: New York University Press, 2001) (For a
comprehensive account of critical race theory. The author also describes in two chapters of this volume the
significance of intersectionality and anti-essentialism for the conceptualization of critical race theory). See
especially Maxine Baca Zinn & Bonnie Thorton Dill, Theorizing difference from multiracial feminism Feminist
Studies 22:2 321-331 (Describing the concept of multiracial feminism. (The authors argue that the term
multicultural feminism, also used to describe multiracial feminism, does not place sufficient emphasis on race as a
power system that interact and shape gender).
142
Alcoff and Potter have asserted, feminist epistemic positions should no longer be taken as

involving a commitment to gender as the primary axis of oppression, in any sense of primary

or positing that gender is a theoretical variable separable from other axes of oppression and

susceptible to a unique analysis.311 Thus, those perspectives reflect a growing awareness of the

impact of culture and race inequalities within the larger sociocultural context. For reasons of

simplicity, however, I will condense all those feminist schools aforementioned into just one

model of feminist theorizing: multiracial (or multicultural) feminism.

My use of the term multiracial feminism (also known as multicultural feminism)

is not arbitrary. It is used to describe in one single phrase several lines of feminist research that

have informed intersectionality theory. I have chosen the term multiracial feminism because it

best represents all other venues of feminist research without excluding any type of particular

racial, cultural or sexual orientation perspective. As Hopkins and Koss note, multiracial

feminism is an overarching concept first described by Zinn and Dill (1996) as embracing

several strands of feminist theory: womanism, women of color feminism, critical race feminism,

and multicultural feminism (cf. Sokoloff et al., 2004, referring to this group of scholars as third-

wave feminists).312 Also citing Baca Zinn and Thornton, Burgess-Proctor observed that,

[multiracial feminism] is known by a variety of names, including intersectionality theory and

multicultural feminism, the term multiracial feminism is preferred because it emphasizes race

as a power system that interacts with other structured inequalities to shape genders (Baca

Zinn&Thornton Dill, 1996, p. 324).313 In sum, the feminist mode of inquiry termed multiracial

feminism (or multicultural feminism) refers to all the forms of oppression being selectively

engaged (and, thus, prioritized) by several marginaled groups through intersectionality analysis.

311
See Linda Alcoff & Elizabeth Potter, Feminist Epistemologies (New York: Routledge, 1993) at 3-4.
312
Supra note 255 at 702-703. See especially note 308, Zinn & Dill, Theorizing difference, 321-331.
313
See note 27 at 35. Brackets included.
143
As Burgess-Proctor points out, In many ways, the development of this intersectional approach

to studying gender may be viewed as a natural progression of feminist thought.314

Indeed, since multiracial feminism was originally described there have been a

couple of developments in the same context. Perhaps the most significant is the integration of

Lesbian feminism and Queer theory into intersectional feminist investigation. Such groups, like

several other marginal groups in the past, sought both acknowledgement of their respective

unique identity and visibility in feminist analysis to present their own claims of social justice. In

criminology, for example, same-sex domestic violence was finally recognised as a relevant

subject matter due to the work of those disciplines.315

The Queer movement has important theoretical implications because it puts into

circulation different types of knowledge deconstruction. For example, as stressed by Sokoloff

and Dupont, the fact that both abuser and victim are women calls into question the primacy of

gender inequality in explaining the dynamics of lesbian intimate violence.316 Certainly, as

indicated above, Queer theorists and Lesbian feminists rely on anti-essentialist stances in order

to articulate their worldview and convey the message that the category woman is a fiction

and that feminist efforts must be directed toward dismantling this fiction317, as Alcoff has noted.

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this work the perspectives of Lesbian feminists and Queer

theorists to the understanding of RJ and domestic violence will not be addressed because there is

a lack of scholarly treatment to the theme that prevent discuss of it at length here.

314
Supra note 27 at 37.
315
See e.g., C. M. Renzetti, Violence in lesbian relationships: A preliminary analysis of causal factors. Journal of
Interpersonal Violence 3 381-399.
316
See Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont,Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender:
hallenges and Contributions to Understanding Violence Against Marginalized Women in Diverse Communities
(2005) Violence Against Women 11:1 38-64 at 43.
317
Linda Alcoff, Cultural Feminism versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity Crisis in Feminist Theory (1988) Signs
13:3 at 416
144
 v. Connecting multiracial feminism, restorative justice and indigenous
justice claims

This subsection seeks to address the connections that exist between multiracial

feminism (i.e., intersectionality analysis), Indigenous studies, and restorative justice. According

to Hopkins and Koss, along with reinterpreting the role of gender and race in feminist analysis,

multiracial/intersectional feminists are also linking Indigenous justice and post-colonization

studies to RJ experiences and in the process offering new ways to approach violence against

women. As they have noted:

Finally, in addition to an insistence on the importance of race as a category of analysis,

multiracial feminism situates feminist theory in the related dialogue about colonization
and postcolonization studies, as well as within a global human rights framework (see
Ollenburger & Moore, 1998). Notably, racism and colonization play an important role in
the debate about restorative justice not just in the United States but also in Canada and
elsewhere (see, e.g., Coker, 1999; Razack, 1994) (.) For example, multiracial feminist
Sherene Razack (1998) warns that the failure of White male judges in northern Canadian
communities to consider the impact of colonization and racism when sentencing male
perpetrators of sexual assault to a restorative justice variety of community-based
punishment results in further harm and no justice for the victim of those sexual assaults.
Donna Coker (1999) raised similar concerns about Navajo Peacemaker Courts that
address intimate violence against women (see also Deer, 2004a).318

As we can see from the passage above, the multiracial (i.e., intersectional)

analysis of women in RJ settings is often conflated with coexistent political and theoretical

trends such as post-colonialism; Indigenous justice; human rights and anti-racist struggles. As

Daly puts it, There is growing interest in what is called intersectional race and gender politics,

which aim to negotiate differing Indigenous and feminist interests in seeking justice. () I use

the term in the latter sense to address the conflicting interests of victims and offenders, social

318
See note 255 at 703. See also note 291, Ollenburger & Moore, A Sociology of Women. See, Razack, note 322,
infra. See note 25, Coker, Transformative Justice.
145
movement groups, and individuals and collectivities in responding to crime.319 Intersectionality

theory hence offered a new way to organize feminist theorizing on RJ, i.e., by integrating post-

colonial and Indigenous justice political issues into the debate about alternative justice remedial

practices developed to cope with violence against women. In so doing, intersectionality theory

provides a tool for understanding how new inequality categories emerge and are applied to

restorative practices around the world in heterogeneous ethnic settings.

That represents an important development of feminist thinking since in the past

feminist theories were first and foremost about gender; and anti-racist theories were about

colonialization, culture, and race-ethnicity.320 In addition to offering a new feminist view of RJ

that took cultural and ethnic imperatives into account, intersectionality theory also transformed

the intellectual landscape by politicizing the discussions about the adherence of Indigenous

communities to RJ practices. In fact, either deliberately or inadvertently, the intersectional

feminist thinking contributed to misidentify that alternative justice model, in the minds of many,

as a form of traditional customary law. As RJ resonates in many aspects with Indigenous

postcolonial processes of contestation, assertion and self-determination and also convey political

struggles that seek to redefine criminal justice relations with vulnerable groups, soon

intersectional feminists merged the two movements into the same struggle. However, some

versions of intersectional approaches are unable to recognize the dangers of such association

since pockets of patriarchy in Indigenous settings have been giving collective power

319
Kathleen Daly makes use of the phrase Race and Gender Politics of Justice to convey her own view on
multiracial feminism dealing with RJ and post-colonial Indigenous issues. According to her, with the emergence of
intersectionality theory issues like colonialism, culture, and race-ethnicity entered in the feminist agenda,
however, they remained at odds with one another in practice. For example, within the context of RJ, Indigenous
(or racialiased groups) emphasise offenders interests while feminist groups, victims interests. See note 16,
Kathleen Daly, Seeking Justice, at 8.
320
Ibid.
146
considerations precedence over objectives of individual gender development. In the following

paragraphs, I look more closely at the politicization of the use of RJ within Indigenous contexts.

In accordance with feminist intersectional views that coalesced RJ and gender and

race politics into the same theoretical framework, Indigenous leaders and RJ proponents

successfully aligned their political struggles and self-interest strategies. For example, RJ

proponents --- as already seen in chapter one --- adopted the language, processes and appearance

of Indigenous customary justice practices. In other words, in seeking to be accepted by

Indigenous people and state actors interested in promoting customary law practices, RJ

advocates structured restorative interventions so that they look like a version of Indigenous

justice practices. In turn, Indigenous leaders gave support to this RJ self-advocacy tactic and

corroborated the expectations or intuitions that many Indigenous people have had about RJ being

a manifestation of traditional Indigenous justice. The rationale for that was quite simple. They

used the RJ movement as a political platform to attempt to transform its emancipatory and

abolitionist stances into political rights for self-determination and social justice. As Cunneen has

pointed out, Indigenous demands for recognition of customary law and rights brought attention

to indigenous modes of social control, and indigenous leaders themselves would often articulate

their claims for indigenous law within the language of restorative justice.321 Nonetheless, there

are complicating factors in applying such alliances and connections that are being overlooked by

some intersectional feminist scholars and activists.

The first factor is that patriarchal relations can be embedded in many (perhaps all)

Indigenous settings and an awareness of this is a key to better understanding the limitations of

the intersectional approach. Just to illustrate, patriarchal relations of power and subordination

321
See Chris Cunneen, Reviving Restorative Justice traditions? in Gerry Johnstone and Daniel W. Van Ness, eds.
Handbook of Restorative Justice (Mill Street, Uffculme: Willan Publishing, 2007) 113-131 at 115.
147
can be disguised as cultural discourses about gender disciplinary roles that can leave many

women resigned to being treated as subordinate as a matter of collectivist imperative, with no

alternative but to accept their self-effacing role in RJ experiences.322 For example, most of the

leadership positions (e.g., Elders and circle keepers) may be held by a male elite and the

effective control of the whole restorative processes may be exercised exclusively by them, while

women exercise only secondary roles. Unfortunately, intersectionality theory does not warn us

against such Foulcadian disciplinary mechanisms of subordination and is prone, due to its anti-

essentialist positions, to underestimate an analysis of gender equality rights in order to prioritize

cultural and political discourses for self-determination that are not always coincident with the

promotion of womens interests. For this reason, intersectionality analysis must also comprehend

and make some space for gender equality discussions although such an inequality category is not

the analytical focus of this specific feminist mode of inquiry.

There are other noticeable problems with the intersectional integration of non-

gender-specific issues into the discussion of RJ and domestic violence in Indigenous settings.

For example, by suggesting that the individual concerns of racialised women cannot be met

without first satisfying to some degree the collective concerns of postcolonial communities for

self-determination and self-governance, intersectionality theory moved the analytical focus

beyond solely considerations of gender to privilege, culture, and ethnicity.323 As a result,

Indigenous women who are victims of intimate and sexual violence are not anymore at the center

of the worries and concerns of intersectional analysis. Such shift in focus results in the creation

of conflicting stances between analytical categories (e.g., culture and post-colonial political

322
See note 303, Cameron, Discipline.
323
Especially, because claims for self-determination and self-government convey ideas of social justice like the
desincarceration of Aboriginal male offenders. See Loretta Kelly, Using Restorative Justice in Aboriginal
Communities, in John Braithwaite & Heather Strang, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge, UK
:Cambridge University Press, 2002) at 219. (Arguing that RJ in order to be truly culturally appropriate must invoke
Indigenous self-determination). But see notes 39 and 43 and accompanying texts for a critique of this stance.
148
claims versus individual gender issues), and when an imbalance between them exists, the most

probable outcome is a less favorable condition to Indigenous women in RJ settings (e.g.,

passivity and marginalization). This results in a form of intersectional disempowerment,324 i.e.,

this means womens interests being put behind collective interests just because the latter are seen

as politically or culturally more relevant.

In fact, some Intersectional approaches may be inclined to favor one analytical

category over the others, and in this process can end up provoking an undesirable

underestimation of gender equality as a strategic analytical category. Since we know that gender

is an element of commonality in domestic violence, there is at least an a priori assumption of its

relevance to the analysis of RJ within that context. After all, intersectionality theory never

established that gender equality concerns are unimportant or could be set aside in the discussion

of domestic violence, only that they were as important as other sites of inequality present in the

larger social context. Furthermore, as we shall see, a significant portion of mainstream feminist

literature on the ability of RJ to cope with violence against women also advances concerns for

redressing power asymmetries between victims and offenders. Those concerns are grounded

mainly in gender inequality concerns. Thus, there is no reason for gender --- as an analytical

standard --- to be underestimated in an intersectional approach to RJ in Indigenous settings.

Ultimately, the realities of gender equality rights in Indigenous settings are also readily

recognizable as important intersectional analytical categories, and must be properly considered

in such approaches. Paradoxical though it may seem, an intersectional approach to RJ responses

to gendered-violence in Indigenous communities must pass through conventional dominance

feminism gender equality concerns at some stage of the analytical process in order to be

balanced.

324
See note 38 and accompanying text.
149
 In reality, wariness of the internal conflicting forces present in intersectional

approaches to RJ in Indigenous communities has led some feminist scholars --- even those

sympathetic to intersectionality theory --- to put forward some criticisms.325 For example, Mary

Crnkovich asserted that although restorative conferences have the potential to resonate with

traditional Inuit justice values of harmony and social peace without making use of incarceration

measures, there is the danger of lack of uniformity and the possibility for victims to be

silenced.326 Sherene Razack, another multiracial feminist, warns that culture, community and

colonization can be used to compete with one another de-emphasizing gender-based harm

completely.327 Likewise, Rashmi Goel went on to conclude that RJ experiences --- especially

sentencing circles --- may overlook the internal and external conflicting interests existent in

Indigenous communities which can damage the reputation of the idea itself. As she writes:

There are competing interests, and political agendas, in addition to the stated goals of
resolving the dispute and stopping the behavior. There is tremendous diversity within the
community, which may render cultural values antagonistic to the needs and desires of
some community members. In such cases, it may be impossible to accurately represent
the needs of community members in a culturally specific process. Therefore, culturally
specific adjudication based solely on the cultural identity of the offender and victim,
without considering underlying interests, is unwise.328

Finally, as Daly and Stubbs observe, collective political aspirations in the form of

claims for self-determination and social justice, are not often acknowledged in alternative

modes of justice, nor are Indigenous womens perspectives typically addressed.329 In sum, an

Indigenous woman's intersectional experience with restorative-like formats of remedial justice

depends on a complex interplay of her community political claims, her own various interests and

a number of offenders specific interests, and it stands to reason that there might be many places

325
Markedly, in the Canadian context.
326
See note 180.
327
See note 44, Razack, What Is to be Gained.
328
See note 8, Goel, No women at the center, at 333.
329
See note 5 at 162 and accompanying text.
150
where the process can go awry. In other words, this means that the interaction between

intersectionality analysis, gender/race politics and the suitability of RJ to deal with violence

against women has great significance in understanding how RJ operates and is likely to be

perceived by Indigenous groups in post-colonial settings. This is especially true in the Canadian

context where Indigenous women hold mixed views toward RJ and domestic violence. However,

this discussion will receive further attention in the next chapter.

c) Problems with intersectionality analysis

Particularly, in this subsection my intention is to clarify the detrimental effects

that Indigenous political demands of self-determination may cause in conjunction with other

existing co-optive forces in the context of RJ responses to domestic violence. In order to do that,

I proceed with my investigation by addressing potential epistemological shortcomings of

imbalanced intersectional approaches, i.e., those that put gender at the end of the list of

analytical priorities present in RJ models resulting in intersectional disempowerment. Gender

perspectives are important to intersectionality analysis within the context of RJ and domestic

violence for several reasons.

Firstly, domestic violence affects women and their communities differently, and

that difference is seldom taken into account in the design and implementation of RJ programs

that usually view group interests and the individual needs of victimized women in a single

project. Secondly, under some existing RJ programs, women and men have unequal access to

voice their concerns and needs following wrongdoing. Particularly in light of the past social

injustices and patriarchal inequalities that underpin several traditional and Indigenous societies,

RJ may focus only on the interests of male offenders. Thirdly, in order to achieve optimum

restorative effects, as mentioned in the first chapter, the inclusion and effective participation of

151
all stakeholders in the restorative process is necessary. Though RJ may be conceived as the

means by which to deliver justice and voice to all, there are concerns that poorly managed RJ

programs without a clear gender-centered perspective may in fact perpetuate cycles of

revictimization, leading inexorably to the exclusion of women in those dialogue-driven

processes.

In an ideal situation, intersectionality theory --- in the best traditions of critical

feminist criminology --- could play a really constructive critical role by serving as an analytical

tool to unveil patriarchy hidden in RJ practices used in heterogeneous settings. In addition, it

could help rectify power imbalances between stakeholders and to resolve conflicts between the

various categories of inequality present in such alternative justice systems. In practice, however,

the approach of an imbalanced version of intersectionality analysis leads to an unwitting

adherence of some intersectional feminists to non-emancipatory political agendas. This can be

seen, I state again, in the uncritical appreciation of the political demands for self-determination

and self-governance present in some RJ responses applied in Indigenous communities.

Intersectionality theory: making feminist analysis less open to gender

equality concerns

Intersectionality theory is supposed to be a type of critical and emancipatory

theory. On the one hand, this means an emphasis on the idea of a critical posture towards agents,

systems and institutions of social control (e.g., conventional criminal justice system and

alternative formats like RJ).330 On the other, it means acceptance of the notion of political

engagement and allegiances with social movements in order to make the interests of the

330
Julie Stubbs notes on the features of Critical feminist criminology. Supra note 260.
152
oppressed and marginal visible.331 However, there are potentially conflicting interests between

those two positions that can mean failure to recognize the problematic nature of womens

individual interests within cultural contexts, i.e., positions where collective political claims do

not necessarily match womens individual interests and needs. The oversight of the existence of

conflicting inequality categories and other forces that deemphasize individual claims for gender-

equality is an important vulnerability of some intersectional approaches on restorative justice.

Notably, this happens because such intersectional approaches make concessions to analytical

categories other than gender equality and selectively engage them as more relevant in the

analysis. As a result, collectivists political demands are put ahead of womens individual

interests and needs, which are relegated to positions of subordination, passivity and silence. In

sum, there is an intersectional failure to recognize that the perspective of gender equality

provisions is a legitimate consideration, and womens individual interests cannot be assumed to

coincide with political collectivitys interests.

Having said that, I move ahead with a brief critical exposition of the anti-

essentialist epistemic position of the intersectional approach, which I believe is one of the

reasons for that imbalance of intersectional approaches when dealing with the conflicting

analytical categories of restorative justice. I argue that anti-essentialist stances can contribute to

hinder our understanding of the increasingly self-effacing positions in which women are being

placed themselves, when dealing with RJ experiences.

Epistemic problems with Intersectionality theory: anti-essentialism

Intersectionality analysis, by offering the heterogeneous perspective and

interpretive insights of ethnically diverse communities, can be employed by feminists to

331
Ibid.
153
acknowledge both the individual lived experiences of diverse battered women and the collective

political underpinnings of RJ under the guise of Indigenous justice. But intersectional feminists,

because of existing epistemic problems, must be careful not to simply perpetuate patriarchal and

oppressive views of reality rather than advance womens emancipatory goals. Both key features

of feminist intersectionality theory, i.e., the rejection of gender as the standard category of

analysis, and the importance given to heterogeneous and multiple perspectives are direct

corollaries of anti-essentialist stances.332 In fact, intersectionality theory holds that the

fragmented and multiple perspectives of womens conditions do not allow the recognition of

shared characteristics universal to all women, which in theory could have potential to unify them

in a coalition of socio-political interests.

But questioning the commonality of gender issues in a manner intended to

undermine or overthrow it left feminist scholars and activists with a twofold problem. Firstly,

they lacked a common political identity and discourse on which to base their policy

recommendations. Secondly, the political utility of the feminist movement began to be

questioned since gender underestimation led to a crisis of identity in the feminist movement.333

This famous quote from Teresa de Lauretis summarizes well the feminist unrest with anti-

essentialist epistemic positions:

Its absolute rejection of gender and its negation of biological determinism in favor of
cultural-discursive determinism results, as concerns women, in a form of nominalism. If
'woman' is a fiction, a locus of pure difference and resistance to logocentric power, and if
there is no woman as such, them the very issue of women's oppression would appear to
be obsolete and feminism would have no reason to exist. 334

332
See note 287 for a definition of anti-essentialism in feminist theory.
333
Ibid.
334
See Teresa de Lauretis, Upping the Anti (sic) in Feminist Theory in Simon During, ed., The Cultural Studies
Reader (London: Routledge, 1993) 307 at 314.
154
 Other important feminist scholars like Naomi Schor, Gayatri C. Spivak and Diana

Fuss put forward similar torrents of criticisms on anti-essentialist epistemic positions.335 In my

view, however, the main consequence of adopting a feminist analysis devoid of elements of

gender commonality is the uncritical acceptance of anti-essentialist models of analysis (e.g.,

intersectionality theory) that may undermine individualist positions and womens subjectivities

regarding equality concerns even though the ultimate goal of intersectionality, as a feminist

critical theory, is exactly to promote them. The goal then is to improve the intersectionality

theory by highlighting certain anti-essentialist weaknesses while retaining its critical identity as a

specific way for understanding and describing gendered-violence in heterogeneous settings. The

bottom line is not to promote empty criticism, but rendering intersectionality theory into a better

approach usable by feminist scholars; an improvement mainly achieved by re-inserting

individual gender-equality concerns into the analysis offered by intersectional feminists.

A less attentive feminist scholar or activist using an intersectional anti-essentialist

approach to address RJ practices in Indigenous settings would first consider the socio-political

imperatives that would accommodate collectivist interests, e.g., privileging culture and ethnicity

political claims over gender individual concerns. Therefore, the impetus for an intersectional

approach may stem from the principle of legitimacy (mainly collectivist), i.e., from a desire to

maintain credibility and prestige in an overtly political environment like Indigenous justice. At

the same time, the motivation could stem from a sense of public responsibility, particularly for

outcomes related to the political goals of self-determination, self-governance and promises of

social justice to Aboriginal offenders subject to endemic injustice in conventional criminal

335
See, e.g., Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed, eds., The Essential difference (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1994) (In this collections of essays, Lauretis; Schor; Sipvak; Fuss and others discuss the demonization of
essentialism within the feminist movement and address the relationship between essentialism and post-colonial
studies. They also speculate about whether there can be a real anti-essentialist feminism, and whether or not the
womans question can be so easily discarded by feminist scholarship).
155
justice systems. Efforts to stem the legitimacy and political development of Indigenous justice

(travestied as RJ) in ethnic communities, which often have taken the form of state-sponsored

efforts to promote experiences like sentencing circles, may make gender-based inequality even

worse for Indigenous women. In sum, anti-essentialist positions would eventually erase gender

equality concerns more focused on the choices of individual stakeholders and their personal

needs and concerns.

Strategic essentialism

The danger of formulaically adopting intersectionality analysis within the context

of RJ and Indigenous settings is that the tensions between the various analytical categories and

political stances present in that remedial alternative justice may remain overlooked. In so doing,

those intersectional feminists most committed to anti-essentialist stances leave unacknowledged

the fact that RJ disguised as Indigenous justice --- together with the related concepts of social

justice and self-governance --- may paradoxically accord with patriarchal and post-colonial

dominance.336 As a result collectivist interests may gain precedence over individual gender

issues. But there is room for retaining gender as a crucial analytical category in an intersectional

approach. The famous concept of strategic essentialism, devised as a counter-reaction to anti-

essentialism, by feminist scholar Gayatry Spivak should be considered.337

According to Spivak, strategic essentialism assumes a temporary unified

gender/sex position in order to achieve a particular political end. Such practice has been used

among marginalized or vulnerable groups when they experience a need in situations of

336
Since alternative justice experiences like sentencing circles never concede actual powers to Indigenous people,
as we shall see.
337
See Gayatrcy C. Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiograph in Donna Landry & Gerald M.
MacLean, eds., The Spivak reader: selected works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York: Routledge, 1996) at
204.
156
asymmetrical power relationships. This is exactly the case of women in situations facing with RJ

and domestic violence in Indigenous settings. Strategic essentialism can reemphasize the focus

on gender issues in order to allow women to reclaim their autonomy and self-empowerment even

when power asymmetric conditions are present and women live in heterogeneous conditions.

Some intersectional feminists intuitively adopted such emphasis and avoided the pitfalls of anti-

essentialist positions, but this will be addressed in the next chapter.

RJ self-advocacy: contributing to the imbalance of intersectional

approaches through cultural frame alignment.

This segment stresses the importance of RJs self-advocacy discourse as an

additional force contributing to produce imbalanced versions of intersectionality theory. The

capacity of informal adjudicatory practices like RJ largely depends on whether its audiences

recognize them as legitimate alternative justice practices.338 In reality, Indigenous leaders,

activists and postcolonial scholars often voice concerns about whether such arrangements have

moral authority, and whether such informal practices are also culturally resonant in relation to

customary justice practices.339 Such perceived legitimacy is also important to sustain RJs

expectations for funding, political support and resources. RJ cannot survive --- being a

participatory democracy experiment --- without political support of the target audience. In

parallel, RJ language is adopted because it also offers novel political possibilities to Indigenous

activists. They transform RJs collective justice claims into new spaces of struggle for self-

determination that are important to their own political agenda.

338
See, e.g., note 81, Abel, The Politics at 5.
339
See, e.g., Harry Blagg, Crime, Aboriginality and the Decolonization of Justice (Sidney: Hawkins press, 2008).
157
 RJs advocacy discourse lies at the meeting of those Indigenous grievances and

several other interest groups claims and depends on their support to gain political legitimacy and,

therefore, progressive outcomes in restorative process. As Stubbs puts it, It has been suggested

that pro-feminist and anti-racist groups should be participants in restorative process in order to

bolster victim narratives and to challenge those who do not take responsibility for their

offending.340 For this reason, the RJ movement usually conveys ideas of social justice that are

less individualistic and more focused on communities and collectivist responsibilities and rights,

aligning them to particular cultural narratives and contexts.341 Sociologists and politic scientists

studying social movements theory describe that process as frame alignment.342 According to

Snow et al., frames or schemata of interpretation are not by themselves coherent ideas, but

ways of packaging and conveying ideas that generate prompt understanding by the target

audience, motivate collective action and create strategies of self-advocacy for supporters.343 As

Anders Walker explains:

To be successful, social movement actors needed to construct their own frames, or

schematic interpretations, that diagnosed social problems, identify a clear prognosis of
those problems, and then mobilize target audiences to solve them. These collective
action frames, as they came to be called, worked best when aligned with the ideas,
assumptions, and beliefs in short cultural frames already held by target audiences, a
technique that David A. Snow, Robert Benford and others have termed frame
alignment.344

340
See note 254 at 59.
341
As a principle RJ practices seek to involve those with a legitimate stake in the situation, including victims,
offenders, community members and society. See, e.g., Kay Pranis, Barry Stuart & Mark Wedge, Peacemaking
Circles: From Crime to Community (St. Paul, MN: Living Justice Press, 2003).
342
See David E. Snow, et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation (1986)
American Sociological Review 51:4 464-481. See also Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movements: Social Movements and
Contentious Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
343
Ibid.
344
See Anders Walker, Shotguns, Weddings, and Lunch Counters: Why Cultural Frames Matter to Constitutional
Law online: (19 August, 2010) Florida State University Law Review, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1661981>.
158
 In other words, the RJ social movement frames itself to make culturally

resonant connections with collective Aboriginal values and belief systems in order to consolidate

its position as a viable alternative justice practice.345 RJs proponents seek to relate their

legitimacy goals to the political goals or cultural assumptions of the targeted group. In so doing,

the restorative frame alignment strategy also takes a particular story of wrongdoing (victims vis-

-vis offenders) and makes it a collective political concern (shared responsibilities between

victims, offenders and communities). That particular story suddenly becomes politically relevant

in the recognition of customary group political rights and is attached to a larger political context

of collective empowerment. However, there is the chance those womens subjectivities and

individual perceptions are silenced or alienated in the process. As Ferree warns, choosing

cultural resonance as a frame alignment strategy requires the possibility of sacrificing ideals,

limiting demands on authorities, and possibly excluding vulnerable groups as their demands

conflict with collective interests.346

The self-advocacy strategy of the RJ movement linking its credibility and moral

authority with the targeted audience in cultural terms becomes complicated when making

political alliances and building community self-empowerment turns out to be more important

than womens personal experiences when dealing with restorative justice. This is precisely the

problem RJ proponents confront when they develop advocacy strategies based on cultural frame

alignment discourses. If they frame RJ to be compatible with existing collective expectations,

they may also be reinforcing pre-existing patriarchal notions about gender disciplinary roles.

While an Indigenous womans community struggles to reassert its self-determination, she may

345
See note 61, Daly & Immarigeon, Origins, at 10. (Arguing that RJ proponents adopted varied organizational and
advocacy strategies. According to them, it is not at all clear whether it is best integrating restorative justice
practices with Indigenous justice customary law or, alternatively, replacing traditional practices with restorative
ones. Anyway, intersectional feminists coalesced both into the same analytical context).
346
See Myra Marx Feree, Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United
States and German (2003) 109:2 American Journal of Sociology 304-44 at 340.
159
find her new subject position within RJ awkward and relatively helpless due to power

asymmetries and gender devaluation. As we shall see in the next and final chapter, the literature

indicates that Indigenous women are basically being led to accept the existing patriarchal

institutions of their communities in face the of multicultural collectivists demands for political

self-determination. In addition, some RJ advocacy discourses --- reinforcing those demands ---

make them prone to a delegation of trust to those who advocate such alternative justice

interventions because these are allegedly culturally competent and, therefore, bear legitimacy for

coping with collective concerns for social justice. Indigenous women who fail or are resistant to

culturally framing their particular narratives of RJ experiences can be alienated and silenced. In

sum, Intersectional/multiracial feminists that are not aware of social movements theory,

particularly cultural frame alignment, may be compelled to endorse such self-advocacy practices

because they are structurally similar to their own conceptions about culture preeminence in RJ

settings as outlined in the previous sections.

2. Daly & Stubbs on the appropriateness of RJ for domestic violence

Feminists studies engendered three major contributions to the study of restorative

justice. First and foremost, they brought women and gender issues to the fore and provided a

diversified critical framework with which to scrutinize it. Those critical theoretical perspectives

range from classic, but disparate lines of feminist thinking like liberal feminism or dominance

feminism, to postmodern feminism and Marxist-socialist feminism that require borrowing anti-

essentialist stances as an epistemological approach. Second, as noted previously, the natural

evolution of those feminist disciplines allowed the integration of Indigenous political claims for

self-determination and social justice into the discussion about RJ and domestic violence; notably,

through the work of multiracial feminists (i.e., intersectional feminists) that coalesced RJ and

Indigenous customary justice into a single analytical mass. Such positioning amplifies the
160
importance that some intersectional feminists attribute to Aboriginal collectivities, and shifts the

focus from victims subjectivities, such as womens needs and interests, to the formulation of a

political agenda, with reverence to non-emancipatory aims, in order to accomplish, manage, and

promote collective self-determination, self-empowerment, and self-governance. In other words,

the intersectional research on RJ may be framed as devaluing sexuality and gender as primary

inequality categories (i.e., anti-essentialism), but also as placing strong emphasis on Indigenous

rights and post-colonial struggles (i.e., intersectional disempowerment).

Finally, feminists studies also developed more pragmatic approaches to RJ and

domestic violence seeking to investigate its suitability to contend with the complexities of

gendered-violence regardless of race or ethnicity. Typically, the focus of those studies has been

on worries about womens security, autonomy (or agency) and offenders accountability.347 All

these particular concerns primarily reflect mainstream feminists and battered womens

advocates gender equality concerns vis--vis power imbalances between victims and offenders.

In contrast to a focus on ethnic and cultural accounts of RJ - so common in intersectional

scholarship - mainstream feminists and battered womens advocates draw from an essentially

gender/sex positional perspective; a pragmatic standpoint that recognizes the inherent power

differentials betweens female victims and male offenders.348 In addition, the pragmatic approach

is also in concert with fears of survivors revictimization and allegations of re-privatization and

trivialization of intimate violence by RJ practices. This is occurring after years of public

denunciation of sexism and gendered-violence by feminist scholarship and activism. Other

common concerns would include, for example, RJ programs giving more emphasis to offenders

347
See note 2, Cameron, RJ: Literature Review, at 21-26. (Angela Cameron developed a comprehensive literature
review on the topic and highlighted these specific worries). See also note 10 and accompanying text.
348
See especially Loretta Frederick & Kristine C. Lizdas, The Role of Restorative Justice in the Battered Women's
Movement in James Ptacek, ed., Restorative Justice and Violence Against Women (New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2009) 612-919 in a kindle e-book version.
161
rehabilitation rather than womens actual needs; the lack of consultation with battered womens

advocate; concerns that women victims should be given a better informed choice regarding

whether or not to participate in RJ experiences; and, finally, the lack of resources and proper

training.349

In fact, Cook et al. observed that by far the most prolific and significant niche of

feminist scholarly work about RJ hinges exactly on the investigation of the potential benefits and

dangers of restorative practices in cases of violence against women.350 As a consequence, there is

a great deal of sound research on the subject matter recommending the summary of results from

existing commentaries by use of earlier reviewers' efforts. For reasons of space and simplicity, I

draw from Kathleen Daly and Julie Stubbs work that categorized that research to explain

diametrically opposite feminist responses to the appropriateness of using RJ in domestic violence

contexts.

Daly and Stubbs have produced arguably the most extensive compilation of

scholarly discussion on the appropriateness of the use of RJ within the domestic violence

context. The practical approach described in their compilation represents a synthesis of some of

the best and most pragmatic commentaries and evaluations of domestic violence in the RJ

literature. It should be noted that their work is often cited or reproduced at length in other

scholarly works on the theme.351 For this reason, I take the liberty of reproducing their

349
See Stephanie Coward, Restorative Justice in Domestic and Sexual Violence: Healing Justice? (December
2000) Directed Interdisciplinary Studies, Carleton University. See especially note 54, Stubbs, Domestic Violence.
See also note 25, Coker, Transformative Justice. See note 49, Cheon & Regehr, RJ Models. See generally Lawrence
W. Sherman, Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice: Answering Key questions (2000-2001) 8:1 Virginia
Journal of Social Policy & Law 263.
350
This area attracted such attention of feminist scholars that Cook, Daly and Stubbs pointed out that, Virtually all
feminist analyses of restorative justice have centred on its appropriateness for partner, family or sexual violence.
See, e.g.., Kimberly J. Cook, Kathleen Daly & Julie Stubbs, Introduction Special Issue (2006) 10:1 Theoretical
Criminology 5-7 at 5.
351
See, e.g., Gitana Proietti-Scifoni, Restorative Justice in Cases of Gendered Violence: Views from Aotearoa
Opinion Leaders (B.Crim. Thesis, Griffith University, 2008) [unpublished] at 11-12.
162
compilation of feminist insights on the suitability of using RJ in domestic violence cases. Their

work summarizes the existing stances about the use of RJ to cope with gendered-violence by

listing potential benefits and problems with RJ.

a) Potential problems of using restorative justice

In general, the feminist objections about applying RJ to gendered-violence cases

hinge on the impossibility to reconcile its ideology and practices with the harsh realities of

domestic violence. Daly and Stubbs pointed out several ways that negative concerns about using

RJ for domestic violence cases could be addressed. The following bullet points summarize and

then synthesize commentaries from the literature:

Victim safety. As an informal process, RJ may put victims at risk of continued violence;
it may permit power imbalances to go unchecked and reinforce abusive behaviour.

Manipulation of the process by offenders. Offenders may use an informal process to

diminish guilt, trivialize the violence, or shift the blame to the victim.

Pressure on victims. Some victims may not be able to effectively advocate on their own
behalf. A process based on building group consensus may minimize or overshadow a
victim's interests. Victims may be pressured to accept certain outcomes, such as an
apology, even if they feel it is inappropriate or insincere. Some victims may want the
state to intervene on their behalf and do not want the burdens of RJ.

Role of the 'community'. Community norms may reinforce, not undermine male
dominance and victim blaming. Communities may not be sufficiently resourced to take
on these cases.

Mixed loyalties. Friends and family may support victims, but may also have divided
loyalties and collude with the violence, especially in intra-familial cases.

Impact on offenders. The process may do little to change an offender's behaviour.

Symbolic implications. Offenders (or potential offenders) may view RJ processes as too
easy, reinforcing their belief that their behaviour is not wrong or can be justified.
Penalties may be too lenient to respond to serious crimes like sexual assault.352

352
See note 9, Daly & Stubbs, Feminist theory, at 159. According to Daly and Stubbs, these potential problems have
been identified by Stubbs (1997, 2002, 2004), Coker (1999, 2002), Goel (2000), Presser and Gaarder (2000),
Shapland (2000), Lewis et al. (2001), Busch (2002), Acorn (2004), and Hopkins et al. (2004). For more details: See
Julie Stubbs, Shame, Defiance, and Violence against Women: A Critical Analysis of "Communitarian"
163
 As we can see, mainstream feminists prioritize the goals of individual women and

battered womens advocates --- safety and offender accountability --- over the goals of ethnic

collectivities looking for ways to redress endemic social injustice in their relationships with the

conventional criminal justice system and seeking to assert their political power in terms of self-

governance and self-determination. I share the same concerns and, therefore, I take a position

contrary to the use of RJ in domestic violence cases although I also incorporate procedural issues

into the debate, as we shall see in the next chapter.

b) Potential advantages of using restorative justice

Victim voice and participation. Victims have the opportunity to voice their story and to
be heard. They can be empowered by confronting the offender, and by participating in
decision-making on the appropriate penalty.

Victim validation and offender responsibility. A victim's account of what happened

can be validated, acknowledging that she is not to blame. Offenders are required to take
responsibility for their behaviour, and their offending is censured. In the process, the
victim is vindicated.

Communicative and flexible environment. The process can be tailored to child and
adolescent victims' needs and capacities. Because it is flexible and less formal, it may
be less threatening and more responsive to the individual needs of victims.

Conferencing, in Sandy Cook & Judith Bessant, eds., Women's Encounters with Violence: Australian Experiences
(London: Sage, 1997) 109-26. See note 5, Stubbs, Domestic Violence. See Julie Stubbs, Restorative Justice,
Domestic Violence and Family Violence Issues Paper 9 (Sydney: Australian Domestic and Family Violence
Clearinghouse, 2004). See Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking (1999) 47: 1 UCLA Law Review 111. See note 25, Coker, Transformative Justice. See note 34, Coker,
Navajo Peacemaking. See note 8, Goel, No Women at the Center. See note 81, Presser & Gaarder, Can RJ reduce
Battering?. See Joanna Shapland, Victims and Criminal Justice: Creating Responsible Criminal Justice Agencies in
Adam Crawford & Jo Goodey, eds., Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice: International Debates,
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) 147-64. See Ruth Lewis, Rebecca Dobash, Russell Dobash and Kate Cavanagh, 'Law's
Progressive Potential: The Value of Engagement for the Law for Domestic Violence' (2001) 10 Social and Legal
Studies 105-30. See Ruth Busch, Domestic Violence and Restorative Justice Initiatives: Who Pays if we Get it
Wrong? in Heather Strang & John Braithwaite, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002) 223-48. See note 47, Acorn, Compulsory Compassion. See note 270, Hopkins et.
al, Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence.
164
 Relationship repair (if this is a goal). The process can address violence between those
who want to continue the relationship. It can create opportunities for relationships to be
repaired, if that is what is desired.353

It should be noted that the demonstration of potential dangers or benefits might be

highly dependent on which RJ model is being analyzed (e.g., Family Group conference,

sentencing circles, etc.) and on which type of crime is committed by the offender (e.g., sexual

violence or just battering).354 A RJ model may look more favorable in comparison to one

alternative or another. Moreover, the target audience is decisive in presenting different

perceptions of the idea. For example, Indigenous women are inclined to be more receptive to RJ

experiences due to prompt identification of Indigenous Justice with restorative justice. In

contrast, white women and battered womens advocates are more distrustful of it due to the

association of RJ with family mediation schemes and alternative dispute resolution. As Angela

Cameron has observed:

In examining RJ practices, two elements must be considered. First is the model in

question; some programmes have been endorsed by women, and others are critiqued
(Goundry, 1998; Razack, 1999; Goel, 2000). Second is whether or not the practice arises
or is derived from an Aboriginal tradition, law or legal order. Although the debates

353
Ibid. According to Daly and Stubbs, these potential benefits have been identified by Braithwaite and Daly
(1994), Hudson (1998, 2002), Martin (1998), Morris and Gelsthorpe (2000), Presser and Gaarder (2000), Daly
(2002b), Morris (2002), Pennell and Burford (2002), Koss et al. (2003), Hopkins et al. (2004), and Daly and Curtis-
Fawley (2005). For more details: See John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and
Communitarian Control in Tim Newburn and Elisabeth A. Stanko, eds., Just Boys Doing Business? Men,
Masculinities, and Crime (London: Routledge, 1994) 189-213. See Barbara Hudson, Restorative Justice: The
Challenge of Sexual and Racial Violence (1998) 25:2 Journal of Law and Society 237-56. See Barbara Hudson,
Restorative Justice and Gendered Violence: Diversion or Effective Justice? (2002) 42 British Journal of
Criminology 616-34. See Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law
Reform Strategies (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 151-88. See Allison Morris & Loraine Gelsthorpe, Re-
Visioning Men's Violence Against Female Partners (2000) 39 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 412-28. Supra
note, Presser and Gaarder, Can RJ reduce battering?. See note 221, Daly, RJ: the Real Story. See note 47, Morris,
Critiquing the critics. See Joan Pennell & Gale Burford , Feminist Praxis: Making Family Group Conferencing Work
in Heather Strang & John Braithwaite, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2002) 108-127. See Mary Koss et. al, Restorative Justice for Sexual Violence: Repairing Victims,
Building Community and Holding Offenders Accountable (2003) 989 Annals of the New York Academy of Science
384-96. Supra note Hopkins et. al. See Kathleen Daly & Sarah Curtis-Fawley, Justice for Victims of Sexual Assault
in Karen Heimer & Candace Kruttschnitt, eds., Gender and Crime: Patterns of Victimization (New York: New York
University Press, 2005).
354
Supra note 353.
165
 themselves are not always delineated by cultural or racial identification, there are often
important differences in methods, philosophies and practice along these lines
(Nightingale, 1991; LaRoque, 1997; McGillivray and Comaskey, 1999; Razack, 1999;
MacDonald, 2001). Such cultural distinctions have been an integral part of discussions
and debates in Canada.355

Furthermore, Angela Cameron, Kathleen Daly and Julie Stubbs; feminist legal

scholars who performed systematic literature reviews on RJ, assert that there are few hard or

agreed empirical data sets to back up any of the positions outlined above. As Daly and Stubbs

point out, Although there is considerable debate on the appropriateness of RJ for partner, sexual

or family violence, empirical evidence is sparse.356 Cameron goes in the same direction. As she

notes: Arguments on either side are presented with emotion and a genuine desire for positive

social change. However, the fact remains that there is little empirical evidence to support either

position (R. Morris, 2000; Presser and Gaarder, 2000; Sherman, 2000; A. Morris, 2002)357 The

current impasse between feminists portrayed above and the lack of empirical evidence

practically ensures that no RJ model is a panacea to violence against women cases regardless of

race or ethnicity. In fact, any RJ program should be taken with care and must be studied with

developed planning that takes into consideration the potential problems and benefits described

above.

As we can see from the arguments above for and against the use of RJ in cases of

intimate violence, the negative or positive influence of existing feminist theories are not being

taking into consideration in the scholarly contribution within the theme. Any potential problems,

where they exist, usually stem from substantive issues not from procedural values or

epistemological problems with a specific feminist approach. Nevertheless, I argue that RJ

355
See note 15, Cameron, Stopping the Violence, at 50.
356
See note 5 at 160.
357
Supra note 356 at 59.
166
practices in Canada and Australaia are increasingly dominated by intersectionality theory

insights and contributions. In fact, RJ interventions --- especially in ethnic and racial settings ---

are infused with intersectional procedural values (such as anti-essentialism; anti-colonialism;

collectivism; heterogeneity and ethnocultural political concerns) and have been shown to create

significant implications for RJ and its adoption and evaluation. For instance, as stressed in the

last chapter, Indigenous advocates and activists claim that RJ is a culturally appropriate response

to the harm done to Aboriginal people by colonialism. This is a sign that intersectional thinking

is pervasive in the RJ strategy of cultural frame alignment because it takes into consideration the

interaction of ethnicity and gender politics at the forefront of debates. A good example of that

are restorative-like experiments like sentencing circles. They are experiments clearly inspired by

multiculturalism and devised as intersectional remedial justice practices in Canada, which were

quickly transplanted to Australia. Notwithstanding, those infusions of intersectional thinking and

multiculturalism into RJ and Aboriginal Justice bring new benefits and potential risks to bear on

Aboriginal communities and greatly impact racialized women and their priorities.

The next and concluding chapter explores how intersectionality theory and

multiculturalism are mobilized to inform decisions concerning the implementation and

evaluation of RJ experiments in Aboriginal settings. In addition, I contextualize the potential

epistemic and political problems in intersectionality theory, as developed in this chapter, to apply

them to the use of sentencing circles within the specific geographical contexts of Canada and

Australia. A conflict between ethnocultural collective politics and individual gender equality

concerns in sentencing circles is articulated and developed. The prospects and perils of co-

optation of intersectionality theory are stressed.

167
 Chapter III Further developments, implications and
conclusions

Chapter outline

After having presented in chapters one and two an overview of the theoretical

framework of the RJ movement and an outline of the feminist scholarship about it, plus some

conceptual clarification as to what I consider to be the main epistemic problems in intersectional

feminism as applied to RJ in Indigenous settings, chapter three points to a conclusion of how in

pragmatic terms an imbalance in intersectional approaches can affect feminist modes of

understanding RJ experiences. Since my thesis offers a critical perspective that focuses on

instrumental and not substantive issues, i.e., seeks to identify and problematize an imbalanced

version of intersectionality theory --- especially concerning its interaction with RJ models

applied in Aboriginal settings --- all substantive (or empirical) considerations are relevant only to

the extent that they corroborate or refute that goal. Thus, I will not focus in this concluding

chapter on a specific RJ program, but only delineate and discuss the intersectional nature,

direction, and meaning of practical restorative experiences that may confirm that such a feminist

approach, paradoxically, can end up being harmful to Aboriginal women if managed without

awareness of epistemological and political problems embedded in it.

In order to do that, this chapter builds on earlier studies and commentaries that

have addressed the interplay between collective ethnocultural political claims and issues of

individual gender inequality, particularly, as applied to RJ as a remedial justice practice in the

form of sentencing circles. Furthermore, I move to end this paper by drawing implications and

168
conclusions from potential vulnerabilities of intersectional approaches within the study of RJ

coping with domestic violence in Indigenous settings. The overall conclusion is that certain

intersectional approaches to RJ experiences are susceptible to be appropriated and diverted from

their initial emancipatory purposes to serve non-women-centered interests with unintended

detrimental consequences to racialized women.

Before turning to the issues above, however, I pause to consider some of the

influences of multiculturalism on intersectionality theory and restorative justice. In the first

section of this chapter, therefore, I seek to develop connections between intersectionality theory,

multiculturalism and sentencing circles. In other words, I contend that the interplay between

imbalanced intersectional approaches and sentencing circle experiences must be read in

conjunction with the influence exerted by multiculturalism in Canada and Australia. As a

consequence, I argue that sentencing circles experiences in those countries are a direct result of a

blend of multicultural rhetoric and intersectional feminists concerns. In reality, there is a similar

arrangement of values and goals associated with those two ideologies. For example, the two

approaches deal with similar subject matters (i.e., respect for ethnocultural diversity and

empowerment of minority groups) and they have other similarities like the accommodation of

Indigenous self-determination political claims in the form of culturally sensitive remedial justice

practices (e.g., sentencing circles). For these reasons, remedial justice practices like sentencing

circles became a political project engendered by a relationship between multicultural theorists

and intersectional feminists; a relationship that also runs in parallel with the rise of the RJ

movement as a convenient alternative to the widely criticized conventional criminal justice

system. However, as we shall see, that relationship is fraught with potential dangers to

vulnerable group members like battered women.

169
 Notably, I stress the problems that multiculturalism may present to vulnerable

groups within ethnic minorities according to a feminist critique of the multicultural political

project of cultural accommodations. I highlight that some of the critiques directed at

multiculturalism can be equally applied to what I previously called imbalanced intersectional

approaches to sentencing circles, i.e., intersectional feminist stances that prioritize the political

assertion of culture, self-determination and justice self-governance in Indigenous groups over

victims individual safety and offenders accountability resulting in intersectional

underestimation of individual gender equality concerns. I conclude by suggesting that the

existing nexus between imbalanced versions of intersectionality theory and multiculturalism

vulnerabilities jeopardize to a greater extent womens positions in restorative circles. In other

words, the ethnocultural focus of some intersectional feminists analyzing sentencing circles in

Aboriginal communities resonates with the multicultural political project of countries like

Canada and Australia. However, this brings possible problems to vulnerable subjects within

ethnic minorities like battered women in Indigenous groups whose interests do not necessarily

coincide with the collective political aims of ethnic communities dominant groups. The

comprehension of these problems in intersectional approaches on RJ programs is, therefore, a

vital step to avoid detrimental consequences in gendered violence cases.

The second section is dedicated to sketching out research implications and

significant conclusions we can make on the basis of RJ experiences like sentencing circles.

Notably, I illustrate and discuss how intersectional approaches on sentencing circles can be

distorted into a divisive and uncritical feminist analytical tool. In fact, the signs are that

intersectional thinking is beginning to be co-opted by collective ethnocultural political demands.

In other words, anti-racist, anti-colonial and ethnocultural politics seem to be commandeering

intersectionality theory to leverage their own political platforms with unintended detrimental

170
consequences to racialized women like exclusion and effacement. This claim of co-optation and

politicization should imply caution in using intersectional approaches to RJ and domestic

violence in Indigenous settings since individual gender equality concerns might not be properly

considered in such a scale of values. In order to illustrate this contention, I make use of selected

literature on sentencing circles in Canada and Australia. The sample of literature moves from

general perspectives about RJ and its relationship with imbalanced versions of intersectional

thinking to more specific empirical problems within sentencing circles. Finally, I make some

comments on the current process of international expansion and commodification of restorative

justice.

The third section serves to wrap up key findings and to establish conclusions and

recommendations for the feminist intersectional community interested in restorative justice.

Most notably, I recommend re-assessing intersectionality theory as an analytical tool to address

RJ and domestic violence in Aboriginal communities since it may be so conflated with non-

women-centered interests that it can mean the total abandonment of its critical and emancipatory

characteristics. Furthermore, to counteract this emptying of intersectional analysis by non-

feminist interests this thesis also recommends developing essentialist strategic visions about the

importance of gender equality issues in sentencing circles and other RJ experiments. I conclude

by suggesting that intersectional feminists must be conscious of how their own political positions

regarding RJ experiments may affect their critical and emancipatory objectives. When

intersectional feminists place an excessive focus on ethnocultural political demands, they are

likely to ignore victims individual gender equality needs and concerns. In fact, I call for

intersectional feminists to be more attentive to the dangers of co-optation of their own

scholarship by non-feminist interests. Only this way, victims of gendered-violence can fully

assert their own interests in restorative-like experiences conducted in Aboriginal settings.

171
1. Further developments: Intersectional feminism, multiculturalism and sentencing
circles

This section deals with multiculturalism as a theoretical and political framework

that runs in close proximity with the nature, objectives and dynamics of feminist intersectional

approaches, particularly as applied to sentencing circles. Although multiculturalism and

intersectionality are distinct concepts, there are shared interests, objectives and concerns that can

be identified and further explored in order to reveal potential vulnerabilities of imbalanced

intersectional approaches to sentencing circles. In fact, one key objective of this segment is to

link intersectional feminism and its approaches to sentencing circles with the broader political

structural context of multiculturalism in Canada and Australia.358 By examining how

multiculturalism can impact intersectional approaches to sentencing circles we can achieve a

better understanding of the vulnerabilities of this feminist analytical framework within the

context of restorative justice. Another goal in this section is to establish that the lessons drawn

from the critique of multiculturalism can also be applied to the study of the relationship between

imbalanced versions of intersectional feminism and sentencing circles.

358
See, e.g., Anne Philips, Multiculturalism without Culture (Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 2007) at 3. See
also: Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K)., 1982, c. 11 [Charter]. Canadian Multiculturalism Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 24 (4th Supp).
Statement, Multicultural Australia: United in Diversity: Updating the 1999 New Agenda for Multicultural Australia:
Strategic directions for 2003-2006, Commonwealth of Australia 2003. (Both Canada and Australia have long
declared themselves officially multicultural countries. In Canada, for example, since 1971, when prime-minister
Pierre Elliot Trudeau has delivered his famous address to the House of Commons outlining the tenets of liberal
multiculturalism in Canada. Multiculturalism, since them, has been reflected in the Canadian legal framework. For
example, through the Canadian Multiculturalism Act and section 27 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. In Australia as far back as 1982 and, more recently, with the statement Multicultural Australia: United in
Diversity in 2003).
172
 a) Multiculturalism and restorative justice: establishing connections

According to Sarah Song, Multiculturalism is a body of thought in political

philosophy about the proper way to respond to cultural and religious diversity.359 Song points

out that multiculturalism seeks to supersede the mere toleration of group differences by treating

members of minority groups, substantively and positively, as equal citizens.360 This includes

recognition of affirmative accommodations of group differences when required through group-

differentiated rights without, of course, promoting the centrality of any culture or ethnic group.

Song notes that group-differentiated rights can be operated individually or by a group. She

provides the example of individuals who are granted exemptions from generally applicable laws

in virtue of their religious beliefs or individuals who seek language accommodations in schools

or in voting. Moreover, she observes that group-differentiated rights can be held by the group

rather than its members individually; such rights are properly called group rights, as in the case

of Indigenous groups and other ethnic minorities, who claim the right of self-determination.361

She gives as examples of these policies the limited recognition of tribal sovereignty and the state

acknowledgement of customary justice practices by the dominant legal system in countries like

Canada and New Zealand.362 Hence, we can argue without great concerns, that the reception and

institutionalization of claims for self-determination by Indigenous people are typically associated

with multicultural discourses, policies and strategies.

359
See Sarah Song, "Multiculturalism" The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (First published Fri Sep 24, 2010),
Edward N. Zalta (ed)., online: (2010) <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/multiculturalism/#ProVulIntMin>
retrieved on Sep 2010. (For a comprehensive examination of multicultural theories including its several varieties
and critique).
360
Ibid.
361
Ibid. See also Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995) at 26-33. (Kymlicka identified three forms of group-differentiated rights: self-government
rights, polyethnic rights and special representation rights). See especially J. T. Levy, Classifying Cultural Rights, in
W. Kymlicka and I. Shapiro, eds., Nomos XXXIX: Ethnicity and Group Rights (New York: New York University Press,
1997) at 22-66. (Levy identified eight different manifestations of cultural rights: exemptions, assistance measures,
self-governemnt, external rules, internal rules, recognition/enforcement, representation and symbolic claims).
362
Ibid.
173
 Furthermore, as Song also mentions, one of the proposed justifications for

multiculturalism besides classical liberal values of equality and autonomy is exactly the critique

of colonialism and the advance of Indigenous rights for self-determination and self-governance

in formerly colonized states. Accordingly, multiculturalists look to the world from a postcolonial

perspective, focusing on colonial oppression and persistent denials of basic human rights to

cultural minority groups, as a point of critique. Multicultural theorists call this particular line of

thinking postcolonial multiculturalism. As Song explains:

Lastly, some philosophers have looked beyond liberalism in arguing for multiculturalism.
This is especially true of theorists writing from a postcolonial perspective. The case for
tribal sovereignty rests not simply on premises about the value of tribal culture and
membership, but also on what is owed to Native peoples for the historical injustices
perpetrated against them. Reckoning with history is crucial. Proponents of indigenous
sovereignty emphasize the importance of understanding indigenous claims against the
historical background of the denial of equal sovereign status of indigenous groups, the
dispossession of their lands, and the destruction of their cultural practices (Ivison 2006,
Ivison et al. 2000, Moore 2005, Simpson 2000). This background calls into question the
legitimacy of the state's authority over aboriginal peoples and provides a prima facie case
for special rights and protections for indigenous groups, including the right of self-
government.363

Not surprisingly, this frame of reference for postcolonial multicultural policies

creates numerous opportunities for the adoption of culturally sensitive justice experiments such

as restorative sentencing schemes and Indigenous-controlled courts.364 Actually, one of the

justifications for the massive growth of RJ experiments in the last two decades in countries like

Canada and Australia, far beyond the broad limits envisioned by its proponents concerning a

paradigmatic shift from punishment and retribution, can be attributed to the political agency of

those liberal multicultural states in promoting what multicultural theorists define as the politics

363
Ibid.
364
The right of self-government involves jurisdictional authority over a delimited territory and institutional
mechanisms to enforce it, e.g., tribal police or some sort of Indigenous Justice. See Margaret Moore, Internal
Minorities and Indigenous Self-Determination, in Avigail I. Eisenberg and Jeff Spinner-Halev, eds., Minorities
within Minorities: Equality, Rights and Diversity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 271-293.
174
of recognition.365 As Song explains, a politics of recognition challenges status inequality and

the remedy it proposes is cultural and symbolic change. With respect to criminal justice and its

formal institutions, this symbolic change means, for instance, the introduction of alternative

justice practices like RJ that presupposes non-incarceration measures for Aboriginal offenders;

dialogue-driven adjudication; diversion from formal courts and, finally, a more holistic and

communitarian process of doing justice.366 It is not by chance that state-sponsored alternative

justice schemes like sentencing circles developed first through Indigenous groups in Canada and

Australia. Multicultural policies of recognition fueled the RJ boom in liberal democracies like

Canada and Australia in conjunction with the influence of several other social movements and

theoretical and philosophical stances, as we have seen in chapter one.

b) Intersectionality and multiculturalism: finding common ground

With regard to the postcolonial aspect of the multicultural promotion of group-

differentiated rights, i.e., the emphasis on certain rights for self-determination for Indigenous

groups, there is an invitation by intersectional feminists to make claims concerning the

commonality of presuppositions that inform multicultural policies and intersectional approaches

to sentencing circles. Notably, I established in the last chapter that intersectionality is an

approach that organized feminist theorizing on RJ practice around the integration of issues like

post-colonialism, anti-racism and, especially, political claims for self-governance and self-

365
See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition in A. Gutmann, ed., Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of
Recognition (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994). (Explaining the concept of recognition from several
perspectives).
366
See note 319, Cunneen, Reviving RJ traditions. (Describing the emergence of RJ practices within the context of
Indigenous groups through multicultural policies).
175
determination by Indigenous groups.367 This means that intersectionality analysis also focuses

attention on responses to inequality that have long been the subject of debate and examination

within multiculturalism and/or object of multicultural policies of recognition like Indigenous

self-determination. As a consequence, one of the main points of friction between

intersectionality analysis and sentencing circles, i.e., concerns about self-government rights by

Indigenous people and decolonization mechanisms comes to look similar in direction and nature

to multiculturalists concerns and; thus, the turn to the critiques made against multiculturalism

becomes a valuable resource for understanding the vulnerabilities of the intersectional approach

as well. In short, multiculturalism and intersectionality theory can be considered intertwined

systems of action and meaning that share, in some aspects, common ideological and political

projects committed with Indigenous mechanisms of self-determination, decolonization and self-

empowerment like restorative sentencing circles.

According to Reingod and Baratz, there is a very strong bond between feminist

theories in general and multiculturalist theories since both share a general concern for promoting

social justice and ethnic equality and there are transformational and emancipatory goals

motivating both intellectual enterprises.368 However, they also acknowledge that this connection

between the feminist paradigm and multiculturalism is not free from dissension. They have

identified three distinct stances among academic commentators. In the first stance, feminism is at

odds with multiculturalism. As they have noted, Advocated mainly by liberal feminist thinkers,

the first approach claims that feminism and multiculturalism are contradictory, and there is a

367
See note 316 and accompanying text. (Actually, Chris Cunneen have established this connection between
feminism and RJ, but in general terms). See note 209.
368
See note 273, Reingod & Baratz, Feminism and Multiculturalism. (The vision is emancipatory in a broader
political sense, whereby intersectionality and multiculturalism rhetoric can serve as tools for decolonization and
anti-racist policies).
176
strained relationship between them.369 This position is, especially, defended by feminists

inspired by liberal thinking like Susan Moller-Okin and Ayelet Shachar.370 In the second

position, feminism and multiculturalism are both contradictory and complementary at the same

time. Notably, scholars within the context of education defend such positions.371 Finally, there

are scholars that consider multiculturalism and feminism as essentially compatible with each

other like Shohat and Volpp.372 These scholars advocate what some feminists call multicultural

feminism, i.e., a strand of feminist theorizing also known by the term multiracial feminism or in

some academic circles as intersectional feminism.373 Nonetheless, the important point of this

claim is not the terminological similarity between multiculturalism and multicultural feminism as

seems to be the case at first sight. More importantly, it is the coincidence of objectives and

values between multiculturalism, critical race theory (i.e., Afro-American feminism), or

intersectional feminism. As Reingod and Baratz suggest:

The proponents of the third approach in the polemic assert that multiculturalism and
feminism offer similar arguments to explain why women suffer from discrimination and
injustice, presenting similar solutions for creating equality between the genders ( ) and
374
is essentially the thesis of the feminist school known as "Afro-American feminism.

369
Supra note at 54.
370
See note 274 and accompanying text. (The concept of multiculturalism has been critiqued by Susan Moller-
OKin. According to her claims of minority cultures contradict norms of gender equality pursued by women in
liberal states). See also Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). (Addressing the relationship between multiculturalism and
feminism as oppositional due to conflicts between aiming to support and protect many cultures and aiming to
promote the equality and dignity for women).
371
See note 273 at 54. (For an account of scholars that share this position).
372
See, e.g., Ella Shohat, ed., Talking Visions: Multicultural Feminism in a Transnational Age (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1998). See also Leti Volpp, Multiculturalism versus Feminism in Natalie J. Sokoloff & Christina Pratt, eds.,
Domestic violence at the margins: readings on race, class, gender, and culture (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 2006) 39. (Arguing that positing feminism and multiculturalism as oppositional is flawed and illogical under
the perspective of immigrant minorities. She contends that there is a common ground for a constructive dialogue
between the two ideological stances.)
373
See infra note 372.
374
Ibid.
177
 In reality, the terms Afro-American feminism (or Black feminism), critical race

feminism and multicultural feminism come to identify several feminist perceptions that are

aligned at the same time with certain features of multiculturalism and multicultural feminism.

For example, as we have seen in chapter two, multicultural (or multiracial) feminism is greatly

influenced by intersectionality theory in the sense of the attention given to the interplay of

multiple categories of inequality and the appreciation of culturally heterogeneous perspectives

and insights.375 Thus, we can identify in multicultural (or intersectional) feminism one strand of

feminist thinking that is in part committed to some of the ideological principles of

multiculturalism, in particular, the respect for diversity and empowering culturally diverse

groups (e.g., Indigenous people). In short, the postcolonial multicultural rhetoric in its

proposition of rights to self-determination for cultural minority groups like Indigenous people

posits several interrelated and reinforcing proximal political and philosophical drivers that

substantively overlap with intersecionality theory.

c) Intersectionality and multiculturalism: establishing differences

Despite the arguments above, finding common ground between postcolonial

multiculturalism and intersectionality as applied to RJ does not mean that the two ideologies are

totally equivalent. What may approximate multiculturalism to intersectional feminism may also

confound scholars trying to make sense of their dissimilarities concerning epistemic approaches.

It is precisely because their goals and subject matters look so close to one another in some

aspects that it becomes necessary to establish clear distinctions between the two ideological

375
See notes 310 and 311 and accompanying texts. (Explaining the use of other terminologies to convey the idea
of intersectionality theory like, for example, multiracial feminism).
178
positions. Actually, intersectionality theory is not equivalent to multiculturalism.376 Although

there are highly significant similarities between postcolonial multiculturalism and intersectional

feminism, particularly, as applied to RJ, the two concepts cannot be confounded with each other.

There are clearly disparate epistemic stances between the two theories. Multicultural theories are

arguably defined mainly by essentialist positions; i.e. multicultural rhetoric treats individuals as

if their particular ethnocultural group essentially defines them. For this reason, in multicultural

theory culture plays the role of homogenization that sex/gender can play in women's studies. In

contrast, intersectionality theory, in ideal terms, operates through well balanced anti-essentialist

positions and explores the tension that arises along multiple inequality categories and axes of

oppression, without giving primacy to a specific inequality category or site of oppression.377

Both concepts have evolved from similar articulations within the RJ realm, but they have

significant epistemological differences that focus on exploring ethnocultural considerations from

different perspectives. In sum, intersectionality theory is not a feminist version of postcolonial

multiculturalism, but seems to share certain substantial aspects of it.

Nevertheless, as we shall see in this chapter, there are imbalanced anti-essentialist

intersectional positions --- especially, in cases of domestic violence adjudicated in restorative

sentencing circles --- that work to deemphasize gender/sex equality concerns about individual

victims (concerning, e.g., security, autonomy and offender accountability) almost to the point of

displacing then as analytical categories. In particular, because imbalanced intersectional stances -

-- as occurs in postcolonial multicultural theory --- overemphasize the importance of culture, or

ethnocultural political themes, they leave underestimated other inequality markers like gender

power differentials. This suggests a close proximity with postcolonial multiculturalism, which

376
See Rita Dahamoon, Cultural versus Culture: Locating Intersectional Identities and Power (Paper presented
at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, June, 2004) [unpublished].
377
Ibid.
179
also accords a strong emphasis on culture and collective identities, but without great concerns

regarding subjectivities or individual needs. In this sense unbalanced intersectional approaches to

sentencing circles can be, paradoxically, as essentialist as postcolonial multiculturalism because

they prevent intersectional practices from considering other loci of inequality. Unfortunately,

this insistence of unbalanced intersectional feminists on the primacy of ethnocultural political

claims over survivors individual needs sabotages the very conception of intersectional feminism

as an emancipatory and critical feminist analytical tool. This is especially worrisome because

unbalanced versions of the concept of intersectionality mirror other problems of multicultural

theory, especially, concerning vulnerable internal minorities.

d) Intersectionality and multiculturalism: shared vulnerabilities

Sarah Song states that one of the most common criticisms of multicultural policies

are the objections raised against protections to minority groups that may come at the price of

reinforcing internal oppression of vulnerable members of those groups.378 Indeed, this critique

produced in what has been called by academic commentators the problem of minorities within

minorities or collective rights versus individual rights in multicultural theory. In her summary

of some of this criticism, Song notes that multicultural theorists have focused on inequalities

between minority groups and the wider society, particularly, arguing for special protections for

cultural minority groups, but such group-based special protections can, paradoxically, end up

exacerbating inequalities within minority groups.379 According to Margaret Moore, the drive for

this concern is the fear that ethnic minority elites will use group-differentiated cultural rights to

oppress or discriminate against their own vulnerable members such as religious dissenters,

378
See note 362.
379
Ibid.
180
nonconformists, homosexuals, women, and children --- hence formulating policies that will work

to unfairly marginalize or discriminate against people who occupy positions that are at odds

with dominant or accepted cultural understanding.380 Ayelet Shachar calls this fear the paradox

of multicultural vulnerability, which draws attention to the less recognized costs of multicultural

accommodation.381 As she puts it:

Under such conditions, well-meaning accommodation by the state may leave members of
minority groups vulnerable to severe injustice within the group, and may in effect, work
to reinforce some of the most hierarchical elements of a culture. I call this phenomenon
the paradox of multicultural vulnerability. By this term I mean to call attention to the
ironic fact that individuals inside the group can be injured by the very reforms that are
designed to promote their status as group members in the accommodating, multicultural
state.382

Margaret Moore has established a typology of contexts in which ways of

protecting minority groups from oppression by the majority may make them more likely to

undermine the basic liberties and opportunities of internal vulnerable members. First, Moore

highlights what she calls positional or status diversity contexts.383 According to her, vulnerable

members of minority cultures, as in any cultural context, will occupy different positions within

that culture and the reality of the culture may mean discrimination against some people within

that culture. This concern has been primarily raised by feminist writers who point to the

patriarchal nature of many traditional cultures and the perils of cultural arrangements that can be

used to justify the perpetuation or reproduction of forms of discrimination against women.384

Second, Moore argues for philosophical or ideological diversity that is a source of concerns

related to the external conduct or self-advocacy stances of minority groups. As Moore explains,

this stance is concerned about questions of the dynamics of majority-minority relations within

380
See note 367 at 273.
381
See note 372, Shachar, Multicultural Jurisdictions, at 57.
382
Supra note at 3.
383
See note 367 at 273.
384
See note 372.
181
the state, and the tendency for the minority group to seek to appear unified, especial vis--vis the

majority group, in order to gain a better bargaining position.385

Citing a previous work by Leslie Green, Moore remarks that there is a tendency

to minority groups in the state to exaggerate the extent of solidarity behind their particular

political program, because any dissent from it is likely to be interpreted by the majority group as

a sign of weakness, as a sign that compromise is unnecessary, that the elites are not

representatives of everyone and so on.386 As a result, vulnerable internal groups dissatisfied

with certain cultural accommodations may find difficulties in conveying their own needs and

interests and might be silenced or marginalized as dissenters or fifth columnists. Moreover, I

would also include in the typology womens self-imposition of conformist roles due to

patriarchal disciplinary mechanisms, as Angela Cameron has observed in sentencing circles

applied to adjudicate domestic violence cases in Indigenous communities in Canada.387 Song

lists, among others, the following examples of problems with minorities within minorities in

multicultural policies: cultural defenses in criminal law, accommodating religious law or

customary law within the dominant legal system, and self-government rights for Indigenous

communities that deny equality to women in certain respects.388

As noted earlier, the relationship between multiculturalism and intersectional

feminism frequently arises in liberal postcolonial settings where dominant legal systems

informed by multicultural theories are prepared to adopt new alternative justice remedies and

customary Indigenous justice practices. With regard to self-government rights for Indigenous

communities, we can assume not only a commonality of themes and interests, but also of

385
See note 367 at 273.
386
Ibid. See also Leslie Green, The Rights of Minority Cultures (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995).
387
See note 302 and accompanying text.
388
See note 362.
182
potential problems between the two approaches. If we can identify potential problems with

vulnerable groups within minorities in multicultural policies, we can also speculate about similar

problems in imbalanced intersectional approaches to RJ practices. Notably, because such a

strand of feminist thinking brings into discussion within the RJ field exactly the same questions

risen by multicultural theorists, i.e., issues related to Indigenous rights for self-determination and

self-governance in justice matters.

Besides the previously mentioned thematically related allusions of commonality

between multiculturalism and intersectionality theory, there are intersectional epistemic

problems derived from extreme anti-essentialist positions and cultural frame alignment strategies

of the RJ movement itself that also resonate with multiculturalism. For example, imbalanced

versions of intersectional feminism assign great worth to collective ethnocultural claims while

de-emphasizing individual gender inequality concerns, as multiculturalists also do when the

paradox of vulnerability occurs. This highlights how crucial multiculturalism is for the correct

understanding of unbalanced intersectional feminism. Indeed, unbalanced versions of

intersectional feminism dwell on the same weaknesses of postcolonial multiculturalism

concerning the perils around issues of diversity and internal minorities. Intersectional feminists

should be aware of these functional similarities concerning potential problems in order to be able

to avoid them within RJ settings, if necessary. In short, there is a coincidence of subject matters

and epistemic drives that suggest similar negative outcomes when multicultural policies and

imbalanced intersectional feminist approaches are present within RJ contexts. Indeed, this nexus

between intersectionality and multiculturalism should spawn further investigatory efforts and

questions in both research and practice. For the moment, it is sufficient to say that unbalanced

intersectional approaches on RJ programs are tied to multicultural initiatives and that the critique

183
of these policies may actually serve to shed some light on what can go wrong with intersectional

feminism as applied to the RJ field.

2. Discussion and implications: contextualizing imbalanced intersectional approaches

As noted previously, intersectionality analysis has become a well-established

feminist formula to align RJ experiments, postcolonial issues and multiculturalism theories

within the same analytical frame, particularly bringing into discussion themes of great

significance to Indigenous women such as domestic violence, rights to self-determination and

remedial justice practices. Indeed, in commentary after commentary on restorative experiences

within Aboriginal settings feminist scholars have made laudatory references to intersectionality

analysis, while also emphasizing the need to incorporate this kind of feminist approach into their

scholarship. Restorative justice scholar Ruth Busch, for instance, argues that if restorative

experiences are to be used with domestic violence cases, it is imperative to have understanding

of intersectionalities of race and gender in the lived realities of battered victims lives.389 In the

same vein, Donna Coker argues for incorporating insights from critical race theory (i.e.,

intersectionality theory) in order to understand the intersecting oppressive systems that operate in

the lives of men and women in Indigenous communities.390 Moreover, Julie Stubbs points out

that an intersectional framework which acknowledges the multiple and indivisible operations of

race, class and gender may assist to examine how cultural practices work to sustain the power

differences between politics and practices which represent Aboriginal people but ignore their

gender or the reverse.391 Finally, Angela Cameron clearly states her commitment to

389
See note 350, Busch, Who pays if, at 224. See, e.g., note 314, Sokoloff and Dupont, Domestic Violence at
Intersections. (Noting that the incorporation of intersectional approaches to domestic violence studies is a classic
line of feminist research.)
390
See note 25, Cocker, Transformative Justice, at 129.
391
See note 254 at 49.
184
intersectional thinking when she notes that either a cultural or sexist focus on judicially

convened sentencing circles is an incomplete analysis without an intersectional framework.392

Beyond this limited list there are, of course, other feminists and RJ scholars willing to give

implicit or explicit support to intersectionality analysis in RJ studies --- but none of them, I

would suggest, are prepared to push forward the epistemological and political challenges of the

operationalization of intersectional approaches in such areas.

This segment critically reflects on the above feminist stances bringing into

discussion not only positive, but also negative implications of intersectional thinking within the

pragmatic context of RJ experiences, especially sentencing circles. Generally, intersectionality

theory has no negative implications clearly recognized by scholarly work, leading many

feminists to inappropriately disregard potential difficulties and complexities of this approach, as

if they did not exist at all.393 To the best of my best knowledge, for example, this paper is the

first to problematize intersectionality theory within the context of RJ, domestic violence and

postcolonial Aboriginal justice. Because little or no research has been conducted directly

problematizing the concept of intersectionality within RJ and domestic violence settings, there is

a paucity of information to allow intersectional feminists to question their own political and

ideological commitments and how this affects their subjective perceptions of RJ initiatives. For

this reason, it is important to identify potential undesirable effects of intersectional thinking. In

addition, intersectional feminism operates on the assumption that all interests, including

individuals membership within a particular group, can be adequately protected through the

392
See note 2, Cameron, RJ: Literature Review, at 29.
393
But see Rita Dahamoon, Considerations in Mainstreaming Intersectionality as an Analytic Approach (Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, 20-22 March, San Diego.)
[unpublished]. (Expressing fears that mainstream intersectionality may end up reducing an understanding of
difference and power because of the wrongly perceived but widespread idea that categories can be fractured into
never-ending sub-categories. Dahamoon also argues that the prevalence of racism, sexism, homophobia,
disableism, and class privilege within intersectionality-type methods will mean that theoretical, conceptual, and
normative linkages that challenge the status quo may be diluted or rejected entirely.)
185
recognition of their needs as members of the collectivity. However, as we have seen, imbalanced

intersectional approaches can favor communal political interests of the majority, tainting the

evaluation and perception of RJ processes in relation to the individual needs of victimized

women.

Furthermore, there is a growing concern among intersectional feminist scholars

regarding the emptying out of the concept of intersectionality analysis due to its ubiquitous

influence in feminist research.394 According to Michelle Berger, for example, () we are

witnessing a period of flattening the intersections and decoupling lives from political conditions;

and that intersectional analyses are being used to splinter social movements rather than create the

ground for varied groups to come together. 395 This position is also shared by Rachel Luft who

argues that, (there) can be unintended consequences to the blanket application of

intersectionality. Uniform deployment may inadvertently contribute to flattening the very

differences intersectional approaches intend to recognize.396 In other words, intersectionality

analysis can offer an important critique of battered womens experiences in RJ settings by

warning of the presence of multiple intersecting oppressions in such alternative justice projects.

However, there are also potential problems in some intersectional approaches that, ironically,

can serve to reinforce the very identity roles and patriarchal structures that intersectionality

theory aims to unsettle. Imbalanced intersectional readings of RJ experiences can prevent

394
See especially note 29, Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword. See also Leslie McCall, The Complexity of
Intersectionality (2005) 30:3 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. (These authors provide an excellent
account of the ubiquitous influence of intersectionality analysis in feminist studies).
395
See Kathleen Guidroz & Michele Tracy Berger, A Conversation with the Founding Scholars of Intersectionality
in Kathleen Guidroz & Michelle T. Berger, eds., The intersectional approach: transforming the academy through
race, class and gender (The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2009) 61. (The authors in this chapter organized a
conference call between the founding scholars of intersectional theory such as Kimberl Crenshaw, Nira Yuval-
Davis and Michele Fine to discuss the challenges that intersectionality has been facing in the academia and activist
circles).
396
See also Rachel E. Luft, Intersectionality and the Risk of Flattening Difference in Kathleen Guidroz & Michelle
T. Berger, eds., The intersectional approach: transforming the academy through race, class and gender (The Univ.
of North Carolina Press, 2009) 100.
186
recognition of those roles and structures, since both of them can be obscured by the supposedly

antisexist image of an intersectional approach and end up creating a situation of uncritical

validation and conformity. This subsection, therefore, identifies potential problems in

intersectional approaches, particularly, in sentencing circles.

As noted above, no feminist scholar has previously distinguished between positive

and negative aspects of intersectionality as applied to RJ, an important omission since this same

feminist approach plays an important role in RJ models with a specific ethnocultural component.

In fact, as indicated earlier, there is a scarcity of related research that has examined

intersectionality as an analytical tool that pits gender inequality against culture as a worrisome

trade-off, e.g., with non-Indigenous feminists pushing for more equality and offender

accountability and usually Indigenous participants and postcolonial/anti-racist activists pushing

for political self-determination and self-governance. An exception, however, is feminist scholar

Kathleen Daly who seems to be concerned with that delicate balance when she notes that

Indigenous groups (or the collectivity) emphasize offenders interests; while feminist groups

privilege individual victims interests in RJ experiences.397 As stressed in the introduction, Daly

proposes what she calls an intersectional politics of justice that can be equally critical of the

conflicts and competing interests that emerge in the different sites of contestation between

feminist and anti-racist groups as these relate to alternative justice practices.398

As noted previously, Daly claims that the sites of contestation are the inequality

caused by crime (between victims and offenders), social divisions (race and gender politics), and

individuals and collectivities (rights of offenders and victims).399 She believes that it is possible

to respond to these inequalities in a way that is not necessarily a matter of a zero sum game, i.e.,

397
See note 16, Daly, Seeking Justice, at 1.
398
See note 16, Daly, Seeking Justice, at 8.
399
Ibid.
187
an intersectional analysis is capable of avoiding leveraging one site of inequality over the other.

While I would agree with Dallys contention that intersectionality analysis has the capacity to

address all the intersecting sites of inequality equally, I also believe that there are overlooked

imbalanced versions of intersectional thinking that can reinforce zero sum expectations or even

worse, to perpetuate or reproduce inequalities caused by crime and by gender inequality

positions. Unlike Cameron, Daly and other intersectional feminists, I believe that intersectional

thinking within the RJ field can be misrepresented and appropriated to serve political

commitments not fully aligned with womens interests. More recently, even Kimberl Crenshaw

--- a seminal thinker in intersectionality theory --- recognized that, There's an imbalance in how

intersectionality gets used, mostly as a point of entry for gender but not as a point of entry for

race.400 She also observes that the differences between postmodernism, anti-essentialism, and

intersectional critiques are at the core of this imbalance generating, paradoxically, gender

underestimation.

Likewise, I have established that there is an imbalanced anti-essentialist tendency

in some intersectional approaches to RJ and domestic violence that slides towards gender

inequality underestimation; ultimately, leading to intersectional disempowerment and

intersectionality theory co-optation by non-women-centered interests. This imbalance

jeopardizes racialized womens positions by downplaying their need for security, offender

accountability and empowerment at an individual level, particularly, in situations of domestic

violence. In fact, I have noted in other parts of this paper that imbalanced versions of

intersectional thinking could be also divisive, uncritical and susceptible to co-optation by

interests not centered in the subjectivities and needs of racialized female victims of violence.

Such claims, needless to say, are the direct result of my previous articulation of the ubiquitous

400
See note 392 at 76.
188
presence of intersectional analysis within RJ and postcolonial Indigenous justice and have great

significance on how racialized women are perceived and treated in RJ settings, including

sentencing circles.

As we have seen, I have attributed the existence of the above-mentioned negative

features to certain epistemic vulnerabilities of intersectionality theory (i.e., tendency to radical

anti-essentialism) in conjunction with other relatively complex interactions with RJ self-

advocacy (i.e., cultural frame alignment) and multiculturalism theory vulnerabilities (i.e., the

paradox of vulnerability). All these practical forces plus political issues mean that what is

originally intended in intersectionality theory, i.e., emancipation and liberation of racialized

women affected by multiple systems of oppression and privilege, simply does not play out in the

real world. Internalized ethnocultural political ideologies and distorted intersectional approaches

can then lead to collective unjust decisions and underestimated perceptions of battered women in

RJ settings, especially, when these women express some discomfort with ethnocultural

restorative practices. In fact, the pervasive influence of intersectionality analysis makes it even

more susceptible to distortions because its good reputation among feminists can hide or skew

other values and objectives.

Until this point all these claims were developed in this work in a merely

speculative and correlational way. But, it is also important to contextualize the reality of those

claims of intersectional co-optation and disempowerment by stressing negative outcomes around

real restorative experiences that have the potential to jeopardize the lived experiences of women

victims of domestic violence. Ultimately, I try to demonstrate that possible distortions in

intersectional approaches are capable of the emptying out of the concept itself. I start with some

clarifications on sentencing circles in Canada and Australia, just to address some issues left open

in the previous chapters. Having made such clarifications, I move on to identify in a synthesized
189
selected literature on sentencing circles in Canada and Australia some indications that

imbalanced intersectional approaches may be appropriated to serve non-woman-centered

interests.

a) Sentencing circles: further clarifications

Three basic restorative models were initially described in chapter one: victim-

offender mediation/reconciliation, family group conferencing, and restorative sentencing circles.

However, I will give attention only to the last-mentioned restorative model. Sentencing circles

are employed as a sentencing method that incorporates culturally sensitive guidelines with the

purpose to determinate preferably non-custodial sentences for offences committed by Indigenous

offenders. To be more precise, I am referring to what Cameron and Cunliffe call judicially

convened sentencing circles judgments, i.e., a form of sentencing practice that takes into

consideration insights from respected members of an Indigenous community (e.g., Elders) and

other stakeholders (e.g., victims, offenders and their families and supporters) that are literally

organized in a circle at a courtroom or communal hall for sentencing an offender who is

somehow connected to that community.401 The general functioning of a sentencing circle has

already been described in a previous chapter.

It is largely accepted that the first sentencing circle was held in the Canadian

justice system. According to several sources, in 1992, the then Yukon territorial judge Barry

Stuart devised in R. v. Moses a sentencing mechanism under which restrictions on incarceration

401
See note 8, Cameron & Cunliffe, Writing the circle, at 12. (Hereafter, I will refer to judicially convened
sentencing circles judgments simply as sentencing circles. Although sentencing circles has been used either
principally or exclusively to Aboriginal offenders, there are accounts of non-aboriginal people with a connection to
Aboriginal communities being judged in sentencing circles schemes). For example, in R. v. Sellon, 172
Newfoundland Supreme Court Trial Division (unreported) (April 4, 1996). See note 13, Goel, Canadian Sentencing
circles, at 934-943 in a kindle e-book version. See also note 176.
190
measures were fully justified and community participation incorporated into the sentencing

process, on policy grounds compatible with customary Indigenous traditions and RJ practices.402

Stuart articulated the principles of sentencing circles in the following passage of his decision:

Currently the search for improving sentencing champions a greater role for victims of
crime, reconciliation, restraint in the use of incarceration, and a broadening of sentencing
alternatives that calls upon less government expenditure and more community
participation. As many studies expose the imprudence of excessive reliance upon
punishment as the central objective in sentencing, rehabilitation and reconciliation are
properly accorded greater emphasis. All these changes call upon communities to become
more actively involved and to assume more responsibility for resolving conflict. To
engage meaningful community participation, the sentence decision-making process must
be altered to share power with the community, and where appropriate, communities must
be empowered to resolve many conflicts now processed through criminal courts.403

Sentencing circles and analogous experiences with Indigenous-controlled courts

are seen in Indigenous and academic circles as legitimate attempts of redressing the colonial

exclusion of Indigenous people from legal and judicial decision-making.404 However, it should

be noted that the whole sentencing process occurs under the supervision and direction of an

official Judge, usually non-indigenous, who retains de facto power over the ultimate sentencing

outcome. This characteristic of sentencing circles has been a source of criticism from the

Indigenous community and some RJ academics. Dickson-Gilmore and Laprairie, for example,

argue that while the sentencing circle may contribute to an appearance of power-sharing, this

contribution is more illusory than real since the court retains both authority and jurisdiction to

impose whatever sentences the judge rather than the circle, decides or recommends for a
405
particular offender. Actually, sentencing circle experiences are entirely handled under the

auspices of the conventional legal system that also set clear limits on the sentencing outcomes. In

402
See, e.g., note 13.
403
See R. v. Moses, [1992] 3 C.N.L.R. at 118.
404
See note 319, Cunneen, Reviving RJ traditions, at 121.
405
See, e.g., note 8, Dickson-Gilmore & Laprairie, Will the Circle be unbroken, at 142. (Anyway, the collective
adjudication is largely respected by trial judges.
191
Canada, for example, this type of restorative circle follows the provisions of the Criminal Code,

section 718.2(e), which calls on courts to consider all available alternatives to incarceration for

Aboriginal offenders that are reasonable in the circumstances.406

The exact numbers of sentencing circles held in Canada are sketchy due to the

lack of formal written records in some cases, but anecdotal evidence suggests hundreds in

several Canadian provinces.407 Cameron remarks that there are a considerable number of

ongoing sentencing circle programs in several Canadian jurisdictions.408 The numbers may well

be dozens, perhaps almost a hundred sentencing circles and this suggests large acceptance of this

specific RJ model in Canada. Within the Australian context sentencing circles are also largely

accepted. The version of sentencing circles practiced there is a blend of indigenous and imported

elements that consolidated itself in the period following the international expansion of RJ

practices in the early 1990s. To be more accurate, Kathleen Daly observes that sentencing circle

schemes were adapted from the Canadian experience and then imported into Australia in

1992.409 Marchetti provides more details on the implementation and operation of sentencing

circles in Australia. She notes that there are over 50 Indigenous sentencing courts operating

in all Australian states and territories, except Tasmania. These courts were first established in

urban centres in South Australia (the first was opened in Port Adelaide, a suburb of Adelaide,

406
Ibid. (According to Cameron and Cunliffe, before the provisions of the Criminal Code the judge made use of
common law sentencing powers to justify sentencing circle schemes). See also Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46,
s. 718.2(e).
407
See, e.g., note 8, Dickson-Gilmore & Laprairie, Will the Circle be unbroken.
408
See note 2, Cameron, Literature Review.
409
See note 16, Daly, Seeking Justice, at 10. (Unlike Canadian sentencing circles, Daly observes that Australian
sentencing circles are organized as a regular part of the courts sentencing schedule. Nevertheless, Australian
sentencing circles like they Canadian counterpart do not enforce customary law, but ordinary criminal law.)
192
Australia on June 1, 1999) and today they operate under varied legislative frameworks and with

differing eligibility criteria (Marchetti & Daly, 2004, 2007).410

There are objective criteria recognized by case law in Canada to hold sentencing

circles. In R. v. Joseyounen Judge Fafard of Saskatchean Provincial Court established seven clear

criteria that are often quoted by subsequent case law and scholarly commentary:

(1) The accused must agree to be referred to the sentencing circle; (2) The accused must
have deep roots in the community in which the sentencing is held and from which the
participants are drawn; (3) There are Elders or respected non-political community leaders
willing to participate; (4) The victim is willing to participate and has been subjected to no
coercion or pressure in so agreeing; (5) The court should try to determine beforehand, as
best it can, if the victim is subject to battered women's syndrome. If she is, then she
should have counseling and be accompanied by a support team in the circle; (6) Disputed
facts have been resolved in advance; (7) The case is one which a court would be willing
to take a calculated risk and depart from the usual range of sentencing.411

In Australia, Potas et al. note that sentencing circles seek to incorporate the

following objectives:

(a) include members of Aboriginal communities in the sentencing process; (b) increase the
confidence of Aboriginal communities in the sentencing process; (c) reduce barriers
between Aboriginal communities and the courts ;(d) provide more appropriate sentencing
options for Aboriginal offenders;(e) provide effective support to victims of offences by
Aboriginal offenders; (f) provide for the greater participation of Aboriginal offenders and
their victims in the sentencing process; (g) increase the awareness of Aboriginal offenders
of the consequences of their offences on their victims and the Aboriginal communities to
which they belong; (h) reduce recidivism in Aboriginal communities.412

410
See Elena Marchetti, Indigenous Sentencing Courts and Partner Violence: Perspectives of Court Practitioners
and Elders on Gender Power Imbalances During the Sentencing Hearing (2010) 43: 2 The Australian and New
Zealand journal of Criminology 263281. See also Elena Marchetti & Kathleen Daly, Indigenous Sentencing Courts:
Towards a Theoretical and Jurisprudential Model (2007) 29 Sydney Law Review 415-443. (Identifying differences
between Indigenous sentencing circles and RJ experiences while recognizing that there are elements in common.
The authors also provide an informative table describing all Indigenous sentencing courts established in Australia
from June 20006 to January 2007. In addition, this table includes legislation and other directives that governs
establishment and procedures of those courts in all local contexts where such experiences are applied).
411
See R. v. Joseyounen, [1996] 1 C.N.L.R. 182. See also note 13.
412
See Ivan Potas; Jane Smart; Georgia Brignell; Brendan Thomas; Rowena Lawrie; Rhonda Clarke, "Circle
Sentencing in New South Wales: A Review and Evaluation" (2004) 8:4 Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 73.
193
 Judicially convened sentencing circles judgments provide the best empirical

framework for the identification of epistemic and political problems with intersectionality

analysis that may indicate possible damaging consequences to Indigenous women:413 This is

most notably because such models have been largely used to engage cases of intimate violence

in Indigenous settings.414 In fact, Goel notes that Canadian sentencing circles have been used in

domestic violence cases with Indigenous defendants for almost 15 years.415 In addition, they

have produced substantial analyses of feminist scholars committed to the two lines of

intersectional thinking: one more centered in collective ethnocultural political interests and the

other concerned with individual interests of battered women. The geographical context to be

considered is again mainly Canada and Australia.416 The rationale for this choice was already

clarified in previous chapters. But it is sufficient to say here that those countries are liberal

democratic systems that apply extensively hybrid justice constructs like sentencing circles, at the

same time seeking to assert Aboriginal rights for social justice and self-determination while

aligning these goals to RJ and its holistic and anti-retributive stances.

Although sentencing circles primary aim is to reach a sentencing outcome that

naturally balances offender rehabilitation with accountability, community empowerment and

victim healing (i.e., through safety and empowerment) they also bring new preoccupations to the

413
As earlier noted, the harmful consequences flowing from imbalanced intersectional approaches include a
number of negative positional outcomes to victimized women, such as physical and psychological re-victimization,
feelings of exclusion and alienation, and silencing before the primacy of communal interests.
414
Evidence in the case law supports this claim. In Canada, for example, Cameron and Cunliffe compiled the
following cases: R. v. Morris (2004), B.C.C.A 305, 186 C.C.C (3d) 549 [Morris, cited to C.C.C.]; R. v. Naappaluk,
[1994] 2 C.N.L.R 143 (Q.C. (Crim. Div).) [Naappaluk]; R. v. Bennett, [1992] Y.J. No. 192 (y. terr. Ct). (QL) [Bennett]; R.
v. Charleyboy, [1993] B.C.J. No 2854 (B.C. Prov. Ct. (Crim. Div).) (QL) [Charleyboy]; R. v. Green, [1992] Y.J. No. 217
(Y. Terr. Ct). (QL) [Green]; R. v. H.K.C. [1997] S.J. No. 577 (Sask. C.A). (QL) [H.K.C.]; R. v. J.J. (2004) N.L.C.A 81, 192
C.C.C (3D) 30 [J.J., cited to C.C.C.] and R. v. W.B.T., [1995] 132 Sask. R. 221 (sub nom. R. v. Taylor), 3 C.N.L.R. No.
167 (Sask. Q.B. ) (QL). See note 8, Cameron & Cunliffe, Writing the circle.
415
See note 13.
416
In fact, Australasia since New Zealand will be addressed as well, however, in a lesser degree of attention. The
reason for that is simple. Sentencing circles are more common in the Canadian and Australian contexts while in
New Zealand family group conferences plays a more dominant role.
194
field of restorative justice. According to Goel, for example, there are unstated political goals and

implications in those particular RJ models.417 She argues that sentencing circles are backed

politically and ideologically by the particular ambitions of Indigenous people, aimed at

autonomy/self-governance, expression/education and reassertion of traditional methods of

dispute resolution.418 Thus, sentencing circles adopt an ethnocultural approach in searching for

appropriate sentences for Indigenous offenders. The underlying premise when using sentencing

circles as part of such Aboriginal political projects is that they capture unique minority features

that can considerably affect sentencing outcomes. To fully understand these inherently political

variables and their effects on racialized women, we need to study them in a way that takes into

consideration such postcolonial discourses and the positioning of intersectionality theory within

that same context.

In fact, linking sentencing circles experiences to postcolonial processes has been

identified in the literature as an important problematic topic in the field of applied restorative

justice. According to Adjin-Tettey, postcolonial theory is a process of disengaging from Western

imperialism and fracturing and destabilizing hegemonic epistemology, colonial structures, and

domination.419 She also argues that sentencing circles are consistent with postcolonial remedial

justice approaches. Such restorative experiences --- as multicultural policies --- call for

recognition and respect for diverse ways of life, institutions, values and cultures, while also

aiming to remedy the consequences of colonial marginalization like overincarceration and over-

representation of Aboriginal people. However, Adjin-Tettey argues that there is an overlooked

emerging threat in those postcolonial additional goals of Indigenous people when using

sentencing circles. She questions whether or not communal ethnocultural political ambitions in

417
See note 13, Goel, Canadian Sentencing Circles, at 931-938 in a kindle e-book version.
418
Ibid.
419
See note 8, Adjin-Tettey, Sentencing Aboriginal offender, at 187.
195
sentencing circles have the potential to undermine individual victims' rights and safety. As she

puts it:

The process and outcome [of sentencing circles] can be influenced by community politics
in ways that undermine their transformative potential. Concerns that womens interests
and their need for protection might be compromised in some restorative justice initiatives
threaten to undermine their alleged goals since womens interests may be subordinated to
the interests of offenders and perceived community harmony.420 Brackets added

I shall return to this issue later, but it is pertinent to acknowledge since now that

the presence of intersectional approaches have an important role in the answers given to such

questions. Imbalanced intersectional approaches are inadvertently encouraging some

postcolonial feminists and Indigenous women to believe that sentencing circles and other RJ

experiences are always congruent with womens emancipatory values and needs, but the

statements central to that approach may be obscuring detrimental consequences to women by

privileging ethnocultural politics over individual gender inequality.

b) Imbalanced intersectional approaches in context: incorporating insights

Given the widespread appeal of intersectionality theory in feminist readings of RJ

interventions within Indigenous settings it might seem that this analytical frame would lead to a

unified perspective of the value and efficacy of such experiences.421 However, conflicting

conceptualizations of intersectional approaches left distinct traces in the observed performance

and subjective evaluation of sentencing circles and other RJ models. Notably, it fostered

divisiveness among intersectional feminists and between non-indigenous and indigenous women.

Intersectional feminists, program participants and RJ activists with a variety of interests and

420
Supra note at 193.
421
See note 30, Hancock, Intersectionality as a Research paradigm. (Describing the notion of intersectionality as a
widespread feminist method of research.) See also subsection V in the previous chapter.
196
focuses produced different and sometimes clashing visions of restorative justice.422 In Canada,

for example, intersectional feminists and grassroots activists assessing sentencing circles were

polarized into two roughly contrasting groups. On the one hand, we can find a group comprised

of feminist legal scholars, indigenous and non-indigenous women and anti-violence activists

who place strong emphasis on the roles that gendered inequalities and power differentials play in

the implementation and operation of sentencing circles in domestic violence cases and that,

usually, project distrust and criticism on such experiences.423 On the other, a distinct group

comprised of feminists and mainly Indigenous women who tend to suggest favorable outcomes

of restorative sentencing circles due to their potential benefits for anti-colonial and antiracist

objectives of Indigenous people (i.e., self-governance and autonomy).424 As Cameron has

observed, these feminists and Indigenous women view race and culture, and the effects of

422
But see note 349. (There is space for intermediary positions as Proietti-Scifoni, for example, has suggested. She
identified a three-way typology that challenges the dichotomous for and against debate in the literature.
According to her, at least among Aboriginal opinion leaders in New Zealand, there are supporters, sceptics, and
contingent thinkers regarding the appropriateness of using RJ in cases of intimate violence.) I concede that
reducing the complexity of the feminist debate over RJ in only two diametrically opposing sides is, admittedly,
somewhat of an oversimplification. There are, of course, many areas of both actual and potential agreement
between the sides, and it is possible to identify more nuanced approaches that blend aspects of each position
among feminist scholars and participants. However, the initial claims validity remains. Research is replete with
studies demonstrating the segregation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal woman in two conflicting sides concerning
RJ experiences. Likewise, feminists share different opinions according to their ideological views on the issue. See
note 349 at 14. (Listing examples of empirical literature where.) See also infra note.
423
For a detailed list of these authors: See note 15, Cameron, Stopping the Violence, at 53. (Cameron cites several
authors and groups that explicitly assume such position, e.g., Mary Crnkovich; Carol LaPrairie; Emma LaRoque,
Aboriginal Womens Action Network and Kelly MacDonald. I would include Cameron herself. [citations omitted].
As Angela Cameron explains, This group of writers and activists employ feminist theory and methodology
alongside various Aboriginal worldviews on gender roles and equality. Their work centres on the particular
oppressions faced by Aboriginal women, and their analysis of western RJ and Aboriginal justice is informed by
feminist and anti-racist perspectives. They speak both to colonial and patriarchal oppression of the Canadian state
and the oppression of a powerful male elite within their own communities).
424
Ibid at 55. (Cameron lists several Aboriginal authors and non-indigenous scholars and groups as well, e.g.,
Patricia Monture-Okanee; Therese Lajeunesse; Ross Gordon Green; Sharon Perrault and Jocelyn Proulx and the
Provincial Association of Transition Houses. [citations omitted]. She points out that, For these women, Aboriginal
culture (and sovereignty) is the primary tool to be used against colonialism.) See also Sara Mills, Post-colonial
Feminist Theory in Jackie Jones, ed., Contemporary feminist theories (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1998) 98. (Their stances are directly connected with postcolonial feminism, i.e., a strand of feminist theorizing
derived from mainstream postcolonial theory which centers around the conception that racism, colonialism, and
the long lasting effects detrimental (economic, political, and cultural) of colonialism in the postcolonial setting, are
inextricably bound up with the unique gendered realities of non-white, non-Western women.)
197
colonialism and oppression on racialized groups as the primary lens though which to evaluate RJ

programs in Indigenous communities.425 As she has put it:

Although such literature pays attention to gender and gendered violence, race and culture
is prioritized, leading these commentators to conclude that restorative justice should be
used in cases of intimate violence in racialised communities. In their view, restorative
justice not only protects survivors from violence, it plays the very important role of
426
protecting racialised offenders from the state.

In other words, some feminists and indigenous and non-indigenous women may

attempt to employ intersecting inequality categories (i.e., gender, ethnicity, race, culture) as a

signal that intersectional thinking embraces, above all, individual gender inequality concerns in

RJ experiments; a signal most often relevant to victims of domestic violence who are prioritized

in order to stress their needs for security, empowerment and offenders accountability (e.g.,

through public denunciation). In contrast, other feminist scholars and mainly Indigenous women

--- who give primacy to political in nature ethnocultural claims --- may also attempt to employ

those same intersectionalities as a signal that they have prioritized collectivist interests (e.g.,

spearheading self-determination) in the development and operation of sentencing circles, a signal

most often relevant to the political agenda of dominant groups within Indigenous communities

that seek to demonstrate their own fitness for culturally competent self-governance, particularly,

in face of the public, and the state.

Similarly, within Australia, some feminist scholars and Aboriginal women seem

to give more attention to collectivist ethnocultural considerations rather than individual gender

inequality imperatives within RJ initiatives. Australian RJ scholar Henry Blagg, albeit not

writing from an intersectional feminist perspective, argues that the principle of self-

425
See note 2, Cameron, Literature Review, at 30.
426
Ibid.
198
determination needs to be placed at the centre of restorative initiatives since it is a sine qua non

for the cultural and physical survival of Aboriginal people.427 His claim is echoed in the writings

of several Australian feminists, Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, whose work suggest an

intersectional explanation of the difficulties of Aboriginal men and women in RJ settings. For

example, Larissa Behrendet, Loretta Kelly (Aboriginal), Rowena Lawrie (Aboriginal) and

Winsome Matthews (Aboriginal) assign great worth to Aboriginal self-determination and,

although recognizing the plight of Aboriginal victims of violence in the colonization process,

they identify their own core commitments to political autonomy and self-governance of

Aboriginal people, and then select from the existing intersectionalities those which are best

suited to give those commitments more expression.428 Just to illustrate, Behrendet contends that

the legacy of colonization will end only when Indigenous sovereignty is fully recognized by

former colonized states allowing, e.g., Indigenous people jurisdiction and decision-making

powers through the inherent right of self-government.429 She concludes pointing out that, ()

the principles of self-determination and empowerment need to guide any restorative justice

strategy that seeks to navigate and negate the dynamics and forces that encourage family

violence to flourish.430

427
See Henry Blagg, Restorative Justice and Aboriginal Family Violence: Opening a Space for Healing in John
Braithwaite & Heather Strang, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2002) at 199.
428
See note 321, Kelly, Using Restorative Justice. See Larissa Behrendet, Lessons from the Mediation Obsession
Ensuring that Sentencig Alternatives Focus on Indigenous Self-Determination in John Braithwaite & Heather
Strang, eds., Restorative Justice and Family Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 178-190.
See Rowena Lawrie & Winsome Matthews Holistic Community Justice: A Proposed Response to Family Violence in
Aboriginal Communities (2002) 25 The University of New South Wales Law Journal 228-232. But see Pam Greer,
Aboriginal Women and Domestic Violence in New South Wales in Julie Stubbs, ed., Women, Male Violence and
the Law (Sidney, Sydney: Institute of Criminology, 1994) at 65. (Arguing the safety and offender accountability
should be the primary objectives in alternative justice experiences developed in Australia to cope with domestic
violence. She has noted that, While too many Aboriginal men have died in custody, too many Aboriginal women
have died in their communities. In two States more Aboriginal women have died in their communities than all of
the total national Aboriginal deaths in custody.)
429
Supra note, Behrendet, Lessons, at 190.
430
Ibid.
199
 Even in empirical research on sentencing circles this commitment to the

ethnocultural political assertion of Aboriginal self-determination seems to gain more emphasis

than the immediate needs of women victims of violence. In fact, how intersectionalities (e.g.,

race, culture, gender) are addressed in empirical research can communicate powerful messages

about what is valued and devalued in certain intersectional approaches. For example, recently RJ

scholar Elena Marchetti conducted an empirical study in the Australian states of Queensland and

New South Wales, exploring the extent to which gendered power imbalances are present in

Indigenous sentencing court hearings concerning intimate partner violence offending.431 She has

noted that, A decolonising and critical race approach was adopted when conducting the

interviews432 In other terms, she admitted to employing an intersectional approach as applied to

RJ within postcolonial settings.433 Therefore, she clearly identified herself as an intersectional

feminist and, consequently, opted to distinguish herself from mainstream feminism.

In practical terms, this meant that she shifted the focus from a mainstream

feminist binary-based explanatory model of domestic violence (i.e., female victim/ male

offender) to one in which intersecting systems of oppression and privileges were considered with

more emphasis. And inevitably, this also meant ethnocultural preoccupations with issues like

racism and colonialism and its past and present effects on the program participants surveyed.

Hence, Marchetti strategically focused her research process on analyzing how ethnocultural

insights from Elders and court practitioners could address power imbalances that can be present

during a sentence hearing for an intimate partner violence offence. Marchettis intersectional

approach, therefore, distanced her critical perspective from conventional issues of mainstream

431
The study was conducted in 2010. Supra note 408.
432
Supra note 408.
433
Ibid. (Marchetti points out that Aboriginal sentencing experiences cannot be considered restorative justice.
However, she also remarks in her research that they are comparable in several aspects like functioning and
values.)
200
feminist exploration in domestic violence (e.g., gender inequality between victim and offender),

albeit these were not totally absent. Accordingly, she restricted the scope of her research by

interviewing only Elders and court practitioners instead of victimized women and offenders.434

She here explains this omission:

Although Indigenous sentencing courts do not give Elders or community representatives

complete control over the process and final sentence, they do allow for the incorporation
of Indigenous knowledge in the sentencing process and in this way, transform the
sentence hearing into one that reflects Indigenous community values. However, little is
known about how such cultural participation affects an offender and whether such courts
can address power imbalances that may be present during a sentence hearing for an
intimate partner violence offence. The findings presented below explore this issue from
the perspectives of Elders, magistrates, court workers, and domestic and family violence
support workers.435

In doing so, Marchetti reflected an imbalanced intersectional approach by making

the Elders and court practitioners the only representative cross-section of the Aboriginal

community. Relying solely on influential representatives, such as court practitioners or Elders,

led to a biased representation of gender disciplinary norms, not only failing to capture the

existing heterogeneous perspectives, but worse failing to understand the versions that could

jeopardize marginalized community members like battered women. Consequently, the RJ and

intersectionality theory crucial task of giving voice to marginalized and oppressed women who

are battered was obscured by other collective intersectionalities like race, class, and colonialism.

Marchettis study overlooked the singular narrative accounts of victimized women to privilege

collective cultural components of RJ experiences and, therefore, failed to achieve a balanced

intersectional perspective. As a result, her findings reflected only a political ethnocultural

perspective of dominant elites in Aboriginal groups that naturally tended to favor collectivist

interests. Just to illustrate this point, in her research findings all Elders and court practitioners

434
Ibid. (It should be noted that Marchetti recognized the need to interview offenders and victims in future
research.)
435
Ibid at 271.
201
interviewed were clearly favorable to the use of the Indigenous courts in sentencing offenders of

intimate partner violence. Although Elders and Indigenous and non-Indigenous court

practitioners recognized the existence of power asymmetries, they poorly addressed mechanisms

of power imbalance between victims and offenders and, therefore, potential detrimental effects

to victimized women in the circles were overlooked.436 The omission of victims perspectives in

intersectional approaches like that is a strong indicator of intersectional disempowerment and is

another sign of imbalance attributable to the overemphasis given by some intersectional

feminists to political and ideological influences that result from ethnocultural collectivist views.

In a previous Australian study on sentencing circles the same sign of

intersectional disempowerment is noticeable, i.e., collectivist ethnocultural positions effectively

can efface womens positions in sentencing circles. Potas et al., analyzed 13 sentencing circles

cases in New South Wales Aboriginal communities. Similarly to Marchettis findings their

preliminary report suggested that Elders, offenders and Aboriginal communities see sentencing

circles as an unqualified success. As they have noted, In reviewing the effectiveness of circle

sentencing it has been difficult to find any real deficits.437 In addition, they observed that

ethnocultural claims for self-empowerment of Aboriginal communities should be at the center of

that experience. As they have put it:

One of the aims of circle sentencing is to empower Aboriginal communities in the

sentencing process. Clearly the current trial has achieved this a considerable number of
Aboriginal people from the Nowra community have been directly involved in circle
sentencing both as victims and offenders, but also as Aboriginal community representatives,
support people for victims and offenders, and service providers assisting in the
implementation of sentences.438

436
Ibid at 278.
437
See note 410, Potas et al, Circle Sentencing in NSW, at part 4.
438
Ibid.
202
 Commenting on the above research, Julie Stubbs has observed that, although two

sentencing circles analyzed by Potas et al. were related to domestic violence cases, no mention

of any safety planning or follow-up with victims was suggested in the sentencing outcome.439

Actually, Stubbs noted that victims expectations were superficially addressed in the program

design. As she has noted, Most victims reported that they had been unclear about what to expect

and were unprepared for the emotional intensity of the process.440 In addition, she has observed

that the report gave strong emphasis to the role played by Elders in legitimizing the sentencing

process. As she put it, The Aboriginal Elders were seen as the greatest strength of the program,

instilling moral and values and lending authority and legitimacy to the process441 However, to

acknowledge the influence of Elders in the functioning of sentencing circles does not necessarily

mean that such participation is always positive to victimized women, especially because they are

the most important articulators of ethnocultural political claims within Indigenous settings. That

said, while Elders accord with the collective importance of sentencing circles in reaffirming self-

governance and autonomy in Justice matters they may not give adequate importance to the need

to protect victimized women from further harm. Womens voices remain silenced in the circles

due to communal tolerance to domestic violence, for instance. Actually, the accommodation of

ethnocultural political goals conveyed by Elders and respected persons, historically seen as

community mediators in Indigenous settings, may end up threatening even more the positions of

racialized women. In reality, within Canada, where sentencing circles have been studied for

twenty years, some feminist scholars like Goel; Adjin-Tettey; Cunnliffe and Cameron have

identified several negative effects of the political influence of collective ethnocultural claims in

the functioning of sentencing circles.

439
See note 6, Stubbs, RJ and Gendered Violence, at 1696-1703 in a Kindle e-book version.
440
Ibid.
441
Ibid.
203
 Returning to insights devised by feminist scholars Rashmi Goel and Adjin-Tettey,

for instance, it is possible to develop a number of compelling arguments about the narrow-

minded biases and blind spots that an intersectional approach may have due to its interactions

with collectivists ethnocultural political commitments to Indigenous groups.442 Moving from the

RJ theoretical framework to that of postcolonial political considerations, Goel and Adjin-Tettey

have identified points of self-deception in intersectional approaches and distortions in the

functioning of RJ experiences within the Canadian context. As noted in the previous subsection,

Goel has argued that Aboriginal people in Canada through a history of colonial subjugation and

oppression come to apply restorative-like experiences with three specific political goals: 1)

Expression and education; 2) Autonomy and self-governance and, finally; 3) Integration.

With respect to expression and education Goel states that Indigenous

communities view restorative experiences, and sentencing circles in particular, as an opportunity

to convey their philosophical and spiritual ideas and insights to internal and external audiences.

This means that historically constructed causes of societal problems in Aboriginal communities

can be denounced in sentencing circles by addressing issues like colonialism, alcohol/drug abuse

and endemic racism --- within and outside of the justice system. As she puts it, In other words,

the circle serves as an opportunity to highlight the victimization of Aboriginal people at the
443
hands of the majority community. Therefore, intersectionality theory depicts Aboriginal

people within RJ settings through a rhetorical mode of victimization, bringing into discussion the

colonial historic context, victim story-telling, and the semantics of oppression to challenge

stereotypical perceptions of Aboriginal people.

442
See note 13, Goel, Canadian Sentencing Circles, at 1010-1016 in a kindle e-book version.
443
Ibid.
204
 Another political goal is autonomy and self-governance. According to Goel, the

circle can also represent an opportunity to involve Aboriginal people with the control of their

own destiny. This means greater cultural and judicial autonomy for Aboriginal people. In

addition, the circle can also mean political integration, i.e., it may help to establish healthy

interactions between Aboriginal perspectives and Western justice. As Adjin-Tettey points out,

sentencing circles, () are seen to have better chances of rehabilitation, the reduction of

recidivism, and the promotion of a just, peaceful, and safe society.444 But circles political and

legal benefits have to be balanced against the risk of undermining womens positions. In the next

subsection I address some of these risks.

c) Detrimental effects of collective ethnocultural political claims

Rashmi Goel has observed that collective political goals can undermine the

effective function of circles in some sentencing goals. With respect to rehabilitation, for

example, she has observed that some circles spend considerable time discounting offenders

behavior by recounting their personal histories as victims of social injustice and acknowledging

colonial factors that contributed to it.445 As noted in a previous chapter, Goel points out that

sentencing circles can easily leave the impression that Elders --- who probably once experienced

racism and colonial injustice in their own lives --- can treat eligible offenders as less culpable for

their acts than non-Aboriginal offenders.446 Moreover, they can convey the notion that

conventional punishment is always inappropriate even when the offender can be considered a

repetitive or violent aggressor. In other words, the ethnocultural political approach of unbalanced

sentencing circles can compromise victims safety by having an excessive focus on offenders

444
See note 8, Adjin-Tettey, Sentencing Aboriginal offender, at 180-181.
445
Supra note 440.
446
Ibid.
205
vindication and rehabilitation. Adjin-Tettey points out that a failure to account for and be

cognizant of these specific gendered-effects of political ethnocultural claims can have a

significant effect of further alienating women in particular and, more generally, hindering the

success of sentencing circles. As she writes:

Focusing on decolonization or reversing the legacies of colonization could thus render

womens victimization (both from colonization itself and the resulting social
disintegration) invisible. Although it is important during sentencing to recognize the
disadvantaged background of Aboriginal offenders that may have contributed to their
commission of the offence in question, the harmful effects of the victimization of
Aboriginal women (who are obviously disadvantaged as victims of colonization) must
not be trivialized. A tension may thus appear between the collective interest in
decolonization and the immediate interests of victims and the public to see and feel that
justice has been done in the situation.447

With respect to self-governance, Goes argues that the desire for autonomy and

empowerment can make Indigenous communities overestimate their ability to control offenders

and underestimate the resources required to operationalize RJ stated goals in relation to them. As

a result, offenders can see sentencing circles as an easy way out of harsher penalties --- and make

them more likely to enter in the circles with mental reservations. As she notes, This brings into

question not only the ability of the community to provide the necessary rehabilitative support

(Green 1998; Orchard 1998), but also the offenders genuine desire to change.448 Furthermore,

in line with the political ethnocultural narrative style of restorative circles, Indigenous

communities can see sentencing circles as a culmination of their anti-racist and anti-colonial

struggles. Here, however, sentencing circles function not as a symbol of an alternative justice

practice aiming to promote victims interests (i.e., security, empowerment and offenders

accountability), but rather as an affirmation of Aboriginal perceptions of self-empowerment and

the overcoming of colonial hegemonic forces. As Goel puts it, Community input may however

447
Ibid at 1043-1050.
448
Ibid.
206
be compromised by political goals. In particular the desire for self-government may force a

unified front, especially vis--vis the state. Some participants may concede with the positions

enunciated by Elders, even when at heart they disagree, so that the views expressed in the

sentencing circles may not always be the real view of community members.449

Finally, Goel argues that the communitys political goals can play a part in the

silencing of the womens individual histories, reinforcing the fact that the representation of

domestic violence survivors within sentencing circles has not been adequately resolved and

remains deeply problematic.450 She observes, for example, that women may be reluctant to

charge abusers because of the treatment Indigenous men receive within the conventional justice

system. In addition, self-government impairs a victims ability to advocate for herself. According

to Goel, in the Aboriginal way, women have a tendency to put the community before themselves.

This means that they go along with the community view of the correct sentence, even at the cost

of their own disparate opinions. As Goes has noted, Finally, the importance of supporting a

uniquely Aboriginal response to the problem is also voiced by community leaders, only

increasing the pressure on victims to toe the line.451 In other words, Indigenous women who are

victims of domestic violence can find themselves between two appealing choices: They are

wedged between a perceived need to advance their communal ethnocultural political claims in

the face of the state and the desire to express an individual identity and their perception of

449
Ibid. (As we have seen, this is very similar to articulation of the paradox of multicultural vulnerability)
450
Ibid. See also note 8, Cameron & Cunliffe, Writing the Circle at 18-20. (Cameron and Cunliffe have observed that
institutional accounts produced by trial judges in sentencing circles decisions also attempt to rationalize offenders
behaviour and, usually, assume an apologetic tone. In addition, they have identified through a review of case law
that issues, aspects, and concerns related to survivors of domestic violence within sentencing circles were
disregarded, poorly addressed, or avoided in trial records. They observed that survivors can be absent in trial
judgements records in three ways. As they put it, First and most simply, in two of the trial decisions, the judge
makes no reference whatsoever to the presence of the survivor in the sentencing circles. Second, in several
decisions, the trial judge records that the survivor was present when the sentencing circle occurred but fails to
describe the nature and extent of the participation or to record her words. Finally, the trial decisions
overwhelmingly disregard the need to ensure that the sentencing circles is conducted in a way that reassures the
survivor of the community's concern for her safety and emotional well-being.)
451
Ibid at 1084-1092.
207
themselves as a vulnerable group within a minority with which they share a history of

oppression. In short, Indigenous women are caught between a proverbial rock and a hard place.

d) Intersectionality and uncritical validation of ethnocultural political claims

As noted earlier, intersectionality theory is just one theoretical underpinning

through which feminist researchers have examined RJ initiatives. However, its importance

became more pronounced within Indigenous settings because of its resonance with postcolonial

and anti-racist claims embedded in RJs ethnocultural political discourses for self-governance

and autonomy. As also noted in previous subsections, some intersectional feminists interpreting

RJ experiences within Indigenous settings tend to be, above all, in the service of their own anti-

racist and anti-colonial critical views of the conventional criminal justice system and this can

take the form of uncritical validation of alternative RJ practices seen as more legitimate and

culturally competent. Although racialized womens positions are not fully secure against further

harm or exclusion within RJ experiences analogous to Indigenous justice practices, claims of

empowerment of the community and anti-colonial benefits are often present in such

ethnocultural intersectional approaches. In fact, the very intersectional understanding of culture

in such cases proves to be much more essentialist than anti-essentialist in nature and direction.

Ultimately, imbalanced versions of intersectionality present culture as an essentialist concept that

is spatially and temporally predetermined. It is used to represent some sort of homogenized-

culture without any qualification or interrogation of its usage and without reference to

overlapping and multiple aspects of cultural identity. As a matter of fact, intersectional feminists

with strong anti-colonial inclinations insist on treating culture as if it were synonymous with

political claims for self-determination and self-governance: In pursuing one the other is also

achieved, they seem to believe. In this simplistic view, the community life and collective

208
ethnocultural politics gain more space than the needs of survivors of domestic violence. Culture

gains primacy over individual rights and liberties. Hence, some intersectional feminists tend to

exalt culture and collective political gains in detriment of victims interests and needs that should

matter most, especially in an allegedly feminist approach.

Those political and ethnocultural conceptualizations of intersectional thinking

have been limited by a myopic reading of sentencing circle experiences. Although professing to

serve or represent a feminist cause or professing to be critical or transformative, they are actually

incapable of detecting and denouncing the preexisting patriarchal structures and power

asymmetries between offenders and victims that effectively silence and further alienate battered

women. The reason for that is rather simple. The political commitments that drive unbalanced

intersectional approaches shift from individual issues or grievances from victimized women to

collectivist political interests. This indicates that intersectional efforts may be channeled into a

feminist analytical tool with the paradoxical effect of making womens interests recede in

priority. Even if those collectivist ethnocultural interests can be considered legitimate --- and

essentially they are --- there is also a need to understand that battered womens individual needs

may remain unaccounted for, as we have seen above. This means that they remain subordinated

by gender disciplinary identity roles and patriarchal discourses that minimize or ignore the value

of placing the needs and views of battered women at the center of the RJ encounter, even though

such placement is an absolutely critical factor for ending domestic violence. In fact, there

appears to be an emerging tendency of intersectional thinking to be appropriated by political

interests not fully coincident with womens emancipatory aims. Below, I will further discuss

these indications of co-optation that appear to relate to certain ethnocultural conceptualizations

of intersectionality, with the caveat that this assertion is valid only where intersectional

disempowerment occurs.

209
 e) Tendencies to co-optation

As already seen in the introduction, intersectionality theory is a feminist approach

with a value base aimed at social justice outcomes. As a consequence, intersectional approaches

are inherently political in implication and emancipatory in purpose. This means that

intersectional approaches emphasize purposeful policies whose goal is the application of

scholarly methodologies to achieve sustainable pragmatic outcomes for the benefit of oppressed

women. Besides that, much of intersectionality theory potential for social justice stems from its

anti-essentialist ability to effectively address the claims of pre-existing heterogeneous narratives,

i.e., the uniqueness of a specific individual or group claim, even while this individual or group

may share inequality markers with other individuals or groups (e.g., domestic violence affects

differently middle-class white women, and poor, marginalized women of color). However, as

noted earlier, in some imbalanced intersectional approaches, the promotion of gender equality as

a form of intersectional justice has been sacrificed to a simplistic --- albeit rather pragmatic ---

ideology of collective ethnocultural self-empowerment. This shift of direction in intersectional

approaches is a clear sign that co-optation and misrepresentation are increasingly --- and

insidiously --- emptying out the transformative and critical attributes of intersectional thinking.

In particular, the appropriation of intersectionality theory by parallel ethnocultural

politics is evidenced through a shift in declared goals. The original intersectional goals of

revealing socially and culturally constructed gendered categories of discrimination and privilege

appear to have been set aside in the name of postcolonial theory platforms and values. In this

context, as noted in the previous chapter, a new tension has emerged across intersectional

perspectives guiding RJ experiences. On one side we see feminists, often focused on the resolute

defense of womens individual concerns; on the other side feminists focused on ethnocultural

210
political agendas. By ethnocultural political agendas, I mean collectivist political interests (e.g.,

self-government and autonomy) that can potentially downplay antisexist priorities normally set

by intersectional feminist approaches in cases of domestic violence. As a consequence,

conventional feminist critical concerns for security, agency and offender accountability are

appeased through the appearance that such issues are being adequately addressed and, as a result,

no longer need to be engaged. By employing the language of collective self-empowerment,

autonomy, and self-governance, ethnocultural-inflections of intersectional thinking assume a

pseudo-feminist stance. Such rhetoric suggests --- galvanizing political support from some

feminist perspectives --- that domestic violence is above all a sub-product of colonization

processes that can be neutralized through community empowerment and self-determination.452

Although domestic violence within Aboriginal settings cannot be understood apart

from the broader cultural and political history of which they are a part, domestic violence is also

a complex phenomenon involving much more than a colonial hangover. The above mentioned

misrepresentation about community empowerment as a kind of magic-bullet, albeit a well

intentioned one, may contribute even more to womens effacement within RJ settings through

the false perception that ethnocultural claims can ensure a meaningful place to women in RJ

encounters. Unfortunately, despite valuable insights, community empowerment is certainly not a

panacea for domestic violence in Indigenous communities. Through silence and alienation, as we

have seen earlier, the intersectional feminist promise of political and personal transformation

proves to be an unfulfilled ambition since individual experiences of gender inequality and power

452
See note 8, Goel, No women at the center, at 299-312. (According to Goel, for example, colonialism fostered
violence against women in Indigenous communities in three ways: By reducing the power and status of Aboriginal
women by stifling the values and traditions which protected and honoured them; stripping Aboriginal people of
their culture and proffering European values in return; decimating any opportunities women had to hold power
and by validating violence against women as a way to resolve domestic disputes.)
211
differentials within RJ settings are rendered invisible as they are folded into and subsumed under

parallel ethnocultural political agendas.

With this display of pseudo-feminist ideas, intersectionality is open to

assimilation with political agendas being prescribed by non-woman-centered interests and

intersectional insights being used to validate RJ experiences without careful consideration of the

implications of bringing into discussion such issues. As Luft and Ward have warned, The fact

that intersectionality has developed intellectual, political, and moral capital, however, has

created unintended consequences. The extent to which it has become a trend with leverage

means it is also being appropriated to less than intersectional ends.453 They also have observed

that, When not joined to intersectional practice, intersectional intonations function as a kind of

credentialing, an appropriation used to mask an anti-intersectional orientation.454 I am of the

same mind with regard to the RJ social movement and ethnocultural cooptive processes, i.e., the

language of intersectionality can serve to convey political claims that are divorced from the lived

reality of battered women and, ironically, can be appropriated to veil hierarchical power relations

of domination and subordination, inclusion and exclusion. Such a trend does a disservice to the

transformative and social justice aims of intersectionality theory as applied to restorative justice.

Rachel Luft, who understood both the irony and the paradox of intersectional co-optation long

before other intersectional theorists, wrote, As more movement actors adopt intersectional

frameworks without substantive pursuit of intersectional aims --- whether out of naivet or a

more insidious adherence to hegemonic investments --- the disconnect contributes to

mystification and cooptation.455 It is therefore important that feminist scholars, RJ advocates

453
See Rachel E. Luft and Jane Ward, "Toward an Intersectionality just out of reach: Confronting challenges to
intersectional practice" in Vasilikie P. Demos & Marcia Texler Segal, eds., Perceiving gender locally, globally, and
intersectionally (Howard House, Emerald Publishing ltda., 2009) at 16.
454
Ibid at 17.
455
See note 394 at 103.
212
and practitioners are conscious of the cultural, social, political and other forces that contribute to

such tendencies of co-optation. Only this way can they also reveal key intersections between RJ

initiatives and the influence of other contextual factors like RJ cultural frame alignment, the

paradox of multicultural vulnerability, and the political ethnocultural appropriation of

intersectional thinking that, as we have seen, predominantly situate Aboriginal women in the

awkward position of perpetuating their own oppression and subordination through the

justification of restorative practices in their communities.

f) Other implications: RJ international expansion and the perils of

intersectional imbalance

In this subsection, I point out potential research implications drawn from the

current process of international expansion and commodification of restorative justice. This

subsection briefly examines the ways that RJ programs like sentencing circles are transplanted

from one geographical context to another. I highlight the example of sentencing circles in

Canada and Australia. In addition, I establish that intersectional disempowerment may also be a

potential problem when other countries marked by processes of conquest and colonization seek

to embrace the idea of RJs cultural competence without caution. I conclude arguing that

intersectional feminists analyzing such program exports should be aware of ethnocultural

conceptualizations of intersectionality theory when dealing with RJ within the context of

domestic violence and, therefore, about the risks of co-optation of intersectional approaches by

non-women-centered political interests.

While RJ practitioners and activists have been active in Canada and the United

States since the 1970s, RJ scholars and advocates began to adopt transnational networking as an

advocacy strategy only in the early 1990s. Moving into the 1990s there was a rapid progress and

213
spread of RJ initiatives at an international level, especially with the promotion of restorative

models as less retributive, individualistic and more focused on collective responsibility. It was

estimated, for example, that by mid-2000s well over 100 countries used some form of restorative

practice in addressing criminal justice cases.456 However, as we have seen previously, the rapid

international growth of RJ initiatives resulted much more from advocacy strategies and grass-

roots efforts than strong empirical evidence supporting restorative promises. Actually, RJ

advocates lobbying efforts in the eighth (1990), ninth (1995) and tenth (2000) United Nations

congresses for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders were those responsible for

the incorporation of the RJ social movement into the international arena with such visibility and

prevalence. In these congresses much of their work focused on educating international criminal

justice policymakers about RJ while lobbying UN members into lending their support to the idea

itself. As a consequence, they succeeded in convincing UN members to approve an international

document that gathered in one place all basic policies for the use of RJ, i.e., the UN Declaration

of Basic Principles on the use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters.457 And

most importantly, the declaration also called for countries to specifically create laws and

programs to begin dealing with restorative justice. In short, that document allowed RJ advocates

to put their message on the agendas of several international policymakers and lawmakers. In

addition, RJ advocates formed transnational networks that multiplied their lobbying power

throughout the world. Nowadays, there are a number of associations of RJs practitioners and

NGOs like the Centre for Justice and Reconciliation at Prison Fellowship

456 Th
See Daniel Van Ness, An Overview of Restorative Justice Around the World (Paper presented to the 11
United Nation Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 22 April 2005) [unpublished]
457
See David J. Cornwell, ed., Criminal punishment and Restorative Justice: Past, present, and future perspectives
(Winchester, UK: Waterside Press, 2006) at 114. See also note 23. (The UN Declaration of Basic Principles on the
use of RJ programmes, also calls for countries to specifically create laws and programs to begin dealing with
restorative justice).
214
(www.restorativejustice.org) entirely dedicated to expanding RJ methodologies to every corner

of the world.

For this reason, RJ experiments have over the last two decades or more become an

increasing trend for international organizations and activists working on legal development

cooperation. Legal professionals, grassroots activists and criminologists rushed to attend RJ

international workshops on how to employ restorative methodologies in their own local

realities.458 Other professionals rushed to lead these workshops, given the growing demand for

specialists. Just to illustrate this trend, in Europe six international conferences on restorative

justice have been held since 1999. As Van Ness noted, In only twenty-five years, restorative

justice has become a worldwide criminal justice reform dynamic.459 There is no doubt RJ is a

hot subject, and it is a global phenomenon.

Besides advocacy activism and transnational networking the RJ exponential

international expansion is partially due to a process of taking programs and experiences

developed by proponents and state partners in one setting and replicating them in another setting

with minor adaptations. As Cornwell has observed, citing insights from Robert Cormier, one of

the messages conveyed by RJ proponents is that restorative justice is an exportable and

importable commodity on an international scale, capable of being translated into practice in

different cultures while still adhering to its own specific principles and vision.460 In fact, RJ

processes are relatively easy to transport and apply in different settings precisely because the

458
In fact, my first personal contact with restorative justice was in a workshop organized in Brazil, my home
country, in 2004 by a visiting mission from New Zealand composed of scholars and legal professionals involved
with restorative experiments in juvenile justice. On that occasion, I was attracted to the Indigenous roots of
restorative practices in New Zealand and the culturally competent features of restorative justice. Being myself of
Indigenous descent and with an interest in informal justice only made the RJ concept more attractive, at least, as a
first impression.
459
See note 451.
460
Supra note 454.
215
processes of colonization, and its effects, are pretty homeogenous allowing similar

manifestations of non-conventional justice practices. A good example of how this works in

practice are sentencing circles, which were imported from Canada to Australia by RJ activists

and advocates and ultimately accommodated by the Australian state in its legal system with

minor changes. In particular, RJ experiences like sentencing circles have been heralded as

something that has successfully addressed the needs and interests of Indigenous communities

in Canada and Australia. As Cornwell has observed, the Canadian perspective bears remarkable

similarities to that from Australia and New Zealand in relation to the extent to which particular

ambitions and culture of Indigenous peoples have been afforded recognition within

considerations of criminal justice.461 As he puts it, This has, to some extent, opened the door to

wider application of restorative principles within the mainstream debate and the determination of

criminal justice policies and legislation.462 However, as we have seen, this process of

transplanting culturally competent RJ programs from one country to another makes it necessary

at times to align the feminist intersectional approach with the ethnocultural political rhetoric of

Indigenous dominant elites in order to attract support and gain legitimacy before the group, the

majority and the state. As a result, there is a blend of ethnocultural rhetoric and intersectional

feminists concerns within RJ experiences. But they can be blended so fully, that they also merge

into preexisting patriarchal and sexist relationships, where intersectional approaches may

completely lose their critical and transformative potential. As an unintended consequence,

Indigenous womens individual positions can be neglected or downplayed in that process.

Furthermore, several other regions marked by processes of conquest and

colonization and with large populations of marginalized Indigenous people may be attracted to

461
Ibid at xvii.
462
Ibid.
216
embrace the idea of restorative culturally competent initiatives to deal with domestic violence.

As noted earlier, RJ activists and advocates have developed an efficient transnational network

preoccupied with the international promotion of RJ models. Indeed, RJ has over the last two

decades or more become a valuable commodity ready to be exported or imported whenever

required. South America, my native region, is a prime example of a prospective market for RJ

experiences. In particular, because RJ methodologies are not yet fully incorporated or developed

into the legal frameworks of most of the countries of the region due to a variety of reasons such

as the historic reliance on retribution and punishment lately exacerbated by penal populism; lack

of social capital to organize communities around informal justice initiatives; resistance of legal

professionals; poorly institutionalized programs carried out by untrained volunteers or NGOs;

lack of funding and a Romano-Germanic legal tradition that does not allow the exercise of great

discretion about whether or not to prosecute.

As a consequence, in the region there are only pilot projects mainly designed to

address juvenile justice or post-conflict reconciliation processes due to top-down importation

of RJ programs. Now RJ pilot projects are underway in Argentina, Colombia, Brazil and Peru,

where the idea is not employed for cases of domestic violence, despite some exceptions, and not

everybody thinks it is a great idea, especially feminists.463 Nevertheless, there is a growing

demand from Indigenous groups in countries like Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Ecuador, Colombia

and Venezuela for informal and culturally competent adjudication methodologies in expectation

of Indigenous self-determination advancements.464 Although there are not Indigenous justice

463
See Pedro Scuro, Regional Review Latin America in Gerry Johnstone & Daniel W. Van Ness, eds., Handbook
of Restorative Justice (Portland, Oregon: Willan Publishing, 2007) 500-510 (This Brazilian author provides an
account of the development of RJ initiatives in Latin America under a sociological perspective).
464
See Willem Assies, Gema Van der Haar, & A. Hoekema, eds. The Challenge of Diversity, Indigenous Peoples and
Reform of the State in Latin America (Amsterdam: Thela Thesis, 2000).( More recently, Article 5 of the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides for the right of indigenous peoples () to
maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions () which includes
217
experiences based directly in RJ methodologies currently functioning in the region, it is only a

matter of time until one of the countries of the region imports an RJ-like model to deal with the

specific needs of that ethnic group. However, as noted above, the formulaic incorporation and

use of imbalanced RJ models, especially when rhetorical strategies related to ethnocultural

political claims are present, may hide risks for victimized women within Indigenous settings. For

example, by perpetuating harmful and oppressive sexist practices within their own cultural

groups like communal tolerance to battering. For this reason, the notions of intersectional

disempowerment and potential detrimental effects of the appropriation of feminist views by

political ethnocultural discourses within RJ settings are problems that policymakers and law-

makers in prospective RJ markets may want to address since the assessment of restorative

outcomes may vary according to the persuasion of those ethnocultural political claims.

3. Summary of conclusions and recommendations

The central thesis of this paper focused primarily on the problem of conventional

views of the use of intersectionality theory within the context of the RJ movement. The

introductory claim was that some intersectional stances could fail to address gender inequality ---

mainly within Indigenous settings --- and this resulted in misleading assessments of RJ

experiences as applied in cases of violence against women. In particular, the underlying question

was whether or not feminist intersectional critical analysis could be neutralized either by its own

epistemological vulnerabilities (i.e., radical anti-essentialism), or by other cooptive forces

present in the RJ field (e.g., RJ cultural frame alignment and ethnocultural political demands).

My research findings suggest that it can in both cases. The following paragraphs summarize key

justice systems compatible to Indigenous perception of justice). See UN General Assembly, Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, General Assembly, Res. 61/295, UN Doc A/RES/61/295 (2007).

218
findings, at the same time suggesting some conclusions drawn from the study. I conclude making

some recommendations to prevent the problem of the neutralization of the critical attributes of

intersectional thinking by non-women-centered discourses.

Initially, this study established that the RJ movement evolved from a complex

array of distinct and sometimes overlapping strands of grassroots activism, socio-legal

scholarship and political claims such as the social movements of the 1960s and1970s; the

victims advocates movement; penal abolitionism; the feminist movement and insights from

Indigenous and spiritual conceptualizations of justice. The result was a fragmented theoretical

and empirical movement with no general agreement concerning a unifying conceptual structure.

Indeed, as noted earlier, whether a process, outcome, or model is deemed RJ will likely vary

according to the ideological affiliations; theoretical background; ethnic identity, and even the

spiritual beliefs of the evaluator. In this sense, different RJ theorists and practitioners have

different conceptions of restorative justice. Thus, I have reached the conclusion that the RJ

definition is what William Gallie in 1956 called an essentially contested concept, i.e., we cannot

reach agreement about the criteria for its application because they combine a general agreement

on the abstract notion that the idea represent with continual disagreements about what they might

mean in practice.465 I have also argued that this lack of definitional clarity is not an impediment

to sketching out the main characteristics of the RJ movement.

Indeed, I have advanced the notion that RJ is an umbrella term encompassing

various types of processes and outcomes, held together only by the following descriptive

elements --- though not necessarily present in all RJ models: 1) Crime is considered a harm

against individual and communal relationships; 2) no fact-finding judicial adjudication, i.e., the

465
See note 53.
219
wrongdoer has admitted partial or total responsibility for offending; 3) problem-solving

orientation not concerned with punishment; 4) informal dialogue-driven encounters or

conferences making room for the personal involvement of those mainly concerned with the

wrongdoing, i.e., the offender and the victim (or a surrogate), but also their families and

communities; 5) requires follow-up and accountability mechanisms for offenders and victims; 6)

the need for an holistic approach and; 7) It is hoped that the processes and/or outcomes will deter

offenders from further lawbreaking and provide some form of reintegration into the community,

although neither may really be achieved. In addition, a great diversity of models exists among RJ

initiatives, but in general they are summarized in the following: 1) faith-based victim-offender

reconciliation programs (VORPs) and community work-based victim offender-mediation

(VOMs) programs; 2) family group conferences (FGCs) and restorative circles. Although there

are several eloquent accounts and anecdotal assessments of the positive impact of RJ models in

terms of victims satisfaction and offender reintegration into the community, little reliable

research has been done to assess the real impact of restorative practices on recidivism, criminal

justice, or offenders accountability. In fact, it is still unclear whether or not RJ practices are able

to deliver their promises to all stakeholders.

Furthermore, I have demonstrated that at the outset the RJ intellectual movement

was originally conceived as part of a paradigmatic shift and, as such, represented a challenge to

the hegemonic discourse of the conventional criminal justice system in which was based on

retributive justice theories. Therefore, RJ --- at least in its early years --- could be described as a

radical social movement. This contention that RJ was a radical social movement is justified by

its initial orientation towards a fundamental change in the criminal justice system that

emphasized new protagonists in the criminal justice systems (victims, offenders and community

rather than professional judges or attorneys); replacement of structures (informal procedures

220
rather than a formal adversarial due process of law); and new principles and values (repairing the

harm rather than punishment); all of which were outside those already in existence in the

conventional justice system.

However, I also established that this claim was indeed a rhetorical device that

ignored powerful countervailing considerations such as the operational proximity between RJ

and the conventional criminal justice system, and specific components of retributive justice that

with some modifications could also be important elements of restorative justice. In reality, the

rupture with the conventional justice system and retributive (and deterrence) theory never come

to reality. As a matter of fact, contrary to what some RJ proponents prescribe, the most striking

feature of the contemporary RJ scenario is the intensification of its ancillary relationship with the

conventional criminal justice system, especially, through the use of restorative experiences as

diversionary schemes. Actually, as I have argued, claims of a paradigmatic shift were an

advocacy strategy required to convert RJ proposals into something that could be more promptly

accepted by legal actors, scholars and the public who in general were disenchanted with the

conventional justice system. Most importantly, this stance of the RJ social movement led to a

mimetic self-advocacy discourse that exaggerated the resemblance of RJ experiences to

traditional forms of Indigenous justice.

Consequently, the RJ movement made itself more acceptable to Indigenous

people because of the idea that it contested the status quo --- the status quo represented by the

oppressing colonial criminal justice system --- increasing the willingness of individuals and

groups to participate in restorative justice experiences. Some Indigenous leaderships and

participants sensed a resonance in the making and understood RJ experiences fitting alongside

their own customary justice practices, albeit in essence this perception was only the result of the

cultural frame alignment of RJ as a social movement seeking space as a new alternative justice
221
system. Increasingly --- though scholars have differentiated between western RJ and those

justice experiences driven by Indigenous customary practices --- the so-called Indigenous Justice

and certain models of white-based restorative justice (mainly conference-based) have been more

difficult to distinguish from one another. In this context, the idea of RJ as a close relative to

Aboriginal perceptions of justice emerged as an opportunity for political rhetoric which

presented Indigenous people at the heart of decision-making in justice initiatives. However, this

politicization of RJ as applied in Indigenous settings stressed the collective experience of the

history of Aboriginal people in Canada and Australasia, but de-emphasized the role of the

individual, specially the victim, in its relationship to restorative justice.

This paper also analyzed the general critique of restorative justice. In my

summary of RJ critique, I have developed the notion of two great lines of reasoning that

challenged the RJ movement. The first category grouped criticisms around themes related to the

notion of RJ as a paradigmatic shift. They are directly tied to a set of arguments challenging the

questionable and manicheist opposition between restorative justice (depicted as good and

virtuous), and retributive justice (depicted as inherently bad) in the RJ proactive advocacy

strategy. In addition, I have established that RJ practices can be harmful, coercive or

manipulative in various ways towards stakeholders and especially victims. Notably, through the

privatization of crime in RJ theory (lack of public denunciation), the manipulation of offenders

and victims and, as critics have pointed out, by leaving power differentials and social, racial and

gender inequalities unexamined, unattended, and unchallenged.

In this sense the R. v. Naappaluk case provides a clear example of how ethno-

cultural political references can shape a restorative encounter in detrimental ways to victimized

222
women.466 This RJ encounter was the first judicially convened sentencing circle held in an Inuit

community in 1994 and was witnessed at first hand by feminist researcher Mary Crnkovich. She

had no doubt that she had witnessed a political contrived acting that was essentially negative to

women. According to her, there was no concrete connection to the victim 's life since all the

discussion was conveyed by the personal narrative strands of the Elders, the Judge and the

offender and its supporters, who seemed to be more interested in the advantages of Indigenous

justice than real life consequences to the female victim. Indeed, she observed that the female

victim felt isolated by an intimidating focus on the offender and community political interests.

She noted, for example, that the victim had had very few supporters and spoke only three times -

--when requested by the judge and Elders to do so--- during the entire restorative encounter.

Moreover, all the moral support lent by the circle was channeled to the offender benefit rather

than the victim empowerment. At least one political leader present in the circle expressed only

the concerns and wishes of the community. For these reasons, she concluded that the circle

outcomes were too pat and the focus highly suspect and those who cared for the victim had been

introduced to a meaningless and empty experience. As Crnkovich has put it:

The Sentencing Circle may have imposed an even greater silence. The circle was the first
of its kind, being supported by the Judge and Inuit leaders. If she spoke out about further
abuses or her dislike of this sentence, what would she be saying about this process every
one supported? Now, in addition to fearing her husband's retribution, she may fear by
speaking out against the community. The sentence created in this circle is one endorsed
not only by the mayor and other participants but by the judge and a highly respected Inuit
politician. The pressure to not speak out against a sentencing alternative supported by so
many is great. The victim may be afraid to admit she is being beaten [in later counselling
sessions] because such an admission, she may fear, may be interpreted as a failure of this
process. She may hold herself to blame and once again continue to suffer in silence.467

466
See R. v. Naappaluk note 414. (Jusip Naappaluk had plead guilty of assaulting his wife Kullutu Naappaluk. It was
Mr. Naappalucks fourth formal charge, but he admitted informally to the circle several other assaults to his wife.
No imprisonment was suggested and Mr. Naappaluk was put on probation under the supervision of the
community). See also note 13, Goel, Canadian Sentencing circles, at 72-74.
467
See Mary Crnkovich, A Sentencing Circle (1996) Journal of Legal Pluralism 36 159-181 at 172-173.
223
 The second category of criticisms was concerned with RJ as an appendage of the

conventional criminal justice system. According to this viewpoint, there is a fundamental

contradiction at the core of the RJ movement, i.e., its practical functioning as an adjunct of the

conventional criminal justice system rather than a replacement for it. Many critics, for example,

raised objections related to the rule of law, legal principles and due process of law such as lack

of punishment in general terms (deterrence, rehabilitation, public safety and retribution); the lack

of independent legal advice; pressures to admit an offence to obtain the benefit of a diversionary

alternative to court and the avoidance of a criminal record; the lack of testing of the legality of

police procedures, questioning and evidence-gathering and, finally, the privation of the

offenders liberty in the case of him failing with sentencing circles adjudication and probation

conditions (double jeopardy claims). Finally, I have identified an important body of literature

concerned with a postmodern and feminist critique of restorative justice. In particular, the

postmodern critique advanced many negative impacts of current experiences with restorative

justice like battered womens effacement and the danger of overlooking preexisting power and

status differentials in cases of domestic violence. These critical stances have drawn from the

Foucauldian notion of disciplinary mechanisms to argue that restorative programs are ultimately

system-supporting schemes, i.e., mediators or community members facilitate agreements that are

consistent with status quo ante interests, values, norms, and other ideological and political

interests.

Furthermore, given that the RJ movement since its inception is deeply rooted in

feminist thought and activism --- with a particular focus on violence against women ---, the

feminist critique is a sine qua non part of any account of debates on restorative justice. As a

consequence, this paper also considered the role of feminist theory and criminology and their

connections with the RJ movement, arguing that the feminist critical analysis on RJ sought to

224
add women and gender perspectives to RJ practices and was marked by efforts to ensure a safe,

meaningful and empowering involvement of women in restorative practices. Accordingly,

feminist commentators and researchers have advanced concerns related to the harmful effects of

ineffective security and empowerment to women in restorative encounters and conferences that

lead to revictimization issues. Most notably, the mainstream feminist critique established that

restorative dialogue-driven processes and outcomes have the potential to disregard and silence

women by keeping them absent from forums that settle the planning and functioning of RJ

models, which feminists deem to be excessively skewed towards male offenders needs and

interests. Indeed, it is generally agreed that RJ programs on intimate violence should only be

undertaken with certain conditions present, such as strong offender accountability mechanisms;

meaningful levels of security and empowerment; ownership of RJ by all relevant stakeholders;

and basic guarantees of free communication and transparency. However, given the informal and

fragmented nature, form, and implementation of RJ experiences this rarely occurs. For this

reason, mainstream feminists claimed that the informal arrangements of RJ practices and strong

collectivist views of what constitutes a restorative encounter or conference could mean that

women are treated in ways that may reproduce or perpetuate victimization and collective gender

normative stereotypes as seems to be the particular case of some RJ practices used in Aboriginal

settings.

Notwithstanding, this study has identified different trajectories of feminist

thinking with respect to RJ and emphasized the importance of examining the various schools of

feminist thought from essentialist to anti-essentialist feminist schools. After describing the most

salient examples of essentialist and anti-essentialist feminist schools, I have reached the

conclusion that the intersectional feminist school, in particular, entails an anti-essentialist

approach to RJ with important repercussions in the study of restorative experiences in

225
Indigenous settings. First of all, I have identified intersectionality theory as a new way to

organize feminist theorizing on RJ, particularly, by integrating post-colonial and ethnocultural

political issues into the debate about alternative justice remedial practices developed to cope

with violence against women. In addition, I have argued that intersectional approaches also

transformed the intellectual landscape by generating polarized and politicized views of the

discussions about the adherence of Indigenous communities to RJ practices. However, I also

have argued that the politicized rhetoric was not prevalent among intersectional feminists and

several intersectional feminists remained skeptical about the efficacy of RJ to cope with

domestic violence in Indigenous settings. Nevertheless, some ethnocultural conceptualizations of

intersectionality theory tended, as described in this chapter, to generate a sympathetic rather than

structurally critical response to gender inequality issues of restorative justice. That sympathetic

nature towards RJ overlooked womens alienation and exclusion within RJ experiences, which is

generally manifested in obsequious silence in RJ encounters and conferences, and in a propensity

to follow collective directives favorable to RJ interventions even at the cost of their expression

and security. This raised a dilemma for battered women in Indigenous communities since they

were cornered into taking stances that would either make them betray their own community ---

eager to assert self-determination in justice matters through RJ interventions --- or betray their

own interests and needs for security, offender accountability and empowerment.

In parallel, I have demonstrated that the analytical model of intersectionality

theory --- among other characteristics --- is built on the interplay among diverse and sometimes

competing inequality markers such as gender; race; class; culture; and ethnicity. For this reason a

well-balanced intersectional approach to RJ should address those inequality categories on an

equal basis without giving primacy to a specific inequality marker in explaining systems of

oppression like male violence against women. However, I also concluded that an imbalance in

226
anti-essentialist positions in some intersectional approaches tended to take insufficient account

of the potential adverse impact of gender inequality in RJ models, particularly, in Indigenous

settings. In this sense, I have identified an epistemological vulnerability caused by radical anti-

essentialist stances that can render some intersectional approaches to RJ virtually incapable of

addressing gender inequality properly. This vulnerability --- that consists of an under-

appreciation of gender inequality issues ---- and, consequently, the difficulties that confront

individual victims of domestic violence is magnified by collectivist ethnocultural and patriarchal

political interests (e.g., Indigenous self-determination) that obscure or motivate some

intersectional scholars to ignore the impact of power differentials in RJ experiences generating a

form of intersectional disempowerment where womens concerns are put aside in order to

privilege non-women-centered claims. Moreover, I have identified a series of interrelated

cooptative forces --- namely, a) RJ cultural frame alignment; b) the rise of ethnocultural political

discourses for self-determination in post-colonial settings; and c) multicultural rhetoric in

Canada and Australasia --- that helps to explain why some intersectional approaches are unlikely

to address gender inequality within RJ practices.

As briefly indicated in the previous chapter, in order to counteract the

disempowering aspects of unbalanced intersectional stances the wisest course of action is to

tackle the epistemic problem at its source, i.e., by adopting strategically essentialist positions that

recommit intersectional feminists to gender issues when analyzing restorative schemes in

ethnocultural and sexist settings. As I hope I have shown, some intersectional approaches to RJ

have developed epistemic problems and an ethnocultural political inflection that downplays

gender issues. This is weakening an analytical structure that is already under attack from other

cooptative forces. In fact, I have a feeling that intersectionality analysis as applied to RJ in

Indigenous settings is too linked to postcolonial discourses, contingent multicultural rhetoric and

227
short-term anti-racist objectives that shifted the focus from womens issues. Thus, the sensible

thing to do would be to steer intersectional feminists back to gender justice issues. If

intersectionality theory is to forge ahead in providing a safe and meaningful space to Indigenous

battered women within the RJ movement, it is essential that researchers work closely with RJ

practitioners to develop, implement, and analyze methods and programs that can be shown to

benefit, above all, victimized women not other political interests. In the next paragraph I advance

some recommendations for improving the use of intersectionality theory within RJ contexts.

For example, concerning gender underestimation, by using recommendations

posited originally by Angela Cameron who strategically repositioned gender as an important

analytical intersectional standard in RJ interventions.468 She identified --- like in this study ---

that there has been little consultation between victimized women and antiviolence groups, which

are not sufficiently heard or taken into consideration. For this reason she recommended

comprehensive consultations with those actors before, during and after RJ encounters and

conferences. I would include, in particular, consultation and educational procedures for

developing an understanding of the specific individual experiences of battered Indigenous

women in RJ models. Using this perspective, social-legal scholars, policymakers and

intersectional feminist-activists would recommend RJ models that foster womens strengths,

encourage a sense of control, and foster an equal exchange of information among all the

stakeholders in restorative encounters and conferences. In addition, Cameron recommended that

RJ initiatives which accept cases of domestic violence must be evaluated as soon as possible

adopting rigorous control of methodologies in consultation with antiviolence groups.469 I share

the same opinion, especially to avoid inadequate outcome measures (e.g., to measure

468
See note 11 at 199.
469
Ibid at 200.
228
stakeholders satisfaction) and short follow-up periods, which limit the value of empirical

evidence collected in such investigations. I would also include putting women in leadership

positions in all phases of RJ encounters and conferences, especially, in sentencing circles in

order to avoid offender-centered stances and the unwillingness to value the needs and visions of

battered women.

With respect to intersectionality co-optation, I believe that it is not possible

simply to convert the sympathy for the RJ movement that multiculturalism and ethnocultural

political claims elicit from the intersectional evaluator into a critical orientation towards specific

inequality issues like gender injustice since those concerns are embedded in the intersectional

thought on restorative justice. Notably, because they stem from legitimate concerns over

decision-making policies, or from the unfair treatment of Indigenous people. But it is perfectly

possible to steer the debate to more women-centered positions by reintroducing the social fact

that gender inequality matters most in domestic violence cases. Although intersectionality at its

core is precisely the recognition of the deconstruction of gender as an analytical category, I

believe we cannot rescind from the strategic use of gender-issues, politically and pragmatically,

within RJ experiences. As Rachel E. Luft wrote: Movement actors with intersectional analysis

and commitments have to manage the effects of their own dominant and subordinate identities,

and the competing directives that a solidarity politics bases on each suggests, as the navigate a

field of shifting allies, opponents, and power dynamics in a context of a larger, macro structural

constraints and opportunities.470

As the preceding conclusions suggest, some intersectional approaches to RJ

within Indigenous settings are vulnerable to at least two objections: First, epistemological issues

470
See note 451 at 32.
229
that deemphasize gender inequality. Second, cooptive mechanisms that also tend to shift the

focus away from womens issues, most notably, when intersectional feminists contend with

domestic violence in RJ contexts. However, intersectional frames are supposed to come with

strong critical and social change goals. At its essence intersectionality may function as the most

critical step in ending or limiting domestic violence by revealing systems of oppression and

privilege in heterogeneous settings. It can act instrumentally and substantially to reveal sexist

positions over RJ experiences. Unfortunately, however, if applied without caution

intersectionality can also create unexpected vulnerabilities in assessments of RJ experiences in

culturally heterogeneous communities that can perpetuate or reproduce sexist gender roles.

Responding to this dilemma, this study sought to serve as a cautionary note. By this I mean that

close attention must be paid to the intersectional thinking that emerges in RJ settings since it can

backfire on the very individuals and groups it was designed to protect and emancipate.

230
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