Waging Financial War: David J. Katz
Waging Financial War: David J. Katz
8Sandis and Taleb, The Skin in the Game Heuristic for Protection Against Tail Events, 1;
for a more detailed explanation of Black Swans see Nassim Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of
the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007).
9Philippe Jorion, Value at Risk (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1997), 3-15.
Conflict by Other Means Katz 81
10Bank for International Settlements, Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange
and Derivatives Market Activity in 2010 - Final Results, December 1, 2010, 6.
11Central Intelligence Agency, 2011 World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP
(Purchasing Power Parity), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
rankorder/2001rank.html?countryCode=xx&rankAnchorRow=#xx
12United States Department of the Treasury, The Federal Reserve Board. The Use and
Counterfeiting of United States Currency Abroad, Part 3, The Final Report to the Congress by
the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Advanced Counterfeit Deterrence Steering
Committee, pursuant to Section 807 of PL 104132, September 2006, 4, http://www.federalre-
serve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/counterfeit/default.htm
13Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Z.1 Financial Accounts of the
United States, Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts, D3
Credit Market Debt Outstanding by Sector, (Washington, DC:The Federal Reserve Board, March
10, 2011), 9, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf
14Ben S. Bernake et al., International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the
United States, 2003-2007, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, International Finance Discussion
Papers, Number 1014 (Washington, DC: The Federal Reserve Board, February 2011), 8, http://www.
federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1014/ifdp1014.htm
82 Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14
Union.17 The ability to disaggregate Iran from the global oil market by
using a simple risk-management mechanism, in this case P&I insurance,
illustrates the leverage financial warfare offers.
International maritime P&I insurance requirements illustrate an
interesting and under-appreciated aspect of financial risk manage-
ment strikes. Financial risk management strikes can utilize established
international regulatory schemas to attack adversary financial systems,
components, or assets. Lacking P&I insurance, adversary commercial
shipping fleets are precluded from many international ports. Insurance
and credit problems can also attack the international operations of an
adversarys commercial airline industry. Macro risk management strikes
can utilize existing safety codes or operating rules to discover fraudulent
behaviors or uncover systemic violations of international commerce stan-
dards by an adversary or their commercial enablers. Weaponizing and
exploiting international commerce schemas can result in delinking entire
industries from global trade. For example, increasing ramp inspections
or targeting operating audits at adversary commercial enablers could
discover violations of safety standards. Many international commercial
systems, maritime, aviation, postal, etc. require and enforce safety and
behavior standards, particularly where fraudulent behaviors can collapse
the system. International commerce rule schemas can legitimately be
used to limit or bankrupt an adversarys commercial enablers.
Lastly, on a cautionary note, just as the United States used finan-
cial warfare to alter British policy in the Suez, financial warfare may
be used against the United States in the future. American vulnerability
to financial strikes includes interruptions to highly centralized capital
formation chokepoints like the Fedwire Funds Service and the Clearing
House Interbank Payment System (CHIPS) which account for more
than 858,000 daily interbank transactions totaling $973 trillion annual-
ly.18 Levered derivative US financial products introduce vulnerabilities
when risk is opaque and agency problems exist, as illustrated by the
role Credit Default Swaps (CDS) played in the 2008 Mortgage Backed
Security (MBS) collapse.19 The result was bankruptcy and liquidation
of major securities as insurance firms induced federal intervention to
subsidize failed corporations. Ironically, the whole financial system
became less robust rather than more robust. Lastly, deficit fueled
(levered) federal spending increases vulnerability to financial strikes
across the board by reducing capacity for managing negative outcomes
such as errors in forecasting future revenues, constraining current policy
due to undercapitalized past actions, and may incent actions such as
17UPDATE 2-Sanctions Hit Irans NITC Ship Insurance Cover, Reuters, February 18,
2011, http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE71H1ZC20110218?sp=true
18 Bank for International Settlements, Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems in the United
States, Committee on Payments Systems and Settlement Redbook 2012, January 2013, 487-490.
19Michael Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010). The
entire book chronicles how the opacity, agency, and asymmetric nature of the CDS market came
back to impact both the writers of this form of insurance, chiefly AIG-FP, and the buyers to include
Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Morgan Stanley, among others.
Conflict by Other Means Katz 85
20Nassim Taleb, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder (New York: Random House, 2012);
Alexei Barrionuevo, Argentina Nationalizes $30 Billion in Private Pensions, The New York Times,
October 21, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/22/business/worldbusiness/22argentina.
html?; Niall Ferguson, The Ascent of Money (New York: Penguin Press, 2008), 69-73. The 15th century
Italian city states of Florence and Venice both required wealthy citizens to loan money [Florence:
Prestanze, Venice: Prestiti] to their respective governments; Hiroko Tabuchi, Joining Switzerland,
Japan Acts to Ease Currencys Strength, The New York Times, August 4, 2011. In 2010-2011, Brazil,
South Korea, Japan, and Switzerland all intervened to preclude appreciation of their currencies in
order to maintain exports.