Black Butte Copper Project Mine Operating Permit Application (Revision 3)

APPENDIX R: Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Tintina Montana, Inc. July 2017

 APPENDIX R
Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Geomin Resources, Inc.

December 15, 2015

1807 Dickerson. Ste. D

1807 Dickerson Ste. D
Bozeman, MT 59715

PO Box 7005
Bozeman, MT 59771
Geomin Resources, Inc.
Black Butte Copper Project Mine Operating Permit Application

Failure Modes Effects Analysis (FMEA)

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a systematic method for proactively evaluating
facilities or a process to identify where and how they might fail; and to assess the relative impact
of different types of failures. Once this is accomplished, the parts of the process that are most
in need of change are identified. FMEA includes review of the following:
• Failure modes (What could go wrong?)
• Failure causes (Why would the failure happen?)
• Failure effects (What would be the consequences of each failure?)

A FMEA is often used to structure mitigation for risk reduction based on either failure (mode)
severity reduction, or based on lowering the probability of failure’s occurrence or both. FMEA is
used to evaluate processes and facilities for possible failures and to prevent them by correcting
the processes or design proactively, rather than reacting to adverse events after failures have
occurred. This emphasis on prevention can significantly reduce risk of harm to human health
and the environment. FMEA is particularly useful in evaluating a new process prior to
implementation, and in assessing the impact of a proposed change to an existing process.
FMEA provides a documented method for selecting a design with a high probability of
successful operation and safety.
Tintina conducted its first FMEA evaluation early in the mine planning process. In this review
they critically looked at the proposed operational processes and the design of facilities. The
results of the FMEA evaluations were used to modify mining methods, milling processes and
facilities for more effective, efficient and safer operations. The focus of these modifications was
on minimizing risk to environmental resources and human health, while enhancing both
environmental and operational performance and safety.

Objectives of this FMEA

The objective of this FMEA was to review failure modes and effects from historic mining industry
standard methods of processes selection and facility construction, and use this review to
develop mitigations for the identified failure modes. Once Tintina had developed a package of
mitigations the two FMEAs (unmitigated and mitigated) were compared based on residual risk.
Many of Tintina’ proposed mitigations were innovative such as the selection of cemented backfill
surface deposition of tailings while other layered various conventional construction methods into
packages that significantly reduced risk to the environment, human health and the overall safety
of facility construction and operation.

Method of Analysis
Two critical analysis need to be carried out before beginning a FMEA: identifying the cause of
failures and the probability of their occurrence, and the ranking the severity of the potential
impact of the failure.

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Black Butte Copper Project Mine Operating Permit Application

Probability
The first step in developing a FMEA is to identify the cause of a failure mode and the likelihood
of its occurrence. This is often done by examination of similar processes or construction
methods and the failure modes that have been historically documented. A failure cause is
looked upon as a design weakness. All the potential causes for a failure mode should be
identified and documented. The probability of occurrence for various failure modes for this
analysis over the 19 year mine-life included: unlikely (0), remote (0-1), infrequent (1-2),
occasional (2-4), and likely (annually) and are specified in detail in Table 1. A failure mode is
then given a probability ranking. In order to rank various failure modes probability criteria must
be developed that explicitly define the range of failures to be compared and the range of
frequency of occurrence for which they will be compared. Table 1 presents the probability table
developed for criteria evaluated in these FMEAs.

Table 1. Probability of Occurrence Criteria for Ranking Failure Modes

Probability Unlikely Remote Infrequent Occasional Likely
Failure
Failure is
Failure could probable in Failure is
Failure under highly
occur under response to almost
these improbable
Description rare and intermittent, inevitable and
circumstances due to lack of
extreme extreme but possibly
is unlikely relevant
circumstances foreseeable frequent
circumstances
events
Frequency of
occurrence in
0 0-1 1-2 2-4 Annually
the 19 year
mine-life

Consequences
In addition to probability, the severity of the impact or consequences of the identified failure
mode must be identified and criteria developed which can be used to compare the
consequences. Table 2 presents the consequence criteria evaluated in these FMEAs including:
environmental, human health, changes in operations or permitting impacts, and cost.
Residual Risk
Residual risk is the combination of probability of a failure occurring and the consequences of the
failure. Risk levels are typically depicted on a matrix table that compares the effects of both
probability and consequences. The higher the risk level, the more justification and mitigation
that is needed to lower the risk to an acceptable level. The risk categories developed for this
FMEA include: extremely low, low, moderate, high and unacceptable or extreme. The risk level
matrix is presented as a function of both probability and consequence in Table 3.

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Table 2. Consequence Criteria for Ranking Failure Modes

Consequence Negligible Minor Modest Critical Catastrophic

Measurable effect on Measurable effect on Overwhelming effect on

environment or human environment or human environment and
Minor effect on
health resulting in health resulting in human health resulting
No significant environment, human
Defined intermittent or continued operational in shutdown and
affect health, or project
temporary operational changes with financial consequence
viability
changes with modest significant financial affecting project
financial consequence consequence viability

Transient, minor upset Impact which can be

Impact which can be Impact requiring major
requiring operational addressed through
No environmental readily addressed facility redesign or
Environmental risk response, no design or long term design or
risk through minor design rebuild, requiring
treatment response significant treatment
or treatment action prolonged effort
required action

No human health
Human health risk No injuries Possible minor injuries Injury, no fatality Injuries with fatalities
risk

Prolonged delay in
facility operations Complete loss of
Short term loss of
requiring major function requiring
facility in operation
Resulting change in No changes Maintenance action reconstruction, may facility replacement or
requiring minor
operations required only result in agency loss of project viability,
reconstructions; other
initiated temporary suspension of mine
resources available
suspension of permits
operations

Cost < $10,000 $10,000-$50,000 $50,000-$500,000 $500,000-$1,000,000 $1-$10,000,000

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Table 3. Residual risk from probability and consequences matrix.

Consequence Negligible Minor Modest Critical Catastrophic

Human Health No human health Risk No injuries Possible light injuries Injury, no fatality Injuries with fatalities
Impact which can be
Transient, minor upset requiring Impact which can be readily addressed through long Impact requiring major
Environment No environmental Risk
operational response, no design addressed through minor design or term design or significant facility redesign or rebuild,
or treatment response required treatment action treatment action requiring prolonged effort
Cost <$10,000 $10,000-$50,000 $50,000-$500,000 $500,000-$1,000,000 $1-$10,000,000
Probability Frequency in 19 years
Extremely Low Low Moderate High High
Failure under these circumstances Failure under these Failure under these circumstances is Failure under these Failure under these
is unlikely, no significant affects circumstances is unlikely, with unlikely, with measurable effect on circumstances is unlikely, circumstances is unlikely,
no relevant effect on environment or human health with measurable effect on with overwhelming effect
Unlikely 0 environment, human health or resulting in intermittent or environment or human on environment and
operations temporary operational changes and health resulting in human health resulting in
modest financial consequence continued operational shutdown and financial
changes with significant consequence affecting
financial consequence project viability
Extremely Low Low Low Moderate High
Highly improbable failure, with no Highly improbable failure with Highly improbable failure with Highly improbable failure Highly improbable failure
significant affects no relevant effect on measurable effect on environment with measurable effect on with overwhelming effect
environment, human health or or human health resulting in environment or human on environment and
Remote 0-1 operations intermittent or temporary health resulting in human health resulting in
operational changes and modest continued operational shutdown and financial
financial consequence changes with significant consequence affecting
financial consequence project viability
Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Failure under rare and extreme Failure under rare and extreme Failure under rare and extreme Failure under rare and Failure under rare and
circumstances, with no significant circumstances with no relevant circumstances with measurable extreme circumstances extreme circumstances
affects effect on environment, human effect on environment or human with measurable effect on with overwhelming effect
Infrequent 1-2 health or operations health resulting in intermittent or environment or human on environment and
temporary operational changes and health resulting in human health resulting in
modest financial consequence continued operational shutdown and financial
changes with significant consequence affecting
financial consequence project viability

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Table 3. Residual risk from probability and consequences matrix.

Consequence Negligible Minor Modest Critical Catastrophic

Human Health No human health Risk No injuries Possible light injuries Injury, no fatality Injuries with fatalities
Impact which can be
Transient, minor upset requiring Impact which can be readily addressed through long Impact requiring major
Environment No environmental Risk
operational response, no design addressed through minor design or term design or significant facility redesign or rebuild,
or treatment response required treatment action treatment action requiring prolonged effort
Cost <$10,000 $10,000-$50,000 $50,000-$500,000 $500,000-$1,000,000 $1-$10,000,000
Probability Frequency in 19 years
Low Low Moderate High Unacceptable
Failure probable in response to Failure probable in response to Failure probable in response to Failure probable in Failure probable in
intermittent, extreme but intermittent, extreme but intermittent, extreme but response to intermittent, response to intermittent,
foreseeable events, with no foreseeable events, with no foreseeable events, with measurable extreme but foreseeable extreme but foreseeable
significant affects relevant effect on environment, effect on environment or human events, with measurable events, with overwhelming
Occasional 2-4 human health or operations health resulting in intermittent or effect on environment or effect on environment and
temporary operational changes and human health resulting in human health resulting in
modest financial consequence continued operational shutdown and financial
changes with significant consequence affecting
financial consequence project viability
Low Low Moderate High Unacceptable / Extreme
Failure is almost inevitable and Failure is almost inevitable and Failure is almost inevitable and Failure is almost inevitable Failure is almost inevitable
possibly frequent, with no possibly frequent, with no possibly frequent, with measurable and possibly frequent, with and possibly frequent, with
significant affects relevant effect on environment, effect on environment or human measurable effect on overwhelming effect on
Likely Annually human health or operations health resulting in intermittent or environment or human environment and human
temporary operational changes and health resulting in health resulting in
modest financial consequence continued operational shutdown and financial
changes with significant consequence affecting
financial consequence project viability

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Black Butte Copper Project Mine Operating Permit Application

Site-Specific Example
Table 4 presents part of the selection processes for developing lists that characterize facilities to be
examined for failure modes at the Project site. In Table 4 facilities were grouped by HDPE lined
facilities with both mine water and waste storage stored on the facility, and then by the hazard ranking
of the facility; other screening criteria segregated facilities with mine waste but with no water stored on
them, and finally there is a screened sub-group of unlined facilities with stockpiles of soils or
construction materials only.

Table 3. Mine Storage Facilities Types having Failure Modes with Potential
Impacts to Water Quality

Facility Type Characteristics Facility Name

HDPE Lined Facilities with Mine Water and Waste Storage

Cemented
High Hazard Storage > 50 acre-feet 60,000 m3
Tailings Facility
Dam, with mine (78,500 cu yds.) possible loss of
wastes and mine human life, extensive property or
water storage ecological damage. Process Water
Pond
Storage <50 acre-feet 60,000 m3,
(78,500 cu yds.) Routinely pumped
Low Hazard Dam,
back to water treatment plant, pond
with mine wastes
will have almost no water except for Contact Water
and water
after storm events, no expected loss Pond
storage
of human life, damage limited to
owner’s property, minor ecological
risk.
Low Hazard Dam,
with no mine No expected loss of human life, Non-Contact
wastes, and fresh damage limited to owner’s property. Water Reservoir
water storage
HDPE Lined Facilities with Mine Waste Storage Only
Potentially acid-generating rock, Waste Rock
waste rock pile may not reach Storage
Mined Material saturation in 2-years, seepage
Copper-
Storage Facility reports to contact water pond or
enriched Rock
diverted directly to water treatment
Storage
plant.
Unlined Stockpiles with Construction Material Storage Only
Excess
Construction
Non-acid Generating Materials. Construction
Materials
Top- and Subsoil

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With the FMEA model developed for probability, consequence and residual risk, each facility and
process was subjected to the analysis, identifying failure modes and probability of their occurrence, the
consequences of the failure and then analyzing the resulting residual risk. For components with high
residual risk, mitigations were developed by which processes were modified and facilities redesigned to
mitigate the identified risk. This analysis produced extensive tables of data inputs and results. At the
end of the analyses of the FMEA study, the early unmitigated developed processes and facility designs
were compared against the mitigated counterparts and compared for residual risk. Table 5 is a portion
of the FMEA analysis with a selected group of failure modes looking at various facilities and processes
by comparing the unmitigated alternative for facility design or select processes with the mitigated
alternative. In Table 5 the transition from warm to cool colors represent transitions from likely to
unlikely occurrence of a failure mode, and from catastrophic or extreme to negligible consequences.

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Black Butte Copper Project Mine Operating Permit Application

Table 5. Comparison of FMEA for Select Unmitigated and Mitigated Processes or Facility Construction Scenarios

Revised Revised
Probability Consequence
Failure Mode Cause Facility Name Tintina Proposed Design Mitigation Probability Consequence
Unmitigated Mitigated

Tailings
Remote Catastrophic Probable Maximum Flood Event Storage Unlikely Catastrophic
(CTF)
Process Water Probable Maximum Flood Event Storage Plus
Remote Catastrophic Unlikely Catastrophic
Overfilling and Discharge with or Inadequate (PWP) 1:500 Year Event Storage of CTF
without embankment failure Storage Capacity Contact Water Pond
Infrequent Critical 1:200 Year Event Storage Remote Critical
(CWP)
Noncontact Water
Infrequent Modest 1:200 Year Event Storage Unlikely Negligible
(NCWR)

Tailings Pump back 1:500 year event to Process

Remote Catastrophic Unlikely Catastrophic
(CTF) Water Pond
Process Water
Remote Catastrophic none Unlikely Catastrophic
(PWP)
Overfilling and Discharge with or No Pump-back
Automatic Pump-back to Water Treatment or
without embankment failure Capability Contact Water Pond
Infrequent Critical Process Water Pond, only minimal storage Unlikely Critical
(CWP)
daily, often dry
Noncontact Water Spillway Controlled Discharge of fresh water
Infrequent Modest Unlikely Negligible
(NCWR) > 1:200 Year Event
t
Stage 1 FOS 2.5/2.3 (up/downstream) (min
Tailings 1.5)
Remote Catastrophic Unlikely Minor
(CTF) Stage 2 FOS 2.5/2.3 (up/downstream) (min
1.5)
Constr. FOS 2.5/2.5 (up/downstream)(min
Process Water
Remote Catastrophic 1.3) Unlikely Catastrophic
Embankment Failure. Foundation (PWP)
Opn. FOS na/2.5 (up/downstream)(min 1.5)
Geotechnical Instability Design Failure
Constr. FOS 2.5/2.5 (up/downstream)(min
Contact Water Pond
Infrequent Critical 1.3) Unlikely Critical
(CWP)
Opn. FOS na/2.5 (up/downstream)(min 1.5)
Constr. FOS 2.5/2.5 (up/downstream)(min
Noncontact Water
Infrequent Modest 1.3) Unlikely Modest
(NCWR)
Opn. FOS na/2.0 (up/downstream)(min 1.5)

Stage 1 FOS 1.6/1.5 (up/downstream) (min

Tailings 1.2)
Infrequent Modest Unlikely Modest
(CTF) Stage 2 FOS na/1.5 (up/downstream) (min
1.2)
Constr. FOS 1.6/1.6 (up/downstream) (min
Embankment Failure Process Water
Earthquake Infrequent Catastrophic 1.2) Unlikely Catastrophic
Seismic Instability (PWP)
Opn. FOS na/1.6 (up/downstream) (min 1.2)
Constr. FOS 1.6/1.6 (up/downstream) (min
Contact Water Pond
Infrequent Critical 1.2) Unlikely Critical
(CWP)
Opn. FOS na/1.6 (up/downstream) (min 1.2)
Noncontact Water Infrequent Modest Constr. FOS 1.6/1.6 (up/downstream) (min Unlikely Modest

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Table 5. Comparison of FMEA for Select Unmitigated and Mitigated Processes or Facility Construction Scenarios

Revised Revised
Probability Consequence
Failure Mode Cause Facility Name Tintina Proposed Design Mitigation Probability Consequence
Unmitigated Mitigated

(NCWR) 1.2)
Opn. FOS na/1.2 (up/downstream) (min 1.1)

Tailings are cemented; No significant water

Tailings
Infrequent Critical stored on tailings facility except after storm Unlikely Negligible
(CTF)
events
Constr. FOS 2.5/2.5 (up/downstream)(min
Process Water
na na 1.3) na na
(PWP)
Embankment Failure Liquefaction of Opn. FOS na/2.5 (up/downstream)(min 1.5)
Geotechnical Instability tailings Constr. FOS 2.5/2.5 (up/downstream)(min
Contact Water Pond
na na 1.3) na na
(CWP)
Opn. FOS na/2.5 (up/downstream)(min 1.5)
Constr. FOS 2.5/2.5 (up/downstream)(min
Noncontact Water
na na 1.3) na na
(NCWR)
Opn. FOS na/2.0 (up/downstream)(min 1.5)

2, 100 mil HDPE Liners with intermediary

Tailings
Infrequent Critical geogrid, overlying and underlying cushion Unlikely Modest
(CTF)
layer, minimal water on facility
2, 100 mil HDPE Liners with intermediary
Process Water
Occasional Critical geogrid, overlying and underlying cushion Remote Critical
(PWP)
layer
2, 100 mil HDPE Liners with intermediary
Contact Water Pond
Infrequent Critical geogrid, overlying and underlying cushion Unlikely Modest
Inadequate or no (CWP)
Seepage of leachate layer, little water stored on pond
liner
Noncontact Water 60 mil HDPE upstream embankment liner,
na na na na
(NCWR) Seepage inherent in design from reservoir
100-mil HDPE liner, with overlying cushion
Waste Rock Storage
Infrequent Modest layer and underlying foundation drain, 2-3 Unlikely Minor
(WRS)
year time period, only toes saturated
Copper-enriched Rock 100-mil HDPE liner, with overlying cushion
Storage Infrequent Modest layer and underlying foundation drain, 13 Remote Modest
(OS) year period

Foundation drainage layer and piping,

Tailings
Infrequent Critical foundation drain pond with pump-back Unlikely Minor
(CTF)
system, minimal water on facility
Foundation drainage layer and piping,
Process Water
Occasional Critical foundation drain pond with pump-back Remote Critical
(PWP)
system
No foundation
Seepage of Leachate Foundation drainage layer and piping,
drain pump back Contact Water Pond
Infrequent Critical foundation drain pond with pump-back Remote Minor
(CWP)
system, little water stored in pond
Foundation drainage layer and piping,
Noncontact Water
na na foundation drain pond with pump-back na na
(NCWR)
system
Waste Rock Storage Infrequent Modest Foundation drainage layer and piping, Unlikely Minor
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Table 5. Comparison of FMEA for Select Unmitigated and Mitigated Processes or Facility Construction Scenarios

Revised Revised
Probability Consequence
Failure Mode Cause Facility Name Tintina Proposed Design Mitigation Probability Consequence
Unmitigated Mitigated

(WRS) drainage collection on top of HDPE liner to

CWP, pump back CWP to WTP or PWP
Copper-enriched Rock Foundation drainage layer and piping,
Storage Infrequent Modest drainage collection on top of HDPE liner to Remote Modest
(OS) CWP, pump back CWP to WTP or PWP

Mill to CTF Double lined pumping line steel inside HDPE

Tailings
Tailings Spill Pumping Line Occasional Minor pipe; pipe in HDPE lined trench or on top of Unlikely Negligible
(CTF)
Failure CTF HDPE Liner.
Underground All mine openings (portal and ventilation
mine water raises) located above regional groundwater
discharge to table, no possibility of discharge to surface
surface water in Mine Portal and Vent water in closure
Contaminated Discharge from
closure, risks of Raises, Life of Mine Infrequent Critical Unlikely Negligible
Mine opening
future blow-outs of and Closure
contaminated
water and
sediment
Open trucks or Concentrate shipping is closed and sealed
Along highways and in
Contamination of Air and multiple laydown cargo containers by truck and rail
off-site laydown-
Laydown areas during areas during Likely Critical Unlikely Negligible
intermediate shipping
Concentrate Shipping shipping of
storage areas
concentrate
Surface contact water from areas
immediately adjacent to facilities reports to
Contact Water Collection and Failure to collect
All facilities Occasional Minor foundation drain ponds for pump-back to Infrequent Negligible
Transport or leakage
facilities or contact water reports to lined
collection ditches or pipelines to CWP
Storm water reports to storm water collection
basins for infiltration or dispersion, silt fencing
Failure to trap All facilities including
Storm Water from Stockpiles Occasional Minor and other BMPs on all downgradient Infrequent Negligible
sediments stockpile
construction disturbances associated with
stockpiles.

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Black Butte Copper Project Mine Operating Permit Application

Schematic Representation of FMEA Residual Risk Assessment

Figure 1 is a schematic that plots failure probability vs. consequence to define fields of residual
risk, as an example of how specific case studies will be examined for the remainder of
alternatives and mitigations considered. On Figure 1 the categories of residual risk are ranked
as very low, low, moderate, high and extreme or unacceptable.

Figure 1. Schematic plotting probability vs. consequence to define fields of residual risk

On the following graphics each of the failure modes from Table 5 is sequentially examined first
by identifying the failure mode and its cause, and then by looking at each facility to be
compared. First the facility is ranked for the probability and consequences and the residual risk
for the unmitigated condition. Then the proposed mitigations are enumerated, and finally the
same facility is ranked for the probability of the failure mode and it consequences under the
mitigated set of conditions. Graphically each of the facilities are labeled with unmitigated
ranking shown in red font and the mitigated ranking shown in green font. Finally an arrow is
drawn between the two rankings to illustrate the change in residual risk that results from
implementation of the mitigations. Figures are titled as a function of the failure mode.

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The first set of five figures (Figures 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6) considers mine facilities that store both
mine wastes and water for various failure modes.

Figure 2. Overfilling of facility and discharge resulting from inadequate water storage
capacity

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Figure 3. Overfilling of facility and discharge resulting from lack of pump-back capability

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Figure 4. Discharge resulting from facility foundation design failure

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Figure 5. Discharge resulting from facility failure due to earthquake

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Figure 6. Discharge resulting from facility failure due to liquifaction

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The next two figures (Figures 7 and 8) consider mine facilities that store only mine wastes (no
ponds of water) for various failure modes. Note that the Temporary WRS facility may not reach
saturation or generate seepage in as little as its proposed 2-years of operation (prior to
reclamation and closure).

Figure 7. Discharge resulting from tailings pumping line failure

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Figure 8. Discharge of seepage resulting from inadequate or no liner

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Figures 9 examines facilities or ditches whose BMPs fail to control either contact water
collection or storm water and sediment discharge.

Figure 9. Discharge of seepage resulting from no foundation pump-back

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Figures 10 examines facilities or ditches whose BMPs fail to collect either contact water or
storm water sediment.

Figure 10. Discharge resulting from failure to collect contact water sediment

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Figure 11 examines the resultant risk from failure to site mine openings above the water table.

Figure 11. Discharge from mine opening resulting from portal and raise locations

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The final figure (Figure 12) examines the resultant risk to air quality and potentially to surface
water from failure due to shipping concentrate in open trucks with multiple laydown areas along
the transport route vs shipping concentrate in closed and sealed shipping containers.

Figure 12. Risk of contaminating air or laydown areas during concentrate shipping

Summary
A few examples of how selected failure modes for operational processes, facility siting, and
facility construction criteria can be evaluated using FMEA are presented above. This analysis
was used to identify and then propose mitigations to more typical historical mine planning in
order to enhance the success of this Project. The FMEA analysis documents that the
incorporation of these mitigations consistently and significantly reduces residual risk of failure.
The analysis allows the selection of improved processes, better selection of facility locations,
and incorporation of improved changes in construction or design methods. The list of proposed
mitigations at the beginning of Section 5.1 of the Mine Operating Permit Application points out
some of the highlights of this planning process that Tintina believes will lead to a successful
mining operation that substantially mitigates impacts to human health and the environment.

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