ARTICLES 147-148: PROPERTY REGIME OF Issues:

UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

Whether Art 147 FC is the correct law governing the
1. VALDEZ VS. RTC disposition of property in the case at bar.
Case Doctrine: Held:
● In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the Yes. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
property relations of the parties during the period of the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147
or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family
Code. Code.
Facts: Article 147 applies when a man and a woman, suffering
no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in
live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
1971. They begot 5 children. In 1992, Valdez filed a
or without the benefit of marriage. Under this property
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the
regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
ground of psychological incapacity. The trial court
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal
granted the petition, thereby declaring their marriage null
co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
and void. It also directed the parties to start proceedings
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
on the liquidation of their common properties as defined
joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having
the provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code.
contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the in the care and maintenance of the family household."
decision. She asserted that the Family Code contained no Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of couple's separate property are not included in the co-
common property in "unions without marriage. ownership.

In an Order, the trial court made the following When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
clarification: "Consequently, considering that Article 147 impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively
of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence acquired by both of them through their actual joint
of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been contribution of money, property or industry shall be
obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will owned in common and in proportion to their respective
be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
will own their 'family home' and all their other properties shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal.
for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and The share of any party who is married to another shall
partition of the properties owned in common by the accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership,
plaintiff and defendant, the provisions on co-ownership as the case may be, if so existing under a valid marriage.
found in the Civil Code shall apply." If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
Valdes moved for reconsideration of the Order which was the manner already heretofore expressed.
denied. Valdes appealed, arguing that: (1) Article 147 of
the Family Code does not apply to cases where the parties In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
are psychological incapacitated; (2) Articles 50, 51 and 52 settlement of the parties' common property, the trial court
in relation to Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code acted neither imprudently nor precipitately; a court which
govern the disposition of the family dwelling in cases has jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity must be
where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including a deemed likewise clothed in authority to resolve incidental
marriage declared void by reason of the psychological and consequential matters. Nor did it commit a reversible
incapacity of the spouses; (3) Assuming arguendo that error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own
Article 147 applies to marriages declared void ab initio on the "family home" and all their common property in equal
the ground of the psychological incapacity of a spouse, shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and
the same may be read consistently with Article 129. partition of the property owned in common by them, the
provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not
Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129, the separation of property between Miguel and Carlina
12 of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set and the termination of their conjugal partnership?
up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the
and heir be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for
property regimes recognized for valid and voidable
recovery of ownership and possession?
marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled),
are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-
exists between common-law spouses. defendant in the case?
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of the Family Code, Held:
applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and 95) of Article 43, 13
relates only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages 1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in
and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 14 favor of Miguel and Erlinda. The provision of law
of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code
marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage providing for cases of cohabitation when a man and a
before the latter is judicially declared void. woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
2. AGAPAY VS. PALANG the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While
Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on July 15, 1973,
Facts:
said union was patently void because the earlier marriage
Miguel Palang married Carlina Palang in 1949. He left to of Miguel and Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected
work in Hawaii a few months after the wedding. Their by the latter’s de facto separation.
only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both
returned for good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina.
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
subsequent marriage with 19-year old Erlinda Agapay. common in proportion to their respective contributions. It
Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A must be stressed that actual contribution is required by
house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel and Erlinda’s efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher. household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition
of common property by one who has no salary or income
1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as
or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party
a form of compromise agreement to settle and end a case
is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no
filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to donate
presumption of equal shares.
their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to
their only child, Herminia. Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari
In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of
store. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint. Two years later,
conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only around 22 years
Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for
of age and Miguel was already 64 and a pensioner of the
recovery of ownership and possession with damages
U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
against Erlinda, seeking to get back the riceland and the
unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed
house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his
P3,750.00 as her share in the purchase price of subject
cohabitation with Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the
property, there being no proof of the same.
complaint but CA reversed the decision.
In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the
Issues: riceland was bought 2 months before she and Miguel
Who owns the riceland? actually cohabited to exclude their case from the
operation of Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the
Who owns the house and lot? precise date when they commenced their adulterous
Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state
agreement partake the nature of judicial confirmation of definitively that the riceland was purchased even before
they started living together. In any case, even assuming
that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, 3. TUMLOS VS. FERNANDEZ
the rules of co-ownership would still apply and proof of
actual contribution would still be essential. FACTS:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez were plaintiffs in an action
Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money
for ejectment filed against Guillerma, Gina and Toto
to the purchase price of the riceland, there is no basis to
Tumlos. In the complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged that
justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
they are the absolute owners of an apartment building that
Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal
through their tolerance they allowed the Tumlos’ to
partnership property of Miguel and Carlina.
occupy the apartment for the last 7 years without payment
2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly of any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma will pay 1,600
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 a month while the other defendants promised to pay 1,000
when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the a month which was not complied with. Demand was
notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for made several times for the defendants to vacate the
the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. premises as they are in need of the property for the
Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel provided the construction of a new building.
money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s
Defendants appealed to RTC that Mario and Guillerma
name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was
had an amorous relationship and that they acquired the
properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one
property in question as their love nest. It was likewise
which was clearly void and inexistent by Article 739 of
alleged that they lived together in the said apartment
the Civil Code because it was made between persons
building with their 2 children for about 10 years and that
guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
Gullerma administered the property by collecting rentals
donation. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code
from the lessees until she discovered that Mario deceived
expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
her as to the annulment of their marriage.
between spouses now applies to donations between
persons living together as husband and wife without a ISSUE: WON Guillerma is a co-owner of the said
valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who apartment under Article 148.
incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union. HELD:

3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the SC rejected the claim that Guillerma and Mario were co-
marriage shall not take place except by judicial order or owners of the subject property. The claim was not
without judicial conferment when there is an express satisfactorily proven by Guillerma since there were no
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment other evidence presented to validate it except for the said
which resulted from the parties’ compromise was not affidavit. Even if the allegations of having cohabited with
specifically and expressly for separation of property and Mario and that she bore him two children were true, the
should not be so inferred. claim of co-ownership still cannot be accepted. Mario is
validly married with Lourdes hence Guillerma and Mario
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, are not capacitated to marry each other. The property
proof of filiation of illegitimate children and the relation governing their supposed cohabitation is under
determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto Article 148 of the Family Code. Actual contribution is
should be ventilated in the proper probate court or in a required by the said provision in contrast to Art 147 which
special proceeding instituted for the purpose and cannot states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the
be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is family and household are regarded as contributions to the
for recovery of ownership and possession. acquisitions of common property by one who has no
salary, income, work or industry. Such is not included in
5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a
Art 148. If actual contribution is not proven then there
party to the case at bar. His mother, Erlinda, cannot be
can be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the
shares.
case at bar.
 4. SAGUID VS. CA While there is no question that both parties contributed in
their joint account deposit, there is, however, no sufficient
FACTS: proof of the exact amount of their respective shares
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married, but therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the Family Code, in the
separated de facto from her husband, when she met and absence of proof of extent of the parties’ respective
cohabited with petitioner Jacinto Saguid In 1996, the contribution, their share shall be presumed to be equal.
couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
5. ACRE VS. YUTTIKKI
cohabitation. private respondent filed a complaint for
Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with FACTS:
Receivership against the petitioner. She prayed that she
Sofronio Acre, Jr. Married Evangeline Yuttikki while his
be declared the sole owner of these personal properties
prior marriage with Beatriz Acre was still subsisting.
and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her
Sofronio and Evangeline acquired properties where one
contribution to the construction of their house, be
parcel of land was registered in the name of Evangeline
reimbursed to her.
Yuttikki, married to Sofronio Acre Jr. The other parcel of
ISSUE: WON there are actual contributions from the land was registered in the name of Evangeline Yuttiki,
parties married to Sofronio Acre, and Nellie Y. Del Mar, married
to Jose del Mar. Sofronio died after more than 24 years of
HELD: union with Evangeline.
it is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not
The Acres filed a complaint for reconveyance and
capacitated to marry each other because the former was
recovery of properties and/or partition with damages.
validly married to another man at the time of her
They alleged that Sofronio alone acquired the subject
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime
properties with his fund.
therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code,
which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous The trial court dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed
relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, the decision of the trial court.
relationships where both man and woman are married to
other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married ISSUE:
man. Under this regime, “…only the properties acquired Whether or not Evangeline is the owner of the contested
by both of the parties through their actual joint properties.
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their RULING:
respective contributions …” Proof of actual contribution Yes. Evangeline is the exclusive owner of the contested
is required. properties.
Even if cohabitation commenced before family code, The property regime of Evangeline and Sofronio falls
article 148 applies because this provision was intended under the Article 148 of the Family Code, considering that
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil their marriage is bigamous. Under Art 148, properties
Code. acquired by the parties through their actual joint
The fact that the controverted property was titled in the contribution shall be governed by the rules on co-
name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is not ownership. If there is no contribution from either or both
sufficient proof of co-ownership absent evidence of actual of the spouses, there can be no co-ownership.
contribution in the acquisition of the property. The Acres failed to present any evidence to establish that
In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house Sofronio made an actual contribution in acquiring the
and personal properties of the parties. Private respondent contested properties. Clearly, co-ownership does not
alleged in her complaint that she contributed P70,000.00 exist here.
for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in The certificate of title on its face show that the one
her testimony did she specify the extent of her property was exclusively owned by Evangeline, and the
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in other was co-owned by her with her sister. The rule is
her name for the purchase of construction materials. well-settled that the words "married to" preceding
Sofronio Acre, Jr are merely descriptive of the civil status
of Evangeline.
ISSUE:
ARTICLES 150-151: FAMILY RELATIONS
Whether or not the contention of the Mr.Gayon that an
1. GAYON VS. GAYON earnest effort toward a compromise before the filing of
the suit is tenable.
FACTS:
HELD:
The records show that on July 31, 1967, Pedro
Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre As regards plaintiff's failure to seek a
Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging substantially compromise, as an alleged obstacle to the present case,
that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed — Art. 222 of our Civil Code provides:
copy of which was attached to the complaint, as Annex
“No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of
"A" — whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera, for the sum of
the same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described,
toward a compromise have been made, but that thesame
and located in the barrio of Cabubugan, municipality of
have failed, subject to the limitations in article 2035.”
Guimbal, province of Iloilo, including the improvements
thereon, subject to redemption within five(5) years or not It is noteworthy that the impediment arising from
later than October 1, 1957; that said right of redemption this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained
had not been exercised by Silvestre Gayon, Genoveva d between members of the same family." This phrase,
eGayon, or any of their heirs or successors, despite the "members of the same family," should, however, be
expiration of the period therefor; that said Pedro Gelera construed in the light of Art. 217 of the same Code,
and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of pursuant to which:
sale — copy of which was attached to the complaint, as
Annex "B" — dated March 21, 1961, sold theafore Family relations shall include those:
mentioned land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon for the sum of (1) Between husband and wife;
P614.00;that plaintiff had, since 1961, introduced thereon
improvements worthP1,000; that he had, moreover, fully (2) Between parent and child;
paid the taxes on said property up to 1967; and that
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
Articles 1606 and 1616 of our Civil Code require a
judicial decree for the consolidation of the title in and to (4) Among brothers and sisters.
a land acquired through a conditional sale, and,
accordingly, praying that an order be issued in plaintiff's Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff's sister-in-law, whereas
favor for the consolidation of ownership in and to the her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
aforementioned property. none of them is included in the enumeration contained in
said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly, it
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre
alleged that her husband, Silvestre Gayon, died on Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in the case
January 6, 1954, long before the institution of this case; at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the
that Annex "A" to the complaint is fictitious, for the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff's failure to seek a
signature thereon purporting to be her signature is not compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the
hers; that neither she nor her deceased husband had ever same.
executed "any document of whatever nature in plaintiff's
favor"; that the complaint is malicious and had WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby set
embarrassed her and her children; that the heirs of aside and the case remanded to the lower court for the
Silvestre Gayon had to "employ the services of counsel inclusion, as defendant or defendants therein, of the
for a fee of P500.00 and incurred expenses of at least administrator or executor of the estate of Silvestre Gayon,
P200.00"; and that being a brother of the deceased if any, in lieu of the decedent, or, in the absence of such
Silvestre Gayon, plaintiff "did not exert efforts for the administrator or executor, of the heirs of the deceased
amicable settlement of the case" before filing his Silvestre Gayon, and for further proceedings, not
complaint. She prayed, therefore, that the same be inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this
dismissed and that plaintiff be sentenced to pay damages. instance against defendant-appellee, Genoveva de Gayon.
It is so ordered.
 2. ESQUIVIAS VS. CA Ruling:
Facts: Petitioners contend that Atty. Esquivias is only a brother-
in-law of Jose and Elena Domalaon. Atty. Esquivias is not
Julia Galpo de Domalaon was the owner of a piece of land
a member of the family of his wife and is outside the
with an area of 1,260 square meters and the two-storey
scope and coverage of the law requiring that the same
house standing thereon. In 1950 she extrajudicially
members of a family should exert efforts to bring about a
constituted this property into a family home. Alicia
compromise before the commencement of a litigation.
Domalaon-Esquivias, Elena G. Domalaon and Jose G.
Domalaon, among other children, were named We agree with petitioners. Article 222 of the Civil Code
beneficiaries thereof. provides that no suit shall be filed or maintained between
members of the same family unless it should appear that
On March 11, 1974 a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made but
by Julia Galpo de Domalaon in favor of her son-in-law,
the same have failed. The reason for the law is that a
Atty. Salvador Esquivias, husband of Alicia Domalaon.
lawsuit between family members generates deeper
On 30 March 1977 the family home was dissolved by bitterness than one between strangers. Hence, it is
Julia Galpo de Domalaon with the conformity of all her necessary that every effort should be made towards a
children. Afterwards, another deed of sale was executed compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate
by her dated 12 April 1977 transferring to Jose G. and passion in the family.
Domalaon the house and lot which once constituted the
But this requirement in Art. 222 of the Civil Code applies
family home.
only to suits between or among members of the same
Prior to the sale of the property to him, or on 21 October family. The phrase "between members of the same
1976, Jose already filed two (2) applications for Free family" should be construed in the light of Art. 217 of the
Patent in his name covering the entire property. When his Civil Code under which "family relations" include only
first application was approved, a certificate of title was those (a) between husband and wife, (b) between parent
issued on 11 February 1981. His rights over the other and child, (c) among other ascendants and their
application covering the rest of the property were descendants, and (d) among brothers and sisters.
relinquished by him in favor of his sister Elena. It turned
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Atty. Salvador S.
out later that Elena G. Domalaon also succeeded in her
Esquivias is not included in the enumeration of who are
application for Free Patent and a certificate of title was
members of the same family, as he is only a brother-in-
issued in her name on 18 March 1985.
law of respondents Jose and Elena by virtue of his
Alleging that it was only in 1981 that she came to know marriage to their sister Alicia. His relationship with
that the document she signed in favor of Atty. Salvador S. respondents is based on affinity and not on
Esquivias in 1974 was actually a deed of sale, Julia Galpo consanguinity. Consequently, insofar as he is concerned,
de Domalaon filed a disbarment case against Atty. he is a stranger with respect to the family of his wife and,
Esquivias. According to her, being a son-in-law and as such, the mandatory requirement of "earnest effort
lawyer of the Domalaons, Atty. Esquivias took advantage toward a compromise" does not apply to him. In
of her trust and confidence and poor eyesight by Magbaleta v. Gonong we ruled that "efforts to
representing that the document was a sale of her land in compromise" are not a jurisdictional prerequisite for the
favor of all her children. maintenance of an action whenever a stranger to the
family is a party thereto, whether as necessary or
RTC ruled in favor of plaintiffs. However, the Court of indispensable one. An alien to the family may not be
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and willing to suffer the inconvenience of, much less relish,
dismissed the case on the basis of its finding that there the delay and the complications that wranglings between
was no compliance with the mandatory requirements of and among relatives more often than not entail. Besides,
Art. 222 of the New Civil Code; hence, the instant it is neither practical nor fair that the rights of a family be
petition. made to depend on a stranger who just happens to have
Issue: W/N the complaint was rightfully dismissed innocently acquired some interest in a property by virtue
of his affinity to the parties. Contrary to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals, we find no reason to give Art. 222 a
broader scope than its literal import.
 3. SANDEJAS VS. IGNACIO, JR. rights of Rosita, petitioners should have sought redress
from the courts and should not have simply taken the law
Facts: into their own hands. Our laws are replete with specific
Arturo drew up a check, UCPB Check No. GRH-560239 remedies designed to provide relief for the violation of
and wrote on it the name of the payee, Dr. Manuel Borja, one's rights. It is true that Article 151 of the Family Code
but left blank the date and amount. He signed the check. requires that earnest efforts towards a compromise be
The check was left with Arturo's sister-in-law, who was made before family members can institute suits against
instructed to deliver or give it to Benjamin. The check each other.
later came to the possession of Alice who felt that Arturo
However, nothing in the law sanctions or allows the
cheated their sister Rosita in the amount of three million
commission of or resort to any extra-legal or illegal
pesos (P3,000,000.00). She believed that Arturo and
measure or remedy in order for family members to avoid
Rosita had a joint and/or money market placement in the
the filing of suits against another family member for the
amount of P3 million with the UCPB branch at Ortigas
enforcement or protection of their respective rights. As to
Ave., San Juan and that Ignacio preterminated the
Patricia's entitlement to damages, this Court has held that
placement and ran away with it, which rightfully
while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that
belonged to Rosita. She together with Rosita drew up a
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity
scheme to recover the P3 million from Arturo. Alice got
being left to the discretion of the court, it is nevertheless
her driver, Kudera, to stand as the payee of the check, Dr.
essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show the
Borja.
existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal
Alice and Rosita came to SBC Greenhills Branch connection to defendants acts.
together with a man (Kudera) who[m] they introduced as
In the present case, both the RTC and the CA were not
Dr. Borja to the then Assistant Cashier Luis. They opened
convinced that Patricia is entitled to damages. In addition,
a Joint Savings Account. As initial deposit for the Joint
and with respect to Benjamin, the Court agrees with the
Savings Account, Alice, Rosita and Kudera deposited the
CA that in the absence of a wrongful act or omission, or
check. Thereafter, they successfully widraw the amount.
of fraud or bad faith, moral damages cannot be awarded.
Arturo Ignacio, Jr. and Evelyn Ignacio (respondents) filed
a verified complaint for recovery of a sum of money and 4. LEE VS. CA
damages. Judgment is rendered in favor of plaintiffs as
against defendants Security Bank and Trust Co., Rene
Colin Gray, Sonia Ortiz Luis, Alice A.I. Sandejas and ARTICLES 153-154: FAMILY HOME
Rosita A.I. Cusi. 1. MANACOP VS. CA
The counterclaims of Patricia A.I. Sandejas are FACTS:
dismissed. Both parties appealed the RTC Decision to the
CA. The defendants-appellants Security Bank and Trust Owing to the failure to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant
Company, Rene Colin D. Gray, Sonia Ortiz-Luis, Alice to a deed of assignment signed between petitioner's
A.I. Sandejas, and Rosita A.I. Cusi, are ordered to jointly corporation and private respondent herein, the latter filed
and severally pay the plaintiffs. Petitioners and SBTC, on July 3, 1989, a complaint for a sum of money, with a
together with Gray and Ortiz-Luis, filed their respective prayer for preliminary attachment, against the former. As
petitions for review before this Court. a consequence of the order on July 28, 1989, the
corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was issued
Issue: on August11, 1989 which triggered the attachment of a
parcel of land in Quezon City owned by Manacop
1.Whether or not Alice and Rosita are justified in
Construction President Florante F. Manacop, herein
encashing the subject check given the factual
petitioner. The petitioner insists that the attached property
circumstances established in the present case.
is a family home, having been occupied by him and his
2.Whether or not the petitioners can hold respondent family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from
liable for moral damages as effect of his complaint. attachment.
Ruling: ISSUE:
Petitioners' posture is not sanctioned by law. If they truly That the parcel of land is a Family Home and cannot be
believe that Arturo took advantage of and violated the subject for attachment.
HELD: existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of
the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
Petitioner belief that his abode at Quezon City since 1972
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
is a family home within the purview of the Family Code
home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state
and therefore should not have been subjected to the
that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
vexatious writ. Yet, petitioner must concede that
effect.
respondent court properly applied the discussion
conveyed by Justice Gancayco in this regard when he Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of
spoke for the First Division of this Court in Modequillo the money judgment aforecited? No. The debt or liability
vs. Breva (185 SCRA 766[1990]) that: which was the basis of the judgment arose or was incurred
at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
and the money judgment arising therefrom was rendered
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from by the appellate court on January 29, 1988.Both preceded
execution, forced sale or attachment except: the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. This
case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
(1) For non-payment of taxes; provided in the Family Code. (at pp. 771-772).
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the Verily, according to petitioner, his debt was incurred in
family home; 1987 or prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988 of the
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before Family Code (page 17, petition; page 22, Rollo). This fact
or after such constitution; and alone will militate heavily against the so-called
exemption by sheer force of exclusion embodied under
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, paragraph 2, Article 155 of the Family Code cited in
builders, material men and others who have rendered Modequillo.
service for the construction of the building.
2. CABANG VS. BASAY
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from
the time of the constitution of the family home as such, Facts:
and lasts so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot
therein. No. 7777, Ts- 222 located in Molave, Zamboanga del
In the present case, the residential house and lot of Sur. However, Felix Odong and his heirs never occupied
petitioner was constituted as a family home whether nor took possession of the lot.
judicially or extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real
became a family home by operation of law under Article property from the heirs of Felix Odong for P8,000.00. The
153 of the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a latter also did not occupy the said property.
family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in
in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being a continuous, open, peaceful and adverse possession of the
leap year). same parcel of land since 1956 up to the present. They
were the awardees in the cadastral proceedings of Lot No.
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-222. During the said
family home from the time it was occupied by petitioner cadastral proceedings, defendant-appellees claimed Lot
and his family in1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were actually
of the Family Code, it is provided that "the provisions of occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out, however,
this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences when the Municipality of Molave relocated the townsite
insofar as said provisions are applicable." It does not lots in the area in 1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778
mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a was used by the government as a public road and as there
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences were many discrepancies in the areas occupied, it was
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at then discovered that defendant-appellees were actually
the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the occupying Lot No. 7777.
Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint
the Family Code. Article 162 simply means that all for Recovery of Property against defendant-appellees.
RTC ruled in favor of the defendants. CA reversed the
said decision. Petitioners insist that the property subject community property, or conjugal property and partly on
of the controversy is a duly constituted family home the exclusive property of either spouse with the consent
which is not subject to execution, thus, they argue that the of the latter.
appellate tribunal erred in reversing the judgment of the
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where
trial court.
there is no communal or conjugal property existing, it can
Issue: W/N the improvements introduced by petitioners be constituted only on his or her own property.
on the subject land are family homes will not extricate
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of
them from their predicament.
petitioners. For all their arguments to the contrary, the
Ruling: stark and immutable fact is that the property on which
their alleged family home stands
The petition lacks merit.
is owned by respondents and the question of ownership
As defined, [T]he family home is a sacred symbol of had been long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate
family love and is the repository of cherished memories courts judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus,
that last during ones lifetime. It is the dwelling house petitioners continued stay on the subject land is only by
where the husband and wife, or an unmarried head of a mere tolerance of respondents.
family reside, including the land on which it is situated. It
3. SPS. DE MESA VS. ACERO
is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an
unmarried head of a family. Article 153 of the Family FACTS:
Code provides that
Spouses De Mesa obtained a loan from Spouses Acero
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is which was secured by a mortgage over the subject
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its property. When Spouses De Mesa failed to pay the loan,
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually the property was sold at a public auction. Spouses Acero
resides therein, the family home continues to be such and was the highest bidder and the corresponding certificate
is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment of sale was issued to them. Thereafter, they leased the
except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the subject property to Spouses De Mesa who then defaulted
value allowed by law. in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals
due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment
The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at
against Spouses De Mesa. In their defense, Spouses De
the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in
Mesa claimed that Spouses Acero have no right over the
urban areas and P200,000.00 in rural areas. Under the
subject property. They deny that they are mere lessors,
afore-quoted provision, a family home is deemed
alleging that they are the lawful owners of the subject
constituted on a house and a lot from the time it is
property and, thus cannot be evicted therefrom. The MTC
occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. Spouses De Mesa
constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially.
appealed the Decision.
There can be no question that a family home is generally
In the meantime, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with
exempt from execution, provided it was duly constituted
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), seeking to nullify the title
as such. It is likewise a given that the family home must
of Spouses Acero on the basis that the subject property is
be constituted on property owned by the persons
a family home which is exempt from execution under the
constituting it. Indeed, as pointed out in Kelley, Jr. v.
Family Code, and thus, could have not been validly levied
Planters Products, Inc. [T]he family home must be part
upon for purposes of satisfying their unpaid loan. The
of the properties of the absolute community or the
RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals
conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
affirmed the Decision.
either spouse with the latters consent, or on the property
of the unmarried head of the family. In other words: ISSUE:
The family home must be established on the properties Whether the subject property is exempt from execution
of (a) the absolute community, or (b) the conjugal
partnership, or (c) the exclusive property of either spouse
with the consent of the other. It cannot be established on
property held in co-ownership with third
persons. However, it can be established partly on
HELD: ISSUE: WON Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the
deceased
It is without dispute that the family home, from the time
of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries HELD:
actually resides therein, is generally exempt from
Considering that Mariano was born on June 17, 1943 and
execution, forced sale or attachment. However, this right
Emiliano died on January 1, 1943, the former is presumed
can be waived or be barred by laches by the failure to set
to be a legitimate son of the latter because he was born
up and prove the status of the property as a family home
within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage.
at the time of the levy or a reasonable time thereafter.
The fact that the husband was seriously sick is not
The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
sale under Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it physically impossible for the husband to have had access
must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 days next
himself before the sale of the property at public auction. preceding the birth of the child. Impossibility of access
It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption by husband to wife includes absence during the initial
merely alleges that such property is a family home. This period of conception, impotence which is patent, and
claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the incurable; and imprisonment unless it can be shown that
Sheriff. cohabitation took place through corrupt violation of
prison regulations. Maria’s illicit intercourse with a man
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners’ negligence or
other than the husband during the initial period does not
omission to assert their right within a reasonable time
preclude cohabitation between husband and wife.
gives rise to the presumption that they have abandoned,
waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under Hence, Mariano Andal was considered a legitimate son of
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is the deceased making him the owner of the parcel land.
incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and prove the
same within the prescribed period and it is not the 2. BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA
sheriff’s duty to presume or raise the status of the subject FACTS:
property as a family home.
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had
various properties. They both died intestate. The special
proceedings for administration of the properties were
ARTICLES 164, 166, 170 &171: LEGITIMATE
filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio
CHILDREN; GROUNDS TO IMPUGN
filed for issuance of letters of administration in favor of
LEGITIMACY
the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition, saying that she
1. ANDAL VS. MACARAIG is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is capable
of administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of
FACTS: documentary evidence and testified that the spouses
Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of Vicente
Duenas, filed a complaint for the recovery of the tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that the
ownership and possession of a parcel of land owned by spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage.
Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas. Eduvigis Macaraig, Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the
herein defendant, donated the land by virtue of donation biological child of the spouses who were unable to
propter nuptias in favor of Emiliano. The latter was physically procreate.
suffering from tuberculosis in January 1941. His brother,
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code
Felix, then lived with them to work his house and farm.
and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed
Emiliano became so weak that he can hardly move and
the lower court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-
get up from his bed. Sometime in September 1942, the
Badua is not the biological child of the late spouses.
wife eloped with Felix and lived at the house of Maria’s
father until 1943. Emiliano died in January 1, 1943 where ISSUE:
the wife did not attend the funeral. On June 17, 1943,
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate
Maria gave birth to a boy who was, herein petitioner.
child and the sole heir of the late spouses.
RULING: Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children
of the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.
of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even
be applied in the case at bar. The above provisions do not while denominated as being one for partition, would
contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from
the biological child of a certain couple. being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
legitimacy of the child by:
The trial court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual petitioners for lack of cause of action and for being
intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the improper. It decreed that the declaration of heirship could
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the only be made in a special proceeding in asmuch as
child; petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status or
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child right.
could not have been his child; ISSUE: WON Jacqueline and Jinkie are illegitimate
(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial children of the late Juan Dizon
insemination, the written authorization or ratification by HELD:
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud,
violence, intimidation or undue influence. No. A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners
were born during the marriage of their parents. The
Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period certificates of live would also identify Danilo de Jesus as
within which the husband or any of his heirs should file being their father. There is perhaps no presumption of the
an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this law more firmly established and founded on sounder
case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are morality and more convincing reason than the
contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.
Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not born
to Vicente and Isabel. Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate
filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect,
Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by the Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law legitimacy of children conceived or born during the
are the sole heirs of the estate. marriage of the parents. The presumption of legitimacy
3. DE JESUS VS. ESTATE OF DIZON fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only
the father, or in exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can
FACTS: contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got
child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of
married on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage
the husband can be rejected.
that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus,
herein petitioners, were born. The rule that the written acknowledgement made by the
deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G.
illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be validly
Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as
invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue,
being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de
i.e whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledge
Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992.
illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
Jacqueline and Jinkie filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 adjudicated without an action having been first instituted
for "Partition with Inventory and Accounting" of the to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo
Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court. B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the
paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine
contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that months after the day she said she was raped by Umanito.
purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock shall be Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if
considered legitimate although the mother may have uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by
declared against its legitimacy or may have been other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3). The disputable
sentenced as having been an adulteress. presumption that was established as a result of the DNA
testing was not contradicted and overcome by other
4. PEOPLE VS. UMANITO evidence considering that the accused did not object to the
FACTS: admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A"
and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented
The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused evidence to rebut the same.
Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is
deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the
The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape,
had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a child and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as perpetua and the indemnification of the private
well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.
deemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father
of BBB. Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing
conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, and
With the advance in genetics and the availability of new that no cause is presented for us to deviate from the
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny
certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. Umanito’s Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The instant case
The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed to is now CLOSED and TERMINATED
the parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not
to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test results. ARTICLES 172 &175: PROOF OF FILIATION

The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe 1. FERNANDEZ VS. CA

the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or 2. JISON VS. CA
other information obtained from DNA testing and is
FACTS:
hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as
the accused has been acquitted or served his sentence. Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint
against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for recognition as
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood
illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years
stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and
after her mother’s death and when she was already 39
Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the
years of age.
biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a
Complete Match in all of the 15 loci tested between the Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940
alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza
findings, there is a99.9999% probability of paternity that Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since
Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
admitted that if the value of the Probability of Paternity is recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his
99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that
of paternity. petitioner supported her and spent for her education such
that she became a CPA and eventually a Central Bank
ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of
Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11
[BBB].
witnesses.
RULING: ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate
Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then child of Francisco Jison.
recently promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence
(DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary
conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA, Umanito had
HELD: 3. TIJING VS. CA
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate Facts:
filiation may be established in the same way and on the
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife,
same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172
they have six children, youngest of whom is Edgardo
thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which
Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched
legitimate filiation is established.
Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job. Bienvenida left to
“To prove open and continuous possession of the status Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually
of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the let Angelita take care of her child while she was doing
manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her
father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear son, Angelita was nowhere to be found, and despite her
manifestations of parental affection and care, which and her husband‘s efforts, they could not locate Angelita
cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of and their child‘s whereabouts.
such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of
Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of
paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the
Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita,
child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and
accidentally, but continuously”.
allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now named John
The following facts was established based on the Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as
testimonial evidences offered by Monina: her own son, sired by her common-law husband Tomas
Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now alleges
1. That Francisco was her father and she was conceived
that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and
at the time when her mother was employed by the former;
Tomas for it was the latter‘s own brother who admitted
2. That Francisco recognized Monina as his child that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident.
through his overt acts and conduct. Tomas begot no children from his legal marriage nor with
the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas‘ brother even
SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly testified that Tomas himself admitted to him that the
identifying the putative father is not competence evidence subject child was adopted.
as to the issue of paternity. Francisco’s lack of
participation in the preparation of baptismal certificates Issue:
and school records render the documents showed as
Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject
incompetent to prove paternity. With regard to the
child.
affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age
attesting that Francisco was not her father, SC was in the Ruling:
position that if Monina were truly not Francisco’s
Bienvenida. It was Bienvenida who was able to produce
illegitimate child, it would be unnecessary for him to have
the competent evidences to establish the child‘s filiation
gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce
with her and her husband. She substantiated her claim
her filiation. Monina’s evidence hurdles the “high
with sufficient
standard of proof required for the success of an action to
establish one’s illegitimate filiation in relying upon the clinical records, presenting the proper and credible
provision on “open and continuous possession”. Hence, witnesses who assisted her in her child‘s birth.
Monina proved her filiation by more than mere
preponderance of evidence. Not to mention the fact that it could be readily observed
that Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in
Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance
even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well within between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A material evidence to establish parentage. Whereas,
denial then of her action on ground of laches would Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation
clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied. years before the alleged birth of the child and the
admission of Tomas‘ own brother that Tomas was sterile
makes it impossible that he and Angelita could have
produced subject child. More importantly, the birth
certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and private
respondent were legally married which is false because CA
even private respondent had admitted she is a common-
– ordered Charles to recognize Gliffze and give
law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in
monthly child support
said birth certificate.
ISSUE: WON Gliffze is entitled to receive child support
4. GOTARDO VS. BULING
and to be recognized as Charles’ son.
FACTS:
HELD: YES.
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate,
complaint with the RTC of Maasin,Southern Leyte, for
through the record of birth appearing in the civil register
compulsory recognition and support pendente lite,
or a final judgment, an admission of filiation in a public
claiming that the CharlesGotardo is the father of her child
document or a private hand written instrument and signed
Gliffze. (answer) Petitioner denied the paternity.
by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous
Parties’ failed to amicably settle the dispute, the RTC possession of the status of a legitimate or illegitimate
terminated the pre-trial proceedings. Trialon the merits child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
ensued. and special laws.
Evidence for Divina (casual employee) showed that she We have held that such other proof of one's filiation
met Charles (accounting supervisor) onDecember 1, 1992
may be a “baptismal certificate, a judicial
at the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Maasin, Southern Leytebranch. admission, a family bible in which [his] name has been
entered, common reputation respecting [his]pedigree,
Charles courted Divina in the third week of December
admission by silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and
1992 and they became sweethearts in thelast week of
other kinds of proof [admissible]under Rule
January 1993. Charles gave the respondent greeting cards
on special occasions, (Valentine’s Day and her birthday); 130 of the Rules of Court.”
she reciprocated his love and took care of him when he
was ill. We explained that a prima facie case exists if a woman
declares
In September 1993, Charles started intimate sexual
relations with the respondent in the former’s rented room —supported by corroborative proof
in the boarding house managed by Rodulfo (Divina’s —that she had sexual relations with the putative father; at
uncle). Rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August this point, the burden of evidence shifts to the putative
30, 1994. father. We explained further that the two affirmative
The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and defenses available to the putative father are: (1)
became more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on incapability of sexual relations with the mother due to
August 8, 1994, she got pregnant. Charles was happy and either physical absence or impotency, or(2) that the
made plans to marryDivina. BUT, Charles backed out of mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of
the wedding plan. (Divina filed for damages for breach of conception. In this case, the respondent established a
promise to marry but was amicably settled). prima facie case that the petitioner is the putative father
of Gliffze through testimony that she had been sexually
Divina gave birth to Gliffze on March 9, 1995. (When involved only with one man, the petitioner, at the time of
Charles did not show up and failed toprovide support to her conception. Rodulfo corroborated her testimony that
Gliffze, Divina sent him a demand letter on July 24, 1995 the petitioner and the respondent had intimate
for recognition andsupport of their son) relationship. On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny
that he had sexual encounters with the respondent, only
Due to unanswered demand, Divina took her demands in
that it occurred on a much later date than the respondent
Court.
asserted, such that it was physically impossible for the
Charles denied being Gliffze’s father in Court. respondent to have been three (3) months pregnant
already in September 1994 when he was informed of the
RTC
pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to
– approved monthly child support. RTC (appeal) substantiate his allegations of infidelity and insinuations
– reversed former decision of promiscuity. His allegations, therefore, cannot be given
credence for lack of evidentiary support. The petitioner’s Issue:
denial cannot overcome the respondent’s clear and
Is Dinah entitled to the custody of Gardin?
categorical assertions. Since filiation is beyond question,
support follows as a matter of obligation; a parent is Ruling:
obliged to support his child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate. Support consists of everything indispensable No. The general rule is recommended in order to avoid
for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, many a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial away from her. The exception allowed by the rule has to
capacity of the family. Thus, the amount of support is be for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child.
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the A mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who
amount of support is made as the amount shall be in is below seven years of age for “compelling reasons.”
proportion to the resources or means of the giver and the Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
necessities of the recipient.47 It may be reduced or unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness,
increased proportionately according to the reduction or drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and
increase of the necessities of the recipient and the affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven
resources or means of the person obliged to support. years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but
5. SALAS VS. MATUSALEM the court is not bound by that choice. The court may
exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s
preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit,
in which instance, custody may be given to the other
ARTICLE 176: ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN;
parent, or even to a third person.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY; RA NO. 9255 (2004)
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the
1. TONOG VS. CA
controlling factor, SC find that the appellate court did not
Facts: err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should
- Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
thrust into a strange environment away from the people
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and
and places to which she had apparently formed an
sister.
attachment.
- A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is
a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father
a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special
and grandparents.
proceedings before the trial court.
- Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin
2. DELA CRUZ VS. GRACIA
and the trial court granted the petition and appointed
Edgar as the legal guardian. FACTS:
- Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the  Dominique and Jenie were living together
court set aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah without the benefit of marriage. Jenie got
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a pregnant but unfortunately, Dominique died 2
motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court months before Jenie gave birth.
issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody
 Jenie then applied for registration of the child’s
over Gardin.
birth using Dominique’s surname, Aquino.
- Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who
 When Jenie applied for registration of child’s
modified their previous decision and granted Edgar
birth, Jenie attached the ff.:
custody over Gardin.
 Certificate of Live Birth
- Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the
minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of  AUSF, together with Dominique’s
Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her handwritten autobiography
as the mother of the illegitimate minor.
  Affidavit of Acknowledgment issued by
Dominique’s father and brother
 Respondent denied the registration because the
child was born out of wedlock.
 Trial court then dismissed Jenie’s petition
because the document (autobiography) was
unsigned and as per IRR of RA 9255 (An Act
Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the
Surname of their Father) which states that:
 “Private handwritten instrument must be
duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity”
 Furthermore, petition was denied because the
document did not contain any express recognition
of paternity.
ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten instrument of the
deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a
recognition of paternity
RULING: YES.
Art. 176 does not expressly/explicitly state that the private
handwritten instrument must be signed by putative father.
It must be read in conjunction with Art. 175 and 172. It is
therefore implied.
Special circumstances to the case:
 Died 2 months prior to child’s birth
 Handwritten and corresponds to facts presented
 Corroborated by Affidavit of Acknowledgment
by father and brother who stand to be affected by
their hereditary rights
The Court then adopted the ff. rules:
1. Where the private handwritten instrument is
the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove
filiation, there should be strict compliance with
the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent
2. Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation
therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence
3. GRANDE VS. ANTONIO