Developments in Radicalisation

and Political Violence

De-Radicalising Islamists:
Programmes and their
Impact in Muslim Majority
States
Hamed El-Said

January 2012
Developments in Radicalisation
and Political Violence
Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence
is a series of papers published by the International Centre
for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR).
It features papers by leading experts, providing reviews of
existing knowledge and sources and/or novel arguments
and insights which are likely to advance our understanding
of radicalisation and political violence. The papers are written
in plain English. Authors are encouraged to spell out policy
implications where appropriate.

Series Editors
Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens
ICSR, King’s College London
Dr John Bew
ICSR, King’s College London

Editorial Assistants
Katie Rothman
ICSR, King’s College London

Editorial Board
Prof. Sir Lawrence Freedman
King’s College London
Dr. Boaz Ganor
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya
Dr. Peter Neumann
King’s College London
Dr Hasan Al Momani
Jordan Institute of Diplomacy

Contact
All papers can be downloaded free of charge at www.icsr.
info. To order hardcopies, please write to [email protected].
For all matters related to the paper series, please write to:
ICSR
King’s College London
138–142 Strand
London WC2R 1HH
United Kingdom
© ICSR 2012
 1

Executive Summary
Violent extremism remains a major threat to global
security. The global nature of the phenomenon is reflected in
its unselective character. Capitals from Oslo to Cairo, Riyadh
to Kuala Lumpur, and London to Washington have had to deal
with the consequences. No region, or even country, can claim
to be entirely immune from the problem.

Recent developments, such al-Qaeda’s attempt (via

Omar Farouk Abdulmuttalab) to blow up an airliner bound
for Detroit in December 2009, and bombs sent from
Yemen to Chicago in October 2010, suggest that violent
extremist groups and individuals remain more determined,
sophisticated, unpredictable, and hard to identify.

Counter-terrorism is therefore likely to remain an

important policy preoccupation and gain further significance
in international relations in the short to medium terms. The
continuation of conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
deterioration of the situation in Yemen and Somalia, and the
volatile nature of the Middle-East peace process all contribute
to the persistence of extremism. But so too do other, less
obvious factors, and the understanding of this has generated
considerable interest in new approaches initiated by several
Muslim-majority states to counter the phenomenon of violent
extremism.

This report is part of a larger project funded by the Norwegian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will be published by Routledge
in early 2012. The Report examines the approaches of eight
Muslim-majority states1 known to have developed ‘soft’
strategies to counter this problem, and demonstrates how
all of these countries have developed varied approaches,
strategies and processes. For example, some focus more
on countering and preventing further radicalisation in their
societies (what we refer to in this report as ‘counter-
radicalisation strategy’). Countries that fall in this category
include Morocco and Bangladesh. Others, such as Yemen
and Egypt, focus more on rehabilitating and counselling those

1 These are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi

Arabia and Yemen.
2

who have already become radicalised (De-radicalisation).

Some have developed well-structured official programmes
(Saudi Arabia), while others rely more on individual initiatives
(Jordan). Finally, some have experienced collective de-
radicalisation, whereby a group of former radicals decide to
take a collective decision to denounce violence, admit their
mistake and rejoin society. Such collective de-radicalisation
can, and has taken place inside prisons (e.g. Islamic
Jihad and Jihad Organisation in Egypt in 1997 and 2007,
respectively) and outside prisons (e.g. the Algerian Islamic
Salvation Army in 1997).

By studying the counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation

policies implemented in our eight Muslim-majority states, the
report identifies certain key factors which can be considered
as conducive to successful de-radicalisation programmes.
These include the following: the role of popular support
combined with a committed, charismatic, political leadership;
the role of families; the role of civil society; and the role and
quality of the clerics and scholars involved. The political and
developmental strength of the state is also important, as is
the relationship between national counter-radicalisation and
de-radicalisation efforts on the one hand, and external factors
and interventions on the other.

Finally, no single formula can deal with all cases of violent

extremism, even within a single region. Counter-radicalisation
and de-radicalisation efforts must take account of the culture,
mores, traditions, history, and rules and regulations of
each country. 
 3

About the Author

Hamed El-Said is Chair and Professor of International
Business and Political Economy at the Manchester
Metropolitan University Business School (UK). Hamed is
advisor to the United Nations’ 1267 Al-Qaeda Taliban
Monitoring Team, and to the Arab Thought Forum, founded
and chaired by HRH Prince Hassan ben Talal of Jordan. In
2008, he headed the research team of the United Nations
Counter Implementation Task Force’s Working Group on
Addressing Radicalisation and Extremism that Lead to
Terrorism. This position was responsible for analysing counter
radicalisation and de-radicalisation programs of United
Nations Member States in order to identify best practices
and lessons to be derived. The findings were collated in a
report submitted to the United Nations Member States in
late 2008, and which was published on the United Nation’s
website: (http://www.un.org/terrorism/pdfs/radicalization.pdf).

Professor El-Said has published extensively on the

Middle East and North Africa. He is the co-author of Aid and
Power in the Middle East and North Africa, and Economic
Liberalisation, Social Capital and Social Welfare in the Arab
World (both published in 2009 by Palgrave McMillan with
Professor Jane Harrigan). His latest work includes a book
entitled Globalisation, Democratisation and Radicalisation
in the Arab World (with Jane Harrigan, Macmillan Palgrave,
2011), and Deradicalising Islamists: Learning from Counter
Radicalisation and De-radicalisation programmes of
Muslim-Majority States (Routledge, 2012, in print).
4

Contents

Introduction 5

Algeria’s Civil Accord 7

Bangladesh’s Hybrid Approach 13

Egypt’s Spontaneous De-radicalisation Process 17

Jordan’s Lack of a ‘Soft’ Strategy 21

Malaysia’s De-radicalisation: Learning from the Past 25

Morocco: Promoting Islamic Beauty 29

The Art of De-radicalisation: Saudi Arabia 35

Yemen’s Attempts at Rehabilitation 41

Conclusions: Some Key Lessons 45

 5

Introduction2

I
n recent years there has been an important shift of
emphasis in dealing with violent extremism. Scholars,
practitioners and policymakers no longer focus solely on
factors that may lead a group or an individual to choose the
path of violence. They have now also begun to look carefully
at what has caused some people, whether individually or as
a group, to leave violent extremism behind, or even to turn
against their former comrades and work to undermine their
views and tactics.

In large measure, this shift has come about as a result of

pioneering work by several Muslim-majority states that have
established programmes designed either to forestall the
violent radicalisation of groups and individuals in their
societies (counter-radicalisation), or to rehabilitate and
reintegrate groups and individuals that have already crossed
the line and have either committed an act of extreme violence,
joined a violent extremist organisation, or set off down the
path to do so (de-radicalisation). Countries like Egypt,
Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have
implemented such programmes, whose most distinctive
feature is an emphasis on non-coercive measures to win
‘hearts and minds’ in countering violent extremism.

The apparent success of these programmes has attracted

the attention of other states, such as Australia, Canada, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
However, although they are often referred to, information
about national counter- and de-radicalisation programmes is
not yet widely disseminated, analysed or understood. Despite
their popularity, as Seifert noted, “exactly how [they are]
accomplished”, and how “successful” they have been
“is not entirely clear.”3

2 Professor Jane Harrigan has contributed to the sections written on the

Malaysian and Bangladeshi efforts in this report. Richard Barrett also read the
early drafts of the report and made valuable comments.
3 K. Seifert, ‘Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?’, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2010,
pp. 21-30
6

This report is part of a larger project, funded by the

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to study counter-
radicalisation and de-radicalisation programmes initially in
eight Muslim-majority States: Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt,
Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. All of
these countries have programmes either to counter the
appeal of violent extremism, to rehabilitate already radicalised
individuals, or both. Some are considered to have the most
successful reform programmes in the world, notwithstanding
the difficulties of measuring success in this area. This report
seeks to generate information on the approaches of the
eight Muslim-majority states and identify lessons learnt and
best practices that could benefit a wider audience within the
international community.
 7

Algeria’s Civil Accord

F
ew countries have suffered from internal violence
more than Algeria did during the 1990s in what came
to be known as its ‘dirty war’. Violence erupted after
the army cancelled an election that would almost certainly
have brought the religiously-oriented Islamic Salvation Front
(ISF) to power. The Algerian President, Abdul-Aziz Boutaflika,
subsequently said that “Algeria paid the highest price for
survival, tens of thousands of victims and more than $20
billion worth of losses, stifling development… in addition
to the deterioration of Algeria’s international standing”. He
also estimated the human cost of the war, in 2005, to be
“already over 100,000” casualties.4

In 1997, the Islamic Salvation Army (ISA), the ISF’s self-

declared armed wing and Algeria’s largest militant group,
unilaterally declared a ceasefire. The improved coercive
power of the state was an important factor behind this
decision. As one former Emir of a militant group stated:
“Before 1995 we were winning the war. Things changed
after 1995 when the balance shifted in favour of the state
and we began losing. This was the most important factor
behind us declaring a ceasefire in 1997.”5

The reform process, however, only took hold two years

later when Boutaflika won the 1999 presidential elections.
Boutaflika was determined to put an end to violence in the
country and to restore stability and economic development.
Immediately after becoming President, he announced the
major policies that he intended to implement and which he
believed were necessary to bring peace. To mobilise public
support behind his policies, Boutaflika personally promoted
two referenda, one in 1999 and one in 2005. The former
produced the Civil Concorde Law (CCL) and the latter, the
Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation (CPNR). Both

4 Author’s interview, Algeria, December 2009

5 Author’s interview, Algeria, December 2009
8

attracted overwhelming support from the Algerian people

and laid the foundations for de-radicalisation in the country.

Algeria’s de-radicalisation policies, encapsulated in the

CCL and CPNR, revolved around three central packages.
First, there were measures aimed at restoring peace. These
included pardons, amnesties, reductions in sentences and
the dropping of charges against all those who gave
themselves up voluntarily, renounced violence and handed
in their weapons. However, Article 10 of the CCL made
an important exception for those “who had committed,
participated in or called for the implementation of
collective atrocities such as rape or the use of explosives
in public places”. Such people could not expect forgiveness.

Second, Boutaflika introduced measures aimed at

supporting national reconciliation, solidarity and reintegration.
These included either reinstating people who had lost their
jobs and careers because of the ‘national tragedy’, or offering
them compensation instead. The latter included the provision
of health and education benefits to ailing and needy families
of reformed militants, of imprisoned violent extremists and of
those killed during the war by either civilian or militant groups.
As with other measures later adopted in Saudi Arabia, such
incentives aimed to check hatred against the state, ease the
pain and financial burdens borne by the families of
incarcerated breadwinners, and so prevent the future
radicalisation of the siblings and offspring of detained or
deceased individuals. Boutaflika also extended financial
compensation to the families of the missing,6 as well as
to the families of other victims of the conflict.7

Finally, Boutaflika implemented measures aimed at preventing

the recurrence of violence. These prohibited “political activity,
in whatever form, by any person responsible for the excessive

6 Algeria has more than 10,000 missing people attributed to the ‘national
tragedy’, the largest number of missing people in the world after Bosnia.
Article 30 of the CPNR defined missing as “Any person whose death is
declared by a judicial order and about whom there is no news and whose
body has never been found after investigation by all legal means.”
7 Compensation included payment for damage to homes and their contents,
for example, caused by explosives or military action between the authorities
and violent extremists.
 9

use of religion that led to the national tragedy”, as well as by

“those who refused to acknowledge responsibility for devising
and implementing a policy of glorifying violence against the
‘umma’ and state institutions.” (Article 26)

These policies were not easy to implement. Indeed, for some,

they were extremely painful, particularly the families of victims,
who felt that the state had not only failed to acknowledge
and recognise their plight, but had treated them on an equal
footing to the former violent extremists and their families.

Yet, perhaps the most important lesson that emerged from

the Algerian experience relates to the role of civil society, an
important source of ‘soft power’. Participation in civil society
organisations (CSO) promotes bonds of solidarity and
cooperation among members and therefore influences such
variables as trust and tolerance. Through their extensive
social networks and their inherent dynamism, innovation and
energy, CSOs have much wider access to society than the
state. This also allows them to play an important role in
countering violent extremism.

To promote his reform policies, President Boutaflika relied on

CSOs, which had sprung up quickly in the 1990s as a result
of a 1988 law that facilitated public associations within the
country. As an Algerian observer wrote:

Civil society and political parties were also active in

mobilising the population against the phenomenon [of
violence]. They were instrumental in creating a modus
operandi anchored in peace and national reconciliation.
…. Even the bereaved, from victims-of-terrorism
associations were actively involved in defending these
principles and still fought for tolerance, peace and stability.
The role of the community, therefore, was of strategic
importance in defeating terrorism…8

There is little doubt that the CCL and CPNR have achieved
a great deal. For a start, and following the collective

8 M. Berkouk, ‘The Role of Civil Society in Combating Terrorism in Algeria,

Institute of Diplomacy and International Relations’, University of Algiers, 2009,
p. 13
10

de-radicalisation process, which first started in the mountains

before being later facilitated by the CCL and CPNR, incidents
of, and fatalities from, violent extremism plummeted drastically
in Algeria. For example, the average number of terrorism
incidents declined in Algeria from 73 in 2000 –2001 to 26
in 2006 – 2007. Fatalities also declined from an average of
594 to an average of 132 over the same period.9 Algeria has
transformed over the last decade, yet the reforms do not
seem to have gone far enough to eliminate all violent
extremism from the country.10 In 2005, President Boutaflika
evaluated the situation as follows: “Now security and safety
have been restored as a result of the policy of al-We’am
al-Madani (national reconciliation)... However, our national
wound has not been healed yet because of terrorism, whose
evil has been reduced, but not completely removed …”11

Nonetheless, there are several other issues that still linger

since Algeria’s 1997 de-radicalsation process that have not
been dealt with effectively. They are a cause of concern for an
international community which is closely monitoring Algeria’s
de-radicalisation policies. For example, many de-radicalised
individuals still feel neglected and undermined. This is largely
because a significant number of them have not received
state compensation, been restored to their former jobs,
or been assisted in finding new employment. Algeria’s
de-radicalisation programme also lacked any training or
rehabilitation programme to retrain and prepare de-radicalised
individuals and equip them with the necessary qualifications
that would enable them to find a job. Large numbers remain
unemployed with low expectations for the future. Pardoned

9 It is important to note here that by the year 2000, terrorism incidents had
already declined drastically from their peak in the mid-1990s as a result of
the collective de-radicalisation process which started in 1997 and led the
leadership of the ISA to announce a unilateral ceasefire. This paved the way
for thousands of former militants of ISA to abandon their weapons and rejoin
their society. For details on terrorism incidents and fatalities in Algeria (and
elsewhere), see START (2009). Global Terrorism Dataset: Variables & Inclusion
Criteria, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism, Maryland University, Version 3, May.
10 For more details, see L. Vriens, ‘Armed Islamic Group: Algeria, Islamists’,
Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May, 2009, available at: http://www.cfr.org/
algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists/p9154.
11 A. Boutaflika, Speech delivered in the Occasion of the National Seminar for
Regional Activities, 14 August, 2005, available at: http://www.riassa.dz/arabe/
discoursara/2005/08/htm1/D140805.htm.
 11

former radical groups and individuals also remain disgruntled

because the state has stripped them of their political role.
They have not been permitted either to join political parties,
establish their own parties and associations, or engage in any
political activity. This has led to feelings of social, political and
economic marginalisation among the graduates of Algeria’s
de-radicalisation programme.

Some victims’ families also remain discontented because

they wanted recognition from the state and for it to distinguish
more clearly between them and former militants and their
families. Of equal importance, the families of missing
individuals still require answers as to the fate of their loved
ones. This issue was further complicated by the fact that the
state absolved its security personnel of any responsibility for
atrocities and even based its pardons, reductions in
sentences and all other benefits upon the premise that
society could not pursue through the courts any state
official suspected of committing atrocities.12

Finally, no guarantees were provided regarding the army and

security forces’ role in politics. Whether they will intervene
to derail election results in the future, as they did in the early
1990s, remains to be seen. For the time being, most
Algerians have had enough of bloodshed and instability,
and have therefore accepted President Boutaflika’s reforms.

Whether or not the above-mentioned unresolved issues

will return to haunt the Algerian state in the future remains
to be seen.

12 N. Jebnoune. ‘Is the Maghreb the “Next Afghanistan”? Mapping the

Radicalization of the Algerian Salafi Jihadist Movement’, Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University, 2007; L. Vriens, ‘Armed Islamic Group: Algeria,
Islamists’, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May 2009, available at: http://
www.cfr.org/algeria/armed-islamic-group-algeria-islamists/p9154
12
 13

Bangladesh’s Hybrid
Approach

B
angladesh has traditionally promoted an inclusive,
secular and tolerant brand of Sufi Islam. Over the past
60 years, Bangladesh has enjoyed positive relations
between its four major faith communities. 88 percent of the
population are Muslim and the remaining 12 percent Christian,
Hindu and Buddhist. Major religious festivals are marked
by national holidays and celebrated in an atmosphere of
tolerance, with the main religions sharing many rituals in
common and receiving extensive media coverage. Therefore,
Bangladesh has not experienced any major religious unrest
and, historically, relatively few people have been attracted to
any violent extremist ideology. This is despite Bangladesh’s
problems of widespread poverty, limited land and other
resources, and areas of poor governance.

However, between 1999 and 2005 Bangladesh experienced

an upsurge in support for Islamic violent extremism. An
influx of already radicalised groups, such as returning
veterans of the Afghan war and migrant workers from abroad,
influenced public opinion, as did events on the world stage,
particularly U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and
events in Palestine which fuelled radicalism and anti-Western
sentiment.13 This occurred in a context of political neglect
of the threat posed by violent extremism, poor governance
and widespread corruption, which are cited as key factors in
the increasing radicalisation of elements within Bangladeshi
society.

With a new caretaker government in office between 2005

and 2007, and the subsequent election of the Awami League
Government, a consensus began to emerge among all

13 J. Harrigan, ‘The rise of religious-based radicalism and the deradicalisation

programmeme in Bangladesh’, in H. El-Said and J. Harrigan, De-Radicalising
Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States (Routeledge,
2011); International Crisis Group, ‘Bangladesh Today’, Asia Report, no. 121.,
2006
14

parties that religiously-based violent extremism needed to

be taken seriously.14 This new concern was partly prompted
by a wave of well-orchestrated and near simultaneous
bombings in 2005 in all but one of the country’s 64 districts
for which the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), the
main violent extremist group in the country, claimed
responsibility. The group’s publicly declared objective was
to remove the country’s secular government and impose a
Taliban-inspired Islamic theocracy in its place.

The caretaker government reacted quickly and repressively

with swift arrests and the adoption of new legislation that
resulted in the execution of six of the JMB’s seven Shura
Council leaders for the murder of two judges. It also
established the death penalty for patrons, financiers and
trainers of terrorists, with special tribunals set up to deal
with such cases.

The authorities augmented these punitive measures with a

‘soft’ counter-violent extremism strategy.15 This approach
has been described as a hybrid between counter- and
de-radicalisation programmes because, although it relied
on group profiling, its target group was a mixture of those
who had already become radicalised as well as vulnerable
individuals who were susceptible to violent extremist
ideology.

One of the programme’s key objectives was to promote a

more moderate version of Islam and expose violent extremist
ideologies as misconceived. To achieve this, the authorities
relied heavily on the country’s vibrant NGO sector that had
emerged over the years to provide communities with basic
services which the government had failed to provide. After
2005, the authorities deliberately facilitated the setting up of
new NGOs to help implement the country’s de-radicalisation
programme. It was felt that NGOs provided an ideal vehicle
for delivering the government’s counter-violent extremism
agenda as they were well embedded in society and their
work was well understood and appreciated at a local level.
14 S.A. Khan, in I. Ahmed (ed.), Terrorism in the 21st Century: Perspectives from
Bangladesh, (The University Press Limited, 2009)
15 ‘Madrassahs Have Been Made an Easy Scapegoat’, New Age (Dhaka),
21 August, 2009
 15

A grass roots programme was implemented mainly in

the three regions historically known for violent extremism,
recruitment to militant groups, crime and violence: Cox’s
Bazaar, Bogra and Sylhet. The programme did not focus
on rehabilitation of convicted extremists but was rather a
broader-based, society-wide motivational programme,
targeting village madrassas, mosques, imams and religious
leaders with a strong local following. The programme also
used influential figures from outside the target areas to
deliver its key messages.

The scheme was tailored to address current concerns

through workshops, seminars, conferences, roundtables
and symposia held at various venues, including in madrassas,
mosques, and community centres. The authorities channelled
funds via NGOs, which were responsible for their own
day-to-day operations. The events were highly interactive
with question-and-answer sessions and ‘an open floor’ for
discussion. Subjects discussed included Islam and peace,
Islam and modernity, Islam and pluralism, Islam and human
rights and the role of imams.

There was also a small financial component to the

programme. A small number of individuals, for example
the best madrassa graduates from each region, and those
having difficulty finding work, have been offered small loans
from NGOs. In some cases, financial support was extended
to setting up businesses such as tea stalls, rickshaw
operations and the like. Alongside this, there were offers of
vocational training with small scholarships in areas such as
mechanics, air conditioning maintenance and plumbing. All
funding for such activities came from the government, which
indirectly channelled it through NGOs.16 Although
Bangladesh does not have a specific de-radicalisation
programme, the government still offers some financial
assistance to the families of convicted violent extremists.
This included, for example, assistance to help with
education for the children of incarcerated individuals.

16 N. Fink Chowdhury and H. El-Said (2011), ‘Transforming Terrorists: Examining

International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism’, IPI Policy Paper, 27 April,
2011
16

Internal and external observers have commended

Bangladesh’s strategy of involving and exploiting the
extensive influence and reach of its civil society
organisations in the country’s de-radicalisation efforts.17
However, they criticise the Bangladeshi programme for being
hybrid, lacking focus, and its over-reliance on the profiling of
individuals, mainly young madrassa graduates, which risks
radicalising them further. As recent theoretical and empirical
research has shown, it is extremely difficult to profile a
terrorist. Borum rightly argued that “There is no ‘terrorist
personality’, nor is there any accurate profile – psychologically
or otherwise – of the terrorist.”18

Observers of the Bangladeshi counter-radicalisation

efforts have also noted the standard of religious scholars and
leaders involved in the programme, who are seen to be poorly
educated and not particularly articulate or well informed. The
Bangladeshi authorities, on the other hand, have hailed the
programme as a success. Their judgement is based on the
decline of three key indicators since the programme’s launch
in 2005: the number of terrorist incidents, the level of local
violence, and recruitment into religiously-based extremist
groups.

However, causation is notoriously difficult to ascribe. Some

of the decline in violent extremist activity may be due to the
greater and more effective use of force in tracking down and
apprehending violent extremists that followed the JMB’s 2005
bombing campaign. However, it is perhaps too early to
evaluate the real impact of the programme, since it has only
been in place for less than five years. Like other counter-
extremism programmes around the world, the success of
the Bangladeshi programme is still in question.

17 For information, see ‘The rise of religious-based radicalism and the

deradicalisation programme in Bangladesh’, and ‘Transforming Terrorists:
Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism’.
18 R. Borum, ‘Psychology of Terrorism’, University of South Florida, 2004,
available at: http://worlddefensereview.com/docs/PsychologyofTerrorism0707.
pdf
 17

Egypt’s Spontaneous
De-Radicalisation
Process

I
n the mid and late 1990s, Egypt became the first
country to pursue a ‘soft’ approach to countering violent
extremism. It is where prison-based de-radicalisation
strategies, based on debate and dialogue with violent
extremists, were developed inside the infamous Scorpion
Cell of Cairo’s Tora Prison. Other Muslim-majority countries
later adopted similar methods.19

The process started when members of al-Gama’a

al-Islamiya (IG), the largest and most organised Egyptian
violent extremist group, unilaterally announced a cessation of
violence. The IG’s imprisoned leaders subsequently expressed
their views in a series of books and pamphlets, collectively
known as ‘The Revisions’, which they wrote from inside their
cells, and in which they formally explained their new thinking,
publicly renounced violence and expressed their recantation
of violent ideology and tactics.20

Almost ten years later, in 2007, Egypt’s second most violent

group, al-Jihad al-Islami (IJ) followed suit. IJ was founded by
two of the most significant individuals in the history of
Egyptian radicalism: Ayman al-Zawahiri, the new leader of
al-Qaeda, and Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (aka Dr. Fadl), one of
the most influential ideologues in the history of the
Salafi-jihadist movement. Indeed, the 2007 revision episode
was announced by Dr. Fadl himself, who expressed his
revised views in a new book Advice Regarding the Conduct
of Jihadist Action in Egypt and the World, in which he set
new rules for jihad in a way that de-legitimised all forms of

19 ‘Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?’

20 O. Ashour, The Deradicalisation of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamic
Movements (Routledge, 2009)
18

terrorism as un-Islamic and restricted holy war to extreme

circumstances of self-defence. The book was also
serialised in the influential London-based Arabic newspaper,
Asharq Al Awsat.

The de-radicalisation process within the IG and IJ was a

spontaneous, internally generated course of action. It was
not initiated by the state through a professional,
comprehensive or well-planned de-radicalisation process.
On the contrary, according to Stracke it “was initiated by
prisoners themselves,” particularly by the leadership of
both IG and IJ who then sought collective reform from
their followers.21

Yet, one of the key lessons to emerge from the Egyptian

experience of group de-radicalisation relates to the role of the
state. Although the government did not initiate the reforms,
it nonetheless played an important role in facilitating the
muraja’h (revision) process among imprisoned leaders and
members once it started. It did this not only by sparing the IG
and IJ leadership from execution (unlike in Bangladesh), but
also by facilitating dialogue, debate and meetings inside
prisons between the leaders, their members, and other
secular and political prisoners.22

As well as facilitating internal interaction, the Egyptian

government also invited credible scholars from Al-Azhar
University, one of the most respected institutions of Islamic
scholarship in the world, to visit prisons to debate and
discuss key issues with the leaders of the violent extremist
groups. As Black wrote: “Like the Gama’a before them, the
Interior Ministry and State Security allowed Sharif and other
prisoners to meet and consult each other in prison and hold
religious dialogue with clerics from al-Azhar, the fount of
mainstream jurisprudence in the Sunni world.”23 Quietly,
Egyptian authorities also facilitated prison tours by the IG
and IJ leadership to encourage their followers to repent
and renounce violence.

21 N. Stracke, ‘Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform’, Perspectives

on Terrorism, Volume I, Issue 4, 2007
22 The Deradicalisation of Jihadists: Transforming Armed Islamic Movements
23 I. Black, ‘Violence Won’t Work: how author of Jihadist’ “bible” stirred up a
storm’, The Guardian, 27 July, 2007
 19

Although the majority of members of both IG and IJ accepted

and ratified their leaders’ revisions, a minority did not. In this
respect, the Egyptian government performed another
facilitating role. Through monitoring prisons and surveying
where the reform movement was making headway, it was able
to identify individuals who were attempting to sabotage the
revision process. Therefore, “the Egyptian authorities decided
to facilitate the process by separating the supporters of the
reform or ‘revision’ process from the small group that was
objecting to the process. It did this simply by relocating about
30 of the ‘rejectionist’ militant Islamists to other prisons”.24

Finally, once the reform process got underway inside prisons,

the Egyptian authorities used the media to counter the appeal
of violent extremism within wider society. For example, they
allowed de-radicalised leaders of IG and IJ to publish articles
in the main newspapers which explained their new thinking
and included their renunciation of violence.25 Many of the
emotional discussions that had taken place inside prisons
were widely covered in the Egyptian press. Ideologues of
IG and IJ and prominent members of Egyptian society were
also allowed to attack radical ideology and extremist groups
through articles in daily newspapers, and to publish more than
25 volumes of revisions in a series called Tashih al-Mafahim
(Corrections of Concepts). The latter not only de-legitimised
violent ideology, but also tackled doctrinal issues such as
declaring someone takfir (apostate), attacking civilians (both
Muslims and non-Muslims), and the meaning, conditions and
ethics of jihad.

Apart from releasing almost 12,500 repentant individuals, the

Egyptian authorities provided few other incentives to counter
radicalisation more broadly. Indeed, the state made few, if
any, attempts to facilitate the reintegration of released
individuals into society through, for example, provision of jobs,
financial stipends, training, education or health care, as has
been the case in Saudi Arabia. This led many to argue that
the Egyptian programme was incomplete and “has not been

24 ‘Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform’

25 For more details, see J. Harrigan and H. El-Said, ‘Group Deradicalisation in
Egypt: The Unfinished Agenda’, in H. El-Said and J. Harrigan, De-Radicalising
Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority States (Routledge,
2011)
20

actively pursued.”26 Some observers have even questioned

the entire de-radicalisation process, arguing that these
prison debates and recantations were no more than “fake
co-operation” to “ensure a quick release of members”
from prison.27

Yet those who attended prison debates and discussions in

order to mediate or report on them believe that these were
“sincere” and “genuine” revisions. This includes senior
analysts and politicians such as: Montasser al-Zayyat, legal
advisor of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood; Makram Mohamed
Ahmed, closely affiliated to the Minister of the Interior and
then editor of the government weekly, Al Mussawar; and
Diaa Rashwan, analyst for the al-Ahram Centre for Political
and Strategic Studies in Cairo. They assess that the leaders
had “occupied themselves with endless theological debates
and glum speculation about where they had gone wrong,”
prompting a change in their views and tactics.28. Others also
noted that “Egypt’s de-radicalisation work had helped to keep
violence at bay: the proof … is that there has not been an
incident in the Nile Valley since Luxor” in 1997.29

However, the lack of further efforts in Egypt to counter violent

extremism within wider society may give some cause for
concern. The country suffers from problems that are often
seen as contributing factors to the radicalisation process such
as widespread poverty, inequality, corruption, restricted
political rights, and regular human rights violations. Some
commentators warn that if de-radicalisation is not supported
by measures to deal with the root causes of the problem, then
it is not difficult to imagine a resurgence of the phenomenon
in the future.30

26 ‘Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?’


27 ‘Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?’
28 Quoted in L. Wright , ‘The Rebellion Within: An al-Qaeda mastermind
questions terrorism’, The New Yorker, 2 June, 2008, available at: http://www.
newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602fa_fact_wright?printable=true.
29 I. Black, ‘Violence Won’t Work: how author of Jihadist’ “bible” stirred up a
storm’, The Guardian, 27 July, 2007
30 For more details, see: ‘The Rebellion Within: An al-Qaeda mastermind
questions terrorism’; D. Lynch, ‘Egypt’s economy soars; so does misery’,
USA TODAY, 14 May, 2008; and ‘The long wait: A special report on Egypt’,
The Economist, 15 July, 2010.
 21

Jordan’s Lack of a
‘Soft’ Strategy

I
n November 2005, Jordan experienced its first ever
suicide attack when three bombers blew themselves up
simultaneously in three of the capital’s most prestigious
hotels, killing 60 people and injuring more than 100. This
came as a shock to many in a country historically known
for its relatively stable and modern secular government,
and conservative yet often pro-Western policies.

In the 1990s, Jordan, along with much of the rest of the

region, experienced a dramatic growth in radical Salafi
movements. The return of ‘Afghan Jordanians’31 in the late
1980s and early 1990s marked the beginning of the
evolution of an extremist movement in the country. Regional
and national politics also led to further radicalisation, including
the 1991 Gulf War, the peace treaty with Israel in 1993, and
the close alignment of the country’s foreign policy with the
United States. So too did national factors, such as the state’s
failure to manage economic growth and stem unemployment,
inequalities in wealth, and the lack of any prison reform policy
or rehabilitation programme to retrain and qualify Afghan
Jordanians for jobs in the labour market.

Jordan’s approach to countering the growth of violent

extremism lacked coherence and was characterised initially
by a total reliance on traditional security approaches, such
as attempts to infiltrate extremist groups, arrest their
members and pre-empt attacks. By the late 1990s,
according to Amnesty International, more than 1,700 people
had been arrested in connection with religious and violent
extremist groups.32 While most of the detainees were put on
trial, court proceedings were neither free nor fair. Allegations

31 Jordanians who had fought against troops from the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan
32 ‘Amnesty International Annual Report: 2001’, available at: http://web.amnesty.
org/web/ar2001.nsf/webmepcountries/JORDAN?OpenDocument
22

of torture, confessions extracted under duress, the fabrication

of charges and the coercion of witnesses were widespread.

Jordan learned the hard way that prisons and detention

centres can become breeding grounds for hardliners and
recruitment centres for violent extremism. Abu Rumman and
Abu Hanieh documented how Jordan’s prison environment
transformed sympathisers who vaguely understood the notion
of violent jihad into hardliners, and caused them to undergo
further radicalisation.33

Jordan’s most innovative counter-radicalisation initiative, the

Risalat Amman (Amman Letter) was launched in 2004 by King
Abdullah II, who ascended to the throne in February 1999
following the death of his Father, King Hussein. The Amman
Letter aimed to attack the takfiri culture of violent
extremism. It launched an unprecedented counter-ideological
drive against the takfir creed and was meant to serve as a key
example of how to confront radical ideology. The letter was
issued by a convention of 180 Muslim scholars, handpicked
by the king and representing various strands of Islam, who
were brought together to project a more tolerant and
apolitical version of the faith than that endorsed by the
extremists. It advocated peaceful coexistence between
peoples based upon respect, mutual pacts and agreements,
and rebutted the takfiri ideology of the Salafi-jihadis.

The Amman Letter also aimed to de-legitimise fatwas

issued by violent extremists that typically excommunicated
other Muslims and justified violent acts, and to confine the
right of issuing fatwas to officially recognised, competent
scholars. To this end, the Government organised a
conference of prominent Islamic scholars, representing
all schools of Islamic thought, in Amman. The conference
adopted the Amman Letter in full and approved fatwas
advocating co-existence, moderation and al-Wasatiyya

33 M. Abu Rumman and H. Abu Hanieh, The Jihadi Salafist Movement in Jordan
After Zarqawi: identity, leadership crisis and obscured vision, (Friedrich Ebert
Stiftung, 2009)
 23

(the middle way), rejecting all forms of violence as un-Islamic

and a distortion of the basic peaceful principles of Islam.34

The Amman Letter did not reflect a new approach to

countering violent extremism in Jordan. Nor did it involve any
key Jordanian social or non-governmental organisations, or
credible religious leaders. On the contrary, civil society
organisations were further restricted, new press laws
undermined freedom of speech and expression, and a new
and controversial anti-terrorism law gave further powers to
the state’s security and law enforcement agencies. In fact, it
was the hotel bombings of November 2005, almost one year
after the Amman Letter, and five months after the Amman
conference, that did the most to turn Jordanian public opinion
against violent extremism.

Jordan’s experience also draws attention to the importance

of choosing credible and competent messengers to promote
interfaith initiatives or other proposals to counter the
message of violent extremists. In 2008, there was a curious
and surprising development within Jordanian prisons.
According to the Director of the rehabilitation and correction
centres, Colonel Sharif Al-Omari, imprisoned extremists called
upon the Jordanian authorities to treat them in the same “way
the Saudi authorities treat their radicals, and carry out
dialogue with us”.35 As a result, the Jordanian authorities
organised a two-month ad hoc programme, the aim of which
was not so much to debate with the inmates as to lecture
them on the key religious issues that underpinned the Amman
Letter: a moderate version of Islam and a refutation of takfiri
ideology. The scholars chosen to address the detainees came
mostly from Jordanian universities; they were little known to
the prisoners and were seen as mere instruments of the state,
with little credibility. As a result, the most radical elements in
prison not only refused to participate in the programme, but
also refused to communicate with, pray behind or even eat
and drink with the scholars and professors because,
according to Bassam Al-Emoush, one of the key professors

34 The conference was organized in July 2005. For more information, see Y.
Minzili, ‘The Jordanian Regime Fights the War of Ideas’, Current Trends in
Islamist Ideology, Vol. 5, Hudson Institute, 2007
35 Author’s interview with Colonel Sharif Al-Omari, Director of the Rehabilitation
and Correction Centres, Amman, December 2008
24

chosen by the authorities to talk to prisoners, they believed

that they “were sent by the state, which made me an infidel
in their eyes.”36

Most observers of Jordan’s attempts to counter violent

extremism are sceptical of the country’s efforts so far. As
Ibrahim Gharbiya, a senior Jordanian expert on extremist
Islamic organisations, noted:

… [the] denunciations of terrorism and the information

campaign to inculcate moderate Islam have not reached
deeply into the general public, except among those who
were already moderates. Extremist ideas and violent
groups … continue to serve as an instrument for recruiting
activists … Our ideological and administrative campaign
to forestall extremism has not succeeded because it has
not yet reached the sources of violence and crime. The
existing simplistic solutions have not helped in the war
against violence and have even served it. The search for
the correct approach cannot be postponed.37

36 Author’s interview with Dr Bassam Al-Emoush, Amman, December 2008

37 Quoted in ‘The Jordanian Regime Fights the War of Ideas’
 25

Malaysia’s
De-radicalisation:
Learning from the Past38

N
ot all Muslim-majority states suffer the problems of
violent extremism to the same extent. Malaysia, for
example, though by no means immune to the threat,
has not experienced any major terrorist incidents in the past
twenty years. The country has a long history of terrorist
insurgency dating back to the 1940s, involving a communist
insurrection that spanned 41 years from 1948 to1989. The
insurrection was waged largely by ethnic Chinese, and
consisted of a guerrilla-style armed rebellion by an
ideologically-driven group that wanted to topple the
government and take control of the country. The groups’
terrorist tactics, which are not unlike those used by current
ideologically-driven groups such as Jemaah Islamiah (JI),
included attacks on rubber estate managers, tin mine
operators, the security forces and members of the public
as well as the sabotage of rural development projects.

To counter the communist threat, the state resorted to tactics

which are common in other countries facing violent extremism
today, such as Saudi Arabia and Morocco. These included
strengthening the armed forces39, revising the Internal
Security Act in 1960 (which was first introduced by the British
colonial power in the 1940s), and launching psychological
operations and a counter-insurgency campaign to gain the
population’s allegiance and reduce the appeal of the views
and ideology of the insurgents. A massive resettlement and
development project was also launched to resettle those parts

38 Unless otherwise stated, most information for this section is generated from
fieldwork and personal interviews conducted with Malaysian officials at the
ministry of interior and incarceration centre during a two-week visit in April,
2010.
39 In 1970 another six brigades and two more divisions of the army were formed
to help safeguard the country from the insurgency
26

of the population that provided most support to

insurgents in safe, well-defended, well-equipped and
economically viable new villages. The aim was to break the
link between the insurgency and the Chinese community.

The authorities also introduced a de-radicalisation programme

for captured communist insurgents, aimed at reshaping their
outlook, including through spiritual counselling. In addition,
they provided support to their families to check hatred against
the state and marginalisation in society.

In dealing with subsequent threats from violent extremist

groups such as Jama’a Islamiya (JI), Malaysia has built upon
the lessons learnt from the communist insurgency. Between
2000 and 2005 the authorities arrested a small group of
Muslim Malays for attempting to mount a violent struggle
against the state. These were mostly young but radicalised
members of the opposition Pan-Malaysia Islamic Party
(PAS)40, who were previously religious students in Pakistan
and Taliban-trained. They killed a Christian State
Assemblyman, tried to steal arms from a police station,
robbed banks and detonated a few ineffectual bombs but
were eventually tracked down and arrested.41 The
authorities established a prison-based rehabilitation and
counselling programme to convince them to moderate their
views and repent.42 The ISA was used again as an important
pre-emptive law that gave the police sweeping extra-judicial
powers to search, arrest and detain without trial in order to
prevent any acts prejudicial to the security of Malaysia.43 This
meant that suspects could be arrested before they committed
any act of violence, and there were to be no trials, even where
enough evidence existed to bring a case to court.

40 Following the sacking of Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim in September

1998 PAS became more radical and critical of the incumbent regime.
41 J. Harrigan, ‘Malaysia: A History of Dealing with Insurgency and Extremism’,
in H. El-Said and J. Harrigan, De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their
Impact in Muslim Majority States (Routeledge, 2011)
42 Ibid.
43 Z. Abuza, ‘The Rehabilitation of Jemaah Islamiyah Detainees in South East
Asia’, in T. Bjorgo and J. Horgan, Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and
Collective Disengagement (Routledge, 2009)
 27

The ISA allowed for a sixty-day interrogation period by the

police. If the prisoner was not released after this sixty-day
period he was to receive a detention order for a two-year
period which could be renewed indefinitely.

While in detention, prisoners were subject to a relatively

well-designed de-radicalisation programme, which drew
on elements later found in the Saudi programme. The
programme’s objectives were to offer robust alternatives to
the detainees’ deviant and misconceived ideology in order
to ensure that they understood that their activities were a
threat to the country and contrary to the true teachings of
Islam, and to instil awareness of the responsibilities of
citizenship regarding race, religion, loyalty to the nation and
obedience to its ruler. The program involved religious and
social counselling, moral education and self-esteem classes,
and vocational training to enhance detainees’ skills.44

Religious scholars mainly drawn from Jakim, the state

religious department, held religious instruction sessions for
the detainees while prison officers worked closely with the
scholars to produce tailored programmes. Outside scholars,
such as university professors who, unlike official scholars,
are widely respected due to their independence from the
government, were also invited to visit once a week. Most
of the daily classes, however, were given by the prison staff
themselves. Topics discussed with detainees included jihad,
osoul al-fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), the right interpretation
of the Qur’an, and Islam’s position vis a vis other races and
religions.

The religious education sessions were delivered to groups

or, where necessary, on a one-to-one basis. In addition
to religious scholars, psychologists were involved in the
rehabilitation programme with counselling sessions to
discuss individual problems.

Religious classes took place on a daily basis for one-and-

a-half hours, on a purpose-built campus. While radical
detainees were isolated from other prisoners, they lived
together in dormitories where they socialised among

44 ‘Malaysia: A History of Dealing with Insurgency and Extremism’

28

themselves. As in Egypt, the few most radical elements

who steadfastly refused to repent, opposed the programme
and attempted to undermine it, were moved to a separate
facility.45

While in detention, detainees were subject to evaluation

once every six months by a special committee of three
officials directly linked to the King himself. This had the
authority to recommend the detainee’s release if it felt that he
no longer presents a threat to society. On average, detainees
spend almost three years in detention, during which their
rights to family visits, medical check-ups, representation,
defence, and court appeals against their detention are
constitutionally protected. They are also treated humanely
and lawfully so as to reduce the risk of re-offending.

Significantly, the Malaysian programme does not end at

the prison gate but continues after the detainee’s release,
normally under a Supervision Order. At this stage, the Police
Department takes over from the Prison Department, and the
released detainee is provided with continued counselling and
religious education as well as with other assistance to
facilitate his reintegration into society. This includes training
and the provision of a job if necessary, while some detainees
are provided with financial assistance to start up small
businesses.46

As is the case with any de-radicalisation and rehabilitation

initiative, it is difficult to judge the success of the Malaysian
programme. Since 2001, 154 radicals have been detained
under the ISA. All except six were deemed to have
successfully completed the de-radicalisation programme
and were released, without later re-offending, which is taken
as one indicator of the programme’s success. However, many
of those released remain under Restriction Orders, with tight
supervision and monitoring, and therefore have no incentive
and less opportunity to resume extremist behaviour.

45 Author’s interviews with officials at the main incarceration centre at Kamunting,

April, 2010.
46 Author’s interviews with counter terrorism state officials, Ministry of Interior, KL,
April, 2010.
 29

Morocco: Promoting
Islamic Beauty

M
orocco has introduced the most extensive counter-
radicalisation measures among the eight countries
studied in this report. The 2003 and 2007
Casablanca bombings were taken very seriously by the
Moroccan regime, which derives its legitimacy from two
traditional religious sources: its descent from the family of
the prophet Mohammad; and its role as the ‘Commander
of the Faithful’ and mediator between and among all
factions of Moroccan society.

Morocco, in some respects like Malaysia, has developed an

important reconciliation programme for political prisoners,
which it could extend and build upon as a base for a
potentially effective de-radicalisation policy if it so decided.
Since independence in 1956, the Moroccan state has been
accused of grave violations of human rights, particularly under
the reign of the late King Hassan II (r. 1961–1999), including
long imprisonments, “forcible disappearances, torture and
mass political trials…”47 Most Moroccans today recall those
years as zaman al-rasas (the time of bullets) or al-sanawat
al-sawda (the black years).

As a result of both internal and external pressures,

King Hassan II agreed to the creation of an Independent
Committee (IC) in 1999, whose main tasks were to reconcile
Moroccans with their past by investigating all human rights
violations committed by the regime between 1956 and 1999
and to compensate victims and their families. Despite some
progress, the IC was hampered by internal divisions and
splits, and was unable to produce a full reconciliation process
that satisfied all Moroccans. The impasse was overcome by
the new king, Muhammad IV, who succeeded his father in
1999 and ratified, in 2002, the establishment of the Equity

47 M. Clouser, The Performance of Human Rights in Morocco (University of

Pennsylvania Press, 2005)
30

and Reconciliation Commission (ERC) to replace the IC

and move the reconciliation process forward.48

In many respects, the ERC developed a very similar

programme to the CCL and CPNR in Algeria. For example,
the IC and the ERC called for the release of, and amnesties
for, all political prisoners and exiled individuals. The authorities
also sought to return political prisoners and other victims of
human rights violations to their former jobs. A compensation
scheme was also introduced to compensate all victims of
human rights violations and their families financially.

However, the IC and ERC were only entrusted with the

responsibility of investigating human rights violations that took
place in Morocco between 1956 and 1999. Their remit did
not include, and has not yet been extended to, prisoners and
their families subject to similar treatment after 1999.49

According to the International Crisis Group, the Moroccan

authorities have arrested “over 2,000 suspected militants
or sympathisers” since 2003.50 Yet no attempts have been
made to debate, counsel or rehabilitate them. The Moroccan
authorities remain adamant that Salafi-jihadi detainees are
“not subject to revisions” because they are “ignorant, radical
and reckless”.51

Paradoxically, Morocco has simultaneously launched an

extensive and wide-ranging religious reform programme
following the 2003 and, in particular, the 2007 bombings.
The aim of the reforms was to counter radicalisation and
the appeal of violent ideology in society. They did so by
strengthening the official religious establishment, particularly
the three key religious institutions of the state: the Ministry
of Religious Affairs (MRA); the Supreme Council of Scientists;

48 Moroccan Centre for Studies and Contemporary Research (MCSCR). Taqrir

al-Hala al-Dineya in Morocco (The Report of the Religious Status in Morocco),
CEMERC, Morocco, 2009
49 ‘Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address
Violent Extremism’. Also see H. El-Said, ‘Counter Radicalisation Without
De-radicalisation: the case of Morocco’, in H. El-Said and J. Harrigan,
De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their Impact in Muslim Majority
States (Routeledge, 2011)
50 International Crisis Group, ‘Morocco Conflict History’, September, 2008
51 ‘The report of the Religious Status in Morocco’
 31

and the al-Muhamadiya Foundation, putting them in charge

of all religious activities in the country.

To take one example, mosques are now the only places of

official worship recognised and controlled directly by the
MRA. All donations to build new mosques or renovate
existing ones must also go through the MRA. Moreover,
Friday sermons have been brought more directly under MRA
control. The MRA prepares Friday khutbas (speeches) in
advance, which are delivered in the name of the king himself.
The MRA has been encouraged and funded to increase its
role in the dissemination of religious knowledge. For example,
before 2003, the MRA used to issue, at most, two magazines
a year. In 2006, the MRA published 17 books on subjects
such as ‘true Islam’, ‘religion and society’, and ‘religion and
the state’.52

The role of the mosque was also expanded to include

human development. Given the high illiteracy rates in
Morocco and the inadequacies of the education system,
literacy programmes were incorporated as an important
part of mosque activities from 2007. These programmes
not only teach basic reading and writing skills, but also
seek to overcome religious illiteracy and expose misleading
ideologies. More than 176,000 Moroccan students
participated in such programmes in 2007/08 alone.53

The Supreme Council of Scientists (SCS) – the highest

religious institution in the country – has also undergone
similar reforms. For example, the number of local councils,
supervised by the SCS, increased from 14 in 2003 to 70
in 2007. These local councils have been delivering over
295,000 wa’ath (religious) lessons annually since 2007. A
new, Ifta’ (religious ruling) committee was created under
the umbrella of the SCS, which today is in sole charge of
issuing fatwas in Morocco.54

52 ‘The report of the Religious Status in Morocco’

53 ‘The Religious Case in Morocco’ (Taqrir al-Hala al-Diniya fi al-Maghrib), first
edition, The Moroccan Centre for Contemporary Studies and Research,
October 2009
54 ‘Counter Radicalisation Without De-radicalisation’
32

Moreover, the Moroccan authorities also turned to the media

to spread the message of toleration, moderation, Sufism and
a state-sanctioned version of the ‘true path of Islam’. After
2003, the authorities licensed 28 new religious radio stations,
both private and public, including the popular government-
owned and run King Muhammad VI Radio Station. In 2008
alone, Morocco’s religious radio stations broadcast more than
200 halaga dinyeah (religious discussions) on issues related
to osoul al-fiqh (the study of Islamic jurisprudence), modern
Islam, hadith, family relations, the state and society, true
Islamic practices, and values and principles. The authorities
also established the King Muhammad VI TV Channel
(al-Sadisha), which specialises in religion and religious
education. It regularly broadcasts live question and answer
programs as part of its daily 10 –12 hour content.

Finally, Moroccan authorities encouraged the MRA, SCS,

key Moroccan ulama and pro-regime religious parties and
movements to establish their own websites to counter and
rebut radical ideologies. This effort is now led by the Al-
Muhammadiyah Foundation. Dr. Abadi, the foundation’s
director, claims to have the most effective anti-terrorism
website (www.arrabita.ma) in the entire region, judged by
the 7,500 daily hits that it receives. Al-Muhammadiya
provides web-based lessons in religious education and peer
group sessions. Dr. Abadi has a live discussion program on
the internet once every two weeks, where he says that he,
“simply answers questions on all religious aspects, including
terrorism. It is an open encounter for two hours.” In addition,
Dr. Abadi has a daily seven-minute program on Morocco’s
main TV channel which he uses to “provide a daily
interpretation of the Qur’an, verse by verse. My plan is to
do the whole Qur’an.” Finally, Dr. Abadi runs a weekly, live,
interactive question-and-answer program on Morocco’s main
radio station, lasting from 9 –11pm. “We frankly and openly
promote a Sufi version of Islam in our work, which we call
Islamic beauty.”55

Most observers argue that it is too early to judge the

effectiveness of Moroccan counter-radicalisation efforts.56

55 Author’s interview with Dr. Abadi, Rabat, December 2009.

56 ‘The Religious Case in Morocco’
 33

Moreover, Moroccan authorities have sought to promote

official religious institutions and practices in isolation from
its vibrant, dynamic and active civil society. This, along with
denying Islamist detainees the right to fair trials, widespread
allegations of torture, forced confessions, and a failure to
engage the families of incarcerated violent extremists in
an interactive counselling programme, has had negative
effects. It appears that the authorities may already have lost
the support of the families of detained violent Islamists for its
counter-radicalisation policies, and that many of their siblings,
offspring and friends have tended towards extremism.

In Sufism, Morocco has also sought to promote its own

version of apolitical Islam, which most mainstream Sunni
movements traditionally frown upon. Unsurprisingly,
Morocco’s leading academic expert on Islamist movements,
Dr. Muhammad Dareef, is sceptical of official efforts to reduce
the appeal of violent extremism. He stated that Morocco’s
policies not only keep the country “under the threat” of violent
extremism, but may have also increased exposure to
this threat.57

57 Dareef, Muhammad. Terrorism is the Product of External Contradictions and

Morocco is Still Threatened, in al-Tajdid, May 16-18.
34
 35

The Art of
De-radicalisation:
Saudi Arabia

W
hile Egypt may have pioneered a new approach
to de-radicalisation, it is Saudi Arabia that has
developed the most professional, comprehensive
and successful of such official programmes. However, the
counselling programme is only one component of a wider
effort to counterradicalisation in the country that dates back
to at least the mid-1990s.

The year 1995 was a turning point in the country’s history.

It marked a high-point of anti-American sentiment, which
was reflected in two major attacks against American targets
in 1995 and 1996.58 The country also saw a smooth transfer
of power and the arrival of a new regime when Crown Prince
(CP) Abdullah became the de facto leader of the country after
a heart attack incapacitated the late King Fahad. Known for
his nationalist tendencies and religious credentials, the radical
sahwa (awakening) Islamists who emerged in schools and
universities in the 1970s saw CP Abdullah as more credible
and legitimate than his predecessor.

CP Abdullah’s first move was to distance himself from

the United States. He openly criticised American policy in
the region, particularly America’s perceived bias towards
Israel, the nation which he held responsible for escalating
hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis on the one hand,
and radicalising thousands of Muslim youth on the other.
In an extraordinary letter in which he threatened a
reconsideration of bilateral relations, CP Abdullah warned
the U.S. Administration, that “from now on we will protect
58 ‘Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?’, Middle East Report, No. 28, International
Crisis Group, 14 July, 2004 ; ‘Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the
Islamists?’, Middle East Report, No. 31, International Crisis Group, September
21, 2004
36

our national interests, regardless of where American’s

interests in the region lie”.59

CP Abdullah’s second move was to initiate gradual political

reform and broaden political participation. For example, the
Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council-CC), established in 1992
to promote more political participation, increased its staff
from 60 to 90 and then to 120. None of the CC members
came from the Royal family and all were highly respected and
credible members of Saudi society. He also created provincial
councils in the mid-1990s to allow public opinion on daily
affairs to reach the leadership.

One product of reforms initiated by CP Abdullah was related

to the educational system. This led to a more balanced
curriculum between religious and non-religious subjects.
Textbooks were also purged of lessons that inculcated
hostility, particularly towards non-Muslims and especially
towards Christians and Jews.60

Finally, the Saudi authorities relaxed regulations on the

media and allowed its right-wing Islamist clerics and
preachers, particularly sahwaists, to criticise the system,
including the quality of education, health, and, most
importantly, the wahhabi official establishment. They held
the latter responsible for the rise of violent extremism in the
country because of what they perceived as a rigid and strict
interpretation of the sacred text. It is important to note that
a large number of those clerics and preachers, known as
sahwaists, went through a process of radicalisation in late
1980s and early 1990s, culminating in the imprisonment
of many of them. While in prison, the majority underwent
a process of muraja’h (revision) in a similar fashion to the
Egyptian IG and IJ movements; a process which has
received little, if any, attention.

Even after revising their views and tactics, the sahwaist

clerics and preachers remained critical, and largely
autonomous, of the regime, which gave them tremendous
credibility and legitimacy. They understood the consequences

59 ‘Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who Are the Islamists?’

60 ‘Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?’
 37

of violent extremism and set out to mediate between the

state and society, including its radical and violent extremist
elements. Although critical of the wahhabi religious
establishment, the sahwaists demanded stronger but more
independent religious institutions. The regime encouraged
them to express their views, and even to play a greater role
in moderating the views of their followers. This was because
they opposed and rejected violent extremism,61 an outlook
that they shared with the state whose official wahhabi
establishment’s standing and credibility had suffered a
great deal.

Given the increased role of the internet, the Saudi authorities

encouraged its clerics, as its security allies, to establish their
own websites in order to monitor radical websites, prepare
statements to rebut radical ideology, and answer public
questions. Examples of such websites include the murajaat
(revisions) (www.murajaat.com), sakeenah (inner peace),
and alifta (www.alifta.com).

One of the major outcomes of the waves of terrorist

attacks that struck Saudi Arabia in 2003 and 2004 was the
introduction by the powerful Ministry of Interior (SMI) of a
professional, coherent and comprehensive counselling
programme for which the kingdom has become well known.
According to SMI, the aim of the counselling programme is,
“to deal with the wrong convictions of the detained person
in order to change and substitute them with correct
convictions that agree with the middle way of Islam and its
tolerance. This is realised by using the method of dialogue,
wisdom and gentle preaching by competent people,
specialists in religious, psychological and social sciences,
with a follow up by security experts…”.62

The SMI established a special Advice Committee to

oversee the programme. The latter relied on a large number

61 This was particularly the case following the revision (muraja’h) process which a
large number of sahwaist leaders, including such figures as Salman al-Awada
who initially praised Bin Laden, went through in the late 1990s and early
2000s. For more details see De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and their
Impact in Muslim Majority States
62 ‘Centre for Muhammad Bin Nayef for Advise, Counselling and Care’, Riyadh,
Public Security Press, 2009
38

of competent and credible clerics, psychologists, and

scientists, mostly drawn from sahwaist elements who had
moderated their views and who were able to emphasise their
independence from the state to the detainees. At the core
of the programme is the treatment of the detainees who are
seen as ‘misled’ and in need of good advice, rather than
criminals requiring punishment.63

The counselling programme starts with the al-Munasah

(advice) scheme, which takes place inside prisons. Here,
detainees are voluntarily subjected to short-term (up to two
weeks) and long-term (up to six weeks) individual and group
sessions. Towards the end of their sentences, the detainees
who collaborate, moderate their views, and renounce violence
are moved to a purpose-built, ‘halfway-house’ facility called
the Mohammed bin Nayef Centre for Counselling and Care,
located in the outskirts of Riyadh. Here, the beneficiaries
undertake several ‘diets’ or courses, which include: a religious
programme; a social programme; a psychological
programme; an art programme; and a history programme.
These programmes aim at correcting the deviant ideas and
views of the beneficiaries from all aspects and directions.64

One feature that distinguishes the Saudi de-radicalisation

programme from others like it is the essential role played by
the beneficiaries’ families, both in al-Munasah and even more
so in the Care Programme. Families are encouraged not only
to visit their sons regularly at the authorities’ expense, but
also to take part in the programme itself. They are briefed on
the condition of their sons, their experiences and how they
have been affected. Families are persuaded and counselled
on how to talk to their sons, to encourage them to repent
and return home to rejoin their families and loved ones. This
is sometimes harder than it may seem, as families have often
rejected their sons due to the shame that their extremist

63 Author’s Interview with Sheikh Ahmed Al-Jelan during a visit to Prince

Mohammed Bin Nayf Centre For Advice, Counseling and Care, Riyadh,
August, 2009
64 ‘Centre for Muhammad Bin Nayef for Advise, Counselling and Care’; author’s
interviews with scholars and scientists at Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef Care
Centre, Riyadh, August, 2009.
 39

activities have brought. It is therefore a process of working

on both parties; the families and their errant members.65

In addition to the curricular courses outlined above, the

Care Programme includes extra-curricular activities, such
as sport, in which all members of the programme take part
in, including scholars, scientists and security personnel.
The objective here is not only to create a cordial atmosphere
and a certain amount of bonding, but also to “give us the
opportunity to study the participants’ attitudes. Some show
aggression in the games, which may suggest that they need
more counselling.”66

Upon release, beneficiaries receive help to prevent

recidivism and ensure their smooth reintegration into
society. This includes the payment of a monthly stipend for
up to one year or until they are able to stand on their own feet
without state support. The state also intervenes to find jobs
for released participants, the authorities encourage and pay
for beneficiaries to resume their education, while also
facilitating marriage for single beneficiaries. This aims at
engaging them in family responsibilities and to refocus them
away from violent extremist activities. According to some
observers, “this strategy [has] proved to be very successful.”67

When measured in terms of terrorist incidents and

recidivism, Saudi Arabia is considered a success story for
the ‘soft’ approach to countering violent extremism. A wide
range of observers share this evaluation; including
Christopher Boucek, who concluded that: “The [Saudi]
programme has succeeded in helping detainees repudiate
extremist ideology…Roughly 1,400 out of 3,000 individuals
who have completed the programme…only 45 have been
re-arrested. The programme’s overall success has made it
a model for ‘soft’ counter-terrorism around the world.”68

65 ‘Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?’

66 Author’s interview with Dr. Abdualrahman al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, August, 2009.
67 ‘Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform’
68 C. Boucek, ‘Saudi Arabia’s ‘Soft’ Counterterrorism Strategy: Prevention,
Rehabilitation, and Aftercare’, Carnegie Paper Middle East Program, Number
97, September, 2008
40

However, it is important to note that Saudi Arabia has not

fully succeeded in eliminating all attempts to carry out violent
extremist acts. In fact, some groups seem to have undergone
further radicalisation in recent years, evidenced by the merger
of the Saudi and Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula in January 2009 and the attack in August that year
on the patron of the counselling programme, Prince
Muhammad Ben Nayef himself.69 Prince Nayef bin
Abdul-Aziz, the Interior Minister, stated that the kingdom
“aborted more than 230 operations in recent years.”70 This
may be the result of both internal and external factors,
including an incomplete reform agenda, which has left
limited opportunity for political participation and popular
representation, as well as political events outside the
kingdom. Saudi officials have no control over what happens
in Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, but “every time something
happens there, recruitment in Saudi Arabia, including inside
prisons, increases dramatically.”71

However, although recidivism will continue to occur, whether

influenced by internal or external factors, public support
for the programme remains high. The programme was not
designed for Saudi citizens who had been incarcerated in
Guantanamo Bay (the group most prone to recidivism) but
as Prince Mohammed has said, if a man reverts to violent
extremism having been given everything by the state, he
attracts little if any public support, whereas if a man returns
to violence because he has been tortured or otherwise
mistreated he is likely to take others with him.72

69 ‘Saudi prince vows to fight terrorism after attack’, Associated Press, 

28 August, 2010
70 Quoted in Middle East Online, September 27, 2010
71 Author’s interview with Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Hadlaq, Riyadh, August 2009.
72 ‘Arab Prisons: A Place for Dialogue and Reform’
 41

Yemen’s Attempts
at Rehabilitation

F
ollowing the attacks of 11 September 2001, a Dialogue
Committee (DC) was established by presidential decree
(on 30 August 2002) to debate and engage with
hundreds of individuals who had been arrested on suspicion
of collaborating with al-Qaeda. Yet, only three of the country’s
fifteen most prominent official clerics and scholars who the
President invited to participate in the DC agreed to do so.
“The rest refused because they felt that this could undermine
their reputation and they could be perceived to be overly
complicit with the state. They also believed that these men
were already radicalised and could not be changed as
a result.”73

Judge Hittar, who headed the DC, together with his fellow
DC members, chose to select just four or five detainees, who
were believed to be among the most radical and hardened
supporters of al-Qaeda, to engage in dialogue. The intention,
was that by convincing the most committed members of the
group to change their views and moderate their tactics, the
debate with other less radicalised inmates would be made
easier and therefore more likely to succeed.

The first meeting took place on 5 September, 2002 and

lasted for five hours, during which the following subjects
were discussed and debated: the Islamic nature of the state,
the responsibilities of the Muslim ruler, the meaning of jihad,
relations with non-Muslim states, and who has the right to
issue fatwas in Islam.

Between 30 August 2002 and 2010 a total of 500

detainees were released after engaging in debates, first with
their colleagues and then in large group sessions with the
official scholars of the state. Social and economic incentives
were also provided to both detained and released prisoners.

73 Author’s interview with Judge Hittar, Sana’a, June 2010

42

For example, and as part of selective inducements

provided by the state, families of the detained individuals
were encouraged to visit their incarcerated sons and relatives
more often. The Yemeni authorities wanted to demonstrate
to the families that they were not torturing or treating their
sons with cruelty as al-Qaeda had publicly claimed. They also
hoped that the families would exert social and tribal pressures
on the detainees to moderate their views and repent, and at
the same time persuade other sympathisers and collaborators
with al-Qaeda to give themselves up voluntarily without
fearing torture.74

Secondly, released detainees received up to YR 20,000 each

to help them rebuild their lives after prison. The state also
sought to ensure, whenever possible, the return of released
prisoners to their former jobs in the public sector, though
often with little success. After their release some received
cheap loans and/or grants from the state to establish private
businesses, which many used to buy cars and become taxi
drivers. Marriage was facilitated too, with the state covering
most of the costs involved. This went hand-in-hand with
assistance in-kind, such as a food bag full of cooking oil,
rice, sugar, tea and coffee.75

The Yemeni de-radicalisation curriculum received very

negative feedback from observers and state officials alike.
President Ali Abdullah Saleh himself spoke of only achieving
a 60 percent success rate. Officials in the Political Security
Organisation (PSO), established in 2002 to deal with all issues
related to security detainees, argue that the programme was
successful between 2002 and 2005. During this period, they
state that the country did not see a single act of terrorism
and that none of the freed detainees returned to violence.
But things, they add, started to go bad in the second half
of 2006 when 23 detained violent extremists escaped from

74 Author’s interviews with Ahmed Derhum, Head of anti-Terrorism Unit at

National Security Centre, Sana’a, June 2010. Also see ‘Transforming
Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism’
75 Author’s interviews with Colonial Muhammed Ben Break, head of Counter-
terrorism Analysis Team at the Political security Organization, Sana’a, June
2010. Ahmed Derhum, Head of anti-Terrorism Unit at National Security Centre,
and Judge Hattar also confirmed the accuracy of this information. Personal
interviews, Sana’a, June 2010. Also see ‘Transforming Terrorists: Examining
International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism’
 43

prison, mobilised a large number of sympathisers and began

to spread violent ideology. This led to the termination of the
programmeme in 2006.

It is difficult to speak of a professional, comprehensive,

and financially-sustainable counselling and rehabilitation
programme in Yemen. To start with, Yemeni has not been
able to mobilise sufficient numbers of competent and credible
clerics to disrupt the message of the violent extremists; their
numbers were too small to be able to convince hundreds of
detainees to revise their views. Secondly, there was
insufficient dialogue between clerics and detainees.
“Detainees had more conversations and discussions with
each other than they did with official clerics, and it was
this which convinced most imprisoned individuals to
moderate their views and tactics.”76 As Seifert noted, it was
not a programme per se but rather an “attempt” to steer
detainees away from violent extremism by going “through the
motions of… signing up a slip of paper, [and] being granted
their freedom” in return.77

Thirdly, and after 2004, the authorities faced a renewed

Houthi rebellion in the North followed by an increasingly
violent secessionist movement in the South. With meagre
resources, the authorities had to shift whatever limited funds
they had to meet these new challenges, and were no longer
able to continue to finance the de-radicalisation programme.
With high unemployment and poverty rates in the country
and the low qualifications and education of most detained
individuals, the state was able to secure jobs for only a very
limited number of the released prisoners.

Within a short period of time, released former prisoners had

spent the YR 20,000 they received from the state and, since
they failed to find jobs and came from poor families, had no
other sources of income. On the contrary, “most felt that they
had to assist their families. Of those who got married, many
quickly became short of money and marriage and family
became a liability, rather than an asset.”78 Under the
76 Author’s interviews with four former detainees, Sana’a, June 2010
77 ‘Can Jihadis Be Rehabilitated?’
78 Author’s interview with four former detainees and graduates from the Yemeni
Dialogue Committee, Sana’a, June 2010
44

circumstances, many “re-joined al-Qaeda who pays its cadre

around $300 monthly.”79

Finally, external interventions may also have led to recidivism.

For example, after 2006, the Yemeni authorities began to
rely on tribal leaders, especially those co-opted by the state
through official patronage and other largesse, to convince
al-Qaeda members within their tribes to give themselves up
to the state and renounce violence.80 This mechanism found
some success, but was undermined by attacks which were
perceived to be foreign led or foreign inspired. The fact that
these attacks killed civilians made negotiating deals with
violent extremists far more difficult. It also put further pressure
on the unity of Yemeni society, turned Yemeni tribes against
the state, and led disgruntled tribes to provide shelter and
protection to al-Qaeda members.81

79 Author’s interview with Abu Jandal, former bodyguard of Bin Laden’s in

Afghanistan, Sana’a, June 2010
80 A. Oudeh and I. al-Mamari (2010), ‘Amnesty Condemns Presence of US
Cluster Bomb in Yemen’, Yemen Observer, Volume XII, Issue 42, 9 June 2010
81 ‘Amnesty Condemns Presence of US Cluster Bomb in Yemen’
 45

Conclusion:
Some Key Lessons

D
espite the varying approaches to countering violent
extremism in each of the eight Muslim-majority states
in this study, based on the extent of the problem, its
historical roots, and the resources available to deal with it,
there are several general lessons that emerge from studying
their experiences.

First, national consensus behind such policies is vital

for their effectiveness. For example, lack of popular and
political support has denied de-radicalisation efforts in
Jordan the social underpinning that has contributed to their
success in Saudi Arabia. It is also equally important to
maintain such a consensus over time. For example, initial
support for de-radicalisation efforts ebbed away in Yemen,
thus undermining the programme, while in Algeria it has
remained relatively strong.

Second, committed and charismatic leadership is

necessary for counter- and de-radicalisation policies to
succeed. State leaders play an important role in initiating the
change of approach to violent extremism that is necessary to
adopt ‘soft’ policies, provide them with impetus, inject them
with confidence, build trust in their purpose, and so create
and maintain a consensus around them. The experience of
Saudi Arabia after 1995, Algeria after 1997 and Morocco after
1999 all provide examples of this leadership role. Even in the
absence of such leadership at the national level, the support
of the government remains of paramount importance in both
counter-radicalisation (Bangladesh after 2005) and de-
radicalisation efforts (Egypt).

Third, states alone do not have all the tools necessary to

counter violent extremism, while Civil society organisations
have wider reach and more resources. By pursuing de-
radicalisation and counter-radicalisation policies solely at the
46

state level, however extensive they may be, governments

may miss identifying and reaching the groups and individuals
who are of most concern. The engagement of society more
broadly is likely to provide new ideas and reinforce the action
of the state through the empowerment of local communities
and associations that are directly in touch with vulnerable
individuals and groups. For example, it is unlikely that a purely
state-run programme could ever identify and influence the
tight-knit groups of Moroccan youth from the country’s large
under-privileged areas that have been responsible not just for
the attacks in Morocco in 2003 and 2007, but also in Madrid
in 2004.

Fourth, It is not enough simply to imprison violent extremists

and then isolate them from each other and/or the rest of the
prison population. Without a professional, comprehensive and
financially sustainable de-radicaisation programme, supported
by consciously designed prison policy, as exists in Malaysia,
radicals are not only likely to harden their views, but to also
persuade other prisoners to adopt them, as has happened
in the past in Jordan.

Fifth, de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes

inevitably work most effectively where the Government makes
some attempt to improve the overall environment in which
society operates. Countries with strong developmental
capacity (those able to manage sustainable high growth rates,
and check corruption and inequity), are less vulnerable to the
threat of persistent violent extremism than those that lack
governance. For example, in Malaysia the authorities saw
improving the socio-economic conditions of the population
as a vital way to remove sources of discontent, which could
be exploited by the insurgents.

Sixth, it is highly unlikely that relying on religious dialogue

and counselling alone will terminate violent extremism.
Programmes should not ignore other, non-ideological, social,
economic and political factors, which may also contribute
to radicalisation. Equally, in an increasingly globalised world,
national counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts
cannot be studied and evaluated in isolation from external
factors. Incidents that play to the violent extremist narrative
 47

of ‘them and us’, exacerbated by events in Iraq, Afghanistan

and the Palestinian territories, are bound to occur. It is
for the global community to ensure the immediate and
unconditional condemnation of all abuses of human rights
and of any attempt to stir up hatred between peoples, as
well as to encourage and allow an appropriate popular
response.

Finally, there is no single recipe for success. Counter-

radicalisation and de-radicalisation programs must be
consistent with and derive from each country’s mores,
culture, rules and regulations, and take account of what
is acceptable and not acceptable in their societies. For
example, the Saudi de-radicalisation programme would be
difficult to implement elsewhere, not only because of its
resource-intensive nature, but also because of the unique
structure of the society and the abundance of competent
and credible clerics and scholars. Developing soft
programmes to counter violent extremism that are
consistent with and derived from the ‘cultural tool kit’ of
their society will be the main challenge facing countries
threatened by the phenomenon and seeking to develop
such policies.
About ICSR
ICSR is a unique partnership of
King’s College London, the University
of Pennsylvania, the Interdisciplinary
Center Herzliya (Israel) and the
Regional Center for Conflict Prevention
at the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy.
Its aim and mission is to bring together
knowledge and leadership to counter
the growth of radicalisation and
political violence. For more information,
see www.icsr.info

www.icsr.info