Rodriguez Vs Arroyo Digest
Rodriguez Vs Arroyo Digest
FACTS:
This case involved two consolidated petitions assailing the April 12, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals granting the writ of amparo and writ of habeas data by petitioner Noriel
Rodriguez, who is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a
peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. Petitioner was then abducted, tortured and forced to confess
to being a member of the New People's Army (NPA).
Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former
President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General
Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, and five others. The
writs were granted but the CA dropped President Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may
not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency as part of her
presidential immunity. Also, the prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order
and inspection order was denied by the CA.
The respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the decision of the CA but before
such motion could be resolved petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration
raising that the CA erred in not granting the interim relief for temporary protection order
and in dropping President Arroyo as party-respondent.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by petitioner may be granted even after
the writs of amparo and habeas data have been granted.
3. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas
data cases
4. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or
threatened by respondents
HELD:
1. The interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner is only available before final judgment.
Section 14 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo clearly provides that interim reliefs may
only be availed of upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final judgment. Given
that there has already been a final judgment in the given case, petitioner may no longer
avail of the interim relief of temporary protection order.
As it was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that courts should
look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. Also, the Supreme
Court (SC) reiterated that the presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence
with the presidents incumbency. Given these, former Pres. GMA cannot use presidential
immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of
Rodriguez.
4. Yes, the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by
respondents. The SC held that there was no reason to depart from the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals, the same being supported by substantial evidence following the
doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases which is to consider all the pieces of
evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. The sworn affidavit of the petitioner and the medical examinations conducted
on him are sufficient evidence proving that the military personnel involved in the case
indeed abducted Rodriguez on September 6, 2009 and then detained and tortured him.
**
The petition further premised government complicity in the abduction
of James on the very positions held by the respondents. The Court in
Rubrico v. Macapagal-Arroyo had the occasion to expound on the
doctrine of command responsibility and why it has little bearing, if at
all, in amparo proceedings.
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines
responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
[threats thereof or extrajudicial killings] for purposes of imposing the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance [or extrajudicial
killings].
xxxx
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately
from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings
and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature
has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are
criminal x x x are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature
has the power to enact. x x x[
**
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or
strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to
aid the court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an
amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to be
inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party
seeking the order. In this case, the issuance of inspection order was
properly denied since the petitioners specified several military and
police establishments based merely on the allegation that the
testimonies of victims and witnesses in previous incidents of similar
abductions involving activists disclosed that those premises were used
as detention centers. In the same vein, the prayer for issuance of a
production order was predicated on petitioners bare allegation that it
obtained confidential information from an unidentified military source,
that the name of James was included in the so-called Order of Battle.
Indeed, the trial court could not have sanctioned any fishing
expedition by precipitate issuance of inspection and production orders
on the basis of insufficient claims of one party.